35/GS/S

The Society

India

September 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

WARNING

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

(U/OU) . . Unclassified/For Official Use Only
(C) . . . . . . Confidential
(S) . . . . . . Secret

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by April 1973.

INDIA

CONTENTS

This chapter supersedes the sociological coverage in the General Survey dated February 1970

FIGURES

The Society

A. Introduction

Every sixth person in the world is an Indian. India, whose people have had a continuous civilization for some 5,000 years, is one of the most complex of national societies. Its population, the second largest in the world (numbering at least 578 million in mid-1973), increases by about 2.5% per year and includes a multiplicity of ethnolinguistic groups. All the major world religions and many smaller sets have significant numbers of adherents among the citizenry. In social development, the people range from primitive tribesmen to sophisticated, Western-oriented business and professional men.

To communicate with the various groups, the Indian Government must use more than a dozen official and semiofficial languages (of which few are mutually intelligible), and it deals informally in scores of additional languages and dialects. Its task of administration has been fraught with major difficulties, complicated by the fact that some ethnic and religious groups have sought to advance their own causes through antigovernmental political movements. Urban areas connected to the outside world by modern communications and trade differ materially in their social structure from isolated villages in the rural areas. Divisive forces, therefore, are strong in Indian politics. Regionalism is an outstanding feature of the society, and most Indians are loyal first to their caste, clan, or tribe, next to their cultural or linguistic area, and only afterward to the nation as a whole.

A number of basic stabilizing and unifying threads run through the social structure, however, cutting across regional lines and helping to create a sense of nationhood. Of these, the most important is Hinduism, the early forms of which were introduced

NOTE—The entire contents of this chapter is UNCLASSIFIED but is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

into India about 1500 to 1200 B.C. by Indo-Aryan invaders from Central Asia. Hinduism persisted and grew through centuries of Muslim and British rule, primarily because of its remarkable ability to absorb a wide variety of philosophies and religious practices.

The rigid caste system, which evolved from the class structure introduced by the Indo-Aryans in antiquity, is another stabilizing factor. Membership in a caste is normally determined by birth, and caste generally governs not only religious rites and duties but also social status and often occupation. Marriage is within the caste but often outside the family, clan, and village, a situation which has resulted in the development of extensive intervillage ties and an effective network of word-of-mouth communication.

The extended family system is widespread, and it also provides social and economic stability. Consisting of men closely related through the male line, their wives, and their children, the extended family frequently totals 20 to 30 persons living in close proximity. Members contribute to joint family property and call upon family supplies, resources, or support as necessary.

The persistence of Hinduism, as well as of caste and the extended family, has been aided throughout the centuries by the fact that the agricultural population of India has lived in relatively isolated and self-sufficient villages, more or less unchanged by the wars and invasions conducted by the ruling classes. As a result, the Indian villager generally is steeped in the traditionalism and conservatism characteristic of peasants. Although in many areas improved education and communications are gradually ushering in new ideas and methods, resistance to change persists.

The British during the 19th century introduced another series of stabilizing and unifying factors in territories directly administered by them. These included a common system of administration and law,

1

a single official language, a nationwide railroad system, and the beginnings of modern industry. Other developments tending toward unification have been stimulated mainly by the Indians themselves. Among these was the movement for independence from British rule, launched in earnest about 1920 and completed in 1947. This effort, led by the Indian National Congress (known more commonly as the Congress Party, or Congress) not only united the Indian people in a manner not previously experienced but also gave such strong support to the newly independent government under Prime Minister Nehru that it was able to run on the momentum of the independence struggle for more than a decade thereafter.

Increased mobility in the postindependence period has also helped to create a sense of unity, though not necessarily of stability. Improvement of roads and automotive transport, the creation of two government-owned airlines, and the rapid growth of the bicycle industry have all helped Indians to learn about their own country. So have the expansion of government payrolls and programs and also government training policies, which place together persons from different areas, backgrounds, and classes. Indians have been traveling abroad in large numbers, and growing literacy, abetted by press, radio, and film media, has made them more aware than previously of local and foreign developments. In this situation, the recent war with Pakistan and the diplomatic and military threats posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) have tended to unify the people in the interests of national defense.

Since 1947 the interaction and cohesive and divisive forces in Indian society has been influenced by political and economic circumstances, making national unity and tranquillity difficult to achieve. The central government has attempted to emphasize unifying elements—a common cultural heritage, common defense problems, and an urgent need for economic development. Its efforts at modernization, however, have begun to erode patterns of traditional social organization and thought, which in the past have acted as strong stabilizing factors. At the same time the resistance of well-established regional forces has hindered the movement toward national unity. Continuing troubled relations with Pakistan have contributed to occasional friction between Hindu and Muslim religious groups.

Rising popular expectations resulting from independence and the presumption that freedom would bring immediate improvement in the standard of living have been frustrated by the rapid growth of the population and the sluggish growth of the economy. Directly or indirectly, population pressure has lowered real wages, diminished the per capita availability of food supplies, slowed per capita economic advancement, created growing unemployment problems, and provided opportunities for subversive groups to capitalize on unsettled conditions. Problems also arise from the rapid growth of urban populations that is attendant upon industrial progress (Figure 1). Persons migrating to the cities in search of work often find it difficult to adjust to an urban environment. The degree of security provided by village and extended family relationships is

FIGURE 1. A street scene in Delhi

2

reduced, and the new city dweller finds himself more affected than before by fluctuations in price and employment levels. The increasing heterogeneity of the urban population is also promoting social mobility, occasionally permitting a man to claim membership in a social group higher than his inherited caste level.

To achieve full national unity, the government is trying to expand its social and economic development programs into all parts of the country with maximum possible speed. To succeed in this, it must train persons to carry out these programs and educate a largely unskilled and illiterate populace to understand what must be done. Funds for this task are limited, and since 1962 increased defense expenditures have complicated the problem of allocations. Many areas of Indian public and private life are today characterized by a wide gap between goals and performance and between official statistics and reality.

B. Structure and characteristics of the society

Indians are generally categorized according to differences in religion, caste, and language and to some extent—in the case of the tribespeople, for instance—in racial background. The great majority of the population embrace Hinduism. However, some 61 million Muslims make up a significant minority. The 14 most commonly spoken local languages and the hundreds of minor languages and dialects cut across religious lines, fragmenting even the majority Hindu community into regional groups which speak mutually unintelligible languages. The physical types found in India are so mixed that an individual's ethnic affiliations cannot be determined by appearance alone. Shadings of physical difference can be significant in the social hierarchy of a given region, however, since taller, lighter skinned people generally consider themselves superior to those of shorter stature and darker coloration.

1. Religiously based societies

a. The Hindus

The most important social grouping—83.5% of the population (more than 453 million people in 1971)—is that of the Hindus, who are organized under an intricate and stratified social system into a multitude of castes and subcastes. The Hindu religion provides a feeling of religious identification, yet the rigid caste system divides the people into special interest groups jealous of their particular functions and fearful of outsiders. Authorities differ on the exact criteria separating one caste or subcaste from another, but in general each caste consists of persons who were born into and marry within it, perform similar religious practices, observe the same customs regarding association with members of other castes, and share the social status assigned to the caste as a whole. Each caste normally has a traditional occupation (e.g., carpenter, weaver, blacksmith), but in many castes a large number of members pursue different lines of work.

The origins of individual castes are obscure. In theory, at least, the system is modeled on the hierarchy of social classes introduced between 1500 and 1200 B.C.—along with Hinduism itself—by Aryan invaders from Central Asia. According to the Brahmanical composers of the sacred Vedic scriptures (1500 to 600 B.C.), the society was ideally stratified into four occupational levels, or varna. These levels were the priestly Brahmans (who had the highest social status), the warrior Kshatriyas (from whom rulers were drawn), the trader Vaisyas (a middle class), and the lower class Sudras (artisans, servants, farm laborers, etc.). The most menial workers—those doing fieldwork, hard labor, or performing services, such as trash collecting, deemed to be degrading or defiling— were outside the social system entirely and considered "untouchable."

Although the present caste system superficially resembles the Vedic model, it has been subject to extensive alteration over the centuries and is now far more complex than that described in the Vedas. There are strong disagreements as to which of the more than 3,000 castes or subcastes belong to which varna, and it is not unusual for certain castes to aspire to a higher position in the social scale than neighboring caste groups are willing to concede. Untouchables have for all practical purposes developed into separate castes at the bottom of the caste hierarchy and, although untouchability was officially abolished by the 1950 national constitution, serious discrimination persists.

In India, Backward Classes—which are about 30% of the population—constitute a general category of people who for the most part are officially listed and given special recognition for a variety of reasons. In the Indian context, backwardness has a number of distinctive features in addition to economic or educational deprivation or low social status. It is viewed as an attribute not of individuals but of clearly defined social segments of the population in which membership is decided by birth. Backward Classes could—and in fact in some instances do—include individuals who are highly advanced both economically and educationally. Additionally, as a member of the Backward Classes one is entitled to certain advantages and concessions specifically conferred by the government.

3

Scheduled Castes (about one-seventh of the population), Scheduled Tribes (one-sixteenth of the population) and Other Backward Classes (about one-seventh of the population) are the three broad divisions which comprise India's Backward Classes. Confusion often arises over misapplication of terms, even in India, with Backward Classes or Scheduled Classes in some instances being used to denote the listed Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and at other times having a somewhat broader application. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are loosely defined in the Indian constitution. A Scheduled Caste is "any caste, race or tribe" specified as such by the President by public notification; Scheduled Castes have generally been known in popular parlance as "depressed classes," "untouchables," or "*harijans.*" A Scheduled Tribe is any tribe specified as such by the President by public notification. Lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are drawn up by the central government and can only be revised by presidential authority. A Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes looks into the affairs of these communities on a continuing basis. The grouping "Other Backward Classes" is a more nebulous category and is mentioned only in the most general terms in the Indian constitution. "Other Backward Classes" have not been enumerated in the census, and a commission which sought to define their position in more specific terms could not come to any agreed conclusions. State governments have, in general, been allowed to use their own criteria in drawing up lists of the Other Backward Classes in order to promote their education and welfare.

The caste system is looser in northern India, where the invading Indo-Aryans first settled, than in the south, where conqueror-conquered relationships led to the formation of more complicated and more strictly observed caste lines. Nevertheless, throughout India the caste system stresses the group rather than the individual and values conformity to established custom as opposed to individual innovation.

In urban areas, where economic necessity and the requirements of modern life are altering the caste system, many educated Indians are in a state of spiritual conflict. They wish to adopt modern ideas and practices but are influenced by tradition. These persons have little difficulty giving up some of the taboos regarding traditional occupations, eating habits, or association with other castes, but they still pay heed to caste restrictions in marriage and social obligations.

In the rural areas, where more than 80% of the population lives, modernization has had less impact on intercaste relationships. Over the years the dominant caste, usually composed of landowners, has consistently hired members of a specific lower caste as farm laborers and looked to certain other castes for other services. The obligations involved in this relationship extend in both directions: the laborer, servant, or artisan feels he must provide his special services for the traditional patron, while the patron is obliged to deal with and support these individuals regardless of economic exigencies or the quality of service. Less influential castes have similar mutual arrangements.

These relationships are changing gradually, however, as more lower caste members become literate and their desire for greater economic independence and occupational diversity increases. In some areas government limitations on the size of landholdings have reduced the dominant caste's capacity for employing agricultural labor and have given previously landless peasants a chance to acquire real property. With the improvement of local transportation facilities, artisans and persons in service trades have tended to drift to small towns, where they serve clients in several surrounding villages. Discrimination against Untouchables, who prior to 1950 were prohibited from drinking at wells and visiting temples used by caste Hindus, still exists but is practiced mainly in rural areas. Fundamental changes in village life are slow in coming, and customary relationships for the most part continue to govern rural life.

Caste plays a strong role in local politics. After India's achievement of independence in 1947, the ballot box and public office became important routes for upgrading the social status of numerically dominant castes or of coalitions of smaller castes. The major political parties have been alive to the advantages and pitfalls of caste politics. In many areas they have attempted to preserve political and social stability by arranging an appropriate caste balance in their election slates.

b. The Muslims

India's 61 million Muslims form the second largest religious community in the country, constituting a little under 11% of the population. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has a Muslim majority of almost 70%, and Muslims are also prominent in parts of Kerala, Manipur, Punjab, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Assam, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar[1] (Figure 2). Although there are

[1] For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

4

LANGUAGE

- Indo-Aryan
- Dravidian
- Tibeto-Burman

GÁRO Language or dialect

MINORITY RELIGION*

4% Estimated percent of state or union territory population professing Islam

C Christianity
B Buddhism
S Sikhism
J Jainism

*Hinduism, found throughout India as the majority religion (over 80% of the population), is not shown

— State or union territory boundary

501863 7-73

FIGURE 2. Languages and minority religions (based on 1971 census data)

5

some heavy concentrations of Muslims, very few local communities are exclusively Muslim. Most Muslims are descendants of earlier converts from Hinduism and continue to live in their ancestral towns or villages in a cooperative relationship with members of other religious communities. Quarrels occasionally arise between local Hindus and Muslims over religious issues, however, and intercommunal bloodshed sometimes follows. Communal rioting is more prevalent in areas having a relatively large Muslim population.

The Muslims' social and economic life differs little from that of their neighbors. Their dress and appearance is normally similar to that of the local Hindus, although some variations in attire occur. Among conservative groups, many women wear the covering garment called the *burqa*. Most Muslims speak the language of their native region, but some of the better educated and more urbanized have adopted Urdu, a Persianized form of Hindustani—a legacy of the Muslim Moghul Empire—as their major tongue.

Islam regards all believers as equal before God, and Muslim society is therefore theoretically free of caste distinctions. This has been a persuasive factor over the centuries in the conversion of low caste or Untouchable Hindus. In practice, however, a caste system of sorts has carried over into the Muslim community, as well as into the Christian and Sikh minority groups. Class distinctions among the Muslims are usually based on the caste levels of the original converts, but traditional occupations and wealth also affect the class structure. Relationships between Muslims and Hindus at the village level are often governed by rules similar to those applying to Hindu intercaste relationships. Muslim class restrictions, however, are not so rigid as those of the Hindus, although marriages between Muslims of different classes, even though not proscribed by religion, are infrequent.

c. Other religious groups

Christians of various sects and ethnic origins numbered 14 million in 1971 and comprised about 2.6% of the population; they therefore constituted India's third largest religious group. The southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh together account for more than 60% of India's Christians. Conversions to Christianity have occurred sporadically over the past 2,000 years in areas determined largely by historical accident. The oldest of the several groups of Indian Christians is located in Kerala State. Variously known as "Christians of St. Thomas," "Malabar Christians," or "Syrian Christians," these people trace their conversion back to the arrival of the Apostle Thomas in Malabar in A.D. 52. They were originally high-caste Hindus and remain economically and politically important in Kerala. A second and far larger group of Christian conversions dates from the work of the Portuguese missionaries in the 16th century and from other European and American Protestant missionary activity which began in earnest in the 19th century. Most of the converts were of low social status, many of them Untouchables. Missionaries were also active among the tribal peoples of central india and the hills of northeastern India.

Over 100,000 Christians are Eurasians, often called Anglo-Indians, who are descendants of mixed European-Indian parents. Anglo-Indians are primarily urban dwellers. They were not accepted as social equals by either the British or the Hindus in preindependence India and had difficulty attaining positions of influence. Their special occupational preserve was the Indian railroad system, where they worked in mechanical and lower grade administrative capacities. There is now little overt discrimination against the Anglo-Indians, although Hindu bitterness over their opposition to Indian independence persists. Despite these obstacles, some Anglo-Indians have attained prominence in various fields. In varying degrees Christian converts have maintained many of their traditional customs and occupations. On the whole, however, their social restrictions, particularly those concerning intermarriage, are less rigid than those of Hindus or Muslims. There are no taboos concerning persons with whom they may eat.

The Sikh religious minority group, with some 10 million adherents or about 2% of the population, is concentrated in the Punjab region of northwestern India, but members are found throughout India. The approximately 8 million Sikhs who live in Punjab make up about 60% of the population of that state. Most of the remaining Sikhs are found in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. The Sikhs are a monotheistic, nonascetic, and theoretically casteless group which has drawn most of its converts from Hindu agriculturalists and landowners belonging to the relatively high Jat and Khatri castes. Low-caste Hindus were converted later, and many of the Hindu caste restrictions—particularly those relating to intermarriage—still persist in practice among the Sikhs. The Sikhs are relatively more receptive to, and adept in the use of, modern mechanical devices than most Hindu groups. They are sturdy, industrious, and

6

place a high value on good physical condition. Proportionally more Sikhs than any other religious group enter the Indian military services.

Some Hindu Untouchables have, over the years, seized upon Buddhism as an escape route from an uncongenial Hindu social system, and in 1971 Buddhists numbered 3.8 million, most of whom lived in the western State of Maharashtra, home of the late influential Untouchable leader B. R. Ambedkar, who was converted to Buddhism. The great majority of the converts are only nominally Buddhists. They continue to observe Hindu practices and to occupy an extremely low positi n on the social scale.

In contrast, two other small religious minorities, the Jains and the Parsis, have assumed an importance in the economic and political life of the country far out of proportion to their numbers. The Jains, numbering almost 3 million, are concentrated in the western States of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rasjasthan and in the western portions of Madhya Pradesh. Most live within 400 miles of Bombay city, where members of their community have become extremely successful businessmen and moneylenders. The probity of the Jains has won them the respect of the Hindu majority, freeing them from the discrimination suffered by a number of other religious minorities. They were one of the first groups to seek Western education.

About 200,000 Parsis reside primarily in western India, most of them in Bombay. They are descendants of Zoroastrians—worshippers of fire and the sun—who ruled Persia for centuries and fled to India in the seventh and eighth centuries before the proselytizing Muslim conquerors. Having originally settled in Gujarat, many subsequently moved to Bombay to take advantage of the commercial opportunities created by the British in the 17th century. Western commercial contacts and English education enabled them to become the most cosmopolitan and eventually the wealthiest community in the subcontinent. Over the centuries the Parsis have judiciously maintained their separate identity through strict religious practices and through marrying within the group. Their numbers are gradually shrinking, however, as a result of inbreeding and limitations on membership. Inbreeding has reportedly resulted in a sharp rise of childless marriages, and, according to Parsi figures, 50% of the population never marries. The Parsi birth rate has been estimated at about 12 per 1,000, which is about 2 per 1,000 less than the reported Parsi death rate. An increasing number of Parsi women, who outnumber the men, are marrying outside the community and their children are not regarded as Parsi. Moreover, no conversions to Zoroastrianism are permitted.

d. The tribes

The 1971 census reported some 38 million members of Scheduled Tribes, groups which because of their economic backwardness and their remoteness from the country's socioeconomic mainstream have been singled out under the national constitution for special treatment in the fields of education, welfare, and government representation (Figure 3). The tribes are distributed throughout India but are concentrated in three zones of settlement. The largest cluster is in a belt running across central India from the Gulf of Khambhat (formerly the Gulf of Cambay) to West Bengal and Orissa. These aboriginal tribes speak primarily Austro-Asiatic or Dravidian dialects. A smaller concentration of Mongoloid tribes inhabits the hilly areas of Assam. The third and by far the smallest zone of tribal settlement is in the southern part of the peninsula in the mountains parallel to the western coast. Some of the tribes have adopted primitive forms of Hinduism, while others have converted to Christianity. Many, however, are strongly animistic.

FIGURE 3. A Palibo tribesman from Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North East Frontier Agency

7

Cultural variations are wide, but as a rule tribes adhere to communal economic patterns based on hunting and primitive agriculture.

2. Language

India's language problem is one of the most complex in the world. Waves of peoples and cultures have swept over the subcontinent, leaving a legacy of linguistic diversity which today is both a strong barrier to the development of national consciousness and a source of chronic friction within some of the 21 states—reorganized largely along linguistic lines in 1956—between states, and between the states and the central government in New Delhi. The problem is greatly intensified by the tendency of major language groups to regard themselves as cultural entities. Large sections of the population identify strongly with their particular language and take fierce and partisan pride in it. Whenever language has becom a emotional public issue, agitation and violence .. followed. During the 1950's, linguistic pric nd regional separatism frequently combined to provoke tension, sporadic rioting, and occasionally a complete breakdown of law and order. Despite its reluctance to do so, the central government's 1956 reorganization of the states largely along linguistic lines was an effort to end such agitation.

Geographically, the sharpest linguistic division is between northern, and eastern central India, where Indo-European languages, introduced by the Aryans between 1500 and 1200 B.C. predominate, and the south, where the predominant languages belong to the totally different Dravidian group (Figure 2). Within these broad categories, however, are more than a dozen mutually unintelligible languages, each with its own distinctive script. Hundreds of dialectal variants, as well as a number of minor, unrelated languages, further complicate the problem of communication. Tibeto-Burman languages are spoken in hundreds of separate dialects in eastern Kashmir, the central Himalayas, and the hills of northeastern India, where the inhabitants have racial and cultural affinities with the peoples of Tibet and Burma. Munda and Mon-Khmer languages, related to Southeast Asian tongues, are spoken by primitive tribes in Bihar and Orissa in eastern India.

Among the primary language group, the Indo-European, Hindi is the most widely spoken language and is used mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. About 30% of the country's population claim Hindi as a primary tongue, while an additional 12% speak the closely related Indo-European languages of Urdu, Punjabi, and Rajasthani. Urdu is a Persianized form of Hindi developed by the Muslim rulers of the Moghul Empire. In very simple spoken form, Hindi and Urdu are mutually intelligible. In their more sophisticated literary forms, the two languages are distinct, with little in common except the grammar and basic vocabulary. Written Urdu uses a Perso-Arabic script, while Hindi is written in the Devanagari script derived from Sanskrit, the classical literary language of Hinduism, and designated by the constitution as official. Rajasthani, a collection of the dialects of former Rajput princely states, has little literature except in the Marwari dialect of Rajasthan. The use of Punjabi has special political and emotional overtones because of its status as the language of the Sikh religious community, most of which is concentrated in the Punjab. The Sikhs write Punjabi in the distinctive Gurmukhi script. Hindus living in the same region frequently use the Devanagari script and, fearing Sikh domination, sometimes claim to be Hindi speakers. Punjabi is also written in Persian script by some Muslims.

The government is directed by the constitution to encourage both the dissemination of Hindi and its growth through the adoption of a modern vocabulary. In carrying out this edict, the government has drawn heavily on Sanskrit root words and thus is promoting a more "Sanskritized" version of the language than is used in common speech. Although an increasing number of non-Hindi speakers, primarily in the north, are learning the language, the 1961 census indicated that more people (11 million) listed English as their second language than Hindi (9.4 million).

During the long colonial period, English became the link language for communication between people living in different areas of the country, although use of English was largely limited to the Western-influenced upper levels of the society. From the mid-19th century onward, English was the working language of a growing native corps of Indian civil servants. It became the language of government, commerce, and the universities. English contributed to the growing sense of solidarity among the political and intellectual elite who spearheaded the independence movement. Now spoken by from 2% to 3% of the population, English remains the most important language for government and for business activity conducted on a countrywide scale. It is subject, however, to almost constant attack by non-English speakers, especially in the backward Hindi-speaking areas of the north.

One of the major language issues is the extent to which English should supplement Hindi as a working language of the central government, and, indeed,

8

whether Hindi should remain India's sole official language. This "official language" issue has often led to widespread unrest as competing groups have attempted to advance the interests of their own native tongues. The official language question was one of the most bitterly controversial issues dealt with by the drafters of the Indian constitution. To most of the constituent assembly it seemed incompatible with the country's newly won sovereignty to uphold the paramount status of English, the foreign tongue of the former colonial regime. Yet, despite strong pressures from the Hindi-speaking north, English was retained as the official working language of the British-trained bureaucracy, in part because any native language would have been "foreign" to most of the population.

Unable to solve this basic problem, the framers of the constitution temporized with a compromise provision. "Hindi in the Devanagari script" became the "official language of the Union," but English would continue to be used for 15 years (until January 1965) for "all official purposes" in which it was employed prior to 1950. Parliament was empowered, however, to prolong the use of English beyond 1965.

This compromise solution dissatisfied many among both the Hindi- and non-Hindi-speaking peoples. Language, particularly as it affects the recruitment, promotions, and functioning of the central government's civil services, has been a key issue in Indian politics ever since. A basic north-south clash of interests has arisen from the fact that during British rule non-Hindi-speaking south Indians acquired a dominant position within the English-speaking bureaucracy. Many northerners who champion the cause of Hindi do so in an attempt to offset this imbalance and to give Hindi speakers an advantage. This north-south regional rivalry is exacerbated by the fact that Hindi-speaking India is an area of low literacy, low urbanization, and low industrialization. Thus, implicit in the continuing struggle over the official language is the fear of the more developed states like Tamil Nadu that if Hindi speakers should gain a preponderant share of the government posts, the Hindi-speaking states would win an irrevocable advantage in the distribution of the central government's scarce resources.

In 1959 Prime Minister Nehru indefinitely extended the deadline for the switchover from English to Hindi, and subsequently the central government made various pronouncements calculated to reassure the non-Hindi speakers that they would not suffer discrimination. As a final move to head off the impending storm, Parliament in 1963 passed the Official Language Act, specifying that English "may"

continue to be used for virtually all official central government purposes for an indefinite time after the expiration of the 15-year grace period.

Despite these efforts, violent protests broke out in south India with Hindi's constitutional coming of age in 1965. The south Indians—especially the proud and volatile Tamils of Tamil Nadu State (then called Madras)—combined their traditional distrust of northerners with a belief that the Official Language Act would reduce the disproportionately high number of positions they—as English-speakers—held in the central civil services. They branded Hindi an instrument of north Indian "imperialism" and called for a constitutional amendment insuring the continued use of English as the link language for all India. Mob violence ravaged much of Tamil Nadu and broke out in other non-Hindi areas. The disturbances were calmed only when Prime Minister Shastri and his colleagues in the ruling Congress Party high command publicly committed themselves to strengthening the 1963 legislation.

In late 1967 Shastri's successor, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, attempted to make good his pledge, but the uproar by both the pro- and anti-Hindi elements forced her to make concessions that satisfied few. A highly controversial amendment to the 1963 Official Language Act and an accompanying language resolution were rammed through Parliament amidst anguished cries from the opposition and mounting popular agitation across northern India. What was originally intended as a giant step toward a final compromise solution of the official language issue fell short of that objective and left unresolved many of the problems that had provoked language disorders in the past.

The 1967 amendment requires the central government to use both Hindi and English "until the legislatures of the non-Hindi-speaking states decide otherwise." Within the central government this legislation requires the translation of all documents into English until the non-Hindi-speaking civil servants "have acquired a working knowledge of Hindi." Parliament added several amendments to the original draft that underscore the commitment to bilingualism. English, for example, is obligatory in correspondence between New Delhi and the non-Hindi states, and English translations are required in communications from a Hindi-speaking state to a non-Hindi-speaking state.

The legislative provisions were generally accepted by non-Hindi-speaking Indians, who had largely abandoned their earlier demand that the constitution itself be amended. The northern pro-Hindi forces,

9

however, led by the Hindu nationalist *Jana Sangh* (Indian People's Party) and the increasingly militant Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), reacted vehemently. Offering parliamentary resistance at every stage and inciting violent public protest demonstrations in major north Indian cities, the Hindi advocates were finally able to undermine the thrust of the new legislation through substantial modification of a government language policy resolution that was introduced in Parliament along with the language bill. The most important change in this resolution was a provision that either English or Hindi should be compulsory for recruitment into the civil services, except for posts requiring "a high standard of English alone or Hindi alone." This introduced for the first time the principle that a job applicant knowing only Hindi might be appointed to a competitive position in the all-India civil services.

