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Government and Politics

Singapore

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by January 1973.

SINGAPORE

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This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1968, copies of which should be destroyed.

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Government and Politics

A. Summary and background (C)

The tiny but strategically located Republic of Singapore is one of Asia's youngest nations, having become independent only in August 1965. It is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system modeled on the British pattern, and has been governed since 1959 by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party (PAP). Although Singapore is in effect a one-party state dominated by the strong-willed Lee and the PAP, the government's success in fostering economic prosperity, effective government, and modern social services has given it a wide base of popular support.

Ever since the founding of Singapore by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819, its governmental structure has been heavily influenced by British institutions. For over a century the island was part of the Straits Settlements, together with Malacca and Penang on the Malay Peninsula. From 1826 the Settlements were a residency of the British East India Company; in 1867 they became a Crown Colony under the jurisdiction of the British Colonial Office. When Malacca and Penang were detached in 1946 to become part of the Malayan Union—later the Federation of Malaya—Singapore remained a Crown Colony and the British initiated the first steps toward limited internal self-government.

The British allowed Singapore's first legal political party to be formed in 1947, and the first popular elections, for a few seats in the hitherto all-appointed Legislative Council, were held the next year. In 1951 elections were authorized for a slightly larger Council, but most seats remained appointive, and only a fraction of the eligible voters bothered to go to the polls. By the 1955 elections the British—pressured by continuing demands for self-government—had promulgated the Rendel Constitution, which provided for a new legislature, the Legislative Assembly, in which most seats would be elective, and for the leader of the strongest party to be named Chief Minister and in turn name six of the nine cabinet members; the British Crown continued to retain ultimate power through the Governor.

The existence of the 1955 constitution prompted a large election turnout, as the British had hoped. It also surfaced a disquieting political unrest, largely leftist, that had seethed during the years of nonrepresentative government and fanned popular sentiment among all groups for total self-government. The long-proscribed Communist underground saw its best hope of success in supporting PAP, which—though not then the stable vehicle that now rules Singapore—seemed the party of the future. PAP rallies accordingly drew large crowds of trade unionists and Chinese students who shouted anticolonial slogans and sang pro-Communist songs; Communist influence in PAP was strong until the left wing split off and formed the *Barisan Sosialis Singapura* in 1961. Also leftist was the Labour Front which, though the lead party in the 1955 elections, was a loosely organized group of socialists and trade unionists whose mercurial leader, David Marshall, became Singapore's first Chief Minister. Rivalries among these and several lesser parties created a turbulent political scene in the late 1950's.

The British granted independence to the Federation of Malaya in August 1957 but refused to consider it for Singapore—chiefly because of the island's strategic value as a military base and commercial center but also because of the above-mentioned aggressive leftist movements. During 1958, however, Britain took the final steps toward granting Singapore full autonomy in domestic matters. In June 1959, following elections in which Lee Kuan Yew's PAP won a large majority in the legislature, a revised constitution was implemented granting Singapore full control over its internal affairs except for security; a tripartite Internal Security Council composed of British, Malayan, and Singaporean representatives was charged with monitoring Singapore's internal security situation. Defense and foreign affairs continued to remain British responsibilities.

A major plank of the PAP's 1959 platform advocated independence through merger with Malaya. Federation leaders at first firmly rejected this idea for fear that the incorporation of Singapore's predominantly Chinese population would threaten the ethnic Malays' traditional political paramountcy. Lee Kuan Yew nevertheless pressed for merger, arguing that such a move would contain the Communist-led leftist movement in Singapore and warning that the likely alternative might eventually be a Communist-dominated independent Singapore on Malaya's doorstep. Convinced by these arguments, Malaya's Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in May 1961 publicly advocated an enlarged federation that would encompass not only Malaya and Singapore but also the British territories in Borneo. His inclusion of the latter territories—populated largely by Malay-type tribal groups—was obviously aimed at providing an ethnic counterweight to Chinese-dominated Singapore.

Once Rahman focused attention on it, the "Malaysia concept" became the subject of extended negotiations among the governments concerned. These talks culminated in the Malaysia Agreement of July 1963, signed by the United Kingdom, Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. Despite bitter opposition by Communist-oriented groups in Singapore, who saw the move as a sellout to the conservative, Malay-dominated regime in Kuala Lumpur, a popular referendum held in Singapore in mid-1963 resulted in a 71% vote in favor of merger. Thus, on 16 September 1963 the British flag was hauled down in both Singapore and the Borneo states, and Malaysia came into being.

In the enlarged federation Singapore was given a considerable measure of internal autonomy, but as a *quid pro quo* its representation in the federal parliament in Kuala Lumpur was substantially smaller than the size of its population would warrant. A continued British military presence in Singapore was assured by the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement, which was extended to all of Malaysia.

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had ardently backed merger as a way for Singapore—with its largely Chinese population—to avoid economic and political isolation and, hopefully, as a way for the Singaporean people to join with the various ethnic and cultural groups of the other member states in a truly multiracial society. After merger became a reality, Lee, so as to further promote these goals, attempted to extend his political base beyond Singapore. In 1964 he fielded PAP candidates in elections in the Malay Peninsula, and in May 1965 he set up the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to press for a "Malaysian Malaysia . . . the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia," in which there would be political equality for all, regardless of ethnic background.

Lee's efforts to inject his party into national politics alarmed leaders of the Malaysian Alliance—the political coalition that dominates the Kuala Lumpur federal government. These leaders were already upset by the extent of local Chinese economic control in Malaysia. The problem was worsened by a pronounced personality conflict between Lee and several Malaysian leaders. In early August 1965, Rahman bluntly told Lee that Singapore must withdraw from Malaysia. The result was a separation agreement and the declaration of Singapore's independence on 9 August 1965.

At the time of separation Singapore's leaders were concerned about their nation's ability to survive independently. Heavy dependence on Malaysia for both raw materials and markets and the loss of a lucrative trade with Indonesia, because of Sukarno's determination to break up the Malaysia federation, appeared to threaten Singapore's economic viability. Malay-Chinese friction that had erupted into communal rioting in 1964 seemed likely to recur, and Lee was also disturbed by the tendency of many Malay and Chinese Singaporeans to look to Kuala Lumpur and Peking, respectively, for political and cultural guidance. Moreover, all Singapore leaders feared for the long-range security of their small state, surrounded by Malays and a natural target for Peking's subversion because of its largely Chinese population. London's announcement in 1968 that it was moving up to 1971 the date for withdrawing its military forces from Malaysia and Singapore added further to Singapore's unease. Figure 1 depicts two divergent viewpoints in Singapore with regard to independence.

Since the mid-1960's, however, apprehension over Singapore's future has been supplanted by growing confidence. Fears that Britain's military pullout would spur unemployment by adding thousands of British-base employees to an already large unemployed force have been dispelled, as expanded business, service industries, and foreign-investment projects actually caused a labor shortage during 1972 and required the import of about 70,000 laborers, mostly from Malaysia. As a result of its expanding economy, Singapore now has the second highest standard of living in Asia—surpassed only by Japan.

