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Government  
and Politics

# Iran

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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# Iran

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*This General Survey covers the time period November 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.*

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
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Structure of government

# Government and Politics

## A. Introduction (S)

Iran, a constitutional monarchy, has undergone rapid social and economic change and a reorientation in foreign policy in the past decade, but at the same time it has maintained a high degree of political stability. The ruling monarch, the Shahanshah (King of Kings) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, has developed from an indecisive youth at the time of his assumption of the throne in 1941 into a strong, determined, self-confident ruler. He is driven by the dream of guiding his country into the modern industrialized world in his own lifetime, and to that end he has undertaken a widescale reform program, labeled the White Revolution. With his country strengthened by domestic stability and economic gains, the Shah has loosened his post-World War II dependence on the United States for economic and military assistance and has undertaken a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, once his archenemy. He has retained his basically Western orientation but is generally seeking recognition for Iran as a strong, independent force in international affairs.

The Shah is the second member of the Pahlavi dynasty founded by his father, who seized power in 1921 and was crowned Shahanshah in 1925. In 1906 and 1907, a primarily middle-class, nationalist revolutionary movement forced the then ruling Shah to accept a constitutional form of government. The Fundamental Laws (or constitution) enacted in those 2 years, together with subsequent amendments, provided for a bicameral parliament to which a Prime Minister and Cabinet approved by the Shah were responsible. Neither of the Pahlavi Shahs felt it necessary to abolish this system—which has proved flexible enough to be considered useful even in a time of rapid social change—and in practice they have continued to wield decisive influence over the entire governmental structure.

The Shah believes that Iran must undergo orderly social and economic modernization if it is to retain its present stability and avoid the vio-

lence and revolution which have plagued much of the Middle East. The Shah is interested both in preserving his own throne and in the progress and prosperity of his people. Since 1961, therefore, he has been introducing fundamental reforms aimed at building a modern society and increasing the popularity of his regime. The program includes land reform, literacy and health improvements, nationalization of natural resources, modernization of higher education, and increased rights for women. Social reform has been accompanied by great efforts to modernize agriculture and speed the industrialization of the country with the help of revenues from the Western oil consortium which produces and sells most of Iran's crude oil.

The Shah believes that social reform and economic progress must precede the development of democratic political institutions. Political parties and elections, therefore, are maintained primarily as window dressing and as vehicles for advocating the Shah's program, rather than as a means for the expression of the public will. The Shah has said that as the people become better educated and illiteracy is eradicated, the people will "understand and endorse the ideas of other political parties." The parties, meanwhile, will have become defenders of the national interest as a whole rather than of narrow individual interests. In the meantime, he claims, Iran must continue to be ruled with a firm hand.

There is no effective vehicle in Iran for the expression of basic opposition to the regime or its programs, nor is there any valid method of measuring political opinion or the level of political sophistication. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has been rendered impotent because of rigid control by the security forces and the confusion created by the Iranian-Soviet rapprochement. However, outbreaks of violence over the past 2 years—bombings, attacks on police, and bank robberies to obtain funds—indicate the presence of antiregime groups whose precise training and direction are unclear. Nationalist opposition groups are also closely con-



trolled and have found many of their programs absorbed into the Shah's White Revolution. Many students and intellectuals, formerly implacable in their opposition to the monarchy, have opted for the status and material rewards resulting from participation in the establishment. Although the depth of popular loyalty to the Shah cannot be measured, it is very likely that the reform program has improved his image and that of the government generally. The greatest danger to security probably lies in the almost total reliance of the governmental structure on one man—the Shah. Although the constitution now provides for an orderly succession, the Shah's death could produce a period of severe instability.

Proud of Iran's domestic stability and economic progress and freed of his former financial and psychological dependence on the United States, the Shah has launched a more aggressive and independent foreign policy. The most important facet of this new policy is a normalization of political and economic relations with the Soviet Union, which by early 1973 had extended over US\$900 million in economic and military credits to Iran on highly favorable terms. The Shah remains skeptical of the U.S.S.R.'s intentions and was upset by the April 1972 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq which he felt would give Iraq a freer hand in its anti-Iranian activities. However, he apparently believes that the advantages of normalization outweigh the dangers.

Since 1965 the Shah's major foreign policy preoccupation has been the security of the Persian Gulf and southwestern Iran. He is convinced that radical Arab elements, especially Iraqi, are attempting to undermine Iranian authority in the area and to foment subversion in the province of Khuzestan.<sup>1</sup> He also fears a further breakup of Pakistan resulting in possible attempts to unify the Baluchi people in that country and in Iran. The Shah has undertaken an extensive program to enlarge and modernize Iran's air force and navy and is attempting to improve relations with the moderate Arab states and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Although he would like to cooperate with the moderate Arabs in maintaining stability in the area, the Shah has let it be known that Iran intends to play the dominant role in the Persian Gulf.

Despite his more active and independent foreign policy, the Shah remains basically pro-Western in

<sup>1</sup>For discrepancies on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

outlook and still regards the United States as his closest ally. Iran continues its membership—even if somewhat unenthusiastically—in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a defensive alliance also including Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, and it purchases most of its sophisticated military equipment from the United States. The terms of those purchases and the Shah's disputes with the Western oil consortium over revenues and the nature and extent of Iranian control over the oil industry are irritants in his relations with the United States, but the outlook for the U.S. presence in Iran remains good.

## B. Structure and functioning of the government

### 1. Central government (C)

The constitution of Iran is composed of the Fundamental Law of 1906, the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907, and subsequent amendments. Since 1907, the constitution has been amended only four times. It has proved flexible and imprecise enough to retain its usefulness even as Iran has emerged into a rapidly developing and modernizing state. At the same time, some provisions of the constitution, such as the requirement that all legislation be submitted for approval to a committee of five theologians and that juries be provided for political and press trials, seem never to have been implemented. The absolutes enunciated in the constitution are in many cases tempered by the phrase "except as otherwise provided by law" or some variation of this phrase. The original intent was to prevent capricious and tyrannical acts by the monarch and to insure that any limitations on the constitutional provisions would be imposed by the parliament.

The government is defined as a constitutional monarchy, the powers of which are limited by a bicameral legislature. The formal powers of parliament closely resemble those of a European legislature, but in practice the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers called for in the constitution has not been maintained, and the executive branch has almost always dominated the other two. The dominant position of the Iranian executive results from a strong authoritarian tradition in Iran along with intense loyalty to and awe of the monarchy; it also results from the lack of cooperation and discipline among the intensely individualistic Iranians, who do little to contest the executive branch.

Every branch and level of government is dominated by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Assuming power in 1941 after his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, was forced to abdicate following the British and Soviet invasion of Iran during World War II, the present Shah was for many years an uncertain and insecure leader. The nadir of his control over his own government came in the early 1950's, when Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and his National Front party embarked on a campaign of violent anti-British agitation. Since the early 1960's, however, the Shah has developed into a confident, competent monarch who is fully in control of his throne and his government. He is known for his detailed knowledge of Iranian affairs at every level and for his ability to formulate and carry out policies virtually without challenge. The coronation of the Shah in October 1967, after 26 years of rule, symbolized the Shah's political coming of age and his pride in Iran's progress under his rule. The elaborate celebration in October 1971 of the 2,500 years of the Iranian monarchy was further designed to emphasize the strength of the monarchy and to arouse national pride.

#### *a. Executive branch*

The Shah is the chief of state and head of the executive branch of the Iranian Government. The Fundamental Laws are ambiguous in defining his overall powers, which are as dependent on the force of his personality as on the specifics of the constitution. He does not rule by divine right; the constitution defines his sovereignty as a trust "confided (as a Divine Gift) by the people to the person of the King." Nevertheless, the Shah normally uses his judgment in defining and interpreting his powers.

As amended in 1925, the constitution gives the crown to "His Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi and his male descendants." The eldest son born of a Persian mother to a Pahlavi Shah is automatically the heir-apparent. If a Shah has no son, he may appoint an heir-apparent, subject to the approval of the Majlis, the lower house of parliament. The original 1907 law gave the right to the throne in perpetuity to the Qajar dynasty (which preceded the Pahlavis), but the 1925 amendment stated that no member of the Qajar family could be appointed as heir-apparent or as regent. The Shah's half brothers therefore are ineligible for the throne, since their mother was a Qajar.

In 1967 the Shah, who now has two sons, took steps to insure an orderly transfer of power in the

event that he should die before the Crown Prince reaches the age of 20 on 31 October 1980. At the Shah's request, a Constituent Assembly was elected in August 1967 which approved a constitutional amendment providing that the Empress Mother of the Crown Prince shall immediately assume the regency unless the Shah has previously appointed another person as regent. The regent is to form a council of regency composed of the Prime Minister, the heads of the two houses of parliament, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and four "knowledgeable persons well versed in the affairs of the state." This council will advise the regent in the functions of the monarchy until the heir-apparent reaches the age of 20. Under the previous constitutional provisions, the Majlis was to select a regent after the death of the Shah. This could have led to a period of leaderless government and might have opened the way to disruptive maneuvering for position. The constitution continues to provide that the Shah may appoint a temporary regency council when he is absent from the country—a practice the Shah has often followed.

For many years, the Shah was unwilling to consider the appointment of a regent before his death—primarily because he feared subsequent political maneuvering would threaten his control or even his life. The decision to make the necessary constitutional amendments in 1967 was a further indication of the Shah's growing self-confidence and of his faith in the loyalty and ability of Empress Farah, who is popular, capable, and deeply interested in the Shah's reform program. Nevertheless, the Shah's appointment of the Empress as regent was an innovation in a country where women are just beginning to gain equal social and political rights.

The Shah is both titular head of state and supreme head of the executive branch of the government. As stated in the Fundamental Laws, "The executive power is reserved to the Shah, that is to say, the laws and decrees shall be carried out by the ministers and state officials in the august name of His Imperial Majesty in such manner as the law defines." The Shah is, however, specifically freed of personal responsibility for the actions of his ministers and other executive branch officials. It is the ministers who are responsible for all matters to both chambers of parliament. Thus the Shah is neither elected by the people nor responsible to parliament, which is elected by the people.

The powers of the Shah, as specified in the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907, include the right to appoint and dismiss all ministers and other heads of government agencies; to confer all military ranks, decorations, and other honorary distinctions; to initiate legislation in parliament; to issue decrees and orders for the enforcement of all laws but not to hinder or delay enforcement of the law; to command all the military forces; to appoint one-half of the membership of the upper house of parliament (the Senate); to call the parliament into special session or to dissolve either or both houses under special circumstances; to declare war and conclude peace; and to negotiate treaties with foreign nations "which it would be in the interest of the state and the nation to keep secret." By virtue of an amendment passed in 1949, the Shah has the power to dissolve either or both chambers of parliament in order to hold new elections. Another amendment, passed in 1957, gave the Shah the additional power of reviewing all financial legislation passed by the Majlis and sending it back for reconsideration if it does not meet his approval. The Majlis may pass such bills over the Shah's objections by a three-fourths vote of all members present.

Mohammad Reza Shah maintains thorough control over members of the executive branch of government. Theoretically, the Majlis chooses each Prime Minister by informal ballot and has its choice approved by the Shah. In practice, he informally selects one of his trusted friends as Prime Minister and exercises a strong influence over the Prime Minister's choice of Cabinet members. All candidates ultimately meet with the Shah's approval; within those bounds, the latitude allowed the Prime Minister in his selection of a Cabinet depends on the amount of political unrest in Iran at the time, the pressure of foreign affairs, the number of confidants requiring reward for past service, and the Shah's assessment of the reliability and personal ambitions of the new Prime Minister himself. The Shah is usually particularly interested in the designation of the Minister of War, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Interior (who controls the gendarmerie and police), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The names of all candidates are submitted to the Majlis, which formally approves the new government. Publication of a royal decree formally appointing the new government completes the process. Under the constitution,

the Cabinet ministers are individually and collectively responsible to parliament; in practice they are much more directly responsible to the Shah.

The Shah also has controlling influence in the legislative branch of government. His influence is extended through the force of his personality and the fact that, in practice, candidates for parliamentary seats must meet with his approval before their names can be entered on the electoral rolls. The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 gives him the right to formulate legislation and to present it to parliament for passage into law. Although this provision is seldom used, legislation is rarely proposed and almost never enacted without tacit approval of the Shah. Furthermore, the Shah's signature is necessary on any legislative act before it can be put into effect, and his own attitude toward a bill affects the importance attached to it and the speed with which it is implemented.

Furthermore, the Shah's influence extends, directly or indirectly, into most government organizations and politically important groups. He has regular meetings not only with all Cabinet ministers and the heads of the Senate and Majlis, but with the heads of all the security forces in the country, including the chiefs of the armed forces, the Imperial Guard, the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), the gendarmerie, and the police force, and also with the chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company. Less regularly, he also sees provincial administrators, members of the Majlis and Senate, and officials below the ministerial level in government agencies and ministries. In addition, the Shah gives audiences to influential clergymen, bazaar merchants, labor leaders, tribal representatives, and the press. The Shah is thus able to take soundings about activities and attitudes in government and society and to make his policies and wishes known and his influence felt at all levels.

The Shah is assisted by a Minister of Court, who is not a member of the Cabinet but who holds ministerial rank. The duties of this minister include administration of the Shah's personal household and the protocol associated with the court. The Minister of Court is always a personal friend of the royal family. He and his subordinates have ready access to the Shah and are often used to bring information to and from the royal family. He tends to build up a certain amount of prestige because of his closeness to the Shah and his ability to arrange appointments for persons outside government.

The Cabinet in early 1973 consisted of the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers (who also serve as ministers of state), three additional ministers of state, and 18 other ministers.<sup>2</sup> The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 restricts the privilege of holding a Cabinet post to Muslim Iranians, and it bars the sons, brothers, and paternal uncles of the reigning Shah from holding such office. Another constitutional provision forbids Cabinet ministers from holding other offices. This restriction is presumably the basis for the general practice of not drawing ministers from among members of parliament. Those few who have been named to the Cabinet gave up their parliamentary seats. Little else is said about ministerial qualifications. The Shah may dismiss any or all of the ministers, as may the parliament.

The Fundamental Law of 1906 provides for ministers to attend sessions of the Majlis and to take part in debate concerning proposed legislation and the administration of the law. The ministers are collectively and individually responsible to both chambers of the parliament and must appear before these chambers whenever summoned to explain their actions. According to the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907, when the Majlis or Senate, by a full majority, declares itself dissatisfied with either the whole Cabinet or one minister, the Cabinet or minister shall be considered dismissed.

When parliament is in session, it is common practice for a new Cabinet to present its proposed legislative program to parliament for approval. It has also become common practice for parliament periodically to question ministers and other high-ranking officials of the government. If the person who began the interrogation is not satisfied with an official's answer, it is possible for the entire Senate or Majlis to censure the official or have him removed from office. Between 1941 and 1951 several Cabinet ministers were ousted in this manner. Since then, although the questioning may be sharp at times, a motion of censure has become quite unlikely unless the Shah engineers it.

There is no tradition in Iran of having direct lines of responsibility from the Prime Minister to the ministries, and ministers are more likely to con-

sider themselves answerable to the Shah than to the Prime Minister. The discipline which a Prime Minister can exert depends upon his personal influence and, more importantly, the extent to which the Shah will back him up. The Prime Minister may reshuffle the Cabinet to discipline or reward Cabinet members, but these actions must, of course, be cleared with the Shah. In extreme cases, the Prime Minister can discipline his ministers through the threat of dismissal. On occasion, Prime Ministers have used their influence with members of the parliament to have that body chastise refractory ministers.

Each Cabinet minister draws up legislation on current or proposed activities in his own ministry, and the legislation is coordinated at Cabinet meetings. It has become common practice for the Prime Minister to approve or reject the bills proposed by ministers for presentation to parliament, and Cabinet meetings are thus often the scene of bitter interministerial conflict. If the Shah is personally interested in expediting a project, of course, the coordination process is much smoother.

The Minister of Interior supervises all provincial and local administrators, who in turn administer and control elections. He also controls both the police and gendarmerie. As an important key to internal politics and security, he is frequently consulted by the Shah. The Foreign Affairs Minister's position is distinctly subordinate because the Shah is greatly interested in and generally formulates foreign policy, often conducting major negotiations himself. The main responsibility of the Ministry of Justice is the promulgation and administration of the civil, penal, and commercial legal codes of Iran. The Minister of Justice recommends and the Shah appoints judges throughout the country, except those presiding over the lowest level of locally elected courts.

