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Liberia

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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Armed Forces

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the *NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

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Liberia

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Armed Forces

A. Defense establishment

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), with a total of 24,400 men, are organized into four components. About 4,200 men make up the active duty ground forces of the Liberian National Guard (LNG), which provides the first line of land defenses. The Militia, forming the second line of land defenses, is made up of a reserve force of approximately 20,000. The 170-man Liberian National Coast Guard (LNCG) provides coastal and territorial water security. Reconnaissance and aviation support for the army is provided by the 17-man Aviation Unit. In addition there is a 1,300 man National Police Force, under the Minister of Justice, which is capable of making some contribution in augmenting the operation of the AFL. (C)

The Defense establishment is tasked with providing national defense and internal security and also with assisting in national development through civic action programs. The National Guard has little capacity for sustained combat but is capable of quelling local civil disturbances and riots. The aviation element in the National Guard serves mainly in logistical support and liaison roles, but is capable of limited search and rescue and patrol functions. The Coast Guard, with only one motor gunboat and two small harbor patrol craft, is capable of conducting only limited coastal patrols. The Militia, led mostly by political appointees, would be incapable of performing most military missions. (C)

The bulk of Liberia's forces are concentrated near the capital, Monrovia, for internal security purposes. No threat to Liberia is posed by any neighboring country, although a latent distrust of Guinea occasionally surfaces. As a deterrent to hostilities from bordering states the Liberian Government has strongly encouraged regional cooperation, but has steered clear of any formal agreements on defense matters. Guinea and Sierra Leone on several occasions have asked Liberia to participate in their mutual defense pact. These requests were rejected both by former President Tubman and by President Tolbert. However, in April

1973 Tolbert did assure the President of Sierra Leone that no activity hostile to his regime would be allowed in Liberia. (C)

Liberia is a member of the Organization of African Unity, which has a Defense Commission. An Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Liberia provides that, in the event of aggression against Liberia, the two governments will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for Liberia's defense. The United States is also allowed to use the port of Monrovia and Roberts International Airfield in time of emergency. (C)

1. Historical (U/OU)

In 1848 the Liberian legislature established a War Department, now the Ministry of National Defense, charged with the responsibility of organizing, training and maintaining an army. The permanent military force was first organized in 1908 as the Frontier Force and was redesignated the Liberian National Guard (LNG) on 1 February 1962 (Figure 1).

The armed forces have only modest military traditions, based on actions taken to suppress tribal rebellions in the interior before World War II. The forces did not enter combat in either of the World Wars, although Liberia declared war on Germany both times. During 1962-63 Liberia provided a reinforced security company of about 235 men to the United Nations Operations, Congo, on a rotational basis. Individuals assigned to these security detachments were drawn from all units of the National Guard.

Since 1912, U.S. officers have served as military advisers or staff officers to the Liberian Government or as commanders or staff officers of Liberian forces. There has been a U.S. Military Mission in Liberia since 1951.

The naval force, known as the Liberian National Coast Guard (LNCG), was established in 1957. Since that year U.S. Coast Guard or Navy personnel attached to the U.S. Military Mission have been assigned as advisers to the LNCG. The LNCG has had




FIGURE 1. Liberian Armed Forces at the turn of the century (top) and during the Tubman funeral ceremonies in 1971 (U/OU)



no combat experience but has engaged in successful patrols to curb unauthorized fishing and smuggling activities.

2. Command structure (C)

The President of Liberia is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Figure 2). He exercises command through the Department of National Defense, whose head, the Minister of National Defense, is a Cabinet member. The minister is assisted by a Deputy Minister of Defense. Responsible to the minister are the Assistant Ministers of Defense for Coast Guard Affairs and for Militia Affairs.

The uniformed commander is the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia, a lieutenant general, who exercises military control over all three components of the forces—the National Guard, the Coast Guard and the Militia. He is assisted by a Deputy Chief of Staff

who is a major general and assistant chiefs of staff for personnel (G-1), intelligence (G-2), operation and training (G-3), and logistics (G-4). Largely because of their joint service responsibilities the logistics and training commands, the signal company, the engineer battalion and the aviation unit are directly responsible to armed forces headquarters. The commanders of the Militia and the Coast Guard officially are responsible to their respective assistant ministers through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, but the latter frequently is bypassed in the issuance and execution of orders.