Many non-Hindi speakers view the policy resolution as being highly discriminatory, since the minority of Hindi speakers will be taking competitive examinations in their native tongues, while everyone else has to use a foreign language, i.e., Hindi or English. To help ease the burden, the policy resolution also recommends that the schools teach three languages—English, Hindi, and the regional tongue—or in Hindi areas, another Indian language. This has not satisfied the southerners, who are skeptical that the three-language formula will ever be applied in the north. Serious riots broke out in the south—especially in Tamil Nadu—when the legislation and policy resolution were passed in Parliament.

The basic causes behind the language agitation of 1965 and 1967-68 are still present. Underlying the north's espousal of pro-Hindi themes is the general backwardness of the heavily populated Hindi heartland. Expectations for a better future are apparently increasing, however, as more young people than ever before embark on higher education with the hope of securing better paying jobs. Yet even when the medium of instruction is English, the bulk of the graduates do not really acquire a useful knowledge of the language, and this severely limits their chances for the employment they seek. Consequently, the growing student population provides a tempting target for those who would exploit the language issue for personal or political reasons. Caste rivalries add another dimension to the pro-Hindi movement. Members of poor but rising castes, whose sons attend inadequate schools, resent the ability of the traditionally more prosperous castes to monopolize the few good English-medium institutions.

After two decades of periodic language agitation, many south Indians have come to believe that the south and other non-Hindi-speaking areas can expect only incomprehension, condescension, or fanatical intolerance from the Hindi north. The Gandhi government's willingness to give way to some pro-Hindi pressures has fostered the impression that New Delhi's word cannot be trusted on the language issue. This continuing legacy of distrust may prove to be a formidable barrier to further language compromises.

The constitution specifically recognizes 15 regional languages: Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. This does not in itself confer official status on the languages, but they may be used in dealings with the central government and many have been adopted by one or more state governments as their official administrative language. Only in Nagaland is English the official state language. The 1961 census figures indicated that 383.8 million persons (87.4% of the population) were native speakers of one of the 15 designated languages and that there were several other major languages and dialects (Figures 2 and 4). Ever since regionalist pressures compelled the government to redraw state boundaries in 1956, the areas in which the major languages are spoken (with the exception of Hindi and Urdu) have been roughly conterminous with state boundaries. Because cultural areas tend to coincide with linguistic areas, the creation of linguistic states has reinforced regionalist sentiment at some cost to national unity.

In addition to the 15 constitutionally recognized Indian languages, there were, in 1961, some 35 other Indian languages, each spoken by 100,000 or more persons. These languages, many of them tribal, are the native languages of approximately 12% of the population. The remainder—less than 1%—of the population spoke 673 other Indian languages or ungrouped dialects and 103 non-Indian tongues—excluding the numerous dialects of the sparsely populated Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency).

Hindus in India speak mainly Hindi, Rajasthani, Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya, Bengali, Assamese, and the four Dravidian languages—Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam. Muslims speak primarily Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, and Kashmiri. Many of the Christians know English in addition to their native tongue because of missionary contacts. Indians living overseas, especially in Sri Lanka, Burma, Malaysia, South Africa, Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana, the United Kingdom, Fiji, Kenya, and Singapore, have carried Indian languages to those areas.

10

FIGURE 4. Major languages

MAJOR LANGUAGE	MILLIONS OF PERSONS SPEAKING— 1961	PERCENT OF POPULATION SPEAKING	LOCALE
Indo-European:			
Hindi*.....................	133.4	30.4	Main plain of Ganges and Yamuna rivers. Language of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Rajasthan States.
Urdu*.................	23.3	5.3	Northwestern India. Also spoken by Muslims in some southern districts. Language of Jammu and Kashmir State.
Punjabi*...................	11.0	2.5	Plains of northwestern India adjoining Pakistan. Language of the Punjab.
Kashmiri*..................	2.0	0.4	The Vale area of western Jammu and Kashmir.
Rajasthani.................	14.9	3.4	The present State of Rajasthan in western India. Sometimes considered merely a grouping of separate but similar Hindi-related dialects.
Western Pahari, Kumauni, and Garhwali.	2.9	0.6	Southern Himalayan slopes from Pakistan to Nepal, including the union territory of Himachal Pradesh. Speakers of these dialects accept Hindi as their written language.
Gujarati*..................	20.3	4.6	Coastal area of northwestern India centering on the Kathiawar peninsula. Language of Gujarat State.
Sindhi*....................	1.4	0.3	Northwestern Gujarat and western Rajasthan.
Marathi*..................	33.3	7.6	Northwestern section of Deccan plateau and west-central coast of India. Language of Maharashtra State.
Bihari.....................	16.8	3.8	Eastern Gangetic Plain adjacent to West Bengal.
Bengali*..................	33.9	7.7	Delta area of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. Language of West Bengal State.
Assamese*.................	6.8	1.5	Brahmaputra valley and adjacent slopes. Official language of Assam State.
Oriya*....................	15.7	3.6	Northeastern Deccan and Mahanadi delta area. Language of Orissa State.
Dravidian languages:			
Kannada*.................	17.4	4.0	Southwestern region of the Deccan plateau and part of the west coast south of Maharashtra. Language of Mysore State.
Telugu*...................	37.7	8.6	Eastern Deccan and adjoining coastal areas between States of Orissa and Tamil Nadu. Language of Andhra Pradesh.
Tamil*....................	30.6	7.0	Southeastern coast and southern tip of the Deccan area. Language of Tamil Nadu State.
Malayalam*...............	17.0	3.9	Southwestern coast and southern tip of the Deccan area. Language of Kerala State.

*Regional languages listed in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Sanskrit, not included above is essentially a dead language. It was listed in 1961 as the "mother tongue" of only 2,544 persons.

Language is not usually a significant social barrier locally, since in a given area all castes generally speak the same tongue. The diversity of languages and dialects, however, requires a heavy expenditure of time and funds by national and state governments in preparing publications for dissemination down to the village level. Moreover, the use of English over the past two centuries for most administrative, scholarly and scientific purposes has inhibited the development of Indian languages into effective vehicles for modern communication in those fields. Several state governments still find it necessary to retain English for some administrative purposes despite the formal adoption of a regional tongue as their official state language.

3. Individual and group relationships

With all its ethnic and cultural diversity, India is nevertheless overwhelmingly a Hindu country. Hindu patterns of living, including village organization and even religious attitudes, are reflected in the life patterns of non-Hindu groups. This is largely due to the fact that most members of minority religions are descendants of converts from Hinduism. Moreover, Hinduism as a social system has shown an enormous capacity for absorbing and accommodating itself to outside influences without altering its essential structure. However, while religious affiliation has an important bearing on an individual's outlook and rules of behavior, many significant differences in

11

living patterns result from environment and historical accident rather than religious ties.

The classic form of the family is the patrilineal extended family. In practice, however, large extended families of the classical mold living in a single household are not common. Economic pressures, together with the gradual spread of urbanization, have reduced households to little more than 5 to 10 persons each. The intact extended household is more characteristic of rural, lower caste, orthodox Hindu families than of the upper class, urban, Westernized Indians.

The extended family has been preserved to a greater degree as an economic unit than as a residential arrangement. Food and household property are often held in common, and productive capacity, whether in the form of farm labor, salaried employment, or the fabrication of handicrafts, is geared to the benefit of the family as a whole. Family-centered religious rites are of great importance for the general welfare of the family itself and at certain times in the life of the individual (Figure 5).

The Muslim family structure is similar to that of the Hindus, except that it is not based on the idea of a joint estate to be maintained for the common needs of the family. Important exceptions to the joint family pattern are also found among the tribal and semiaboriginal groups and a few Hindu castes of the south coast and the far north.

The Hindu family is organized on the principle of descent and inheritance through the male line (with the rare exception of certain matrilineal castes of the

FIGURE 5. A Hindu family worship at their family shrine

south). It is headed by the senior couple—with the wife of the oldest male acting in many respects as a second in command—and consists also of their sons with their wives and children, any unmarried daughters, and other close relatives of the senior male who are unable to fend for themselves outside the family. The senior male is responsible for the welfare of all family members. Despite the theoretically authoritarian nature of the household, however, important decisions are generally taken only after the views of all adult family members are solicited and considered by the head of the household.

Villages of a region are often bound together by an intricate network of tradition-dictated kinship and marital ties. Kin groups almost always consist of persons of the same caste and from the same linguistic and geographic area, although a few castes in various parts of the country choose wives for their sons from daughters of a specific lower caste. Members of a common kin group or clan support each other in disputes and cooperate economically. Local caste councils oversee adherence to the rules of the caste and—particularly among lower castes—are often empowered to punish or expel offenders.

In the choice of marriage partners, individual preference is a secondary consideration. Most marriage contracts are still arranged by the parents. In the north, marriages are usually between persons from different villages, while the preferred marriage in the south is within one's own village. Parents frequently call upon professional marriage brokers to arrange a suitable match. Important considerations in negotiating a marriage agreement are family wealth and social prominence as well as the compatibility of horoscopes drawn up for the prospective bride and groom. A dowry or bride price usually seals the bargain, the former being an upper caste practice while the latter is more common among low-caste Hindus and tribal peoples. Virtually all marriages are monogamous. The Hindu Marriage Act forbids polygyny and polyandry among members of the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jain religious communities. Although such multiple marriages still occasionally occur, they had become rare before the law was enacted. Muslims are still lawfully permitted to take as many as four wives, but nearly all Muslim marriages are monogamous.

While the horizontal lines of caste and kinship bind the Hindu to his caste brothers, loyalties to the village, with its vertical class hierarchy, are also important. Village ties are strengthened by the relative isolation of many villages and by their traditional economic self-sufficiency (Figure 6). In northern India, village populations average about 500 people who live in

12

FIGURE 6. Woman drawing water from a village well in central India

houses clustered near a water source either a well. The land belonging to the inhabitants surrounds the village. To the south the homes are more widely scattered and the villages somewhat more populous. Most villages have a temple or common assembly hall in the center. Different castes usually live in separate sections of the village sometimes set apart by a street or stream. The feeling of solidarity in these caste neighborhoods is often strong being cemented by kinship and daily association.

The village council or *panchayat* has traditionally been an informal body run by representatives of the dominant castes. The senior member of the most powerful caste is normally the village headman. The government has changed the *panchayat* with mixed results into an elective unit of local government. The *panchayat* has jurisdiction over local disputes. It determines the dates and forms of community festivals. It acts as a preliminary board of inquiry in cases of complaint against government officials and it is in charge of community construction of temples shrines wells and roads.

Urban living (Figure 7) complicates the simple caste pattern formed in the villages, but even in the cities many characteristics of the village system are found. Separate wards and quarters have developed within the cities along caste religious and linguistic lines. Clustering of occupational castes in work as well as in residential areas has produced specialized commercial streets or bazaars. Many caste groups compensate for the loss of a unifying common occupation by formalizing their caste structure. The caste council is strengthened a constitution is written dues are assessed and projects of mutual benefit are undertaken. The practical problems of urban life force the abandonment of many rural caste practices. Social distance is impossible to maintain under conditions of crowded housing buses streets public transportation

11

FIGURE 7. A peddler displays his wares on a Delhi street. Many Indians spend their lives in the city streets; some even sleep there.

public restaurants, and the factory or office. Moreover, a semi-Westernized class structure overlaps the caste system, dividing the urban populace into entrepreneurs, white-collar workers, professionals, and laborers. Industrial organizations, business cooperatives, labor unions, and political parties draw their membership from a variety of castes. When these organizations have gained the support of influential members of a given caste, however, the group as a whole tends to follow — a testimony to the persistence of the caste ties.

4. Attitudes and values

Over the last 150 years, attitudes and values, primarily but not exclusively among the educated elite, have been increasingly affected by Western concepts. The process of Westernization in general and modernization in particular has been noticeably broadening its base since independence in 1947. There is no sharp dichotomy between traditional and modern viewpoints but rather a wide spectrum of emphasis with both elements present in the same mind and varying from one occasion to another. Traditional attitudes and values are still predominant among the masses of rural India, and the modern concepts have had their greatest impact on the intellectual and political elite who reside in the major cities, especially those where British influence was the greatest — Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.

a. *Traditional and transitional*

The vast majority of the people are still strongly motivated by the traditional values, which have in turn been shaped by two major and complementary influences, one environmental and the other spiritual: poverty and Hinduism. In combination and reinforcing their [illegible] effects on human behavior, poverty and Hinduism have produced an attitudinal and value structure that tends to act as a brake on modernization.

For the Indian masses poverty means, among other things, hunger and malnutrition, which lead to physical and mental retardation. It means poor health and lack of energy, and it contributes to ignorance and fear of the unknown, which in turn can lead to superstition and irrationality.

Probably the most pervasive theme in Hinduism is that of hierarchy, the rigid stratification of society by castes and subcastes with its deeply ingrained sense of inequality among men. The caste system and many of the attitudes that go with it show great persistence, and there is a good case for arguing that caste consciousness and organization have even increased in modern India. At the same time, however, virtually all serious observers agree that under the impact of Western ideas the caste system and the values and attitudes that govern it are undergoing considerable change. For example, the Westernized elements of the upper classes have been liberated enough from caste pressures to voice egalitarian views which are quite alien to their society and quite difficult for them to practice. The process of modernization, however, is extremely slow and thus far has only penetrated the upper level of the urban society, and there only partially.

Almost as striking as the theme of hierarchy is that of segmentation, the need to divide society into

compartments and to define in considerable detail the characteristics that separate them. However, caste is more than a simple system of distinctive units interacting. People view themselves as belonging to units of different orders in different contexts. With this goes a preoccupation with what makes each group different from the rest and a certain lack of concern with, if not mistrust of, those not in one's caste or subcaste. In many respects, each of the thousands of castes and subcastes is a minority in the larger Indian society, carefully preserving its own ritual practices and style of life.

The attitudes associated with segmentation persist to a significant degree, but in this respect also Western influences and better communications are producing some change. There appears to be an increasing trend toward accepting horizontal integration—i.e., awareness of one's role in social groupings larger than the immediate caste. This is especially evident in the cities where, especially among the upper caste elite, alliances outside the traditional caste boundaries are sometimes formed to achieve economic or social gains. A related development is the deepening awareness of India's national identity—a relatively new dimension in the Indian psyche—which tends to assign a less important role to group divisions within the country than they formerly occupied. This runs counter to the narrow traditional segmentary system and strengthens the sense of nationhood. Deeply ingrained parochial loyalties die hard, however, and the breaking down of traditional attitudes has only just begun.

Another basic attitude of traditional Hindu society is the acceptance of things as they are and as something that cannot be changed. This stems essentially from the related Hindu religious concepts of *karma* and *dharma*, which hold that what one is today is the product of past lives and that in order to be better off in the next incarnation, one must accept one's present status and carry out caste-derived codes and functions faithfully and without question. This outlook may account for the fact that traditional Indian society is essentially nonachieving. Standards of excellence, maintenance, and quality control are comparatively low. There is in general low achievement motivation in the rearing of children, in education, and in many other fields. From this fatalistic outlook also springs the attitude that nature must be adjusted to, not subjug. ted.' Indeed, undue interference with nature is considered as against the wishes of the Creator and against 'he innate laws of life. What counts most is acceptance of and obedience to religiously derived and caste-sanctioned rules and rituals, everything else being viewed as essentially extraneous.

The fatalism of the traditional Hindu view of man's position in the world is one of the main sources of social inertia in the country. Gradually, however, it is being supplanted by more achievement-oriented attitudes and values, especially among the growing Western-influenced elements in the society. The accomplishments of India as an independent, democratic nation, especially in the fields of industrialization, transportation, and science, have been indicators of attitudinal changes in urban areas for some time. Inroads on traditional fatalism in the countryside, however, have been considerably less evident, although with the introduction of new agricultural technology things are beginning to change. The rural people have a strong attachment to individual landownership and have resisted government efforts to promote cooperative farming.

At the village level, respect for authority and traditional values inhibits local initiative. This is reinforced by the respect accorded the learned person (in the traditional rather than the Westernized sense), i.e., the teacher or the leader whose conclusions the uneducated person does not question. Opposition to authority, accordingly, is viewed as deviate behavior and a revolt against the social order. The teacher-pupil relationship is clearly outlined in the religious literature and is hard for the average villager to reject. At the same time, the principle of self-denial, asceticism, and withdrawal from the world (as in the case of Hindu saints) is much admired and has strong attractions politically. It lies at the root of Gandhian simplicity and morality and is paid at least lipservice by virtually every politician.

b. Western and modern influences

The gradual and long process of Westernization has brought about considerable change in Indian society and has affected attitudes, values, and motivations in many complex ways. The forces that brought Westernization to India are alien to the country and did not grow out of the traditional value system. Nevertheless, these forces have gradually become indigenous in the sense that they have been adopted and shaped by members of the intellectual and political elite, who, in turn, have endeavored to diffuse them throughout the society. The process of disseminating modern views and attitudes to the rural masses, however, has been slow despite considerable effort on the part of the government. Lack of technological tools to bring about change is an important component of Indian inertia; where new technology has been introduced, achievement-oriented attitudes have increased.

15

Westernization, begun under British colonial rule, has affected India in a number of interrelated ways. First, it has brought the influence of science and technology to bear on Indian thought and society. Secondly, it has introduced the ideas and techniques of democracy into the society and brought with it a commitment to egalitarianism. Closely allied with democracy, the influence of liberal humanitarianism—ideas of social responsibility and social welfare—has also had an effect on Indian society. Finally, the concept of development—the revolutionary notion that man's lot on earth can be improved and that poverty can be eradicated—has had an important impact on the minds of many Indians.

Largely as a result of long exposure to Western influence, there has been an increasing assimilation of scientific modes of thinking among the intellectual and political elite. Also, there is, at least at the top, a growing recognition of the value of pragmatism, and this has begun to affect economic planning and policies. At the same time, some Hindu values and attitudes are becoming secularized, with less emphasis being placed on religious and metaphysical aspects of life. In many respects the caste system is gradually becoming less a system for perpetuating Hindu spiritual values and is turning more into a system of economic and social interest groups.

Democratization has been in process for some time, but to date it has affected the structure of social, economic, and political institutions more than it has the basic attitudes of the people. It has, however, opened up new opportunities and liberties to more and more people, and this has had an indirect impact on their attitudes and values. Its influence is reflected in the ever-growing number of students at all levels of education—testimony to the increasing desire for social mobility and new economic opportunities.

Combined with democratization there has been a growth of social consciousness, especially among the intellectual and political elite. The government has made a concerted attack on the existing social ethos in the form of measures designed to eradicate untouchability and the more inhumane practices of the caste system and to instill ideas of social welfare and responsibility within the general populace. To date, this far-reaching program has not resulted in a perceptible rise in social responsibility on the part of the citizenry. Nevertheless, it is an accepted practice among some elements of the elite to contribute time and money to help the poor, and an impressive number of voluntary welfare organizations have come into being. The English-language newspapers have also consistently championed social reform and frequently reveal violations of social justice.

c. Other

Freedom of women has come to the fore in modern India. Equality of the sexes is emphasized in various government programs, in equal pay for equal labor, and in freedom to vote and participate in public life. Although in the villages the younger women are still expected to defer to men and to their elders, there is no insurmountable barrier to the attainment by women of high positions in the cultural and professional life of the country. The Muslims remain less liberal than the Hindus in this regard, and purdah (the seclusion and veiling of women) is still practiced among many middle and upper class Muslims.

Indian attitudes toward military service depend to a considerable extent on area and caste. About half of the Indian Army is recruited from the Punjab area and consists of members of traditional "martial classes": Sikhs, Rajputs, and Jats. Sikhs alone comprise about 14% of the enlisted ranks and 20% of the senior officer corps of the armed forces, although Sikhs as a whole represent less than 2% of the total population. The Marathas of Maharashtra also have a warrior tradition. Most Bengalis are not martially inclined, although the commander of the Indian Army from late 1962 to mid-1966 was a Bengali Brahman. There are no martial castes in the south comparable to those of the Punjab, despite eras of almost continual warfare in the south. Because military pay and living conditions are often higher than those prevailing in civilian occupations, recruitment—even from among nonmartial castes—poses no difficulty for the Indian Government. During India's clashes with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, the Indian people responded enthusiastically to the government's appeals for unity and support of the war effort. Although the principle of nonviolence is a theme in Hindu thought, there is a strong countervailing acceptance of the use of force as a legitimate means of protecting cherished institutions and achieving national aims.

Regional loyalties, based primarily on linguistic considerations, are important elements in the Indian system of values. The sources of regional pride are diverse, but in most areas a revival of provincial distinctiveness has been underway since the 19th century. In Bengal the impetus was provided by a number of late 19th and early 20th century writers who sparked a revival of Bengali literature and stimulated a resurgence of interest in the best features of the area's past. In western India early 20th century nationalists such as Bal Gangdhar Tilak pointed with pride to the exploits of the 17th century Maratha warrior-hero Shivaji. In south India, particularly in

16

the Madras area, Dravidian castes have pitted themselves against what they consider to be foreign northern influences, personified by the Madrasi Brahmans. Thus the average rural citizen's loyalties proceed outward in descending order of intensity from his family to his village caste group, his village as a whole, his caste as a whole, his linguistic area or state, and finally to the Indian union.

The attitude of Indians toward government ranges from sarcasm and hostility on the part of many of the urbanized industrial elite to fatalistic apathy on the part of many rural citizens. Most villagers look upon government as primarily an agency for the maintenance of public order and arbitration of local disputes. Despite the introduction and partial implementation of successive plans for economic development since 1951, some (admittedly fragmentary) surveys suggest that many villagers either have not heard of the planning process or seriously doubt that it will do them any good. Nevertheless, in some areas—such as the Punjab—government programs have been successful, and a new receptiveness to innovation has emerged.

Discrimination against some minorities persists, even though it is prohibited by the constitution, while other groups are given special opportunities. Much of the discrimination is a product of the caste system, in which every Hindu views persons of lower caste as potential sources of ritual pollution. In this sense the former Untouchable suffers primarily because of his position on the lowest rung of the social ladder. Discrimination against Muslims is not so pronounced, but the Muslims' position is complicated by the fact that neighboring Pakistan, a Muslim nation, is widely rega. led as an implacable enemy of India, and many Hindu employers seem to give preference to Hindus over Muslims in filling vacancies. Anglo-Indians complain of similar discrimination, and their protests may have some validity. Many of the tribal groups also argue that their interests are being neglected. The mutual dislike which exists between the Christian and animistic hill tribesman and the plains-dwelling Hindu in parts of eastern India complicates relations between the government and the sometimes rebellious hill tribes.

The great majority of Indians have no strong feeling for or against foreigners or foreign governments. The rural Indian has only vague notions about the nature of his own country, and he may feel little more identity with another Indian from a distant linguistic area than with an actual foreigner. Urban Indians, particularly those who are well educated, are likely to feel more strongly about foreigners than do those living in rural areas. The nature of their reaction is shaped by a variety of often contradictory influences, such as political affiliation, dedication to Hindu traditionalism, degree of contact with and acceptance of Western ideas, experiences abroad, and occupation.

Only the educated elite—a very small percentage of the total population—have well-developed views on foreign policy. Most of these individuals supported the nonaligned posture adopted by the Nehru government, if only because they were wary of involvement in a global conflict. Since 1962, China has joined Pakistan as one of India's primary foes, and there is a fear of anti-Indian collusion between China and Pakistan. The U.S.S.R. is admired for its own economic progress, for its extensive assistance to India's economic development, and for its political support of India throughout the 1971 crisis with Pakistan. Most educated Indians, however, strongly prefer the Western liberal traditions inherited from the British to Soviet-style regimentation. Traditionally, there has been a friendly attitude toward the United States, despite occasional sharp criticism from Indian leftists. Most literate Indians know about and appreciate U.S. economic aid but tend to equate the United States and the U.S.S.R. in this regard, in spite of the much larger American contribution. It appears that a reservoir of good will remains despite disapproval of U.S. policy during the 1971 Indian-Pakistan crisis.

5. Social stability and mobility

The remarkable durability of the Hindu caste and class system, with its essentially stable social order, has not produced a comparable degree of political stability or a sense of national unity. There is, in fact, no historical precedent for the concept of a unified Indian subcontinent encompassing all of the territory now incorporated within the Indian union. Regional feuds, often in the form of quibbling over state boundaries, disrupt the central government's attempts to promote a concerted national effort.

Similarly, caste rivalries within the states often impede effective administration. In several states divergent caste interests are the source of chronic factionalism within both Congress Party-controlled state governments and non-Congress coalition regimes. This factionalism is a natural outgrowth of the traditional pattern of Hindu social mobility. Since individuals theoretically cannot rise socially above the caste into which they were born, they must work toward elevating the level of the caste as a whole. As a local caste prospers—i.e., acquires larger areas of productive land or adopts a new and more profitable

17

occupation—it translates its economic advances into political leverage. It gradually alters its "life style" to suit its new economic and political position. This usually involves a growing number of self-imposed restrictions on contacts with other castes, more and more of which come to be viewed as inferior. It also entails adopting more rigid taboos (such as giving up meat or alcoholic beverages) and practicing higher forms of religious ceremonies. In many cases elaborate genealogical data are assembled to prove that the caste has always enjoyed a high status. Such changes do not occur quickly but extend over decades and even centuries. In many cases each subtle change in life style is vigorously resisted by neighboring superior castes who see their own status or occupational monopolies threatened. It is not unusual for violence to erupt when a low caste decides to take a major step upward.

Individual deviation or disobedience is frowned upon, whereas group action to alter the status quo carries no social stigma. For this reason social collectivism is deeply infused in the Indian mind. It assuages those torn by conflict between traditional values and modern views of self-assertiveness. Individual discontent is in most instances communicated through the caste and toward efforts to improve its lot.

Modernization, urbanization, and Westernization have opened up new economic opportunities and broken down some caste barriers. The government's constitutional responsibility for promoting the welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by reserving special positions for them in the universities and in government employment has further disrupted the traditional social balance. Although these developments have not greatly improved the individual's prospects for advancing himself above his caste level, they have heightened caste competition for economic improvement. The economy has not expanded fast enough to meet these increased demands, and the result has been increasing frustration and discontent. Meanwhile, Hindu traditionalists have become alarmed at the changes in the old order and vociferously oppose the encroachments of modernization. The political process affords some outlet for these pressures and tensions, but a strained atmosphere has developed in which agitation over seemingly petty issues can explode into violence.

C. Population

1. Size and density

The Indian people are outnumbered only by those of China. Provisional figures from the 10th decennial census indicate that on 1 April 1971 there were

547,367,926 persons living in India, including those residing in Indian-held portions of Jammu and Kashmir and in the former Portuguese territories now under Indian control. This marked an increase of a little over 24% over the 439,235,082 persons recorded in the 1961 census. By June 1973 the population was estimated to have grown by about 5.5% since the 1971 census, resulting in a population of about 578,000,000 in mid-1973.

Population pressure on India's limited resources has become one of the country's most serious problems. Although Indians constitute nearly 15% of the world's population, they occupy only 2.4% of the inhabited area of the world. In 1971 an Indian population almost equal to that of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Japan combined lived in an area about one-tenth as large. The average population density in the 1,211,000 square miles covered by the 1971 census was about 471 persons per square mile, compared to about 360 persons per square mile in 1961. Some 51% of the population in 1971 lived in areas with a density of more than 500 persons per square mile and 13% in areas with over 1,000 persons per square mile (Figure 8).

In 1971 the State of Maharashtra, which most nearly approximated the countrywide average in population density (Figure 9) had more than twice as many residents as California in an area only two-thirds as large. The most sparsely settled state, remote and rugged Nagaland, was about equal in area and population to Vermont. Kerala, the most thickly settled state, with 1,419 persons per square mile in 1971, was then roughly equal in population to New York State but had only one-third the land area.

