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Country Profile

Morocco

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This General Survey supersedes the one dated January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.





Country Profile: Morocco

The Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.

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

The Lion of the Maghreb No Longer

Moroccan National Emblem

The Arabs have an ancient saying that Algeria is the man of the Maghreb, Tunisia its woman, and Morocco its lion. Probably the proverb originates from Algeria's central location in North Africa, with smaller, weaker Tunisia on one side and, on the other, the more rugged, untamed Morocco—the country that is *Al Maghreb al Aqsa*, or the Far West of the Arab world. As Algeria strives to become a strong nation through industrialization and as Tunisia struggles for a better life for its people, the record of the independent Maghreb countries validates parts of the proverb, but not in the case of Morocco. The promise of pride and strength implied in the analogy to a lion has not been fulfilled, for Morocco has become economically the least progressive and politically the most troubled of the Maghreb states, resembling less and less the image of the proverb and its own national emblem. (U/OU)

Morocco is unusual among the Arab countries in that it has known no total eclipse of its statehood. When the Ottomans held most of the Middle East and North Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries, Morocco retained its separateness and royal succession. Even during the years of the French Protectorate (1912-56), the sultanate was preserved. (U/OU)

Today Moroccan society includes a sophisticated, French-speaking elite and large numbers, particularly the youth, who look toward Westernization and modernization. At the same time, the past is evident in the respect for Islamic piety and traditional culture paid by both the learned and the uneducated. The past is also evident in the Moroccan Government, which is in many ways a medieval anachronism. King Hassan II has ruled the country since his investiture in 1961 as a personal fiefdom. As a result, serious endemic economic and social problems have worsened. The gap between the rich and poor has not been narrowed, and the people on the whole have a little less than those in the rest of Maghreb. (C)

The gross domestic product (GDP) of Morocco on a per capita basis is equivalent to about US$170 a year—more than $100 below Algeria's and almost $40 under Tunisia's. The sectoral distribution of the GDP remained practically unchanged throughout the 1960's. Manufacturing consistently contributed only about 12% of it, while that sector of the Algerian and the Tunisian economies grew substantially. Morocco's average economic growth rate of 4% a year in the 1960's lagged behind those of the two other countries.

and it was in fact largely erased by the high yearly 2.9% growth rate of the population. (U/OU)

Because of the population increase, inflation, and declining purchasing power, the standard of living of most of the people has actually been falling. In rural areas, where about 65% of Morocco's 16 million people live, subsistence agriculture has become increasingly difficult. Thus, ever growing numbers of peasants flock to the cities in search of a better life. They live in *bidonvilles* (literally, tin-can towns) on the outskirts of the cities, and they swell the ranks of the unemployed. (U/OU)

The job market is expanding much more slowly than available manpower or skills. Despite the great strides made in education since Morocco recovered its independence in 1956, the literacy rate (about 20%) is the lowest in the Maghreb, and the type and quality of training bear little relationship to national manpower needs. Many secondary school graduates are among the unemployed, who comprise almost 28% of the urban and 19% of the rural labor force. Morocco has made some effort to alleviate the unemployment problem—probably the greatest one it faces—with a public works program, but it has been less successful in this endeavor than Tunisia, which has cut the unemployment rate to about 15%. (U/OU)

Until 1971 a layer of political stability covered these fundamental economic and social concerns. Then King Hassan joined that dwindling group of Middle Eastern monarchs whose staying power is speculative. A number of high-ranking officers in July 1971 led 1,500 cadets of the noncommissioned officers' school in an attack on the palace at Skhirat, where the King, his senior advisers, and the diplomatic corps were celebrating his birthday. Just 14 months later, air force pilots tried to shoot down the Boeing 727 that was bringing the King home from France. Behind this attempted regicide was the Minister of Defense and head of the armed forces General Staff, Maj. Gen. Mohamed Oufkir. It was officially reported later that he had committed suicide, but it is more likely that he was summarily executed on the King's orders. As the officers involved in the earlier unsuccessful coup either were among the some 100 persons killed during the storming of the palace or were executed soon thereafter, the specific motives of the rebels may never be known. Their distinguishing characteristic seems to have been a common distaste for the corruption in the government and for the patronage system by which the King runs the country. (C)

Since the attempted coup in August 1972, King Hassan has taken over personal command of the army and apparently seeks to maintain his regime by balancing the various military and security forces. He has made it plain that he will deal ruthlessly with dissident elements and that he is not prepared to make meaningful concessions to the demands of the political parties. They still hope to share Hassan's power, but they have become increasingly ineffective since parliament was dismissed in 1965 and they were excluded from participation in government. Convinced of his own righteousness, Hassan seems unwilling to relate the attempts on his life to his failure to effect improvements in the welfare of his people. (C)

The apathy with which the public responded to the attempts on Hassan's life reflects the general dulling of political interest throughout the country. It indicates as well that Hassan has squandered the legacy of popularity left him by his father. The throne has become shaky in Morocco only recently, as the country's problems have mounted. (U/OU)

Upon independence in 1956, Morocco's prospects seemed better than Tunisia's, although not so promising as Algeria's. The country is not well endowed with natural resources, but it does have more cultivable land than any other Maghreb state. Moreover, the relative ease with which independence was achieved gave the country an advantage. After the Algerian rebellion broke out and the Moroccan resistance began to tie down troops that France could ill afford because of its preoccupation with Algeria, independence was granted to Morocco more quickly than even the most optimistic nationalists had anticipated. It was not accompanied by revolutionary upheaval as in Algeria, nor by the sharp divisions in the nationalist movement and crises with France that marked the Tunisian struggle. (U/OU)

The Moroccan nationalist movement was distinguished from those of most other countries in that it came to center around the ruler of the land. Because the French Protectorate was built on the fiction that Sultan Mohamed V—Hassan's father—was the sole authority qualified to speak for Morocco, he was exiled in 1953 when his sympathies turned to the nationalists and he refused to sign decrees drafted by the protectorate authorities. Enthusiasm for the deposed sovereign then rose to near idolatry. He was restored to his throne in 1955, following the French change of policy, and he was supported by the important Istiqlal party as the

national leader. Symbolizing his intention to introduce a more modern type of government, he changed his title from Sultan to King and convoked a constitutional assembly. The way toward constitutional monarchy seemed to be paved. (U/OU)

Developments throughout the Maghreb in the mid-1950's and early 1960's conjured up an image of a united region. It was argued by Western political scientists, and some of the nationalists too, that the three countries shared an identity derived from Berber, Arab, and French influences. If they became a single nation, they could be supported largely by Algerian resources (oil and natural gas), led by Tunisia's dynamic Habib Bourguiba, and inspired by Mohamed V, who—as the heir to a 300-year-old dynasty which claims descent from the Prophet—was the acknowledged religious leader in the area. It soon became apparent, however, that widely differing political systems and philosophies and methods of economic organization and management far outweighed common interests. Although a slow trend toward bilateral collaboration is now emerging, the dream of Maghreb unity has been put aside. All of the states have their special problems, and the stable future of none is assured. Yet Morocco in the 1970's has more political and economic troubles than the others. (U/OU)

Some of the reasons for Morocco's relatively poor record are obvious. It lacks Algeria's oil, which has given that country the capability of industrializing, and it has not had Tunisia's Bourguiba, who has literally talked his nation into modernizing. Observers also point to the King's enthusiasm for golf and to the chicanery of government ministers, and they blame the state of affairs in Morocco on the frivolity and corruption of its leaders. Underlying these all too valid explanations, however, is a blend of historical, sociological, and geographic elements that has rendered the process of modernization particularly difficult. (C)