The Minister of War is primarily concerned with administrative, personnel, and fiscal matters and represents the military before the Majlis. The Shah, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, exercises operational control of the services directly or through the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff. The Shah is greatly interested in military policy, deployment, and equipment and plays a personal role in many aspects of military affairs—particularly in negotiations involving the acquisition of new equipment.

<sup>2</sup> For current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

The Ministry of Finance, through its work with the national budget, has influence over almost all other departments of the government. The Prime Minister sometimes holds the post of Minister of Finance himself. The ministry collects taxes and keeps track of all governmental revenues. It also administers certain government-owned enterprises, such as the tea and sugar monopolies, the Caspian Sea Fisheries, and national banks. The ministry uses the armed forces to collect taxes in recalcitrant tribal areas when necessary.

Rapid economic and social development is of major importance to the Shah, and five of the seven new cabinet-level posts created since 1967 reflect this emphasis, i.e., the Minister of Agriculture and National Resources, the Minister of Science and Higher Education, the Minister of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs, the Deputy Prime Ministry for Development and Economic Affairs, and the Minister of State for the Plan and Budget Organization. Overall responsibility for planning and monitoring economic development programs and for formulating a national budget rests with the Plan and Budget Organization, a formerly independent agency (called Plan Organization), subordinate since 1959 to the Prime Minister's office. It will operate under the direction of a newly formed Economic Council, composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Finance, Labor and Social Affairs, Cooperatives and Rural Affairs, Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Economy, a Minister of State, and the Governor of the Central Bank. This council is responsible for ensuring the general objectives of development plans and supervising the preparation of the national budget.

Another special agency which formally comes under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's office but whose director reports almost daily to the Shah, is that of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK). This agency is in charge of collecting information on activities which might endanger national security both at home and abroad, and it also performs covert action operations.

Most routine activities of the ministries are supervised by undersecretaries and directors general, men of lesser rank than Cabinet ministers. A few high-level career civil servants remain in each ministry during changes in government to lend continuity, but changes in personnel at the

Cabinet level often result in changes in many important offices throughout the ministry.

The Iranian civil service, composed of approximately 415,000 employees in 1972, has been overstaffed, grossly inefficient, and plagued by nepotism and corruption. A new Civil Service Code, hammered out in June 1966, attempts to cope with this situation by introducing a standard grade and payment system—similar to that of the U.S. Civil Service—requiring entrance examinations, limiting the amount of extra "allowances" which any employee may receive, and reducing the number of employee categories. To implement the law, a State Organization for Administration and Employment Affairs (SOAE) has been established, and the Secretary General of the SOAE has Cabinet status as Minister of State. Organizing an efficient, honest, standardized civil service is expected to take years, however, partly because of resistance by government employees to reform and because of a lack of clear administrative records.

One of the most serious problems in the entire executive branch of government is the tendency among all personnel, including Cabinet ministers, to tell the Shah what he would like to hear. To some extent this problem is being lessened as the civil service and the Cabinet are infused with better trained technicians and fewer old-line politicians and first-family members, but it still hampers efficient planning and execution of policy.

#### *b. Legislative branch*

Iran theoretically has an independent legislative branch, but parliament is in practice dominated both in form and substance by the Shah. Candidates for parliament are always cleared either by the Shah or by his security officials, and the elections themselves are sometimes engineered to insure election of favored candidates. Although there are sometimes sharp debates in parliament, there is never criticism of the Shah, and bills which he supports are inevitably passed. The quality of Iranian legislators has improved considerably, as old-line politicians have been replaced by better educated representatives. Nevertheless, parliament, at least in relation to issues important to the Shah, can still be called a rubberstamp.

The Iranian parliament is bicameral, consisting of a lower house (*Majlis-e-shouraye-Melli*—the National Consultative Assembly) and an upper

house (*Senā*—Senate). The Majlis is by far the more important of the two. This house consists of 268 deputies elected by direct popular vote from regional constituencies and religious minorities for 4-year terms, all of which expire simultaneously. The present (23d) Majlis was elected in July 1971. The house can meet and begin work on legislation as soon as two-thirds of the representatives have assembled in Tehran. At least one more than half of the deputies present in the city at any time is required for a quorum. A simple majority vote of those present is sufficient to decide any issue. The Fundamental Laws provide that the Majlis must be called into session at least once a year, but this provision has been ignored on occasion.

The wide authority granted the Majlis in the Fundamental Law of 1906 reflects the predominant political issues of that time: the arbitrary rule of the Shah and particularly his uncontrolled foreign borrowing which had bankrupted the country. This authority includes approval of all laws necessary for the strengthening of the government and kingdom, the regulation of state affairs, and the constitution of ministries (i.e., approval of Cabinet nominees). Aside from such general provisions, the subject given the most attention in the constitution is that of finance. Of a total of 17 articles concerning the authority of the Majlis, seven deal with matters important to the nation's economy, including levying taxes, drawing up the budget, selling state properties, granting commercial concessions, obtaining loans for the state, and financing and constructing national railways and roads. The Majlis retains sole responsibility for passing on the national budget and for dealing with other state financial matters. This authority is in practice usually limited to passing on policies proposed and implemented by the executive branch.

The Fundamental Law of 1906 provides that sessions of the Majlis be open to the public and to journalists. There is a constitutional provision for holding secret meetings, but the Majlis cannot pass legislation in secret. A bill may be presented to the Majlis in open session and voted without debate.

The Majlis appoints functional committees to debate various pieces of legislation prior to the discussion by the full house. There are usually 25 to 30 such committees, including at least one to handle the legislation prepared by each of the ministries in the Cabinet, in addition to several others for specific types of bills.

The most powerful individual in the Majlis is the Speaker, who is elected by the entire house at the first formal meeting of each session. He reconciles any Majlis committee differences on a given piece of legislation, helps to reconcile differences between Senate and Majlis versions of the same bill, and counts the ballots in the Majlis to determine whether a bill has passed or failed. He sees the Shah regularly when parliament is in session.

Twenty-three assemblies have been elected by the Iranian people since the first Majlis was elected in 1906. The power given to the Shah in 1949 to dissolve either or both houses of parliament has been used twice against the Majlis, in 1954 and 1961.

The Fundamental Law of 1906 provided for an upper house of parliament, or Senate. This house was not called into being until 1950, however, because of the opposition of the Majlis and then only at the urging of the Shah. The Majlis feared that a Senate would be composed of the old-line elite and be a strong support for the monarchy. This proved to be the case from 1951 to 1953 when, in a struggle between Prime Minister Mosadeq and the Shah, Mosadeq controlled the Majlis while the Senate almost invariably supported the Shah. The Senate is composed of 60 members, 30 of whom are appointed by the Shah and 30 are elected by direct popular vote. In contrast to the Majlis, half of both the appointed and elected Senators must be from Tehran, and the rest from the provinces. The term of each Senator is 4 years.

The Fundamental Law states that the regulations of the Senate must be approved by the Majlis, but in practice the Senate has been allowed to regulate its own internal procedures. The President of the Senate, like the Speaker of the Majlis, occupies an important position in the structure of parliament; he, too, sees the Shah periodically, helps to reconcile differences between the two houses, and counts the votes in the Senate.

The Senate's authority theoretically extends to all matters which can be considered by the Majlis, except those relating to finances. Actually, however, the Senate is much less influential than the Majlis. It usually passes legislation more quickly and with less debate than the lower house. During its brief history, the Senate has been dismissed three times—in 1952, 1953, and 1961.

According to the Fundamental Laws, proposed legislation may be drafted in either house of parliament, by any one of the ministries of the execu-

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tive branch, or by the Shah. Most legislation is in practice drafted by the executive branch, and the legislature's function is approval or disapproval. When the bill is passed by both houses, it goes to the Shah for his signature and is passed to the Prime Minister for enforcement. In case the Senate and Majlis fail to agree on the disposal of a bill after it has been sent twice from one chamber to the other, the bill is submitted to a joint committee made up of an equal number of representatives from each house. While this committee is meeting, the Speaker of the Majlis and the President of the Senate hold informal discussions. Usually, a compromise is reached. If not, the problem is presented to the Shah for his consideration. If the Shah approves the decision made by the Majlis, the bill is put into effect. If he sides with the Senate, or takes no stand, the entire issue is dropped for at least 6 months, after which time it may be reintroduced.

The constitution makes no provision for judicial review of legislation other than to say that a committee of five theologians will pass on the law's adherence to Islamic tenets. There is no known occasion, however, in which such a committee has been convened, although some of the legislation in connection with the Shah's reform program has been opposed by many religious leaders.

## 2. Provincial and local government (U/OU)

Iran has had a strongly centralized system of government in which local and provincial officials remain largely dependent on Tehran for decision-making and financial assistance. This system was inherited from Reza Shah, who found that tight central control was necessary to unify the loosely organized domains of the preceding Qajar dynasty. In the 1960's, however, the present Shah undertook a program to improve the quality of provincial and local governments, to decentralize administration, and to provide for more popular participation at the local level. The process has been slow, however, and in 1970 the Shah called for increased efforts to speed up the creation of local institutions in the interests of decentralization. Political, economic, and educational conditions have continued to hamper local development, however, and control by the central government, appointed governors, and ministries predominates. It probably will be many years before Tehran will delegate substantial decision-

making powers to local or provincial authorities, although this most likely would increase the efficiency of the government.

### a. Provincial

Iran is divided into 14 provinces (*ostans*), each under the direction of a governor general (*ostandar*), and nine independent governorates (*farmandari kol*) under a principal governor (*farmandar*). The independent governorates are somewhat smaller in area than the provinces, but their administrative heads have all the powers granted to the governors general of the provinces. The provinces, many of which represent historic divisions of Iran, are: Central (Tehran), Gilan, Mazandaran, Azarbaijan-e Sharqi (East Azarbaijan), Azarbaijan-e Garbi (West Azarbaijan), Kermanshahan, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, Esfahan, Baluchestan va Sistan, Kordestan, and Jazayer va Banader-e Khalij-e Fars va Darya-ye Oman (Ports and Islands of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, or the Coastal Province). The independent governorates are: Bakhtiari va Chahar Mahall, Boyer Ahmadi-ye Sardsir va Kohkiluyeh, Semnan, Hamadan, Lorestan, Ilam va Poshtkuh, Yazd, Zanjan, and Bushehr. Changes in administrative divisions are made from time to time by the central government in response to economic and social developments.

Each province and independent governorate is subdivided into districts (*shahrestans*), also administered by a governor (known as a *farmandar*). In rural areas, each district is divided into subdistricts (or *bakhshs*) administered by *bakhshdars*; and each subdistrict, into groups of villages, or counties (*dehestans*), administered by *dehdars*. Each group of villages is finally broken down into individual village units administered by headmen (*katkhoda*). In 1970 there were 151 *shahrestans*, 459 *bakhshs*, and 1,543 *dehestans*. Within the districts, any locality with more than 5,000 inhabitants is qualified to become a municipality (*shahrdari*), governed by a mayor (*shahrdar*) and, in some cases, by a municipal council. In 1970, there were 444 *shahrdaris*.

The governors general and the principal governors report directly to the Minister of Interior in Tehran and are usually selected by the Shah himself. They are the executive officers of the provinces and are wholly responsible for the management of subordinate counties, the affairs of which they must inspect. The degree to which a governor general

can control his province depends primarily on his personal prestige, energy, and relationship with the Shah. This control is blurred by the fact that other officials possess the same advantages, since most ministries and some independent agencies have a field service in the province and, normally, the department heads in Tehran exercise direct control over subordinate field units.

The district governor is appointed by imperial decree, after having been recommended either by the governor general of the province or by the Minister of Interior. He is responsible for implementing the directives of the governor general, who in turn receives instructions from the Minister of the Interior.

As part of the Shah's plan to upgrade provincial government, the Ministry of Interior announced in July 1972 changes of posts of 75 *farmandars* in the largest local government personnel shift in 10 years. Promotions were given to 32 *bakhshdars*—most of them university graduates—who replaced older, less trained officials.

#### *b. Local*

Although the Fundamental Laws required that popularly elected councils on the provincial and district level have some control over their own affairs, this provision was long ignored. In October 1962 a law was passed providing for provincial councils, to be formed by one member from each of the lower councils within the province. No action appears to have been taken until 1970, when councils were established for each of Iran's 151 districts and most of the 14 provinces. The district councils were elected by a combination of direct elections (in district capitals) and indirect elections (in the rural areas of each district). The provincial councils were all elected indirectly by the district councils of a given province.

The elections were marked by widespread apathy stemming from doubt in the efficacy of the new councils, an inadequate job of educating the people by the government, and the problems inherent in conducting elections in a still largely illiterate society with no tradition of popular participation in government. Local elections in October 1972 held no surprises and resulted in a landslide victory for the governing party.

In municipalities without elected councils, the mayor is appointed by a special division in the Ministry of Interior after recommendation by the

governor general. When municipal councils have been chosen, the appointed mayors will be replaced by *shahrdars* elected by the new councils. All other local officials will still be appointed in Tehran.

Provincial, district, and municipal councils are to have limited authority in matters involving development projects, health, education, and municipal affairs. They will have the right to inquire into and supervise the spending of revenues and will be authorized to levy certain taxes for limited use. Decisions taken by these councils, however, will be subject to veto by the governors general and Ministry of Interior officials and will depend on the latter for their implementation.

Most administrators of smaller units, from sub-districts to villages, are selected by the Minister of Interior; however, in villages where land-reform measures have taken effect, some administrators are chosen by their peers. Since land reform was instituted in 1962, numerous cooperative societies have been formed on the village level and have involved peasants—many of whom now are small landholders—in the decisionmaking process. In 1963, Tehran issued a decree calling for the establishment of elected village councils, over 3,000 of which councils have since been chosen. These councils are responsible for maintaining close cooperation with the directors of the village agricultural cooperatives and for planning and implementing local social and economic projects.

The elected municipal and village councils are a part of the Shah's effort to improve and decentralize the government and to achieve greater public participation in it. Tehran is also attempting to increase the number and quality of officials at the local level. Efforts are being made to involve local and provincial officials in the preparation of the national budget so that local needs can be estimated more accurately. The Interior Minister has initiated recruitment and training programs to improve the quality of district, municipality, and subdistrict appointees. Most of the emphasis thus far has been on improving efficiency rather than on decentralization, and the whole process is moving very gradually.

### 3. Judicial system (U/OU)

Although the constitution prescribes the separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial arms, the government traditionally has not



separated the executive and judicial branches, and the latter remains subordinate to the former. The Shah and the government, through the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, appoint judges on all levels of the court system and appoint, dismiss, and assign the public prosecution staff. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has no independent authority to review the constitutionality of laws or issues; it operates merely as the highest appellate court in the land.

The judicial system, although better administered than in the past, still suffers from manipulation, favoritism, corruption, and miscarriages of justice. The low salaries of judges make them vulnerable to bribery, and there is a tendency in the judicial establishment to protect families and friends in making decisions. Lack of competency is another problem, for few lawyers open law books after graduation from school. Finally, and probably most undermining, the government sometimes refuses to be bound by its own laws. The public is aware that when the government decides upon a course of action, legal barriers fall easily. Lack of confidence in the judicial system has caused Iranians to avoid recourse to it if possible; if forced to use it, they summon all the influence their family has or can afford to obtain a favorable decision.

At the close of the 19th century Iran had two bodies of law: the *sharia*, or religious law, and the secular law, known as the *urf*. These were administered, respectively, by the Islamic clergy and the Shah's government. Neither system was standardized or codified in the modern sense, and jurisdiction was vague. Starting with the constitutional movement of 1906 and culminating in the legal reforms under Reza Shah, the authority and functions of the religious courts were reduced, and all administration of law was brought under the central government.

Gradually, civil codes replaced the religious ones, and European law codes were freely drawn upon and adapted to Islamic principles. Marriage and family laws were in secular form but followed the theme of the old Islamic *sharia* principles; religious branches were retained in some courts to deal with matters of personal status. By 1970, however, the remaining religious courts and branches and all other courts were clearly organized under the Ministry of Justice, and all courts of every kind and level were obligated to hand down verdicts in compliance with the established codes of law.

Courts are not constitutionally bound by any decrees of the central or provincial government that are contrary to existing law. The jury system is not used except in cases of political crimes or infractions of the press law. In these it is constitutionally required, but this provision seems to have been ignored.

The court system is divided into five main levels. At the lowest are local courts elected by the people in rural and urban areas. In 1972, there were more than 4,000 such courts, called houses of justice (*khane-ye-ensaf*), serving some 16,000 villages and hamlets with 700 more planned. There also were 132 arbitration councils (*shoraye-davaeri*) elected in urban areas, with 70 more underway. These elected local courts—called for in the Shah's White Revolution—were established to bring the judicial system closer to the people, to lessen the cynicism of Iranians toward the courts, and to increase public participation in government. Apparently the courts are very popular, since they have eased the work load of other courts and have given the public easier access to justice with a minimum of formality and no cost. The houses of justice have handled more than a half million civil and penal cases and the councils of arbitration almost a half million more.