2. Ethnic composition

The ethnic history of India is extremely complex, and racially distinct divisions between peoples generally cannot be drawn. Caucasoid, Australoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid racial strains are apparent within the population, with peoples of Caucasoid stock being the dominant element (Figure 10). The main Caucasoid element is Mediterranean, including most of the people of the south and east. Mediterranean and proto-Nordic elements are most heavily represented in the northwest. Throughout India, however, there is evidence of much intermixture, with Australoid, proto-Nordic, Alpine, and Mongoloid strains being blended in varying degrees with the prevailing Mediterranean Caucasoid stock and with one another. As a result, there is much diversity among the Indian people. Racial diversity, however, is not a prime source of divisiveness within

18

Population

Persons per square mile

| 0 | 26 | 130 | 260 | 520 |

| 0 | 10 | 50 | 100 | 200 |

Persons per square kilometer

FIGURE 8. Population density

Indian society, language and caste serving as the principal agents of disunity. Religion, too, serves to a lesser extent as an element of disunity, although the majority Hindu faith largely transcends language and racial identification (Figure 11).

The main features of the Mediterranean type found in India are a medium stature and a slight build. Black wavy hair, brown or black eyes, and a fairly pronounced nose are common. Skin color ranges from medium to dark brown, and face and body hair is scant. Although scholars see certain close relationships to the people of predynastic Egypt, the Mediterranean

element is associated with a culture that developed on the Indian subcontinent prior to 3000 B.C. The Alpine admixture, some of which also dates back to this early period, is relatively small but has become widely diffused. The Alpine type is round headed and heavily built but of medium stature, with a light brown complexion and profuse face and body hair. The last major addition of a Caucasoid strain resulted from the great folk wanderings which brought the proto-Nordic Indo-Aryans into the area early in the second millennium B.C. The proto-Nordic strain, reflected in a taller stature and lighter complexion, can be seen in

19

Persons Per Square Mile

1971 Population (in Millions)

Persons Per Square Mile	State	1971 Population (in Millions)
777	Uttar Pradesh (1)	88.3
893	Bihar (2)	56.4
425	Maharashtra (3)	50.3
	West Bengal (4)	44.4
1313		
406	Andhra Pradesh (5)	43.4
243	Madhya Pradesh (6)	41.7
818	Tamil Nadu (7)*	41.1
396	Mysore (8)	29.3
352	Gujarat (9)	26.7
194	Rajasthan (10)	25.7
365	Orissa (11)	21.9
	Kerala (12)	21.3
1419		
350	Assam (13)**	14.6
694	Punjab (14)	13.5
583	Haryana (15)	10.0
86	Jammu and Kashmir (16)	4.6
161	Himachal Pradesh (17)	3.4
386	Tripura (18)***	1.56
124	Manipur (19)***	1.07
114	Meghalaya (20)***	0.98
80	Nagaland (21)	0.52

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are keyed to map. Centrally administered territories and other minor regions are shown in black on map where scale permits and are not otherwise represented on this chart.

*Name was changed from Madras in 1969.

**This state has been affected by boundary changes since 1971. The 1971 population figures have been adjusted to conform to present boundaries.

***Elevated to statehood in 1972 as a result of reorganization in the northeast.

**FIGURE 9. Population size and density, 1971**

the light skin and gray or hazel eyes of a number of Kashmiri and Dardic tribals, and even of an occasional Punjabi or Rajasthani. Fairly widespread diffusion of the proto-Nordic strain among many upper class families of the subcontinent, although identifiable by studies of blood types, is obscured in outward appearance by its mixture with the dominant Mediterranean type. The main visible contribution is a narrow, more clearly defined nose and some lightening of the skin.

FIGURE 10. A Hindu feeding sacred monkeys at a Benares temple has the Caucasoid face and brown skin characteristic of the majority of people dwelling in India and Pakistan

The Australoid type is most evident among primitive tribal groups which until fairly recent times have retained many of their special characteristics because of their isolation in the more inaccessible hill and forest regions. Their main distinguishing features are short stature, dark brown skin color, broad low-bridged noses, fleshy lips, and curly, but not frizzy, black hair. Australoid influence can be traced from the northwestern borders of Kashmir to the easternmost hills of Assam and down to the southern tip of the peninsula. Most scholars believe the Australoids constituted a major part of the aboriginal stock of south and southeast Asia and trace relationships to the aboriginals of Australia and the islands of the Pacific. Although many Australoids have clung to their tribal ties and way of life since at least the third millennium B.C., increasing numbers also have been closely associated with other more settled groups, generally living apart or on the fringes of village or town.

The chronology of Mongoloid incursion into the subcontinent is obscure. The main distinguishing features of this racial stock are high cheekbones, a

20

FIGURE 11. Some peoples of India

characteristic eyefold, straight black hair, and a light tan or sallow skin. There is a scattering of Mongoloids along the northern Himalayas from the Ladakh area in the state of Kashmir to the eastern hills of Assam and Burma. Most of these are mountain tribals who constitute varying mixtures of Australoid and Mongoloid. The Mongoloid element is most strongly marked among small, upper class groups in Ladakh, reflecting family and sectarian ties that were established during a period of Tibetan expansionism betwen the 16th and 18th centuries A.D. Because Mongoloid physical characteristics tend to dominate any mixture with Australoid or Mediterranean elements, Mongoloid influence is still visible even among predominantly non-Mongoloid groups like the Kachari, Meithei, Tippera, and Ahom, whose chiefs ruled Hinduized kingdoms in North Bengal and Assam between the 7th and 18th centuries A.D. and who have been largely assimilated into the caste system.

There are also a few Negritos in the eastern hills of Assam, in one or two forest pockets of South India, and on the Andaman Islands. The source of this Negroid element in south Asia and the Pacific islands is a matter of speculation, but there are groups of Negritos, often associated with Australoids, scattered from south India and Malaya to the Philippines and Melanesia. These remnants of prehistoric people, although of great anthropological interest, are too miniscule to have had any social influence in India.

3. Population distribution and structure

a. Distribution

The vast majority of Indians still reside in rural villages in spite of an accelerated migration to the cities during the past five decades. In 1961 the rural population totaled 360,298,000 persons or about 82% of the total population. Nearly half of these lived in villages of between 500 and 2,000 persons, and 85% inhabited villages of between 200 and 5,000 persons (Figure 12). The total number of villages was determined to be about 567,000. In 1971 the rural population was 438,580,844, or about 80% of the total population.

The urban population in 1971 amounted to about 108,787,000 persons living in 2,921 towns and cities.[2]

------

[2]The Indian Government defines urban areas as: towns (a term which indicates certain types of local administration rather than size) and all places having 5,000 or more inhabitants, a density of not less than 1,000 persons per square mile, and a working population of which at least three-fourths are engaged in nonagricultural pursuits.

22

FIGURE 12. Distribution of urban and rural population by size of community, 1961

Urban dwellers had increased from 11.2% of the total population in 1921, to about 20% by 1971, indicating a gradual urbanization. (Figure 13). The first big flow of immigrants to the cities was in the late 1930's, as men moved in search of factory jobs. The peak decade for urbanization was 1941-51, when an estimated 9 million persons—equivalent to 20% of the 1941 urban population—moved to the cities in response to the rapid wartime industrialization. The urban population is expected to increase to at least 160 million by 1981. India's urban population is concentrated in states of comparatively high industrialization such as Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, West Bengal and Mysore (Figure 14). In contrast, states which have undergone relatively less development, such as Orissa, Assam, Nagaland, Bihar, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh have an urban population of less than 10%. The position of Union Territories and other areas is not strictly comparable to the States.

Most of the urban expansion between 1961 and 1971 occurred in the larger cities. About two-thirds of the increase in urban population was in cities having a population of 100,000 or more, even though these

FIGURE 13. Urban-rural distribution of the population
(Percentages)

	URBAN	RURAL	INCREASE IN URBAN POPULATION DURING THE PRECEDING DECADE	INCREASE IN POPULATION AS A WHOLE DURING THE PRECEDING DECADE
By pre-1961 criteria:*				
1921............................	11.2	88.8	...	...
1931............................	12.0	88.0	19.0	11.0
1941............................	13.9	86.1	32.0	14.2
1951............................	17.3	82.7	41.0	13.3
By 1961 criteria:*				
1951............................	16.1	83.9	...	...
1961............................	18.0	82.0	36.0	21.5
1971............................	19.9	80.1	38.0	24.7

... Not pertinent.
*The criteria for differentiating urban from rural areas were changed with the 1961 census. The 1951 census documents classed as urban areas some 803 localities that would have been considered rural areas by 1961 standards. Urban growth in the decade 1951-60 has therefore been computed by adjusting the 1951 figures to conform to the more recent criteria.

areas accounted for only 40% of the total urban population in 1951, 45% in 1961, and 52% in 1971. This was largely due to the fact that many of the industrial projects begun under India's First and Second Five Year Economic Development Plans between 1951 and 1961 were concentrated in the larger urban centers. There were eight cities with populations exceeding 1 million in 1971 (Figure 15), an increase of one—Kanpur—over 1961. These accounted among them for some 25.4 million persons, or about 23% of the urban population.

b. Structure

In 1971 there were 283,252,214 males and 264,115,712 females in the Indian population, a sex ratio of 107.2 males per 100 females. This compares with 106 per 100 in 1961, 105.7 per 100 in 1951 and 103 per 100 in 1901. While the average life expectancy of women was 1.4% longer than that of men in the decade preceding independence and more than 7% longer during the period 1911-20, there has been a marked shift in the direction of greater male longevity over the past two decades. Figures for the decade 1951-61 indicate that the average lifespan of the male was 3% longer than that of the female.

The percentage of males in the population is highest in urban areas, primarily due to the migration of men into the cities in search of jobs. In 1971 Bombay and Calcutta had 140 and 142 males per 100 females respectively, while New Delhi and its environs had 125 males per 100 females. The proportion of males to

females also varies widely from one part of the country to another. Studies of the 1961 census indicate a generally higher ratio of men to women in northern states than in the south, and the 1971 figures will probably show similar results. Some of this variation may be more apparent than real. Respondents sometimes underreport the number of females in their household by excluding certain categories such as childless widows. This tendency is probably more pronounced in the north, where the Islamic influence · has been strongest. In some areas, however, there does appear to be a higher death rate among female child, n than among males, perhaps because they receive less care and attention. An increase in female deaths in the early childbearing ages is also an important factor. In addition, improvements in health care and working conditions have benefited men more than women.

India has traditionally been a land of early marriage for females. Although the average age at the time of marriage is reported to be rising, studies show that this change is occurring at a very slow pace. In 1951 the median marriage age of persons up to 52.5 years of age was 14.5 for females and 20 for males; according to research conducted in West Bengal, the average age of women married there between 1957 and 1962 was still under 15 years. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 prohibits the marriage of most girls under the age of 15, while earlier legislation sets 14 as the minimum marriage age for Muslims and other groups. These laws are not rigidly enforced, however (Figure 16).

23

FIGURE 14. Proportion of urban population to total population of the states, union territories and other areas, 1971

STATES/UNION TERRITORIES AND OTHER AREAS	PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION
States:	
Andhra Pradesh	19.4
Assam	8.3
Bihar	10.0
Gujarat	28.1
Haryana	17.8
Himachal Pradesh	7.1
Jammu and Kashmir	18.3
Kerala	16.3
Madhya Pradesh	16.3
Maharashtra	31.2
Manipur*	13.3
Meghalaya*	13.0
Mysore	24.3
Nagaland	9.9
Orissa	8.3
Punjab	23.8
Rajasthan	17.6
Tamil Nadu	30.3
Tripura*	7.8
Uttar Pradesh	14.0
West Bengal	24.6
Union territories and other areas:	
Andaman and Nicobar Islands	22.8
Chandigarh	90.7
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	...
Delhi	89.8
Goa, Daman and Diu	26.3
Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands	...
Arunachal Pradesh**	3.1
Pondicherry	42.1
Mizoram***	11.6

... Not pertinent.
*Elevated to statehood in 1972.
**Name changed in 1972 from North East Frontier Agency.
***Elevated from District in Assam to Union Territory in 1972.

The 1961 census lists about 13% of the females between 10 and 14 as married. Marriage ages are lower in rural than in urban areas; some 22% of all rural females between 10 and 14 years old were married at the time of the 1961 census, compared to less than 7% of the urban females in the same age group. Marriage is almost universal among women, and all but a few men also marry. Only 0.5% of the women and 3.3% of the men over 35 had never married, according to the 1961 census.

There are few divorces in India. Census figures in 1961 indicated that about 1% of the females and 0.8% of the males who had previously been married were either divorced or separated. These figures may be somewhat low because of underreporting, and they do not include divorced persons who had remarried prior to the enumeration. Nevertheless, they do indicate an extremely low divorce rate. Remarriage of widows is uncommon among upper caste Hindus but is more frequent among the lower castes, as well as among Muslims, Christians, and Parsis. Widowers of all communities tend to remarry.

The main change in the age structure of the population over the past half century has been an increase in the number of young people, due largely to improved health standards. Age-sex estimates drawn from 1951 to 1961 census figures show that the most significant change during the decade was the increase in the proportion of the population below 10 years old from 27% to nearly 30% (Figure 17). There was an overall decline in the proportion of persons over 20. The population as a whole is relatively young and is likely to remain so unless there is a substantial decline in the birth rate. In 1961 about 50% of India's inhabitants were under 20 years of age. In contrast, the same age group comprised only about 39% of the U.S. population in 1960.

4. Population growth and control

a. Population growth

One of India's most important problems, economically, socially, and politically, is the growth of its population. Each year there are some 21 million births and 8 million deaths, resulting in a net


Figures are in thousands of persons
*Excludes New Delhi

FIGURE 15. Cities of over 1 million inhabitants, 1971

24

FIGURE 17. Age-sex distribution, India and the United States, 1961

population growth of over 13 million. At least 55,000 babies are born each day. The birth rate is agreed to have been about 41 per 1,000 during the period 1961-65, slightly below the rate estimated for the previous 10 years (Figure 18). Indian officials, on the basis of surveys and samples, believed in early 1969 that the birth rate had been lowered to 39 per 1,000 population, although this figure might well be too low. The United Nations staff estimates that it averaged 42.8 per thousand per year during 1965-70. The annual death rate has dropped sharply in the past few decades. In 1969 Indian officials estimated it had dropped to 14 per 1,000, but the United Nations estimate is 16.7 per thousand on the average for 1965-70. The population is increasing by a rate of about 2.5% per year. Unless this rate is checked, India will reach the 1 billion mark by the year 2000.

The preliminary official Indian 1971 census results indicate that at that time the actual population of India was slightly less than the lowest official projections for 1971 with an annual rate of increase of about 2.25%. No specific data have been published, however, on such categories as birth rate, death rate, fertility, or migration, thereby inhibiting further current analysis.

Official projections of population growth for the period 1966 through 1981 (Figure 19) were drawn up in 1964 by a specially appointed Experts Committee of the Planning Commission to be used by the state and central governments in formulating their long-range development plans. These statistics were not intended to be predictions, but because they are the only official projections in use they have tended to be regarded as such. The high projections assume no

FIGURE 16. The median marriage age for women is still in the teens. Above: A Wancho girl on the way to her husband's house for the first time. Below: A South Indian Brahman wedding.

25

FIGURE 18. Birth and death rates
(Decennial averages)

	REGISTRATIONS		ESTIMATED ACTUAL RATES	
	Annual births	Annual deaths	Annual births	Annual deaths
		— Per 1,000 persons —		
1901-10	37	na	48.1	42.6
1911-20	37	34	49.2	48.6
1921-30	34	26	46.4	38.3
1931-40	34	23	45.2	31.2
1941-50	28	20	39.9	27.4
1951-60	22	11	41.7	22.8

na   Data not available.

fertility change in 1966-70, a 5% decline in 1971-75, and a 15% drop in 1976-80. The medium projection presupposes 5%, 10%, and 20% fertility declines respectively for these same periods and the low projections 10%, 15%, and 25% declines. The single mortality assumption underlying all three of these projections is that the expectation of life at birth would rise by 0.9 years annually during 1956-70 and then would increase somewhat more slowly, by 0.75 annually, during the following decade. The year 1956 is the center of the period covered by the 1951-60 official life tables, which show 41.9 years as the expectation of life at birth for males and 40.6 for females (Figure 20). The death rates resulting from these assumptions start at 17.2 per 1,000 for 1961-65, move down gradually to about 9 by 1976-80. The mortality measures by age needed to move the population through successive periods are derived from the standard age-specific patterns corresponding to levels of life expectancy which have been developed in the United Nations' so-called "Model Life Tables." Throughout, heavy emphasis is placed on the lowering of mortality rates achieved as a result of public health and medical gains during the 1950's. This emphasis mainly explains the rapid pace of advance anticipated throughout the projection periods. International migration is ignored as negligible.

With respect to growth rates, the high projection of the Experts Committee implies a peaking during 1966-75 at 2.6% to 2.7%, followed by a drop to 2.3% to 2.4% during 1976-80. The medium projection implies that the growth rate was at its peak about 1969 and should decline to about 2% in another decade. The low projection, considered most unrealistic by skeptical observers of India's family planning program before the 1971 census, implies a decline from 2.1% during the present 5-year period to about 1.6% in another 10 years. While it cannot necessarily be

26

concluded from the 1971 census that India's family planning program will cause the low projection to become reality, the census does seem to indicate that family planning has had more impact than was expected.

It is clear that the rapid growth of India's population is the most important single obstacle to the country's efforts to raise the welfare of its people. The steadily increasing number of persons sharing the national income will continue to threaten per capita living standards until population growth can be substantially reduced.

b. Family planning

India was the first nation to adopt a comprehensive national family planning policy as an integral part of its developmental plans. The task of stabilizing India's population is staggering, and success is by no means assured. After years of uncertainty and lack of commitment, however, the Indian Government finally launched a greatly expanded family planning program in 1964-65 by extending family planning services beyond public health clinics.

The critical importance of family planning has been accepted by the central government and to greater or lesser degrees by all of the state governments, although with so many competing development needs there is always the danger of a letdown in the intensive effort that will have to be maintained. The immediate aim of the Indian family planning officials is to reduce the

FIGURE 19. Official Indian projections of population size and of birth, death, and growth rates

	TYPE OF PROJECTION		
PERIOD	High	Medium	Low
Population (millions):			
1966	494.0	494.0	494.0
1971	563.0	558.0	554.0
1976	643.0	629.0	615.0
1981	723.0	693.0	666.0
Birth rates (per 1,000):			
1961-65	41.0	41.0	41.0
1966-70	40.5	38.6	36.8
1971-75	38.3	35.1	31.8
1976-80	32.8	28.7	25.0
Death rates (per 1,000):			
1961-65	17.2	17.2	17.2
1966-70	14.2	14.0	13.7
1971-75	11.7	11.3	11.0
1976-80	9.4	9.2	9.0
Growth rates (percentages):			
1961-65	2.4	2.4	2.4
1966-70	2.6	2.5	2.3
1971-75	2.7	2.4	2.1
1976-80	2.3	2.0	1.6

FIGURE 20. Life expectancy
(Decennial averages)

	EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH	
	Male	Female
1889 1900	23.63	23.96
1901 10	22.59	23.31
1911 20	*19.42	*20.90
1921 30	26.91	26.56
1931 40	32.09	31.37
1941 50	33.45	31.66
1951 60	41.90	40.60

*Decrease in life expectancy during 1911 20 was largely due to an influenza epidemic, 1918 21.

birth rate to about 32 per 1,000 population by 1973-74 and to 25 per 1,000 by around 1980, but the probability of success in this endeavor by the end of the next decade appears dim.

By mid-1971 Indian estimates indicated that about 10% of the couples in the reproductive age group of 15-44 (about 90% of the married population of India) were using some means of family planning. Demographic evidence indicates, however, that until about 30% of all couples of reproductive age use contraception, a nation's birth rate does not begin to fall significantly. Family planning officials estimate that at least 5 million births had been prevented by early 1969. Estimates had climbed to 7.4 million in 1971 and officials hope to raise this total to 18 million by 1974. Despite the lack of significant organized opposition to family planning, this may be an optimistic goal. Even though vigorous government propaganda efforts appear to have generated a general awareness of the need for family planning and favorable attitudes toward it, actual adoption of family planning methods lags far behind.

In striving to realize this goal, the government is promoting what Indian officials have called a "cafeteria" of techniques—sterilization, "loops," oral contraceptives, and more conventional contraceptive measures. Sterilization is the most important facet of the family planning program, however, and it is expected to progress rapidly in the next few years, primarily among couples with four or more children. Expectations may prove misplaced, however. High infant and child mortality rates make it impractical to expect that a couple with several young children will accept anything but a reversible method until they are reasonably assured that their children will survive. Over 9.3 million persons had been sterilized by September 1971. Between 1965, when the program

began, and March 1971 some 3.99 million "loops" had been inserted. The "loop" program, however, has been slowed down because of poor cultural tolerance of minor side effects, adverse rumors, and the difficulty of reaching a significant percentage of the rural women because of a shortage of doctors.

After clinical trial for 2 years, oral contraceptive pills were approved for private prescription in 1967, and the government has tentatively included the pill in its program. As of mid-1970, 200,000 women were taking pills obtained through 261 special centers. The relatively high cost of the pills and the requirement of continuous use limit the impact they can have in India. During 1970-71 about 2.1 million couples were protected by conventional contraceptives. The condom is thought to be the most practical and effective method of child spacing for the 75% of the male population which is out of contact with clinical facilities. In late 1970 the government announced that each government employee would receive six condoms and literature on family planning with his monthly salary. A scheme for mass distribution of subsidized condoms through commercial firms has been started, as has a free distribution system through hospitals, clinics and family welfare centers. Subsidized condoms will also be sold by teachers, postmen, village workers, and other local officials.

The Pregnancy Termination Bill, which was passed in August 1971 and became effective April 1972, legalized abortion. One of the circumstances in which pregnancy can be terminated is if continuance involves risk to life or grave injury to a woman's physical or mental health; this includes cases where pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any contraceptive device or method used by either wife or husband. The Indian Government estimated in 1970 that about 4.5 million illegal abortions occur annually. The new legislation is expected to have a significant influence on fertility in areas of India where qualified medical personnel are available to perform abortions.

The family planning program is accompanied by a large promotional campaign, with a variety of incentives being offered to induce married couples to adopt family planning techniques (Figure 21). In most states, husbands and wives who participate in the sterilization program are directly compensated by the government for expenses incurred in traveling and time lost from work. In some states, direct payments are offered to those men willing to undergo vasectomies. Industry, too, encourages workers to participate fully in family planning, and the government compensates companies for much of the time lost by their employees who take advantage of

27

FIGURE 21. A public health service nurse at Katabarga counsels on birth control and gives out free calcium

these services, the balance being an allowable deduction for tax purposes. Uttar Pradesh is experimenting with a reduction in the medicine and maternity benefits allowed to governmental and other employees who have more than three children. An especially promising incentive program is underway in Madras and Maharashtra, where a person already sterilized refers as many of his acquaintances as he can convince and is paid a small fee for each referral. In Maharashtra cash awards are given to village *panchayats* that meet family planning quotas.

In an attempt to encourage the medical profession to become more actively involved in persuading people to practice family planning, several state governments now permit giving the entire incentive allowance to the private doctor, who then uses his own discretion in its dispersion. Several special inducements are designed to increase the number of medical personnel working on the problems of overpopulation and to stimulate greater efforts from those already engaged in family planning programs. One thousand scholarships are given each year by medical schools to women students who agree to work in the family program for as many months after graduation as they spent studying under the scholarship. Special allowances are also paid to district family planning officers and doctors who participate in the family planning effort. Private medical practitioners are paid special allowances for sterilization and for "loop" insertions.

5. Population movements

Since 1950, immigration and emigration have had only a marginal impact on the Indian population,

particularly when compared to the mass migrations that accompanied India's independence. The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 into the two independent countries of India and Pakistan touched off a massive population upheaval, with some 14 to 16 million persons migrating each way across the new international boundaries. Hindus and Sikhs fled from Pakistani-controlled areas of the Punjab and Bengal, while Muslims in the Indian border areas departed in large numbers for Pakistan. The movement precipitated an unprecedented degree of communal violence in which hundreds of thousands perished.

Between 1947 and 1956 about 4 million East Pakistanis moved into Indian territory. A second influx from East Pakistan began in 1964 following the eruption of serious communal violence there in January of that year. According to official Indian figures, 1,707,076 Pakistanis migrated to India between January 1953 and August 1968. Most of this movement took place across the East Pakistan border with the Indian States of West Bengal and Assam and with the then Union Territory of Tripura, causing economic problems and significant acculturation, especially in the latter two areas. The world's largest population movement in recent history—some 10 million people—occurred from March through December 1971 as refugees fled across the border to West Bengal, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam following the Pakistan army's crackdown on East Pakistan in March. By March 1972—some 3 months after East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh—virtually all of the refugees had returned.

28

The large influx of Pakistani Hindus into India in the 1950's and 1960's was partly offset by the migration of Muslims, either voluntarily or by eviction, to Pakistan. Over 1 million Muslims fled or were evicted from India between 1951 and 1970, about half of them after 1963. Efforts by the governments of Assam and Tripura to evict Muslims as illegal "infiltrators" from Pakistan have severely strained Indo-Pakistani relations on occasion. Evictions were at a relatively low level in the 1950's, but they were stepped up after the release of the 1961 census figures, which indicated—according to the Indian Government—that 200,000 to 300,000 Muslims had infiltrated into Assam and Tripura during the preceding decade, presumably in search of arable land.

An important source of immigration has been from Indians living outside the subcontinent, who numbered approximately 5 million in 1970 and were mostly concentrated in African and Asian countries around the periphery of the Indian Ocean. These overseas Indian communities resulted from waves of migration that began centuries ago as Indian scholars, priests, and merchants moved throughout the region spreading Hindu culture far to the east and establishing contact with Africa. The most significant emigrations began in the mid-19th century as workers moved to labor-deficit areas in other parts of the British Empire. As former colonies gained independence, their Indian inhabitants constituted cohesive minorities and were often subject to serious discrimination. The Indian Government encourages persons of Indian origin abroad to identify themselves with the local society and to adopt the nationality of the countries of their residence. A large number of these persons, however, have not acquired local citizenship and have returned to India to live permanently.

In mid-1964 economic pressures on some 550,000 Indians in Burma became so intense that many of them sought repatriation. As of August 1968, 163,099 Indian nationals had been repatriated from Burma, although the influx had slowed to a trickle. The largest number had settled in Tamil Nadu (86,674) and Andhra Pradesh (24,509). Most of the repatriates were urban shopkeepers who were under such pressure from the Burmese that they had to leave most of their assets behind. A large percentage of them are participating in government-sponsored relief and rehabilitation programs, but generally they have not responded very well to the manual arts training they are given.

Under the Indo-Ceylon Pact of 1964, 525,000 "stateless" persons of Indian Tamil origin were to be repatriated to India over a 15-year period, while Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was to grant citizenship to another 300,000. Actual implementation of the agreement was delayed, however, until March 1968 when the Ceylon Government finally passed the necessary legislation to put it into effect. As of early 1972 the Indian Government had registered 104,606 former stateless Tamils as Indian citizens but only 43,927 of these had been repatriated to Tamil Nadu. Thus, at the halfway point of the pact's operation, implementation was far behind schedule. Although progress has been made on increasing the rate of repatriation, both the Indian and Sri Lanka governments are pessimistic about achieving the numbers agreed upon in the time remaining. To reach full implementation of the agreement by 1979, the average yearly movement of Tamils from Sri Lanka to India would have to be nearly 60,000.

Immigration of non-Indians has been extremely limited since 1959, when the Dalai Lama and thousands of his followers escaped Chinese persecution in Tibet by fleeing into India, Sikkim, and Bhutan. In 1970, the Dalai Lama's headquarters estimated that some 85,000 Tibetans had fled their country since 1959 and that some 60,000 remained in India, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The death rate reportedly is high enough among the Tibetan refugees to keep their numbers from increasing through natural reproduction. The Indian Government has established resettlement sites for the Tibetan refugees, and most have been rehabilitated.