Throughout history Morocco has been a hard land to conquer and, once conquered, to control. Although the sultanate dates from the eighth century, national unity is a relatively recent phenomenon, for many of the tribes and regions of the country were brought under central government control only at the time of the French Protectorate. Moreover, many Arab lands have had longer and more pervasive contact with the West than Morocco has had, despite its proximity to Europe. The country is heir to a modernizing trend introduced by the protectorate and also to centuries-old attitudes and customs. In this situation, the old often proves more influential than the new. (U/OU)





The Geographic and Cultural Amalgam (u/ou)

Even in a continent outstanding for its geographic diversity, the contrasts in Morocco are striking. It is the massive mountain complex of the Middle, High, and Anti-Atlas, with the desert in the south and the Atlantic and the Mediterranean on the west and north, that gives the country its variety. Beyond the Middle Atlas, the land is a great red plain, colored by its weathered sandstone. Towering above it are the peaks of the High Atlas, which reach over 13,000 feet and are the highest and most rugged in North Africa. To the north, these mountains are snowcapped or covered with forests of evergreen oaks and conifers, while palm groves rim the foothills and the southern slopes are barren and sunbaked. South and east of this Atlas chain, arid plains extend into the Sahara.

Many of the settlements in the south—only about 500 miles from the tiled-roof villages of Morocco's Mediterranean shore—are walled and battlemented citadels. These are the casbahs, the elaborate mud forts that served as redoubts during tribal wars. Later the term casbah came to be applied—somewhat erroneously—to the old sections, or the *madinahs*, of the cities. With their mazelike streets, these walled and ancient urban casbahs seem to bring the Middle Ages into this century, and they are proving an important attraction in the tourist boom.

Morocco is intermediate in size between Algeria and Tunisia and is far more mountainous than either. In the north, the Rif mountains, which are the southernmost extension of Europe's Alpine system, rise steeply from the Mediterranean coast. Just to the east of Tangier—that cosmopolitan city which commands the point where the Mediterranean meets the Atlantic and which was long under international control—port towns, including Spanish-held Ceuta and Melilla, perch on mountain ledges; and all of the cities and towns of the coast are oriented toward Europe. Inland, the villages are more isolated. Elaborate terracing procedures make agriculture possible, but the crops often are not sufficient to feed the local population.

South of the Rif are the Middle Atlas mountains, flanked by Morocco's two principal rivers: the Oum er Rbia and the Moulouya, which flow, respectively, to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. As these mountains merge into the High Atlas, every cultivable patch of ground at the lower elevations is utilized to grow wheat, barley, sorghum, almonds, and vegetables. Irrigation ditches, cut into the slopes, bring water to the fields from mountain streams. The next and lowest of the Moroccan ranges is the Anti-Atlas. South of this area the desert begins, and lack of rainfall prohibits agriculture except in the oases and in the riverbeds, whose subsurface moisture is tapped when the rivers dry up in summer.

The Atlas Mountains ensure Morocco a more plentiful water supply than any other North African state. Although all the country is hot and dry in summer, winter storms blowing from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean drop moisture on the coasts, on the Atlantic lowland, and on the Rif and Atlas slopes facing the sea. Rains are characteristically irregular, violent, and brief, however, and drought years are not uncommon. Precipitation always decreases sharply from north to south, until semiarid and eventually desert conditions prevail.

Morocco's heartland lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the great arc formed by the foothills of the Rif and Atlas mountains. It is a rich agricultural area. The coastal plain, known as the Rharb, and the basin of the Sebou River produce citrus fruits, the country's

main commercial crop, and farther inland cereals, sugar beets, grapes, and olives are grown. This central and coastal area is also the most densely populated and economically advanced part of the country. It contains the important phosphate mines, and its agriculture supplies the food processing industries.



Casablanca

All the country's major cities are in this area. The old imperial capitals of Fes,[1] Meknes, and Marrakech, together with the former garrison city of Rabat, describe a triangle between the coast and the Middle and High Atlas mountains. In 1912 the French began to restore Rabat—the city the Sultans had founded as a stronghold (or *ribat*) against unfriendly tribes—and it is today the political capital of the country, while Casablanca remains the commercial capital.

The different character of Morocco's cities reveals the varying impact of foreign influence. Sea, mountain, and desert did not isolate the land, but they did limit and direct the extent to which it was penetrated. Despite its proximity to Europe and long coastline (roughly 800 miles on the Atlantic and 300 on the Mediterranean), Morocco was never really open to the commerce of the seas. Spanish and Portuguese at various times in history disputed for control of the shores, but the very regularity of coastline, providing no natural shelter, acted as a barrier to maritime influences. Casablanca, Morocco's largest port, did not develop until the French built costly breakwaters, and the other harbors of the

[1]For diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.

country are manmade, with the exceptions of Spanish-held Ceuta and Melilla.

Land access to Morocco has also been difficult. To the east, the narrow Taza corridor, separating the Rif and the Atlas, still affords the only easy route from Algeria. And to the south, the historical route of the caravans from deep Africa into Marrakech winds tortuously through desert and mountains.

Migration into Morocco was never very great. French and Spanish settlers at the time of the protectorates numbered only about 500,000, as contrasted to over 1 million Frenchmen in Algeria. Once inside the country, all newcomers throughout history tended to concentrate in limited areas, forcing the indigenous peoples back into the mountains and out of the best land but never themselves permeating the country. Thus the French imprint is very strong in Casablanca and Rabat and the modern sections of other cities. Trees line the streets, and the high white buildings resemble those the French built in Indochina.

Spanish influence, coupled with the stronger French imprint, inclines some observers to call Morocco the most diverse of Arab lands. Tetouan, once the capital of the Spanish zone, is indeed a Spanish city with crenellated stone walls and iron grill work. Spanish influence is evident in Morocco's heartland too, for it entered the country centuries before the protectorate and through another path. As the Christians regained Spain in the Middle Ages, the Moors from Andalusia settled in Morocco. Many were employed as artisans and craftsmen, particularly in Fes, where they emulated the Alhambra at Granada, combining in Al Qarawiyin University, for example, Spanish grace and elegance with African austerity.

The European mark in Morocco is indelible, particularly among the small core of the elite who are as much at home in Paris as in Casablanca. French is still the main language of instruction in most postprimary schools. This European influence, however, has been small compared to the Arab transformation of the land. The invasion of Arabs from what is now the Syrian area in the seventh and eighth centuries and the larger one they mounted from Egypt in the 11th century were far more pervasive than the coming of the Europeans in the 19th century. Yet historians doubt that the Arab invaders reached Morocco in large numbers, and they too had their main impact on the cities. It is the cities that are the core of Arab Morocco—Arabic in language and in values—for Islam gave its style of living to every



The old quarter of Fes, a medieval, Arab city. The pyramidal roofed building is the tomb of Idriss II, who fortified Fes about A.D. 809.

region of easy access. In the mountainous areas, better defended by nature, it impressed its influence on beliefs but had marginal effect on manners and customs, which remained faithful to the past.

The dominant threads of rural life in many parts of Morocco are still Berber. Living in settled communities, the Berbers retain tribal ties and follow, to some degree, customary laws. In striking contrast to the veiled women in the Arab cities, the Berber women go unveiled and wear colorful dress. According to some observers, the way of life is more open and democratic in Berber communities than it is in Arab settlements.