Arbitration councils consist of a chairman, two primary members, and two alternate members. They are elected by the community from a list of 30 candidates who have been screened by a committee whose membership usually includes a Ministry of Justice official and officials of the Iranian police and security services. The Ministry of Justice appoints one adviser to offer legal advice to the council and to assure the legality of the council's decisions. The adviser is also empowered to reject decisions deemed inconsistent with Iranian jurisprudence and to transfer the cases to the regular courts. The councils are empowered to investigate and adjudicate minor civil disputes and complaints, such as traffic accidents and property damage, whose settlement does not involve more than Rls10,000 (about US\$132), as well as minor offenses and misdemeanors whose penalty does not exceed 2 months' imprisonment or a fine of more than Rls1,200 (\$15.50).

The houses of justice are similar in nature to the arbitration councils, but there is no legal adviser from the Ministry of Justice to oversee rulings. Members of the houses are chosen by the villagers

for their honesty and good reputation, and, although the houses are far less sophisticated than the arbitration councils, they have been quite effective. Most of the cases before houses of justice involve disputes between villagers over water rights, trespassing, and damage to crops due to negligence. The remainder are of a more personal nature, usually involving domestic disputes. Houses of justice are authorized to examine all claims not exceeding Rls4,000 (\$53). If all parties agree, they may hear claims involving movable property valued up to Rls20,000 (\$266). The houses of justice are authorized to fine persons only up to Rls200 (\$2.66).

The next level of the court system consists of minor courts, whose judges are roughly equivalent to justices of the peace, and small municipal courts. They have jurisdiction over civil cases involving suits up to Rls50,000 (\$664) and petty offenses punishable by fines or up to 2 months' imprisonment. Minor courts are presided over by a single magistrate.

Next in the hierarchy of courts are the district courts, located in larger towns, which hear cases from areas composed of one or more counties. District courts, consisting of a judge, a prosecuting attorney, and an examining magistrate, have jurisdiction in the first instance over major misdemeanors, punishable by fine or 11 days' to 3 years' imprisonment, and civil cases involving more than Rls50,000 (\$664). They also review cases appealed from the minor courts.

Next in order are the provincial high courts, which are located in the provincial capitals and consist of two branches, civil and criminal. The civil branch, composed of two or three panels of judges, investigates appeals from all lower courts. The criminal branch has authority in the first instance over all offenses classed as crimes, which are punishable by from 2 years' solitary confinement to execution; its various panels consist of either three or five judges.

The highest court of the land, of which there may constitutionally only be one, is the Supreme Court. Located in Tehran, the court has the highest appellate jurisdiction. It resembles in certain ways both the Supreme Court of the United States and the dissimilar Court of Cassation of the French system; but is not exactly like either of them, although it is sometimes referred to as the Court of Cassation. The Supreme Court of Iran has authority in the first instance in the trial of Cabinet

ministers. In addition, it adjudicates disputes as to the relative competence and jurisdiction of civil and military courts in some cases. It has 11 branches, or sections, of four justices each. The president of the first section is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Attorney General, appointed by the Shah on nomination of the Minister of Justice, is chief public prosecutor and is attached to the Supreme Court.

Iran also has special courts with limited jurisdiction, the most important of which are the military tribunals. Whenever martial law is declared in any area, the Ministry of War can establish military tribunals which have the power to assume responsibility for any or all cases normally brought before the regular courts. There are two levels of military courts, the second of which sits as an appellate body to the first. No appeal can be made from the second military tribunal except to the Supreme Court—and to this body only with the express permission of the Shah, a permission seldom given.

Usually the Judge Advocate General in charge of all military courts decides to assume responsibility only for cases involving violence, public order, subversion, and the press laws; matters such as credit cases, land litigation, and family affairs are left to the civil court system. During a period of martial law, military authorities may make arrests without charges, enter houses without search warrants, suppress the press, prohibit public meetings, and impose a curfew.

In addition to their authority during periods of martial law, permanent military tribunals are responsible for trying all military personnel for crimes committed while on duty. Military tribunals also have authority in the cases of all political crimes and infractions of the press law. Despite the fact that the Fundamental Laws provide for the presence of a jury when such cases are heard, these cases are not tried by jury and they seldom reach the civilian courts.

The Civil Servants Tribunal has several branches throughout Tehran and the provinces. It has responsibility for bringing to trial all cases of graft or corruption involving government civil servants up to the level of ministers. Anyone convicted by these courts of a major crime can appeal to the Supreme Court. If a Cabinet minister is accused of a crime in connection with his responsibilities as a member of the government, the Supreme Court serves as a court of first instance.

There are two disciplinary tribunals for those in the legal profession. One—called the High Judicial Council—is for complaints brought against judges. The other is for complaints against actions taken by lawyers in their official capacities. Each of these tribunals consists of a single court in Tehran, and there is no appeal.

To become a judge or a public prosecutor, a man must be a graduate of either of the faculties of law, political science, or theology at the University of Tehran. The Ministry of Justice makes the final decision—often on political grounds—as to whether an individual applicant is recommended to the Shah for appointment.

For each branch of the court system there is at least one public prosecutor or assistant public prosecutor. These men are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and have considerable powers in the court system. It is to the office of the public prosecutor that anyone wishing to initiate litigation must come to have his case assigned to a particular court. Crimes against the state may be brought to the attention of the public prosecutor by the police or may be independently brought to court by the prosecutor's office itself. Prior to trial, the public prosecutor's office has authority to order arrests, issue search warrants to the police, establish bail, and order the detention of defendants without bail. Public prosecutors have the additional responsibility of observing how laws are functioning and of reporting any defects to the Ministry of Justice, which has the authority to draft new laws or to submit old ones to the parliament for reconsideration.

The Iranian penal code draws heavily on the French Penal Code of 1801—both for its underlying principles and for its structure. In accord with the French system, offenses are classified in groups on the basis of code; however, the Iranian code establishes four instead of three types of violations. The most serious offense is the felony, conviction for which may result in death. Other penalties for the offense are imprisonment or exile for a specified time or for life as well as loss of civil rights. The middle categories include serious misdemeanors and minor misdemeanors (the French code has only a single category of misdemeanors). Included in the former category, as in the French code, are offenses such as robbery and arson. Penalties for these misdemeanors are imprisonment of over 1 month or a heavy fine. Minor misdemeanors are punished by imprisonment of over 1 week or a fine. The least serious offense, the infraction, includes

vagrancy, cruelty to animals, and traffic violations, all of which are punishable by small fines or by prison terms of less than a week.

Alternatives to imprisonment, as specified in the penal code, are exile or obligatory domicile in a specified location under police supervision. The courts rarely order such punishment.

Accommodations to Islamic law and society are most notable in the subsection of the code which deals with crimes against morality. Article 179 exempts a man from punishment if he kills his wife for adultery, and it punishes him with only 6 months' imprisonment if he kills his daughter or sister under similar circumstances. No such license is allowed the women in the reverse situation, although a drive for equal legal rights for women is gaining momentum. Elsewhere the code takes cognizance of the Iranian patriarchal society and of the Muslim tradition of sanctuary; if relatives of a criminal assist him, they are exempt from punishment, but all others harboring such an individual may be punished by prison terms ranging from 1 month to a year.

Violations of criminal law are charged and tried in accordance with a system adopted largely from that of France. A warrant is supposedly necessary before an arrest can be made, but exceptions are numerous. The accused is theoretically protected by the requirements that he must be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours following arrest and that he has the right to be represented by counsel. Trials are not by jury—despite the provision in the Fundamental Laws for the presence of a jury in trials involving political offenses and breaches of the press laws—and the verdict is reached by the court itself. Trials are public except in cases deemed to jeopardize morality or state security. During a trial, the prosecution and the defense are given equal opportunity to present their sides. If the defendant is not present, he may be judged in absentia, on the basis of the arguments of the prosecution alone. Appeals from the decision of the court may be made within 12 days by either the defense or the prosecution. As stated above, justice in Iran is not always dispensed in strict accordance with the legal code, and a defendant's wealth and political influence—or lack of it—tend to affect the manner in which he is treated.

Outside of the national legal system is a unique legal structure, called the *Hamayanakan*, which deals with personal status laws, including marriage and divorce, of the Armenian community.

### C. Political dynamics (S)

The Shah is at the pinnacle of political power in Iran; it is he who determines the direction and content of policy, the nature of political activity, and the conduct of elections. Below the Shah is a coterie of Cabinet officers, high-level civil servants, political party leaders, military officers, and first-family members whose political power is directly related to their influence with and access to the Shah. Since these persons have no independent power base and are dependent on the Shah for their positions, their individual status and membership in the group at this level fluctuate with the Shah's attitudes and wishes. At the next level is a larger group of middle and lower grade civil servants, local government officials, members of the reform program corps, and religious leaders—all of whom are expected to serve more or less as the Shah's political agents in the field. The great mass of Iranians, both rural and urban, have no direct influence on the political situation and are generally apathetic. When they do feel strongly about an issue, however, their attitudes are, in practice, informally passed along to higher political authorities and can, in fact, affect policy. This upward channeling of opinions is facilitated by a unique Iranian institution, the *dowreh*, or circle. It is common for educated Iranians to meet periodically in small gatherings of trusted friends and family members where information can be exchanged and opinions expressed with relative candor. Overlapping membership insures that key attitudes are disseminated and conveyed to people of influence and authority. Thus, although Iran's government is authoritarian, it is far from oblivious to rumblings from below and in fact on most issues demonstrates a remarkable sensitivity. Iran's large and heterogeneous bureaucracy is another vehicle for making known and obtaining political and personal wants, although it is not always responsive and may alter facts. As advisers to the Shah are prone to adjust information to advance their own interests, the data on which he bases his decisions are not always accurate.

Political life in Iran has always been characterized either by a strong, authoritarian central government or by fragmented despotic power units, similar to the war lordships of pre-Communist China. The necessity for strong government can be explained in part by the intense individualism of Iranians, who tend to be motivated solely by

self-interest and who give allegiance to self, family, religion, and tribe before government and nation. Both politics and government have traditionally centered around personal contacts, influence, and the force of personality rather than institutions or political parties. For a decade, however, the Shah has been building modern economic and social institutions and encouraging those whose positions are based on ability rather than on whom they know. Thus, traditional and modern forces can be seen at every level of political power in Iran, and they are forced by the Shah to work together.

With the passage of time, and progress in implementing the reform program, doubts have lessened among nationalist intellectuals as to the government's sincerity in its desire to transform society. Despite consistent pressure from the top to inculcate a sense of urgency, some programs have lagged in execution; of primary importance, however, is the fact that none has failed. It would be difficult for political opposition of whatever origin to enunciate a comprehensive, integrated program more clearly in the national interest and substantially different from that of the Shah.

The economic and technical changes taking place in Iran have made the country a more cohesive whole; there is a greater sense of participation and more national consciousness among the people than at any time in the past. At the same time, the Iranian political system is seriously weakened because it still ultimately depends on one man—the Shah. Moreover, the economic, social, and administrative modernization that has taken place has done little to create solid political institutions, and Iranians have not yet been allowed to exercise decisionmaking in the political arena.

Political dissenters, at home and abroad, among Iranian students and opposition factions or individuals describe the government as excessively authoritarian and paternalistic. The Shah has not permitted the development of political parties such as exist in Western democracies, firmly believing that social and economic stability must be achieved first. In effect, the Shah views political activity as the means by which his program for modernizing Iran will be advertised and carried out. The only permissible political activity, therefore, is conducted by those who accept the validity of the Shah's program.

It can be assumed that the rapid change and increased mobility within Iranian society since 1961 have had an impact on the political attitudes of the

people, but the absence of open campaigning and elections makes the extent or direction of such change impossible to determine. It is also impossible to determine whether or not the people would support or reject the continuation of the Shah's programs should the Shah die. The Empress is designated regent if the Shah dies before the Crown Prince reaches the age of 20. Almost certainly, the military would step in at first to support her government, but beyond that almost anything could happen.

### I. Political forces

#### a. Shah

The Shah took the throne in 1941 and for many years was controlled by, rather than the manipulator of, the political forces in Iran. He labored under the shadow of his aggressive, domineering, self-made father, Reza Shah. He was intimidated by his Cabinet ministers and family and seemed generally too sensitive and introspective to be an effective ruler. A number of factors have contributed to the Shah's growth during the past 10 years into a strong, confident monarch (Figure 1). These are the success of his third marriage with the birth of two male heirs and Iran's progress under his



FIGURE 1. Shahanshah Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (U/OU)

development programs. Probably most important is his desire to prove himself a great leader in his own right, coupled with his awareness—finely attuned by several narrow escapes from assassination—that he is mortal and that his time is limited. He is driven by the conviction that only he can pull Iran into the 20th century and that modernization must be accomplished in his lifetime.

In recent years the Shah has scored an impressive chain of successes. At home he has cut down or isolated potential rivals, staked out his claim to be a royal revolutionary, and in the process has established his supremacy beyond question. He has presided over remarkably rapid economic development, attributable in part to his ability to squeeze enormous additional funds from Western oil companies. On the foreign front as well, the Shah has built an image of independence. He deals with the great powers with assurance, and insists that his U.S. ally should give great weight to his appreciation of regional problems. In short, the Shah has become a supremely self-confident figure with much to be proud of. He is intelligent and personable, if sometimes mercurial, is fluent in English and French, and has a taste for sports, art, and literature. Much of the Shah's education dealt with military affairs, in which he is still deeply interested and in which he considers himself an expert.

The Shah believes that in order to realize his goals and to preserve his own position he must firmly grasp the reins of power and insure that no other person or group can build up an independent power base. With the firm support of the military and security forces, he has succeeded. The Shah's reform program—undoubtedly motivated in large part by a genuine concern for his country—can also be seen as an astute effort to bolster and broaden his political support. He has adroitly used the traditional levers of power while building modern economic and social skills and institutions. He has successfully muffled both ultranationalists and traditionalists and, in many instances, has brought them into participation in the reform program.

The Shah (who was 53 years of age in October 1972) is still at times moody, introspective, and hypersensitive. His ego has been inflated by economic successes at home and by his growing stature in international affairs, and he seems to be taking on some characteristics of a prototypical dictator. He has surrounded himself with toadying

yes-men who have begun to insulate him from affairs outside the palace walls. He is also extremely covetous of his power and shows no sign of relinquishing even the most trivial of his prerogatives. Although the Shah remains well read and well informed about events in which he is most interested, the give-and-take of decisionmaking in Iran is almost nonexistent, with the Shah consequently making decisions in a vacuum. This has led increasingly to the settling of important matters by last-minute decrees based solely on emotionalism.

#### *b. Palace clique*

The Shah is surrounded by a coterie of politicians, family, military officers, and others who are political forces only to the degree to which they have access to and influence with him. The court was considered at one time to be the center of licentiousness and depravity, of corruption and influence peddling, but the Shah has tightened his control, and the court's role has diminished. Because their position depends on the will of the Shah, most members of this group tend to be sycophantic in their devotion to his programs. Nevertheless, it is probably only at this level that there are independent thinkers who also have access to the Shah. Minister of Court Asadollah Alam, for example, seems to be able to speak relatively frankly to the Shah. The Shah probably depends on this coterie to provide facts, figures, and support rather than to engage in any decisionmaking.

The Shah's immediate family has not always been an asset to him and has been kept in semi-obscure. The Queen Mother, once an inveterate intriguer, is now seldom heard from, and the Shah's half-brothers, reported in the past to be potential contenders for the throne, now appear in public only to open sports events, present trophies, or officiate at ceremonies too inconsequential for the Shah's personal attention. Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, was for years the central figure in nearly all the scandal connected with the court. Her intervention on behalf of her paramours was notorious, and it was widely rumored that she was involved in smuggling drugs. She has become more discreet, however, and is even undertaking semi-diplomatic missions for her brother.

Other members of the Pahlavi family and of the relatively large Qajar family retain social influence, but they have an ever diminishing influence in political life. Access to court personalities is still considered important, however, to insure success in

business and political activities. The Shah, on his side, relies on some 10 people to provide him direct access to major interest groups. These advisers include Empress Farah, Princess Ashraf, Manuchehr Eghbal, chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company and his deputy Beza Fallah; General Ayadi, the Shah's personal physician; Sharif-Emami, a senator and old-time politician; Prime Minister Hoveyda; Ardeshir Zahedi, former foreign minister; General Hossein Fardust; and Minister of Court Alam. They do not work as a team; several, in fact, are rivals, a situation that the Shah probably encourages.