B. Joint activities (C)

1. Military manpower

As of 1 July 1973 Liberia had 395,000 males in the ages 15 through 49, of whom about 53% were




FIGURE 2. Liberian Armed Forces organization (C)

physically fit for military service. The distribution by age groups was as follows:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	82,000	50,000
20-24	72,000	40,000
25-29	63,000	35,000
30-34	56,000	30,000
35-39	48,000	25,000
40-44	41,000	15,000
45-49	33,000	15,000
Total, 15-49 ..	395,000	210,000

From 1973-77 the number of men who will reach 18, or the average age of military enlistment, will be about 17,000 annually. There is no conscription in Liberia so that the National Guard is maintained by voluntary enlistments. All males between the ages of

16 and 35 are required to enlist in the Militia, but the law is not strictly enforced. There is no difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of applicants for officer and enlisted ranks, but the basic problem in manning the AFL is the relatively small number of literate and educationally qualified persons available to fill vacancies, or even to undertake training. Furthermore, poor benefits do not make the AFL attractive to the small group of prospective personnel whose services are in demand by various agencies of the government, business, and foreign technical assistance programs. Although 2 years of ROTC is a required subject for males in Liberian colleges, it does not assure an individual a commission, which is attained either through Officer Candidate School or by Presidential appointment.

The stratification that prevails in much of Liberia's social, economic, and political life is reflected to a

lesser degree in the armed forces. Virtually all of the enlisted men are recruited from among the tribal elements of the population (over 95% of total population). The officer corps is split roughly in half between those from a completely tribal ancestry and the Americo-Liberians. Most senior ranking militia officers are of Americo-Liberian origin and are political appointees.

Morale of enlisted men in the National Guard is generally poor, because of low pay, inadequate quarters, and deficiencies in support and leadership. The older, less educated officers, spend much of their time engaged in private enterprises, thus setting a poor example for their subordinates and creating an environment nearly devoid of discipline. Some enlisted personnel act as servants or are assigned similar chores in the households of members of the ruling elite. Many perform other nonmilitary tasks, such as guarding government agencies or tax collecting. Such assignments are demoralizing and are detrimental to military proficiency. The absence of retirement benefits until January 1973 discouraged voluntary separation and contributed to the practice of retaining feeble and ineffective officers and enlisted men. A rather bizarre example of the abuses of this policy was the retention on active duty of a 76-year old 1st Lieutenant. The new retirement plan should induce earlier departures and provide an incentive for career personnel. Traditionally, LNG personnel have been complacent about the shortcomings of Liberian military standards, but recently they have become increasingly open in their criticism of the government, especially regarding financial mismanagement. Delays in pay and forced contributions to a national fund sparked an uprising in one battalion in December 1972. These issues and general discontent with the Tolbert government nurtured serious coup plotting by the Assistant Minister of Defense for Coast Guard Affairs and several senior officers, all of whom were arrested in March 1973. Such actions called into question the long-time steadfast loyalty of the military. Shaken by these events, the administration will probably take corrective action to eradicate some of the potentially combustible conditions present in the armed forces.

Liberia's reserve force, the Militia, is organized into a division with 16 understrength regiments. With substantial administrative and technical support from foreign sources, the National Guard might be expanded by activating the Militia. The Militia is so loosely organized and administrated that it is virtually impossible to determine actual strength or mission capability. The estimated strength of the Militia is

20,000. Weapons and ammunition are almost nonexistent in Militia units. There is no means of logistical support and no heavy fire units. Militia units muster for drills on a sporadic basis normally with very poor turnouts. Militiamen could effectively be used as guards, supplements to local police forces, intelligence gatherers in their local area, or for ceremonial purposes. However, hindered by inadequate training and insufficient arms, the majority of Militia troops would be ineffective in a combat role.

2. Strength trends

The personnel strength of the ground forces has gradually but steadily increased since 1951. In the early 1960's the Militia reached an estimated strength of 20,000 and has remained fairly constant. National Guard strength has been generally increasing since the early 1960's. The Coast Guard has increased from 76 men in 1961 to its 1973 strength of 170 officers and enlisted men.¹ The following tabulation shows the approximate strength of the armed forces of 1 January for each year designated:

YEAR	NATIONAL GUARD	MILITIA	COAST GUARD
1947	1,000	5,000	...
1961	2,000	na	76
1964	3,000	20,000	100
1967	3,400	20,000	110
1968	3,800	20,000	115
1970	4,400	20,000	130
1972	5,200	20,000	160
1973	4,200	20,000	170

na Data not available.

... Not pertinent.