The population consists of the Arabized majority and a Berber minority. Language is the dividing line. Although Berber is not a written language and no standard form of it exists, estimates of numbers speaking a Berber dialect in Morocco range from 25% to almost 50% of the people. Many of them, however, know Arabic as well and have become Arabized Berbers. Intermarriage between Arabs and Berbers has been frequent, and physical characteristics are not distinguishing. Speaking of the dilution of the bloodstrain of the Arabs as they spread from the



Djama el-Fna, the central square of Marrakech. In contrast to Fes, this city is open and African in character. It was the capital at the time of the Almoravid dynasty, and when those rulers carried their authority into Muslim Spain in the 11th century, the name of the city came to be applied to the country, called Morocco for the first time.

Arabian Peninsula throughout the Middle East and North Africa, former U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare once commented that anyone is an Arab who says he is an Arab. While an exaggeration with regard to mankind as a whole, the remark is perhaps valid for Morocco. Historically, Berbers could become Arabs by learning the language and identifying themselves as such. Over the centuries many of the Berber tribes did just that.

Despite the blending of the two peoples, Arab-Berber differences are real. The French made much of them in pursuing their policy of divide and rule. They operated separate schools for the Berbers in attempts to Gaulicize them; they packed the army with Berbers; and they tried to establish special courts based on Berber customary law rather than on the Islamic Sharia. This division of the society was opposed by Arabs and Berbers alike, but most Moroccans today nonetheless identify themselves as one or the other. While many Berbers share all the privileges of the Arabic-speaking elite, those removed from the towns did not learn Arabic, and they became the more isolated, poorer elements of the society. As the country has developed, ethnic identity has been reinforced by the rural-urban division, and ethnic problems have been aggravated by the gap that exists between the elite and the masses. Thus many impoverished Berbers blame Arab domination for their plight.

Yet these differences should not be overemphasized. The two peoples have coexisted, for the most part peacefully, for over 1,000 years. Perhaps because the Berbers in some ways resemble the Kurds (both are mountainous people living in Arab or other foreign lands and speaking a different language), observers have expected them to share the Kurdish desire for independence. However, no separatist movement has ever developed among the Berbers with the exception of the uprising against the Spanish and the French led by Abdel Krim in the 1920's, and that revolt appeared to be a drive for local autonomy in the Rif rather than an effort to unite the Berbers. Recently attempts have been made to read meaning into the fact that the attempted coups of 1971-72 were led by Berber officers, but for various reasons the ethnic identity of the rebels seems simply incidental. As a lingering result of the French practice of recruiting Berbers into the army, almost all of Morocco's high-ranking officers are Berbers. Although more of the younger officers are of Arab origin, the domination of the Berbers is still such that they would be involved in any army plans or maneuvers. Moreover, Berber officers were among the loyalists as well as the rebels, and a number of them on both sides lost their lives at Skhirat.

Cleavages and animosities among Berbers are often as severe as between Berbers and Arabs. The basically pluralistic Moroccan society revolves around family, tribe, and region, with Arab or Berber identity only one factor in the complex of loyalties. Many Berbers, in fact, do not identify themselves as such but use instead regional names. The Shluh, for example, are the Berber agriculturalists of the High and Anti-Atlas mountains.

In this diverse land, the great unifying factor is Islam, the official religion of the state and the faith of almost all the people. Even Islam, however, is marked by variations in belief and practice throughout the country, for the Berbers were quick to embrace the religion of Arabs, but they evolved their own forms of it. In the countryside particularly, the animism of ancient times found sustenance in Muslim beliefs. Nature worship persisted, and religious observances included magical practices. In addition, cults of saints, or marabouts, developed, based on the concept that certain persons possessed special holiness (*bārakah*) and were able to perform miracles. Later a type of popular mysticism spread under the guise of religious brotherhoods. Some of these brotherhoods came to extend over a large part of North Africa and established networks of lodges called *zawiyahs*. In periods of weak central government, they fulfilled social and political functions as well as religious ones.

Meanwhile, the cities stood as centers of Muslim orthodoxy, and eventually reform movements grew up in them. In Fes in the 20th century one such movement set out to purge the country of unorthodox practices, of which the *zawiyahs* were considered the protagonists. Connected with this movement was a new Moroccan nationalism; a tacit alliance had developed at the time of the protectorate between the *zawiyahs* and the French, who gave the brotherhoods a degree of autonomy in return for their loyalty, and the nationalists thus attacked them for their connection with the French and their divisive influence. Opposition to the brotherhoods has continued since independence and has resulted in the disintegration of most of them.

Dilution of spiritual concerns undoubtedly has taken place among the urban educated. At times, there is tension between the more permissive way of life imported from Europe and the Islamic code, for religion is still a strong influence in Morocco. The popularity of the pilgrimages to holy sites and the well-

kept marabouts' tombs that dot the countryside give evidence of the importance of faith to most of the people. Religious and temporal authority are combined in the institution of the monarchy, if not in the person of the King, and those associated with Islam through descent or scholarship continue to command respect throughout the society. For many of the people, religion remains intermixed with belief in malevolent or benevolent powers and beings which must be honored, propitiated, or avoided. And even the puritanical turn that Islam took in Morocco has not lost its effect. In contrast to the mosques of most Arab countries, which are freely open to the public, those in Morocco are closed to non-Muslims. The only exception is one mosque in Rabat, opened by special permission of the King to further tourism.

The Weight of History (u/ou)

Historical continuity prevails in Morocco as in no other Maghreb country. Its past is one of the rise and dismemberment of empires. At times one or another of them spread into Spain or spilled over into Algeria, although central control of the domains that now constitute the country was often tenuous. The throne nonetheless made possible a measure of unity, for the warring tribes usually subscribed to the religious—if not the temporal—authority of the Sultan. Officially, the country remains today the Sharifian Empire of Morocco, meaning that it is ruled by a Sharifian family, i.e., one of the *shurafa* who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Independence was lost only during the 44 years of the protectorate, and even then the sultanate was retained as an institution. Unlike the rest of the Arab world, Morocco was never part of the Ottoman Empire. In the 17th century, when Algeria and Tunisia were taken by the Turks, Morocco managed to stave them off, using as a counterweight Spanish and Portuguese interest in its coastal areas. Certainly Turkish domination was in none of the conquered lands an enlightening influence, but in North Africa it did implant a measure of administrative control that was lacking in Morocco.

The French did better than the Turks in winning Morocco. In 1912 the Treaty of Fes was signed making the country a French Protectorate, and subsequently Spanish zones were established in its northern and southern extremities. Occupation by the French,

however, was of relatively short duration, and its accomplishment was a long and bloody affair. They had come to Algeria in 1830, completed its conquest about 1880, and had held Tunisia since 1881, but—despite the Fes treaty—effective control over all of Morocco was not established until 1934, after fighting that resulted in almost 50,000 French casualties.

Most Arab countries have had at least three or four generations of contact with industrialized nations; and their Westernization—which is largely a matter of education—has been phased out over a longer period than has Morocco's. For that country, independence meant isolation. Not content with holding out against political seizure in the mid-19th century, Morocco strictly limited its commercial exchanges with the outside world. Closed against outside influence, the country became engrossed in internal struggles, for Berber tribes, the soldiers of the Sultan, religious personages, and town bourgeois were in frequent collision. These convulsions resulted in social stagnation, just when Europe was evolving at increasing speed.

This 19th century isolation was, in a sense, a continuation of the past, for Morocco was left more alone than many eastern lands throughout history. Even the Roman occupation was confined to parts of the north. The first Moroccan ruler about whom firm data exist was Juba II, son of a Berber chieftain in the Algerian area whom the Romans educated and placed in control of Moroccan territory about 25 B.C. He married the daughter of Anthony and Cleopatra and established a court of evident sophistication at Volubilis. Traces of this rule remain only in this limited area, indicating—in comparison to far more extensive ruins in the rest of the Maghreb—that Morocco was only lightly held by the Romans.