Empress Farah (Figure 2) has been by all accounts an influence for good, and, of all the court personalities, she probably has the most influence on the Shah. She is intelligent and cosmopolitan in outlook and appears to take her position seriously. She has been active and effective in promoting social issues and, unlike many others connected with the court, she has never been touched by scandal. The Empress is of considerable social and political assistance to the Shah. She appears with him at various functions and has even made provincial tours by herself, a task which is unusual for a woman in Iran. The image she projects—that of a beautiful and talented woman devoted to her family and to good works—is especially useful in Iran. The culture had lacked before any such "lady



FIGURE 2. The Empress Farah Diba (U/OU)

bountiful" tradition, and the attractive Empress provides a basically useful model of the modern Iranian woman.

Of more political significance are the Prime Minister, other members of the Cabinet, high-level civil servants, and political party leaders. These are the people who are educated, who discuss programs and policy with the Shah, who present many of the Shah's programs to the country, who are responsible for executing the programs, and who joust with each other for favor in the Shah's eyes. The nature of this group changed during the 1960's; its members are no longer chosen primarily on the basis of membership in one of Iran's first families but on technical and intellectual skills and the ability to get things done. Wealthy landlords and high religious figures have also faded as significant elements of this group—primarily because of their opposition to parts of the reform program. (Many of their children, however, remain prominent.) Corruption is still a problem in Iran, but there is a growing sense of public service and dedication to progress.

High-ranking military and security officials can also be included in the Shah's immediate coterie, partly because he still depends upon them to preserve his throne. Although the Shah's economic and administrative reform program theoretically threatens the senior military officers, who have vested interest in the status quo, they appear to be completely loyal to the Shah. This loyalty appears to extend down into the ranks of middle and junior grade officers, who are constantly screened for signs of political opposition. The Shah also relies on the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) not only to design strategy for neutralizing the opposition but to organize political support for the government.

*c. Middle class*

The next level of political life in Iran includes those who are more aware of and involved in politics than the masses but who are not important enough to have frequent access to the Shah. This group includes local and provincial government employees; most of the Majlis representatives; members of the reform program's Health, Literacy, and Development Corps; loyal members of the clergy; and lower and middle grade civil servants.

Although members of this group do not move in the higher circles of society or government, they

are of great importance to the Shah because they serve, in effect, as his eyes and ears among the people. It is they who actually carry out many aspects of the reform program, who make up the membership of the political parties, and who campaign for office. The Shah must necessarily depend on them to explain, advertise, and advocate his programs and to give him virtually his only information regarding attitudes among the people as a whole.

The transition from traditional to modern society is perhaps most apparent at this level of political life. Local officials and many lower level civil servants in Tehran are not highly educated and tend to do things in the old way—through personal contacts, knowing the right people, and favoring their families and friends. They are gradually being replaced, however, by younger, better educated Iranians who have been specifically trained for their jobs and are learning to operate through organizations and bureaucratic channels. This is certainly true of most members of the reform program corps who have been scattered throughout the country. The newer group of government and Health, Literacy, and Development Corps members are bringing a new sense of urgency to the reform program. Many of them are people who would normally oppose the Shah as a dictator but who are pragmatic enough to join the bandwagon. The group could cause problems, however, should the momentum of social and economic change falter.

The *ulama*, or Shia clergy, once exercised considerable influence over town, village, and rural life in their role as religious leaders, teachers, and healers. They are beginning to lose this influence, however, as the people turn to government as a source of leadership. They have also lost a great deal of the influence they once had in the political hierarchy because of their opposition to land reform, women's rights, and liberalized divorce laws. Among the peasants, the clergy probably retain considerable influence on social and spiritual matters, but they are carefully discouraged from participating in political activity unless it is in support of the government.

Though formal pressure groups are relatively rare in Iran, the most effective ones—such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Bar Association, the secondary school teachers, and several smaller groups of professionals—are composed essentially

of middle class and professional personnel. More traditional pressure groups are the merchants' and craftsmen's guilds, which have a long history and which represent independent middle and lower class businessmen and artisans. Most lobbying is still conducted in the traditional way by contracting friends or acquaintances in power, informally and personally, rather than through an organization.

*d. Lower class*

The great masses of Iranians—the peasants, the tribesmen, and the urban lower class—remain a political enigma. Certainly it can be said that the rural masses are no longer cut off from events in the rest of the country, since even the most remote village has its transistor radios, and health and literacy corpsmen are found in many small rural villages whose previous contact with the government was confined to police and tax collectors. Land reforms in the rural areas and the growing economy and expanded services in the cities appear to be making a dent in the traditional apathy and cynicism of the Iranian masses. A new mood of progress and even some new trust in government (beyond the traditional loyalty to the Shah himself) may slowly be replacing the usual fatalism.

Most of the lower class—particularly the peasants—seemed to be a conservative, relatively inert element in Iranian political life. The Shah's popularity with this class is probably higher than at any time in the past, and the people generally seemed grateful for the new services provided by the government, but they were not an active force in demanding change. Despite improvements in their economic and social status and their growing awareness of government as a force for change, most Iranian peasants seem to be apolitical. Whether modernization will create a sense of organized political consciousness or produce active pressure for programs and benefits is problematical. It has never happened before in Iran—but then neither have the social and economic changes now sweeping the country.

*e. Political opposition*

The Shah faces no viable political opposition. The left has been rendered impotent since the declaration of the Shah's White Revolution and its ambitious reform program and by the fact that political oppositionists are carefully monitored by the security forces. At the same time, many con-

servative elements, once ardent supporters of the Shah, have been disaffected by his reform program. Members of the religious hierarchy, in particular, view elements of the program—such as land reform and women's rights—as striking at their power and interests. The government's continuing pressure against religious dissidents, combined with rewards for faithful mullahs, has severely weakened the religious opposition, which has not been successful in fomenting political opposition since the mid-1960's. The conservative opposition suffers from the same disorganization and disunity that characterizes the left. The government's tactics, together with the conservatives' inability to agree on a program or leader, prevent the conservatives from being serious contenders in the political arena.

**2. Political groupings**

Political parties, which first made their appearance after the constitutional revolution of 1905-11, still do not play a major role in political life. Candidates for elective office and for offices within the parties themselves are carefully screened, and the Shah has said that no organization can exist in the country unless it is in line with the revolution. The Shah apparently believes that only when the entire population is literate and has a stake in preserving the *status quo* can political parties be allowed to suggest policies and campaign freely. Then, he believes, parties will operate in the national interest, rather than for narrow personal advantage. He undoubtedly fears that the free operation of parties would endanger his throne and his program, but he also recognizes that Iranian individualism makes responsible organized political activity difficult. He has, in fact, attributed Iranian stability to the lack of freewheeling political parties.

The limitations placed on the activities of political parties make it difficult for them to recruit active, enthusiastic members. The middle and upper classes and the urban workers—the major source of political party membership in many countries—tend to be cynical about or disinterested in political parties. Those who are interested in running for office must associate themselves with a party, and the rank-and-file membership of the parties therefore consists largely of opportunistic members of the professions or businessmen who see some advantage in associating themselves with Shah-approved political activities. An opposition party has even more difficulty recruiting members and maintaining morale than a progovernment one.



During the last years of the Qajar dynasty from about 1900 to 1925, secret political groups developed to oppose the despotism of the Qajar Shahs, to oppose foreign influence in Iran, and to establish contacts with Iranian political groups abroad. The Qajars were forced by a revolutionary movement to permit parliamentary institutions in 1906. The first Majlis, elected in that year, was divided into a conservative majority, represented by the pro-Soviet Moderate Socialists, and a radical minority, represented by the revolutionary, pro-British Popular Democrats. These groups were not stable, and they developed neither a broad popular following nor proper electoral machinery.

After a brief experience with parliamentary government, the sessions of the Majlis were interrupted by foreign intervention and World War I. It was not until the 1920's that the Majlis met regularly. For most of the succeeding period until September 1941, Reza Shah suppressed the formation of any parliamentary groupings as well as any political party outside the Majlis. The occupation of Iran by the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. during World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 brought about the reappearance of political parties. For the most part these represented cliques of influential politicians or occupational and regional groupings, but some were ideologically and class oriented. As political activity during the occupation focused on Soviet and British competition for influence, on a conflict between the Shah and the aristocracy, and on a conservative-radical conflict, political parties came to reflect these differences.

Strong party activity first began in late 1949, when Mohammad Mosadeq, a nationalist parliamentarian who had attracted a large following in the Majlis, allowed himself to be placed at the head of a coalition of parties called the National Front. The most important parties in the National Front were the Iran Party, the Toilers Party, and the Third Force Party. The Iran Party had been organized in 1944 by a group of engineers under Allahyar Saleh. Strongly nationalistic and favoring social, economic, and administrative reform and a restriction on the Shah's powers, this small, loosely organized party was vocal enough to be included in the Cabinet at the time of the short-lived coalition with the Communist Tudeh Party in 1946. The socialist Toilers Party, organized in 1951, attempted to compete with the Tudeh on ideological grounds.

It was then comprised of two elements: a pragmatic coalition of supporters of philosopher-politician Mazaffer Baghai in Kerman and in the Tehran bazaar; and the younger intellectuals who were followers of Khalil Maleki, a socialist who had abandoned the Tudeh. In 1952, Maleki split with Baghai and established the pro-Mosadeq Third Force Party, also socialist oriented. Since Mosadeq neglected these coalition parties and their leaders after he became Prime Minister in April 1951, his own somewhat disorganized personal followers gradually began to think of themselves as representing the National Front, now to be distinguished to some extent from its component parties. After the pro-Shah coup against Mosadeq in August 1953, the new Iranian government forced the National Front underground, but it continues to exist to a limited degree. The Iran Party, the Toilers Party, and the Third Force Party disappeared almost completely from the scene. Mosadeq died quietly, almost unnoticed, in 1967.


Between 1953 and 1957, almost no legal party activity took place. In 1957, however, the Shah, on the assumption that a two-party system would enhance the appearance of democracy in Iran, ordered two of his close supporters to establish and lead a progovernment political party, called the Melliyun (Nationalist) Party, and an official opposition party, called the Mardom (People's) Party. Deputies of the Majlis then in session were encouraged to declare for one or the other of these parties. Many deputies did declare party allegiance, but the number declaring for each party fluctuated continually, and membership did not remain constant. Together with a number of independents, the parliamentary members of these parties contested the abortive elections of 1960 and 1961.

New national elections were held in September 1963, despite declining efforts by the Tudeh and the National Front groups to obstruct them. The National Union, composed of political groupings pledged to support the Shah's reform program, was supported by a large majority vote. Prominent in the coalition was the group called the Progressive Center, led by Hasan Ali Mansur.

The National Union, including the Progressive Center, and the Meliyun Party declined and disappeared as separate entities, and the function of majority, or government, party was assumed by the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party. Hasan-Ali Mansur had organized the party in December 1963, and by

March 1964, it held a strong, reform-oriented majority in the Majlis. Mansur was assassinated by a fanatic member of the reactionary Devotees of Islam in January 1965. His brother-in-law, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who was Minister of Finance, was then called upon by the Shah to be Prime Minister and became leader of the Iran Novin Party. In the election held in August 1967, the Iran Novin increased its majority, with the remainder divided among the Mardom and the Pan-Iran party.

The years 1968 to 1972 saw chances for the development of a genuine two-party system lessen with the increasing strength of Iran Novin and the emasculation of Iran's other parties. In 1970, the Pan-Iranists dealt themselves a mortal blow with their opposition to the government's decision to give up a long-standing claim to Bahrain. The party's unexpected censure motion in the Majlis resulted in the dissolving of two Pan-Iran controlled municipal councils and the prohibition of Pan-Iran participation in the September 1970 elections. In the national elections of 1971, Iran Novin captured 230 of the 268 Majlis seats, Mardom, 37, and one for the new Iranian Party (Figure 3). In the Senate, 28 of the elected members are of the Iran Novin Party and two of the Mardom (Figure 4). The Mardom Party suffered a severe setback in July 1972 when Ali Naqi Kani, secretary general of the party, resigned just six weeks before the elections, apparently as a result of the Shah's unhappiness over the freewheeling campaign he was conducting. The Iran Novin Party won these elections handily.



\*All parties are progovernment. Chart does not indicate right, left, or center political orientation.

FIGURE 3. Party representation in the Majlis, 1972 (U/OU)

	5th (1967-71)	6th (1971-75)
IRAN NOVIN (New Iran)	27 (93%)	28 (93%)
MARDOM	2 (3.5%)	2 (7%)
INDEPENDENT	1 (1.5%)	...

\*One half of the 60 Senate seats are appointed by the Shah and show no party affiliation. The other half are elected.

	21st Majlis (1963-67)	22d Majlis (1967-71)	23d Majlis (1971-75)
IRAN NOVIN (New Iran) (Progovernment; New Iran formed 1963)	140 (70%)	183 (84%)	230 (86%)
MARDOM (Loyal opposition; formed 1957)	30 (14.5%)	28 (13%)	37 (13.6%)
PAN IRAN (Revived 1967; disbanded 1970)	...	5 (2%)	...
IRANIAN PARTY (formed January 1971)	...	...	1 (0.4%)
INDEPENDENT	28 (14%)	1 (1%)	...
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>198**</b>	<b>217**</b>	<b>268</b>

\*\*2 additional seats for Bahrain were never filled; Bahrain is no longer claimed by Iran.

FIGURE 4. Distribution of parliamentary seats in the last three elections (U/OU)

a. Iran Novin Party

The Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, which is the most powerful legal party in Iran, had its origins in a 39-member club—the Progressive Center—which Hasan-Ali Mansur, an economist, established early in 1961 when he was secretary general of Iran's now-dissolved High Economic Council. The club was formed with the purpose of drawing up and recommending to parliament a program for modernizing the country. Members of the club ranked among the country's intelligentsia and held high positions in the government. By 1962, the center's membership had expanded to 200. Mansur at that time claimed that the center had no intention of entering politics. The center continued to mature until June 1963, when the Shah appointed it as his own personal bureau for economic and social studies. Working in committees, the center members

studied the country's problems and prepared a 17-principle program for what they described as the renovation of Iran. This was praised by the Shah, since the center's principles were consistent with the Shah's own reform program.

The Progressive Center openly entered the political arena in July 1963, when Mansur announced that his party, now grown to 300 members, would campaign in the forthcoming national elections. Mansur planned to send center candidates to parliament in sufficient numbers to assure support for the Shah's reform program. In the September 1963 elections, the center won 140 of the Majlis seats, which then numbered 200. Shortly afterward Mansur—who had been made Prime Minister—announced that the center would henceforth be called the Iran Novin Party.

The party has produced a 34-point manifesto which declares that all Iranians should have equal personal and social rights and are entitled to education and public health facilities. It recognizes the family as the foundation of society and emphasizes freedom of speech and of the press. It asserts that there should be free access to courts of law for all individuals and protection against unemployment and accidents. It advocates retirement benefits and old age pensions.

The Iran Novin Party's statement of party principles advocates private ownership and private economic activities encouraged and guided by the government. It argues for decentralization and administrative reforms and for the need to marshal manpower for the maximum use of national resources. It favors the expansion of labor unions, the factory worker's profit-sharing scheme, and taxes based on the principle of social justice. It states that adjustments should be made in the distribution of wealth according to the country's economic and social conditions. It supports regional development, especially the improvement of economic and social conditions in the villages and the maximum use of cultivable lands through agrarian reform.

The Iran Novin Party claims to have over 1 million members—an undoubtedly exaggerated figure. At the party's first congress, held in May 1967, the Political Bureau was formally approved as the highest governing organ in the party. In late 1972 the Political Bureau had 10 members, including the Prime Minister, the secretary general, party leaders in both houses of parliament, and the chairman of the party's Central Council. Before the

establishment of the Political Bureau, the Executive Committee of the Central Council ran the party. The Central Council was increased to 500 members in 1971 and the Board of Directorate to 90. Both act as rubberstamps for the Political Bureau. The large and unwieldy Central Council does little more than select the Executive Committee.

The Iran Novin Party has made active efforts to improve its organization at the provincial and local levels. The party has branches in many cities and towns throughout Iran. These provincial branches are governed by a directing body consisting of four members who sit on the party's 16-member provincial committee. In Tehran, the party has taken steps to set up some 130 party cells (*howze*), each having approximately 20 members who are required to meet together with a party official at least once a week to discuss the party's programs, plans, and problems.