Concern over the security implications of the British pullout has been partly alleviated by Singapore's participation since 1971 in a Five Power Defense



PAP urges "Build a Vigorous Singapore"

Leftist union opposes idea

FIGURE 1. Singapore independence—two views (U/OU)

Arrangement, under which the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand maintain a modest military presence in Singapore and Malaysia. In late 1972, however, both Australia and New Zealand came under Labor Party leadership which may remove most or all of their units in 1974. Singapore has bolstered its own security and defense forces through national conscription and the acquisition of more modern equipment. Also in the name of security, the government passed a series of laws in the late 1960's providing stiff penalties for unauthorized political activities.

Singapore's success in achieving stability and prosperity rests with Lee Kuan Yew and a small group of intimate colleagues. Lee has served as Prime Minister ever since the island acquired internal self-government in 1959. A brilliant Cambridge-educated lawyer, Lee continues as the dominant figure in both the PAP and the government and has demonstrated his ability to chart and navigate an intricate political course. Among his able and trusted advisers, the most influential is Defense Minister Goh Keng Swee.

Prime Minister Lee has won grudging acceptance from many who formerly questioned his motives. Conservative domestic elements and Western observers who deemed Lee a dangerous radical during his rise to political power in the 1950's now accept him as a staunch defender of Singapore's essentially capitalistic, entrepreneurial system. While much of the poorer sector of the population—educated in Chinese-language schools and still strongly attached to Chinese culture—still suspects Lee as a member of the English-educated elite, the size and importance of this sector has been reduced by governmental programs stressing English-language education and Singaporean national identity. Moreover, economic prosperity, firm security and political controls, and the lack of effective leadership among the chauvinistic Chinese have combined to undercut the latter's opposition to Lee's administration. Earlier fears among the Malay and Indian population that they would be severely handicapped by discriminatory measures have largely been allayed by the government's evenhanded communal policies.

Having won a clean sweep in parliamentary elections in both 1968 and 1972, and lacking any apparent internal or external threat, the well-entrenched Lee government seems assured of

dominating the political scene for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, problems are on the horizon. The growing prominence of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for example, is rekindling a sense of ethnic and cultural pride among Singapore's Chinese citizens and is bolstering those who resist government policies designed to create an Anglicized Singaporean national identity. China's rising status is expected to force Lee to accelerate his timetable for developig relations with Peking and could result in some increase in Chinese Communist subversive activities. Moreover, the continuance of Singapore's low wage level—which until May 1972 was arbitrarily controlled to make Singapore attractive for industrial investment—could create discontent in the face of the high level of business prosperity. A critical test for the Lee government will be whether it can raise wages without at the same time losing for Singapore an asset that has made po: ible its current industrial buildup.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U 'OU)

1. Constitution

The Republic of Singapore is a constitutional democracy based on the British parliamentary system. In Singapore, however, the executive branch enjoys greater power than in the British model, primarily because of the lack of meaningful political opposition to Lee Kuan Yew.

The constitution is basically the same as that drawn up for the State of Singapore while a member of Malaysia, except for amendments necessitated by separation on 9 August 1965. Separation forced Singapore to reorganize its administration, assume responsibility for its foreign relations, and provide for its own defense—particularly after Britain's announced plan for a military withdrawal in 1971. Parliament accomplished the initial constitutional changes through the Constitution Amendment Bill and the Republic of Singapore Independence Bill which it passed in December 1965 and made retroactive to the separation date. The constitution says nothing about civil rights as such but states that it is the government's responsibility "constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities." With regard to the Malay minority, the constitution specifically enjoins the government "to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language." The minuscule Indian minority (7%) is not mentioned by name. Amendment of the constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote by Parliament.

2. Executive

a. Structure

Executive authority is vested formally in the President as head of state, but his duties are largely ceremonial and circumscribed. He can convene, adjourn, and dissolve Parliament, and the legislation it enacts must have his approval to become law. He can also make numerous appointments within government, but only on the advice and recommendations of other government leaders, councils, and commissions. Parliament appoints the President to a 4-year term, and it may remove him by a two-thirds majority vote.

Because the presidency is devoid of real political power, Parliament customarily chooses a nonpolitical man for the office. Benjamin Henry Sheares, the incumbent since January 1971, is a semiretired gynecologist with no history of active involvement in political affairs. In accord with Singapore's multiracial emphasis, Dr. Sheares is a Eurasian, and his predecessor was a Malay.

Real executive power is centered in the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The individual the President appoints as Prime Minister must be a member of Parliament who commands the confidence of its majority; in practice this individual leads the majority party. The Prime Minister selects his cabinet from members of Parliament, with formal appointments being made by the President. The total number of cabinet positions is not fixed by the constitution; in early 1973 there were 13 ministries (excluding the office of the Prime Minister), filled by 12 ministers.[1] Lee Kuan Yew works very closely with the cabinet, all of whose members he handpicks for their loyalty and capability. Lee sounds out their views, but his own predominate. Like most other government bodies, the cabinet reflects Singapore's racial mixture; there are nine Chinese, one Malay, one Indian, and one Eurasian. If the Prime Minister loses the confidence of Parliament or gives up his membership in it, the cabinet must resign; however, the President may reject its resignation and instead dissolve Parliament and force new elections. Figure 2 shows the structure of government.

[1]For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.



FIGURE 2. Structure of government (U/OU)

The constitution does not provide regular deputies for the prime ministership or the presidency. In the event of illness or absence, the President may appoint "any other minister" as acting prime minister, and the cabinet may appoint as acting president someone who "would be qualified to be . . . president." A deputy prime ministership existed for a time despite the lack of constitutional authorization, but it has not been filled since April 1968. In May 1968 Parliament—concerned over the illness of then-President Yusof—authorized itself to name a vice president, but it did not do so; its speaker took over as acting president during Yusof's illness and following his death in 1969.

The possibility of Lee's exit has never had to be considered, since he is firmly in control and also relatively young (49) and healthy. Lee says, however, that he may be ready to turn power over to a new group by the late 1970's or early 1980's, and he seems to be building up a coterie of younger party men capable of tackling the job. Should Lee die or for some reason vacate his position, his successor would likely be one of PAP's inner circle, such as Defense Minister Goh Keng Swee.

b. Administration

For nearly a century under the British, Singapore's administration was conducted by a number of executive departments supervised by the colonial secretary, who in turn was responsible to the governor. Since the Rendel Constitution of 1955, however, the various executive departments have been apportioned, sometimes arbitrarily, among the cabinet ministers. The Prime Minister may charge any minister in writing with responsibility for any department or subject, may revoke or vary any of these assignments at will, and may retain in his own charge any department or field he chooses.

Each ministry has a permanent secretary and/or a parliamentary secretary, and some ministries have political secretaries as well. The permanent secretary is the only one of these offices provided for in the constitution, however; the others are Prime Ministerial appointments designed to expand party involvement in government programs. The permanent secretary—the top-ranking civil servant in each ministry—is appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister from a list of names submitted by the Public Service Commission. Each permanent secretary is assigned to a particular ministry by the Prime Minister but, once appointed, he serves under the direction of the minister concerned.

The Public Service Commission, formed in 1951, advises the President on appointments, promotions, and other civil service matters and also serves as a central agency for planning and administering scholarships, training awards, and grants. The Commission consists of a chairman and no fewer than two nor more than four other members, each appointed by the President on the Prime Minister's advice. It is served by a secretariat consisting of career civil servants.

