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Country Profile

Iran

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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
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INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Structure of organizations concerned with internal security and foreign intelligence, their responsibilities, professional standards, and interrelationships • Mission, organization, functions, effectiveness and methods of operation of each service • Biographies of key officials

This General Survey supersedes the one dated November 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.



CHANGE FROM THE TOP



Iranian national emblem

One of the most dramatic efforts at modernization among the less developed nations is taking place in Iran. Unlike most countries in Asia and Africa, and especially the Middle East, Iran has taken steps toward modernization not as a result of revolution or the violent overthrow of the social order but rather because of the initiative of the country's ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. (U O U)

Mohammad Reza has not always been the prime mover of modernization. He assumed the throne in 1941 when his father, suspected of collaborating with the Nazis, was forced to abdicate by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, who occupied Iran to halt the growing influence there of the Axis powers. The young Shah, only 22 years old when he suddenly succeeded to the throne, for a time lived in the shadow of his forceful and talented father, the founder of the dynasty and a dominating figure. Moreover, in the first 10 years of his reign, Mohammad Reza seemed uncertain about the role he should play in the administration of his country. Schooled in Switzerland and influenced by Western democratic traditions, the Shah tended to view his role as that of a constitutional

monarch on the European model, allowing an elected government to set national goals and determine national policies. (U O U)

The turning point in the political development of the Shah toward his present style of rule and involvement came during the turbulent prime ministership of Mohammad Mosadeq, from 1951 to 1953. Mosadeq had risen to power when a simmering dispute between the Iranian Government and the British-owned oil company over increased royalties resulted in the nationalization of the company. In the face of British economic countermeasures and with the shutdown of production at the company, Iran experienced growing financial difficulties. (U O U)

Unable to check the deterioration of the economic situation, Mosadeq resorted to repressive, strong-arm tactics to silence his critics. In so doing he alienated most of his conservative supporters and, when they abandoned him, the Communist-led Tudeh Party was left as his main support. Mosadeq then sought to prop up his position by dismissing parliament. When the Shah tried to remove him, he called crowds into the street to demonstrate in his favor, deposed the Shah,

and established a regency council. The Shah fled to Baghdad and later to Rome before Iranian army troops, backed by the United States, led a countercoup against Mosadeq in August 1953 and reinstated the Shah.

Apparently aware that he must assume a more forceful role in government or again risk losing his throne, the Shah began to strengthen his position. After resolving the oil dispute with Britain, he devoted the rest of the 1950's to consolidating his authority throughout the country, but especially in the military and the government bureaucracy. Having done this, he turned his efforts to the modernization of his country, proposing and initiating a wide-ranging program of social and economic reform. (U O U)

One feature of the Shah's effort to modernize Iran carries on a goal his father had: the creation of an army strong enough to maintain internal control, in a land of ancient rivalries and animosities, and to win for the country a position of influence in the Middle East. Modernization of the armed forces, however, could not be accomplished in a vacuum. A whole range of changes in the country's social and economic structure had to occur also. Providing manpower for an armed force to be trained and equipped with the weapons of modern technology would require better educated and healthier soldiers, available only if the general populace were better educated and healthier. The operation of a military system would require a sophisticated administrative apparatus. (U O U)

The Shah has also sought to consolidate his position through a program of land reform. Great wealth had enabled a number of families in Iran (probably fewer than the 1,000 usually cited) to encroach steadily upon the power of the monarchy and at times to challenge it. Wealth in Iran has traditionally been based on the ownership of land. In making land redistribution an integral part of his new program the Shah had two aims: to break the political power of the landowning elite by dividing the holdings that were their source of


wealth and, at the same time, to win the gratitude of the peasants. The Shah hoped to use this gratitude to forge a political alliance with the peasants that would counter the remaining political muscle of the landed elite who, in the mid-1950's, were still in control of parliament. (U O U)

Altruism and nationalism have also had important parts in the Shah's effort to modernize his country. He has professed and evidently has a personal commitment to reform. In his coronation speech he pledged his devotion to "the constant improvement of the Iranian nation, . . . to bring [it] up to the level of the most progressive and prosperous societies of the world." He has stressed the importance of changing the essentially feudal social system. Thus in *Philosophy of the Revolution*, his 1967 book on the reform program, he declared that:

The old social order, which prevailed for centuries and in which class privileges and class distinctions are more or less considered in the nature of things, is no longer acceptable. Consequently if our nation wishes to remain in the circle of dynamic, progressive, and free nations of the world, it has no alternative but to alter the old and archaic order of society completely, and to build its future on a new order compatible with the vision and needs of the day. (U O U)

In keeping with his words, the Shah in 1952 began to sell the vast lands that he himself held as personal property. He sold them on long-term credit to the peasants working them, and the final distribution was achieved in January 1963. The Shah also pushed for the popular distribution of all public domain land in excess of that needed by government institutions, a process begun in 1958. In 1961 the Shah formed the Pahlavi Foundation, which takes revenue from business enterprises owned by the Shah and contributes it to support various social services. The Shah postponed his own coronation until 1967, 26 years after coming to the throne, maintaining that though the crown was his by inheritance, he could not wear it until he had earned the right to do so. (U O U)

Obstacles to Change (c)



Change has not been easy to accomplish in Iran, and the Shah has had to contend with many difficulties which directly affect both the rate and the direction of modernization. Because a modern army must have mobility and a modern industrial economy must have ready access to raw materials and markets, the physical environment has provided a challenge.

Iran is a harsh land, located on a high triangular plateau surrounded on all sides by mountains. The variegated territory breaks up physically into four regions: the western and southern mountains, the northern chain and the lowlands around the Caspian Sea, the arid central plateau, and the eastern highlands. The nature of the country results in a wide range of climates. Rainfall in the area just below the Caspian Sea averages 50 inches per year, with slightly less in the western and northern mountains, and the amount decreasing in areas toward the southeast and central area. The mountains cut off moisture into the central area, which is a large desert constituting nearly half the country.

The availability of water has been a major factor determining the size, location, and pattern of human settlement in Iran. Outside the northern and western areas, where most of Iran's 30.8 million people live, villages are centered around the water supply. In some places the supply is so small that people survive only by adopting nomadic habits, migrating from near desert lowlands to grasslands in the higher areas.

The roads which connect the various parts of the country must skirt the desert, wind through mountain passes, and follow valleys. In the central portion of the country there is one road that traverses the area from north to south, and only two go from east to west. The country's rail system is poorly developed, consisting only of about 3,000 miles of track which connect the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea and the major agricultural centers of the northeast and northwest with Tehran. Air transportation is available to the larger towns, but for the average traveler the journey from the capital to provincial areas must be made by other, more difficult means.

The resulting physical isolation of various portions of the country has kept the people divided. Many of them are descendants of the invaders who swept through the land centuries ago, and they remain separated into minorities, of which the largest are the Turkic peoples, the Kurds, and the Arabs. Only about 50% of the population speaks Persian as a native

¹For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.

tongue, although many more learn the language in school. The language barriers are weakening, and integration is being hastened by the increasing urbanization, but strong provincialism still characterizes the society.