The local and provincial bodies are represented on the national level through the Iran Novin Party Congress. A congress is supposed to convene every 4 years, the first in May 1967. The second congress of the party was held in Tehran in May 1971, in which some 3,000 party members took part, representing 150 party committees, party parliamentary factions, and other affiliated units.

The development of a strong party organization at the local level is theoretically intended to provide a channel through which local interests can be communicated to the highest party level. In fact, however, the chain of command is used most often to convey the wishes of the Shah and the party leadership to the local bodies. The party is more nearly a national organization than ever before, but its lack of independence and its reputation as a mouthpiece of the government have prevented the development of real public support.

#### *b. Mardom Party*

The Mardom Party, which also suffered from the pall cast by the rigged elections of 1961, was revived in modest form in 1964 with the encouragement of the Shah, who was anxious to have a respectable opposition party. By 1965, the party was attempting to fulfill an opposition function by criticizing tactics of the majority party and occasionally by arguing against government legislation. Nevertheless, the party remains essentially an adjunct of the establishment. Party leader Ali Naqi Kani resigned only 6 weeks before nationwide city

and provincial council elections. Kani had spearheaded an unusually active campaign attacking the policies of the Iran Novin Party. Kani's aggressive tactics irritated the conservative faction of his party, and the press has speculated that these conservatives forced the secretary general to step down. The Mardom Party had been the object of increasing criticism from the Shah, who prefers a more leisurely development of the loyal opposition, and the royal court may have had a hand in Kani's downfall. Kani's resignation will probably cause the Mardom Party to lose its recently acquired vitality.

The Mardom Party has great difficulty in maintaining the morale of its membership and in recruiting new members. Ambitious young Iranians either find membership in a permanent opposition group useless or are frustrated by the group's "me-tooism." Party members are periodically heartened by rumors—such as those circulated before the parliamentary elections of August 1967—that the Shah plans to increase the size of Mardom representation in parliament. When the Mardom Party came out of the 1967 elections with fewer representatives than ever, it went into doldrums, from which it has not emerged. In 1969 the party had 28 members in the Majlis and two in the Senate; in 1971 it won 37 lower house seats, but in an expanded Majlis, and its percentage share remained about the same. Nevertheless, the Shah is determined to maintain the appearance of a two-party system in Iran and is not likely to allow the Mardom Party to disappear entirely.

The Mardom Party claims over 200,000 members, but this figure seems greatly exaggerated. The High Council of the party, composed of about 133 members in 1967, is elected by the party national congress and studies and approves party policies and programs which are usually submitted by the Central Committee. The Central Committee is the real locus of power in the organization. Composed of 15 members, the Central Committee formulates and executes policy after *pro forma* review by the High Council. The party has not created a local or provincial network comparable in any way to that of the Iran Novin Party, partly explaining the beatings it takes at the polls.

#### *c. Iranian Party*

The small Iranian Party began functioning in January 1971, after the demise of the Pan Iran Party. Dr. Fazollah Sadr, a Majlis deputy and

former deputy leader of the Pan-Iranists, is the new organization's secretary general. The Iranian Party appears to have picked up the fallen super-patriotic mantle of the Pan Iran Party but is moderating the stridently reactionary rhetoric of the Pan-Iranists. The new party captured one seat in the 1971 elections.

### 3. Electoral laws and practices

Elections in Iran are aimed at improving the democratic image of the government and at giving the people a sense of participation in the governing process rather than at allowing the free expression of the people's will. The electoral process is firmly controlled by the government—though more subtly since 1961. Control is achieved through the weeding out of undesirable candidates and through sometimes blatant manipulation at the polls. Consequently, elections are viewed by most of the population with apathy and, in more politically aware circles, with cynicism. Despite active "get out the vote" campaigns, many Iranians do not exercise the right to vote, as it is a foregone conclusion that the government party will win a substantial majority.

Iran's Fundamental Laws provide for two types of elective bodies, the national parliament and the provincial, district, and municipal councils. Three sets of electoral laws, however, are in effect; in addition to laws governing elections to parliament and to municipal councils, an apparently unimplemented set of laws governs provincial and district council elections. Many of the provisions in each set of laws are similar.

To vote in any election in Iran, one must be an Iranian citizen of at least 20 years of age who has resided in his electoral district for at least 6 months; in the case of Senatorial elections, a voter must be at least 25 years of age. Among those barred from voting are insane persons, foreign nationals, criminals and political convicts, regular members of the armed forces, and police and gendarmerie officials who reside in the area over which they have authority. Women were enfranchised by decree in March 1963 and voted for the first time in national elections held that same year.

To be eligible for candidacy in any Iranian election, one must be an Iranian national of at least 30 years of age and literate in the Persian language; in the case of Majlis candidates, one cannot be over 70 years old. Barred from running for office

are persons who are ineligible to vote, the sons, brothers, and paternal uncles of the Shah, governors general, judges, finance agents, magistrates, prosecutors general, Cabinet ministers, and all other heads of government departments. Lesser government officials can become candidates but must resign their appointive offices if they are elected.

In order to become a candidate for the Majlis or the Senate, most candidates must also be Muslims. Exceptions are one Jew, two Armenians, one Assyrian, and one Zoroastrian, who represent religious minority groups in the Majlis. To run for the Senate one must be over 40 years old and must have had experience as a Cabinet minister, ambassador, governor general, state prosecutor general, deputy in the Majlis for at least 3 terms, judge for 20 years, senior army officer, or university professor for 20 years. One may also qualify if he is a landlord or merchant who pays an annual tax of at least Rls500,000 (about US\$6,660) or is a lawyer with long experience. Candidates for parliamentary seats need not have resided in a specific constituency for a given period of time, although it is necessary for a candidate to be well-known to his constituency. In order to become a candidate for a municipal council, one must have resided for at least 3 years in the district from which he seeks election.

Members of the Majlis, members of the Senate, and members of municipal and village councils are elected by direct elections. The procedure by which all Iranian elections are conducted is the same. Voting is supervised by the Ministry of Interior through its provincial representatives. SAVAK also maintains an active surveillance over the whole procedure. Representatives of national government ministries, the governors general of provinces, the governors of districts and subdistricts, and the mayors of cities and towns appoint committees which arrange for the popular election of election supervisory councils. These councils, with the help of the local gendarmerie and city police, oversee the general popular voting. It is also provided in all electoral laws of Iran that the supervisory councils may be dissolved or may have their composition changed by Ministry of Interior officials if the councils prove to handicap the smooth progress of the elections.

The supervisory councils and ministry officials share the responsibility for announcing to the voters the date, time, and place of voting, the names of

the candidates, the qualifications for voting, and the manner in which a voter must prove himself qualified to vote. Voters must register and obtain an electoral card prior to election day. The members of the supervisory council are present in the polling places during election day to check the identity and electoral cards of all voters, witness their balloting, and mark the electoral card as the voter leaves the poll. Supervisory council members who count the votes after closing the polls are authorized to discard those ballots which are illegible or improperly filled out.

The number of deputies is proportional to the population, one deputy for every 100,000. In the last 10 years the number of deputies has increased from 200 to 268.

Complaints against the manner in which elections are carried out must be sent to the appropriate supervisory council, which, in the case of national parliamentary elections, investigates the complaints itself. In the case of municipal elections, a special committee appointed by the mayor or district government investigates complaints on behalf of the supervisory council. There is no further recourse for those who object, except to send their complaints to the newly elected parliament or municipal council itself. In the past, riots protesting election rigging have been common, especially in Tehran and other important cities. During the national elections in August 1960, protests over rigging forced suspension of the elections. Following new elections in January 1961, a series of public demonstrations led the Shah to dissolve the Majlis in May and rule by decree for nearly 2 years.

Majlis and Senate elections before 1963 frequently lasted for several weeks and sometimes for months because of the practice of allowing the Ministry of Interior officials in each electoral district to select different dates for elections. Voting now takes place on the same day all over the country.

In the August 1967 parliamentary elections about 3.5 million votes were cast for members of the Majlis, and the Senate and for representatives to the National Constituent Assembly, which amended the constitution provisions relating to succession to the throne.

The last parliamentary elections in July 1971 produced a voter turnout estimated by Iranian officials at nearly 5 million. This is probably somewhat inflated. The next elections should occur in the summer of 1975.

## D. National policies

### 1. Domestic policy (C)

The direction and content of Iran's domestic policy are determined by the Shah. Since 1961, the Shah has become increasingly obsessed with the social and economic modernization of his country. The embodiment of his drive toward modernization is the White Revolution, a program ultimately including 12 points: land reform; electoral reform; the Literacy Corps; the sale of government factories; nationalization of forests; profit sharing; the Health Corps; the Development and Extension Corps; the village court system; administrative and educational reform; regional development; and nationalization of water resources. The Shah is proud of the accomplishments of his program, but with each new step he seems even more anxious to speed up Iran's development. The reform program has changed the image of the Shah in most circles from one of a reactionary tyrant to one of a progressive monarch. Reform has also taken the steam out of opposition movements and has brought the government closer than ever before to the Iranian peasant.

The core of the Shah's program is land reform, which he regards as the key to further economic development and a wider base of political support. The first phase of the land reform program was enacted into law in January 1961, and it required the largest landowners to turn over to the government all their landholdings except for one rural village and its associated lands. The government then distributed ownership of the land to the peasants working it. The former landlords are being compensated with shares in government-owned factories or with government bonds paid over a 15-year period. Peasants who acquired land are paying the government for it, also over a 15-year period. Since the landlord traditionally supplied seeds, draft animals, water, and tools to the peasants, the government has begun to establish cooperative societies to insure that the peasants are not without these supplies and that they have some authority in each locality to guide them and promote modern agricultural practices. In February 1965, the government launched the second phase, under which landlords were told they could retain only a certain acreage—the amount varying according to location and fertility—and were required to turn the remainder over to the government for distribution to additional peasants.

In late 1971, the Shah announced that his land reform program was completed. The government reported in mid-1969 that the distribution phase had been completed in 54,183 villages or hamlets, with approximately 7,800 uncompleted. The legal settlement involved some 2.4 million farmers—about two-thirds of the agricultural labor force. It is not clear how many peasants still own their land—some apparently sold it back to the landlords—or what other complications have arisen in the distribution phase. Productivity apparently has not suffered, perhaps in large part because of favorable weather conditions. The final phase of land reform involved the expansion of rural cooperatives and increasing productivity, and was begun in January 1966. In 1972, the government claimed that almost 9,000 rural cooperatives had been established, with a total membership of 1.85 million. In 1968, the government established the Agricultural Development Fund of Iran to promote the development of large-scale, efficient agricultural organizations as a supplement to small farms. By early 1972, 27 farm corporations with 9,170 shareholders were operating in rural areas. In a further move to boost productivity private investment in agriculture has been exempt from taxation until 1980. The exemption applies only to those farms using modern techniques and thus favors the large agro-industrial units. The Plan and Budget Organization has allotted \$35.5 million for rural development for 1972-73.

As the land reform program unfolded, the Shah found that the illiteracy of the peasants was a major obstacle to their understanding and enjoying the full benefits of the scheme. To remedy this, he initiated the Literacy Corps in December 1962. This corps is composed of army conscripts who have graduated from secondary school or a university and who perform their military service by teaching peasants to read and write. The program is considered the most successful of the Shah's development concepts. By early 1971 over 71,000 military conscripts had served as literacy corpsmen in Iranian villages and had taught more than 2 million Iranians. Before the inception of the corps, only 8% of the rural population had received any education, but by 1967 the percentage was 20% and was continuing to rise. In a move aimed primarily at urban illiteracy, the government in 1969 proposed that each literate Iranian be required to spend several hours a week teaching anti-illiteracy courses for 6 months or to teach one illiterate to

read and write. The alternative would be to pay the price for the education of one illiterate—approximately \$144. There is no recent information on the progress of this program.

Because the literacy corpsmen originally were spending much of their time in health and economic development activities, a Health Corps was formed in 1964 and a Development Corps in 1965 to relieve them of these subordinate burdens. The Health Corps consists of physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and medical assistants who are military conscripts and who are assigned to work in close cooperation with village councils to improve health and hygiene through lectures, films, practical demonstrations, and treatment. In 1971 about 2,500 were serving in the corps. Although the Health Corps probably is not as effective as permanently staffed medical facilities in the villages, it has represented a significant step forward for Iran.

The Development and Extension Corps numbered about 6,000 persons in 1971. The corpsmen are also military conscripts who go out into villages to teach modern agricultural techniques and help establish cooperatives. They are thus closely related to the land reform program.

In an attempt to involve the urban worker in the reform program, the government in January 1963 initiated an industrial profit-sharing scheme in which workers were to obtain up to a 20% share in the profits of their factories. Employers under the plan were required to sign collective agreements with worker representatives aimed at encouraging productivity, cutting costs, and reducing waste so that part of any increase in profits could be passed on to the workers in the form of income. The program has been criticized as having very limited success with the workers. A sampling of about one-third of the agreements signed indicated that the average bonus accruing to individual workers was only approximately \$32.00 per year—far short of the 20% allowed by law. A Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs official said at that time that his ministry tried to be responsive to worker complaints but carefully geared its policies to avoid discouraging management. Part of the problem is the reluctance of corporations to reveal their true profit picture.

To increase public, as well as foreign, confidence in the government and to try to keep funds flowing into the programs rather than into the pockets of the administrators, the Shah in 1961 inaugurated an anticorruption campaign. High civilian and mili-

tary officials, including some who were thought of as friends of the Shah, were jailed and charged with corruption in office. Although most were acquitted after lengthy court proceedings, the exercise served to warn officials throughout the hierarchy that the Shah was serious about stamping out blatant misuse of government funds and materials. However, in recent years there has been a new upsurge of accusations of corrupt practices among high officials but no renewal of the anticorruption campaign.

The demands on the government created by all the new programs initiated in the last 10 years produced clear evidence of the inefficiency of the government bureaucracy at all levels. Although steps had been taken by many ministries to streamline their procedures in hopes of pleasing the Shah, it was not until late 1967 that administrative reform was officially declared a tenet of the White Revolution. In 1968, the Shah reintroduced an Imperial Inspectorate to hear and act on public complaints against the bureaucracy. In addition, committees have been set up in the ministries to oversee administrative reform, and inspection teams have been dispatched to the provinces to study administrative procedures there and to hear public complaints. Despite some public cynicism and the resistance of the entrenched civil servants, slow progress is being made both in improving administrative procedures and in recruiting more highly qualified bureaucrats.

In 1967, reform of higher education was added to the development program, and yearly education conferences have been held ever since. A separate Ministry of Science and Higher Education was established aimed at improving higher education, promoting more independent research, and turning out greater numbers of vocational and technical personnel to help in implementing other facets of the reform program. In 1968, the government announced the beginning of a thorough overhaul of the university system and began by replacing all university chancellors. In 1971, the government turned its attention to elementary and secondary school teachers. About \$6 million was allotted to provide bonuses, promotions, advanced training, and housing.

To reduce the manipulation of elections on the local level and to enable the peasants to make their votes more effective, reforms in voting procedures were initiated in 1963, involving registration and the use of voting cards.

Further steps toward equal rights for women were taken in 1967 through passage of the Family Protection Law. Under the law, unilateral divorce action by husbands is no longer possible, and women may initiate divorce proceedings. The law also provides for the protection of any children involved in a divorce action. A man must now gain court approval before he can forbid his wife to seek outside employment. If the first wife does not agree to her husband's second marriage, she may use it as grounds for divorce.

As the Shah's reform program became an accepted part of national policy and moved into the "nuts-and-bolts" phase of implementation, some of the initial zeal was lost. Nevertheless, steady progress has been made in many phases of the program. At the very least, the program has probably improved the attitude of the rural population toward the government and increased the popularity of the Shah. Some opposition to the program still exists—particularly in the conservative religious community—but it is largely silent. In the case of the Family Protection Law of 1967, the original bill has been modified to avoid pressing social reform more quickly than the public is willing to accept. Some features of the program, on the other hand, tend to generate pressure for additional change. In general, an attitude of progress and hope for the future seems to be pervading even previously isolated villages—an attitude that bodes well for the regime only if progress continues.

## 2. Foreign policy (S)

For much of its history Iran has been under the predominant influence of foreign powers. An important principle of the Shah's policy and one which he inherited from his father, Reza Shah, has been to rid Iran of this influence and to assert the country's political, economic and to some extent military independence. In terms of international politics this has meant maintaining more of a balance between East and West. While remaining committed to the West, the Shah has allowed the development of contacts with the Soviet Union and East Europe and has established relations with Communist China and Albania. While looking to the West for aid, he has fostered economic relations with the Communist bloc. While relying for external security of the United States and on the CENTO alliance, he has bought some military equipment from the Soviet Union. His fear of Soviet military aggres-

sion has been displaced to a large extent by his belief that radical Arab forces—particularly those in Iraq—have designs on the Persian Gulf and on the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. The Shah doubts that the United States would defend him in case of a regional conflict not involving a Communist nation, and he is determined to line up other sources of support and supply in the Communist world, in Western Europe, among the moderate Arab states, and in South Asia.