In 1970 there were 66,899 civil service employees—54,493 "monthly-rated" staff and 12,406 "daily-rated" workers. With the exception of judges and police officers below the rank of inspector, all appointments and promotions to monthly-rated posts are made by the Public Service Commission or the

Legal Service Commission, its counterpart for legal positions. The civil service is organized into four divisions: I–administrative and professional grades; II–executive and nonprofessional grades; III–clerical and allied grades; and IV–mainly unskilled workers.

No more than 300 Singaporeans, however, bear the main burden of planning and administration. "If all the 300 were to crash in one jumbo jet," speculates the Prime Minister, "then Singapore will disintegrate."

3. Legislature

Parliament is a unicameral body responsible for enacting laws for the "peace, order and good government of Singapore." Until the September 1972 election it consisted of 58 members from the same number of electoral constituencies. In that election, seven new seats raised the total to 65. Prior to the election, 21 of the 58 constituencies had been redivided to account for population shifts.

Members of Parliament must be 21 years of age or over and are chosen by compulsory universal suffrage. A full parliamentary term is 5 years; if Parliament is dissolved, a new election must be held within 3 months. An earlier rule that interim vacancies be filled within 3 months was abolished by the Constitution Amendment Act of 1965. Parliament convenes periodically but has no scheduled meeting dates. Proceedings may be conducted in English, Malay, Mandarin, or Tamil, with simultaneous translations provided.

Parliament is dominated by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the ruling People's Action Party. PAP has held most of the seats in Parliament since 1959; since 1968 it has occupied all of them. This has enabled Lee to see to it that Parliament's membership is balanced racially in proportions about equal to the numbers of Chinese, Malays, Indians and others in the population.

Although the President has certain theoretical restraints over Parliament, these have had no practical significance. The President's required approval of legislation, for example, is largely *pro forma*, since he is chosen by Parliament and must answer to it. Similarly, a Presidential Council appointed by the President in 1969 to review legislation for possible infringement of minority rights has been largely disregarded: since 1970 Parliament has withheld from the council prior perusal of any legislation on defense, security, public safety, "peace" or "good order."

4. Local government

Local government is not provided for in the constitution. However, Citizens' Consultative Committees were set up in 1966 in all electoral constituencies to inform the government of the people's needs and the people of the government's actions and policies. For administrative purposes, the 65 committees are grouped into three Rural District and five City District Citizens' Consultative Committees, each having a civil servant as the ex officio secretary responsible to the Prime Minister's Office.

5. Judiciary

Singapore has a highly centralized and efficient judicial system which is based on English common law but modified to suit local conditions. The Chief Justice, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, heads the judiciary and exercises administrative judicial system.

The highest tribunal is the Supreme Court, consisting of a High Court, Court of Appeal, and Court of Criminal Appeal. The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in serious criminal and civil cases and also has appellate, general supervisory, and revisionary jurisdiction over the Subordinate Courts. Two High Court judges (one of them the presiding judge) have ruled on capital offenses since 1970, when trial by jury for such offenses was abolished; all other trial by jury was ended a decade earlier. Appeals of High Court decisions go to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Criminal Appeal. Supreme Court decisions may be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Singapore's ultimate appellate court, which sits in London.

Singapore's Subordinate Court system includes district and magistrates' courts, juvenile courts, coroners' courts, and a Sharia (Islamic law) Court which handles cases involving only Muslims and usually concerns Muslim marriages. Both the district and magistrates' courts have original criminal and civil jurisdiction. District courts try criminal cases, imprisonment for which must not exceed 7 years, and civil cases involving a maximum of S$5,000. Magistrates' courts try criminal cases for which prison terms do not exceed 3 years and civil offenses involving no more than S$1,000. Juvenile courts handle cases similar to those in district or magistrates' courts, except that the offenders are children. Coroners' courts hold inquests into the circumstances where there is reason to suspect a violent or unnatural death has occurred.

Although justice is administered fairly, many Singaporeans are concerned over the lack of civil liberties. They deplore the jury system's demise and such laws as the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance—allowing the government to hold a person

without trial up to 2 years—and the Criminal Law Temporary Provisions Ordinance, which enabled the government in the late 1960's to jail without trial over 600 "criminal detainees" (many in the maximum security Changi Prison). Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew justifies such actions on what he considers pragmatic grounds, but he once admitted to the Advocates' and Solicitors' Society—one of his chief critics: "We have departed in quite a number of material aspects . . . from the principles of justice and the liberty of the individual . . . in order to maintain norm al standards. . . . This is a heavy price."

C. Political dynamics

1. The political context (U/OU)

Singapore's political system, thanks to British tutelage, is fairly sophisticated but lacks the balance of the British model. Popular interest and involvement in politics date back to essentially 1955 (when Singaporeans first elected a majority of representatives in the legislature) but took on major significance only during the 1959 elections, just prior to Singapore's acquiring autonomy over its internal affairs. Political awareness mounted with the formation of Malaysia in 1963 and Singapore's forced withdrawal from it 2 years later. Government efforts since separation to protect the rights of its Malay minority (15% of the population) by retaining Malay as the national language and by granting equal employment rights, citizenship guarantees, and special educational stipends, have quieted Malay fears of becoming second-class citizens but have antagonized Chinese chauvinist elements, who accuse the government of demeaning Chinese culture and bowing to Malay pressures. By and large, wider participation in and responsibility for government have helped Singapore's several ethnic groups identify more closely with the national government.

Mandatory voting forces everyone to the polls, even for minor by-elections, but nebulous issues and a paucity of choices often make such events perfunctory. Most Singaporeans have no tradition of participatory democracy or the protection of civil rights through such legal tools as *habeas corpus*, and are therefore satisfied to settle for the PAP government, whose effective, forward-looking leadership for over a decade has far outweighed its sometimes brusque treatment of political and newspaper critics.

The opposition has intermittently boycotted the legislature since 1963 and is bogged down in intraparty and interparty feuds. Deprived of distinctive issues and divided over policies, most opposition parties simply lie low until election time. Of 14 opposition parties registered in mid-1972, for instance, none was represented in Parliament and only five were active in the sense that the public knew they existed—usually through newspaper reports ridiculing their stands or highlighting their disputes. One citizen compared the minor opposition parties to "idlers in the coffeeshops who will rush out in the streets on hearing the sound of drums, cymbals, and gongs and will immediately retire to their seats when the show has passed."

Despite PAP's influence and its record of impressive achievement, its leadership is aware of important vulnerabilities. The extreme left—however chaotically run—identifies more closely with lower class Chinese, who are educated in schools where Chinese is the medium of instruction, than does PAP, whose senior leadership is closely linked with the more Westernized Chinese middle and upper class. Any serious reduction in popular support for PAP over such issues as one-party rule, the dominant role of English in schools, Singapore's nonaligned foreign policy, authoritarian restraints on the nation's political life, or a protracted economic slump could give opposition elements an opportunity to rally their weak forces and again challenge PAP for political supremacy.

2. People's Action Party (C)

The moderately socialist PAP was formed in November 1954. Its leadership called for a democratic government responsive to a fully elected legislative assembly, which London granted in 1959, and for the union of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya, which took place in September 1963.