Not until the Arab invasion at the end of the seventh century did Morocco begin to assume its present character. Whatever the strength of Arab-Berber differences today, history records a truly remarkable degree of accommodation between the two people. Although the Berber tribes initially resisted the Arabs, less than 50 years later (in 711) they were fighting as comrades in Spain. Appealing to the religion of the newly converted people or, perhaps, to their lust for booty, the Arabs were able to lead Berber forces to invade Europe, and they penetrated as far into Gaul as Poitiers. Essentially, the invasion was Berber, commanded by the Berber general Tariq—who gave his name to the Rock (*jabal* in Arabic) of Gibraltar—but it was an Arab operation, directed from Damascus. Spanish lands were allotted to the Arabs and, in the end, they came to contr[1] the principalities that developed there.

Morocco at that time was a province of the Arab Caliphate. The first truly independent Moroccan Kingdom grew from the arrival in Tangier in 788 of Moulay Idriss, a descendant of 'Ali and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. He had escaped from the Arab east after compromising himself in a rebellion against the Abbasids in what is now Iraq. As a sharif, he was able to assume command of Berber tribes in the neighborhood of Volubilis, where he had settled. With their aid, he soon established the city of Fes as his headquarters and began to carve out in rudimentary form the type of Moroccan Kindgom .hat has existed ever since.

This basic nature of the government remained unchanged, although the dynasties that followed that of Moulay Idriss—the Almoravid, Almohad, the Merinid, and the Saadian—came not from the Arab east but from the Berber south. The present Alaouite (Alawite) dynasty also came from the south. Although the Alaouites claim to be a Sharifian family, coming originally from a town on the Red Sea, they had lived for centuries in Tafilalt near modern Erfoud. The founder of the dynasty was Moulay al-Rashid, who succeeded in wresting Fes from Saadian control in 1667.

The succession of these dynasties in Morocco, however, did not mean unification. Throughout the centuries, the country remained an amalgam of tribes, very loosely bound together by the link of religion. It was divided into what came to be known as the *bled al-makhzen,*[2] or lands of government, and the *bled al-siba,* or lands of dissidence. The latter was free of *makhzen* taxes and military levies, and the tribes that composed it maintained that status as long as they could repel the forces of the sultan. Usually the *makhzen* comprised the lowlands between the Rif, the High Atlas, and the Atlantic, and the *siba* was a phenomenon of the mountains and the desert, but the distinction between the two was sharp neither in time nor in geography.

The *makhzen* itself represented essentially medieval and feudalistic control, emanating alternately or concurrently from Fes, Marrakech, and Meknes.

[2]Literally, the word *makhzen* means storehouse. Its application to the government points to the fact that the main purpose of the sultanate administration was the collection of taxes. *Bled* indicates the Moroccan pronounciation of the Arabic word *bilad* (*country*).

Alliance-building was its key element. The sultan used diplomacy and the granting of privileges to win the cooperation of local officials—the *caids* and the *pashas*. (Indicating historical continuity, these titles are still used for the agents of the Ministry of Interior, who administer modern Morocco.) Originally, they were members of the tribal groupings they administered, supposedly in the name of the sultan. Some of the *caids* of the larger southern tribes were only nominally subordinate to the *makhzen*. In fact, they often presided as lords over territories defended by their own armies, and at times they joined the *siba*.

With the coming of the French, the tribes lost military parity with the central authority, and the *siba* was eliminated. At the same time, many elements of *makhzen* administration were retained. General (later Marshal) Louis Lyautey, who presided over the pacification of Morocco, developed the concept of indirect administration. He found it easier to control the country by using local chiefs, and also this policy conformed to official desires to preserve indigenous institutions. The *caids* and *pashas* were subordinate to the French *chefs de region*, but they were allowed a considerable degree of autonomy. In some cases, their positions were bolstered by augmenting their property rights. Thus much of the traditional government and political system survived the French rule relatively intact.

The medieval quality of this system of government was brought before world press and television in 1953—just 3 years before Moroccan independence—when Thami El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakech, collaborated with the French in deposing the Sultan. As a rival and enemy of Mohamed V, the Pasha supported the French when the Sultan began to oppose them. Subsequently, he organized a demonstration of tribesmen to protest the rule of Mohamed V and to justify the French scheme to replace the monarch with a little known but docile member of the Alaouite family. Two years later, persuaded that the French were about to restore Mohamed V to the throne, Thami El Glaoui went to him, kissed his feet, and asked his pardon. The scene was reminiscent of 1076, when Henry IV of Germany submitted to the Pope at Canossa.

Reflecting the nature of the society, the nationalist movement in Morocco was conservative and religious in origin. It grew from the coming together of urban intellectuals who called themselves Salafists and who stood for Islamic reform and the purging of the brotherhoods. One of the leaders of this group was the tutor of Allal El Fassi, the present head of the Istiqlal party. El Fassi himself first won prominence in the 1930's by opposing the so-called Berber *dahir* (decree), by which the French attempted to limit the application of Sharia law. These defenders of Islam naturally opposed administration by a Christian power, so the transition from a religious orientation to one that was overtly political and from reformism to separatism was an easy one. It resulted in the founding of the Istiqlal party in 1943.

The independence struggle was also in the beginning largely an elitist affair, Arab and urban in origin, but its goals came to be supported by resistance groups who fought the French in the countryside and by the growing labor movement. All this while, the society was changing profoundly. The modern infrastructure was being established, modern medicine was contributing to the population growth, and peasants were being drawn off the land by the lure of wages in development work.



Plus c'est la Meme Chose (c)

Sultan Moulay Abd al-Rahman, painted by Delacroix, 1832.

Hassan rides to Friday prayer, 1971.

This latter part of the French aphorism ("The more things change, the more they stay the same.") is often quoted by observers to describe the palace politics of Morocco. Using techniques reminiscent of those of the old *makhzen*, King Hassan manipulates his senior officials and acts to prevent the formation of any group powerful enough to threaten him. In a sense, the real politics of the country is the competition for patronage among the ministers, the trusted advisers of the King who form what is known as the Royal Cabinet, and other members of the military and civilian bureaucracy. Changes in the society and government are promised and some are initiated, but fundamental reform has yet to take place.

The powers of the monarchy grew gradually after independence. In the early governments, Istiqlal party members held most of the important ministerial posts, and they were in a position to bargain with Mohamed V for a constitution and the holding of elections. Disagreements within the party, however, soon gave the King the upper hand. At a time of labor protests and clashes between the tribes and remnants of the Army of National Liberation, the Istiqlal was unable to form a government. Thereafter the King appointed ministers answerable to him "personally" and not to the party. The army responded to his appeal to halt the fighting in the countryside, and the process of reforming it into a national force that would serve as an appendage to the palace was initiated. In the absence of a popular mandate through elections or legal rights under a written constitution, political parties were helpless.

King Hassan has made gestures toward participatory democracy. Under his rule, three constitutions have been promulgated and two national elections have been held. The 1962 constitution established a bicameral legislature and granted limited popular representation. In 1965, however, in the wake of riots in Casablanca and disagreements among members of the King's coalition in the House of Representatives, the King accused the parliamentarians of irresponsibility and dismissed the legislature. He then reverted to personal rule through courtier governments. Another constitution was not put forth until 1970, and the elections for which it provided were boycotted by the important political parties and were apparently rigged. Reform measures taken after the Skhirat massacre included yet another constitution, but it also places no meaningful restrictions on the King's authority. He retains his rights to appoint and dismiss ministers, to declare a

state of emergency, to control in large measure the composition of any legislature that might be elected, and to dissolve it at will.