A move by the government in 1970 to increase and upgrade the armed forces brought in over 1,500 new recruits. The actual increase, however, was much less, due to a simultaneous paring process which removed old and incompetent personnel. At the beginning of 1973 the President directed a reduction of the active AFL to an authorized strength of 4,000, excluding the 200-man ceremonial band. Many reductions took place in February 1973, which came in the form of voluntary and forced retirements and general discharge for causes ranging from unfitness to "general worthlessness." At the same time as the reduction in force, a retirement pay system was also instituted. The net effect should be a smaller but more highly qualified force.

¹For current detailed information, see *Military Intelligence Summary*, published semiannually by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. Training

The armed forces rely almost exclusively on the United States for training assistance. The U.S. Military Mission to Liberia (LIBMISH), established in 1951, assists in all troop training programs. The Liberian National Guard language school, assisted by LIBMISH personnel, conducts English-language classes in an attempt to upgrade the literacy level of armed forces personnel. An important function of LIBMISH is the selection and sponsorship of military personnel to attend training schools in the United States; over 400 Liberians have taken some 700 courses since 1951. The LIBMISH sponsorship program is being significantly curtailed. Emphasis is now placed on logistics and training courses in an attempt to build a Liberian cadre of instructors capable of conducting their own training program.

The John Hilary Tubman Military Academy (TMA), Liberia's main military training center, is operated by personnel of the Training Command (Figure 3). Recruit, noncommissioned officer, and officer training are conducted at the academy. Recruit training is of 12 weeks duration and is patterned after basic training in the U.S. Army. Training includes weapons instruction, small unit tactics, and a variety of classroom instruction. The first large group of recruits completed training in December 1969. The Liberian NCO Training School, formerly at Camp Schieffelin, became a permanent part of the Tubman Military Academy in February 1969. The first basic officers training class graduated from the academy in April 1970. This course is a 12-week program conducted primarily by Training Command personnel, supplemented by guest instructors from the

U.S. Military Mission and the Liberian General Staff. Enrollment in the basic officer course is also open to Militia officers. In 1971 the academy conducted a 6-month Officers Candidate School. The school is attended by enlisted personnel who receive a commission upon completion of the course.

While the TMA has offered a variety of courses, there is no ongoing regularly scheduled program of courses. Most courses are run on an as-needed basis. One reason for the sporadic operation of TMA is the nonavailability of TDY funds. Once a cadre of instructors is established, it is hoped that the academy will offer courses on a regular, recurring basis.

Since 1970 each Militia regiment has been directed to conduct 1-day assemblies quarterly. Militia training centers on basic military subjects such as drill and ceremonies. Riot control, marksmanship, and small unit tactics, as well as field sanitation and personnel hygiene, may also be included in some training programs.

Students participate in the Army Student Training Program at Booker Washington Institute and in the ROTC at the University of Liberia and Cuttington College. The ROTC has been a totally ineffective "marching society," and students do not necessarily receive commissions in the officer corps upon graduation.

4. Military budget

The military budget for Liberia's small armed forces is prepared by the Department of National Defense, incorporated into the National budget by the Budget Bureau, and then presented to the legislature for review. Final enactment, however, depends upon the




FIGURE 3. Tubman Military Academy (U/OU)

personal approval of the president. Defense budgets for the years 1968 through 1973 were as follows:

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Defense budget*	2.9	3.2	3.4	4.0	3.3
Defense budget as a percent of total national budget	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.6	4.6
Defense budget as a percent of estimated GNP	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.0

*Millions of U.S. dollars.

Liberia has two distinctly separate economies—a foreign-managed economy based upon the exploitation of the country's natural resources (primarily iron ore and rubber) and an indigenous economy based primarily upon subsistence agriculture. The country can provide only limited financial support for its armed forces, and domestic production of military equipment is restricted to personal quartermaster items. This situation greatly inhibits training and operations since there is a constant scarcity of petroleum, maintenance parts, and TDY funds.

5. Logistics

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, has staff responsibility for logistical operations of the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and the Militia. The Logistical Command, headed by a lieutenant colonel, conducts day-to-day logistical operations and consists of a headquarters, depot (consolidated supply and maintenance), arsenal, and a transportation company.