Little thought was given historically to the concept of the nation-state and programs that affect the whole country. Even today only the small urban segment of Iran's people identifies to any significant degree with the nation. Most people live in villages, and their first allegiance is to their families and then to the village. They do not aid the next village, let alone the rest of the nation. The nomadic tribes have been even further removed from participation in national life. Government efforts to settle the nomads have been successful, and the 1966 census enumerated only about 500,000, probably undercounting them to some extent. Many of the settled nomads, however, retain tribal affiliation, and they see the state and government as nothing more than a central authority attempting to change their way of life.

Even without the problems of provincialism, the Shah and his government would have difficulty in garnering the support of the peasant masses for most reform programs. Conditioned by their way of life, the typically conservative farmers are prepared to accept changes that allow them to own or add to their own land, but are not willing to accept those that affect their personal affairs, such as raising the status of women. They are, for the most part, impoverished and illiterate; they are resigned to their condition, expect little from life, and are concerned primarily with survival.

In the upper levels of Iranian society, most individuals seek above all else to enhance their personal position and wealth. Self-seeking individuals are not novel, of course, but Iranian society has traditionally viewed self-aggrandizement as a singular virtue. The person who rises to the top by whatever means he can use is looked upon with admiration. Thus, when the Englishman James Morier wrote the satire *Haji Baba of Isfahan*, in which just such an unscrupulous and ambitious schemer is the central character, the book won instant popularity with Iranians as the tale of a folk hero, rather than the intended indictment of a disagreeable personality trait. As a result of this prevailing attitude, it is hard to find individuals who are willing to join in national programs, either as administrators or as participants, unless they see personal reward in the undertaking.

In a sense, there is an aura of history that hinders acceptance of the Shah's forward-looking programs. The mere fact that Iran has existed as an entity for over 2,500 years has fostered a general resistance to rapid change unless it is forcibly imposed. For most of Iran's history this tendency has been a virtue because there was real danger that the society would lose its cultural identity as the country was successively invaded and occupied by Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Tatars, and Afghans. Now the Shah is criticized by some segments of the population for his alleged disruption of cultural continuity and for the challenges to religion that they perceive in his policies.

Particularly strong objections to the Shah's reform program have come from the religious establishment, traditionally one of the most powerful groups in the country. The importance of religious leaders and scholars in Iranian society can be understood only by realizing that Islam is not merely a religion. It is an all-encompassing religious, economic, legal, social, and intellectual system that controls all aspects of life, ranging from worship to inheritance laws to the relationship between individuals. Because of their knowledge and professed ability to interpret Islamic law, members of the religious establishment have traditionally demanded veto power over any government action they consider a contradiction of Islamic law.

For over a century the religious establishment, taking this tack, has objected to the government's entry into such areas as education, landownership patterns, and the status of women. The religious leaders fully realized that the end result of the government's course, if not checked, would be secularization—i.e., that personal affairs would be regulated by government laws and courts rather than by religious ones. Thus when the Shah's reform program was transformed into law in January 1963, the reactionary members of the religious establishment were the first publicly to oppose it. They also led the rioting that erupted in a number of urban centers in June of 1963. Although the government has subsequently restricted the influence of the establishment in Iran's cities, religious leaders in the rural areas continue to exert an important influence over the deeply religious peasants. To allay religious opposition, the Shah stresses the close identification of the nation with Islam and is punctilious in the public performance of his religious duties.

The Strong-Man Tradition (u/ou)



Darius Persopolis



Sassanian king



Carpet depicting Nader Shah



Reza Shah

Shahs crown themselves

The centrifugal nature of the forces at work in Iran is offset to a degree by another aspect of Iranian history—the tradition of a strong ruler at the head of an authoritarian government imposed on the nation by fiat. Throughout the invasions and conquests of history, the emergence of the strong leader has been a recurrent feature and probably an important factor in the preservation of the culture of the land. Iran was under foreign domination at times for centuries, but it never completely adopted the ways of its conquerors; instead, sometimes the descendants of the conquerors became themselves strong Persian rulers. The monarchy—the shah of shahs—has proved an en-

during institution, an apparent embodiment for the people of a beneficent power far away and far above them. While the peasants may not be conscious of the nation-state, they are familiar with its rulers, for they know about the glorious history of their land, largely through oral or written acquaintance with the great poets of the past.

Cyrus the Great founded the first Persian² empire that of the Achaemenid dynasty, in the sixth century B.C. by conquering the Medes and other kingdoms between the Mediterranean coast of Syria and the Oxus River in central Asia. His grandson Darius developed the system of dividing the empire into 20 satraps or provinces connected by an excellent network of imperial roads. After conquest by Alexander and centuries of Greek rule came the Parthian dynasty, followed by the Sassanian empire, which modern Iranians revere as second only to the Achaemenids. The Sassanids strengthened the power of the central government during their 400-year reign from the beginning of the third to the middle of the seventh century A.D. They carried out administrative reforms and surveyed the area that is now Iran. With the overthrow of the last Sassanid Shah by Arab invaders in 651, Iran entered a period of nine centuries during which it was ruled by a succession of foreign conquerors. With the rise to power of the Safavids in 1501, however, a native Iranian dynasty again held sway. Shah Abbas, the greatest of the Safavids, was an

²The inscriptions left by the Achaemenid rulers refer to their clan as the Achaemenid, their tribe as the Parsa, and their nation as Arya. Iran as a geographic term derives from Arya, and it was formally declared the legal name of the country in 1935. From Parsa came the Greek word Persis, which became Persia in other European languages. The word went into Arabic, which lacks the letter p, as *fars*, and that is the term the Persians themselves use for their language and a province of the country.

excellent administrator, and by the time of his death in 1629 the empire was again under the control of a strong central authority.

After two centuries, the Safavids were overthrown by the king of neighboring Afghanistan. The Afghans in turn were driven out by Nadir Shah, a Turkic-speaking tribesman, who has been called the last of the great Asian conquerors. A tyrannical monarch, he led a brilliantly successful invasion of India and brought back a vast treasure including the famous Peacock Throne and the Koh-i-noor diamond. The next dynasty of note was that of the Turkic Qajars, whose long period of rule was characterized by the intrusion of foreign political and economic interest, notably British and Russian.

The overthrow of the Qajars in 1921 by Reza Shah, the present monarch's father, restored a forceful ruler to the throne. Until he was forced to abdicate in 1941 by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, Reza Shah was able to reverse the decline that had marked the reign of the Qajars. Governing Iran with a strong hand, Reza Shah centralized the government, molded the heterogeneous military bodies in Iran into a unified army, and made the first moves to crush the power of the religious establishment.

The present Shah has endeavored to underscore his ties with his historical predecessors by stimulating his countrymen's pride in Iran's past imperial greatness—and doubtless, in the process, their acceptance of the legitimacy of the historic institution of a strong sovereign. The latest and most famous of his efforts to glamorize this tradition came in 1971 with the extravaganza at Persepolis, which celebrated the 25th centenary of the Persian monarchy and was attended by kings, presidents, and statesmen from more than 60 countries.