The division of the opposition and personal rivalries within the political parties have consistently abetted the monarchy's exercise of unrivaled power. The Istiqlal, which upholds traditional values but advocates a constitutional monarchy and such measures as land reform, was badly weakened in 1959, when the younger, more liberal elements broke off to form the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). Representing the non-Communist left, the UNFP has been harrassed by the government since soon after its formation. Like the Istiqlal, it has atrophied because of its long exclusion from power, and in addition it lacks unified leadership. Other parties, such as the Popular Movement, continue to function in Morocco, but they have never had a significant following.

Despite the weakness of the parties, the King continues to consult with their leaders. In 1970 the Istiqlal and the UNFP formed the National Front of Opposition in an attempt to wrest some power from the King; and Hassan has offered them participation in government but on his own terms. He held 28 meetings with party leaders in late 1971 and early 1972 to discuss with them their assumption of ministerial portfolios. In the end, the talks turned out to represent perhaps an exercise in political theatrics. A new government was formed in April, comprised once more of the King's men and of apolitical technicians. Overtures made again to the parties in late 1972 had the same result.

Much has been made of the corruption of the men who surround the King. It is true that a number have used their offices for material gain, that bribery smooths the working of the bureaucracy, and that patronage and favoritism are components of the system. Moreover, the King has in the past dealt lightly with offenders Only one minister had been removed from office for corruption before 1971. Then the Ministers of Finance, Commerce, and Tourism and the Director General of the Bureau of Mines were dismissed, tried, and sentenced after General Medbouh, who was executed for his part in the 1971 coup attempt, discovered they had tried to get $1 million from Pan American World Airways in return for supporting a bid for a hotel site.

Yet it is also true that many of the King's supporters are honorable men and well intentioned. Why have they accomplished so little in bringing about economic growth and an equitable distribution of income? Analysts have argued that use of power in Morocco tends to be defensive, that it is seldom considered a means to chart a new course. Behind this theory is the obvious fact that the King has followed the technique of building up clientele groups, and he has found it easier to govern in this way and with the support of the military than to deal with political parties or with individuals representing constituencies.

These clientele groups are drawn from the Moroccan elite, which itself is small. Members grew up in the protectorate years, and they belong to the prominent families of old Morocco. (As many trace their origins to Fes, complaints about the power of the Fassi—as the bourgeoisie of Fes are called—are commonly heard throughout the country.) They benefited from independence because they were the ones with the money to buy the property the French wanted to sell, and those with the power to arrange transfer of the funds got bargain prices. The fortunes they subsequently amassed, while by no means great ones by Western standards, are sufficient to encourage maintenance of the *status quo*.

The elite, moreover, is characterized by an elaborate system of mutual obligations. Often commercial, marital, and social ties cut across political differences. Allal El Fassi of the Istiqlal, for example, is a personal friend of the King as well as the leader of the opposition to him. Most members of the elite or their associates have participated in the King's patronage system, and thus they tend to feel powerless as the monarchy distributes rewards and privations. The attempted regicides of 1971-72 indicate that the elite is changing, perhaps drastically. But in the past, few of its members have been willing to endanger their well-being or that of their colleagues to achieve the goals they may sincerely hold for the society.

The result seems to be a sort of shifting and collective leadership, always controlled by the King, in which no one is responsible. There is no lack of planning and activity, but very little happens. A case in point is the family planning program. It was established in 1966, and in the Five Year Plan of 1968-72 it was cited as a national priority objective. One measure of the program called for employing and training 600 full-time family planning field workers at the rate of 120 a year. Special funds were allotted to the Ministry of Health for the purpose. In 1968 a group of 35 was trained to do family planning information work, and they began their activities in various parts of Morocco. No additional workers were trained, and in 1970 the Ministry of Health disbanded this small group. Unless the birth rate declines, the population will double in 24 years.

The Poor Not Enriched (c)

We have often said that our socioeconomic policy is aimed at enriching the poor without impoverishing the rich. Unfortunately, for reasons there is no need to set forth now, we have seen that while the poor have not been enriched, the rich have increased their fortunes. Thus the gap between the two categories has only widened. This situation is intolerable in a country like Morocco.

King Hassan, 4 August 1971

The reasons which the King declines to set forth for not enriching the poor are various, and many have economic logic behind them. With limited resources, the government has been reluctant to take measures to endanger production levels or to disrupt the rural sector. Its policies have emphasized economic growth and long-term benefits rather than measures to achieve a more equitable distribution of the gains. Little attention has been given to that problem, although fewer than 10% of the people reportedly receive more than half the national income.

In agriculture, which has been receiving about half the government investment, most of the projects undertaken are those with long gestation periods, such as dam construction. The benefits, moreover, accrue mainly to the modern sector, which consists of the lands confiscated by the government after independence or sold by Europeans to Moroccans, together with some farms still owned by Europeans. This sector provides nearly all the agricultural exports (mainly citrus fruits and vegetables), but it employs only about a quarter of the rural population. Investment would benefit the small farms, on which most of the people live at a subsistence level, supplying them with fertilizers and introducing modern techniques through extension services. However, the disparity in efficiency between the large and small farms is very great, and the government is eager to

increase the exports that the former provide. These exports finance the import of capital goods and also a significant part of the food supply. Once an exporter of wheat, Morocco now must import enough to feed its population even in good crop years.

Underlying agricultural problems is the antiquated land tenure system. Most of the pasture land is still under tribal ownership, a fact which discourages individual development efforts. An estimated 7% of the farmers own over half of the cultivated land; 60% own less than an acre, and 33% have no land at all. The government has distributed about one-sixth of the land it nationalized after independence, but the large estates—particularly those of the wealthy Moroccans—have not been disturbed. Public demands for land distribution are mounting, and land reform is an important issue of the political opposition. Meanwhile, the government is caught between these demands and its reluctance to jeopardize the high production levels of the large farms.

This dilemma and other problems of the government were aggravated throughout most of the 1960's by an economic standstill. Midway in the decade the government curbed spending to relieve inflationary pressures. Then drought years cut inputs to the food processing industry and caused a slump in consumer demand, reinforcing the depressing effects of the reduced government spending. The result was a sharp increase in unemployment. Moreover, the mining industry has been in trouble. Outputs of iron, lead, and zinc ores have declined as mines have been depleted. Morocco has held its place as first or second in world exports of phosphates, depending on the level of U.S. sales in a given year, but that industry is threatened by falling market prices and new foreign competition.

Since 1968 the economy nonetheless has been healthier, largely because of several good crop years. Sharply increased government investment and revived consumer demand resulting from the good harvests prompted a resurgence of economic activity throughout the country, and it has been reflected in rising private investment. Moreover, Morocco has succeeded in putting itself on the world tourist map, thus creating work and bringing in foreign exchange. Both tourism and the relatively high level of private investment, which the government has encouraged, are threatened by the political instability evident since 1971, but to date its effect does not appear to have been serious.

Although the Moroccan economy relies heavily on assistance from the West, it is not without development prospects. The returns from investment in irrigation projects are just forthcoming and will reduce dependence on rainfed agriculture, while production can be further increased by new efforts to obtain higher yields. An agreement has been concluded with the European Economic Community which gives Moroccan production preferential entry into the Common Market countries, and it may serve as an inducement to foreign investors to establish factories there. The textile industry is meeting domestic needs, new industries such as automobile assembly have been established, and there is room for great expansion of tourism.