The logistical system is inefficient and inadequate, although some progress is being made under LIBMISH supervision by the logistics command adviser. Maintenance standing operating procedures are being established, and supplies at military depots are being segregated and relocated to increase efficiency. Storage facilities are located in and near Monrovia. The main depot at Camp Schieffelin, 20 miles southeast of Monrovia, is hindered by poor leadership and a lack of communications and skilled personnel. Inefficient supply requisitioning and stockage procedures greatly inhibit an effective depot operation. A recent warehouse inventory disclosed that 25% of the stock items were excess to AFL needs; many parts were for equipment never even stocked by the AFL. There are two arsenals for storage of arms and equipment, one in Monrovia and one in Schieffelin.

The United States has been Liberia's principal supplier of military equipment, providing material valued at over \$9 million, mostly on a grant basis; however, the U.S. Military Assistance Program to Liberia will terminate at the end of 1973. The



FIGURE 4. Swiss-built MOWAG armored cars (U/OU)

government is currently negotiating a \$2 million FMS package which will include artillery, ground transportation, communications, aircraft, patrol boats, and numerous concurrent spare parts and maintenance kits. Weapons and equipment supplied by countries other than the United States are very limited. Liberia has purchased UZI submachineguns and Belgium FN rifles from Israel, MOWAG armored cars from Switzerland (Figure 4) and trucks from Japan.

Transportation is an area of marginal capability. Despite a continuing training program, the development of competent drivers, operators, and repairmen is a slow process. General-purpose vehicles are in short supply, and maintenance is inadequate at the unit level. Cannibalization of inoperative vehicles is prevalent. Poor roads, inclement weather, and vehicle abuse take a heavy toll of available equipment.

C. Ground forces (C)

The regular army, called the Liberian National Guard to emphasize its primarily defensive function, is charged with the mission of maintaining internal security and national defense. It also has a civic action mission which has been strongly emphasized in the absence of any external threat to the country. Despite efforts to upgrade the force, the National Guard is handicapped by inadequate training, poor logistics, and lack of capable leaders. The guard has little capacity for sustained combat but is capable of quelling local civil disturbances and riots. Even with police assistance, however, the National Guard would be hard pressed to control widespread internal disorders, and could offer only token resistance against a well-planned attack from any neighboring country.

1. Organization

The National Guard is organized into a single Separate Brigade under the command of a brigadier general.² He is directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff, AFL. The Commander, LNG, is assisted by a staff for controlling the ground forces elements which consist of five infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, a service support battalion, and security units. Liberia is broken down into three territorial commands. An infantry battalion headquarters in each region serves as headquarters for the commands, which are all under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Regiment.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The total personnel strength of the National Guard is about 4,200 (280 officers and 3,920 enlisted men). The National Guard Brigade is the major tactical unit, consisting of a headquarters company, 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the Bella Yella National Prison Security Detachment, a scout platoon (armored cars), a service support battalion, an executive mansion guard battalion (Figure 5), and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Infantry Battalions. Subordinate to the service support battalion are a headquarters company, a medical company, a band company, a military police company, an honor guard unit, and the chaplain corps. The 1st Infantry Battalion at Camp Schieffelin and the 2nd Infantry Battalion at Todee, both in the vicinity of Monrovia, are commanded by full colonels and are composed of five companies; a headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons

²The regimental system of organization was abolished and the Separate Brigade established during July 1973. The change is meant to eliminate the regimental headquarters which proved to be an administrative bottleneck and to provide tighter central control over the support units.



FIGURE 5. Liberia's Executive Mansion Guard Battalion (U/OU)

company. The rifle companies are equipped mainly with M-1 rifles, Browning automatic rifles, .30 caliber light machineguns and 60-mm mortars. The heavy weapons companies are armed with 81-mm mortars (Figure 6) and .50 caliber machineguns. The 3rd, 4th and 5th Infantry Battalions, under the command of the 2nd Regiment, serve as territorial commands. Montserrado, Grand Bassa, and Grand Cape Mount counties form one region with headquarters at the 3rd Infantry Battalion, Barclay Training Center in Monrovia. In the south, the counties of Grand Jide, Sinoe, and Maryland are under the 4th Infantry Battalion whose future headquarters will be located at Zwedru. The 5th Infantry Battalion, with a future headquarters site at Gbanka, covers the counties of Bong, Lofa, and Nimba in northeastern Liberia.

The territorial command battalions, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, bear little resemblance to what we commonly know as combat battalions. Headquarters provides a limited control over subordinate units within the territories. Platoon-sized detachments are spread out within the area with little or no coordination between the units. The smaller detachments are used mostly for



FIGURE 6. Liberian National Guard officer assists in removing a misfire from 81-mm mortar (C)

security and ceremonial purposes for county superintendants. They also function as border guards and tax collectors, and serve as guards for tribal chiefs and for some major foreign business concessions. The larger detachments normally have single sideband radios and adequate weapons and ammunition. The greatest military significance is perhaps the mere presence of the units in an area. Some semblance of a military unit could be assembled in the event of an external or internal threat, although only the 1st, 2nd, and Executive Mansion Guard (EMG) Battalions have a rudimentary capability for performing combat missions.