Monopolizing Political Power (s)



Parliamentary opposition to his program has been one problem the Shah has not had to face, for controlling the parliament as he does, he has had little difficulty in obtaining the necessary approval and funding from it. Although Iran is a constitutional monarchy with a popularly elected representative body, the Shah has been able by bribery, cajolery, and threats to make parliament little more than window dressing for his regime, giving the appearance of a democratic system. To insure that he encounters no opposition, candidates for offices in the legal political parties or for seats in the lower house of parliament, the Majlis, are carefully screened and personally approved by the Shah. That relatively small segment of society which is politically aware is perturbed by the Shah's interference in the political process, but they realize there is little they can do about the situation other than to draw public attention to it when they can. The Shah, for his part, allows a measure of freedom for them to vent their vexation verbally in order to underscore the fact that he is in complete control of the political scene. Thus a few years ago the following tongue-in-cheek interview with an imaginary parliamentary deputy appeared in a Tehran daily:

- Q. What is the population of your constituency?
A. 10,000.
- Q. How many votes did you get?
A. 150,000.
- Q. Don't you think there is some discrepancy here?
A. I do but I was told to shut up.
- Q. How many rival candidates were there? Did any of them get more votes than you?


- A. There were many. All of them got more votes.
- Q. Then, how did you manage to get elected?
A. That is the miracle of the ballot box.
- Q. What were the three most important events of your parliamentary term?
A. The first occurred when I was sitting at home wondering what kind of job to find and the radio announced that I had been elected to parliament. The second was the day that parliament raised our salaries to \$1,000 a month and the third was when we were given a big housing allowance.

By monopolizing political power the Shah is, in fact, the government, and he alone determines the direction and content of national policies. To help in the actual process of governing he has surrounded himself with a coterie of cabinet officials, high-level civil servants, senior military officials, parliamentary leaders, professional men and businessmen, members of the royal family, courtiers and confidants. To serve as his political agents in the provinces there is a second level of middle and lower grade civil servants and local officials. To make certain that he continues to control the reins of power and that no one rises to challenge him, the Shah gives no individual or group the opportunity to build up an independent power base. Usually anyone suspected of harboring such ambitions is transferred from his position to an unrelated field.

Although Iranian security has suppressed opposition to the Shah's monopolization of power, there have been eruptions of violence to indicate to the world that the country indeed has dissident elements capable of rash actions. One such incident occurred in May 1972 when several bombs were set off in Tehran during a state visit by President Nixon. During the course of the year Iranian officials announced that 28 people had been executed and 109 others imprisoned for offenses ranging from attacks on police and security forces to assassinations and kidnappings.

Most of the political extremists, numbering at a minimum several hundred, are young, educated middle-class Iranians. There is no serious threat that they will take over the government. It can be said, however, that to a degree they pose a danger to the current political and economic course charted in Iran by the Shah, inasmuch as one or more of their number might mount a suicidal attempt on the Shah's life. As the Shah is architect and prime mover of the country's reforms and economic development policies, his assassination would place their continued implementation in question. The pervasive security apparatus commanded by the Shah is capable of minimizing this danger, however, as well as keeping the lid on any potential for organizing larger scale threats to public order.

The White Revolution (c)



To signify that the change he would bring to Iran would be accomplished without bloodshed, the Shah has called it the White Revolution. He has also said that land reform is its core. When the revolution was formally launched in 1963, Iran's economy was primarily agrarian in nature. Although agriculture now accounts for only about 16% of the gross national product (GNP), it continues to be vital in providing the necessary food for the country's growing population and furnishing raw materials for the expanding industry. The plans of the Shah have thus called for a rise in farm productivity. Under the traditional system of land tenure, this had been given little thought. The landowning class sought profits only to invest in quick turnover areas such as urban real estate, not in new techniques for modernized farming. The peasants had no stake in the land and were in fact ready to leave their rented farms to migrate to urban centers in search

of better paying jobs. By giving peasants a share of the land, it was hoped that a desire for more productive farming could be instilled in them.

Before the Land Reform Law, only 1% of the people—many of them absentee landowners—owned over half the agricultural land. The law forced them to sell all their holdings over a fixed amount and provided for the peasants to pay for the land over a 15-year period. Religious endowments, which held another 15% to 25%, were required to give their tenants 99-year leases. In 1971, the government proclaimed that the physical task of redistributing the land had been completed. Although there are no detailed statistics on the number of landowners affected by the reform, the government claims that all 52,818 villages in Iran have been involved and that there are now 1,550,000 new landowners.

The economic benefits have not, however, been as great as expected. The peasants, who under the traditional tenure system had had a bare subsistence level of existence, still need money to buy seeds and other supplies and now have the added financial burden of paying for their new land. For the government, agricultural output has not risen at the rate it had sought. The peasants also have not had the necessary capital to invest in mechanized equipment and chemical fertilizers, moves that would increase productivity. The government believes mechanized farming is feasible only if the small farmers band together in cooperatives, and it is trying to foster the formation of such cooperatives in the current phase of the land reform program. Iran does not have enough trained manpower, however, to manage the cooperatives that have already been formed. Those that have put together a staff have been plagued by administrative inefficiency and lack of capital.

The peasant's problems are not due just to a lack of money. He also is hampered by ignorance, ill health, and simply unawareness that there are different and more efficient ways of farming. Each weakness seems to reinforce the other in preventing the farmer from getting out of the rut he finds himself in. Thus the White Revolution seeks to improve literacy, health care, and community development. The government's approach has been to form task force groups known as corps, organized along military lines. The corps concept offers secondary school and university graduates an opportunity to serve rural areas and villages in their field of special training, in lieu of military service. The most successful of the various task groups has been the Literacy Corps, which operates in those villages in which no formal school has been established. Govern-

ment statistics indicate that by 1971 the Literacy Corps had trained 1.4 million people to do some rudimentary reading and writing.


Soon after the Literacy Corps showed signs of being a success, the Health Corps was organized and by 1972 it was providing a large part of the health care. In the course of the program, some 6,600 corpsmen, including doctors and medical aide personnel, have been assigned to clinics and dispensaries and to some 500 mobile units throughout the countryside. According to the Shah, the number of citizens who have access to the facilities of the corps rose from 7 million in 1962 to 8 million in 1971—almost 50% of the rural population.

Plagued by the lack of qualified personnel in the fields of agronomy, veterinary medicine and civil engineering, the Development Corps has thus far been the least successful of these ventures. Other obstacles

that have hampered its work include a shortage of funds and a lack of resources in the village that are supposed to be aided. Some corpsmen have been able to fill the void in the cooperative phase of the land reform program, however, and are advising some farmers in the use of modern agricultural techniques.

A good start has been made in achieving the goals of the White Revolution. Nevertheless, some persistent problems have affected all aspects of the program. The most obvious and immediate has been the shortage of skilled personnel. Closely tied to this has been a lack of capital to finance the various projects once they have been initiated. To a degree the government, bent on pressing for more progress, has brought these problems upon itself. Rather than consolidating what has been achieved, projects often have been hastily expanded.

Oil and What Else? (s)



To move as rapidly as possible to industrialize Iran, the Shah has relied heavily upon petroleum. In the long run, however, he wants to build up manufacturing as a hedge against dependence on oil, for the estimated reserves will last only another 42 years even at the present rate of extraction. Because of the large sums of money needed in the initial stages of es-

tablishing a variety of modern industries, the government has had to shoulder the major burden of providing the investments needed.