Cautious efforts are being made to achieve a more equitable distribution of income, although they by no means approach the bold initiative suggested by the King's oratory of August 1971. A progressive tax on incomes amounting to the equivalent of over US$10,000 was instituted in that year. Moreover, indirect taxes—which, together with customs duties, have accounted for about half of budget revenues—have been reduced. Distribution of government land to the peasants has been speeded up, and measures have been taken to encourage labor-intensive industries with hopes of reducing unemployment. While the best of governments could find no quick or easy solutions to the problems of Morocco, evidence of concern for the welfare of the people may assuage discontent.

With or Without the King (s)



After two attempts on the life of the King within 14 months, a "wait-and-see" mood prevails in Morocco, and it permeates as well all comment on the future of the monarchy. Hassan owes his life to the ineptness of the coup plotters; and now the officer corps, which had been the throne's main prop, no longer supplies reliable backing. His purging of senior officers, some of whom undoubtedly have their own supporters both in the military and among the civilian elite, and his sharp criticism of the armed forces must have increased the numbers of those antagonistic to him. Moreover, students, teachers, and laborers have not lost the disruptive capability they demonstrated in riots of 1965. Hassan has assumed control of the military and strengthened his supervision of government administration, but his record as a dilettante does not augur well for efficient and effective rule.

Yet the King is a shrewd man who has proved himself adept at manipulation, and assessment of his rule is not wholly negative. Holding a law degree from Bordeaux University, he combines the style of the West with the traditional way of life in a manner perhaps well suited to his country. As he moves his court to his numerous palaces in an aura of privilege, wealth, and luxury, he preserves an aloofness that may be expected by the mass of people who regard him as their religious leader. At the same time, he is the leader of the Westernized elite and he holds press conferences which occasionally have the give-and-take quality of those in Europe and the United States.

Hassan's major achievement is in the age-old art of statecraft, and his foreign policies have benefited his country. Maintaining a posture of nominal nonalignment but actual pro-Westernism, Morocco since independence has obtained about $860 million in U.S. aid, approximately half as much from France, and almost $120 million from Communist countries. Despite the opposition of the Istiqlal and the UNFP, the King has permitted the United States to retain naval communication facilities in and near Kenitra, probably seeing in the informal agreement an assurance of U.S. aid. This arrangement is threatened by the possibility that Hassan may seek to end it in order to strengthen his credentials among the nonaligned states or to allay domestic criticism. And he has another issue—that of the Spanish Sahara—whose activation would serve the same purposes. Hassan occasionally speaks out strongly against continued Spanish control of this territory, and he also asks for the return of Ceuta and Melilla, but he takes no action in these directions to seriously aggravate Madrid.

While maintaining good relations with the West, Hassan has worked to build his image among Arab and African countries. He was elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at a summit meeting of that organization he hosted in Rabat in June 1972. Although he has kept his country relatively removed from the contagion of the Arab-Israeli conflict and has not been inclined to sacrifice Morocco's U.S. ties to Arab solidarity, he is on good terms with all the Arab states except Libya. Those relations were naturally chilled when the Libyan radio called on the coup plotters to try again after the 1971 attempt on the King's life failed.

One of the most important objectives of Hassan's foreign policy has been the development of a community of interests with his Maghreb neighbors. The

major irritant in relations with Algeria had been Morocco's claims to a large part of the Algerian Sahara, and they led to a brief border war in 1963. Evidently recognizing Morocco's inability to press these claims, Hassan downplayed them, and in 1972 an agreement was signed for demarcation of the disputed area. Moroccan relations with Algeria and Tunisia are presently low key, and the parameters of meaningful economic cooperation are limited by the lack of complementary resourses. Nonetheless, the leaders of these states have exchanged friendly visits, resulting in agreements calling for the denunciation of any pact or force directed against another and for increased cooperation.

In domestic affairs, Hassan has been autocratic but not, for the most part, repressive. His crackdowns on the opposition have, to date at lease, been sporadic. Morocco is rare among the Arab and African states for a multiparty system; and the right of criticism, though restricted, is uncommon for that part of the world. The Istiqlal continues to put out the leading Arabic-language daily newspaper, *Al Alam* (The Banner), and has used it to denounce such measures as the 1970 and 1972 constitutions. In August 1972 the paper carried a statement blaming the King's policies for the attempt on his life. These issues were confiscated, but no further action was taken against the paper. In fact, if one of the attempted coups had succeeded, Moroccans would almost surely have less opportunity to express dissent than they do now.

Morocco also has one of the few independent trade union organizations in African and Arab countries. The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), with some 200,000 members, is an influential group, which supports but is not allied with the leftist UNFP and openly criticizes the monarchy. Although the power of the UMT has been hurt by the great extent of unemployment in the country, it has pressed hard for wage increases and had some success. Perhaps seeing in the UMT a counterweight to army influence, Hassan has not been willing to use force to curb its extended strikes and periodic walkouts.

For several months after the Skhirat massacre, Hassan did succeed in creating a sense of an impending better future. He promulgated a new constitution, promised elections, proclaimed a fight on corruption, raised salaries, and lifted the tax on sugar—an important item in the diet of the Moroccan poor. However, as he postponed elections, appointed another cabinet without party participation, and relied increasingly on the army, it became apparent that the main lesson Hassan had learned from Skhirat was to give more intimate and protected birthday parties. There have been few real indications that the lessons learned from the second attempted coup have been more profound.

Yet it is not too late for the throne to become an agent for change in Morocco. The King could institute meaningful land reform, develop a new class of technicians to guide the development of cooperatives and other projects, shift the tax burden to those able to bear it, and expand the civic action and public works programs engaging the army and the unemployed. In short, Hassan could lead a campaign for social and economic betterment, and he is in a better position to do so than any successor would be. He is less likely to be troubled by regional and other divisive tendencies in the society, for his position still commands respect, especially in the countryside. Such a campaign has been led by the Shah of Iran, whom Hassan is said to admire. And at various times during his reign Hassan has pledged reform and an "agrarian revolution." If change does take place in Morocco and if it is directed by the palace, it will be healthy for King and country.

CHRONOLOGY (U/OU)

c. 146 B.C.-A.D. 400

Roman influence and subsequent control replaces that of the Carthaginians.

A.D. 429

Invasions by Vandals and Visigoths begin.

c. 685

Arab raiders enter Morocco through the Taza gap.

711

Forces under the leadership of the Arab governor Musa Ibn Nusayr and his Berber subaltern Tariq invade Spain.

c. 788

Moulay Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet, establishes the first Moroccan dynasty and extends hegemony over most of the northern part of the country.

c. 1000

Arab tribes of the Hilal invade Morocco.

1062

Berber tribes from the south make Marrakech the new capital and found Almoravid dynasty.

1147

New confederation takes Marrakech and its leaders become the Almohad rulers.

1212

Almohad forces are defeated in Spain, and Muslim power there begins to wane.

c. 1216

The Beni Merin tribe enters Morocco, defeats the Almohads, and eventually establishes the Merinid dynasty.

1549

Capture of Fes marks beginning of control by the Saadians, who had previously defeated Portuguese forces.

c. 1576

Sultan Abd al-Malik is influenced by the Ottoman Turks, who then controlled the rest of the Maghreb, but he resists their domination.

1664

Moulay al-Rashid becomes the first strong ruler of the Alaouite dynasty, which started to rise to power about 1660.

1787

Morocco and the United States sign the Treaty of Marrakech, settling differences resulting from pirate seizure of U.S. ships.

1912

Treaty of Fes establishes the French Protectorate; Spanish zones are recognized in the north and south and the existing international status of Tangier is accepted.

1956
March

Formal independence is granted by France to French Protectorate of Morocco.

April

Spain relinquishes control over Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.

October

International status of Tangier is revoked; zone is integrated into Morocco.