The 1st Engineer Battalion provides engineer support to the armed forces and performs civic action projects related to construction, road maintenance, and the repair, maintenance, and renovation of building (Figure 7). Detachments of the battalion have been involved in building barracks at Barclay Training Center and Camp Schieffelin, and an airfield at Belefuana. The battalion's remote location at Camp Jackson in Namata near the Guinea border, contributes to lack of control, resulting in minimal effectiveness. The battalion has a secondary mission to act as an infantry unit to provide internal security when required; its capability to perform this mission is also minimal.

The 1st Field Artillery Battalion is tasked to provide weapons support, in the form of indirect fire (4.2 in. mortars) and antitank (106-mm recoilless rifle) and antiaircraft (.50 caliber machinegun) fire, to the infantry battalions and to defend the border area with Guinea. Like the 1st Engineer Battalion, its virtual isolation at Namata creates logistical problems which reduce its capabilities to fulfill either mission. The .50 caliber antiaircraft guns do not have mounts and cannot be used in an antiaircraft capacity.




FIGURE 7. Engineers repairing road as part of civic action project (U/OU)

Approximately three-fourths of the forces are concentrated within a 40-mile radius of Monrovia to protect the capital and key facilities in the vicinity. The interior is thinly garrisoned by small detachments that operate in a virtually independent status and augment local police units in the day-to-day task of providing public safety.

3. Training

The National Guard depends heavily upon courses conducted in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. U.S. Mobile Training Teams have conducted some specialized training courses in Liberia. LIBMISH personnel assist in all aspects of training and have advisers assigned to the Liberian Armed Forces general staff, Tubman Military Academy, LNG Brigade Headquarters, the Logistical Command, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions, the Executive Mansion Guard Battalion, the 1st Engineer Battalion, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, and the Military Police and Medical Companies. The 1st Engineer Battalion adviser also assists in armed forces civic action projects. English language courses conducted at the academy and Camp Schieffelin have advisers assigned on a part-time basis.

Training programs generally have lacked the coordination and standardization needed to make them effective. Major efforts have been taken to upgrade training by the Training Command and individual units, although the high illiteracy rate remains a problem. In units without U.S. military advisers, training is almost nonexistent. The President's interest in upgrading the armed forces and the increased training programs at the Tubman Military Academy should help to improve proficiency levels. The academy sporadically offers recruit, NCO, basic officer, and officer candidate training programs (Figure 8). Master training plans have been published at one time or another for all major units. These plans emphasize the development of effective teams capable of performing operational missions. Nevertheless, programs consist mainly of individual and small unit training in physical fitness, drill and ceremonies, riot control, military courtesy, and marksmanship, as well as a variety of general military subjects. Since mid-1972, programs have included platoon and company Army Training Tests (ATTs), small unit tactics, and crew served weapons instruction. Tactical training operations for units larger than a company have not been conducted. A small number of Liberian army personnel have received foreign training in other than U.S. schools. Both Israel and the United Kingdom have sponsored Liberian officers at intelligence



FIGURE 8. Recruits in field training at Tubman Military Academy (U/OU)

courses, and Liberians have been sent to Israel and Switzerland for training on arms and equipment purchased from these countries.

4. Logistics

The National Guard is dependent upon the Logistical Command for maintenance and supply. Almost all equipment and spare parts are obtained through the U.S. Military Assistance Program. The Logistical Command is mainly a depot operation. Headquarters, LNG Brigade, and the regiments and battalions of the National Guard have supply officers (S-4's) and small supply and maintenance sections. Most infantry companies have a supply NCO and an armorer. Logistics in the National Guard are generally poor. For units assigned in and around Monrovia the logistical system operates fairly well, but units assigned away from the capital area have extreme difficulty obtaining supplies.

The inadequate system for supplying field rations has been a major problem in field maneuvers; troops on maneuvers have relied too heavily on the logistics system for food supply resulting in much reduced mobility and responsiveness. In place of "C" type rations, enlisted men now are given \$15 to \$30 subsistence pay for living off the local economy, although difficulties arise when unit commanders refuse to go on maneuvers unless TDY funds are in hand.