The private sector of the economy consists mainly of assembly type operations that have quick, high profits. Most of these companies are not very large; according to Iranian Government statistics, 91% of Iranian

plants employ 9 or fewer workers. While the government would like to see privately operated satellite industries grow up around such basic ones as steel and petrochemicals, the private sector is held back by many of the same handicaps that affect the whole modernization and reform program the government has undertaken. There is a shortage of development capital, and there simply is not enough technical and managerial personnel available to satisfy the needs of both sectors. The government has attempted to solve the first problem by making more funds available to investment banks, and has attempted to relieve the shortage of skilled personnel by setting up on-the-job training programs. The larger firms, at least, are benefiting from these moves.

Despite the fact that private manufacturing has not developed as rapidly as the government hoped, the rest of the industrial sector is burgeoning and is the fastest growing part of the economy. New developments, such as the government's plans to exploit large-scale copper deposits and newly discovered iron ore fields, are likely to fuel the continued expansion of industry in Iran.

To date, however, the Shah has been able to carry out his social and economic modernization, in addition to creating a modern army, largely because of his nation's oil boom. Iran's GNP is currently the largest in the Middle East and more than double that of either Israel or Egypt. For the past 7 years it has been growing at an average annual rate of 11%. The largest contributor to the GNP and the one thing most responsible for its continued growth is the oil industry. For the fiscal year ending in March 1972, Iran earned from oil \$2.2 billion in foreign currencies; the estimate for the current fiscal year is \$2.7 billion.

In the decade from 1961 to 1971, Iran's oil production rose at an average annual rate of 14.5% compared with 8% worldwide and 10% for the rest of the Middle East. Today Iran has become the world's fourth largest supplier of oil, following the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Saudi Arabia. Its output in 1971 was 1.7 billion barrels, one-tenth of the world's total. With estimated reserves of some 70 billion barrels—about 10% of the world's total—Iran's importance as an international supplier of oil is assured.

Iran's oil revenues have not risen solely because of increased output. For some time the Shah and his representatives have negotiated astutely with foreign oil companies for an increased share of the profits that

the companies derive from their export and sale of Iranian petroleum. The actual amount of the profit is determined by establishing an artificial fixed price that Iran receives for the oil. Since the initial agreement was signed in 1954, both the percentage of profit and the fixed price have been raised in Iran's favor. Under the terms of new agreements that have been signed, Iran can expect to receive some \$14 billion in revenue during the period 1971/72 to 1975/76. Moreover, in mid-1972 Iran entered negotiations for still further arrangements which would give Iran's national oil company increased amounts of oil for unrestricted sale in international markets. Tehran has also demanded operational control of refining facilities and increased investments from the foreign companies in refining and other operations. In a move to pressure the oil companies to agree to his proposals, the Shah on 23 January 1973 threatened to abrogate current agreements; discussions with the consortium were underway at that time. In any case, Iran stands to gain even greater amounts of oil revenue with which to finance the Shah's programs.

Iran is also developing other sources of revenue. It has the world's third largest reserve of natural gas, the volume of which is conservatively estimated to be over 200 trillion cubic feet. Its largest customer at present is the Soviet Union, which purchased nearly 200 billion cubic feet of gas valued at \$37 million in 1971. Iran has a contract with Moscow to sell, in time, some 5,000 billion cubic feet. Production of liquefied gas is also undergoing negotiations; as 1973 began, new plants involving a total investment of \$3 billion were under consideration with Japanese and other foreign firms.

Oil revenues alone, of course, have not been enough to pay the way for all of the Shah's ambitious reform, modernization, and industrialization programs. Foreign credits, however, will finance nearly one-fourth of Iran's projects during the current 5-year plan. The United States has been a major source of this assistance, having provided since 1946 about \$1.1 billion in grants and credits for the economy and about \$1.7 billion for the military. Other large developmental credits have come from West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan; and the Communist countries since 1958 have extended over \$1 billion in economic credits, more than half of it from the Soviet Union, which between 1967 and 1971 also gave about \$325 million in credits for military use.

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Looking East, West, and to the Middle East (c)



Iran's foreign policy has been closely tied to its domestic situation. In the aftermath of the Mosadeq period, the Shah became heavily dependent on the United States for economic assistance and military aid. Accordingly, he became closely aligned with the West. In 1955 Iran joined the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact and in 1959 signed a bilateral agreement with the United States. As Iran's economy became progressively stronger in the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, the Shah began to draw away from close identification with the United States and the West in general. He now appears to want more room to maneuver in his relations with both the East and West.

Since 1963 Tehran's relationship with the Soviet Union has steadily improved. Long before the Shah's anger in the 1950's because of Moscow's support of Mosadeq, Iran and its giant neighbor to the north were at odds with one another. During most of the 19th century there were Russian encroachments upon Iran's territory. And although the Bolshevik government renounced Tsarist imperialist policies in the area,

Soviet troops have twice occupied Iranian territory. In 1920 they entered Iran to give support to the "Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan," which had been set up at the southwest corner of the Caspian Sea. The Soviets withdrew when the Shah's father refused to sign a treaty with Moscow, and the territory was restored to Iran. After World War II, when Soviet and British troops had occupied Iran, the Soviets refused to leave. Their presence was used to set up two independent republics in areas of the country inhabited by Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks, before pressure from the United Nations finally forced a Soviet withdrawal.

Since the mid-1960's, however, the Soviet Union has become an important source of economic aid for Iran. Many of the heavy industry plants obtained by the Iranian Government have come from the Soviet Union and its allies. Moscow has also become a major customer for Iranian natural gas. The countries have exchanged state visits and generally have relaxed the hostile postures of their recent past.

The Shah naturally has displayed special concern about Iran's position in the Middle East. His recent

assertiveness was born of a determination to see that Iran became the dominant power in the Persian Gulf when the United Kingdom withdrew its military forces from the area in 1971. He moved quickly to fill the void and achieved that end. In 1971, the Shah used a show of force to resolve a longstanding dispute with two Arab sheikhdoms over the ownership of some islands strategically located at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. He dispatched troops to effect control of the islands and force a settlement on Iranian terms.

Iran continues to have difficulties with Iraq, its Arab neighbor to the west. The most serious problem between the two countries centers on the Iraqi contention that their border along the Shatt al Arab, an internal waterway that provides access to the Iranian

port of Abadan, lies on the Iranian shore rather than following the median line of the channel. Iraq has also accused Iran of militarily supporting the rebels in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, who have been carrying on an intermittent rebellion against the government in Baghdad for the past 10 years. Iran, for its part, has been irritated by the periodic expulsion of Iranians from religious shrines in Iraq. For a running feud to exist between a non-Arab monarchy and a radical Arab regime next door is hardly surprising. For the friction to flare into armed conflict would be another matter, and something each party has compelling reason to avoid. Neither side stands to gain by doing battle over their differences, least of all the militarily inferior Iraq.