At the start PAP was marked by dissension between moderate and extremist elements. The former were led by Lee Kuan Yew representing the British-educated, English-speaking sector of Singapore's largely Chinese society; the latter were led by leftist Lim Chin Siong on behalf of the Chinese-educated, Chinese-speaking component of the trade-union movement. After these rival elements jockeyed some 7 years for party control, Lee Kuan Yew launched an open attack on the radical opposition and tried to prove its Communist affiliation. The leftists responded by withdrawing from PAP in 1961 and organizing the *Barisan Sosialis Singapura* (BSS, or Singapore Socialist Front). PAP decisively beat its leftist opponent in the 1963 elections, when the chief issue was Singapore's merger into Malaysia, and it won all the seats in the elections of April 1968—which the BSS boycotted—and those of September 1972, in which the BSS and four other opposition parties took part.

a. Policies

PAP, whose political philosophy is rooted in British socialism, describes itself as a non-Communist, democratic socialist party. It emphasizes honest, efficient government and the expansion of education, industry, and social welfare services such as medical care, health, and public housing. PAP's leadership is not doctrinaire in its socialist beliefs, however, and does not seek public ownership of the means of production. Party policies thus satisfy low-income citizens who might otherwise be receptive to Communist overtures, while at the same time they do not threaten the capitalistic, entrepreneurial system that buttresses Singapore's economy.

b. Organization and leadership

The PAP is very tightly organized, thanks to Lee Kuan Yew's close personal supervision. Its senior policymaking authority is the 12-man Central Executive Committee (CEC), whose members also hold key government jobs. The composition of the CEC is largely English-educated or -oriented Chinese but conforms generally to the island's racial distribution. The CEC in turn is ruled by a camarilla or inner circle made up of four men who have worked closely together since before the party was formed, have generally acted in concert, and are held in awe by practically all PAP members. Headed by Lee, who is PAP secretary general, the group (Figure 3) includes party chairman Dr. Toh Chin Chye (Minister of Science and Technology); deputy chairman Dr. Goh Keng Swee (Minister of Defense); and director of the political bureau Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (Minister of Foreign Affairs).

The CEC is chosen by PAP's cadre or staff officers (roughly 3% of the party), who themselves are picked by the CEC—a kind of reciprocity which Lee says must have "some merit," since the Vatican's similar system of the Cardinals appointing the Pope and the Pope appointing the Cardinals has lasted nearly 2,000 years. The CEC directly controls the editorial board of *Petir* (Lightning), the party organ, which is published in the four official languages, and it appoints the members of the seven party bureaus: Malay Affairs, External Affairs, Women, Welfare, Culture, Publicity and Propaganda, and Political.

PAP has a branch in each electoral constituency and a few subbranches in the larger ones; some sizable branches exist where population is small but recruitment intense. The branches' independence is greatly curtailed by Singapore's compactness and by the fact that communication with the CEC is almost entirely one way: downward.

c. Membership

In the late 1960's PAP claimed 30,000 members, but this total included many who had resigned, had been expelled, or had allowed their membership to lapse. A more realistic figure was about 15,000, of whom from 300 to 500 were cadre members, the party's elite and its backbone. Regular membership is fairly easy to obtain, although the CEC must pass on all applications. However, cadre members reportedly must have made a 2-year "special" contribution to PAP, been nominated by a CEC member, and been examined and finally approved by Prime Minister Lee himself. Lee hopes in this way both to choose the party's best talent and to prevent its penetration by subversive elements. Lee's major concern since at least 1971—when he saw to it that youth sections were introduced in most branches—has been to infuse new blood into PAP and to develop a strong second echelon of well-educated cadres to lead the party and the country in the 1980's.

Lee wants PAP nominees drawn from a broad cross-section of society, but he specifically seeks professional people, intellectuals, and labor leaders from unions affiliated with the government-controlled National Trades Union Congress. Members of the exclusive and prestigious Pyramid Club—self-styled as "people who are making an effective contribution to society, or . . . are capable of doing so"—are so often tapped for PAP membership that the club is an unofficial PAP adjunct. Most Pyramid Club members are from the English-speaking elite that provides leadership for the PAP and most of the government. Overall, however, PAP is a middle-class party, three-fourths of whose members joined it to improve their chances for employment or for other factors such as prestige.

d. Finance

PAP headquarters has three sources of income: membership fees, assessed contributions from members of Parliament, and private donations. Membership fees ($2 a year) comprise the smallest amount, particularly since headquarters takes only one-eighth of the fee and allows the branch to which it is paid to keep the rest. This is the only subsidy received by the branches, which otherwise support themselves. Branches raise further funds by running kindergartens, carnivals, fun fairs, and large dinners to which prominent philanthropists and millionaires outside the constituency are also asked; those invited invariably feel obliged to pay something. Contributions from members of Parliament (MP) total about S$150,000 a year at fixed monthly rates of at least $50 for an MP, $100 for parliamentary secretaries, and

Lee Kuan Yew

Goh Keng Swee

Toh Chin Chye

Sinnathamby Rajaratnam

FIGURE 3. PAP's "inner circle" (U/OU)

$500 for ministers; totals vary according to family financial circumstances. Large private contributions probably are made directly to the CEC, and the amounts are not generally known.

PAP's expenditures are remarkably low for a major party because of the branches' virtual self-support and because of fringe benefits deriving from the party's link with the government. The major expense is for salaried party officials and rental of the building at headquarters. Expenses for publicity are few, since PAP has full access to all government-owned and controlled communications media—films, radio, television, and publications, such as the weekly magazine *The Mirror*—as well as to civic organizations, the armed forces, and paramilitary forces. Election year expenses can be kept low, because compulsory voting obviates the need to induce people to go to the polls, motor vehicles may not be used to convey voters to the polls, most workers are volunteers, and donations in cash or foodstuffs are easy to extract from most ethnic Chinese, who view such gifts as a way of avoiding trouble rather than as support for the party or its platform.

3. Barisan Sosialis Singapura (S)

The pro-Communist BSS (Singapore Socialist Front) is Singapore's leading but probably most disorganized opposition party. The only major goal its leaders have agreed on since they left PAP and formed the BSS in 1961 is that Singapore and West Malaysia should form a single political unit, "Malaya." In their view Singapore's independence is "phony" and Malaysia is "an artificial colonialist creation." In late 1971, however, party chairman Lee Siew Choh (Figure 4) admitted that the BSS could no longer struggle for a "truly independent, united, and democratic Malaya" because it was paralyzed by ideological differences, lack of cohesion, financial difficulties, low morale, and falling membership.

a. Policies

BSS leaders and members have never agreed on whether to act within Singapore's legal framework or to try for power by subversive means, and most stands or steps finally taken by a majority are criticized or countered by other party members. As a result, the party's positions on important questions like its representation in Parliament and the nature of its antigovernment "struggle" have vacillated widely over the years.