In past centuries, large numbers of Nepalese migrated southward across the Indo-Nepalese border and eastward into northern Bengal, Assam, Sikkim, and Bhutan. They form 75% and 25% respectively of the populations of the latter two mountain states. The 1961 census revealed that slightly more than 1 million speakers of Nepali resided in India. Although there have been no major waves of immigration from Nepal in this century, a minor ebb and flow across the border continues and consists largely of Nepalese seeking or returning from temporary jobs in India.

Migration between major cultural areas inside India appears to be at a relatively low level. The census of 1931—the last year for which such data were compiled—reported that only 3% of the persons enumerated were residing outside the state or province of their birth. Nevertheless, after 1950 the construction of large-scale industrial complexes apparently encouraged somewhat greater internal migration than in preindependence years. The fact that between 1951 and 1961 the populations of West Bengal and Assam grew by 32.9% and 34.3% respectively—a rate far above the national average population growth of

29

21.5%—suggests that these states received a considerable influx from other states. The expanding West Bengal industrial complex probably attracted large numbers of workers from Bihar, Orissa, and possibly Uttar Pradesh, states which experienced rates of population growth below the national average. In the case of Assam, the influx probably consisted of persons seeking farmland or agricultural employment and was augmented by infiltrations from East Pakistan. Two southern states, Madras (now Tamil Nadu) and Andhra Pradesh, showed growth rates well below that anticipated on the basis of birth and death rates. This may indicate extensive emigration by jobseekers. On the other hand, it may be largely the result of population shifts or statistical aberrations stemming from the redrawing of state boundaries during the 1950's.

D. Problems of the labor force

1. Employment opportunities and attitudes toward work

a. Opportunities

Unemployment and underemployment are perhaps the biggest problems of India's large and rapidly increasing labor force. It is estimated that there are about 4 million net additions to the labor force each year, while unemployment, which in 1971 stood at 15 million, is increasing by 2 million annually, a figure which would well grow larger unless population growth is checked and the economy expands at a greater rate than it has in the past. In addition to the unemployed workers, there are many underemployed, unable to find as many hours of employment as they are willing or need to work. At least 18 million workers, many of whom reside in rural areas, are believed to be underemployed, and as unemployment rises, underemployment will probably become even more widespread.

At the same time, Indian officials have estimated that about 70% of present employment-seekers are without any professional or vocational training or even previous work experience. Thus, imbalances between the limited number of skilled and professional workers and suitable jobs in industry constitute another critical problem.

The largest part—about 70%—of India's labor force is employed in agriculture and activities related to the land. The agricultural economy has been unable to provide continuous work for the entire rural labor force and accounts for about 75% of the growth in unemployment. Although in much of India the

climate is sufficiently warm for year-round cultivation, there is not an adequate water supply and there has been only a limited use of irrigation, causing agriculture to be largely dependent on monsoons and restricting the practice of double-cropping. Intensity of agricultural employment, thus, varies according to the seasons. There is often an acute shortage of labor during peak agricultural seasons, while large numbers of workers remain unemployed or underemployed during the slack season (which lasts from 3 to 6 months). The seasonal aspect affects all classes of agricultural workers. Furthermore, with the rapid increase of population in rural areas, there is increasing unpaid family labor, and family plots are more often subdivided into areas too small to require hired help.

In areas where farmers can afford to take advantage of new agricultural technology, agricultural labor has been provided with fairly continuous work throughout the year. However, improved agricultural techniques have also caused problems in some areas since they have created at least temporary job shortages. The Indian Government favors the adoption of new farming methods and land reform. However, the government seems unable to keep up with the problems created by the undeveloped state of agriculture and the growing number of persons seeking employment in rural areas because of natural population increase, and its efforts have been largely ineffective.

Despite the pressures of unemployment and underemployment, village ties remain strong and the average Indian, especially one who owns a plot of land, is reluctant to migrate to the city. Nevertheless, as pressures increase due to the labor surplus in rural areas, agricultural labor is slowly being pushed toward nonagricultural employment, which is found mostly in the cities. The increasing number of landless laborers has been an additional problem. Usually completely unskilled and frequently unfamiliar with the mechanics of modern living, they constitute a mobile element in the labor force. When they move to the city, the problems of social adjustment to city life and job placement in industry are particularly difficult. The overwhelming majority—about 80%—of these laborers are "untouchables" or members of the Scheduled Castes.

Unskilled or semiskilled migrant laborers seek work in factories, mines, construction projects, forest-clearing operations, and on plantations. Factory employees with any degree of job security are often joined by their families and become permanent urban residents, returning to the villages only for visits. The

30

tendency of workers to continue to consider their villages as their main home and return often for various purposes—holidays, weddings, visits with their families—results in a high rate of absenteeism and as much as a 60% annual turnover of the labor force in many factories. In order to cope with absenteeism, factories maintain large pools of surplus labor, many of whom frequently work fewer than 10 days a month.

A little under a fifth of the Indian labor force is engaged in manufacturing and in tertiary industry (trade, commerce, transport, and communications and other services). Within this sector, the greatest opportunities for employment seem to be in service-oriented work, particularly government service. The Indian bureaucracy has increased considerably since independence, especially at the local level, and is still growing rapidly. By 1968 almost 10 million people were employed by the government, both central and local, and almost 2 million were members of the armed forces and the police.

Another problc 1 is the increasing number of unemployed high school and university graduates who lack academic specialization or technical training. Unemployment among this group has reached significant proportions, numbering in the tens of thousands, although they represent only a fraction of the entire labor force. This group, which comes largely from that stratum of ociety which possesses the greatest political and economic power, is becoming more visible as its members tend to concentrate in the cities, where they constitute a potential source of social, economic, and political tension.

The government has several programs designed to alleviate the problems of unemployment and underemployment, although these fall considerably short of the need. An elaborate, but limited, system of vocational and technical training has been developed, and a determined effort has been made to expand the educational facilities for specialists in the more advanced areas of science and technology. The National Employment Service (NES) has gradual!ly expanded its activities to include the collection of employment market information (by law all business establishments employing 25 or more workers must inform the NES when they have job vacancies), vocational guidance and counseling, and the rehabilitation of physically handicapped workers. In June 1971 the service operated 434 Employment Exchanges and 48 University Employment Information and Guidance Bureaus. Most jobless persons, however, fail to use the services of the NES; probably only about 10% to 20% of the hard-core unemployed use the NES. Although the scope of its activities and the number of exchanges has been gradually

expanded, the NES is mainly concerned with unemployment in urban areas and has not tackled the even greater problem of rural unemployment. Moreover, the exchanges can only recommend workers for va nt jobs, and most of the vacancies require greater skills than the vast majority of the unemployed can provide.

Besides the factors which affect jobseekers in most countries—job availability, training, experience—caste can play a role in the Indian worker's search for employment. In addition, he may face discrimination on the basis of color, religion, language, or other factors which divide Indians into myriad groupings.

Theoretically, every caste has a traditional or hereditary occupation in which its members are engaged and from which it derives rank in the social and religious hierarchy. In practice, however, caste restrictions are not rigidly observed and it is doubtful that there ever was a perfect correlation between caste and occupation, although there has always been more correlation in rural than in urban areas. In the villages today, with an evergrowing population, the number of caste members engaged in their occupation, particularly if it is connected with service, often becomes too large for local requirements and some members must either change their work or leave the area to find employment. In addition, the availability of manufactured goods reduces the local need for certain services.

New occupations have arisen, however, through urbanization and industrialization, and Indians of different castes now work in the same factory or industry, or at the same occupation. Further, training, aptitude, and preference and acceptance by fellow workers tend to build new caste priorities in new occupations. This is especially true in urban areas where the clustering of occupational groups occurs. Members of similar castes whose former occupational specialties and social rank have been lost regain their status by forming new caste groups and establishing new rules of behavior.

Considerable regional discrimination in employment opportunities exists even for those who are linguistically well qualified for employment outside their own region. No one group bears the brunt of this discrimination. Rather it tends to be manifested by one regional group against another, often with caste overtones. It is, for example, exceedingly difficult for a Madrasi to obtain employment, outside of government service, in the north and equally difficult for a Punjabi to obtain employment in the south or east. Since so few jobs are available, the tendency for the employer is often to think of family, caste, or region first.

31

Members of various non-Hindu minority groups are also discriminated against, but it is almost impossible to pinpoint many cases. Muslims, for the most part, have difficulty obtaining employment in the security and defense services. Very often the degree of discrimination will depend on the caste and regional background of the responsible official and is very difficult to prove.

There is a definite color bias among Indians, with fair skin being preferred. This is manifested primarily in social relationships but has been a factor especially when dark-skinned southerners migrate to northern urban centers seeking employment.

As women have received more education, restrictions on their employment have decreased, although in rural India women still adhere largely to traditional occupations such as agriculture. Today, women with necessary skills appear to have an equal chance for obtaining employment in most industries, professions, government services, and businesses. Women constitute about one-fifth of the labor force in India but nearly 80% of them are employed in agriculture. In pre-independence India, women who worked in the industrial labor force were mostly employed in the textile industry.

b. Attitudes

As caste restrictions on choice of occupation have been slowly disappearing, there has been a gradual liberalization in the attitudes of Indians toward occupations other than traditional caste endeavors. While particular status and prestige are attached to white-collor jobs, the average Indian, whether rural or urban, is willing to work at almost any occupation so long as he can rationalize it as being neither demeaning nor disagreeable. Rural Indians are willing to leave the land or the village, albeit often reluctantly, if they perceive an opportunity to earn a living at another endeavor. Most caste Hindus, however, shun the most menial jobs. Accordingly, these tasks are still left to the Scheduled Castes, although the government has attempted to open new opportunities for them.

Educational level affects the attitude of most Indians toward the occupation they choose. The higher the educational level the less willing an Indian is to engage in blue-collar labor. Highly educated Indians tend to abhor manual labor and avoid returning to rural areas for employment. Among educated Indians who have not gone beyond high school, however, the old distaste for manual work is gradually disappearing. While status is still an important consideration to them, the sharp line, based

on income, that used to divide the working class from the middle class is becoming blurred as salary levels for the blue-collar worker are increasing, often beyond those immediately attainable by the white-collar worker. In addition, higher skills and educational requirements expected of workers in modern factories have tended to further obscure the traditional distinction between manual and nonmanual workers. Indian society seems to be acquiring a better sense of the dignity of labor. There seems to be a greater sense of equality among workers and also between the supervisory group on the one hand and workers on the other. As workers send their children to school and college, and these offspring enter the labor force, traditional distinctions and attitudes have tended to erode.

2. Working conditions and wages

Standards of industrial safety and sanitation remain very low. Costly worker benefits dilute the resources available to management for much-needed plant expansion or modernization. The central and state governments continue to pass legislation intended to improve conditions, and occasionally attempt to induce private firms to meet minimum standards, but they have not set the pace by significantly improving the working conditions in the public sector factories which are under their control.

The Indian workers are largely apathetic toward efforts to improve conditions. Many of those engaged in primary production are neither aware of nor receptive to new methods. The small minority of the labor force employed in organized manufacturing— 4% of the working force in 1961—is relatively less skilled than Western industrial workers and largely illiterate or barely literate. Many workers actually resist new safety and sanitation measures because they regard them as too cumbersome. Others tolerate unsatisfactory working conditions because of job insecurity.

The unrest which has been observed among various segments of the labor force has been caused by dissatisfaction over lack of employment opportunities, unemployment, underemployment, and low wages. Government employees, both central and state, have long been dissatisfied with their wages, which they claim have not kept pace with industry. While the situation of some industrial workers may be better than that of government employees, the industrial worker may be relatively no better off than he was in the early 1960's because although money wages have increased, real earnings have not kept pace. A number of supplemental allowances, included "dearness" or

32

cost-of-living allowances, bonuses and fringe benefits have been more important to the industrial worker than the base wage—which remains constant and is usually low—and there has been agitation to increase them. Allowances sometimes exceed the amount of base pay.

Unskilled urban labor is hired at the worksite or supplied by labor recruiters who enlist workers from the village. The recruiters, or "jobbers," are generally paid a lump sum by management and assume full responsibility for paying, supervising, disciplining, and firing the workers they recruit. They are reported to sometimes exact bribes from would-be workers and persons already in their charge.

Agricultural workers generally earn less than unskilled industrial laborers. The overabundance of rural labor, scarcity of work. and willingness of women and children to work for very low wages depress the agricultural wage level. Agricultural workers have limited bargaining power due to inferior social status, debt obligations, and lack of organization. In addition, wages vary with weather, crop conditions and general levels of prices and prosperity. Payment is made either wholly or partly in kind for over half the man-days worked, cash wages being more prevalent in areas where cash crops predominate. About a third of the laborers receive meals, tobacco, clothing, coffee, or tea from their employers. Workers hired for a specific time are generally paid part of their wages in advance and the remainder at the end of the contract period. Seasonal workers are occasionally recruited and hired in groups, in which case payment is often made in lump sum to the group leader or recruiter. This practice has also been subject to abuse.

The Indian Government officially considers the working age of the labor force to be between 15 and 50. However, in 1961 about 14% of all economically active persons were either younger or older. The legal minimum working age for children varies from 12 on plantations to 14 in factories and 15 in mines. Most of the employed youths below the age of 15 work in agriculture or related industries. Workers above the age of 59 are spread more evenly through the major occupational fields, although they are somewhat less prevalent in organized manufacturing, construction, transport and communications than in other fields.

3. Labor organizations

a. The trade union movement

The role and influence of labor in India is not comparable to the situation in the industrialized states of the West. Labor in India is poorly organized and financed, lacks clearly identifiable policies and programs, and is beset with intense union rivalries. There is a multiplicity of unions, virtually all politically oriented, having only secondary interest in the actual welfare of trade union members, and operating in a situation dominated by the government bureaucracy. Organized labor's capacity for disruption is considerable. but it has little corresponding ability to contribute to stable institutions.

Trade unionism in India, which began after World War I, was first officially recognized by the government with the passage of the Indian Trade Union Act in 1926. This conferred legal status on registered trade unions and outlined their rights, obligations, and privileges. According to the provisions of the act, groups of seven or more workers can form a union and register with the state Registrar of Trade Unions, provided that half the officeholders are actually engaged in the industry involved. A 1947 amendment to the act requires that employers recognize registered unions and regard union officers as legitimate negotiating representatives of the union membership.

In 1970 India had a total estimated trade union membership of between 4 and 5 million. This represented only about 2.5% of the total labor force. but about 30% of all potentially organizable workers who received wages and salaries. About half of the trade union members were affiliated with the four major national federations that dominate the Indian labor scene. The federations have evolved from a series of secessions, splits, and reconciliations which have marked the turbulent history of the Indian trade union movement since 1929. The basic unit in trade union organization is the single plant union, in which all skills are represented; craft unionism is little known or practiced. Union organization has followed a vertical pattern with loose, politically oriented federations at the top, and with local unions retaining their organizational structure and substantial decisionmaking powers. The four national federations are primarily coordinating bodies, although they have the power to negotiate with employers' organizations and to make representations to the government on important matters. Interunion coordinating committees or trade councils have developed in the larger industrial centers, but these have been largely *ad hoc* arrangements for a specific purpose, usually for a general strike, and have not survived on a continuing basis. As a consequence of this lack of horizontal organization, the national unions have not become as strong as they might be.

33

Indian trade unions are still heavily dependent upon political parties and governmental largess for achievement of their objectives. The current status of India's economic development is such that most unions cannot hope to obtain sufficient benefits for their members. Since much of an Indian worker's income derives from governmental action rather than from agreements made with employers, the unions have come to rely on political parties to protect the workers' interests and to obtain government favors. On their part, the parties often embody union aims within their broader purposes, albeit with varying degrees of commitment and effectiveness. They provide patronage in the form of appointments to key committees which shape government labor policy, to various government boards, commissions and even top government positio s, and in addition perform favors which enhance or stabilize the union's position with the membership. In return, unions supply to "their" party varying measures of mass support, rank-and-file leadership cadres, and even potential party leaders. However, it is the financial weakness of the unions that places them in the position of subordination to the parties. Compromises have been reached at least temporarily between most trade unions and various political parties, but these relationships are more beneficial to the parties than to the workers. It is only such relatively highly skilled, experienced and well-educateu groups as aircraft technicians, pilots, and railroad station managers whose independent unions have enough strength to obviate the need for political party support. As of 1973, these craft unions were too few in number to have a significant effect on the labor unions was a whole.

Although trade unions do not have much political influence and do not significantly affect political institutions or events in India, they have an indirect effect on the Indian political scene. Political parties keep close contact with those trade union leaders who have demonstrated political effectiveness. These men represent a potential source of political leadership and often have been called upon to serve within the parties—to the detriment of the unions they have deserted. The politicians are also wary of the political influence that trade union leaders could exert if unions should become a more important factor in Indian society. Moreover, any disruption in industrial relations could have political consequences with national ramifications should the degree of disruption become too great. Party leaders, accordingly, maintain close contacts with union leaders in order to avoid or minimize labor discontent. Workers join unions despite their ineffective performance because there is no other alternative in the current Indian context. The

worker does not appear to be permanently attracted to the party-controlled union, however, and when better prospects arise, he may shift his allegiance.

b. Major labor organizations

India's largest trade union federation is the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), founded in 1947 under the auspices of the Congress Party. At the time of the latest available government verification of membership claims (December 1966), INTUC's verified membership—1,405,465—was more than that of the other three major national federations combined. In 1970 INTUC had over 2,000 affiliated unions, about half of which were in the textile industry and on the plantations. It is also active in other industries, including mining, chemicals, iron and steel, cement, sugar, engineering and road transport, but it is by no means alone in these spheres. Because of its close ties with the Congress Party, INTUC has supported the government's pleas to present demands for wage increases to established governmental authority rather than resort to strikes and slowdowns. It opposes undue concentration of economic power and exploitation of workers and advocates nationalization of industry, participation of workers in management and improved working conditions, but its approach to overcoming the problems of a free trade union movement has been generally ineffective. INTUC's consistently moderate stance has rendered it susceptible to defection by those who prefer more militant policies which stress aggressive trade unionism and less government interference. INTUC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Following the Congress Party split in November 1969, INTUC seemed headed toward more independence from political control. Since then it has shown a tendency to cooperate with other labor organizations and has, in fact, announced a program of cooperation at the local level with the *Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (the Indian Labor Congress). For INTUC to achieve total independence from party ties, however, will be difficult if not impossible, as its strength and effectiveness are derived from its relationship to the government through the Congress Party—rather than from grass-roots support among the workers—and from the support it can garner from its political benefactors. Despite the formidable problems it faces and the unique labor environment in which it must operate, INTUC is the largest and most representative organization of workers in India and is seriously taken into account in the political and economic planning of the government.

34

The second largest officially recognized trade union federation, the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), which is controlled by the Communist Party of India (CPI), is considerably smaller than INTUC in terms of membership—432,852 verified members in 1966—but it is probably the most influential labor organization in India. In its attempts to exploit worker grievances to further its political role, it has consistently made attractive but extreme demands in the economic field. Its leaders have encouraged the workers to strike over the smallest grievance, and its affilitates were responsible for a considerable amount of the more violent agitation that shook the Indian labor scene in the late 1960's. ALTUC holds a predominant position in such industries as engineering, cement, and petroleum, and has significant pockets of strength in some port, textile, mining, road transport, and steel mill trade organizations. It has set up so-called "independent" unions and has used them to penetrate some public sector industries; these unions are particularly strong in public sector banking, insurance, and defense establishments. AITUC is affiliated with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.

Until May 1970 AITUC's chief importance was that it was the only mass organization in which both wings of the Indian Communist movement—the CPI and the Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPM)—were united. At that time, the CPM-backed minority of the leaders, who considered the Soviets to be "revisionists" but declared their independence from Peking, withdrew their affiliates, numbering about 30% of AITUC members, and formed the Center of Indian Trade Unions (CITU). CITU has become the largest and most powerful force in organized labor in West Bengal, controlling about 80% of the former AITUC membership in that state. With limited influence in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, and slight influence in Punjab and Maharashtra, CITU is by no means a labor organization of national dimensions, and has not been formally recognized as such.

Although as a result of the split AITUC's influence over labor has been eroded somewhat and its effectiveness decreased, these weaknesses may have been overcome by its potential to act without the constraints of internal dissension and to foster its policies of joint action with non-Communist unions. While neither AITUC nor CITU has taken a firm stand on actual unification of all trade unions, both have publicly advocated unity of action by all labor groups. The AITUC's action in this regard has been hampered by its inability to reach a prior understanding with CITU. The AITUC has, nevertheless remained the dominant labor organization in India in terms of ability to call strikes and agitate for economic and political reasons.

The *Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (Indian Labor Congress—HMS) grew rapidly as a national federation in the mid-1960's. In 1966 the HMS, with a verified membership of 433,015, for the first time surpassed AITUC as the second largest federation. Since that time its growth has leveled off. HMS political allegiances have been more diffuse than those of the other major federations. Before the merger of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) with the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) into the Socialist Party (SP) in 1971, HMS was oriented toward the rightwing PSP. Its relationship to that party, however, was tenuous, and some of the top leadership as well as the rank and file came from the leftwing SSP and from the extreme leftwing of the Congress Party. Basically the membership of the HMS has consisted of socialist trade unionists who have rejected the approaches of both the Congress Party and the Communists to labor problems. The HMS is predominant among waterfront and railroad workers and has some strength in mining, plantation labor, chemicals, sugar, and steel.

The HMS has had a number of impressively able organizers who have succeeded in building up solid organizations with wide-scale worker support. Nevertheless, its lack of discipline and national cohesion have limited its influence. Perhaps in a move to alter this position, the HMS has advocated the need for unity among all trade unions. In mid-1971 it was actively engaged an attempt to unite with INTUC and AITUC to form one organization. As a result of these efforts, HMS and INTUC have announced a program of cooperation at the local level and have formed a joint council of five representatives from each union at the national level. By early 1972 INTUC, HMS, and AITUC had met to discuss the framework for a new industrial relations system. Although nothing conclusive has emerged, continuing HMS efforts to foster unity, as well as government encouragement and general agreement on the need for change, have had a conciliatory effect. Much enmity—principally between the INTUC and AITUC—must be overcome, however, before unity can be achieved. Like the INTUC, the HMS is a member of the ICFTU.

The United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), the fourth nationally recognized federation, is much smaller than the other three and is largely limited to nonrail transport workers in West Bengal and Kerala.

35

Its political orientation is that of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)—a small deviationist Communist group. UTUC is fully controlled by the RSP, serves as its trade union base, and always supports its candidates. Both organizations share the same leadership. UTUC is unimportant except in terms of its political influence in West Bengal; it had 93,454 verified members in 1966.

There are a few other labor organizations which are not recognized formally by the central government but which have some membership in specific areas. The *Hind Mazdoor Panchayat* (Indian Labor Council—HMP), previously controlled by the SSP, is the most active of those organizations. The HMP, centered in Bombay, claimed 100,000 members in 1970 but probably had only about 50,000. The *Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh* (Indian Workers Organization—BMS), the labor arm of the Hindu nationalist *dana Sangh* party, claimed a membership of over 200,000 in 1970 and, despite its Hindu communal outlook, appeared to have made some advances, especially in the Bombay area, in the cotton textile a..d railroad industries. There is also the conservative Coordinating Committee of Independent Trade Unions (CCITU), which is oriented toward and financed by the Swatantra Party, and the *Bharatiya Kamgar Sena* (Indian Laborers' Army—BKS), which is sponsored by the militant Bombay organization, *Shiv Sena*. A more genuinely self-sustaining group is the Indian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (IFITU), whose membership and strength are so small as to prove its lack of sponsorship by political parties.

In 1970 over 1 million trade unionists in India belonged to plant and industry unions which were not affiliated with any national federated body. In some cases various local units have such differing political tendencies that no group wishes to cause dissension by suggesting an affiliation. In other cases, such as the various unions of government employees, overt affiliation with a national organization controlled by a political party would be illegal. In still other instances, the unions are company-dominated or in a few cases are genuinely independent of political parties. Even in these cases, however, the union leaders not infrequently have a political leaning or association which has some influence over the membership.

c. Management organizations

Management, which in the past tended to be either highly individualistic or linked into large industrial family empires, has since 1947 shown a tendency to organize more formally. This has occurred partly as a defense against increasingly strict government curbs

on construction, expansion, ii iports, exports, and expenditures of foreign exchange. Also responsible have been the government's growing insistence on the implementation of labor welfare measures and its efforts to coordinate industrial developments through tripartite conferences and committees involving government, private management, and organized labor.

Most important among the hundreds of management associations are the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and its offshoot the All-India Organization of Industrial Employers, the All-India Management Association, and the All-India Manufacturers Organization (all with headquarters in New Delhi), the Millowners Association of Bombay and its offshoot, the Employers Federation of India (officially recognized as the most representative organization of employers in India), and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Calcutta. These organizations represent management interests on most official bodies concerned with national labor policy and attempt to influence the application of legislative or administrative regulations. In addition they maintain an exchange of views at the national level as well as close contacts on a more personal basis at the state and local level. The effectiveness of these management organizations varies considerably, but through their overlapping connections they have considerable influence on the character and direction of government policy and controls.

d. Industrial relations

The fundamental prerequisites for labor peace are lacking in India, and since the mid-1960's the country has experienced a high level of disruptive labor unrest and agitation. India lacks both a really workable procedure for determining the collective bargaining agent and an effective grievance procedure at the plant level. Moreover, there is insufficient acceptance by employer and government groups of the existence of unions as a force to be reckoned with. Firm limits of governmental action in labor disputes have also not been established. Rising prices, economic recession, and fierce trade union rivalries further aggravate this already bad situation.

Collective bargaining as it is understood in the United States, in the sense of agreements voluntarily reached as the result of direct negotiations between the union and management, has not made much progress in India. From management's point of view, the multiplicity of unions, with different and often opposing political party affiliations, makes it very

36

difficult to arrive at any real agreement. If an agreement is made with one union, worker-members of unions not party to the negotiation often do not consider themselves bound by the decision, and in most cases they will oppose it. From the union's point of view, the lack of progress in collective bargaining is attributable to the employers' unwillingness to recognize the unions or deal with them as equals. Indian law compels the employer to recognize registered unions, but many are not registered. Further, there is no established mechanism to determine which of the competing unions in a given plant is the most representative and therefore entitled to be the bargaining unit with which the employer should deal. The result is that in many cases management fails to recognize any union, and its relations with the workers differ little from management-worker relations in nonunion shops.

Most agreements are applicable only at the plant or company level but in many cases involve more than one trade union. The central government has endorsed the principle of collective bargaining, but it has also sanctioned compulsory arbitration and justified its action on the grounds of maintaining industrial peace in the interests of protecting its economic development program. The government has recognized that there is no real parity of bargaining power between labor and management because of the low level of wages, generally bad working conditions, and large numbers of unemployed and underemployed among the workers. As one step toward correcting this imbalance, the government has imposed minimum provisions wherever possible, either through legislation or arbitration awards, with regard to both wages and working conditions.

The central government has also fostered both voluntary and legal machinery at different levels to promote direct discussions between labor and management on labor problems. These include: labor welfare officers paid by management in establishments with 500 or more workers; conciliation officers attached to labor courts and industrial arbitration tribunals; joint works committees in industrial establishments with 100 or more workers; tripartite industry wage boards, set up by the government on a regional or national level; and various tripartite bodies advisory to the government, such as the permanent Indian Labor Conference and its executive body, the Standing Labor Committee.

Collective bargaining is implicit in varying degrees in all of these devices. For instance, on the 22 national industry wage boards, labor and management "bargain" in recommending wage scales and working conditions in the industries for which the boards are

set up. On many wage boards a fourth member, representing the general public and consumer as distinct from the government, acts as a go-between in reaching compromise decisions. The decisions of the wage boards, however, do not have the force of law, and nonimplementation and tardy implementation have frequently been the causes of serious strikes. It is increasingly becoming the practice not to submit unanimous recommendations, thus opening the way under Indian practice for the central government to amend such recommendations to conform to its own judgments. However, when these amendments themselves become the subject of unrest and agitation, the government is virtually helpless since—like the original recommendation—the amendments are not legally binding.