As the Shah Goes, So Goes Iran (c)



Tehran 1946



Tehran today

In the 10 years since he began his reform and modernization program, the Shah has achieved a number of successes. The nation's economy has experienced substantial growth, and its soaring industrial development seems to assure a healthy rate of continued expansion. In rural areas, the White Revolution has taken excessive holdings from wealthy landowners and parceled them out to those who had only small plots or none at all. The literacy program promoted by the Shah has given the rural poor greater access to education. University graduates have also gained;

many of them have become technocrats in the bureaucracy created to administer the various reform programs. The wealthy have participated in and profited from the growth of the economy. Those discontented about the developments of the past decade are, in the main, members of the educated middle class whose political voice has not been strengthened in keeping with their expectations.

Iran is not without its weaknesses. A long-term threat to the success of the White Revolution, for example, is the problem of a runaway birth rate. The

population is growing at more than a million a year; from a total of 31 million in 1973, it is estimated that there will be 50 million Iranians by 1989. Much of this population will be economically unproductive. Nearly 57% of Iran's people are now under the age of 20, and the median age will fall as the population increases.

As the young are entering the labor force faster than the economy can absorb them, Iran is paradoxically confronted with the problem of growing unemployment at the time of its greatest economic surge. In the cities, where people from the countryside continue to come in search of jobs, unemployment has been estimated as high as 12% of the labor force. For some, the opportunities for social mobility are increasing as a result of the economic development, but there is no evidence that the gap between the rich and the poor has been substantially narrowed. Essentially, Iran must still be considered underdeveloped because of the low per capita GNP (about \$400 a year) of its inhabitants.

Nevertheless, the country's stability and economic outlook make its overall prospects good and its future promising. Its ties with the West are strong ones. Moreover, Iran has managed to remain relatively

unembroiled in the highly charged Arab-Israeli quarrels on its one side, while nurturing a rapprochement with the Soviet Union on the other.

There is no effective challenge to the Shah's position. It is secure. He dominates Iran. He has wrought dramatic and peaceful change from the top. The major weakness of what remains very much the Shah's system—political, social, and economic—is that it has not been institutionalized. It seems to depend for its essential impetus, inspiration, and direction upon him alone. Although an administrative apparatus has been erected and is engaged in the daily operation of the various projects he has launched, few decisions are made by anyone but the Shah.

His decade of modernization may have built loyalties and momentum of its own. And the Shah's age (he will turn 54 in October 1973) and good health augur well for him to have a number of years in which to further his policies and give them deeper roots. But, as is the case with systems molded so single-handedly by one who has monopolized the instruments of policy, the full test of Iran's viability must await his passing.

Chronology (u/ou)

c. 559-330 B.C.

The first Persian empire, founded by Cyrus the Great of the Achaemenid dynasty, eventually extends from what is now Afghanistan in the east to the Mediterranean and Aegean seas in the west.

c. 330 B.C.

Alexander the Great is crowned king of Persia after defeating Persian forces, marking beginning of Greek rule, which lasted until c. 250 B.C.

c. 250 B.C.

Revolt against Greek rule leads to establishment of the generally undistinguished Parthian dynasty, which lasts for almost five centuries.

226-651

The Sassanian rulers restore the Persian empire to greatness.

651

All Sassanian domains come under Arab Muslim control, marking an almost 900-year period of political decline, disunity, and disorder under the Arabs, Turks, and Mongols.

1501-1736

Under the Safavid dynasty internal order and unity are restored and Shia Islam is established as the state religion.

1795

Long dynasty of the Turkic Qajars begins.

1906

December

Fundamental Laws (i.e., national constitution) adopted by Iranian Parliament under Qajar dynasty monarch.

1907

October

Supplementary Fundamental Laws passed, also part of the constitution.

1921

February

Successful coup led against Qajar regime by Reza Khan, leader of an Iranian army Cossack brigade, and Sayyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, who later became Prime Minister; Treaty of Friendship signed with the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

1925

December

Coronation of Reza Khan, henceforth known as Reza Shah Pahlavi.

1941

August

United Kingdom and the USSR invade Iran to counter threat of expanding German influence.

September

Reza Shah abdicates in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah.

1946

May

USSR withdraws its troops from Iran after Iranian complaints to the UN Security Council regarding Soviet failure to withdraw occupying troops after end of World War II.

1949

February

Tudeh (Masses) Party, the Communist political party in Iran, outlawed for alleged involvement in an attempt to assassinate the Shah.

1951

March

British-owned oil industry nationalized; oil production ceases; anti-British street demonstrations threaten the national security.

April

Mohammad Mosadeq becomes Prime Minister.

1953

August

Mosadeq ousted by coup, and the Shah, who had fled to Europe after an abortive attempt against Mosadeq a few days earlier, returned to Iran.

1955

November

Iran joins Baghdad Pact, which in 1959 became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

1959

March

Bilateral defense agreement signed with United States.

1960

July

Iran and the United Arab Republic break diplomatic relations in a dispute over relations with Israel.

October

Male heir born to Shah, named Reza Cyrus Ali.

1961

May

Ali Amini appointed Prime Minister, initiates widespread political, economic, and social reforms at Shah's behest.

1962

September

Unilateral declaration by Iran, for the benefit of the USSR, that Iranian soil will not be used by foreign powers for missile bases.

1963

January

National referendum on Shah's six-point reform program results in overwhelming vote in favor of program.

September

Parliamentary elections held for 21st Majlis.

1964

July

Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey establish Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

1965

January

Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansur assassinated by a member of a fanatical Muslim group; Amir Abbas Hoveyda appointed Prime Minister.

April

Attempt on Shah's life by a conscript member of Imperial Guard.

June

The Shah makes official visit to USSR.

1966

January

Iran and USSR agree that USSR will build a steel mill, develop iron and coal, and build a pipeline for Iranian natural gas to USSR.

1967

January

Soviet military credit of US\$110 million extended to Iran.

August

Parliamentary elections held for 22nd Majlis.

September

Constituent assembly amends constitution to provide for succession to Shah; Empress named Regent.

October

Coronation of Mohammad Reza Shah.

November

US economic aid to Iran officially ends.

1968

January

British announce they will pull forces out of Persian Gulf at end of 1971.

1968

February

Shah cancels trip to Saudi Arabia in dispute over status of Bahrain as competition in the Persian Gulf mounts.

September

Shah visits USSR.

October

Municipal council elections held in larger cities and towns.

November

Shah visits Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

1969

April

Iran breaks diplomatic relations with Lebanon over Lebanese refusal to extradite Lt. Gen. Timur Bahktiar, wanted for trial in Iran.

Iran abrogates 1937 agreement with Iraq over border in the Shatt al Arab because of alleged Iraqi violations.

October

Shah visits United States.

1970

July

General Timur Bahktiar assassinated in Iraq by Iranian agents.

1971

July

Parliamentary elections for 23rd Majlis.

October

Celebration of 2,500th anniversary by Persian Monarchy.

November

Iranian forces occupy Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

1972

October

Shah and Empress visit USSR.

Area Brief*

LAND:

636,000 sq. mi.; 14% agricultural, 11% forested, 16% cultivable with adequate irrigation, 51% desert, waste, or urban, 8% migratory grazing and other
Land boundaries: 3,305 mi.