Iranian-Soviet relations began to improve in September 1962, when Moscow accepted the Shah's pledge not to permit the establishment of foreign missile bases on Iranian soil and shelved its policy of open diplomatic and propaganda pressure to overthrow his regime. The real turning point, however, came in 1966, when, after the Shah's visit to Moscow, the U.S.S.R. agreed to extend a credit equal to \$289 million toward building a long-sought steel mill and related projects. Part of the credit is being used to build a machine manufacturing plant and to construct a pipeline to carry Iranian natural gas to the U.S.S.R. as payment for this and subsequent credits; deliveries of natural gas began in late 1970. Soviet economic aid has thus become a major factor in Iranian economic development. Plans were outlined in late 1969 for longer term cooperation in oil, gas and other industries over the next 12-15 years, and there are more than 1,500 Soviet economic experts in Iran. Soviet and East European aid commitments total over \$1 billion, compared with a total Western commitment of nearly \$2 billion. There have been signs, however, of Iranian dissatisfaction with industrial projects established under Soviet and East European credits and in some cases, such as the Soviet-built engineering factory, the Iranians are seeking alternative participation by Western industry. In future barter deals the Iranians may be inclined to look for Communist bloc goods in preference to projects.

Iranian-Soviet trade has also developed. By 1969 the Soviet Union had already become the largest importer of Iranian exports other than oil. Iranian imports from the Soviet Union have increased markedly in recent years, and mutual trade will almost certainly continue to grow—a 5-year trade agreement was signed in 1970—with the stimulus of aid projects and the flow of Iranian natural gas exports.

The first arms contracts with the Soviet Union were concluded in 1967 and comprised ground-



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force equipment such as antiaircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles. In 1969 the Iranian Army ordered a large quantity of 130-mm field guns, for which special training is also being provided. Soviet military credits extended to date total about \$325 million and are being repaid in natural gas, which has been flared in the past. This easy form of payment, along with the fact that interest rates run as low as 2.5%, will probably encourage further Iranian purchases, though not of major items such as airplanes and tanks, which would lead to an unacceptable level of Soviet influence within the armed forces. The expansion of economic ties with the Soviet Union has also had political benefits. It has to some extent appeased the neutralist and xenophobic sentiments of some Iranians who believed that their country was overly committed to the West, and the policy is believed to be well received by most other Iranians as well.

Nevertheless, the Shah is aware that the rapprochement involves a Soviet effort to gain influence in Iran and that the U.S.S.R. is basically opposed to his monarchy. He often mentions that the Communist propaganda beamed by clandestine radio stations outside Iran continues to criticize his regime and serves as the real measure of Soviet friendship. The numerous Soviet advisers and technicians in Iran with various economic and military projects are closely watched by Iranian security and intelligence forces, and the number of students sent by Iran to Communist countries for training has been strictly limited. The Shah is also concerned over Soviet involvement with the radical Arab states and over the possibility of Soviet incursions into the Persian Gulf region. In essence, he is attempting to gain the economic and political benefits of association with the U.S.S.R., while continuing to strive against increased Soviet influence in his region.

Iran has signed two treaties with the U.S.S.R.: those of 1921 and of 1927. Under the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 26 February 1921, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic reserved the right of armed intervention if Russian counterrevolutionaries or a third power attempted to use Iranian territory for military operations against it. In the 1 October 1927 Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality, the U.S.S.R. and Iran agreed that neither would enter into any alliance directed against the security and independence of the other. Iran considers that these two treaties have been abrogated by Soviet actions in Iran during and after World

War II, but the U.S.S.R. has issued periodic reminders that it regards them as still valid.

Notwithstanding his detente with the Soviet Union, the Shah is in no doubt that Iran's natural and most vital alignment is with the West. Revenues from the oil consortium of major Western oil companies constitute the main part of Iran's income in foreign exchange, the West supplies all major items of military equipment and the training for its armed forces, and the support of the United States and of the CENTO alliance is a major deterrent to a possible Communist threat to Iranian territorial integrity.

Iran's relationship with the United States, like that with the U.S.S.R., has also undergone a subtle change since 1965. Constantly rising Iranian oil revenues, improving agricultural output, the expanding economy, and the availability of outside credits have all served to reduce Iran's economic and psychological dependence on the United States. Although the Shah still regards the United States as his country's best friend, the self-confidence he has gained domestically has encouraged him to seek a broader role for himself and his country. The U.S. economic aid program in Iran ended by mutual agreement in November 1967, but Iran continues to purchase most of its sophisticated military equipment in the United States, and the Export-Import Bank underwrites some private U.S. investment.

The United States concluded a bilateral defense agreement in March 1959 with each of the Middle East members of CENTO, including Iran. The agreement, which is specifically tied to the 1957 Joint Congressional Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East (the Eisenhower Doctrine), says that the U.S. Government, in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, will take "such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon" in the case of Communist aggression against Iran.

In the period 1946-71, the United States provided almost \$2.6 billion in government loans and credits. The Military Assistance Program totaled \$1.1 billion, of which \$504 million were loans advanced (\$141 million has been repaid), and additional military aid has been extended. Military credit sales to Iran of \$140 million and \$200 million have been authorized for FY72 and FY73. Total U.S. private direct investment in Iran is estimated at about \$600 million (including petroleum). There are more than 2,000 official Americans in Iran, including dependents, and more than 10,000 private Americans.

Since 1965 the Shah's major foreign policy pre-occupation has been the security of the Persian Gulf and southwestern Iran. The Shah is convinced that radical Arab elements are attempting to undermine Iranian authority in the gulf and to foment subversion in the Province of Khuzestan, which has a large number of ethnic Arabs. The British withdrawal of its military forces from the Persian Gulf at the end of 1971 focused the Shah's concern on that area even more sharply. In November, immediately after the British withdrawal, Iranian forces moved into the islands of Abu Musa (Jazireh-ye Abu Musa—Persian) and the Tunbs (Jazireh-ye Tonbe Bozorg—Persian). Abu Musa was divided between Iran and Sharjah by prior agreement with the Sheikh of Sharjah. The two Tunbs, however, were seized outright, and the Arab inhabitants were expelled; the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah had refused to come to any prior understanding with the Shah.

The Shah's assertive policy in the gulf has brought him increasingly into confrontation with Iraq. Since Iraq's 1958 revolution, relations between Tehran and Baghdad have ranged from cool to openly hostile. Iran has supplied arms, money, and transit rights to the dissident Iraqi Kurds led by Mustafa Barzani and has looked for other ways to shake the government in Baghdad. In turn, Iraq has apparently permitted raids into Iran by pro-Iraqi Kurds and dissident Iranian Kurds resident in Iraq. Iraq also has reportedly assisted members of the Khuzestan Liberation Front, which is composed of dissident Iranian Arabs who want to liberate that province. Another longstanding problem between the two countries involves the division of the waters of the Shatt al Arab, the river which separates Iran and Iraq in the south. Iran has long chafed under the terms of the 1937 treaty, which, except for two places upstream, sets the boundary on the Iranian bank at low water, and Iran has repeatedly sought to have the treaty renegotiated. The issue was revived again in 1969, when Iraq sought to enforce its rights in the river, and Iran responded by renouncing the treaty and staging a massive military buildup along the shore. The Iranian show of force was designed not only to force a new treaty but probably to serve notice that Iran has the will and the power to play the major role in the area.

Relations between the two countries were severely strained during the latter part of 1971 and early 1972 with the large-scale expulsions of Iranian residents from Iraq (Figure 5). From November to

January, some 60,000 Iranians were sent across the border. Iranians reacted with restraint, however, and began a vigorous repatriation program for the refugees.

Iran is not directly concerned in the Arab-Israeli confrontation, in which the Shah's position has been one of fence sitting. Until fairly recently the Shah tended to regard the continuing conflict as being to Iran's advantage. He felt that by occupying the Arabs in the west, the conflict gave Iran a freer hand to pursue its interests in the Persian Gulf. With the establishment in the late 1950's of offices (diplomatic missions in all but name) by Iran and Israel in each other's country, extensive commercial links—e.g., in oil—were developed between them. There also has been a significant degree of cooperation between them in the intelligence field and in military matters, including high-level contacts and Iranian purchases of Israeli arms. During 1970, however, public statements by the Shah contained condemnation of Israeli intransigence and aggression, and for the first time since 1960 diplomatic relations were established between Iran and Egypt. The motives for this shift are complex, but it should be seen against the Shah's concern for stability in the gulf and his fears of a Soviet-backed threat to this stability through Iraq. The Shah seems to have come to see the danger of Soviet penetration and subversion, facilitated by the Middle East conflict, as a greater threat to Iran's long-term position than the maneuverings of Iraq and the radical Arabs alone. Furthermore if Iran is to achieve some measure of cooperation with Arab States in the gulf, the country must not be perceived as completely isolated from Arab policies. The Shah probably sees Iran's warming relationship with Egypt as the key to relationships in other parts of the Arab world and, in view of present conditions of antipathy between Egypt and Iraq, as a means of increasing the latter's political isolation.

Iran has attempted, for the most part, to maintain a carefully correct attitude toward Afghanistan, but there are longstanding sources of dispute. Despite Iran's improved relations with the U.S.S.R., Iranian officials continue to be concerned over Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Another issue is the division of the water of the Helmand river, which flows from Afghanistan into Iran and which has been dammed by Afghanistan for irrigation purposes. The two countries make periodic efforts to resolve this problem, and in late 1972 announced



FIGURE 5. A refugee camp set up by the Red Lion and Sun Society to house Iraqi deportees prior to repatriation (U/OU)

that an agreement was at hand. Recently, however, the Shah has become convinced that the U.S.S.R., India, and Afghanistan were seeking the breakup of Pakistan and, to this end, were fomenting dissent among Baluchi and Pathan groups in Pakistan, with repercussions among Iranian Baluchis.

Iranian relations with Turkey and Pakistan have long been very good. In 1964, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan formed an organization called the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), for the purpose of creating closer cooperation among the three nations in economic and cultural fields. In July 1965, they established a joint maritime transport company and agreed to cooperate in oil exploration and in the establishment of a joint airline. Not much has been done to implement these or other subsequently agreed projects, but the organization remains a nonmilitary symbol of close relations among the three countries. Iran supported Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and was, until 1967, a staunch ally. Relations became somewhat strained when Pakistan gave whole-

hearted support to the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and when Pakistan seemed to be becoming more closely involved with the People's Republic of China. In 1969, however, after the resignation of President Ayub Khan, Iran was quick to recognize the successor government of Yahya Khan and moved to reinforce relations with a number of high-level visits. The Shah afforded Pakistan much moral support during its war with India in 1972; however, military assistance, which Yahya Khan had expected, was withheld, probably to avoid a confrontation with India and to foster the Shah's image as a peacemaker. In the postwar period, the Shah has moved even closer to Pakistan; he is apparently interested in preserving that country's integrity in the face of external threats.

Late in 1955, along with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, Iran signed the Baghdad Pact, which was designed to provide for regional defense against the U.S.S.R. and for regional economic development. The pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the

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withdrawal of Iraq in 1959. The United States has been an associate member of the pact and treaty group since 1956. Iran, as well as Pakistan and Turkey, has been irritated by the refusal of the United States and the United Kingdom to consider threats from non-Communist countries as falling within the purview of the CENTO alliance. Iran has tended to view the Soviet threat with much less alarm than it previously did and has often implied that it remained within CENTO only because there was no feasible alternative. At a foreign ministers meeting in 1969, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister said that his country no longer viewed the organization primarily as a shield against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is not likely that Iran will pull out of the organization, partly because of the economic benefits to be gained through membership and because the Shah is not completely ready to write off a possible Soviet military threat. In fact, by 1972, there was evidence that the Shah was placing increasing importance on CENTO, but in the context of an economic rather than a military alliance.

In 1971, Iran reversed its long-standing opposition to the People's Republic of China and established diplomatic relations with Peking. The move was followed by several exchanges of trade and cultural delegations and the withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese from Iran. There are, however, still trade ties between Taiwan and Tehran.

The Shah also has been attempting to expand his influence in various non-aligned and/or Western-oriented countries. He has visited Morocco, Tunisia, India, Malaysia, and Thailand, among other countries, and has expounded the virtues of his reform program with almost missionary zeal. He has particularly pressed Morocco's King Hassan to adopt a land reform program and has urged him to avoid entanglement with the Soviet Union.

In addition, the Shah apparently has set his sights on expanding his country's presence and influence into the Indian Ocean. He publicly put the world on notice of his intentions in an Iranian Navy Day speech in November 1972, when he said that world events compelled Iran to accept the fact that the Indian Ocean does not recognize borders. The security limits of Iran, he said, would be determined by the range of its air and sea forces, adding that the striking power of the Iranian Navy would be increased within the next 2 years (primarily by the addition of two U.S.-built guided missile destroyers and two British-built destroyer

escorts). Ultimately, this expansion of Iranian interests into the Indian Ocean opens the possibility of a clash with Indian ambitions.

Iran has been a member of the United Nations since 1945, has paid its dues, and has usually supported the policies of the United States in the various U.N. bodies. The Shah has praised the organization as valuable for preserving peace and has similarly supported its efforts toward disarmament and nuclear weapons control. Iran sends representatives to Afro-Asian conferences, where it has usually supported positions favorable to the United States. In general, Iran maintains relations with those governments of Africa, the Far East, and Latin America with which the United States has relations.

### 3. Defense policy (S)

Iran seeks to maintain a military strength sufficient to meet a limited war situation involving aggressive operations launched from another state in the area against either Iran or its interests in the Persian Gulf. In the event of a major invasion by a greatly superior force, Iran could fight only a delaying action until U.S. and allied forces arrive. However, no state in the area except the U.S.S.R. now offers a credible threat to Iran.

The Shah, who takes a special interest in Iran's defense policy, is quite knowledgeable of military matters. He has an insatiable appetite for equipment of the most modern type, which is sometimes beyond the capability of his forces to absorb. He believes in large, well-equipped military forces, not only for deterring neighboring states from infringing on Iran's interests but also for preserving internal security.

Since 1965, the Shah's major interest has been in building up his defenses in southwestern and also southeastern Iran and in creating defenses for the Persian Gulf. He is particularly anxious to increase the strength of the navy and the air force. The Shah, aware that he cannot depend on the U.S. to intervene on his behalf in local conflicts, intends to insure that Iran has adequate military supplies on hand in the event that shipments are shut off during a regional conflict directly involving Iran. Therefore, since 1966 he has ended the virtual U.S. monopoly on arms supplies to Iran and has purchased naval and other equipment from the United Kingdom, concluded an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the supply of substantial quantities of equip-

ment and unsophisticated weapons, and made smaller purchases in West Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, the United States remains his major source of supply—particularly for the sophisticated air force equipment in which he is so interested.

Although the Shah plays lipservice to CENTO and the United Nations as possible sources of military support for Iran in the event of need, he relies on the United States for defense against the U.S.S.R. and Communist-inspired aggression and on his own resources in the case of local defense problems with the Arab states, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. The Shah does not rely on fellow Muslims outside of Iran to come to the country's defense, although he might make an appeal to them in time of crisis in the hope of receiving some marginal support—as, for example, from the Shia Muslims in Iraq.

The traditionally unfavorable public image of the army as a collector of taxes and as a plague on any area in which it is stationed has been gradually changing. This results from the army's civic action program, under which members of the armed forces assist in rural development projects. Also, the better educated conscripts who are placed in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps have made a favorable impression in rural areas.

Civil defense policy for Iran is largely made through CENTO, whose Council of Civil Defense Experts reviews and coordinates the plans of regional members. The Iranian Government has formulated an elaborate civil defense plan to protect the population in the event of an attack, but the system has not gone far beyond the planning stage. The program calls for the cooperation of various governmental agencies, particularly the army and the police, but none of these has given its civil defense assignment any priority.

## **E. Threats to government stability**

### **1. Discontent and dissidence (U/OU)**

Iran is going through a period of transition from an agricultural, semifeudal society and economy to an industrialized and modernized social and economic system. The pace of change is deliberately forced by the Shah, not only to convince public opinion that his regime is the only alternative but also to complete the transition in his lifetime. The Shah's commitment to social and economic development, however, is not matched by an equal commitment to political development. He keeps a tight

rein on political activity and it is probably here that the seeds for any popular dissidence lie.