The majority of collective bargaining agreements are in the nature of settlements reached under conciliation or arbitration. Agreements reached solely through direct negotiations between employers and labor are in a minority and are not legally binding. Many matters that in the United States would be subject to collective bargaining are grouped into a package called "standing orders." These are subject to collective bargaining only for improvement above the minimum specified in the model orders set up by law in each state. Under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946, all establishments with a minimum of 100 workers are required to draft standing orders to be certified by the state government shortly after operations commence. These specify the conditions of employment and among other things cover working hours, shifts, holidays, vacation, sick leave, conditions governing termination of employment, and established grievance procedures. Each state has legislated its own rules implementing the act and setting forth the state's version of model standing orders which serve as general guidelines.

The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 with subsequent amendments establishes machinery for insuring an active governmental role in labor-management relations. This machinery consists of works committees, conciliation officers, boards of conciliation and/or courts of inquiry, provision for voluntary arbitration labor courts, industrial tribunals, and national tribunals. The effectiveness of all this complicated machinery has been seriously limited by lack of clear definition of areas of responsibility and by union rivalries, the high costs sometimes involved, and the protracted delays that are very often involved.

An Industrial Truce Resolution, adopted by management and labor following the Chinese invasion of October 1962, significantly reduced labor disorders for a period of time. Initially the number of

37

man-days lost because of labor disputes fell sharply. By the end of 1963, however, mutual charges of bad faith between labor and management had rendered the truce virtually a dead letter. Since then, the number of man-days lost has been increasing each year.

Trade union rivalries are a major cause for this high incidence of strikes, and added to this have been a steep rise in prices, an industrial recession, and unsettled political situations in several states. Workers have frequently gone on strike in an effort at least to hold their existing real wages, and they have achieved a substantial measure of compensation for the steady rise in prices. In the process, however, the need to revise the lopsided wage structure, where the cost-of-living allowance is often three times the actual basic wage, has been relegated to the background.

Another major demand by labor relates to the payment of bonuses. Bonus payments were introduced during the high profit years of World War I. By 1923 they had become so firmly established that efforts by textile employers to end them provoked an industrywide strike. Industrialists argue that the bonus, which is usually paid during the fall festival season, is actually a distribution of excess profits, but workers consider it to be a regular part of their earnings payable regardless of profit. The findings of a tripartite Bonus Commission, published in January 1964, and legislation passed by Parliament in 1965 failed to satisfy either labor or management.

Automation, affecting mainly white-collar workers, has become a serious issue, particularly in the banking and insurance industries but also in many other areas including the public sector railroads. After much delay, the government finally conceded to labor's demand for a special session of the tripartite Indian Labor Conference to consider all aspects of automation. This session, which was held in July 1968, did little to resolve the issue.

There has also been widespread unrest among a large section of the other white-collar workers— teachers, engineers, office employees, government workers, and others—who have made strenuous efforts to secure higher wage settlements. Many of these groups have won increases in cost-of-living allowances but not without resorting to strikes and slowdowns.

The government's role in the maintenance of industrial peace appears increasingly to have become one of helplessness and anguish. Recognizing the very real need for a fresh approach to the growing industrial relations problem, the government appointed a National Commission on Labor (NCL) in December 1966 to study and make recommendations on a broad range of endemic labor problems.· In

August 1969 the NCL submitted a majority report with dissenting notes from labor members. The report emphasized the need for bipartite collective bargaining and voluntary arbitration and recommended the creation of separate, permanent, independent, and quasi-judicial Industrial Relations Commissions (IRC) at the national and state levels. The NCL recommendations, as of early 1972, were still being studied by the government and are still the subject of active debate.

At the national level both labor and management appear firm in their desire for free collective bargaining and have apparently succeeded in pressuring the government into taking important steps in this area. There has been some resistance, however, at the local level from unions which prefer adjudication. Although industrial disputes in 1971 were at a record high level, a few labor-management agreements were reached without government participation and the pattern seemed to be developing significant support.

Management attitudes toward labor continue to be diverse, with a large majority of enterprises still being managed by entrepreneurs who appear to be as exploitative as those of a century ago. However, an increasing number of Indian businesses are being managed by enlightened professionals who favor modern management techniques to improve production and realize that low wages and poor working conditions do not automatically benefit employers. There is an increasing desire on the part of management as well as labor for speedier governmental consideration of the NCL recommendations, which both sectors hope will lead to effective legislation.

4. Labor legislation

The Indian constitution delegates to both national and state governments concurrent authority in matters relating to trade unions, industrial disputes, social security, employment, wages, and labor welfare. It gives the central government a special mandate to regulate labor practices and safety conditions in mines and oilfields. It directs the national and state governments to protect the health of workers, to insure living wages, to bring about working conditions consistent with a "decent standard of life," and to press for equal wages for men and women doing equal work. Article 23 of the constitution prohibits traffic in human beings and forced labor.

Some labor laws promulgated by the preindependence government of British India remain in force. Many of these were the result of labor unrest following World War I, together with pressure for social reform

38

stemming from India's association with the International Labor Organization. Such legislation, passed in the 1930's, was designed to provide some regulation of industrial working conditions and a modicum of protection of workers' rights, while holding direct government intervention in the private sector of the economy to a minimum.

Since World War II, the central government has been far more active in labor matters. Despite this increased interest, the impact of labor legislation upon the work force remains relatively limited. Much of the legislation enacted by the central government is of an enabling character. It depends for implementation on legislation that is passed by individual states to provide substantive details and enforcement rules. Rules and regulations for any particular act vary among the different states and to a degree reflect the level of industrial development and particular economic needs of India. Most of the laws relate to industrial workers in nonagricultural fields, and therefore do not apply to the largest part of the labor force. Moreover, enforcement of the legislation, which is a state responsibility, is often lax and varies greatly from state to state. Generally, enforcement has been easier and more effective in areas of industrial concentration, especially at larger plants where unions are more likely to exert pressure. The government acknowledges that there is considerable room for improvement in the implementation of labor laws, and lays blame for the shortcomings on inadequate penalties for violations and on deficiencies in the staffing and equipment of labor inspectorates. The bribing of factory inspectors, most of whom are employees of state governments, probably also enables the management of many companies to avoid compliance with the law.

Several central government acts concern conditions of employment in manufacturing and certain nonmanufacturing industries. They establish health and safety standards, maximum hours of work, and conditions for the employment of women and children. In general they prescribe a weekly day of rest, an annual paid vacation, a 48- to 54-hour workweek for adults, and shorter hours for children. The most far-reaching of these laws is the Factories Act of 1948, which applies to all factories using power-driven equipment and employing 10 or more persons and also to nonpowered factories having 20 or more employees. By 1966 the act extended to about 4.7 million workers in just over 65,000 factories.

Other similar acts include the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, the Mines Act of 1952, and the Indian Railways Act of 1890, as amended through 1957, the

Merchant Shipping Act of 1958, and the Motor Transport Workers Act of 1961. Separate state legislation governs conditions of employment in the shops and commercial establishments of virtually all the states and union territories. The Contract Labor Act of 1970 regulates the working conditions of contract labor for the first time, but much still must be done to enforce the law. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946 requires employers to publish "standing orders"—i.e., detailed sets of rules patterned on models issued by the government. The legislation is inadequately enforced, however, even in government-owned enterprises.

The employment of children in workshops and certain transport industries is regulated by the Employment of Children Act of 1938. It prohibits the hiring of children below the age of 15 in railroad and port occupations, and below the age of 14 in workshops connected with carpet weaving, cement manufacture, cloth printing, dyeing and weaving, the manufacture of matches, and certain other activities. The regulations do not apply, however, to children employed in workshops owned and operated by their own families. States are empowered to expand the coverage of the act and make rules for its implementation. Enforcement is a state responsibility, and it is sporadic. Another act concerning children is the Pledging of Labor Act of 1933, which outlaws the pledging by parents of their children's labor in satisfaction of a debt or other obligation (Figure 22).

The Indian Government has promulgated several laws relating to worker compensation and welfare. The Payment of Wages Act of 1936, as amended in 1957 and 1964, requires the prompt and regular payment of salaries (at least monthly) and regulates the types of deductions and fines that can be levied against salaries. It applies to all enterprises covered by the Factories Act, as well as to air, rail, port, and motor transport employees, and to construction and oilfield workers. State governments have extended the coverage of the act to other industrial establishments.

The Minimum Wages Act of 1948 requires the central and state governments to establish minimum wage rates in specifically designated industries employing 1,000 or more workers. The Employees' State Insurance Act of 1948 provides for sickness, maternity, and work-connected injury benefits for workers earning less than Rs400 (US$84 at the pre-1966 exchange rate) in factories using power and employing over 20 workers. The act is administered through an autonomous Employees State Insurance Corporation, which is run by representatives from government, labor, and management and funded by

39

FIGURE 22 Children carrying bundles on the road to Agra, near Delhi

E. Living conditions and social problems

1. Material welfare

operational holdings is only 6.3 acres. Despite considerable legislation in the states and encouragement from the central government, land reform has been uneven and rather poorly enforced. According to a government report on land tenure, about 23% of the farmers in 1961 were tenants. The incidence of tenancy was highest in the Punjab and Bihar (37%), Kerala (31%), and Mysore (25%), reflecting the very uneven pace of land reform in the various states. About 82% of the tenants and sharecroppers still did not have permanence of tenure—being either tenants-at-will and subject to the landlord's right of resumption, or enjoying only temporary protection from eviction. These so-called "disguised tenancies" were fairly widespread throughout the country and were a major impediment to effective implementation of land reform and the Congress Party's avowed objective of "land to the tiller." The most redeeming feature of agrarian reform in India, according to reports, is the near abolition of landholdings in which tenancy rights belong to intermediate landlords rather than to those occupying the land. Variations of this type of landholding, called zamindari, jagir, and inams, covered nearly half of the country before independence in 1947, but in 1961 comprised only 1.75% of the total family holdings. The ryotwari system, or plot proprietorship with the right of occupancy, is now the most prevalent form of landownership in India.

Despite comprehensive legislation passed by several state governments, the eviction of tenants continues through the fraudulent device of "voluntary surrenders." Moreover, the fair rent provisions of enacted legislation are not being effectively enforced in all cases. Ceilings on landholdings, which have been on the statute books of most states for about 10 years, frequently have been evaded through fictitious transfers and partitions and through formation of family cooperatives. In addition, there has been little enforcement of land ceiling legislation.

The agricultural economy is unable to provide continuous work for the entire agricultural force, and in most of the country there is heavy and increasing population pressure on the land. The rapid growth of population and the relatively slow growth of nonagricultural employment opportunities in the rural areas has caused large-scale migrations from rural to urban areas. Special programs were begun in 1961 to strengthen the local economy and increase rural purchasing power. Also, facilities are being developed to train rural youth in nonagricultural trades so as to reduce their dependence on the land. By 1970, landless laborers had been settled on some 12 million acres acquired through the imposition of ceilings on

landholdings and reclamation of former wastelands. The plight of the Indian farmer is being gradually improved in some areas through new central and state government programs aimed at improving farm efficiency and promoting agricultural development. Supporting services such as research, extension, vocational education, farmers training, credit, and marketing are also being developed.

In spite of ambitious efforts by the government to promote economic development, inflation and rapid expansion of the population have frustrated widespread improvement in individual standards of living. The Planning Commission estimated that per capita income was about the equivalent of $70 (at the pre-1966 exchange rate) in FY1967/68 (1 April-31 March) and hoped that this could be raised to $85 by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan in March 1974. It was also estimated that per capita private consumption was about the equivalent of $64 in FY1967/68, and it was hoped that this could be raised to $73 by FY1973/74. Generally the rural people made less money and spent less than the minority living in urban areas. Nearly 60% of total household consumption and 85% of the commodity consumption of Indian households is comprised of agricultural products or manufactures based on agricultural raw materials. Moreover, there are great differences in consumption (Figure 23). Some minor progress has

FIGURE 23. Consumption pattern, FY1967-68

41

also been made in providing more consumer goods. For instance, the availability of domestically produced cotton cloth rose from 11 meters per capita in 1951 to 13.4 meters in 1971. The manufacture of manmade fibers, almost unknown in 1951, added another 2.2 meters to the amount of cloth available per capita in 1971. Consumer goods are still in very short supply, however, especially in the rural areas, and their availability fluctuates widely in response to changes in industrial output. In 1971 only 113,000 of the approximately 570,000 rural villages were electrified, and in 1972 there were only about 1.4 million telephones in the country.

Most city dwellers in India are as badly off as many of the people who reside in the rural areas. The average urban wage-earning family spends nearly two-thirds of its budget on food. Most of the remainder goes for such essentials as clothing, housing, and fuel and very little, if anything, is left over for education, footwear, furniture, and occasional entertainment. Adequate housing, especially in the cities, is very scarce, and there has been virtually no improvement in the housing situation over the last decade. The government has been troubled by, but unable to do much about, the rapid growth of urban slums (Figure 24). Seriously blighted areas frequently spring up almost overnight as homeless migrants squat on public and private property and erect an assortment of cardboard, tarpaper, and tin hovels. Eviction is a slow process and is usually followed shortly thereafter by the reoccupation of the same space by another influx of homeless, poverty-stricken persons. Over half the families who live in permanent structures live in one room.

2. Crime and social problems

A multitude of factors, including economic stagnation, rising prices, urban crowding, limited


FIGURE 24. Slum conditions in Calcutta

42

employment opportunities, and communal antagonisms, have contributed to a noticeable rise in mob lawlessness since 1965. Open political agitation, student disorders, and full-scale rioting have been more frequent in this period than at any other time since independence. The penchant for demonstrations, often violent ones, has been deeply rooted in Indian society as a popular means of expressing dissatisfaction and receives almost casual acceptance from most Indians. Almost daily some group organizes a procession which takes to the streets carrying banners and shouting slogans. The police, anxious to keep crowds and processions under control, sometimes overreact by charging into crowds or by firing with little warning. Agitation over the official language issue was especially severe in Tamil Nadu State—then Madras—in 1965 and erupted there again in late 1967 and early 1968. The language disorders also sparked widespread mob violence across much of northern India. The 1967 general election occasioned an abnormal amount of political turbulence, and through early 1973 politically related violence has erupted periodically, especially in the major cities. The most serious such occasions have been the riots in West Bengal in November 1967 in connection with the downfall of the state's leftist, Communist-led government, the politically inspired rioting in Bombay in early 1969, the communal rioting in Gujarat, and the communal rioting in Maharashtra in mid-1970.

Crimes of violence—apart from the periodic outbursts of communal violence—do not receive the attention of the press or the general public to any great degree. Such crimes, while not infrequent, do not appear to be so common as in the United States. Cases of robbery (theft accompanied by threats of violence) also do not appear to be as frequent as in the United States. On the other hand, petty crime, especially in the form of bribery and corruption, appears to be so widespread and so much a part of everyday life that many ostensibly illegal acts are not even thought of as illegal by many Indians. In part this reflects the use of Western standards to define illegal acts that are, within the Indian societal context, not traditionally regarded as such. Thus, for instance, nepotism is not regarded by most Indians as wrong.

Statistics on crime are very incomplete and generally not very reliable indicators. As of 1970, incidents involving all forms of crime averaged about 4 million annually, and if the statistics are at all indicative this figure is probably higher today. Culpable homicide averages about 4.5 cases annually per 100,000 persons. About half of the important "cognizable crimes" annually reported—most of the more important criminal offenses that the police are

authorized by the Indian Penal Code to investigate without a magistrate's warrant—involve theft and housebreaking. Other prevalent crimes are rioting, cattle thefts, and criminal breach of trust.

Goondas are frequently blamed for much of the crime in the cities, especially during riots. According to the Bombay Commissioner of Police, the term *goonda* covers "girl-teasers, bullies, extortionists, hirelings, protection racketeers, bootleggers, gamblers, paramours of prostitutes, wagon looters, pickpockets, and burglars." In 1970, there were an estimated 25,000 professional *goondas* in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Kanpur alone. The police generally try to round up as many *goondas* as possible when mob violence threatens.

Juvenile crime is not common. Although in 1970 persons under 21 constituted more than half of the population, they committed only about 2.4% of the important "cognizable crimes," and a smaller percentage of crimes in general.

The use of narcotic drugs is fairly widespread, particularly in the northern sub-Himalayan area, but drug addiction is relatively rare. Most drug consumers use a diluted derivative of hemp. There is also some use of, and addiction to, opium, morphine, and cocaine. The legal sale of most narcotic drugs is limited to licensed shops, but control over the distribution of the cheap and plentiful hemp products is largely ineffectual. India is the world's largest producer and exporter of legal opium. The government effectively controls and supervises its production and illegal exports are believed to be minimal.

Regarding other social problems, there are no valid statistics on the extent of alcoholism, although it is undoubtedly considerably less of a problem than in the West. Complete or partial prohibition is in effect in most states, but a substantial quantity of alcohol is produced legally and illegally by organized industries and small family-run village distilleries. There are laws against immoral traffic in women and girls, but prostitution is nevertheless relatively open in large cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Beggary is a persistent and widespread problem, particularly in urban areas.

There has been no comprehensive study of suicide, but Gujarat State released a partial survey covering eight districts in the years 1960 through 1964. This study indicates an average annual suicide rate ranging from 5.5 to 19.7 self-initiated deaths per 100,000 persons. The suicide rate in the United States ranged between 10.3 and 10.8 per 100,000 persons in 1964-67.

3. Welfare programs

In drawing up its integrated 5-year development plans, the Indian Government has held the view that the hardships of even the most depressed classes can best be alleviated by accelerating the growth of the economy as a whole, thereby expanding job opportunities and generating the resources needed for better housing, nutrition, health, and welfare. Traditional attitudes and values which inhibit social consciousness are a substantial barrier to the growth and effectiveness of public and private social welfare activities. The government has made a sustained effort to promote organized social welfare activities, but as yet these touch only a relatively small portion of the population.

The Central Social Welfare Board, a semiautonomous body established in 1953, is responsible for surveying the needs of social welfare organizations, evaluating their programs, and coordinating assistance from the central and state governments. At the state level, there are Social Welfare Advisory Boards that assist the central organization in the formulation of its policies and explain its programs to voluntary organizations.

The Central Social Welfare Board is involved in a wide variety of programs, including grants to private organizations, the establishment of rural and urban extension centers, and special projects to assist underprivileged women and children. The most ambitious program undertaken has been the establishment of rural welfare extension centers to be eventually turned over to private organizations. By 1970, over 2,000 rural centers had been established to provide preschool child care, maternity and infant health services, literacy training and social education for women, arts and crafts instruction, and recreational activities; over 1,400 of these centers had been turned over to local women's groups and other private organizations, with government grants provided for their continued operation. In addition, the government had established over 2,300 similar rural centers in connection with its community development program. Similar services were provided to urban areas through some 66 urban welfare extension centers. Twenty-two night shelters had been set up in several cities for homeless persons. Literacy training programs for adult women and rehabilitation courses for the handicapped were among the other specialized projects under the guidance of the Central Social Welfare Board. During the Fourth Five Year Plan (FY1969/70-1973/74) greater emphasis was given to destitute children.

43

Other government programs are designed to help certain particularly unfortunate groups. Some Rs2 billion (US$430 million, at the predevaluation rate) was spent during the first three 5-year plans (FY1951/52-1955/56) for special programs designed to improve the economic position and general welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. About 33% of the outlay between 1961 and 1970 was for education, while slightly more than 40% went toward economic improvement projects. The remainder was spent on a variety of health, housing, and other welfare programs.

The principal beneficiaries on a per capita basis were the Scheduled Tribes, whose 30 million members constituted about 7% of the population in 1961. During the Third Five Year Plan (FY1961/62-1965/66), Rs530 million (US$111 million) was spent on tribal programs, most of which were designed to reduce the economic isolation of the tribes and to provide improved means of earning a livelihood to those barely subsisting on primitive agriculture and hunting. Programs for 64.5 million Untouchables, who constituted about 15% of the population in 1961, cost Rs380 million ($80 million) during the Third Five Year Plan. Greater emphasis has been placed on education in the Scheduled Caste programs than in those for the tribes, with expenditures for this purpose accounting for nearly half of the outlay. Only about 15% of the Scheduled Caste expenditures between 1951 and 1970 were earmarked for economic projects. Special college-level scholarships are available to members of both groups. During the Third Five Year Plan, more than 300,000 of these annual grants were awarded to students belonging to Scheduled Castes and the tribes received nearly 55,000.

In addition to these continuing programs, the government is establishing institutions to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents, prostitutes, and beggars. Considerable attention has also been given to resettlement problems associated with the continuing influx of refugees. Government-sponsored social security and workingmen's compensation programs and medical care are still in their infancy and have been limited almost exclusively to certain categories of government and industrial workers and their families. Since 1964, the Central Social Welfare Board, in cooperation with the army, has developed and supported welfare centers and organized women's associations in the border districts of Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, and the Punjab. In 1970 there were reported to be 25 schools of social work in India; most of them were affiliated with universities, but some were

privately run. In addition, the government was conducting about 800 courses, in which from 16,000 to 18,000 persons were trained in various phases of social work. The central and state governments were also deeply involved in massive economic and educational development programs intended to contribute directly to the general well-being of the population.

Private welfare organizations have long functioned in India, although their influence tends to be relatively limited. Most of these are under the sponsorship of domestic and foreign religious groups, service organizations, and private trusts and endowments. Western missionaries have long been concerned with Indian health and education problems and still operate some of the best hospitals and secondary schools in the country. Organizations such as Rotary International sponsor hospital and medical care programs. Private hospitals, research institutes, and welfare homes operate under bequests from wealthy industrialists and others. The World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization, CARE, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have all contributed substantially to Indian health and welfare activities. India is affiliated with the International Red Cross and participates in the International Secretariat for Voluntary Service.

F. Health

The general level of public health in India is very low. Malnutrition and numerous debilitating diseases sap the energy of the populace and create an apathy which is in itself a major obstacle to progress. Competent medical and public health personnel are in short supply, as are modern medical facilities. The increasing needs of a rapidly growing population are absorbing all of the input into public health programs, while at the same time traditional social practices inimical to health are still widespread. The high illiteracy rate and the lack of adequate health education make it even more difficult to bring about a marked change of popular attitudes. In view of these serious difficulties, Indian health officials appear to have made remarkable progress since independence, although thus far only minor inroads have been made in the total problem.

1. General health conditions

The Indian climate ranges from cold in the northern Himalayas to hot and humid in the south. Most of the country is characterized, however, by tropical

44

monsoon conditions, with an extremely hot, dry spring, a hot, humid summer, and a cool, dry winter. In these regions health hazards vary with the season. Heat and dryness between April and mid-June cause water shortages and heat prostration, and duststorms often cause eye problems. The June through September monsoon rains bring flooding, water pollution, and epidemics of malaria, dengue, and filariasis. In most parts of the country, winters are not bitterly cold. In general, mortality from diseases appears to be the lowest in midwinter and the highest in late summer. The remoteness of many rural villages complicates the problems of establishing modern medical facilities in them and of treating emergency cases and epidemics.

A wide variety of fauna and flora constitute direct or indirect health hazards. Mosquitoes, flies, lice, ticks, and other disease-bearing insect pests abound. Parasitic worms cause a high incidence of filariasis, hookworm disease, trichinosis, and other disorders. Large numbers of stray dogs and jackals carry and spread rabies. There are more than 45 species of poisonous snakes in India. About 25,000 deaths are caused each year by snakebite, the highest mortality rate being in Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. The highest incidence is in the hot months. Poisonous lizards inhabit parts of India, and wild animals pose a continuing threat to the safety of forest dwellers in many areas. At least 28 species of plants causing severe dermatitis on contact grow in India. In addition, the pollen of many plants produces allergies in susceptible persons. There are over 700 species of poisonous plants, most of which are dangerous only when ingested.

The Indian water supply is drawn from perennial and intermittent rivers, springs, lakes, wells, rainwater cisterns, and tanks (or reservoirs). In addition, irrigation canals and streams serve as common sources of water. Water is generally available in the northern mountains and hills and in some plains areas. Lack of extensive storage facilities renders many parts of the country vulnerable to severe water shortages in exceptionally dry years, however. Except during the June-September southwest monsoon, desert and some plateau areas are without adequate water supplies. In central and southern India, ground water lies at depths of 30 feet or more and is difficult to tap. Many wells are dry during the hot, rainless months from March through early June. Little of the water consumed is adequately treated to remove pollutants, and most is contaminated to some degree. Even the major urban areas lack adequate and safe supply systems. Bacteriological testing is unreliable. Shortages

of chlorine, numerous breaks in the pipelines, and back siphonage caused by periodic drops in pressure contribute to the unsatisfactory condition of drinking water. Contamination is worst during the monsoon season, when flooding adds pollutants to exposed water sources.

Urban areas generally have some form of sewerage system, but nowhere is the system adequate (Figure 25). The increase in the number of urban dwellers is contributing further to the inadequacy of available sanitary facilities. Removal of excreta, refuse, and garbage is unsanitary and irregular. In some urban areas the bucket method of sewage disposal is used, with so-called "sweepers" removing the material by hand. In areas of heavy rainfall, open sewers are serious health hazards. Breakdowns in urban sewerage systems are frequent, and repair and maintenance inadequate. There is no organized waste removal in rural areas. Human excreta are deposited in the fields surrounding the village. Garbage is generally left to roving or domestic animals.

Food handling is generally unsanitary (Figure 26). Ingredients are often polluted, adulterated, or otherwise contaminated, and there is an inadequate sense of the importance of personal cleanliness among those preparing food. Only relatively prosperous Indians have proper storage facilities for perishable foods. In most homes, only such relatively nonperishable foodstuffs as grain and dried condiments are stored.

Poor nutrition increases the susceptibility of Indians to disease. Indian diets are usually unbalanced, regardless of wealth or social class. More than 90% of the average diet consists of grains, peas, beans, sugar, and oils and fats. Consumption of leafy vegetables is low, and meat is not eaten by many Hindus because of religious prohibitions. Milk is popular, but scarcity often results in dilution with polluted water. Surveys indicate that nearly two-thirds of the expectant mothers in the poorer sections of the community suffer from serious malnutrition. Although the average caloric intake has gradually increased over the years, it is still probably below the 2,300 calories estimated in the United States as the minimum average daily requirement, and protein deficiencies are acute in many areas. During the serious droughts of 1966 and 1967 protracted food shortages were experienced in most of the country and widespread famine was only narrowly averted through the import of large amounts of foodgrains. Substantial progress appears to have been made after 1968 toward increasing foodgrain production, but the drought in 1972 again caused lower production, creating serious food shortages in some areas.

45

FIGURE 25. Open sewerage ditch in a typical Calcutta slum

FIGURE 26. Unsanitary food handling: a New Delhi butcher

Ecological problems do not get top priority in India but they have been receiving more attention. Although some progress has been made in this area, there has been minimal funding available for necessary programs and city planning. Automobile smog has reached significant proportions in some areas, but a worse problem has arisen in cities such as New Delhi from soft-coke fires during times of the year when there is little wind. The smog from open-air coke production in Bihar and West Bengal has also been an increasing problem, as has smog around other industrial areas.

2. Major diseases

a. Diseases of man

Nearly all the tropical diseases except yellow fever are found in India. Major epidemic diseases include cholera, smallpox, influenza, infectious hepatitis, and childhood diseases (predominantly diphtheria). Newly recognized as health problems, either because of increased incidence or better diagnosis, are such diseases as poliomyelitis and schistosomiasis. Plague occurs, but the number of recorded deaths has declined to a relatively low level (under 1,000 per year). It is impossible to ascertain the incidence of

most diseases because a large proportion of cases go undetected and because registration of deaths is only fragmentary.