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.
Coastline: 1,560 n.i. (includes off-lying islands)

PEOPLE:

Population: 30,805,000 estimated 1 January 1973; density, 48 persons per square mile; 43% urban, 57% rural

Ethnic composition: Over 50% of the population can be described as Persian, while 22% are also ethnic Iranians, including the Kurds (6%); Turkic peoples comprise 22%. Arabs, 5%, and others 1%

Religion: 90% nominally Shia Muslim; 8% Sunni Muslim; 2% Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and other

Languages: Persian (Farsi), Turki, Kurdish, Arabic

Literacy: About 33% of population age 10 and over (1972 estimate)

Labor force: 8.3 million, including: 37% in agriculture, 27% in industry, 25% in services

Health, nutrition, and sanitation levels: Low

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Empire of Iran

Type: Constitutional monarchy controlled by the Shah

Capital: Tehran

Political subdivisions: 14 provinces and nine independent governorates, subdivided into districts, subdistricts, counties, and villages; major provincial rearrangement planned (C)

Legal system: Based largely on French law, with elements drawn from other continental systems and Islamic law; constitution adopted 1906; Supreme Court operates merely as highest appellate court; legal education at University of Tehran; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Executive power rests in Shah; Prime Minister, appointed by Shah, must be approved by lower house (Majlis); while Cabinet theoretically responsibility of Prime Minister, Shah usually exerts strong influence over its selection; bicameral legislature; Majlis has 268 seats (with 2 vacant for islands of the Persian Gulf) elected to 4-year terms; half of Senate members appointed by Shah.

*The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is Unclassified/Official Use Only unless otherwise indicated.

other half elected; no provision for judicial review of constitutionality of legislative acts

Government leader: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

Suffrage: Universal over age 20

Elections: Majlis every 4 years; Senate every 4 years; latest national election: July 1971; local in October 1972

Political parties: Iran Novin Party; Mardom (Peoples) Party; Iranian Party

Voting strength: Majlis—Iran Novin Party, 230 seats; Mardom Party, 37 seats; Iranian Party, 1 seat; Senate—Iran Novin Party, 28 seats; Mardom Party, 2 seats; plus 30 seats appointed by Shah; all candidates government approved

Communists: 500-4,500 (hard-core, est.); some sympathizers among workers and intellectuals; mostly pro-U.S.S.R. but pro-Chinese faction developing (S)

Other political or pressure groups: Tudeh Party (Communist, illegal); Confederation of Iranian Students (illegal)

Member of: CENTO, Colombo Plan, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IIB, ILO, IMCO, IMF, ITU, OPEC, RCD, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY:

GNP: \$12 billion (Iranian FY71-72 est.), \$400 per capita; real GNP growth, Iranian FY71-72, 14% est.

Agriculture: Wheat, barley, rice, sugar beets, cotton, dates, raisins, tea, tobacco, sheep, and goats

Major industries: Crude oil production (1,555 million barrels in 1971) and refining, textiles, cement and other building materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (C)

Electric power: 2,800,000 kw. capacity (1972); 8.3 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971)

Exports: \$356 million (nonoil, Iranian FY71-72); 89% petroleum; also carpets, raw cotton, fruits, nuts, hide and leather items, ores; Communist countries (primarily U.S.S.R.) took about 31% of nonoil exports

Imports: \$1,872 (Iranian FY71-72); machinery, iron and steel products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment; Communist countries supplied about 13% of commodity imports

Major trade partners: Exports—West Germany, U.S., Japan, U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries; imports—U.S., West Germany, U.K., Japan, U.S.S.R.

Aid:

Economic—\$1,029 million in economic credits extended by Communist countries 1958 to 1971 (\$601 million from U.S.S.R.); total U.S. aid (FY46-71), \$1,131 million; AID program, which reached \$603.9 million (FY46-66), terminated in November 1967; assistance from international organizations amounted to \$682.1 million (FY49-71)

SECRET

ECONOMY: (Continued)

Aid (Continued)

Military—\$325 million in aid extended by U.S.S.R. (1967-71); total U.S. aid 1946-72 amounted to \$1,700 million (S)

Monetary conversion rate: 75.75 rials = US\$1 (1972)

Fiscal year: 21 March—20 March

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 2,875 miles 4'6 1/4" gage, 57 miles 5'6" gage

Highways: 26,500 miles; 7,100 miles paved, 12,900 miles gravel and crushed stone, 6,500 miles improved earth

Inland waterways: 565 miles, not including Caspian Sea, Shatt al Arab, and Lake Urmia

Pipelines: Crude oil, 3,300 miles; refined products, 2,785 miles; natural gas, 1,760 miles

Ports: 7 major, 6 minor

Merchant marine: 15 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 150,399 GRT, or 219,075 DWT; includes 11 cargo, 4 tanker

Civil air: 18 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 148 usable; 6 have runways over 12,000 ft.; 15 have runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 49 have runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 49 fields have permanent-surfaced runways; 82 airfield sites

Telecommunications: Advanced system of high-capacity radio-relay links, open-wire lines, cables, and tropospheric links; principal center Tehran; secondary centers, Esfa-

han, Mashhad, and Tabriz; 307,500 telephones (1971); 3 million radio receivers (1970) and 700,000 TV receivers (1972); 24 AM, 1 FM, and 18 TV stations (January 1973); satellite ground station

DEFENSE FORCES:

Military manpower: Males 15-49, 7,255,000; about 59% fit for military service; about 317,000 reach military age (21) annually

Personnel: 298,300, as follows: ground forces, 165,000; navy, 13,000 (including 3,000 naval infantry); air force, 50,000 (461 pilots); gendarmerie, 70,300 (S)

Major ground units: 5 divisions (2 infantry, 3 armored), 1 army aviation command, 4 separate brigades (2 infantry, 1 airborne infantry, 1 special forces) (S)

Ships: 1 guided-missile destroyer, 2 guided-missile destroyer escorts, 12 patrol craft, 6 mine warfare, 4 amphibious craft, 21 service craft, 2 yachts; 10 hovercraft (S)

Aircraft: 508, including 320 (212 jet) in air force; 52 nonjet in gendarmerie, 117 nonjet in ground forces, and 19 nonjet in navy (S)

Supply: Produces small arms and ammunition to 105-mm; bulk of equipment from U.S., some antitank missiles from France, some surface-to-air missiles and naval craft from U.K., helicopters from Italy; since 1967 has received significant quantities of armored vehicles, artillery (including self-propelled AA guns), and transport vehicles from the U.S.S.R.; recently procured AA guns and associated radar from Switzerland, and tanks from U.K. (S)

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 20 March 1973, estimated at \$1,471.2 million; about 20.3% of total budget

SECRET



①
Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)