1958
April

Spain relinquishes control over the southern Spanish zone of Morocco.

1960
June

U.S. military assistance program is initiated.

1961
February

King Mohamed V dies.

March

Mohamed's son is enthroned as King Hassan II and maintains royal control of the government, acting as his own Prime Minister.

1962
December

Morocco's first written constitution becomes effective, following approval by popular referendum.

1963
October

Moroccan territorial claims lead to 3-week border war with Algeria.

December

U.S. Strategic Air Command completes evacuation of three bases in Morocco.

1965
March

Student demonstrations in Casablanca escalate into violent antigovernment riots joined by the unemployed and by young militants from opposition factions. Violence spreads to Fes but not to other cities. About 250 are killed, 4,000 injured, and 850 arrested.

1965
June

King declares a State of Exception (*l'etat d'exception*), dismisses parliament, and promises a revised constitution and new elections.

October

Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled UNFP leader, is kidnapped in Paris. Facts of his disappearance remain unclear, but case leads to a deterioration in Morocco's relationship with France. In January 1966, France recalls its Ambassador to Morocco, and Morocco recalls its Ambassador to France.

1966
October

Hassan visits Moscow. Four conventions are signed, including a general economic aid agreement.

1969
January

Spain and Morocco sign the Treaty of Fes in which Spain agrees to return to Morocco the enclave of Ifni.

Morocco and Algeria sign the Ifrane Treaty of Friendship.

December

France and Morocco agree to reestablish full diplomatic relations.

1970
August

King Hassan promulgates a new constitution and lifts the State of Exception. Elections are held for a new unicameral legislature.

1971
July

High-ranking army officers lead an unsuccessful coup attempt against King Hassan at his birthday celebration at Skhirat Palace. Loyal forces under the direction of Gen. Mohamed Oufkir restore order within a few days.

1972
March

King Hassan promulgates a new constitution but makes no firm promise on a date for new elections and the establishment of parliament.

August

The King escapes another attempt on his life when three Moroccan Air Force F-5's try to shoot down the plane bringing him from France.

AREA BRIEF*

LAND:

Size: 158,100 sq. mi.

Use: About 32% arable and grazing land, 17% forest and esparto, 51% desert, waste, and urban (1965)

Land boundaries: 1,240 mi.

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. (fishing, 12 n. mi.)

Coastline: 1,140 mi.

PEOPLE:

Population: 15.8 million (July 1972 est.), average annual growth rate, at least 2.9%.

Ethnic divisions: 99.1% Arab-Berber, 0.2% Jewish, 0.7% foreign, mainly French

Religion: 98.7% Muslim, 1.1% Christian, 0.2% Jewish

Language: Arabic (official); several Berber dialects; French predominates in business, government, diplomacy, and post-primary education

Literacy: 20%

Labor force: Almost 5.9 million (1970 est.); 69% in agriculture, 10% in industry and mining, 10% in commerce and government

Organized labor: About 5% of the labor force, mainly in the Union of Moroccan workers (UMT)

GOVERNMENT:

Type: Constitutional monarchy

Capital: Rabat

Political subdivisions: 19 provinces and 2 prefectures

Legal system: Based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Constitution provides for Prime Minister and ministers named by and responsible to King; King has paramount executive powers; unicameral legislature (two thirds to be directly elected, one third indirectly); judiciary independent of other branches

Government leaders: King Hassan II

Suffrage: Universal over age 20

Elections: Last parliamentary elections held 21 and 28 August 1970; elections for new parliament created by the constitution adopted 15 March 1972 have not been held

Political parties: Istiqlal party, National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), Popular Movement (MP), Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPCD), Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS), established in June 1968 and banned September 1969, is front for Moroccan Communist Party (MCP), which was proscribed in 1959; Istiqlal and the UNFP formed a National Front in July 1970 to oppose the new constitution

Voting strength: August 1970 elections were nonpolitical; 1 March 1972 constitutional referendum tallied 98.7% for new constitution, 1.25% opposed, and National Front abstained from voting

Communists: 300 est.

Member of: Arab League, ECC (association until 1974), FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, ILO, IMC, IMCO, IMF, ITU, OAU, Seabeds Committee (observer), U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY:

GNP: $2.7 billion (1970, constant 1966 prices), about $170 per capita; average annual growth 5.4% during 1968-71 (C)

Agriculture: Cereal farming and livestock raising predominate; main crops—wheat, barley, citrus fruit, wine, vegetables, olives

Major industries: Mining and mineral processing (phosphates, smaller quantities of iron, manganese, lead, zinc, and other minerals); food processing, textiles

Electric Power: 748,000 kw. capacity (1971); 1.9 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971), 116 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: $488 million (f.o.b., 1970); food products 51%, phosphates 23%, other 26% (C)

Imports: $686 million (c.i.f., 1970); food 17%, raw material and semifinished goods 43%, equipment 24%, consumer goods 16% (C)

Major trade partners: Exports—France 36%, U.S. 2%; imports—France 31%, West Germany 9%, Italy 5%, Benelux 5%, U.S. 14% (C)

Aid:

Economic—Includes about $720 million from the United States through June 1970; Communist countries, about $80 million

Military—U.S., $67 million; France, $41 million; and Communist countries, $33 million delivered through June 1970 (S)

Monetary conversion rate: 4.59 dirhams = US$1 (selling rate)

Fiscal year: Calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 1,100 mi. standard gage, 93 mi. double track; 493 mi. electrified

Highways: 32,180 mi.; 11,200 mi. bituminous, 3,250 mi. gravel, crushed stone, or improved earth, 17,733 mi. unimproved earth (C)

Pipelines: Crude oil, 85 mi.; refined products, 307 mi.; natural gas, 18 mi.

Ports: 8 major (including Spanish-controlled Ceuta and Mellila), 12 minor

*The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is Unclassified/Official Use Only unless otherwise indicated.

Merchant marine: 13 ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 36,900 g.r.t., 48,400 d.w.t.; includes 11 cargo, 2 specialized carrier (C)

Civil air: 10 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 143 total, 87 usable; 23 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 12,000 ft.; 10 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 40 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Superior system by African standards composed of open-wire lines, coaxial multiconductor and submarine cables and radio-relay links; principal centers Casablanca and Rabat, secondary centers Fes, Marrakech, Oujda, Sebaa Aioun, Tangier and Tetouan; 170,000 telephones; about 1 million radio and 300,000 TV receivers; 24 Moroccan AM, 1 Voice of America AM, 3 FM, 17 TV stations; 11 submarine cables

DEFENSE FORCES:

Personnel: Army, 49,000; navy, 1,600; air force, 3,100 (130 pilots); Mobile Maghzen of Auxiliary Forces, 6,000; royal gendarmerie, 3,500; Mobile Intervention Companies of the national police, 2,500; Males 15-49, 3,827,000 (January 1973 est.), of whom about 68% fit for military service; about 175,000 reach military age (18) annually (S)

Major ground units: 1 light security brigade, 1 parachute brigade, 9 infantry battalions, 1 heavy mortar battalion, 4 cavalry battalions, 1 Royal Guard battalion, 2 motorized infantry brigades, 1 mechanized infantry brigade, and 1 armored brigade which were disbanded in late 1972 consisted of 9 infantry battalions, 4 artillery battalions, 4 tank battalions, 3 reconnaissance (armored infantry) battalions, 1 assault gun battalion, and 1 antitank gun battalion; status of these units has not been determined (S)

Ships: 17 (15 patrol, 1 amphibious, 1 service) (S)

Aircraft: 182 (52 jet, 113 prop, 17 helicopters) (S)