Enteric diseases are clearly the most prevalent. They are spread by unsanitary and unhygienic practices, impure drinking water, overcrowding in homes, and the great prevalence of flies. Shigellosis, amebiasis, and diarrhea are widespread and periodically occur in epidemic proportions. They cause an average of about 200,000 deaths annually. Their peak incidence is in the spring and fall, but outbreaks may occur at any time of the year. Food poisoning almost certainly results in many deaths, but these are not reliably reported. Eastern India near Calcutta is the world's main endemic focus of cholera, which causes an average of about 20,000 reported deaths in India each year. Cholera usually shows a marked increase in West Bengal during the spring months and spreads outward during the summer and early fall. West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and the area around Bombay generally record the highest incidence. Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers are widespread, probably affecting millions of people. An extensive eradication program launched in 1958 has greatly reduced the incidence of malaria. While the program's effectiveness has varied from area to area, in 1971 about 60% of the population had been

46

protected from the disease. Filariasis may well have surpassed malaria as the major mosquito-borne disease; it has been found to be far more prevalent than was previously believed. In 1971 it was estimated that sufferers numbered over 8 million.

Tuberculosis is another major health problem. In 1970 there were an estimated 6 to 7 million cases of active tuberculosis, of which 1.5 to 1.8 million were infectious. An estimated 500,000 persons die from tuberculosis each year. Influenza is a potential threat, and epidemics occur periodically, although the prevalent form seems to be mild. Pneumonia deaths undoubtedly occur in significant numbers, particularly in the mountainous areas of Kashmir, Sikkim, and northeastern India. Smallpox epidemics continue to cause a large number of deaths, even though the Indian Government reports substantial progress in its eradication program begun in 1962.

There were about 2.5 million leprosy cases in India in 1970. Although the government has established control programs, the incidence of leprosy does not appear to be declining. The interstate migration of lepers living as beggars—particularly near places of religious pilgrimage—helps to spread the disease. Trachoma is the major single cause of blindness in northern, western, and central India. It afflicts a large percentage of the inhabitants of the Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat. Other states having a high (but less than 50%) incidence of trachoma are Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, and Madhya Pradesh. Goiter affects about 9 million persons living in the narrow northern submountainous belt extending from Kashmir to Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. It has been estimated that between 5% and 10% of the total Indian population has venereal diseases.

The incidence of infectious hepatitis is high. The common vehicle of infection is water contaminated by raw sewage. Typhuses carried by lice, fleas, and ticks occur in various parts of the country, although there are no comprehensive statistics on the extent of these diseases. The poliomyelitis virus is present, but active cases are not common, largely because most Indians develop antibodies at a fairly early age. Diagnosed cases are increasing, however, and may be even more common in the future if improvements in sanitation reduce natural resistance. Other diseases creating health problems are sandfly fever, various forms of leishmaniasis, yaws, various skin diseases, relapsing fever, and meningitis. Nutritional diseases such as anemia, night blindness, keratomalacia, rickets, scurvy, and pellagra are estimated to afflict about 5% of the population. Rabies is a serious problem because

of the large number of stray dogs, jackals, and monkeys that wander virtually at will throughout many parts of the country. The relative extent of mental diseases is unknown, but estimates indicate that there are as many as 10 million persons needing psychiatric treatment.

The principal threat to the health of foreigners and especially of Westerners residing in India lies in the food and water. This is largely due to the very poor personal hygiene practices of many persons who prepare food. Public health and sanitation standards are generally low, and it is necessary for foreigners to take an intelligent and continuous interest in disease prevention. Preexisting health problems relating to advanced age, physical infirmity, and special diets can easily be aggravated, since adjustment to the climate, food, living conditions, and tropical heat can be very trying, even to persons in the best of health.

The foreign community is most often affected by gastrointestinal diseases, such as amebiasis and shigellosis. Amebiasis is the single most important health hazard to Americans. Increased respiratory infections during the winter months in northern India are similar to those experienced in the United States. Cases of hepatitis, eye infections, and exposure to rabies also occur in the European and American communities. Other diseases endemic to South Asia—for example, cholera and smallpox—constitute no serious threat to anyone who has the required immunizations.

Despite the numerous health hazards, it is possible for foreigners to have no more than the usual minor illnesses experienced at home, provided that they closely follow strict health standards and preventive practices. Immunizations against smallpox, typhoid, cholera, poliomyelitis, tetanus, and diphtheria are necessary. Domestic servants must have periodic and thorough health examinations and be carefully trained in strict sanitary habits. All water for drinking must be boiled for 15 to 30 minutes or treated with purification tablets. Meat should be well done, and generally speaking any raw food should be avoided unless it has been carefully prepared under competent supervision. For a variety of reasons, it is advisable for foreigners to supplement their diet with vitamin and vitamin mineral preparations.

b. Animal diseases

Data on livestock, including the incidence of various diseases among animals, are meager. It is clear, however, that in the absence of an adequately developed veterinary system, animal disease is widespread. The density and variety of the animal

47

population, together with religious prohibitions against killing animals, especially monkeys and cows, even though diseased and dying, make it difficult to improve animal health.

Rinderpest, although much reduced by vaccination, still accounts for serious livestock losses. Hemorrhagic septicemia (pasteurellosis) is also common, as are blackleg, anthrax, echinococcosis, and contagious pleuropneumonia. Protozoan diseases (trypanosomiasis in cattle, horses, and camels; piroplasmosis in cattle, dogs, and horses; and theileriasis in cattle) cause heavy losses in some areas. Internal and external parasitic infestations are widespread. Newcastle disease is the most serious of several poultry plagues. Dairy cattle show a high incidence of tuberculosis. Rabies is widespread and ineffectively controlled. Foot-and-mouth disease, brucellosis, sheep pox, fowl pox, mange, bronchitis, coccidiosis, canine distemper, clostridial infections, mastitis, and salmonellosis are also common. The most important animal diseases transmissible to man are rabies, brucellosis, tuberculosis, anthrax, leptospirosis, Q fever, and echinococcosis.

3. Public health and medical services

Health is mainly the responsibility of state governments, although the national government is constitutionally empowered to legislate concurrently on a number of health subjects and has direct responsibility for a few others. State and central authorities cooperate closely in many projects. The Central Council of Health, with the national Health Minister as chairman and state health ministers as members, coordinates health programs. Under the National Water Supply and Sanitation Program, the central government is sponsoring the improvement of water and sewerage systems operated by local authorities.

Central public health and medical posts, except those in the national Ministries of Railways and Defense, are staffed by members of the Central Health Service, which was established in 1963 with an authorized strength of over 2,000 permanent and temporary employees. The national government sponsors the Indian Council of Medical Research, which helps finance a large number of research institutes and projects. The Central Research Institute conducts both basic and applied research, maintains two medical libraries, trains laboratory personnel, and provides a research reference service. An Institute for Ayurvedic Studies and Research has been established to further research in indigenous medicine. The Universities of Lucknow, Bombay, Nagpur, Calcutta,

and Andhra Pradesh and the All-India Institute of Medical Studies in New Delhi conduct modern medical research programs.

National control and eradication programs, involving state-national cooperation, are aimed at reducing the incidence of malaria, smallpox, trachoma, filariasis, leprosy, and venereal diseases. Only the malaria and smallpox programs have produced significant results so far. The central government also operates a National Institute of Communicable Diseases to study and advise state governments on communicable diseases not yet covered by national control programs.

Indian medical facilities are inadequate, both in numbers and in quality (Figure 27). In terms of numbers required to make significant progress, the problem is almost insuperable. Despite continuing government efforts, by early 1972 there had been relatively little improvement in the overall situation.

Although some of the larger hospitals in Bombay, Calcutta and New Delhi compare favorably with hospitals in the United States, they are the exception. Hospitals in general are overcrowded, poorly equipped, and often unsanitary. In many cases hospital windows are open and screenless, while visiting relatives and stray animals are allowed to wander freely through the wards. Drugs and other medical supplies, many of which must be imported, are available for the treatment of most diseases, but costs are often high. Government-run health centers and a system of visiting medical personnel provide some help for the indigent, as do institutions sponsored by charitable foundations. These facilities fall far short of meeting the needs of the millions of persons requiring medical attention, however. Trained physicians and other medical personnel are in short supply throughout the country, especially in rural areas. The doctor-to-population ratio, which has been slowly improving, was about 1:5,000 in 1970 and by

FIGURE 27. Public and private health facilities

	1970-71	1973-74 TARGETS
Beds	270,212	281,600
Primary health centers	4,840	5,225
Medical colleges	95	103
Annual admissions	11,500	13,000
Dental colleges	15	15
Annual admissions	586	800
Manpower:		
Doctors	127,205	137,930
Nurses	66,000	88,000
Other	48,000	70,000

48

the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan in March 1974, it was hoped that this ratio would have improved to 1:4,300. By 1970 there were only 68,000 trained nurses in India. In 1960 there were almost 0.5 hospital beds per 1,000 population.

G. Religion

Religion permeates Indian society. The world's four major religions—Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism—are represented in India by significant segments of the population, although village deities, dogmas, customs, and ceremonies are often not strongly identified with a single religion. Other religions in India include Sikhism, Jainism, and Zoroastrianism, and there are also millions of persons scattered throughout the country who follow various animistic or tribal religions.

The Hindu preoccupation with the interaction between human life and the supernatural, together with the notion that interpersonal relationships are governed by spiritually ordained rules, has strongly influenced other religious groups in India. This preoccupation has also lent a mystical element to matters that most Westerners would consider entirely secular. The pervasiveness of the Hindu spirit provides a substantial measure of unity in a country that is otherwise linguistically and historically fractionalized. On the other hand, the fatalism inherent in the Hindu religious outlook is frequently a deterrent to innovation and reform.

1. Hinduism

The vast majority of the Indian people—about 83.5% in 1971—espouse some form of Hinduism, a complex amalgam of aboriginal animistic beliefs, Dravidian precepts, and—most important—the religious tenets introduced by the Aryan invaders from about 1500 to 1200 B.C. It is an amorphous religion, with no founder, no established organizational structure, and no uniform dogma. Its adherents include polytheists, monotheists, and atheists. Over the centuries it has proven extremely absorptive of outside beliefs and practices, which have gradually become "Hinduized." It is devoid of any concept of heresy—almost every belief considered basic to Hinduism has been challenged with impunity by some Hindu group.

Hinduism is based on an accumulation of sacred literature—termed sruti (revelation)—beginning with the four Vedas—the principal Hindu sacred books, deemed to be inspired—composed between 1500 and 600 B.C. The Brahmanas (800-600 B.C.) are prose

texts, one or several attached to each Veda, explaining the relationship between the Veda and the ritual associated with it. Also attached to each Veda are the Aranyakas, or "Forest Books," explaining the symbolic meaning of the ritual. These were probably originally intended to be read upon withdrawal into the solitude of the forest, the third of the four Hindu stages for attaining religious salvation. Finally, as an integral part of each Brahmana are the Upanishads, or works that provide philosophical speculation on concepts which dominate Hinduism. Nearly all Hindus believe in reincarnation of the soul and in the unity of all things in a single absolute or Brahma.

Sruti literature is limited to the top three of the four traditional caste levels, or varna. All males from these castes are educated to differing extents in the sruti literature, but it may be used ritually and taught only by a Brahman, except under specific and unusual circumstances.

Smriti (tradition)—literature composed of sacred law and the popular epics—is based on Sruti and often takes the form of aphorisms for easy memorizing. The two most popular smriti works are the epic poems, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. The former tells the story of Rama and his wife, Sita. Its ethical content is extensive, and it is the most popular scripture in the villages of India. The Mahabharata contains the Bhagavad-Gita (Song of the Lord), one of the most important Hindu writings. Smriti literature is available to all and, indeed, represents Hinduism at its broadest, in contrast to the more restricted and orthodox Brahmanism.

The Hindu pantheon is vast, the 33 Vedic deities having been expanded to include a host of lesser gods and incarnations of gods. The preferred god or gods vary with locality and sect. Most villages have local deities, believed to be guardians or to represent disease, famine, flood, drought, birth, and death. To the Hindu, truth is found in all religions, though in different measures, and the important distinction lies not in the supreme spirit worshiped but in the perception of the worshipers. This doctrine, however, does not prevent cultural antagonisms toward other religions from erupting into violence. Hindu-Muslim communal rioting can be both epidemic and bloody. In part this is because the inhabitants of a locale form separate social groups on the basis of religion, and these groups often are economic competitors. Violence often develops spontaneously from a single incident: a real or imagined affront to a revered deity, the slaughter of sacred cattle, or some other insult to religious sensibilities.

49

FIGURE 28. Holy man (Sadhu) seated under a banyan tree. His simple needs are provided by alms.

50

Although lacking a formal organization, Hinduism has evolved into a highly sectarian religion with a large number of cults laying claim to orthodoxy. These loose-knit groupings, usually differentiated by their choice of a preferred god, generally develop around a priest or holy man (*sadhu*) who has won the respect of a group of followers and is accepted by them as their teacher (*guru*). Few of India's 6 million to 7 million *sadhus*, however, attain the stature of *guru*. Most are wandering mendicants who seek personal enlightenment through extreme asceticism (Figure 28). Nearly all belong to one of the 100-odd Hindu monastic orders—a borrowing from Buddhism—but are not proselytizers. Many are elderly men who have reached the traditional "fourth stage" of life, that of complete withdrawal from the world in search of salvation. Hindu temples, viewed as abodes of the gods rather than as centers for communal worship, are tended by individual priests or by monastic sects (Figure 29).

Religious observations within the temple are in the form of ceremonies performed by the Brahman priest. They vary according to the occasion and the god being worshiped, but they usually involve the chanting of sacred scriptures and an offering of food and other substances deemed pleasing to the god. Individual lay worshipers do not take part in these ceremonies. Their visits to the temple are for the purpose of viewing the image of the god and making personal offerings to it. Family worship is conducted in the home, often in honor of household gods. Domestic ceremonies include an offering of *ghee* (clarified butter), incense, wood, or grain thrown into a fire. Gods are also bathed, garlanded, and offered food.


FIGURE 29. Hindu temple at Bhubaneswar, 900–1000 A.D.

Pilgrimages are important to the Hindu. Persons who otherwise would never have left the village and its immediate environs travel hundreds of miles to visit particularly holy temples or rivers (Figure 30). The city of Benares, for instance, located on India's holiest river, the Ganges, is visited by hundreds of thousands of pilgrims each year, many of them aged persons who believe that to die near the Ganges at Benares insures salvation.

Various religious festivals celebrated by the Hindus are geared to the seasonal calendar (Figure 31). *Holi*, celebrated on the first full moon of spring, is characterized by gaiety, pranks, and the throwing of colored water and powders on friends and strangers alike. *Dussehra*, in October, is the most popular festival. It commemorates the victory of the god Rama (typifying good) over the demon-king Ravana (who represents evil), and large effigies of the latter are burned. In the same month Hindus observe *Dewali*— the Festival of Lights—as a symbol of the victory of light over darkness. During *Dewali* many buildings have extensive lighting displays.

Most Hindus acknowledge the ritual ascendancy of the priestly Brahman caste, as well as the caste system as a whole, with its stratification of society into a hierarchy of distinct, endogamous groups. Religious sanctions attached to caste are strong. The purity of a Hindu can be "polluted" by violations—intentional or accidental—of the myriad rules governing his contacts with persons of lower caste, as well as by his personal and dietary habits. Pollution may be removed by cleansing rituals. Veneration of the cow, the symbol of motherhood and abundance, is an established feature of orthodox Hinduism. The origin of the practice is obscure but probably predates the coming of the Aryans into India. Some Hindus feel more intensely about this matter than do others, but most strongly oppose cow slaughter.

Although the constitution stipulates that India is a secular state, Hinduism is an important force in politics, particularly in the north. The ruling Congress Party has so far held fast to its secular principles, but some other political groups, notably the *Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Indian People's Party), have made headway through essentially Hindu nationalist appeals. Moreover, even within the Congress Party, attitudes on some issues, such as those arising from India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, reflect the latent Hindu nationalism of a small but influential group of north Indian leaders.

2. Other religions

The partition of the former British India into the predominantly Hindu India and Islamic Pakistan has

51

FIGURE 30. Hindus bathing in the sacred river, the Ganges, at Allahabad

52

FIGURE 31. Paraders surge through the streets of Shirala to celebrate *Naga Panchami*, the serpent festival. Some brandish live monitor lizards smeared with vermillion and pinioned to poles; others bear earthen pots containing recently captured cobras. When the rites end, the snakes and lizards will be released unharmed.

reduced the proportion of Muslims in India to about 11% of the population. Nevertheless, India's 61 million Muslims constitute the world's third largest Islamic group, exceeded in numbers only in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Islam was introduced into the Indian subcontinent by Arab traders in the south and invaders in the northwest during the late seventh and eighth centuries A.D. Between the 11th and 16th centuries a series of Muslim conquerors extended Islamic rule deep into northern India, culminating in the establishment of the Moghul empire in 1526. Muslim influence declined steadily following the arrival of the British on the subcontinent in the early 17th century, and it went into eclipse after rebelling native troops of the East India Company's army used the last of the Moghul emperors, aged Bahadur Shah, as their figurehead leader during the 1857 mutiny. Muslim political cohesiveness was revived with the founding in 1906 of the Muslim League, but the

creation of Pakistan resulted in the emigration of much of the community's effective political leadership.

Most Indian Muslims are descendants of converts from Hinduism. Only a very small number—normally standing at the top of the Muslim social scale—can trace an unmixed lineage back to original Turkish, Afghan, or Persian progenitors. About 90% of Indian Muslims belong to the Sunni branch of Islam, the orthodox school which rejects the contention of the heterodox minority Shia sect that Islamic leadership originally passed from Muhammad to his son-in-law 'Ali and a succession of other Imams in 'Ali's hereditary line. Doctrinal differences between the groups are much less marked in India than elsewhere in the world, however.

There is no formal ecclesiastical organization, but Muslims recognize a learned priestly class (the *ulema*) which interprets and administers Islamic law. Other important Muslim figures in India are the *imam* (prayer leader); the *kazi* (marriage registrar and judge); the *maulvi* (itinerant preacher); the *maulana* (legal and theological scholar); the *fakir* (equivalent of Hindu *sadhu* or holy man); and the *pir* (spiritual guide, similar to the Hindu *guru*). In contrast to Hindu temples, Muslim mosques are built to house congregations rather than a deity and are primary centers of Islamic worship.

Islam is theoretically casteless and nonidolatrous. In India, however, a caste system based largely on the castes of the original converts has survived the conversion. In some Muslim areas, even a form of untouchability has been preserved. Moreover, instances of worship by rural Muslims at Hindu shrines are not uncommon. Food-handling practices are less important to Muslims than to Hindus, and dietary prohibitions, except that against eating pork, are far less prevalent.

Christianity, the religion of 2.6% of the population (about 14 million the country's third largest religious group), is the result of proselytism which began with St. Thomas in the first century and was intensified by Portuguese missionaries in the 16th century and by other European and U.S. missionaries in the 19th century. By far the largest concentration of Christians (one-third of the total number) is in Kerala, where they constituted 21% of the state population in 1971. Other areas of concentration are the southern States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and the tribal areas of Orissa and of northeastern India.

About half of the Christians are Roman Catholic, and the remainder belong to various Protestant or Eastern Christian groups. Roman Catholics predomi-

53

nate in Goa and in southern India; its oldest communities, the "St. Thomas" or "Syrian" Christians of Kerala, have formally united with the Roman Church. Most Christians in northern India are members of the Protestant churches, the result of early missionary work by British and Dutch and, after the 18th century, American missionaries. The Indian churches are now organizationally independent of their foreign sponsors, although in some cases they continue to receive some support. The various Protestant denominations in the south are merged in the Church of South India, formed in 1947, and most of the churches in the north effected a similar merger around 1963, joining to form the United Church of Northern India.

In 1970 there were approximately 16,000 Jews in India, divided into three groups: The so-called "white Jews of Cochin," descended from refugees of the first century A.D. and now nearly extinct; the "black Jews" of mixed native and Jewish stock; and European Jews, mostly from the United Kingdom.

Buddhism has relatively few followers—3.8 million, or only 0.7% of the population—in India today. Buddhism began in India about 500 B.C. as one of several attempts to reform Hinduism. It became the official religion of the Mauryan Empire during the reign of Asoka in the third century B.C., but began to decline seriously in the seventh century A.D., and had virtually disappeared by the 12th century. Apart from converts drawn mainly from the former Untouchable groups of western India, the few remaining Indian Buddhists are primarily Mongoloid hill dwellers who live in the northern border areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. All of these northern Buddhists practice a Tibetan variant of Buddhism, which dwells far more on ritual, magic, and superstition than does the philosophical Theravada Buddhism of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. In early 1973 there was a continuing campaign to convert Untouchables to Buddhism, and it has been reported that several thousand had been converted by early March.

Jainism, a polytheistic religion which emerged almost simultaneously with Buddhism, was also basically an anti-Brahmanical reform movement. It was founded in the sixth century B.C. by Vardhamana, more frequently called by the title mahaviva (great hero), the son of a Bihari king. Like Buddhism, Jainism is monastic and emphasizes the importance of overcoming the desire for worldly pleasures, which it sees as the major impediment to escaping the wheel of life. Although the Buddhists reject asceticism as a path to salvation, the Jains place great emphasis on self-mortification, believing that liberation can be achieved only through rigid control of the mind and passions. Among the most important of the Jain disciplines is that of ahimsa, noninjury to any living thing. Some Jains carry the stricture to the extreme of wearing face masks so as not to inadvertently inhale insects (Figure 32). There were almost 3 million Jains in 1971.

India's 10 million Sikhs, comprising 1.8% of the population, are followers of doctrines laid down by Hindu reformer Nanak in the 16th century. Nanak's tenets, and those of nine successor Sikh gurus, represent a fusion of Hindu and Muslim ideas. The principal Sikh scriptures are included in the Adi-Granth, a compilation of writings of the gurus as well as of 15th century Hindu and Muslim holy men.

Sikhism is monotheistic and nonascetic. A century or so of persecution by the Moghul rulers hardened the Sikhs into competent fighters, and the government of British India drew heavily on the community in staffing its native army. As symbols of their religion, Sikh men wear special undergarments, a comb, a dagger, and a steel armband or bracelet, and do not

FIGURE 32. A Jain nun making a pilgrimage on foot in Rajasthan. The cloth across the mouth is to prevent her from breathing in and thus destroying insects.

54

cut their hair or beards. The comb and dagger are often miniatures, which are concealed in the ubiquitous Sikh turban.

Zoroastrianism, a religion which originated in pre-Islamic Persia, is practiced by about 200,000 Parsis, who are concentrated around the city of Bombay. Founded by Zoroaster in the fifth or sixth century B.C., the religion is monotheistic, but it has an involved demonology and includes the worship of certain sacred elements, particularly fire. It is concerned with a cosmic battle between good and evil, in which Zoroastrians contribute to individual and world salvation by obeying the will of the god Ahura Mazda. Believing that burial and cremation of the dead defile the earth and fire, respectively, the Parsis have traditionally deposited their deceased within "Towers of Silence," walled enclosures, usually placed on a high point, where the corpses are devoured by predatory birds.

H. Education

1. The national context

The central and state governments are committed to the establishment of universal, free, and compulsory education at the elementary level. While it is also engaged in the intensive development of all forms of higher education, the government has attempted to adapt its policy to India's particular social and economic needs by giving special emphasis to vocational and scientific training. As in so many other areas of Indian public and private life, however, education is characterized by a wide gap between goals and performance, and between official statistics and reality. Gradual progress is being made toward modernizing the antiquated educational system, but curriculums and facilities remain for the most part badly out of harmony with the requirements of a developing society. A majority of those now holding degrees from Indian Universities qualified in liberal arts. The government recognizes, however, that India's universities must produce technicians and professionals capable of dealing with the rapidly expanding technology of a modernizing society. Implementation of official educational goals has run up against all the impeding factors posed by underdevelopment: scarce resources, inadequate teaching and administrative staffs, and the traditional attitudes and apathy of students, parents, and faculties.

Education is primarily the responsibility of the state governments. The central government, however, has come to play an increasingly important role in the formulation of educational policy by conducting studies, disseminating information, urging the states to meet their development goals, and funding educational development projects. State governments are responsible for the development and overall supervision of the schools within their jurisdiction. School administration is often delegated to district school boards (jurisdictions roughly equivalent to U.S. counties), to panchayat samitis (which govern a subdivision of a district), and in many cases to village panchayats (councils). Nearly half of India's educational institutions are privately managed, including a very large percentage of preprimary, secondary, and vocational schools. Nearly all of the private schools are heavily subsidized from government funds. The central and state governments annually award scholarships to nearly a million students at all levels.

Despite considerable expansion of the educational system, illiteracy has been increasing in India. Proportional declines in illiteracy have been offset by the rapidly expanding population so that in absolute terms the number of illiterates has substantially increased. In the years between the 1951 and 1971 censuses, the literate proportion of the population increased from 16.6% to about 29%, although the number of illiterates increased from 298 million to about 357 million. Of the 143 million people officially classified as literate in mid-1968, it was estimated that probably only 55-70 million were really able to engage in meaningful communication via the written word. It is unlikely that there was a significant increase in the absolute number of meaningfully literate people in 1972. Literacy varies widely in different areas of the country and between the sexes, from a high in Kerala of about 60.2% (66.5% males, 53.9% females) to a low in Arunachal Pradesh of 9.3% (14.0% males, 3.5% females). Literacy is about twice as high in the cities as in rural areas because of proportionately greater school enrollment in the cities, and it is highest among high caste groups and certain minorities such as Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, and Jains. Illiteracy tends to be higher among Muslims than Hindus.

2. Elementary and secondary education

Since independence, two systems of elementary and secondary education have operated simultaneously. The larger of these is the academically oriented system modeled on the British pattern. A parallel system of "basic education" introduced by Mohandas Gandhi is aimed at correlating teaching with the physical and social environment of the child. The main emphasis of this latter "basic education" is on socially useful

55

FIGURE 33. Open-air classes at a school in northern India

FIGURE 34. Enrollments in schools and colleges

	ESTIMATED 1968/69		1973/74 TARGETS	
	Millions of students	Percent of age group	Millions of students	Percent of age group
Primary classes (ages 6–11):				
Boys	35.05	96	40.40	98
Girls	20.88	59	27.94	72
Total or average	55.93	78	68.34	85
Middle classes (ages 11–14):				
Boys	9.00	47	12.26	55
Girls	3.72	20	6.20	29
Total or average	12.72	34	18.46	42
Secondary classes (ages 14–17):				
Boys	4.97	29	7.44	37
Girls	1.62	10	3.96	15
Total or average	6.59	19	10.40	26
University and college programs in arts, science, & commerce (ages 17–23):				
Total or average	1.69	3	2.66	4
Technical education:*				
Polytechnic institutes	0.0486	...	0.0486	...
Industrial training institutes	0.147	...	na	...
Colleges	0.0250	...	0.0250	...

na   Data not available.
...   Not pertinent.
*Statistics refer to admission capacity, not actual enrollment.

third of the pupils initially enrolled at age 6 complete elementary education—the minimum thought necessary to achieve literacy. Truancy and dropout rates are very high at all levels of elementary and secondary education, and many children stay in the same grade for several years. There is a very sharp drop in school enrollment after primary school, and another substantial decline after the completion of elementary (primary and middle) education.

Prior to the 20th century, education of females was almost totally neglected. The government has made considerable headway in promo**ing** he education of women, despite some tradit**ional ——**tance. Female students, as a percenta**ge the P ——**ation in the relevant age groups, **increased from 25** in primary schools in the 1950/ school year to 59 in 1968/69, from 5% to 20% in middle schools, and from 2% to 10% in secondary schools. The gap between the enrollment of boys and girls, however, is still considerable.