	COORDINATES				COORDINATES		
	°	'N.	'E.		°	'N.	'E.
Äbäd.....	38	11	45	Müsi, Khowr-e (inlet).....	30	18	48
Äbädän.....	30	20	48	Naft-e Shäh.....	33	59	45
Äghä Järi.....	30	42	49	Nä'in.....	32	52	53
Ahváz.....	31	19	48	Nikshahr.....	26	13	60
Andimeshk.....	32	27	48	Nok Kundi, Pakistan.....	28	48	62
Aräk.....	34	05	49	Now Rüz (offshore oilfield).....	29	30	49
Aras River (strm).....	39	56	48	Now Shahr.....	36	39	51
Asadäbäd.....	34	47	48	Pasargadae (ancient site).....	30	17	53
'Asatüyeh.....	27	28	52	Päzanän.....	30	35	49
Ästärä.....	38	06	48	Persepolis (site).....	29	57	52
Bäd.....	31	41	52	Persian Gulf (gulf).....	27	00	51
Bäfq.....	31	35	55	Pishin.....	26	06	61
Bäghin.....	30	12	56	Qareh Sü (strm).....	34	52	51
Bahmanshir, Khowr-e (strm).....	30	02	48	Qazvin.....	36	16	50
Baku, U.S.S.R.....	40	23	49	Qazvin (rgn).....	35	30	50
Bandar 'Abbäs.....	27	11	56	Qeshm (isl).....	26	45	55
Bandar-e Lengeh.....	26	33	54	Qom.....	34	39	50
Bandar-e Mah Shahr.....	30	33	49	Qotür.....	38	28	44
Bandar-e Pahlavi.....	37	28	49	Qüchän.....	37	06	58
Bandar-e Shäh.....	36	56	54	Rafsanjän.....	30	24	56
Bandar-e Shähpür.....	30	25	49	Rahmänlü.....	37	32	45
Bang.....	29	44	50	Rakhs (offshore oilfield).....	26	25	52
Bid Boland.....	27	51	52	Rasht.....	37	16	49
Binak (oilfield).....	29	45	50	Räy.....	31	50	59
Bojnürd.....	37	28	57	Rezä'yeh.....	37	33	45
Büshehr.....	28	59	52	Riz.....	32	23	51
Chäh Bahär.....	25	18	60	Robät Karim.....	35	28	51
Dasht-e Kavir (desert).....	34	40	51	Rostam (offshore oilfield).....	25	55	52
Dezfäl.....	32	23	48	Safid Rüd (strm).....	37	26	49
Dez, Rüd-e (strm).....	31	39	48	Sanandaj.....	35	19	47
Elburz Mountains (mts).....	36	00	53	Saräreh.....	34	36	51
Emäm Ijasan.....	29	52	50	Sarakhs.....	36	32	61
Esfahän.....	32	40	51	Säri.....	36	34	53
Farahäbäd.....	35	42	51	Semnän.....	35	33	53
Firüz Kuh.....	35	45	52	Sendarak.....	26	50	57
Gachsärän.....	30	12	50	Shäh Pasand.....	37	07	55
Ganäveh.....	29	32	50	Shährüd.....	36	25	55
Garmsär.....	35	20	52	Shäli-ye Balä.....	31	59	48
Golmäkhähneh.....	37	36	45	Shamsäbäd.....	33	49	49
Gorgän.....	36	50	54	Sharafkhähneh.....	38	11	45
Gorgän, Rüd-e (strm).....	36	59	54	Shatt al Arab.....	29	57	48
Gulf of Oman (gulf).....	25	00	58	Shiräz.....	29	36	52
Hafar Channel (sec of strm).....	30	26	48	Süfiän.....	38	17	45
Hamadän.....	34	48	48	Soljani, Khowr-e (bay).....	29	00	50
Hendiän.....	30	14	49	Strait of Hormuz (str).....	26	34	56
Hendiän (offshore oilfield).....	30	05	49	Süfiän.....	38	17	45
Herät, Afghanistan.....	34	26	62	Tabas.....	33	36	56
Hindu Kush, Afghanistan (mts).....	35	00	71	Tabriz.....	38	05	46
Hörmoz.....	27	06	56	Tajrish.....	35	48	51
Hormoz, Strait of.....	26	31	56	Täkestän.....	36	04	49
Jask.....	25	38	57	Tarasht.....	33	58	57
Jolfä.....	38	57	15	Tehrän.....	35	40	51
Kamäläbäd.....	28	19	61	Tembü.....	31	55	49
Karaj.....	35	48	50	Torbat-e Heydariyeh.....	35	16	59
Karaköse, Turkey.....	39	44	43	Veys.....	31	29	48
Karbala', Iraq.....	32	36	44	Yazd.....	31	53	54
Kärün Bar (bar).....	30	24	48	Yerevan, U.S.S.R.....	40	11	44
Kärün, Rüd-e (strm).....	30	26	48	Zagros Mountains (mts).....	33	40	47
Käshän.....	33	59	51	Zarand.....	30	48	56
Käzerün.....	29	37	51	Zähedän.....	29	30	60
Kermän.....	30	17	57	Zäyandeh Rüd (strm).....	32	20	52
Kermänshah.....	34	19	47				
Khärk, Jazireh-ye.....	29	15	50				

SELECTED AIRFIELDS

1

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)