BSS candidates won 13 parliamentary seats (33% of the popular vote) in the 1963 election, but these

FIGURE 4. Lee Siew Choh, BSS Chairman (U/OU)

assemblymen soon began obstructionist tactics and then in December 1965 began a boycott of legislative sessions. Finally in 1966, after the party launched a series of "extraparliamentary" but "constitutional" antigovernment activities—entailing mass rallies, house-to-house campaigning and the threat of strikes—BSS legislators resigned, were imprisoned, or went underground to avoid arrest.

Between 1966 and 1972 the BSS boycotted most elections and from time to time turned to activist tactics. The government has promptly quelled all BSS protests, but the Malayan Communist Party's "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (broadcasting from South China) has been urging the BSS since 1970 to wage "armed struggle" in Singapore before stressing the "Malaya" issue.

The BSS is seriously divided over these attempted, current, or suggested policies. The party chairman, who is leftist but non-Communist, decries talk of "armed struggle" in the city or the surrounding countryside as "just not practical" for Singapore, and in any event unsuitable for a supposedly non-Communist party which instead should be involved in "mass struggle." Party vice chairman Chua Koh Meng and a substantial number of BSS members,

however, strongly support the "armed struggle" idea. The party chairman further believes the BSS weakened its own position by denying itself the use of the parliamentary forum for so long; he was the guiding force behind the party's decision to enter candidates in the 1972 parliamentary elections. This decision, too, was opposed by the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution," by the party vice chairman, and by a sizable portion of the BSS membership. The party received only 4.5% of the total vote in the elections, not enough to win a seat in Parliament.

b. Organization and leadership

The two top BSS officials are at loggerheads over basic ideology as well as party policies. Lee Siew Choh calls Chua Koh Meng the "extreme leftist most destructive to party unity," but Lee himself is no unifier. His inflexibility and ineptitude would probably have meant his ouster long ago, except that he meets the party's need for a well-known non-Communist at the top and there appears to be no one to replace him.

The most competent and popular leader the BSS ever had was Lim Chin Siong, who led the leftist group that split from PAP to form the BSS. Lim retained his post as BSS secretary general during his entire 6-year imprisonment (1963-69), losing it only after he dealt his BSS followers a major blow in 1969 by renouncing communism. In July 1969 he was released and permitted to go to England. Lim's replacement as secretary general, Lim Hock Siew, is still detained for political reasons.

A 15-man Central Executive Committee responsible for making BSS policy decisions is harastrung by the split between chairman Lee and vice chairman Chua and by the fact that only seven of its members are active. Liaison cadres link the committee with its 30 branches, which are grouped into two urban and two rural divisions. Most branches are in the more outlying, rural parts of the island, and only 17 of the total 30 are active.

c. Membership

Recruitment policies are determined largely by chairman Lee who, in the party's early years at least, stressed the need for a tightly organized, highly motivated group of party professionals. He worked toward "strengthening" rather than "expanding" membership.

In 1971 there were from 1,000 to 2,000 dues-paying members, of whom about 500 constituted a dedicated hard core. Labor unions and educational institutions have furnished some of the membership, but most grassroots support comes from the backward and illiterate segments of the population. Instead of becoming mobilized into the committed cadres Dr. Lee envisioned, the membership is dwindling in interest and size. There have been many resignations, some members leaving to join the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya, whose broadcasts have sparked some illegal activities by BSS members. Few members have given the CEC their active support or have shown an interest in becoming party officials. The vice chairman commented in 1971 that most BSS branch officials were in hiding, were under arrest, or were "agents of reaction."

d. Finance

BSS financial resources are meager. They derive chiefly from membership dues and fees, donations from private individuals, fund-raising drives such as anti-Vietnam war concerts, financial support from leftwing labor organizations and business enterprises, and profits from business and financial investments. Although the BSS is Peking-oriented, there is no indication that funds are being received from the People's Republic of China or any other external source.

e. Publicity

Sparse financial resources dictate a fairly modest publicity program. BSS's main publication, the weekly Chinese-language *Chen Hsien Pao* (Front Line News), has a circulation of only about 11,000; its English-language *Plebeian* is much smaller. Inexpensive handbills distributed to the public through house-to-house canvassing discuss general Communist themes and announce the times and frequencies of "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" broadcasts. The kindergarten and literacy classes which the BSS holds in rural areas are probably self-supporting.

The party also avails itself of free publicity. It can, for instance, usually count on having its major statements covered by Singapore's Chinese-language and even English-language newspapers. Moreover, the BSS can use for propaganda purposes the facilities of educational and labor organizations it has penetrated, and it benefits from exhibitions and concerts staged by several pro-Communist organizations.

Recurrent propaganda themes include denigration of Malaysia and the Five Power Defease Arrangement, charges that Lee Kuan Yew and PAP serve the interests of foreign capitalists and colonialists at the people's expense, claims that the government illegally silences critics and political opponents and mistreats





Lee Kuan Yew at PAP rally

R. Vetrivelu at UNF rally

Multiracial citizens line up to vote

Honorable Sui Sen, an unopposed PAP victor

PAP Chairman casts ballot

Mandatory vote brings out everyone

FIGURE 5. 1970 byelections (U/OU)

In April 1972 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew turned down an electoral reform appeal by six opposition parties. This appeal called for appointment of an independent election commission, a minimum 30-day campaign period, the right of prisoners to vote, a relaxation of rules on political meetings and provision of sites for them to be held, allocation of "reasonably adequate" television and radio time for opposition parties, and facilities for close surveillance of ballot boxes by agents of all contesting parties. In its refusal the government reminded opposition parties that the election laws had been enacted in 1954 "before PAP



FIGURE 6. Results of Singapore elections (U/OU)

took office." Unmentioned was the fact that the British had devised these stringent rules expressly to keep Singapore's fledgling parties in line in the 1955 election, when they chose a parliamentary majority for the first time. PAP's resort to such overkill in 1972, when it appeared assured of an overwhelming victory, seemed unnecessary but reflected Lee's propensity to leave nothing to chance.

The results of Singapore's four parliamentary elections are compared in Figure 6. Few significant conclusions on voting trends or changes in the relative standings of parties can be drawn from these results, since the political complexion and orientation of some of the parties have changed, others have merged or split, and many have disappeared. Even PAP, the only party involved in all four elections, changed from radically leftist in the late 1950's, to centrist in 1963, and to slightly right of center in 1968 and 1972. Over the years, PAP has so consolidated its control that there is now no significant challenge to it.

In Singapore's first election, in 1959, the island was still under the watchful eye of the British and made a conscious effort to conduct a model election. In that contest PAP's victory—by no means a landslide—was facilitated by its militantly leftist image and the support received from the large Peking-oriented "Chinese Chinese" part of the electorate. In 1963, after PAP's pro-Communist faction had split to form the BSS, the latter received almost one-third of the total vote, and PAP's following was reduced to less than half the electorate. Moreover, since the 1963 election was held the same month that Singapore joined Malaysia, the multiracial Malaysian Alliance and other factions linked with Malaysia drew off some votes that might otherwise have gone to PAP.

By 1968 Singapore had been a separate, independent republic for 3 years and PAP, by dint of its capable leadership and popular policies, was firmly in the saddle. Under these circumstances the BSS doubted its ability to make a good showing and boycotted the elections, believing it might do better in 1972 should PAP have trouble coping with problems stemming from the British military pullout. Singapore's burgeoning economy in the following years helped instead to consolidate the PAP's hold, however, and completely dissipated any earlier prospects the BSS and the other opposition factions may have had. The result in 1972 was an almost 70% popular vote for PAP and a victory in every constituency.