There were about 500,000 elementary and secondary schools in 1968. Teaching staffs are inadequate, particularly in such fields as science, mathematics, and in technical and vocational courses.

Of the estimated 2.2 million teachers employed in 1969, 26% did not have the requisite qualifications. Even those fully qualified by Indian standards had only minimal academic training. Lower primary teachers are required to have only 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of specialized instruction in a teacher training or normal school. Upper primary teachers are usually required to earn their Secondary School Certificate before entering a 2-year normal school program. Secondary school teachers, on the other hand, must have a Bachelor of Teaching degree, usually earned in a 1-year course at a college of education, the prerequisite for which is a Bachelor of Arts or Science degree from a university. The educational gulf between elementary and secondary school faculties adds to the disjointedness of the school system. It is officially estimated that an additional 644,000 trained teachers will be needed by 1974.

The central government is trying to improve the quality of elementary education. Since 1963 it has sponsored the establishment of state institutes of education intended to give training to teachers and headmasters and to conduct research studies and

57

investigations of elementary education in their stat s. The central government has also initiated quali'y improvement programs for secondary education. In 1964 it began a "crash program" to strengthen the teaching of science. Literature and instruction aids have been provided to the states in other fields. Since 1966 over 1,202 secondary and primary school teachers have received National Awards in recognition of professional competence. The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), established in 1961 by the central government as an autonomous body, aids and advises in the field of elementary and secondary education. The council's research and training programs are developed through the National Institute of Education and four Regional Colleges of Education in Ajmer, Bhubaneswar, Bhopal, and Mysore. NCERT has concentrated mainly on curriculum development, reform of the examination system, and on teacher training and it plans to expand its activities during the Fourth Five Year Plan (FY1969/70-1973/74).

3. Higher education

The demand for higher education in India is very great. An increasing number of the student population coming out of the secondary schools regard university degrees as virtually the only passport to the white-collar jobs with the social mobility, status, and remuneration they desire. The quality and type of education that most of these students are receiving, however, appear seriously out of line with the needs of the country. So great has been the demand for higher education and so rapid has been the growth of institutions that India today is faced with a serious imbalance between the number of adequately trained college graduates and opportunities for employment.

Education beyond the secondary school stage is still primarily directed toward earning a degree from one of India's 70 universities, although government programs providing for advanced training in technical fields below the university level are being expanded rapidly. The universities in India originally functioned chiefly to prescribe courses and examine candidates for degrees. Teaching and research were conducted at affiliated colleges. By 1970 all universities offered courses to students directly on graduate and professional levels, although 88% of the students still attended affiliated colleges. In 1970 over 2,700 colleges—about half of them coleges of arts, sc ce, and commerce and most of the remainder technical and professional colleges—were affiliated with the universities. In addition to the 70 regular universities, the government regarded 10 research institutes

specializing in education and natural, political, and social sciences as equivalent to universities for the purpose of awarding degrees. Some 1.8 million students were enrolled in colleges and u. sities in 1969, about 2.9% of the populatn 17 to By 1974 it is expected that about 3.3% of th. of age population, or roughly 2.7 mi ion stud n be enrolled in colleges and universiti number of students (60% in 1970) are in l programs or studying nonscientific subjects. A relatively small percentage of the college and university students are females.

The pattern of higher education, like that at the lower levels, varies from state to state. All universities except the University of Bombay and state universities in Uttar Pradesh have accepted the 3-year bachelor degree program. Because modification of the secondary school system has lagged behind, however, most students are still required to take a year of intermediate schooling (equivalent to junior college in the United States) before entering college. At the conclusion of their college training, students sit for a final university examination which they must pass in order to win a degree. In 1970 about 10% of all university students were engaged in postgraduate study and research. College and university teachers are usually drawn from the ranks of those academically trained in a given subject, and most do not have teaching degrees. Educational authorities are now attempting to include teacher training in the curriculums of students interested in a career in education.

During the British colonial period, English was the normal language of instruction at the college level. Since independence there has been a gradual switch to instruction and examination in regional languages, especially in nonscientific subjects. In 1967, 40 universities offered instruction on nonscientific subjects in the regional languages in addition to English. Several of the newer universities taught and examined only in the local regional language. Almost all postgraduate instruction, however, was carried on in English. In 1968, the central government endorsed a recommendation by the university vice chancellors that a complete conversion to regional language instruction and examination be effected over the next 5 to 10 years. English, however, is to be taught on the undergraduate level and is to remain the medium of instruction on the postgraduate level. Although this decision came a touchy political issue, it merely confirmed as official policy a trend that was already well underway.

58

The central government is constitutionally charged with the coordination and maintenance of standards of higher education. The major development programs for higher education are executed through the University Grants Commission, a statutory body set up by the central government. Grants are provided to the 70 universities and the 10 institutions "deemed to be universities" on a sharing basis for development projects that meet the commission's standards. The commission provides all the funds used by the four central government-run universities for both special development programs and their maintenance. Special assistance is provided to selected university departments recognized as "centers of advanced study" to help improve the quality of postgraduate education and research. Financial assistance is also given to selected colleges for improvement of their facilities. Special summer institutes, conferences, and seminars as well as publishing, research, and teacher training projects are also financed. During the Fourth Five Year Plan the main emphasis is on consolidation and improvement of higher education through better staffs and library and laboratory facilities. Considerable attention is also being given to improving postgraduate education and research.

Social and economic problems in rural areas are being given attention within the higher education system. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research is the primary organization for sponsoring, coordinating and directing agriculture research and education. By early 1972 there were 14 agricultural universities, 73 agricultural colleges, and 20 veterinary colleges functioning in India.

4. Technical education

Probably the greatest educational deficiency in India is in the technical and engineering fields. Technical education was neglected prior to independence, and, despite heavy government emphasis in development plans, deficiencies and serious imbalances still exist. The transitional nature of and fluctuations in India's economy have made it very difficult to plan technical manpower requirements. For instance, a sharp but selective industrial recession in 1966-67, coupled with a previously stepped-up output of trained engineers, resulted in some 50,000 unemployed engineers in late 1968 and necessitated cutbacks in enrollments at engineering schools. At the same time, certain categories of technically trained persons and skilled workers are in critically short supply.

Several programs for vocational and technical training have been set up at the subuniversity level.

During the Fourth Five Year Plan, vocational training for students who terminate their general education at the elementary level is to be expanded. To prepare students better for employment after the completion of secondary schooling, a number of vocational courses, given in collaboration with specialized technical schools, are being provided during the final year of secondary school. Students who complete their secondary schooling are eligible to attend 284 polytechnic institutes which have an annual enrollment capacity of 48,600, but which in 1968/69 were only enrolling about 31,000 students. The object of these schools, which normally have a 3- to 4-year curriculum, is to produce workers capable of performing routine engineering jobs and of assisting fully qualified college engineering graduates. In 1969, there were also 365 Industrial Training Institutes with an enrollment capacity of 147,000, offering 1- and 2-year courses to produce skilled workers in 52 trades, 12 of which required prior secondary schooling. Free training in the remaining trades was open in theory to those who had not completed secondary schooling, but the competition was so stiff that a large percentage of these trainees also had secondary school certificates. An apprenticeship program has also been established to supplement the Industrial Training Institutes. In 1971-72 some 13,000 apprentices were being trained in public and private sector companies.

There has also been a considerable expansion of facilities for engineering education at the college level. By 1969, there were 138 colleges with an annual enrollment capacity of 25,000 providing instruction in engineering subjects. College degrees in engineering require 5 years of study for students who have completed higher secondary education, a combination of 2 years of intermediate and 4 or 5 years of college training for those who have had only a standard secondary education, or 3 years of engineering college for those who already hold a Bachelor of Science degree. The central government has established a number of institutes to conduct specialized research and to provide high caliber undergraduate and postgraduate education. The most important of these are the five Indian Institutes of Technology (Figure 35), which had an enrollment of over 10,000 in 1969. The institutes award bachelor's, master's and doctor's degrees.

5. Other programs

Outside the regular school and college system, the government sponsors a wide variety of specialized educational programs which reflect its preoccupation with the economic development of the country.

59

FIGURE 35. Scientific education. Students at the Indian Institute of Technology, Powai, Maharashtra State.

Among these is a series of training institutes for administrators, technicians, and village council representatives at all levels who are involved in the community development program. Vocational guidance counseling at employment exchanges is designed to direct young men and women into profitable lines of education. A Worker's Education Scheme teaches industrial workers and labor leaders their responsibilities and rights under existing labor legislation. The government sponsors a number of specialized research institutes in medical and scientific fields.

Considerable emphasis has been placed on educating peasants, rural leaders, and farm extension workers in more modern agricultural techniques. A new comprehensive plan for farmer training and education was initiated in 1966. The scheme, a composite of the better parts of former programs, operates mainly in districts selected for intensive development with more modern agricultural technology. The formal training, largely conducted in local farmer training centers, aims at changing traditional attitudes and improving agricultural operations through new techniques. In late 1968 there were 50 farmer training centers offering 1-day to 3-month courses, and plans called for setting up another 50 training centers. The program for training extension workers is also being stepped up. In late 1968, there were 96 training centers for village leaders, 3 Extension Education Institutes, and about 45 extension "wings" of colleges and universities being realigned and strengthened to meet present and future instructional requirements.

Many valuable educational services are provided by private establishments. In addition to their predominant role in preschool education, a number of private institutions—some of them run by mis-

sionaries—provide excellent primary and secondary schooling. At the college level there are a number of nongovernmental institutions with both religious and secular backgrounds which are supported by private endowment or public contributions. At the government's urging, many industrial establishments have started apprenticeship programs.

6. Problems and prospects

The foremost obstacles to the spread of education are the size and varying cultural backgrounds of the population to be educated. The backwardness of many of the people makes the task of modernizing educational procedures and outlooks particularly difficult. The necessity of teaching students—at least at the primary level—in a wide variety of local languages adds to the expense and difficulty of national schooling. Technical books and facilities are in very short supply, despite aid given by the United Nations, foreign governments, and foreign private foundations. Instructors who are compelled to teach college-level technical subjects in English complain that student comprehension is declining seriously as local languages increasingly attain primacy in the elementary and secondary school systems.

Many fundamental educational problems arise from the heavy emphasis placed on passing matriculation and baccalaureate examinations. Students, who know that their future educational and career prospects hinge on scoring well in the tests, have little patience with course matter that is not strictly geared to the contents of the examinations. They often neglect academic inquiry in favor of memorizing answers to typical test questions. Teachers must also tailor their efforts to the examinations because their prestige and that of their school will suffer if too many of their students fail. Despite the increasing emphasis on science, the educational system still suffers from heavy concentration on the liberal arts. The system of higher education, established by the British to provide classically educated generalists for the civil service, has not yet lost its orientation toward government careers. Membership in the elite Indian Administrative Service is still the ultimate objective of many students, which means that they must gear their schooling toward passing the wide-ranging civil service examination.

Student indiscipline has been a problem in India since independence, due mainly to the inadequacies of the sprawling and overcrowded university system and the inability of the economy to absorb the increasing number of university graduates. Unusually widespread student disturbances, which began in 1965 and gathered momentum in School Year 1966/67, affected

60

almost every state. The economic recession of 1966-67, which hit white-collar workers the hardest, accentuated student insecurity over employment opportunities, and may have contributed to the unusually high incidence of disorders. There were about 2,000 student strikes and demonstrations during 1966/67, some of short duration but others extending over much longer periods. Student demonstrations often spilled over into the city where the university was located and frequently there was destruction of university and government property. A number of important universities were forced to close, in some cases for several weeks, and armed police occasionally had to be brought in to break up the agitation.

By mid-1972, student agitation had declined, but some violent outbursts occurred over local issues. In the ceaseless struggle for political power at the state level, local party leaders have been quick to exploit student grievances as they jockey for influence in coalition state governments.

I. Artistic and cultural expression

India's culture, one of the world's richest and most ancient, is deeply rooted in Hindu values (Figure 36). Largely neglected over the past centuries, it is now experiencing something of a renaissance. Its most significant and characteristically Indian expressions,

FIGURE 36. "The Descent of the Ganges," 7th century relief, Mamallapuram. The river, in the guise of serpentmen, is the focal point, with all sorts of men and animals moving toward it.

dating back to the third century B.C., are found in music and dance. Interest in these has grown phenomenally in this century and has led to the emergence of artists of international stature. There has also been a rediscovery of India's art and architectural treasures, increased awareness of the country's literary and intellectual heritage, and a revival of the drama.

The cultural renaissance is largely a movement of and for the elite. Its centers are in the leading cities, with Calcutta and Bombay being particularly active in the theater and music, and Delhi and Madras leading the way in dance and to a lesser degree in music. Largely separate from this reviving elite culture runs a separate stream of folk culture of great diversity and vigor. It finds its main expressions in folk plays and dance performances dealing with mythological incidents; in colorful floor designs (alpanas); in house decorations; and in a wide variety of folk arts—embroideries, textiles, mirror work, woodcarving, toys, and brasswork. Straddling both types of culture, however, is a preoccupation with the Hindu pantheon and the multiform incarnations of its major deities. Part of every Hindu's heritage are the stories and legends from the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, earliest versions of which date back to about the fourth century B.C. The *Ramayana* is ascribed to the sage Valmiki (although it is believed to have been altered by later hands), but the *Mahabharata* appears to be the work of a number of authors. Both epics have provided major devotional and narrative themes for later literature and popular entertainment.

Western culture has exerted a major influence on the literature, drama, and fine arts of modern India. Indian literature was revitalized during the 19th century through contact with Europe. Since then there has been a major body of writing both in English and vernacular languages, especially Hindi and Bengali, that is essentially Western in tradition. The revival and development of modern Indian drama, with Calcutta as its center, is largely the result of Western influences. Most of the important painters, sculptors, and architects working in India today are strongly influenced by Western art, though often drawing on native motifs and designs. Among Indian intellectuals there is a considerable interest in, and appreciation of, Western culture, particularly literature, the theater, and movies. Jazz and popular Western music have a considerable following among the Westernized elements of India's youth. More serious Western music, however, has always met with comparatively little interest and understanding except in the Parsi community in Bombay. Western dance forms,

61

The oldest surviving examples of visual art are in the form of sculpture, of which the most impressive works are found in Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain shrines. Little significant sculpture is done today. Painting has shown greater vitality. Among the oldest surviving works are Buddhist cave frescoes of the fourth to seventh centuries A.D. (Figure 37). During the Mogul period, Indian art became secular for the first time with the rise of the Indo-Persian miniature painting. Under the sponsorship of the Mogul court and of the rival Rajput princes, painters depicted various aspects of aristocratic life with considerable style and color. An unimpressive era of slavish imitation of Western painting developed in the 19th century. Subsequently, however, Indian painters have shown far more originality and have developed two major schools of technique—the Calcutta artists emphasize somewhat sentimental orientalism, and those of Bombay have adopted Western techniques but infused them with Indian moods and colors (Figure 38).

FIGURE 37. Mural in the cave temple at Ajanta

especially the modern dance, do not fare much better, and the audience for Western art, especially modern art, is extremely limited.

A gradual stultification in many forms of visual art began with the Muslim incursions from the west in the 11th century, since puritanical Islam forbade as "idolatrous" the graphic reproduction of human and animal forms. However, poetry, painting, and architecture were actively encouraged by the Mogul emperors of the 16th and 17th centuries. Literary efforts in vernacular languages were increasingly important after the 14th century. The paramountcy of the British after the late 17th century discouraged indigenous art, since educated Indians turned their attention to Western modes of expression. The rising tide of nationalist sentiment which began in Bengal in the 1830's stimulated interest in India's cultural past, however, and the present century has seen a strong revival of artistic activity.

FIGURE 38. The "Baleful Lady" painted by Rabindranath Tagore is restrained yet shows the primitive, rhythmic style the artist favored

FIGURE 39. Indian musical instruments. Above: Musicians playing on the veena (left) and sitar (center), accompanied by a tabla player (right). (Left) Girl with a tambura.

both schools hold to the same basic rules. The performance of classical Indian music requires extensive improvisation on the part of the instrumentalist, and competent musicianship is acquired only after years of rigorous and disciplined training. The Indian musical form most familiar in the United States is probably the classical raga as performed on the sitar or veena (complex stringed instruments derived from the lute) and accompanied by tablas (drums) and tambaura, a stringed instrument giving a fixed continuous sound (Figure 39). Sitarist Ravi Shankar and sarodist Ali Akbar Khan are among the Indian performers most familiar to Western audiences.

There are four forms of classical dance. The oldest Bharata Natyam (Figure 40) flourished in the Tamil-speaking south where it was originally performed by female temple dancers. Kathakali dancing, also a southern form, was derived from folk depictions of episodes from the Ramayana, a religious epic. In the northwest the prevalent form is Kathak, a relatively subdued, Muslim-influenced style of dancing involving less elaborate gestures and facial expressions, as there is in the Bharata Natyam and Kathakali schools. The fourth major form, the Manipuri, grew out of the tribal folk dances of Manipur on the eastern border of India. It was popularized largely through the efforts of Bengali poet-philosopher-painter-dramatist Rabindranath Tagore. Indian classical dancing has undergone a phenomenal revitalization in the 20th century.

Dance, together with the dance-drama, has a strong mythological flavor. The most popular drama

Music and dance were inseparably linked in ancient India, but in modern times classical music has become important in its own right. Indian music is purely melodic, with polyphony or harmony. It is based on a system of 22 intervals in an octave rather than the Western scale of 12 half-tones. Classical music is performed in both instrumental and vocal form. There is considerable difference in technique, rhythm, and raga between north Indian—or Hindu stani—music and the music of the south, although

FIGURE 40. Bharata Natyam is rendered to the accompaniment of musical instruments and the singing of lyrics. Its appeal lies in the grace and beauty of symmetrical pat-terns of movement and the portrayal of emotion by an elaborate language of gestures and facial expressions.

(letters). These academies in turn recognize and work with a variety of schools and institutions at the state level, and in some cases operate their own institutions.

A National Book Trust was formed in 1957 to encourage the production, translation, or reprinting of good literature, making it available to the public at a low cost. Both the central and the state governments operate training programs for craftsmen and craft teachers.

Most museums in the country belong to the Museum Association of India, which is headquartered in Bombay. Among the most important collections of art and archaeology are those in the National Museum of Western India, Bombay; the Rajputana Museum, Ajmer; the Baroda Museum and Picture Gallery, Vadodara (formerly Baroda); the Archaeological Museum, Mathura; and the Indian Museum, Calcutta.

J. Public information

1. Newspapers and periodicals

The press is India's most important mass medium of communication. The educational system, patterned on the British model, stresses reading and book learning, especially at the secondary and higher levels, and thus steers audiences more toward the printed word than toward audiovisual media. This is reinforced by the Hindu mentality which, with its theorizing and categorizing bent, encourages verbalization and develops a great respect for what is written and printed. Moreover, independent India inherited a well-developed press with relatively high journalistic standards, reasonably good equipment, the requisite technical skills, and a working distribution system.

The number of publications and their circulation has been steadily growing since independence. Registered newspapers and periodicals numbered 11,036 at the end of 1970; 695 were daily newspapers, 60 were newspapers published several times a week, 3,162 were weeklies, and the remainder were published at longer intervals (Figure 41), representing a 7.3% increase in such publications over the previous year and a rise of 39.6% over a 5-year period. Data available to the Indian Registrar of Newspapers indicated a total 1970 circulation of 29.3 million for newspapers and periodicals reporting this information. These publications accounted for about three-fourths of the total in India. Those failing to submit returns were primarily small local publications with very limited distribution. The four metropolitan areas of

FIGURE 41. Newspapers and periodicals, by language, 1970

LANGUAGE	DAILY NEWS-PAPERS	TRIWEEKLY AND BIWEEKLY NEWSPAPERS	TOTAL NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Hindi.............	191	22	2,694
English...........	74	8	2,247
Urdu.............	93	7	898
Bengali..........	13	4	707
Marathi..........	68	5	680
Gujarati..........	47	3	577
Tamil............	46	1	521
Malayalam.......	53	0	432
Telugu...........	15	0	361
Kannada.........	36	2	247
Punjabi..........	14	0	236
Oriya............	5	0	103
Sindhi...........	4	0	72
Assamese.........	2	1	38
Sanskrit..........	1	2	27
Bilingual.........	21	5	863
Multilingual......	1	1	199
Other............	11	1	134
Total..........	695	60	11,036

Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras accounted for about half of the circulation of all newspapers and periodicals and for about 45% of the distribution of daily and weekly publications. Towns and villages of fewer than 100,000 persons received only about 12% of all newspapers and periodicals distributed in India and about 7% of the daily newspapers, in spite of the fact that more than 90% of the population lives in such locations.

Although over half of the newspapers and periodicals are individually owned, the most influential publications are usually owned by corporations and many are members of large chains. In 1970, the 18 largest chains distributed 56% of the daily newspapers throughout the country and accounted for a large percentage of the circulation of dailies in metropolitan areas. Political parties published 94 newspapers and periodicals in 1970 with a total circulation of more than 206,000. The most active parties in the publishing field were the Communist parties with 30 publications, the Congress Party with 35, and the Praja Socialist Party with 7. The Communists had by far the heaviest circulation, distributing about 72% of the total party periodicals. The central and state governments published 396 periodicals in 1970, about 57% by the various departments of the central government in New Delhi. The largest number of government publications (66)

65

was concerned with news and current events, followed by social welfare (45), agriculture and animal husbandry (41), transport and communication (35), commerce and industry (31), and education (27). Central government publications accounted for 3% of the total circulation of all publications in 1970.

English remains the most important single language used by the Indian press. Five of the 12 leading dailies in 1970 were in English, compared to two each in Bengali and Malayalam, and one each in Hindi, Tamil, and Marathi (Figure 42). Although more publications were issued in Hindi than in any other language, statistics indicate that the circulation of all English-language papers (7.2 million in 1970) has remained substantially greater than the gradually growing Hindi and Tamil press (circulation of about 5.9 million and 3.4 million respectively in 1970). Registered periodicals and newspapers were published in a total of 53 different languages in 1970.

Compared to most developing countries, India has an unusually sophisticated press. This is especially true of the leading English-language papers, which have sufficient means to subscribe to wire and photo services, maintain staffs of first-rate feature writers, and buy articles from abroad. Articles and columns acquired from the best known U.S. and U.K. dailies are often printed in the English-language press; James Reston, Walter Lippmann, Victor Zorza, and even humorist Art Buchwald are known to Indian newspaper readers. Foreign periodicals, especially *Time, Reader's Digest, The Economist,* and *Encounter* are widely read by the sophisticated elite. Imported books and journals, most of them from the United States and the United Kingdom, play a key role in the development of India's academic establishment and are in considerable demand.

The daily press is devoted primarily to coverage of national and international news but includes regular coverage of sports and commercial activities. Crime, entertainment, and human interest are generally given only limited attention. Most newspapers, particularly the larger publications, gear their treatment to the interests of middle and upper class educated urbanites who form the bulk of their readership. The newspapers with the widest circulation tend to be relatively conservative. They are frequently critical of the government and its policies but hold views generally similar to those of the government on what India's national objectives should be. Regional and vernacular papers are more strident and less responsible than the major metropolitan dailies. Of the 10 selected weeklies having a circulation of over 100,000 each in 1970, only 2 were devoted to news

coverage. The larger of these was *Blitz,* a Bombay-based, English-language news magazine with a strong pro-Communist and anti-Western orientation and a tendency to exploit crime, sex, and political gossip in the style of the Western tabloid press.

Under normal circumstances the government does not interfere with the freedom of the press. The right of freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 19 of the constitution, although "reasonable" restrictions are permitted in matters relating to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court, public order, decency and morality, the nation's security and its relations with other countries, and incitement to crime. The state of emergency declared after the Chinese invasion of October 1962 resulted in the suspension of Article 19 and the promulgation of rules giving the government almost unlimited potential control over the press. These broad powers, however, were used quite sparingly.

In normal times, the government is able to exert considerable indirect influence over the news media and generally prefers subtle persuasion to more direct measures. Many small publications rely heavily on government press releases and background stories to fill much of their space. The government has encouraged the growth of small- and medium-sized newspapers through control of import licenses for newsprint, the placement of advertising, and financial arrangements. Legislation providing for a Press Council to preserve the liberty of the press and to improve its standards was passed by Parliament in late 1966 and amended in 1970. The council has 27 members, 19 representing the newspapers, 3 from the academic fields of science, literature and cultural studies, 3 members of Parliament (2 nominated from the *Lok Sabha* and 1 from the *Rajya Sabha*), and the remainder nominated by a special select committee. The Press Council has given its highest priority to the study of developments that might lead toward monopolies or undue concentration of press ownership. It has also been concerned with such diverse subjects as the relationship between parliamentary privilege and newspaper reporting, the training of journalists, especially for the Indian-language press, and journalistic ethics.

More than a dozen news agencies provide material to the Indian press. More than 40% of the daily newspapers subscribe to one or more of the three leading press services: The Press Trust of India (PTI), Hindustan News (*Hindustan Samachar*—HS), and the United News of India (UNI). Of these, the English-language PTI—founded in 1947—is by far the largest, accounting in 1965 for 383 of the total of

66

FIGURE 42. Major newspapers and periodicals, 1970

	LANGUAGE	LOCATION	CIRCULATION	COMMENT
Daily newspapers:				
ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA	Bengali	Calcutta	248,547	Nationalist, anti-Communist.
MALAYALA MANORAMA (Malayala De-light).	Malayalam	Kottayam, Kerala	193,122	Pro-Congress Party, anti-Communist.
JUGANTAR (New Epoch)	Bengali	Calcutta	189,143	Neutralist, sensationalist, pro-Congress.
LOKASATTA (Democracy)	Marathi	Bombay	152,870	Probusiness, pro-West, anti-Communist.
TIMES OF INDIA	English	..do..	152,542	Probusiness, anti-Communist, somewhat critical of government and of the United States.
NAV BHARAT TIMES (New India Times)	Hindi	Delhi	152,263	Belongs to *Times of India* group.
HINDUSTAN TIMES	English	..do..	140,918	Objective, relatively liberal, nationalist.
STATESMAN	..do..	Calcutta	140,588	Relatively conservative, pro-West (especially Commonwealth).
HINDU	..do..	Madras	133,701	Conservative, anti-Communist, generally pro-Western.
MATHRUBHUMI (Motherland)	Malayalam	Kozhikode (Calicut)	121,642	Pro-Congress, anti-Communist.
INDIAN EXPRESS	English	Bombay	104,045	Relatively conservative, generally pro-Congress, pro-West and anti-Communist.
THANTHI (Telegraph)	Tamil	Madras	103,045	Sensationalist, tabloid-type paper, generally neutralist.
Weeklies:				
KUMUDAM (Lotus)	..do..	..do..	348,628	Literary and cultural.
MALAYALA MANORAMA	Malayalam	Kottayam, Kerala	272,410	Weekend edition of daily paper literary and cultural.
VARANTARI RANI (Noble Queen)	Tamil	Madras	231,922	Literary and cultural
ANANDA VIKATAN (Supreme Joy)	..do..	..do..	214,999	*Do.*
BLITZ	English	Bombay	163,430	Tabloid news weekly, generally pro-Communist, anti-West.
KALKANDU (Education)	Tamil	Madras	160,571	Children's features.
DHARMAYUG (Religious Era)	Hindi	Bombay	144,982	News and current affairs; weekend edition of *Nav Bharat Times*.
ANDHRA PRABHA ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY (The Awakening of Andhra).	Telugu	Madras	126,417	Literary and cultural.
MATHRUBHUMI	Malayalam	Kozhikode	112,806	*Do.*
KALKI	Tamil	Madras	105,067	*Do.*
Other:				
KALIYAN (Prosperity)	Hindi	Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh	161,892	Monthly; religion and philosophy.
READERS DIGEST	English	Bombay	159,255	Monthly; Indian edition of U.S. magazine.
FEMINA	..do..	..do..	139,548	Fortnightly; women
FILMFARE	..do..	..do..	135,113	Fortnightly; motion picture magazine

67

1,033 press service clients. It also serves the government-owned All-India Radio. PTI has reciprocal arrangements with Reuters and *Agence France Presse* (AFP), supplying them with Indian news and receiving their incoming wire service reports.