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	° 'N.	° 'E.			° 'N.	° 'E.	
Ābād	38 11	45 56		Mus. Khowr-e (inlet)	30 18	48 55	
Ābādān	30 20	48 16		Naft-e Shāh	33 59	45 30	
Āghā Jārī	30 42	49 50		Nā'in	32 52	53 05	
Ahvāz	31 19	48 42		Nikshahr	26 13	60 12	
Andimeshk	32 27	48 21		Nok Kundi, Pakistan	28 48	62 16	
Arāk	31 05	49 41		Now Rūz (offshore oilfield)	29 30	49 25	
Aras River (strm)	39 56	48 20		Now Shahr	36 39	51 31	
Asadābād	34 47	48 07		Pasargadae (ancient site)	30 17	53 13	
Āsalūyeh	27 28	52 37		Pāzanān	30 35	49 59	
Āstārā	38 26	48 52		Porsepolis (site)	29 57	52 52	
Bād	31 41	52 01		Persian Gulf (gulf)	27 00	51 00	
Bāfq	31 35	55 24		Pishin	26 06	61 47	
Bāghin	30 12	56 48		Qareh Sū (strm)	34 52	51 25	
Bahmanshir, Khowr-e (strm)	30 02	48 41		Qazvin	36 16	50 00	
Baku, U.S.S.R.	40 23	49 51		Qazvin (rgn)	35 30	50 00	
Bandar 'Abbās	27 11	56 17		Qeshm (isl)	26 45	55 13	
Bandar-e Lengeh	26 32	54 53		Qom	34 39	50 54	
Bandar-e Māh Shahr	30 33	49 12		Qotūr	38 28	44 25	
Bandar-e Pahlāvī	37 28	49 27		Qūchān	37 06	58 30	
Bandar-e Shāh	36 56	54 06		Rafsanjān	30 24	56 01	
Bandar-e Shāhpūr	30 25	49 05		Rahmānūlū	37 32	45 48	
Bang	29 44	50 19		Rakhs (offshore oilfield)	26 25	52 40	
Bid Boland	27 51	52 19		Rasht	37 16	49 36	
Binak (oilfield)	29 45	50 22		Rāy	31 50	59 58	
Bojnūrd	37 28	57 19		Rezā'iyeh	37 33	45 04	
Būshehr	28 59	52 50		Riz	32 23	51 20	
Chāh Bahār	25 18	60 37		Robāq Karim	35 28	51 05	
Dasht-e Kavir (desert)	34 40	51 30		Rostam (offshore oilfield)	25 55	52 54	
Dezfūl	32 23	48 24		Safid Rūd (strm)	37 26	49 55	
Dez, Rūd-e (strm)	31 39	48 52		Sanandaj	35 19	47 00	
Elburz Mountains (mts)	36 00	53 00		Sarājeh	34 36	51 04	
Emām Hasan	29 52	50 15		Sarakhs	36 32	61 11	
Esfahān	32 40	51 38		Sārī	36 34	53 04	
Farahābād	35 42	51 30		Semnān	35 33	53 24	
Firūz Kuh	35 45	52 47		Sendarak	26 50	57 25	
Gaehsarān	30 12	50 47		Shāh Pasand	37 07	55 16	
Ganāveh	29 32	50 31		Shāhrūd	36 25	55 01	
Garmsār	35 20	52 13		Shalili-ye Bālā	31 59	48 52	
Golmānkhāneh	37 36	45 15		Shamsābād	33 49	49 45	
Gorgān	36 50	54 29		Sharafkhāneh	38 11	45 29	
Gorgān, Rūd-e (strm)	36 59	54 05		Shatt al Arab	29 57	48 34	
Gulf of Oman (gulf)	25 00	58 00		Shirāz	29 36	52 32	
Hafar Channel (see of strm)	30 26	48 10		Sūfiān	38 17	45 59	
Hamadān	34 48	48 30		Solhāni, Khowr-e (bay)	29 00	50 50	
Hendijān	30 14	49 43		Strait of Hormuz (str)	26 34	56 15	
Hendijān (offshore oilfield)	30 05	49 50		Sūfiān	38 17	45 59	
Herāt, Afghanistan	34 20	62 12		Tabas	33 36	56 54	
Hindu Kush, Afghanistan (mts)	35 00	71 00		Tabriz	38 05	46 18	
Hormoz	27 06	56 28		Tajrish	35 48	51 25	
Hormoz, Strait of	26 34	56 15		Tākestān	36 04	49 43	
Jāsik	25 38	57 46		Tarasht	33 58	57 13	
Jolfā	38 57	45 38		Tehrān	35 40	51 26	
Kamālābād	28 19	61 27		Tembi	31 55	49 17	
Karāj	35 48	50 59		Torbat-e Heydarīyeh	35 16	59 13	
Karaköse, Turkey	39 44	43 03		Veys	31 29	48 52	
Karbālā', Iraq	32 36	44 02		Yazd	31 53	54 25	
Kārūn Bar (bar)	30 24	48 11		Yerevan, U.S.S.R.	40 11	44 30	
Kārūn, Rūd-e (strm)	30 26	48 10		Zagros Mountains (mts)	33 40	47 00	
Kāshān	33 59	51 29		Zarand	30 48	56 35	
Kāzerūn	29 37	51 38		Zāhedān	29 30	60 52	
Kermān	30 17	57 05		Zāyandeh Rūd (strm)	32 20	52 50	
Kermānshāh	34 19	47 04					
Khārk, Jazīreh-ye	29 15	50 20					
Khārk (Kharg), Jazīreh-ye (pipeline term)	29 15	50 20					
Khorrāmābād	33 30	48 20					
Khorrāmsāhr	30 25	48 11					
Khosrowābād	30 10	48 25					
Khāzestān (rgn)	30 30	50 00					
Khvoy	38 33	44 58					
Kizyl-Arvat, U.S.S.R.	38 58	56 15					
Lake Urmia (lake)	37 40	45 30					
Lāl	32 21	49 06					
Lashkarak	35 49	51 36					
Lāvān, Jazīreh-ye (isl)	26 48	53 15					
Leytā	35 47	51 41					
Mahābād	36 45	45 43					
Manjil	36 44	49 24					
Marand	38 26	45 46					
Marathón, Greece	38 09	23 58					
Mārūn, Rūd-e (strm)	31 05	49 36					
Mashhad	36 18	59 36					
Māh Shahr, Khowr-e (channel)	30 26	49 09					
Masjed Soleymān	31 58	49 18					
Mendāb	36 02	48 01					
Mirjāveh	29 01	61 28					


SELECTED AIRFIELDS

Abadan International	30 22	48 14
Agha Jari	30 45	49 40
Bandar Abbas International	27 14	56 23
Bushehr	28 57	50 50
Esfahan	32 37	51 42
Caeh Suran New	30 20	50 49
Kerman	30 16	56 57
Kermanshah North	34 21	47 09
Khark Island	29 16	50 19
Mashhad	36 14	59 39
Masjed Soleiman	32 00	49 17
Rasht International	37 20	49 37
Rezaiyeh International	37 40	45 04
Shahrokhi	35 13	48 39
Shiraz International	29 32	52 35
Tabriz	38 08	46 15
Tehran/Doshan Tappeh	35 42	51 29
Tehran/Mehrabad	35 41	51 19
Vahdati	32 26	48 24
Yazd West	31 54	54 17
Zahedan	29 27	60 54


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




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


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


Land Utilization

- Agriculture
- Sporadic agriculture and grazing
- Wasteland




Population

- Persons per square mile
0 25 50 100 200
- Persons per square kilometer
0 10 20 30 70
- Tehran 3,230,000
Esfahan 440,000
Mashhad 425,000
Tabriz 420,000
1971 estimate



Mining and Heavy Industry

- Oilfield
- Gasfield
- Coalfield
- Steel mill complex
- Machine tool plant
- Lead and zinc deposit
- Iron deposit
- Copper deposit
- Chromite deposit
- Main oil pipeline
- Gas pipeline
- Oil refining




COORDINATES


N. ° ' E.	
18	48 55
59	45 30
52	53 05
13	60 12
48	62 46
30	49 25
39	51 31
17	53 13
35	49 59
57	52 52
00	51 00
06	61 47
52	51 25
16	59 00
30	50 30
45	55 45
39	50 54
28	44 25
06	58 30
24	56 01
32	45 48
25	52 40
16	49 36
50	59 58
33	45 04
23	51 20
28	51 05
55	52 54
26	49 55
19	47 00
36	51 04
32	61 11
34	53 04
33	53 24
50	57 25
07	55 16
25	55 01
59	48 52
49	49 45
11	45 29
57	48 34
36	52 32
17	45 59
00	50 50
34	56 15
17	45 59
36	56 54
05	46 18
48	51 25
04	49 43
58	57 13
40	51 26
55	49 17
16	59 13
29	48 52
53	54 25
11	44 30
40	47 00
48	56 35
30	60 52
20	52 50
22	48 14
45	49 40
14	56 23
57	50 50
37	51 42
20	50 49
16	56 57
21	47 09
16	50 19
14	59 39
00	49 17
20	49 37
40	45 04
13	48 39
32	52 35
08	46 15
42	51 29
41	51 19
26	48 21
51	51 17
27	60 51



Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only










Land Utilization

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




Light Industry and Agriculture

- Wheat
- Barley
- Rice and tea
- Sugar refining
- Rug center
- Cotton milling
- Northern limit of dates


Land Utilization

- Agriculture
- Sporadic agriculture and grazing
- Wasteland




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- Oilfield
- Gasfield
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- Main oil pipeline
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- Chromite deposit



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Summary Map