Supply: Produces some small arms and ammunition; dependent on U.S., France, Czechoslovakia, and U.S.S.R. for other materiel (C)

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1971, $143.9 million; 16.5% of total budget

(1)

Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U/OU)

	COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'W.
Abda (*tribal area*)	32 15	8 55
Agadir	30 24	9 36
Agadir (*admd*)	30 00	9 00
Ahermoumou	33 50	4 24
Ain el Aouda	33 48	6 47
Aït Ammar	33 05	6 10
Aït Melloul	30 21	9 30
Al Hoceima	35 15	3 56
Al Hoceima (*admd*)	35 00	4 15
Anti-Atlas (*mts*)	30 00	8 30
Asilah	35 28	6 02
Atlas Mountains (*mts*)	32 00	2 00
Azilal	31 58	6 34
Azrou	33 26	5 13
Ben Slimane	33 33	7 07
Benguerir	32 14	7 57
Beni Idir (*area*)	32 52	6 47
Beni Mellal	32 20	6 21
Beni Mellal (*admd*)	32 30	6 30
Beni Oukil, Station de (*rsta*)	34 38	2 02
Berrechid	33 16	7 36
Bine el Ouidane	32 06	6 26
Bleïda (*ruin*)	30 22	6 25
Bou Arfa	32 32	1 57
Cap Spartel (*cape*)	35 48	5 56
Casablanca	33 37	7 35
Casablanca (*admd*)	33 37	7 35
Ceuta (*Spanish possession*)	35 52	5 20
Chaouia (*tribal area*)	33 12	7 20
Chefchaouene	35 10	5 16
Djebel Jeer (*gasfield*)	31 25	9 14
Doukkala (*tribal area*)	32 55	8 25
Drâa, Oued (*strm*)	28 40	11 07
El Guefaf	32 55	6 46
El Hajeb	33 42	5 22
El Jabha	35 13	4 40
El Jadida (*admd*)	32 54	8 30
El Kelaa des Srarhna	32 03	7 24
Erfoud	31 26	4 14
Essaouira	31 31	9 46
Fès	32 02	4 59
Fès (*admd*)	34 00	5 00
Figuig	32 06	1 14
Gara Djebilet, Algeria (*mine*)	26 45	7 29
Goulimine	28 59	10 04
Guercif	34 14	3 22
Haouz (*plain*)	31 30	8 00
Hassi Bellal	34 18	2 11
Haut (High) Atlas (*mountain range*)	32 00	6 00
Heïmer, Oued el (*foundary*)	34 27	1 54
Ifni (*area*)	29 15	10 08
Ifrane	33 32	5 06
Imi n-Irfi (*mine*)	30 04	8 24
Imini	31 06	7 17
Jerada	34 19	2 09
Kasba Talda	32 36	6 16
Kechoulah (*gasfield*)	31 31	9 20
Kenitra	34 16	6 36
Kenitra (*admd*)	34 00	6 00
Kettara, Mine de (*mine*)	31 52	8 10
Khemisset	33 49	6 04
Khenifra	32 56	5 40
Khouribga	32 53	6 54
Khouribga (*admd*)	32 56	6 36
Ksar el Kebir	35 00	5 59
Ksar es Souk (*admd*)	31 00	4 00
Lúgar, Spain	36 47	3 24
Marrakech	31 38	8 00
Marrakech (*admd*)	32 00	8 00
Mechra Bel Ksiri	34 34	5 57
Mediouna	33 27	7 31
Meknès	33 54	5 33
Meknès (*admd*)	33 00	5 30
Melah, Oued (*strm*)	33 43	7 24
Melilla (*Spanish possession*)	35 19	2 57
Mohammedia	33 42	7 24
Moulouya, Oued (*strm*)	35 06	2 20
Moyen (Middle) Atlas (*mountain range*)	33 30	4 39
Nador	35 11	2 56
Na ior (*admd*)	35 00	3 00
Ouarzazate	30 55	6 55
Ouarzazate (*admd*)	31 00	6 30
Oued el Heïmer	34 27	1 54
Oued Sous (*strm*)	30 22	9 37
Oued Zarjoune	35 44	5 27
Oued Zem	32 52	6 34
Oujda	34 40	1 54
Oujda (*admd*)	33 00	2 00
Oum er Rbia, Oued (*strm*)	33 19	8 20
Penmarch, France	47 49	4 20
Rabat	34 02	6 50
Rabat-Salé (*admd*)	34 02	6 50
Ras el Aswad (*cape*)	35 41	5 17
Rharb (*tribal area*)	34 30	6 02
Rif, Er (*mountain region*)	35 00	4 00
Safi	32 18	9 14
Safi (*admd*)	31 55	9 00
Salé	34 04	6 48
Sebaa Aioun	33 54	5 22
Sebou, Oued (*strm*)	34 16	6 41
Settat (*admd*)	33 00	7 30
Sidi Allal Tazi	34 31	6 20
Sidi Bou Knadel	34 08	6 44
Sidi el Aidi, Gare de (*rsta*)	33 07	7 38
Sidi Ifni	29 23	10 10
Sidi Kacem	34 13	5 42
Sidi Rhalem (*oilfield*)	31 25	9 35
Sidi Slimane	34 16	5 56
Sidi Yahy du Rharb	34 19	6 19
Skhirat	33 52	7 03
Souk el Arba du Rharb	34 41	5 59
Sous, Oued (*strm*)	30 22	9 37
Tadla (*plain*)	32 30	6 20
Tafilalt	32 23	4 30
Tafilalt (*oasis*)	31 18	4 18
Tanerhift	32 24	4 49
Tanfit	30 56	5 49
Tanfit, Plaine de	32 57	5 00
Tanger (*admd*)	35 45	5 45
Tangier	35 48	5 48
Tan-Tan	28 26	11 06
Tarfaya	27 57	12 55
Tarfaya (*admd*)	28 00	11 00
Taza (*admd*)	34 00	4 00
Taza, Trouée de (*pass*)	34 15	4 00
Temara	33 55	6 55
SELECTED AIRFIELDS		
Al Hoceima-Cote du Rif	35 11	3 50
Casablanca/Anfa	33 34	7 40
Casablanca/Nouasseur	33 22	7 35
Fes/Saiss	33 56	4 58
Kenitra	34 18	6 36
Marrakech	31 36	8 02
Meknes	33 53	5 31
Rabat-Sale	34 03	6 45
Tangier/Boukhalf	35 44	5 55
Tétouan	35 34	5 22
Tétouan (*admd*)	35 35	5 30
Tindouf, Algeria	27 42	4 09
Tit Mellil	33 34	7 29
Tiznit	29 43	9 43
Tleta Sidi Mbarek Bou Guedra	32 16	8 59
Touissit	34 29	1 46
Volubilis (*ruin*)	34 04	5 33
Youssoufia	32 15	8 32
Zaïo	34 57	2 44
Zaouia Ahanesal	31 51	6 07
Zeida	32 49	4 57
Zellija-Boubeker	34 29	1 43

②



Morocco
International boundary
Province or préfecture boundary
National capital
Casablanca Province or préfecture capital
Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road or track
Airfield
Major port
Populated places
Over 100,000
25,000 to 100,000
Under 25,000
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1:2,430,000
0 25 50 75 100
Statute Miles
0 25 50 75 100
Kilometers
10
32
Atlantic
Ocean
Mohammedia
Azemmour
El Jadida
(Mazagan)
Sidi Said
Beddouza
Safi
Essaouira
(Mogador)
Mine de Kettara
Barrage
Cap Rhir
Agadir
8304
Tiznit

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

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







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



Summary Map

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