The fact that some 30% of the electorate went against PAP in 1972 has been of some concern to PAP leaders. They were disappointed that despite their efforts to woo the Malay minority, the predominantly Malay PEKEMAS party succeeded in getting 46% and 48% of the vote in the two constituencies in which it ran. Moreover, the 12% vote of the hitherto weak WP was unexpected; Lee attributed this "protest vote" to personal dislocations stemming from industrialization, urbanization, and urban renewal.

D. National policies (C)

1. Domestic

Economic matters are a major preoccupation of the Lee Kuan Yew government. The "new mandate" sought through dissolving Parliament in August 1972 and calling for new elections predictably stressed economic goals. "For the next 5 years," said the official statement, "the government's main aim is to raise standards of skills and technical competence, and to improve professional, management, and technological expertise. Only higher standards can enable Singapore to achieve more sophistication in her industrial, commercial, and service sectors and enlarge her role as an international banking and financial center, providing a home for the Asian dollar."

A willingness to diversify has brought striking economic gains since the mid-1960's, when Indonesian hostility, the split from Malaysia, and Britain's military withdrawal could have caused a major slump. The gradual shift in emphasis from entrepot trade—Singapore's traditional mainstay—and servicing of British installations to a more varied economy stressing industry, tourism, and domestic consumption have made Singapore less vulnerable to Malaysian and Indonesian policies of building direct trade links to world markets and bypassing Singapore middlemen. Singapore's policy shift prompted the creation of so many more jobs that a labor shortage has developed in the more skilled categories. Workers are being certified for employment at an even younger age; married women are being encouraged to join the labor force; and at least 70,000 foreign workers, including 60,000 Malaysians, have been allowed to work in Singapore. During the 1960's the economic growth rate was on a par with that of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea; since 1968 the gross national product (GNP) has increased, on the average, nearly 15% annually and per capita GNP has become second only to Japan in Asia. The most rapid growth is now in the manufacturing sector, which employs one-third of the work force and attracts wide foreign investment.

The appeal to foreign firms has stemmed partly from the government's restriction on workers' rights to

strike and its restraints on wages, bonuses, and other fringe benefits. To counter labor's growing discontent with these restraints, however, the government created a National Wage Council in early 1972 and later agreed to its suggestions for a general 8% wage boost in the private sector, including a 2% increase in contributions by both employers and employees to the Central Provident Fund (a pension plan for workers), and relaxation of some restrictions on workers' rights. The government deems its policy as one of "walking a tightrope" between labor's demands and the need for keeping labor costs down so to continue attracting foreign investment. In the Prime Minister's view, an increase in the workers' share of the "national cake" makes it "in their interest to help increase the size of that cake."

Lee Kuan Yew believes that tight political and social controls are necessary if Singapore is to flourish. There are informal but effective restraints on the press. Students, especially at the university level, have little freedom compared with their American counterparts. The extreme left is closely watched by the police and quickly suppressed if it resorts to illegal activity. Emergency security laws established by the British remain in effect and are frequently used. In May 1971 they were utilized to jail, without trial, officials of a leading Chinese-language newspaper for following a pro-Peking "Chinese chauvinist" line. In related incidents two English-language newspapers were forced out of business, one because it mildly criticized the government and the other because its owner allegedly had received vast sums from "foreign sources," widely assumed to refer to the People's Republic of China. There are stiff fines for air pollution by automobiles, littering (including foreign vessels' discharge of oil or garbage into the harbor), begging, and even penalties for men wearing long hair (Figure 7). Both opponents and proponents of these hardline policies agree that they have helped to maintain Singapore as one of the best organized, cleanest cities in Asia.

Another major policy has been the decision to encourage the growth of a "Singaporean" identity by fostering multiracial nationalism among the diverse ethnic groups. The chief barrier to a truly mixed culture has proved to be the Chinese community itself, which represents 76% of the total population but suffers a deep cultural division. The upper and much of the middle classes are educated in English-language schools, while the lower class receives its education in Chinese-language schools. The result is a basic difference in values, customs, and prejudices; those educated in Chinese-language schools branded Prime

FIGURE 7. Anti-long hair poster (U/OU)

Minister Lee's efforts to produce a new Singaporean identity "anti-Chinese." By 1972, however, the government's stress on English-language education had brought a larger proportion of Chinese students into contact with Western concepts. The government has attempted to assuage the Chinese culturists by insuring that a majority of the PAP electoral candidates have been educated in Chinese-language schools and by recruiting an increasing number of Nanyang (the major Chinese-language university) graduates into the civil service. It also has been more willing to permit media statements favoring the People's Republic of China if these are balanced with tributes to Singapore.

The government has tried to placate the Malay population (15%)—providing scholarships for Malay students and even retaining Malay as the official national language after the 1965 split from Malaysia. Many local Malays still resent the far greater economic success of the Chinese "interlopers," however, and clearly showed their pique during the 1972 elections, when many voted for the all-Malay PEKEMAS. By and large, however, the multiracial policy is a success.

2. Foreign

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been concerned over Singapore's lonely role as a Chinese city-state perched between Malaysia and Indonesia—two ethnically and religiously similar states, both potentially hostile to Singapore. By 1972, however, relations with both were better than they were when the Singapore-Malaysia split, communal rioting within Malaysia, and armed infiltration by Indonesia prevented normal dealings. Although Singapore still

distrusts Malaysia and is unsure of Indonesia. Lee nevertheless paid an official visit to Kuala Lumpur in 1972 and hopes to be invited to Djakarta during 1973. Singapore cooperates with its two neighbors in various efforts at regional cooperation. In 1971 it concurred in a formal declaration that the three states are exclusively responsible for the "safety of navigation" through the Malacca Strait, but only "took note" that Malaysia and Indonesia did not accept the international status of the Strait. Singapore belongs to such regional organizations as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO).

Singapore has no diplomatic or consular relations with either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China, as Lee is fearful that links with either might hamper his efforts to redirect loyalties and create a national identity. However, the government does allow Peking's Bank of China and several emporiums controlled by China to operate locally, and during 1972 it permitted a Chinese table-tennis team to visit and a private Singaporean trade mission to attend the Canton fair. The government backed China's entry into the United Nations but felt the U.S.-China rapprochement in early 1972 came "about 5 years too soon" for Singapore. The government nevertheless is moving slowly in the wake of its fellow members of ASEAN to develop a more positive China policy.

Since being independent, Singapore has promoted trade and cultural relations with the Soviet Union, Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and North Korea; by 1972 it had diplomatic relations with all European Communist states but Albania and East Germany. The Soviet Union has a bank and airline and shipping offices in Singapore in addition to its embassy and trade mission, and its naval vessels are allowed to use Singapore's repair facilities. Singapore's relations with the European Communist states reflect its nonaligned foreign policy and its belief that its security is better assured if it has relations with countries of varying political persuasions.