For most of the post-World War II period, opposition to the Shah's regime has come from members of the Communist Party and from disparate groups of non-Communist nationalists. Except on rare occasions when a specific issue, e.g., oil nationalization, united them, their common but somewhat nebulous demands have revolved around "social justice" for the peasants and the workers. Most of this opposition was composed neither of peasants nor of workers, but rather of foreign-educated intellectuals. The Communists did, indeed, include some activists with a genuine proletarian background, but many were Soviet-trained, professional revolutionaries.

The peasants were apathetic and unorganizable. The scattered nature of village life, poor communications, and the lack of a common ground between the peasants and the intellectuals vitiated the few efforts which were made to arouse the peasants. Concentrations of industrial workers were few, and only in the oil industry were the Communists able to have some success. Opposition activity was effectively suppressed by the security forces through arrests, threats, and intimidation. Probably more important, however, was the undermining by the Shah of the philosophical foundations of the opposition, which alone could have provided a rationale for continued underground opposition. The Shah's reform program preempted for the regime and put into effect nearly everything which oppositionists had been demanding for decades.

The new strains inherent in rapid modernization have not so far produced the degree of tension which might lead to action against the government. The transformation of landless peasants into landowning farmers and the generally successful attempts to bring literacy, medical care, and development projects into the villages are still producing benefits to large numbers of people. There are, however, several million agricultural workers—transient labor in effect—who were not affected by land reform. Many of these have moved to urban areas to look for work and have joined the substantial number of unskilled and unemployed who are increasingly concentrating in the cities. Other landless agricultural workers are still continuing to try to make a livelihood in the rural areas. The disparity between the landless and the newly landed agriculturalist is likely to increase and to bear the seeds of future conflict.

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Perhaps the greatest potential threat to the Shah's regime over the long run comes from the same source as the earlier opposition, the educated middle class. For more than two decades an important factor in the opposition of the educated to the Shah's regime was the inability of many university and secondary school graduates to find a job commensurate with their training. This resulted in a substantial brain-drain. Those who were able to go abroad and stay did so, while many who were forced to remain in Iran and find what employment they could added to the dissatisfied element in the country. The expanding economy, new industry, and additional bureaucracy which have resulted from the reform programs have provided new career opportunities for graduates and persuaded many Iranians to return from abroad. At the same time, the favorable prospects for useful careers have tended to mute dissatisfaction with the lack of real political freedom. The activity carried on by the three approved parties is circumscribed and is unlikely to serve in the long run as a substitute for more untrammelled activity. As the growing mass of educated become more secure economically and socially, the demand for a greater voice in political decisions is likely to grow. Nevertheless, there is substantial opposition to the Shah among university students, both in Iran and abroad.

Traditional sources of discontent, the tribes, have been little heard from in recent years. The Turkish-speaking Qashqai tribes of Fars Province, the Bakhtiari of Esfahan and Khuzestan, and the Kurdish tribes of the west and northwest of the country have all been in a position to challenge the government. However, the penetration of the Tehran bureaucracy and security forces into hitherto inaccessible areas has succeeded in neutralizing these tribes as a political or paramilitary force. Government health, education and settlement programs have had some success in persuading tribesmen to give up their traditional seminomadic existence, but tribalism as a way of life will continue for many years but without presenting a threat to government stability. Only among the Baluchi tribes are conditions in general bad enough to arouse much antigovernment sentiment, but the scattered and unorganized nature of the tribes makes effective action against the government unlikely without substantial outside aid.

Much of the religious establishment has strongly opposed the Shah and his programs without, how-

ever, constituting a well-organized threat to the regime. This opposition has a religious as well as a practical basis. In Shia theology any ruler who does not submit to the direction of the religious leaders is illegitimate. In addition, the secularization of national life, which started under Reza Shah, has removed the religious leaders from their functions as teachers and as judges. Moreover, the present Shah's land reform program has deprived the clergy of much of the income which it had enjoyed from endowed lands. The extensive contact which the religious leaders maintain with the population as a whole gives them access to all levels of Iranian society. Information is lacking, however, on the extent or effectiveness of any anti-government activities which they may carry on. Clergymen preaching against the government from the pulpit have been arrested.

## 2. Subversion

### a. Communist subversion (C)

Knowledge of the current status of the Tudeh (Masses) Party in Iran is sketchy. This venerable party, which for decades was the main vehicle for Communist activity and subversion in the country, has been neutralized to a large extent by the security forces. Externally, where it still remains organized, the party has been split between the orthodox, old guard who follow Moscow, and thus now downplay violent opposition to the Shah, and the hard-line revolutionaries, vaguely dubbed "Maoist," who favor the currently popular line of armed rebellion, bombings, assassinations, and bank robberies.

Communism had its beginnings in Iran when the Adalat (Justice) Party was established after World War I. It grew steadily until 1931, when Adalat was banned because of its Communist affiliations. The party was active clandestinely until 1937, when Reza Shah arrested and jailed many of its leaders.

In 1941, U.K. and Soviet troops occupied Iran and freed all political prisoners, including the Communists. The freed Communist leaders immediately resumed their efforts to weaken the central government. In October 1941 they formed the Tudeh Party to organize workers and intellectuals, using a labor federation, the Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU), as the dynamic force behind the party.

During the 1940's and 1950's some 20 Communist-front organizations were formed to work with

tradesmen, women, farmers, children, and Armenians. In 1944, eight Tudeh members were elected to the 14th Majlis, and for 3 months in 1946 the Iranian Cabinet included three Tudeh members. During their brief tenure, the three Tudeh ministers secured the discharge of more than 300 anti-Tudeh civil servants, but these were reinstated in late 1946.

In 1945, under the protection of Soviet occupation troops in Azarbaijan, the Communist Party set up two autonomous puppet republics there. Under Western and U.N. pressure, however, after about a year the Soviets left the area, abandoning the Communist republics, which then collapsed.

An attempt to assassinate the Shah in 1949 caused the Iranian Government to proscribe the Tudeh, and it has been underground ever since. The party resumed overt activities in 1953, when Prime Minister Mosadeq, while not openly accepting or recognizing it, permitted the Tudeh to back him. After Mosadeq's fall in 1953, the security forces again arrested or deported thousands of Communists, but the key leaders still remained free. During the early 1950's, the party infiltrated the army, maintained a strong antigovernment propaganda campaign, and helped the Communists in Iraq. In 1954, a Communist ring in the army was exposed, and over 500 officers were arrested and tried. There have been several incidents involving Communists in the 1960's, but the Tudeh has not shown any marked increase in its activities.

In early 1973 the Iranian Communists lacked domestic organization and, to some degree, issues. Security agencies had arrested and scattered the leaders, and the White Revolution was dedicated to accomplishing many of the reforms the Communists had been advocating. Improved relations with the Soviet Union had curtailed the harsh radio agitation that was common for so many years. Radio and newspaper campaigns were still being conducted out of the country by Iranian Communists but without visible effect.

At present, the Tudeh Party probably exists inside Iran only in isolated underground units, which appear heavily infiltrated by SAVAK. The main centers of the party inside Iran remain the same as in the past, with perhaps greater emphasis on locations outside of Tehran. These centers are Tehran, Tabriz and Azarbaijan, Abadan and the oil district, Shiraz, and Esfahan. Estimates of party membership vary widely, with figures between 500 and 4,500 members most frequently cited. In addition,

the party probably enjoys the latent support of some workers and intellectuals.

Top Tudeh Party leadership has been outside the country for many years, and apparently little direction is exerted by the leaders over the members in Iran. The expatriate organization consists of about 400 members, including families of the fugitives and new recruits from among Iranian students in Europe. Although concentrated in the U.S.S.R., East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, the Tudeh Party exiles move about freely in both Eastern and Western Europe. Some members have found employment in such organizations as the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions and the International Union of Students; others are known to be teaching in the Communist countries. Most of the Tudeh Party leaders abroad are veteran party members, hardened by prison terms and experienced in staff planning for clandestine operations.

The already weak organization has been further split by internal disagreements. The Tudeh is under orders from Moscow to avoid criticism of the Shah and his regime and to stress the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement. Even the pro-Moscow younger elements in the party chafe at this restriction and regard the old-line leaders as too tired and cautious. A deeper rift has been reported between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups. In 1966 two central committee members were expelled for supporting the Chinese. Again, in 1972, the party's first secretary, Reza Radmanesh, who first held the post in 1948, was removed for "adventurism," specifically for being implicated in General Bakhtiar's plot to overthrow the Shah.

In theory, the Tudeh follows the typical Communist Party organization, with division into cells under district and provincial committees, which in turn are answerable to the Central Committee and the party congress. The nominal power of the Tudeh Party resides in the party congress, to which delegates are elected. Party statutes call for a congress every 2 years, but only two have ever been held—in 1944 and 1948. Since 1960, plans for a third congress have been mentioned, but generally with the caveat that the party organization needs to be revitalized first. The actual directing body of the party is the Central Committee, which apparently meets regularly in plenary sessions and has an Executive Committee to handle party matters in the intervals between plenary sessions. The party is currently controlled by First Secretary Iraj Eskan-

dari and Abul Samad Kambaksh, whose party activity goes back to the 1930's and the 1920's respectively.

The current party line is explained in recent statements such as: "Emphasize organizational principles—decentralization, combination of covert and overt operation, greater preference for quality rather than quantity, and observation of the rules governing underground activity." Party members are warned that "revolutionary conditions have not yet been created in the country," and therefore their duty is "to struggle for democratic rights and freedoms . . . participate in trade union activity . . . convert the peoples struggle for their rights into political activity." They are warned against "emotionalism and false revolutionaryism, leftist, adventurist and provocative actions."

The main means for disseminating the Tudeh message is the radio program *Peyk-e-Iran* (The Messenger of Iran), which is broadcast from Sofia, Bulgaria, in Persian, Azarbaijani, and Kurdish. The Tudeh Party also issues two regular publications from East Germany: the four-page newspaper *Mardom* (People), which generally appears monthly but sometimes at more frequent intervals, and the more elaborate quarterly periodical *Donya* (World). *Mardom* is the official paper of the party. It carries statements and communiqués of the Central Committee, articles counseling members in Iran on agitation and tactics, and gives the Communist slant on international news. *Donya* is a theoretical journal which discusses party policy, Communist meetings, and international affairs and their relation to Iran.

Although Soviet diplomacy in Iran is basically aimed at creating conditions favorable to communism, the U.S.S.R.'s flexibility is such that there is no direct correlation between the degree of tension prevailing between the two countries and the extent of Soviet subversive activities. Thus, ostensibly friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Iran have not entailed Soviet withdrawal of agents or of support for local Communists. Similarly, stringent suppression of Communists by Iran does not result in increased tension with the Soviet Union.

The Tudeh Party has been represented at most major international Communist congresses and anniversaries. Exchanges of messages are regularly reported by Tudeh and Communist broadcasts. Beyond this, the Tudeh apparently has no significant international contacts at present. There is no coordination of activities with other Communist par-

ties in the Middle East and no serious effort to keep in touch with pro-Communist international organizations.

Information on party financing is scanty, and there has been no recent evidence of centralized financial management. At one time the party reportedly was receiving money from unidentified sources abroad in batches of \$500 for easy convertibility. Other funds are probably derived from membership dues and the sale of publications. Some Tudeh Party members abroad may receive support from the Communist parties of the countries in which they are living. Direct financing by the U.S.S.R. of the party within Iran has been reported in past years, but current information is not available.

#### b. Students (S)

For two decades students have been a source of difficulty to the government. Both the Communists and the non-Communist nationalists have found the student body at the universities, especially the University of Tehran, a fruitful recruiting ground for members and supporters of antigovernment organizations, although normally only a small number of the total student enrollment was engaged in such activities. In recent years the increasing control of the security forces and the lack of emotional issues have brought general quiet to the universities. The National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) maintains offices and informers on the campus and appears effective in detecting and countering subversive activities. Government-sponsored student organizations have been established to occupy extra student time, although these organizations do not appear to be popular.

The occasional student demonstration nowadays is usually connected with a specific minor grievance, such as a change in bus schedules which was seen as a hardship on commuting students (1970), or a protest over the long deteriorating academic conditions at Abadan Institute of Technology (1971). The most serious demonstrations with political overtones took place at the University of Tehran and Aryamehr University in May 1971. At that time a large number of students demonstrated to protest the jailing of other students, some for participating in the guerrilla attack on a gendarmerie post. Slogans denounced the Shah and the White Revolution and praised the guerrillas and the murderer of a military court prosecutor. Security forces reacted roughly, occupying the campuses, breaking heads, and jailing protestors.



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The major antigovernment student organization operating outside Iran is the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), which includes opposition elements of every stripe and which maintains organizations in each country where there is a sizable community of Iranian students. In the United States the Iranian Student Association (ISA) is affiliated with the CIS. Similar organizations are found in Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Turkey. The Iranian organizations often cooperate with other national student groups, such as the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Association of Greek Students, and Arab student groups, in joint demonstrations against the officials and installations of their respective governments.

### 3. Insurgency (U/OU)

Most insurgent activity in Iran over the past 25 years has come from the tribes, notably the Kurds, the Bakhtiari, and the Qashqai. These were mainly attempts by the tribes to obtain for themselves freedom from government control and interference. Most of this activity took place in the late 1940's and early 1950's and resulted gradually in the extension of government control into tribal areas and the erosion of the influence of traditional tribal chieftans. The most serious insurgent effort was in 1946, when, with support of the Soviets who were then occupying northern Iran, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the Mahabad Republic (Kurdish) were formed. Both collapsed after a year when Soviet troops withdrew and central government forces reasserted control.

#### a. Communist

Little is known of the revolutionary Communists—those who reject the current Tudeh party line in favor of violent action. In March 1971 an armed group attacked a gendarmerie post in the Caspian Province of Gilan. They were driven off and in the subsequent pursuit several were killed. Thirteen of those who were captured were executed shortly thereafter. Official spokesmen announced that the group had planned nationwide activities of urban and rural guerrilla warfare, assassinations, and thefts. The group was allegedly connected with Iranian Communists operating from Iraq. Since that time several groups described as pro-Peking (although direct Chinese links are not obvious) have been reported, usually when the security authorities make arrests or have a shootout.

One such group, the Tudeh Party Revolutionary Organization, may have been started in Europe as early as 1962 and is allegedly headed by a former Tudeh Party Central Committee member. Another organization, known as the Marxist-Leninist Tufan (Storm) Organization, led by two expelled Tudeh Party Central Committee members, also operates from Europe. The Revolutionary Organization publishes two papers, *Tudeh* (Masses) and *Setareh-ye-Sorkh* (Red Star). The Tufan Organization publishes a paper of the same name. It is not clear if any of the various groups of terrorists apprehended in recent years in Iran have any direct connection with either of these two organizations.

#### b. Non-Communist

There are no non-Communist organizations in a position to challenge the government. One troublesome group, however, is the Freedom Movement, which has engaged in sabotage and in skirmishes with the police. It is a conservative guerrilla and terrorist organization with support from some religious elements and bazaar merchants. In addition, the Iraqi Government has sponsored bands of dissident Iranians and encouraged them to raid into Iran, but with limited success. Baghdad has also sponsored a Khuzestan Liberation Front, to promote separatist sentiments among Iranian Arabs, and a Baluchi Liberation Front for the Baluchi tribes of southeastern Iran. Neither appears to have had any success. The Iranian Government is aware, however, of potential difficulties in these areas and is paying particular attention to economic development there.

### F. Maintenance of internal security (C)

There are several organizations in Iran, both civilian and military, concerned with maintenance of public order (Figure 6). All are under the direct control of the Shah, who relies heavily on both the military and the civilian security forces for his base of power. The Shah encourages rivalry among the forces as a security measure. He also frequently bypasses the official chain of command in making appointments and in exercising his own authority. All of the services are organized on a national level with very little regional or local autonomy. Overlapping responsibilities in reporting antiregime activity and enforcing the narcotics law has led to competition. In addition, there have been jurisdictional disputes between the security forces.




FIGURE 6. Principal forces for the maintenance of order (C)

Nevertheless, the fact that top leaders of both the police and gendarmerie are drawn from the armed forces simplifies liaison. On both the national and local levels, leaders of the various security forces meet periodically to review operations, usually in the presence of such persons as the Minister of Interior, the provincial governor general, or the district governor. In addition, members of the security services share training facilities.