United News of India was established in 1959 by several directors of PTI who were dissatisfied with the larger agency's operation. It is an English-language service and had 62 subscribers in 1965, of which 52 were daily newspapers. UNI has a reciprocal agreement with the Associated Press (AP), making it the primary channel through which U.S. news service material is disseminated in India. It also receives reports from West Germany's *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (DPA) and the Yugoslav *Telegrafska Agencija Nova* (TANJUG).

Hindustan News is more specialized in its coverage. Established in 1948, this agency distributes material in nine languages. It concentrates primarily on regional and local news, carrying very few foreign reports and a lower proportion of national news than PTI and UNI. The agency is cooperatively owned by its staff.

Service of yet another type is offered by the Indian News and Feature Alliance (INFA), formed in 1959 by a veteran journalist with the objective of distributing articles by leading correspondents to small newspapers that could not otherwise afford such talent. In 1965 it was providing several syndicated columns in English and Hindi to 103 newspapers. Of the remaining Indian services, the Indian Press Agency (IPA) is the largest. It is comparable to UNI in total subscriptions, but concentrates less on the daily press than on other periodicals. Its subscribers (78 in 1970) are primarily leftist, Communist, or fellow-traveling publications.

In addition to Reuters, AFP, AP, DPA, and TANJUG, a number of foreign press services are utilized by the Indian press. These include *The New York Times* News Service, the news services of the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Washington Post*, TASS, and the Japanese news service *Kyodo*. The Soviet news service *Agenstvo Pechati Novosti* (APN or *Novosti*) has a special distribution arrangement with the Indian Government. Other press organizations maintain offices in India but do not regularly distribute news. Among them are the *Time-Life* News Service, United Press International, Poland's *Polska Agencja Prasowa*, and Czechoslovakia's *Ceska Tiskova Kancelar*. *The Sun* (Baltimore), the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, The New York Times,* and the *Washington Post* have correspondents in India.

68

2. Books and libraries

Although there are well over 1,000 book publishing houses in India, most of them are small, poorly financed, and equipped and operated almost on a cottage industry basis. Fewer than 200 publishers are of any significance nationally or internationally, and only a small number of these maintain high standards of production and a well-developed distribution system. Most of the books published concerning sophisticated subjects are in English, although some of the leading publishers are also beginning to produce high-quality books in Indian languages. The editions of books published in India are comparatively limited (usually 2,000 to 5,000 copies). This is partly due to the small number of people who read books and probably more importantly to an undeveloped distribution system. A number of the more enterprising publishers and distributors have founded mail order clubs and have through this means been able to increase their business considerably.

In spite of the low literacy levels, there is a strong unsatisfied demand for books in India. The publishing industry is primarily attuned to the safe, profitable textbook market, and publishers are generally reluctant to risk their small capital on new and untested general works. The tendency of the publishers to sell in quantity direct to the schools which are engaged in large-scale educational and training programs inhibits the development of wholesale and retail trade in books. Nevertheless, there is a tremendous dearth of English- and, especially, Indian-language texts. Throughout most of the country it is far more difficult to purchase a book alone a specific title, than to buy a leading p   .

Like many other aspects of Indian pu country's library system reveals a great intent and performance. The go committed to developing an effective li but has neither the means nor, on the attitudes necessary to translate the intent into effective action. Nevertheless, there are a number of comparatively well-run and well-stocked university, research, and special libraries. Moreover, there are a few central public libraries which are introducing modern library concepts in India. The chief examples of the latter are the UNESCO-supported free Delhi Public Library, which was established in 1951 to serve as a model for Asia and has been a marked success, and the National Library in Calcutta, which has India's largest collection of books, over 800,000 volumes (Figure 43). The Delhi Public Library remains, however, the only one of its kind in the country.

FIGURE 43. A reading room in the National Library, Calcutta

In 1970, other public library services were performed by 13 State Central Libraries, by approximately 100 district libraries, about 1,500 town libraries (most of them private, so-called subscription libraries), 1,400 block central libraries, and 24,000 village libraries. Most libraries are very much in need of proper lighting, money, and books and often resemble what the head of the National Library has called "stagnant pools of books." There are hardly any primary and secondary school libraries worthy of the name, and the average college library leaves a great deal to be desired.

3. Radio, television, and films

The government-controlled *All-India Radio* (AIR) is the sole radio outlet in India. In mid-1972 AIR operated about 270 medium and shortwave stations for the domestic and foreign broadcast service. AIR's transmitters and receiving centers can potentially reach over 70% of the population with its programs. There is a wide gap, however, between transmission coverage and actual reception potential. In late 1972 there were about 13 million licensed radio receivers in the entire country, well over half located in the large cities. In addition, there were probably a substantial but unknown number of unlicensed sets. The government, which regards the radio as an important means of educating the people and improving their sense of identity with the nation, is attempting to broaden the listening audience by distributing radios to rural villages (Figure 44). AIR transmission

coverage is to be extended to 80% of the population by 1974, and there is a program to increase the number of radio receivers.

In 1970, about half of AIR's domestic broadcast time ("home service") was devoted to music. The remainder consisted of news (22.5%), discussion (8%), rural features (7%), drama (5%), and a variety of special programs for women, children, farmers, the armed services, and other groups. More than 100 different languages and dialects were used in AIR programs. Most home-service stations operated 8 to 10 hours daily, although Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras broadcast 18 to 21 hours daily. External programs were broadcast in 24 languages (6 Indian, 18 foreign) practically around the clock to Asia, New Zealand, Australia, Africa, and Europe, for a total of about 45 hours daily.

Even though AIR is a government organization, its domestic commentators have a favorable reputation for accuracy and impartiality. There is some avowedly political programming at election time, but the Congress Party and opposition groups are allowed equal time to express their views. The major criticism of AIR's regular broadcasts is that they tend to be dry and impersonal. In surveys, listeners have expressed a marked preference for light, variety entertainment and even for the popular music played by *Radio Ceylon*.

Until late 1972 India had only one television station. This is located in Delhi and has a broadcast radius of only about 37 miles. In October 1972 TV service became available to the Bombay area with the

FIGURE 44. Villagers gathered around a community radio set

opening of a station there built by West German technicians. Reportedly to offset the effects of Pakistani television broadcasts seen in the populous Vale of Kashmir, a TV station also went into operation in Srinagar in January 1973. All of these stations are operated by AIR. There are plans to open stations in Ahmadabad, Amritsar, Bangalore, Calcutta, Kanpur, Lucknow, Madras, and Mussoorie.

Motion pictures are probably the most popular medium of mass communication in India. India ranks second only to Japan in the number of films produced each year. Indian moviemakers release about 300 feature films per year, some 15% of which are in color. Production of regional-language films, aided by incentives from the state governments, is increasing yearly. Films of all types are imported, the largest numbers coming from the United States, followed by the United Kingdom. English-language films cater mostly to the English-speaking big city elite.

Most Indian feature-length films are highly romanticized accounts of modern urban living, although historical, mythological, crime, and adventure themes are also popular. Song and dance routines are almost invariably included. Documentaries and newsreels are gradually becoming a regular feature in some large cities. Censorship on moral grounds is strict, with the result that Indian films are rather bland and foreign imports are often extensively cut. In 1971 there were 7,000 movie theaters in India consisting of 4,500 permanent structures and 2,500 touring types. There were two cinerama theaters in operation in 1968 and a third, under construction then, probably has been completed. About 100 theaters specialized in showing foreign films. Some 500,000 people normally attend motion picture showings every day.

Private studios in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras produce most Indian films. However, industry, business and the government have recognized the effectiveness of films as a medium of communication, particularly with the large illiterate segment of the population. Some businesses have begun to produce commercials while others have recognized the potential public relations role of educational films, which they show in villages by means of mobile film units. The government set up a National Film Board in 1957 to promote the development of the film industry as a "medium of culture, education, and healthy entertainment." A large number of newsreels and other short subjects are produced in regional languages each year by the government. A film production bureau, constituted by the National Film Board, advises and assists in the production of films.

Licensed motion picture theaters are required to include in every performance at least 2,000 feet of government-approved documentary, news or educational films. The government-sponsored Film Institute of India gives special training in film techniques. The government also supports the Children's Film Society, promotes international film festivals, gives awards to noteworthy Indian films, and encourages the export of Indian films.

4. Other channels of information

The government has begun imaginative programs of visual and aural information to increase public awareness of its more urgent programs such as family planning. Various information and educational themes are presented to the public in many ways including displays on billboards, buses, trains, matchbooks, shopping bags, building walls and other surfaces, as well as in calendars, folders and brochures. The government conducts meetings and group discussions, puts on exhibitions, sponsors song and drama shows, and organizes citizen's information forums.

Personal contacts have a special importance in Indian society, despite the increasingly effective mass media techniques. Face-to-face communication is an indispensable means of exchanging information because it utilizes traditional networks of family, caste and religious relationships as well as commerce. Informal means of communication cut across the fabric of Indian society and are important even among the intellectual elite, who have more formal channels of communication at their disposal. The intellectual community receives information on important ideas, books and articles by an effective, although informal, word-of-mouth and letter-writing network.

5. Information from abroad

Many major countries and a number of smaller ones make information available to Indians through informal channels and several countries maintain formal information programs. The principal media used include radio, publications introduced from abroad or domestically produced, foreign government news agencies, exhibits, organized gatherings and cultural exchanges.

The best received and most frequently listened to radio broadcasts from abroad include *Radio Ceylon, Radio Pakistan, British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC), *Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, Radio Australia,* and *Voice of America. Radio Ceylon,* which broadcasts in Hindi, Tamil and English, can be heard

71

throughout India by means of relay transmitters. It advertises many Indian products and provides light musical programs which are quite popular. *Radio Pakistan's* external service broadcasts several hours a week in English and Hindi. In addition, some Pakistani domestic stations are sufficiently close to India to be clearly received in contiguous areas by even the smallest of radio receivers.

The Soviet Union broadcasts to the subcontinent in English as well as 12 Indian languages, including Hindi, Tamil, Urdu, Malayalam, Bengali, Marathi, Punjabi, and Telegu. Apart from official propaganda channels, the U.S.S.R. broadcasts in English, Hindi, Bengali, and Urdu what it claims to be the free "voice of Soviet opinion," through its "unofficial" *Radio Peace and Progress* begun in 1966. In 1973 the U.S.S.R. was transmitting over 115 hours weekly. *Radio Moscow's* official programs have generally been friendly to the Indian Government, whereas *Radio Peace and Progress* was often critical of the Indian Government and of the United States. It is likely that the tone of Moscow's broadcasts will continue to reflect the warm relations now existing between it and New Delhi. *Radio Peace and Progress* is also currently friendly in its tone; however, it often uses its broadcasts as a vehicle for dissemination of statements by Indian Communists. East European Communist states broadcast about 25 hours a week to South Asia. *Radio Peking* broadcasts in four Indian languages and in English. In 1972 it broadcast about 40 hours weekly and was strong enough to be heard throughout India. Beginning around early 1972, the Peking broadcasts, formerly vituperative and strongly anti-Indian, softened their approach toward Indian affairs; at present they are fairly innocuous in content. The Federal Republic of Germany broadcasts several hours weekly in English, Hindi, and Urdu. Australian English-language programs to Asia and Africa are received clearly and are very popular.

The *Voice of America* (VOA) beamed about 80 hours a week to India in 1973, primarily in English but also in Hindi and Bengali. Transmitters in the Philippine Islands and Sri Lanka (Ceylon) relayed programs to India. By early 1973 VOA installations in northern Greece were beginning to provide additional transmitting power. VOA programs consist of news, panel discussions, question-and-answer programs, interviews, talks on science and on life and culture in the United States, and popular music.

Informational-cultural programs are run by several nations and are basically euphemistic designations for propaganda or publicity programs in support of foreign policy goals. Information in the form of press releases, pamphlets, photos and advertising copy is distributed by many foreign embassies to Indian newspapers, and to schools, libraries, and other possible channels of dissemination. The bulk of this information is distributed by the major powers who have more funds available for such purposes. Indian newspapers, particularly small ones with limited news sources, are willing beneficiaries of foreign information features, especially Soviet pieces which are often published in exchange for advertising. Many newspapers regularly publish this material, particularly in their Sunday magazine supplements.

The United States Information Service (USIS) program in India is the United States' largest in the world in terms of money expended for program activities. In addition to the USIS headquarters in New Delhi, there are large branch posts in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. The USIS publishes monthly and fortnightly periodicals, provides programs to AIR for radio and television, and issues news bulletins in 13 languages. It also conducts film showings, cultural activities, educational exchanges and a book program whereby U.S. books are reprinted (often translated into Indian languages) and sold to students at low cost. In mid-1972 the working environment in which the USIS operates had not recovered from the strains placed on Indian-United States relations by the Bangladesh crisis of the previous year.

Next to the United States, the Western nations most active in the cultural-informational field are the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. These nations conduct information programs by circulating periodicals, showing films, and conducting exhibits and classes. United Kingdom activities directed at the academic community are particularly strong. The main elements of this program include lending sets of textbooks to colleges, and supporting a network of 11 well-stocked libraries that have fairly high circulation rates. The West German program is distinguished by its emphasis on cultural activities and presentations, especially in the field of music. It has a system of nine medium-sized libraries in India. The French, through their five *Alliances Francaises*, run a modest program of lectures, exhibits, libraries, and cultural presentations in five Indian cities.

All of the Communist diplomatic and consular missions in India are active in the informational-cultural field. To varying degrees, they publish periodicals, show films, hold exhibitions, place materials in the local press, and arrange and exchange visits. Soviet efforts seek to proclaim Soviet achievements and play up good Indo-Soviet relations,

72

to support Indian goals and prescribe remedies for India's social and economic ills, to attack Western policies and interests in India, and even on occasion to criticize some Indian policies and political personalities of which Moscow disapproves. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to spend the equivalent of US$10 to $15 million annually for informational and cultural purposes. The U.S.S.R. has by far the largest Communist diplomatic mission in India, both in terms of scope and number of personnel, and has consistently expanded its information activities to reach all types of Indian audiences through the written word and visual media. The Soviet mission publishes some 54 different periodicals and bulletins in almost all Indian languages and has four information centers (New Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay). The Soviet Embassy also maintains a full-fledged cultural center in New Delhi, the House of Soviet Culture, which has a sizable library and an auditorium that is used by the embassy and various Communist front organizations. Despite an Indian Government ban on operating foreign centers in cities where there were no consular or diplomatic offices, the Soviets were given permission in early 1972 to open a new cultural center in Trivandrum. It was stipulated, however, that no Soviet personnel should be assigned to the center. Although the center formally opened in April 1972, it was still not functioning in late 1972. Besides normal commercial showings of imported Soviet films in privately run theaters, the House of Soviet Culture and the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society hold regular film showings of their own. The Soviets also sponsor a substantial number of exhibits in various parts of the country, using photographs, charts, or the display of actual objects. These exhibitions are usually well advertised in the local press and cover the arts, trade and industry, machinery, handicrafts, civic affairs, and the life of the people in the Soviet Union. The information centers regularly supply free press materials in the major regional languages and Soviet news agencies perform similar services.

Since 1968 the Indian Press Information Bureau has distributed Soviet press materials by virtue of an agreement with *Novosti*. Local representatives of the Soviet press are also instrumental in arranging for placement of Soviet articles in the English-language and vernacular press. A representative of Soviet radio and television is posted in India and is instrumental in arranging for AIR programs relating to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet news agency, TASS, publishes a monthly journal in nine languages, and conducts fairly extensive information and cultural programs. In 1971,

the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, North Korea, Cuba, and Bulgaria maintained informational-cultural centers and programs but to a lesser degree than the U.S.S.R.

Since the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, the information activities of the Chinese People's Republic within India have been severely restricted. The Chinese Embassy information office issues a weekly publication to a small, selected number of addressees and newspapers, and sends out a limited amount of Peking-printed information materials. There are no Sino-Indian exchange visits or exhibitions, and Chinese films are allowed to be shown only on rare occasions and only to small audiences. A small amount of smuggled Chinese propaganda finds its way into the hands of pro-Peking Communist extremist groups and the extremists also produce and disseminate a limited amount of their own Maoist literature. The small group of rebel Nagas that have gone to China in the hope of obtaining arms reportedly have been given a thorough ideological indoctrination as part of the bargain and the same is probably true of Mizo rebels who have gone to China.

K. Suggestions for further reading

Considerable sociological information on India has been compiled in English by both Indian and Western scholars. There is a large number of books as well as articles in newspapers, scholarly journals, and in Indian government publications concerning virtually all aspects of Indian society and culture. Listed below is a representative selection of some of the more important introductory and reference materials. The annual bibliographic issues of the *Journal of Asian Studies* provide a much more comprehensive listing of major serious books and articles. Maureen Patterson's and Ronald Indem's *South Asia: Introductory Bibliography* (University of Chicago Press, 1962) is also useful.

1. General and reference

Basham, A. L. *The Wonder That Was India*. New York: The Grove Press. 1959. A comprehensive, authoritative, and illustrated account of ancient and traditional Indian life.

Edwardes, Michael. *A History of India from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London: Thames and Hudson. 1961. A useful chronology and an excellent selection of quotations about the past.

India, Planning Commission. *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74*. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1969. Contains considerable statistical and other data

73

on education, manpower, labor, social welfare, community development, and many other subjects including future developmental targets.

India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. *Press in India, 1971.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1971. Annually published basic source for statistical information on the Indian press.

India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. *The Gazetteer of India: Indian Union, Country, and People,* Volume I. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1967. This and other volumes of the new gazetteer contain a wealth of detailed information.

India: A Reference Annual, 1971-72. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1972. Reliable general reference work produced by the government annually.

Griffiths, Percival. *The British Impact on India.* London: MacDonald and Co. 1952. Informative analysis of British influence in India by an Englishman.

Mehta, Ved. *Portrait of India.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 1970. Beautifully written and voluminous report by a Western-trained Indian regarding his experiences on returning to his native land.

Moreland, W. H., and Chatterjee, A. C. *Short History of India.* New York: McKay. 1957. Fourth edition of this excellent one-volume introductory history of India.

Myrdal, Gunnar. *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.* 3 volumes. New York: Pantheon Press. 1968. Concentrates on South Asia and provides an exhaustive and extensively documented review of social, economic, and political conditions.

Nossiter, Bernard. *Soft State.* New York: Harper and Row. 1970. Perhaps the best book on contemporary India. Although somewhat dated by 1971 and 1972 elections and the India-Pakistan war, it still is essentially accurate.

Roberts, P. E. *History of British India Under the Company and the Crown.* London: Oxford University Press. 1952. Authoritative general study of the British Raj.

Smith, Vincent A. *The Oxford History of India.* 3d ed. London: Oxford University Press. 1958. An invaluable, detailed text first published in 1911 but revised to cover the period through partition.

Spate, O. H. K. *India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography.* London: Methuen. 1963. The standard and still very useful book on the physical, economic, and human geography of India.

Spear, Percival. *India: A Modern History.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1961. Standard general historical survey concentrating on prein-dependence period.

————. *India, Pakistan and the West.* 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1967. One of the finest short studies of the interaction of the Indian subcontinent and the West.

The Times of India, Directory and Year Book, 1972. New Delhi: Times of India Press. 1972. Annual reference publication by a leading English-language newspaper that provides extensive information, including a biographic section.

2. Characteristics of the society

Beteille, Andre. *Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Mysore Village.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1965. Intensive study of a multicaste village in south India that exemplifies the social, political, and economic change occurring in much of rural India.

Carstairs, G. Morris. *The Twice Born.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1961. A penetrating analysis of Hindu personality formation in which historical, sociological, and psychoanalytic concepts are employed.

Dube, S. C. *India's Changing Villages: Human Factors in Community Development.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1958. Classic study of Indian village life and the effects of the government's efforts at political, social, and economic moderniza-tion.

Ghurye, G. S. *Social Tensions in India.* Bombay: Popular Prakashan. 1968. An eminent Indian sociologist examines the nature and causes of group tension in India with heavy emphasis on Hindu-Muslim communal differences and the divisive role of language.

Heimsath, Charles H. *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1964. Comprehensive study of the origins and development of the Hindu social reform movement and how it is related to nationalism and Western influences.

India, Office of the Registrar General, Ministry of Home Affairs. *Census of India, 1961.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1968. In a number of specialized volumes, provides the complete statistical information complied from the 1961 Indian census. The Office of the Registrar General also periodically issues "bulletins" that freqeuntly include interpreta-tions and analysis of census data.

India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs. *Census of India-1971: Paper I of 1971-Supplement, Provisional Population Totals.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1971. First in a series designed to give detailed

74

data on the 1971 census, Paper I provides only provisional basic data made available almost immediately after completion of the census.

Lannoy, Richard. *The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1971. Emphasizes elements of Indian life that have been continuous through the centuries in terms of cultural, artistic and social developments. Provides appreciation of relevance of Eastern traditions to 20th century India with aim of identifying the origins of India's contemporary problems.

Majumdar, D. N. *The Races and Cultures of India.* New York: Asia Publishing House. 1961. Useful presentation of the racial backgrounds of the Indian peoples.

Mukerjee, R., and Baljit Singh. *Social Profiles of a Metropolis: The Social and Economic Structure of Lucknow.* New York: Taplinger. 1961. Study of caste and urbanization in a large north-central Indian city.

Ross, Aileen B. *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Analysis of the effect of modern urban life on the traditional Hindu family structure.

Singer, Milton, ed. *Traditional India: Structure and Change.* Philadelphia: The American Folklore Society. 1959. Contains a number of studies on the transitional aspects of Indian society.

Singh, Khushwant. *History of the Sikhs.* 2 volumes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1963. Most definitive work that has been written on this important group.

Srinivas, M. *Social Change in Modern India.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1966. A prominent Indian anthropologist analyzes the main trends of social and cultural change in modern India. His concept of "Sanskritization" resulting in social mobility within the caste system is an original and important contribution.

Turner, Roy, ed. *India's Urban Future.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1961. All of the major aspects of urbanization are covered in this collection.

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. *Family Planning in Asia: A Draft Bibliography.* E/CN.11/807. August 1968. A fairly comprehensive bibliography that includes many entries on India.

3. Religion and artistic expression

deBary, William T., ed. *Sources of Indian Tradition.* 2 volumes. New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Collection of original source materials and writings by prominent scholars on India that provides a comprehensive guide to ancient and modern Indian thought. Volume I is mainly concerned with the major religions of India. Volume II brings together works that reflect modern Indian thought. Both volumes have extensive introductory essays and commentary that greatly assist the reader.

Gargi, Balwant. *Theatre in India.* New York: Theatre Arts Books. 1962. Introduction to Indian theater.

Goetz, Herman. *India: 5,000 Years of Indian Art.* New York: Crown Publishers. 1962. Informed presentation of the development of art in India.

Harper, Edward B., ed. *Religion in South Asia.* St. Louis: Washington University Press. 1963. A collection of useful essays on the role of religion in the South Asian countries.

India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. *Temples of India.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1968. Narrates briefly the growth of religious architecture in India and its various regional manifestations in simple language with photographs and a glossary of Sanskrit and technical terms.

Krishnaswami, S. *Musical Instruments of India.* Faridabad: Government of India Press. 1967. Concise study of the evolution of Indian instruments and description of construction and working of 59 musical instruments.

Murti, T. R. V. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.* London: George, Allen, and Unwin. 1968. Scholarly work that presents Buddhism as both a philosophy and a religion.

Radhakrishnan, S., and Charles Moore, ed. *A Sourcebook on Indian Philosophy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1968. Includes examples of Indian thought from Vedic to modern times.

Renou, Louis. *Indian Literature.* New York: Walker and Company. 1964. Review of Indian literature.

————. *The Nature of Hinduism.* New York: Walker and Company. 1951. Standard account of Hinduism.

Smith, Wilfred C. *Islam in Modern History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Informative presentation which includes an illuminating discussion of the psychological problems faced by the Indian Muslim community.

Spencer, Dorothy M. *Indian Fiction in English: An Annotated Bibliography.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1960. Reliable guide to English-language Indian literature.

4. Labor, health and welfare, and education

Cormack, Margaret L. *She Who Rides a Peacock: Indian Students and Social Change.* New York:

75

Praeger. 1961. Interesting study of the role of Indian students in the society.

Gaudino, Robert L. *The Indian University.* Bombay: Popular Prakashan. 1965. Provocative discussion of general aspects of university life and administration.

India, Ministry of Education. *Annual Reports.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. Provides extensive current information on government programs.

————. *Report of the Education Commission, 1964-1966.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1966. The most comprehensive critical study on the Indian education system, including recommendations for changes.

India, Ministry of Health. *Family Planning and Urban Development: Annual Report, 1967-1968.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1968. Provides extensive current information on government programs.

India, Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation. *Indian Labor Statistics, 1971.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1971. Annual summary of principal labor statistics collected by the central government's Department of Labor and Employment.

India, Ministry of Labor and Employment and Rehabilitation. *Report of The National Commission on Labour.* New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1969. An indepth, analytical survey of Indian labor.

Lambert, Richard D. *Workers, Factories, and Social Changes in India.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1963. Examines at length the important relationship between industrialization and social change.

Morris, David Morris. *The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1965. Complete analysis of both the social and economic problems involved in the creation of an industrial labor force.

Myers, Charles. *Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1958. Scholarly study of labor problems.

Naik, J. P. *Elementary Education in India: The Unfinished Business.* London: Asia Publishing House. 1966. Short critical survey.

The Planning Commission of the Government of India. *Encyclopedia of Social Work in India.* 3 volumes. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 1969. This comprehensive collection provides extensive information about international, national and state-level agencies and private social welfare activities in India.

Rao, Venugopala S. *Facets of Crime in India.* New Delhi: Allied Publishers. 1962. Brief but informed study of crime in India by a senior police officer.

Shils, Edward. *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation.* New York: Humanities Press. 1964. Perceptive study of the Western-influenced intelligentsia in India.

Shrimali, K. *Education in Changing India.* New York: Taplinger. 1965. Analytical survey of Indian education.

United States, Department of Labor. *Labor Law and Practice in India.* Washington, D.C.: Gov. Print. Off. 1966. Authoritative study prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide background for U.S. businessmen, labor specialists, students, and others.

76

Glossary

Abbreviation	Indian Name	English
AIR		All-India Radio
AITUC		All-India Trade Union Congress
BLD	Bhartiya Kamgar Sena	Indian Laborer's Army
BMS	Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh	Indian Workers Organisation
CITU		Centre of Indian Trade Unions
CPI		Communist Party of India
CPUM		Communist Party of India/Marxist
CPUM-L		Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist
HMP	Hind Mazdoor Panchayat	Indian Labor Council
HMR	Hind Mazdoor Sabha	Indian Labor Congress
HR	Hindustan Samachar	Hindustan News
ICFTU		International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IFITU		Indian Federation of Independent Trade Unions
INFA		Indian News and Feature Alliance
INTUC		Indian National Trade Union Congress
IPA		Indian Press Agency
IRC		Industrial Relations Commission
NCERT		National Council of Educational Research and Training
NCL		National Commission on Labor
NES		National Employment Service
PHP	Praja Socialist Party	People's Socialist Party
PTI		Press Trust of India
RSP		Revolutionary Socialist Party
SP		Socialist Party
SSP	Samyukta Socialist Party	United Socialist Party
UNI		United News of India
UTUC		United Trade Union Congress
	Rajya Sabha	Council of States
	Lok Sabha	House of the People
	Bharatiya Jana Sangh, or Jana Sangh	Indian People's Party