Singapore's relations with the United States are generally good but have vacillated with the personal attitudes of Prime Minister Lee. Lee has appeared to support U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, which he felt diverted Communist pressure from Singapore. From time to time, however, he has expressed doubts about the Nixon Doctrine and American staying power. In mid-1972 Lee stated that he favored U.S. maintenance of "a sufficient economic and strategic presence in the area to prevent any other single power, or group of powers, from gaining complete hegemony over Southeast Asia."

Singapore has mixed feelings toward its British Commonwealth allies. Britain formally ended a 150-year role of providing defense for Singapore and Malaysia at the end of October 1971 when the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement was permitted to lapse;



FIGURE 8. Commonwealth heads of state meeting, 1971 (U/OU)

by that time the great bulk of the British land, sea, and air forces had already departed. Economic and cultural ties remain very close, however, and Singapore is active in Commonwealth affairs. Singapore hosted a meeting of the British Commonwealth leaders (Figure 8) during 1971 and warmly entertained the British royal family in early 1972.

Singapore frankly questions the effectiveness and duration of the Five Power Defense Arrangement, which replaced Britain's military commitment to Malaysia and Singapore. The arrangement, signed in April 1971 by Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, calls for five-power consultation in the event of an armed attack or externally aided insurrection and the stationing of token Commonwealth military forces in West Malaysia and Singapore. (In late 1972 these forces had a personnel strength of some 8,000, of which about 7,000 were based in Singapore.) Singapore's skepticism stems from a belief that neither Australia nor Malaysia has shown a strong sense of commitment to the mutual-defense idea, and from a feeling that Malaysia—possibly aided by Indonesia—would be the most likely source of a conventional military attack on Singapore. Prime Minister Lee therefore leans toward building a self-defense force capable of dissuading any potential aggressor. Singapore has stepped up its defense expenditures—it allocated more than 25% of its total FY1972/73 budget to defense—and is acquiring increasingly modern equipment.

E. Threats to government stability

1. Discontent and dissidence (C)

Singapore, to an extent greater than in most countries, has either solved its major domestic problems or so minimized them that discontent and dissidence have less and less to feed on. Pro-Communist elements are hampered by being divested of social issues that spur the growth of communism elsewhere. Having led the independence movement, the PAP government is obviously no "imperialist puppet," and its provision of more jobs, welfare services, and inexpensive housing for low-income groups has robbed pro-Communists of the poverty issue. Above all, the apparent lack of official corruption and "squeeze," so widespread in Asia, has convinced most Singaporeans that government decisions are made to benefit citizens as a whole and not to line the pockets of any favored group, clique, or social class. The extreme left continues to have some appeal for Chinese chauvinists, however, as does Malay nationalism for a small number of Malay extremists.

A slight majority of the total population does have Chinese concepts of culture, law, interpersonal relations, morals, and dress and think of China as the "homeland" despite their Singapore citizenship. They benefit from the nation's general prosperity, but their inability to speak English has forced them into the lower social and economic groups and the lower echelons of both the party and the bureaucracy. The government's policy of emphasizing Singapore's multiracial character—an effort to erase fears that Singapore could become a bridgehead for Chinese Communist interests and hence a threat to its neighbors—intensified their sense of inferior treatment and their conviction that the government has "sold out" their Chinese heritage. Chinese-speaking students and labor-union members were ardent left-wing activists over the years until the government defused both groups through a series of effective measures in the 1950's and 1960's. This element of the population is still a potentially dissident one, but the government seems able to handle it effectively for the present.

A substantial part of the Muslim Malays (15% of the total population) consider their forebears the original inhabitants of Singapore, resent the success of the Chinese "interlopers," and bemoan their own place on the bottom rung of the ladder. However, the government's evenhanded racial policy and the Malays' relative prosperity compared with that of their Malaysian or Indonesian brothers, have helped preclude serious outbreaks of communal violence. Nevertheless, the Malays in Singapore remain sensitive to communal tensions across the Johore causeway in Malaysia.

2. Subversion (S)

a. Communist movement

From its beginning during the 1920's, communism in Singapore was an integral part of the Communist movement that embraced the Malay Peninsula. Today, links between the two groups are tenuous.

Although the Communist movement in Malaya and Singapore prior to World War II was responsive to policies set by the Soviet Union, from the outset it was largely under the operational control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Through its Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, the Comintern took advantage of Kuomintang (KMT)-Communist cooperation in China between 1923 and 1927 to introduce experienced Chinese agents into Malaya and Singapore under cover of the organization of the KMT. The work of the Chinese Communists in night schools and with small labor unions and craft guilds

resulted in the formation of the *Nanyang* (South Seas) Federation of Labor in 1924 and the Communist Youth League in 1926. Both organizations were centered in Singapore but had branches elsewhere in the peninsula.

When the KMT purged itself of its Communist elements following the KMT-CCP split in 1927, the Comintern was unable to use KMT cover among the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Apparently on Comintern orders, the South Seas Communist Party, or Nanyang party, was organized in Singapore during the winter of 1927-28 to fill the gap. This party was accorded jurisdiction over Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, and the Riau Islands of Sumatra. The almost totally Chinese composition of the party met with heavy Comintern criticism, however, and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was formed in 1930, principally to base the party's appeal on nationalist rather than communal principles and to reduce domination by the CCP.

The Communist organization in Singapore has from the beginning been under the jurisdiction of the CPM, but since 1954 the CPM's headquarters and principal leaders have been in the jungles of the Thai-Malaysian border area and are preoccupied with maintaining their existence in the face of Malaysian and Thai operations. Thus, the CPM's influence over its Singapore comrades is probably highly tenuous.

Denied a rural base from which to operate, CPM forces in Singapore were even less fortunate than their Malayan-based comrades. After the Communist triumph in mainland China in 1949, as many as 60% of the party members in Singapore are believed to have migrated to China. Others joined the guerrillas in Malaya. During the 12-year (1948-60) Emergency, the CPM apparently continued to conduct most of its Singapore operations through a so-called Singapore Town Committee, but the latter was broken up by the Singapore authorities in 1956. Investigations in early 1963 led to the arrest of several persons associated with the partially revived Town Committee, which subsequently has been incapable of significant subversive activity. The Moscow-Peking idiological dispute has also contributed to Communist fragmentation.

The number of hard-core Communists in Singapore is currently estimated at between 200 and 500—almost all of them ethnic Chinese. They have only a very rudimentary level of formal organization, and lack effective and dedicated leadership. A few Communist cells and "Communist-type" cells may be functioning, but they apparently have no firm plans for political action. Nonetheless, Communist influence in Singapore still exists because of the infiltration of Communists into other organizations.

b. Subversive activities

Subversion today in Singapore is almost entirely Chinese Communist in inspiration. There is no evidence of attempted subversion (in the sense of clandestine operations aimed at overthrowing the government) by Eastern European diplomatic or trade representatives. In any event, subversive activities on the part of the Soviets would probably be ineffective in view of Singapore's predominantly Chinese population. Leftwing, Indonesia-oriented elements were once influential within the Malay community, but they had become inconsequential even before the abortive Communist coup in Indonesia in 1965 and the subsequent suppression of the Indonesian Communist movement. Small Malay extremist groups associated with or ideologically oriented toward similar groups in Malaysia have on occasion been involved in anti-Chinese communal incidents, but they have at no time constituted a significant threat.