Preventive maintenance in units is practically nonexistent. Depot maintenance is improving but cannot keep pace with the number of vehicles damaged through neglect. There is a general lack of

funds for petroleum, batteries, and tires; however, weapons are adequately maintained.

Supply is generally poor but is expected to improve with new warehouse facilities and with new inventory control and parts storage procedures. Uniforms are purchased annually for members of the AFL; however, there is no dependable supplier, and orders are normally late. Locally procured items such as petroleum, batteries, tires, paint, paper products, and building materials are in short supply because of an inadequate budget and mismanagement of available funds.

5. Army aviation

The Aviation Unit (AU) is commanded by an army colonel and is directly under the control of Armed Forces Headquarters. Located at Spriggs-Payne Airport in Monrovia, the unit is equipped with four Cessna-180, one Cessna 150 (Figure 9), and one Piper Seneca aircraft. The Piper Seneca arrived in April 1973 and is the only twin-engine aircraft in the AU inventory. None of the planes is armed, and thus the AU has no combat role nor capability.

The primary missions performed by the unit are logistical support for outlying military detachments of the AFL and air transportation for senior military and government officials. Its other responsibilities are flying training, search and rescue, and aerial reconnaissance in support of border and coastal patrols, but these demand only a small portion of the unit's time and resources. In April and May 1972 the Aviation Unit conducted its first combined operation with the Coast Guard when a sweep of the coast was made to intercept illegal fishing boats.



FIGURE 9. Air Reconnaissance Unit maintenance officer and Cessna 150 trainer in hanger (U/OU)

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Only 17 men (7 officers, 4 cadets, and 6 enlisted men), all U.S. trained, are in the unit. Three of the officers are pilots and a fourth is undergoing training. There are presently three cadets in aviation training. The shortage of pilots in the AU (ratio of 1 pilot to 2 planes) is a problem shared by other organizations in Liberia, and a joint effort has been undertaken to remedy the situation. A basic flight training program for some 20 students commenced in April 1973 under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Transportation. According to the course proposal, aircraft from the AU and the National Police Force would be made available for flight instruction, and maintenance would be performed by the AU. Each student would receive 40 to 50 flying hours which would prepare him for further training in the United States at a later date. Trainees would serve in the AU, the National Police Force Air Wing, or the Liberian National Airlines upon successful completion of the preliminary program.

Maintenance is performed by unit personnel with parts procured either through U.S. MAP or directly from Cessna. Preventive maintenance is the best in the AFL, and there is unlimited fuel at the disposal of the unit.

D. Navy (C)

The Liberian National Coast Guard, established in 1957, is the country's only naval force. The Coast Guard Commandant is subordinate to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia, but frequently receives orders directly from the Assistant Minister for Coast Guard Affairs. Headquarters are at Monrovia, and temporary refueling and provisioning stops are maintained along the coast during operational patrols. Future plans call for establishment of permanent detachments at Buchanan, Sinoe, and Harper, but no concrete timetable has been established.

The Coast Guard is charged with the control of alien fishing in territorial waters, control of smuggling, search and rescue, and patrol of the coastline. The one motor gunboat (PGM) and two minor patrol craft of

the Coast Guard are not adequate to accomplish these missions. The 100-foot PGM, the *Alert* (Figure 10), is equipped with one 40-mm AA gun forward and two .50 caliber machineguns and has a maximum speed of 12.5 knots. The two 30-foot utility launches, constructed of fiberglass reinforced plastic, can attain a speed of 14 knots. All 3 patrol boats were received in 1967 through the U.S. Military Assistance Program. The Coast Guard boats receive minor repairs at a commercial 400-ton capacity floating drydock in Monrovia. Refit and overhaul must be performed out of country, generally at Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

With only 170 personnel, the Coast Guard is insufficiently manned as well as underequipped for its mission. However, the Coast Guard enjoys a reputation for higher professional bearing, discipline, and morale than evidenced in other elements of the AFL. Selection criteria for the Coast Guard are reputedly more stringent than for the National Guard, and most personnel are drawn from Liberia's coastal tribes who have a long history of seafaring prowess. Their training, both in the United States and in Liberia under U.S. Coast Guard and Navy personnel, has been generally successful, although proficiency levels remain well below Western standards. Patrols conducted by the Coast Guard, despite their limited number and scope, have achieved satisfactory results in light of available resources.




FIGURE 10. "The Alert," flagship of the Liberian Coast Guard (U/OU)