**I. Security forces**

*a. Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie*

The largest of the nonmilitary security organizations is the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. It consists of about 70,000 men, including a 16,000 Border Guard and aviation and naval battalions. The Border Guard, an army responsibility prior to 1963, has been fully integrated into the gendarmerie and now is a branch of that service. Directly subordinate to the gendarmerie is the National Resistance Forces, an indigenous militia force capable of providing village defense and early warning of insurgency or conventional attack. The gendarmerie

is responsible, under the Ministry of the Interior, for the protection of the rural areas and small towns and villages of fewer than 5,000 persons. Its area of authority encompasses more than 80% of the national territory and 75% of the population. Its major missions are to provide police protection, maintain internal security, enforce judicial decrees in the rural areas, act as an adjunct to the army in time of national emergency, and suppress smuggling and traffic in narcotics. It conducts investigations on its own initiative and on the basis of complaints received from citizens. The gendarmerie also functions as a highway patrol along major arteries.

In addition to its law enforcement and security functions, the gendarmerie handles routine judicial and administrative affairs for the central government, such as issuing summonses and publishing decrees. In the villages it apprehends criminals, brings cases to trial, and, until the comprehensive legal reforms initiated in 1963 got underway, acted as judge, public prosecutor, and lawyer for the defense. At times it was the only legal governmental link or legal authority to settle disputes,

and its word was literally law. In some of the more remote areas, this condition was still true in 1970.

The gendarmerie is organized on a national scale. It is patterned along military lines, with the regiment as the main unit. Gendarmerie operations are conducted in 14 separate areas roughly corresponding to the political divisions of the country. In 10 of these areas there are district headquarters of gendarmerie which command two or more regiments; the other four areas report directly to central headquarters. By eliminating district headquarters from the command hierarchy in these four cases, national authorities maintain close supervision over areas traditionally troublesome because of tribal or minority disaffection.

Gendarmes are stationed in about 2,100 widely scattered posts. Traditionally, each post was located on a tower from which guards could keep watch on the countryside, but the towers have been replaced by modern blockhouses. Most posts are staffed by a group of from six to 12 men under the command of a sergeant or a lieutenant; some have fewer men. Gendarmes conduct regular patrol activities. Patrols sometimes consist of a platoon or a company and may be in the field for days or weeks before returning to headquarters.

The ranks of the gendarmes are comparable to those of the army in prestige and prerequisites. Officers, who constitute about 5% of the force, are with few exceptions army officers. The commander is selected by the Shah and officially appointed by the Minister of Interior.

Most of the enlisted gendarmes are volunteers recruited for a 5-year tour of duty from among those who have completed army conscription service. About 85% of them are literate. The gendarmerie enrolls some of its members in courses conducted by the army and the National Police, and it also maintains its own training facilities, centered at Tehran. Shortage of technical skills and lack of knowledge about modern police methods are continuing problems.

Promotion for enlisted men is based on length of service, ability, and the recommendations of their immediate commanders. The same system of promotions is used by the army and the National Police. A panel of examiners, appointed by the commanding general, must approve all promotions. The appointment of all senior officers must be approved by the Shah.

Improvement in the equipment and installations of the gendarmerie has been relatively rapid since 1950, when U.S. material support was extended under the Military Assistance Program. A gendarmerie radio network connects Tehran with all of the regimental and company headquarters, which are linked in turn with subordinate units—usually by messenger. The primary weapon of the force is the rifle. A pool of armored cars is maintained in Tehran for dispatch where needed. Jeeps and other motor vehicles are rarely possessed by units smaller than a company. The gendarmerie is being equipped with helicopters to improve its mobility along the borders, especially in connection with narcotics smuggling.

#### *b. Iranian National Police*

The Iranian National Police of about 28,000 men is, like the gendarmerie, organized along national lines. Its area of responsibility, however, covers mainly the urban areas—cities with over 5,000 population. The headquarters of the National Police is in Tehran. The entire force is commanded by the Chief of National Police, who exercises authority through the chiefs of police in the cities. The cities are divided into precincts, with boundaries based on the type of area and the incidence of crime. Each precinct has its own headquarters, the chief of which is under the city chief.

The national headquarters has a number of bureaus and sections, including those for intelligence, passports and nationality, traffic, criminal identification, personnel, prisons, criminal investigation, communications, police college, and fingerprints (about 6 million were on file in 1972). Additional sections handle government assignments and special cases for the national chief of police. The Tehran municipal police constitute a staff section of the national headquarters. In 1959 the Public Safety Division was established in the Ministry of the Interior to advise on organization and training affairs, the enforcement of narcotics laws, the control of public disorders, and the development and maintenance of communications systems.

The Intelligence and Operations Bureau—formerly the Information Bureau—of the Iranian National Police has the responsibility for investigating individuals and groups suspected of subversive activities. It also monitors the activities of foreigners in the cities.

The police consists of about 2,600 officers, 18,000 noncommissioned personnel, and 5,400 civilian em-

ployees. Recruits are accepted primarily from among literate former army conscripts between the ages of 19 and 23. The literacy qualification was not always met, nor was it uniformly high in the past, but by 1970 this requirement was met in almost all cases as the result of improved national educational opportunities. Recruitment procedures and qualifications for officers have been gradually raised, and women have been recruited since early 1967. Some officers come up from the ranks, but the majority are secondary school graduates; all are required to complete the training course offered at the Police Officers College, unless appointed for special professional work.

Salaries and promotions are based on the civil service system. Differences in background and in social and economic status between officers and patrolmen are marked, and the latter have little chance of rising above the noncommissioned ranks. Morale within the National Police is not high. Among other things, police officers resent the fact that army officers are usually transferred to fill top police posts. Promotions, subject to the nepotism and favoritism ingrained in Iranian culture, often have little relation to merit.

Since the reform programs of the early 1960's, vigorous attempts have been made to improve both the morale of the policemen and their image in the minds of the citizens. Pay, working conditions, and pensions have improved. When possible, patrolmen and junior officers are stationed in their home localities; senior officers are moved every few years. By 1970 the National Police, in addition to assisting the people in times of national disaster, were attempting to eliminate improper practices and unnecessary redtape in their administration. Moreover, they were being encouraged to interest the urban citizens in national political affairs and to advise them, particularly on election procedures.

Although special school and in-service training programs have been established over the past 25 years, well-trained policemen are still in the minority. The National Police depend upon radio and telephones for communication and are fairly well equipped, although maintenance of equipment and lack of technically trained personnel are continuing problems.

Because of the unusually high discretionary power possessed by the Iranian police, many businessmen and homeowners attempt to cultivate the

police in their vicinity, resulting in considerable corruption and inefficiency.

## 2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The Iranian Government is amply supplied with legal weapons with which to fight subversion and insurgency. The civil Penal Code, in effect since 1926, contains a section dealing with crimes against the security of the state. Espionage, treason, and aid to a foreign enemy, as well as rebellion and conspiracy against the Iranian Government, draw penalties ranging from a short imprisonment to death, depending upon how deeply the offender was involved. Political crimes, however, are rarely tried under the civil code. Normally, they are tried by courts martial under the Military Penal Code or under special legislation. The Military Justice and Penal Code, ratified in 1938, is designed primarily to cover offenses committed by members of the armed forces, but it has been interpreted as extending also to nonmilitary persons. This code provides harsh penalties for crimes against the security of the state; attempts on the life of the Shah and actions aimed at overthrowing the government are punishable by death. In 1931 the "Law Dealing with Opponents of the Country's Independence and Security" outlawed all genuine or disguised political organizations engaged in Communist activity or propaganda. In 1949, following an attempt to assassinate the Shah, the Tudeh Party and its labor front were banned for continuous conspiracy to violate the 1931 law. The 1957 "Law on Safeguarding Public Security" is a variation of a provision of the martial law act and permits detention on grounds of suspicion and provides for the establishment of security commissions empowered to take action outside the courts and to impose penalties contrary to penal codes.

Probably the most important and effective direct action undertaken by the government under this legal umbrella is that directed by the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), whose organization and duties are described in the separate chapter on Intelligence and Security. The law creating SAVAK in 1957 gives it responsibility for investigation of all crimes concerning public security that are defined in both penal codes and the law of 1931 and directs that all cases coming under this legislation will be tried by military tribunals. SAVAK makes a strenu-

ous effort to monitor all suspected activities and to conduct surveillance of all suspicious characters. Its reputation for ubiquity may exceed its actual capabilities, but it does infiltrate and keep close watch on any organization which might present a threat to the government as well as innocuous organizations where a stray critic of the regime might be dropped.

The gendarmerie is the first line of defense against insurgent activities along the borders and in rural areas. In recent years it has clashed several times with Iraqi-supported bands and has suffered casualties. To strengthen its capabilities for anti-insurgent operations, the gendarmerie maintains mobile strike forces which are more heavily armed than the normal force.

The gendarmerie performs its routine duties efficiently, but in the case of larger problems, such as extensive tribal unrest, it might have to call upon the armed forces for reinforcement. In general, the gendarmerie is viewed more favorably by the people in the area of its responsibility than are the armed forces, except perhaps in locations where the army is helping peasants with development projects.

The Iranian National Police stress preparations for the control of civil disturbances. In recent confrontations with crowds of demonstrators, the police have proved effective, if frequently brutal. Working conditions, pay, training, and administration are slowly improving, thus raising police morale and reducing the traditional tendency toward corruption. During the 2,500th anniversary celebrations in 1971, and President Nixon's visit in 1972, the National Police showed themselves to be an efficient and professional urban police force.

Since 1961 the Iranian Government has undertaken several programs which are indirectly reducing the climate for subversion and insurgency. The foremost of these is land reform, which has at least temporarily lessened potential pressures by Iranian peasants for a fairer share in Iranian society. Several programs utilize army draftees, who meet their military obligation by serving in one of several corps. The Literacy Corps, which teaches men and women to read and write, is giving peasants and other illiterates hope that they can eventually join the ranks of the educated. The Health Corps and Development Corps are further raising morale in backward areas and giving peas-

ants and tribal groups the impression that the government in Tehran deserves their loyalty. Prime Minister Hoveyda has made efforts to reduce urban discontent by paying particular attention to the price levels of basic commodities. In addition to lowering the prices of some commodities, he has established fair-price shops and bazaars, verbally attacked merchants who were not cooperating, and encouraged direct purchases from rural cooperatives in order to eliminate middlemen. These measures for the most part are temporary expedients, but they at least indicate the government's awareness of its problems.

Finally, the Shah, through both his domestic and foreign policies, is having some success in creating an image of Iranian independence of outside influence and is making Iranians proud of their historical achievements by stressing the glories of Persia's past.

There is no significant nongovernment counter-subversive activity in Iran because welfare societies, political parties, business groups, and cultural associations feel it is not their responsibility to engage in such activities independently of government initiative. All seemingly unofficial counter-subversive efforts are in some way directed or influenced by the government. SAVAK's close surveillance of all organizations and meetings—no matter how innocent they may be—tends to discourage any action not previously approved by the government.

#### G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

Avery, Peter. *Modern Iran*. New York and Washington: Praeger, 1965. Useful and readable.

Bill, James. *The Politics of Iran; Groups, Classes and Modernization*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Co., 1972. Highly interesting and informative.

Curzon, George. *Persia and the Persian Question* (2 vols.). London and New York: Longman, Green, 1892. Reprinted, Barnes and Noble, 1966. A classic and unequalled description of Iran at the end of the 19th century against which modern Iran can be compared. Written by the British Member of Parliament who later became Viceroy of India.

*Iran Almanac and Book of Facts*, 1972, 11th Edition. Tehran: Echo Publishing Co., 1972. A

yearly compendium of facts compiled from many sources, including official Iranian.

Smith, Harvey H., et al. *Area Handbook for Iran*. D. H. Pam No. 550-68. American University, Foreign Area Studies. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. A compilation of

factual data on all phases of Iranian history, government, and social affairs. Good bibliographies.

Zonis, Marnin. *The Political Elite of Iran*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. An in-depth view of the attitudes and orientations of the most powerful decisionmakers of Iran.

## Chronology (u/ou)

- c. 553-330 B.C.**  
The first Persian empire, founded by Cyrus the Great of the Achaemenid dynasty, eventually extends from what is now Afghanistan in the east to the Mediterranean and Aegean seas in the west.
- c. 330 B.C.**  
Alexander the Great is crowned king of Persia after defeating Persian forces, marking beginning of Greek rule, which lasted until c. 250 B.C.
- c. 250 B.C.**  
Revolt against Greek rule leads to establishment of the generally undistinguished Parthian dynasty, which lasts for almost five centuries.
- 226-651**  
The Sassanian rulers restore the Persian empire to greatness.
- 651**  
All Sassanian domains come under Arab Muslim control, marking an almost 900-year period of political decline, disunity, and disorder under the Arabs, Turks, and Mongols.
- 1501-1736**  
Under the Safavid dynasty internal order and unity are restored and Shia Islam is established as the state religion.
- 1795**  
Long dynasty of the Turkic Qajars begins.
- 1906**  
**December**  
Fundamental Laws (i.e., national constitution) adopted by Iranian Parliament under Qajar dynasty monarch.
- 1907**  
**October**  
Supplementary Fundamental Laws passed, also part of the constitution.
- 1921**  
**February**  
Successful coup led against Qajar regime by Reza Khan, leader of an Iranian army Cossack brigade, and Sayyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, who later became Prime Minister; Treaty of Friendship signed with the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.
- 1925**  
**December**  
Coronation of Reza Khan, henceforth known as Reza Shah Pahlavi.
- 1941**  
**August**  
United Kingdom and the USSR invade Iran to counter threat of expanding German influence.
- September**  
Reza Shah abdicates in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah.
- 1946**  
**May**  
USSR withdraws its troops from Iran after Iranian complaints to the UN Security Council regarding Soviet failure to withdraw occupying troops after end of World War II.
- 1949**  
**February**  
Tudeh (Masses) Party, the Communist political party in Iran, outlawed for alleged involvement in an attempt to assassinate the Shah.
- 1951**  
**March**  
British-owned oil industry nationalized; oil production ceases; anti-British street demonstrations threaten the national security.
- April**  
Mohammad Mosaddeq becomes Prime Minister.
- 1953**  
**August**  
Mosaddeq ousted by coup, and the Shah, who had fled to Europe after an abortive attempt against Mosaddeq a few days earlier, returned to Iran.
- 1955**  
**November**  
Iran joins Baghdad Pact, which in 1959 became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
- 1959**  
**March**  
Bilateral defense agreement signed with United States.
- 1960**  
**July**  
Iran and the United Arab Republic break diplomatic relations in a dispute over relations with Israel.
- October**  
Male heir born to Shah, named Reza Cyrus Ali.
- 1961**  
**May**  
Ali Anini appointed Prime Minister, initiates widespread political, economic, and social reforms at Shah's behest.
- 1962**  
**September**  
Unilateral declaration by Iran, for the benefit of the USSR, that Iranian soil will not be used by foreign powers for missile bases.
- 1963**  
**January**  
National referendum on Shah's six-point reform program results in overwhelming vote in favor of program.
- September**  
Parliamentary elections held for 21st Majlis.

**1964****July**

Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey establish Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

**1965****January**

Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansur assassinated by a member of a fanatical Muslim group; Amir Abbas Hoveyda appointed Prime Minister.

**April**

Attempt on Shah's life by a conscript member of Imperial Guard.

**June**

The Shah makes official visit to USSR.

**1966****January**

Iran and USSR agree that USSR will build a steel mill, develop iron and coal, and build a pipeline for Iranian natural gas to USSR.

**1967****January**

Soviet military credit of US\$110 million extended to Iran.

**August**

Parliamentary elections held for 22nd Majlis.

**September**

Constituent assembly amends constitution to provide for succession to Shah; Empress named Regent.

**October**

Coronation of Mohammad Reza Shah.

**November**

US economic aid to Iran officially ends.

**1968****January**

British announce they will pull forces out of Persian Gulf at end of 1971.

**1968****February**

Shah cancels trip to Saudi Arabia in dispute over status of Bahrain as competition in the Persian Gulf mounts.

**September**

Shah visits USSR.

**October**

Municipal council elections held in larger cities and towns.

**November**

Shah visits Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

**1969****April**

Iran breaks diplomatic relations with Lebanon over Lebanese refusal to extradite Lt. Gen. Timur Bahktiar, wanted for trial in Iran.

Iran abrogates 1937 agreement with Iraq over border in the Shatt al Arab because of alleged Iraqi violations.

**October**

Shah visits United States.

**1970****July**

General Timur Bahktiar assassinated in Iraq by Iranian agents.

**1971****July**

Parliamentary elections for 23rd Majlis.

**October**

Celebration of 2,500th anniversary by Persian monarchy.

**November**

Iranian forces occupy Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

**1972****October**

Shah and Empress visit USSR.