Since the phasing out of the Cultural Revolution in China at the end of the 1960's, and particularly since 1971, Peking itself has increasingly downplayed the role of subversion in Southeast Asia—Singapore included—as an element of national policy and has instead placed greater emphasis on promoting state-to-state relations. Because Singapore does not officially recognize Peking, Chinese nationals cannot get visas to work there even though four companies incorporated in the PRC have Singapore branches under local management, and even though nine Singapore department stores sell mostly mainland Chinese products. The Bank of China comes the closest to an official PRC presence and is the only enterprise that tries to use its facilities to disseminate Communist propaganda. The Bank may also be a source of clandestine funds. From China itself, the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (*Suara Revolusi Malaya*) provides general ideological guidance and often broadcasts anti-Singapore or pro-CPM propaganda in Chinese, Malay, and Tamil, and both *Radio Peking* and the New China News Agency quote from publications of the BSS, the major leftist party.

There is no evidence that China or any other foreign country or organization finances or otherwise controls the BSS or any other leftist group in Singapore. The failure to devote more attention to these groups stems in part from policy considerations—the PRC's deemphasis on subversion—as well as from the realization that the groups are ineffective and are penetrated by the Singapore authorities. There is









that Communist states might use trade with private Singapore concerns for subversive or economic warfare purposes, the government established a state trading company and gave it responsibility for handling all commercial transactions with countries in which trade is a government monopoly or is under direct government control.

More important than these specific countersubversive measures to the government's success in coping with subversion and promoting stability are the sophisticated, broadly based system of social welfare and its complementary political action program. Just as expanded welfare services are basic to PAP philosophy, so are they equally basic to the party's efforts to broaden its political base and consolidate its power. Within this unified approach to nationbuilding, the main thrust of governmental efforts has been to foster nationalism, improve living standards, reduce unemployment, and encourage the populace to organize at the grassroots level, largely through voluntary associations. Consequently, by a combination of both specific and general measures, the government has kept the forces of subversion off balance and has eroded their bases of popular support while steadily adding to its own countersubversive capabilities.

G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

Arasaratnam, Sinnapah. *Indians in Malaysia and Singapore*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 1970. 214 pp. An account of the settlement and naturalization of Indians in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore from the mid-19th century to the end of the 1960's.

Bellows, Thomas J. *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System*. New Haven: Yale University. Monograph Series No. 14, SEA Studies. 1971. 194 pp. This detailed study focuses on the People's Action Party, but also includes good sections on the rise and eclipse of the political opposition and on Singapore's changing party system.

———. "The Singapore Party System," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, VIII, No. 1, March 1967.

Boyce, Peter. *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries*. Sydney, Australia: Sydney University Press. 1968. 268 pp. This book centers on Malaysia's quest for world acceptance, with an emphasis on the Indonesia-Malaysia *Konfrontasi*, but includes Singapore because of its role in Malaysia for part of the period under review.

Buchanan, Iain. *Singapore in Southeast Asia: An Economic and Political Appraisal*. London: G. Bell and Sons. 1972. 336 pp. An interesting, but rather dyspeptic, view of Singapore's political, economic, and social situation in the early 1970's.

Chan Heng Chee. *Singapore: The Politics of Survival, 1965-1967*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1971. 65 pp. A slightly revised MA thesis (Cornell University, 1967) on problems confronting Singapore after it split from Malaysia in 1965.

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Josey, Alex. *Democracy in Singapore: The 1970 By-Elections*. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1970. 104 pp. A thorough discussion of why PAP decided to prune its "deadwood" in the 1970 by-elections and how it went about it.

———. *Lee Kuan Yew*. Singapore: Donald Moore Press. 1968. 657 pp. An approving, but balanced, biography of Singapore's Prime Minister; contains some biographic detail, a chronological account of Lee's career from the start of self-government (1959) through 1968, and an assessment of his strong views on multiracialism.

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———. "Singapore Socialism," *Pacific Community*, No. 4, Autumn 1970.

Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding, eds. *Modern Singapore*. Singapore: University of Singapore. 1969. 285 pp. The University of Singapore's contribution to the 150th anniversary of the founding of Singapore in 1819. Each of the 15 chapters—which cover many political and sociological aspects of Singapore's life—is written by a past or present professor or lecturer at that university.

Pang Cheng Lian. *Singapore's People's Action Party: Its History, Organization and Leadership*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1971. 87 pp. A thorough discussion of PAP, with good tables on membership breakdowns by age, education, and race, as well as on Singapore's various elections.

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Ryan, N. J., *The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore: A History from Earliest Times to 1966*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1969. 285 pp. A good historical account of Malaysia and Singapore, showing the influences on these two areas of neighboring and foreign countries, geopolitical factors, wars, and world events.

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Tregonning, K. G., "Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: A Politico-Geographical Contrast," *Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1966.

Van der Kroef, Justus M. *Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1967. 268 pp. A general study of the Communist movement in the Malaysia-Singapore region as well as in surrounding areas through the mid-1960's.

Chronology (u/ou)

1819

British settlement is establis'.ed by Sir Stamford Raffles.

1867
April

Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) become Crown Colony.

1942
February

Singapore succumbs to Japanese attack.

1945
September

British ru over Singapore.

1946
April

Singapore becomes a separate British crown colony.

1959
May

People's Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, wins general election, capturing 43 of the 51 seats in Parliament and receiving 53.4% of the popular vote.

June

Singapore is granted internal self-government; defense and foreign relations are retained by United Kingdom.

1963
September

Malaysia is formally inaugurated; confrontation with Indonesia follows.

People's Action Party wins general election, capturing 37 of the 51 seats in Singapore Parliament and receiving 47% of the popular vote.

1964
July

Communal riots erupt between Chinese and Malays.

September

Further communal disturbances flare up but are kept under control by police and security forces.

1965
August

Singapore is forced to withdraw from Malaysia and becomes an independent nation.

1967
July

United Kingdom announces plan to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970's.

August

Singapore is one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

1968
January

United Kingdom ad- ces to late 1971 the date for withdrawal of its military forces fr.. n Southeast Asia.

April

People's Action Party wins all 58 seats in Parliament.

1971
April

Five Power Defense Arrangement (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) signed.

October

Departure of last British forces (less Five Power contingent) ends 150 years of British-provided defense.

1972
September

People's Action Party wins all 65 seats in Parliament.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
...	*Angkatan Islam*	Islamic Movement
BSS	*Barisan Sosialis Singapura*	Singapore Socialist Front
CCP		Chinese Communist Party
CEC		Central Executive Committee (PAP)
CPM		Communist Party of Malaya
ISC		Internal Security Council
ISD		Internal Security Department (police)
JIC		Joint Intelligence Committee
KMT	*Kuomintang*	Nationalist People's Party (Taiwan)
PAP		People's Action Party
...	*Partai Rakyat Singapura*	Singapore People's Party
...		Malaya People's Socialist Party
PEMAS	*Persetuan Melayu Singapura*	Singapore Malay Union
PEKEMAS	*Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura*	Singapore National Malay Organization
PF		People's Front
PRC		People's Republic of China
SID		Security and Intelligence Division (Ministry of Defense)
UNF		United National Front
WP		Workers' Party

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET