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Government
and Politics

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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U.S.S.R.

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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The present Soviet state is the lineal descendant of the Russian socialist regime established by V. I. Lenin in 1917, and it still retains many points of similarity with that governmental system. The police terror and total repression of the Stalinist era, however, left their mark, as did the revelations and reforms of the Khrushchev years. Moreover, the transformation of the U.S.S.R. from an agricultural into an industrial state, as well as the continuing impact of the worldwide scientific-technological revolution, has had a profound effect upon the attitudes of the Soviet leaders and the range of policy options they see open to them. The visionary content has eroded from the national policies of the Soviet state—a process which may be said to have been begun by Lenin himself—and been replaced by the more pragmatic values and goals of Great Power politics.

In theory, the U.S.S.R. is a federation of 15 equal republics, with political power exercised by the freely elected representatives of the laboring masses. In practice, it is a tightly centralized single-party dictatorship. The ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) exercises a virtual monopoly of political power. It directs the organs of government through its control of nominations and appointments to positions within the machinery of state. It commands the instruments of state power—the armed forces, the security police, and the civil police—through an intricate system of controls and checks. Purportedly independent institutions—the soviets (councils), the courts, trade unions, youth organiza-

tions, and the whole gamut of cultural and social associations—respond to its command. Public expression of opposition to the party's leadership and policies is effectively prohibited by its total domination of the news and communications media.

The Soviet state's federal structure is a fiction. Not only the central party and state machinery, but the organs of the local party and state organizations in republican capitals and regional centers are subordinate to the central party organs. Local officials can be posted and removed at the behest of Moscow, and quite independently of the desires of the local state and party apparatus.

The result is a concentration of decisionmaking power in the hands of a numerically tiny elite. The 16 full members of the Politburo of the party's Central Committee stand at the apex of the Soviet state in control of key posts of both party and government (Figure 1). The authority of the party leaders over the roughly quarter of a billion citizens of the Soviet Union is unfettered by either legal limitations or formal institutional checks and balances. It is subject only to the limitations imposed by the necessity of reaching and maintaining a consensus among themselves and of satisfying the interests of the lesser party oligarchs who command the regional and local machinery of the party.

Even though undefined and uncertain, these informal bureaucratic limitations have become increasingly significant in recent years. Since the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the pattern of Soviet politics has tended to gravitate in the direction of bureaucratic systematization. This has been evident in

the relative stability of the Politburo itself. Despite the inevitable shifts in its internal balances, changes have been minimal. The forced "retirement" of Petr Shelest and Gennady Voronov in April 1973 were the first such dismissals among full members of the Politburo since 1966, when Anastas Mikoyan was permitted to go into honorable retirement. The same trend has been evident in the Central Committee, where the rate of turnover has dropped sharply since the Khrushchev years.

Indeed, one of the foremost motives for the overthrow of the late First Secretary was the general resentment felt within party ranks for his overbearing style of rule. Khrushchev had reacted to mounting difficulties on the domestic scene and on the foreign political front by relying increasingly on dictatorial methods in his relationships with his peers in the party leadership and in his treatment of lesser luminaries within the party apparatus. In the end, his alienation of the professional party bureaucrats who sat in the Central Committee and of his colleagues in the Politburo proved politically fatal.

Khrushchev's successors have sought to avoid his mistakes, and there has been no return to the style of rule which he favored. The collective leadership which his successors proclaimed has in the main been maintained in fact as well as in theory. Efforts have been made to avoid any undue concentration of authority in the hands of any single individual. General Secretary Brezhnev, although increasingly preeminent among his colleagues, has shown neither the power nor the inclination to ride roughshod over them as did Khrushchev in his time.

Both change and continuity are evident in the policy goals which the present Soviet leaders have set themselves. In their relations with the outside world, the Soviet leaders see their country as having achieved for the first time true political and military parity with the United States. Their new confidence has made them both more willing and more able to deal through negotiation with Washington and other capitals on the basis of more traditional concepts of national interest. Moscow's increasingly sophisticated approach to relations with the outside world is undoubtedly influenced by its enduring quarrel with China, which has both faced it with a new and major enemy and demonstrated the inadequacy of a shared ideology as a basis for a lasting alliance. Despite the innovations, however, the basic cornerstones of Soviet

foreign policy remain. These include the maximization of Moscow's power and influence in relation to its rivals, the maintenance of a buffer zone of dependent Communist states in Eastern Europe, and the shielding of the Soviet population from the influence of Western individualist culture and thought.

At home, the Soviet leaders have made serious attempts to come to grips with the nagging problems of the economy. Agriculture has been allotted an increased slice of the investment pie, and some attention has been turned to satisfying the long neglected needs of the Soviet consumer. Neither effort has enjoyed any sweeping success. Agriculture remains the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy, and consumer goods production continues to lag.

At the heart of the problem is the reluctance of the Soviet rulers to depart from the shibboleths of Marxist-Leninist economics. They have shied away from even modest efforts to reform the organization of agriculture, which is still based upon the model of collectivization imposed by Stalin in the late 1920's and 1930's. The needs of the consumer goods industry have always been subordinated to those of heavy industry—with its direct correlation to military power—and this relationship has not yet been fundamentally altered, despite the growing tendency of Brezhnev and some other leaders to heed the desires of the Soviet consumer.

Neither have the Soviet leaders shown any inclination to adopt liberalizing reforms in the political and social sphere or ease the restrictions on freedom of expression. In fact, since 1964 there has been a tendency toward a tightening of controls which had been eased by Khrushchev. Trial, exile, and police persecution have silenced many of the leading members of a small dissident movement. However, this retrograde tendency has stopped well short of a return to the completely arbitrary and willful police methods of the Stalin era, and a feeble voice of dissent is heard from time to time.

The Soviet leaders fall back on ideology to justify the party's monopoly of political power. The urge to "modernize" socialism which is evident in many of the leadership's approaches to foreign and domestic policy problems has no parallel in their attitudes toward the fundamental relationships between the party and the mass of the population. Here the Leninist formulas of proletarian dictatorship and the identification of party policies with the "real" interests of the working class survive virtually intact.

In spite of inevitable grumbling and dissatisfaction with material conditions among the masses, there is no evidence of any broad-based opposition to the existing regime. The vocal dissident movement which came into the open in the mid-1960's is still confined almost entirely to the representatives of the cultural and scientific elites and to some ethnic minorities, notably the Jews. There is no sign that the views expressed by these groups enjoy any broad popular support. In short, the regime apparently can rely on the passive support, born of fear and inertia, of the majority of the population.

The willingness of the population to accept uncomplainingly a harsh dictatorial rule has deep historical roots. Foremost among these is the complete absence of any native tradition of democracy, or even of any limitation upon the power of the state. The autocratic rule of the tsars survived virtually unchanged into the 20th century. The experiment with democratic forms which followed the February Revolution of 1917 was both brief and ineffectual. The Bolshevik coup of October brought it to an end, and the remnants of democratic freedoms were extirpated during the Civil War of 1918-20. This was followed by the turmoil of collectivization, the Stalinist purges, World War II, and German occupation. By the time Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet people had suffered a cumulative ordeal unparalleled in modern times, with scant opportunity for developing even the most basic concepts of individual rights.

Moreover, Russian willingness to tolerate both tsarist and Communist despotism has been conditioned by the traditional concept of strong, centralized rule as a guarantee against both internal anarchy and foreign danger. This view, engendered by the Russian national experience, remains strong in the U.S.S.R. today. In addition, most Soviet citizens share the pride of their rulers in the Soviet Union's status as one of the two most powerful nations on earth.

The patriotism, willingness to sacrifice, and pride of achievement of the Russian people provide the necessary basis of support for the present regime and constitute significant elements of national strength. At the same time, popular impulses for self-expression and social justice which have surfaced from time to time in the past and again seem incipient continue to be feared by the Communist leaders as a potential weakness in the fabric of the state.

B. Political dynamics

1. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (U/OU)

a. *The framework of power*

The political forces that directly affect the internal balance of power have been dominated by the Communist Party virtually since the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917. All other surviving parties were forcibly suppressed in 1921-22. Even during Stalin's reign of terror in the 1930's and late 1940's, when the security police played the dominant role, the party not only survived but continued to exercise many of its political functions. It provided the Stalin dictatorship with an appearance of legitimacy and continuity with Lenin's revolutionary state, as well as an instrument and ideological pretext for national expansionism.

During the early post-Stalin years of collective rule, the party leadership focused on the threat represented by the physical power and high degree of organization of the security police and the armed forces, and took steps to reassert party control over these elements. In 1953, Minister of Internal Affairs L. P. Beriya was executed as a "traitor" on charges of attempting to seize power and to place the police above party and government; and in 1957, Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov was removed from his party and military posts, apparently for trying to free the armed forces from party interference. Since the removal of Beriya and Zhukov from power, the security police and the military have been effectively removed from direct involvement in the formulation of policy and have been placed under closer party supervision. Although they and other institutions still have considerable influence, none is capable of exercising independent political power outside the party.

The Communist Party has thus been the key to the maintenance of the Soviet system. Although the Soviet constitution simply alludes to the "leading" role of the party (Article 126), the party is in practice responsible for the formulation of all state policies and has ultimate control over their execution. Because of this, politics in the Soviet Union is largely political maneuvering among individuals high in the party's hierarchy. Public opinion scarcely exists as a political force and plays only a peripheral role at best. Organized political groupings either within or outside the party are forbidden, and even informal factionalism is sharply circumscribed in practice.

While presuming to be a "voluntary association" standing outside and above the formal institutions of government, the Communist Party actually determines the organizational and personnel structure of the government and controls and directs its activity. This it does primarily through the assignment of party personnel to all important governmental posts. This relationship exists at all administrative levels and extends to all other vital institutions. The interlocking personnel appointments at the highest party and government levels are shown in Figure 1; Figure 2 shows the organizational relationship between the several echelons of the party and government structure.

The pervasive involvement of the Communist Party in all Soviet institutions gives great power and authority to its leaders, both collectively and individually. Ultimately, the hard policy choices are made by the men at the top of the party. The most likely arena of meaningful political struggle is therefore within the party rather than between the party and special interest groups such as the military, the managerial elite, or industrial laborers, although these special interest groups may precipitate intraparty political struggles.

Nevertheless, the fragmentation of power inherent in the collegial nature of the post-Khrushchev leadership allows even greater room for political maneuvering among the individual party leaders, who tend to identify with and advocate the varied interests of institutions falling within their areas of competence. They use their influence to win favorable policy and budgetary decisions and to gain the appointment of proteges to key positions, especially within the party staff which has a powerful voice in personnel policies. Individual party leaders have been generally able to resolve most differences among themselves without engaging in a protracted and self-destructive power struggle, but they continue to strive for greater influence in policymaking and improved personal status and position.

b. Membership

The membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union totals approximately 15 million. This is slightly more than 9% of the Soviet population old enough to join (18 and over). Figure 3, which shows the growth of the party since 1918, also indicates the close relationship that exists between the leadership's domestic and foreign policies and the growth of the party. Following the violent fluctuations in

membership caused by the zigzag political course of the early postrevolutionary years and of the Stalin era, the party's membership has followed a more consistent and stable pattern of growth conforming to the more settled pattern of Soviet politics.

Party membership, according to the rules adopted in 1961, is open to all citizens of the U.S.S.R. age 18 and over who have demonstrated a devotion to the Communist cause. Young persons under the age of 20 may enter the party only through the Komsomol (Communist Youth League). Before gaining membership, however, an applicant must negotiate a lengthy and complex bureaucratic process. He must be nominated by three party members of at least 3 years' standing who have known him for at least a year. The nomination must then be approved by the membership of the primary party organization the prospective member wishes to join, and endorsed by the next link in the party chain of command, the district or city committee. The applicant must serve a probationary period of 1 year as a candidate member; at that time the primary party organization and district or city committee again have the option of rejecting his application. After becoming a full member of the party—with the right of electing and being elected to party posts—the individual must remain active in party affairs and pay regular dues in order to retain his membership.

The party's ethnic composition approximates that of the population as a whole, more than three-fourths of the total membership being Russian and Ukrainian—respectively 61.2% and 15.9% in 1971. Information on the social composition of the party is misleading, because Soviet statistics do not register the present social status of party members, but rather their status at the time they joined the party. The members of the "intelligentsia" (generally white-collar workers), however, are believed to constitute a large, albeit declining, majority. Especially since 1958, the party has stressed the preferential admission of industrial workers and farm workers engaged directly in production. These two groups together constituted more than 65% of the new party candidates admitted during 1966-70. As the ratio of the urban to the rural population increased in those years, so did the proportion of industrial workers in the party, and in 1973 this group accounted for 57.3% of all new party candidates.

On the average, CPSU members of the present generation are slightly older and better educated but have had a briefer tenure in the party than those of




FIGURE 2. Party echelons and the Soviet Government, 1973 (U/OU)




FIGURE 3. Growth of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1918-72 (U/OU)

previous decades. The proportion of party members with a secondary or higher education had risen from nearly 34% in 1952 to more than 42% in 1961, and to over 56% in 1971. In January 1967, 49.5% of the members were over 40 years of age, while in 1946 64% were under the age of 36 due largely to the mass recruitment of party members during World War II.

The ratio of members with more than 10 years' tenure, rising from 34% of the total membership in October 1952 to 60% in October 1961, dropped to 41.7% by January 1967 as a result of a vigorous recruitment campaign pressed during 1958-65. Since

then the stress has once again been placed on more selective recruitment procedures, and the proportion of veteran party members of more than 10 years' standing has once again risen to 56.2%. A sizable and rapidly increasing proportion of party members have had no connection with the party during the Stalin era and hence have little sense of personal involvement in the excesses of that period. It should be noted, however, that the members of the present inner circle of the Politburo belong to the oldest generation of party members, i.e., those whose entry into the party dates back to the 1920's and 1930's and to the height

of the Stalinist terror. The youngest members of the Politburo are of the World War II generation of party members.

Although there are able people in the party, particularly at the top of the hierarchy, it does not attract a membership uniform in caliber. Party membership is a key element to personal advancement in Soviet society, and this circumstance guarantees that the party is faced with the continual problem of ridding itself of inactive, opportunistic, or corrupt members. Party discipline is generally strict, both in the interest of enforcing standards upon the members and to impose political uniformity and prevent factionalism. It is normal for several tens of thousands of party members to be expelled annually for misdeeds or slackness. An exchange of party membership cards, the first since 1954, began in 1973 and is scheduled to continue through 1974. The process involves a thorough scrutiny of party membership rolls, but it is not expected to develop to the proportions of a wholesale purge.

Although they are identified with regime policies and generally regarded as members of a privileged class, party members have not incurred widespread dislike as individuals simply on the ground of their membership in the CPSU. Most Soviet people recognize that party status is a useful and, at higher levels, a necessary means of advancement. Membership at the lower levels does not necessarily imply total support of the regime or of its ideology, and some young persons may even join the party in the hope of effecting reforms from within.

Closely tied to the party are the Communist youth organizations: the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth, generally referred to as the Komsomol or Communist Youth League (ages 14-28), and the Pioneers (ages 10-15). Their combined membership in May 1970 was over 44 million, about 27 million of whom were in the Komsomol. The Octobrists, children ages 7 through 9, are not formally organized, but their planned activity is a preparatory stage for entry into the Pioneers. Communist youth, like members of the party, are subject to intense ideological indoctrination. On the whole, however, their role is an auxiliary one and their discipline not so strict.

c. Organization

The basic unit of the party is the primary organization (Figure 2), which is formed in factories, governmental agencies and institutions, farms, and

units of the armed forces. Although the party statutes provide for the election of party officials, all officials require the approval of, and are often designated by, higher party authority. Each organization is answerable to the next higher unit in the hierarchy of party organizations. Party leaders make some attempts to encourage the initiative of rank-and-file members and the use of "criticism and self-criticism," but the most important function of party activity is the faithful execution of orders from above. Thus, in practice the party's guiding principle of "democratic centralism" essentially means that power flows downward from the top leadership and not upward from the membership.

The All-Union Party Congress is nominally at the top of the party structure. It is convoked by a Central Committee plenum and the decision published in a decree. The plenum also establishes the "norms of representation," which specify the ratio between party members and delegates to be selected to the Congress. At the 24th Congress, in 1971, for example, the ratio was one delegate for each 2,900 members, and a total of 4,740 voting delegates were selected. The delegates to the All-Union Party Congress are formally elected at republic party congresses which precede the All-Union Congress. The delegates to the republic party congresses, in turn, are elected at the lower level provincial (*oblast* or *krai*) conferences by other delegates selected at lower echelons of the party's chain of command. The entire process of elections is thus hierarchical and purports to spring from the grass roots; in practice, it is entirely controlled by central party organs.

The All-Union Party Congress merely ratifies policies fixed by the Central Committee's Politburo (during 1952-66 called the Presidium). During Stalin's regime the congress was convened at irregular and increasingly lengthy intervals. After Stalin's death in 1953 the party leaders generally came closer to meeting the statutory requirement of holding a congress at least every 4 years. The 24th Congress in 1971 adopted a rule change to lengthen the interval between congresses from 4 to 5 years, formalizing the precedent which had developed.

The Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission are next in the theoretical hierarchy. Those elected as voting members of the Central Committee include all members of the Politburo and Secretariat, the leaders of the largest regional party organizations, the top-ranking officials of the

executive and legislative branches of the government, and a scattering of leaders from other important mass organizations. It also includes a few representationally decorative members, such as old party veterans, and rank-and-file workers and peasants. Figure 4 indicates the growth over the years in the size of the Central Committee.

In principle, the Central Committee is responsible for administering the affairs of the party between party congresses. In practice, these functions are carried out by officials of the central party bureaucracy—the Central Committee departments (*otdely*)—which are in turn supervised by the members of the Secretariat and ultimately are responsive to the Politburo, the party's most powerful body (Figure 5). The Central Committee was reduced to meaninglessness during the latter part of the Stalin era, when it was convened only three times in 10 years. Khrushchev called the Central Committee together far more frequently; from 1956 to 1964 the Central




FIGURE 4. Growth of the central party organs (U/OU)




FIGURE 5. Central party machine (U/OU)

Committee averaged three sessions a year, each session averaging a little over 3 days in length. However, Khrushchev used the device of "expanded" sessions to which hundreds of nonmembers were invited, in order to ensure that it would function as a docile propaganda sounding board.

General Secretary Brezhnev has given the committee new prestige by restricting participation in the sessions to its members, although its sessions have been shorter and slightly less frequent than under Khrushchev. According to the party statutes, the Central Committee is supposed to meet at least twice a year to discuss and act on the most important issues facing the party and the state. During the 8-year period between Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 and the end of 1972, 26 such plenary meetings were held. They took up such questions as changes in the composition of the party leadership, foreign policy,

economic plans, agricultural programs, and industrial reorganizations. Many of the plenums involved little more than formal approval by the Central Committee of policies already established by the Politburo. At least some of the sessions, however, have led to real debate on the questions under discussion. The October 1964 plenum, of course, produced the decision to oust Khrushchev. The June 1967 plenum, after the Arab-Israeli war, brought a challenge, albeit a futile one, to Brezhnev's leadership. Even though the Central Committee's authority over day-to-day affairs is insignificant, it does serve as a potential court of last resort in case of a power struggle within the leadership.

The chief policymaking unit of the party is the Politburo of the Central Committee. It is made up of 16 full members and seven candidate (nonvoting) members. The party's chief executive body is the 10-member Secretariat. Its main functions are the selection of personnel for all significant party and state posts and supervision over the implementation of party decisions. The Party Control Committee is the least important of the Central Committee's auxiliary bodies. It is charged with the enforcement of party discipline and morality, and is responsible for bringing violators to account.

Party controls over central executive agencies of the state are exercised through departments (*otdely*) of the Central Committee, which actually functions as the staff (*apparat*) of the Secretariat. Each secretary, including General Secretary Brezhnev and the others having Politburo status, oversees the work of one or more departments. Within the bounds set by top leaders, these departments work out the details of public policy.

In general terms, the professional party staff performs the following functions:

- Disseminates, explains, and interprets party and state policy decisions.
- Implements party policies.
- Checks on and insures the implementation of state policy by governmental and other organs.
- Mobilizes economic and social pressures for the implementation of party and state policy.
- Allocates the manpower and resources of the party.
- Collects and evaluates information and prepares reports, memorandums, and staff studies for the Secretariat and Politburo.
- Calls the attention of the Secretariat and Politburo to problems and prepares, suggests, and recommends plans for their solution.

Similar staffs with comparable functions are organized under the secretariats of the republic party central committees in all but the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Figure 6). The




FIGURE 6. Republic, regional, and lower party structure (U/OU)

R.S.F.S.R. traditionally has been within the purview of the all-union party staff in Moscow. Prior to 1966, a Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R. existed under the Central Committee to perform these staff functions through departments similar to those on the national level; with the bureau's abolition by the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, the R.S.F.S.R. staff was assimilated into the central party departments.

Below the republic level, party control is exercised by provincial and district (*rayon*) party committees and their bureaus and secretaries. They are assisted by departments similar to those assisting the republic party central committees, though of lesser scope.

Except for a brief period between late 1962 and late 1964, when Khrushchev divided local party organizations along functional lines into two separate industrial (*urban*) and agricultural (*rural*) segments (the so-called production principle), the party structure has been organized geographically, i.e., each party organization has been responsible for almost everything that happens in its territory.

d. The process of control and persuasion

A key element in the hierarchical system of party control over national life is the primary party organization, which is vested with supervisory powers over the public institution, ministry, factory, farm, or other body where it is located. These "watchdog" organizations, moreover, are responsible to higher party committees, not to the administrative chain of command of these institutions. Warning or assessments of activities in all spheres of public life are forwarded to the appropriate level of the party hierarchy. At each level the party committees are assisted by a supervisory apparatus consisting of commissions and departments, which have the responsibility of checking all activities within individual sectors of public life, such as industry, agriculture, and the like.

The concept of party control from within thus implies maintaining an awareness of all activities at the grassroots of national life and intervening as necessary to keep the system functioning as effectively as possible. Past Soviet statements on the meaning and limits of party control have lacked precise definition, particularly in the economic sphere. As a result, local party leaders have sometimes been chastised for interfering too much in management and, at other times, criticized for failing to exercise enough leadership.

During the period of Khrushchev's rule, party leaders were increasingly pressed to undertake economic training and to exercise greater authority in

directing the economy. In the early years of the post-Khrushchev collective leadership, the distinction between party and government responsibilities was drawn more sharply, and the party deemphasized its program of economic training for party functionaries, while giving priority to their political indoctrination. Party organizations were instructed to "assist with advice and by example," not to displace public institutions and organizations or usurp their functions.

More recently, the pendulum has tended to swing back in the direction of giving party organizations a greater supervisory role, especially those within planning and research organizations. Changes in the CPSU statute adopted at the 24th Congress provided for party control of the work of planning and research institutes, and permitted party organizations to check for compliance of central and local state institutions with party and government directives. The theoretical separation between party and state functions apparently continues to be honored more in the breach than in the observance.

Supplementing the party's hierarchy of direct controls is an almost equally elaborate system of propaganda to guide and channel popular opinion. The energy and capital expended by the regime on propaganda are quite out of proportion to the normal efforts of any government to obtain support for its policies. The Soviet leaders use propaganda to generate support for their policies, to convince the masses of the legitimacy of their monopoly of power (as the alleged representatives of the laboring masses), and to do battle with undesirable or "alien" ways of thought.

The party has arrogated to itself the role of teacher, guide, and leader of all aspects of Soviet society. Its primary control center for propaganda is the Propaganda Department of the Party's Central Committee. The Propaganda Department has counterparts in the lower party committees.

Every major field of public activity has an information agency, organized in a hierarchical structure, to mobilize public opinion in support of a particular set of regime policies. Each level of these hierarchies has its equivalent-level party committee to provide detailed guidance in the party line. Among the principal information agencies are the indoctrination and propaganda systems of the party itself, the youth organizations, the trade unions, the governmental ministries, and the armed forces. Every factory, farm, military unit, and even penal institution has at least one person charged with propaganda. Obligatory lectures, which formerly were conducted at places of work before a captive audience, are now, with the introduction of the shorter 5-day workweek, being

organized by propagandists at places of residence during leisure hours. Schools, the press, radio and television, motion pictures, literature, art, and to a certain extent science, have the responsibility of carrying the official line to the people.

The effectiveness of official propaganda in generating support for the leaders and their policies cannot, of course, be judged statistically. Most Soviet citizens do not believe everything they read in their newspapers; in fact, many are skeptical about most public information, domestic as well as foreign. In public, however, they usually consider it safer to repeat authorized points of view. Although regime propaganda clearly falls far short of its avowed purpose, it does have a numbing effect that aids in maintaining stability and control. Its impact, however, is being somewhat affected by growing contacts with the non-Communist world.

2. The top leadership

a. *Politburo (S)*

The dominant political figures in the U.S.S.R. are the members of the policymaking Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Since the April 1973 plenum there have been 16 full members and seven candidate members of the Politburo. Candidate members have a right to attend Politburo meetings and to participate in debate, but have no vote.

In the past, Politburo members have served as both top party administrators and simultaneously as government administrators. This practice permitted dominant figures such as Khrushchev to concentrate immense power in their hands to the detriment of the positions of their colleagues in the leadership. The men who make up the present leadership thus far appear to have learned the lessons of the past. Since December 1965 no single individual has been permitted simultaneously to hold executive (as opposed to policymaking) positions in both the party and state apparatus.


Eight members of the present Politburo hold party executive positions, seven are state officials, and one heads the central trade union organization. The party executives include four members of the Secretariat, the Chairman of the Party Control Committee, the republic party chiefs of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the head of the Moscow city party organization. The state officials consist of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the titular head of state), the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier), a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Ministers of Agriculture, Defense, and Foreign Affairs; and the Chairman of the Committee

for State Security (KGB). Three members of the party Secretariat, the party chiefs of the Leningrad city and of the Belorussian and Uzbekistan republic party organizations, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R. make up the list of the seven candidate members of the Politburo. The armed forces are now represented on the Politburo for the first time since Marshal Zhukov was ousted by Khrushchev in 1957.

Figure 7 shows the changes in the composition of the Politburo over the years, and at the same time illustrates the remarkably high degree of continuity in its membership. Six of its members have held full Politburo rank for more than 10 years, and two (Premier Kosygin and party secretary M. A. Suslov) have, with brief interruptions, been members for more than two decades. The degree of continuity is even higher within the inner power structure of the Politburo. Its senior members were already powerful in the last years of Khrushchev's rule, and there are tenuous lines of continuity from Stalin's time to the present. The composition and size of the group underwent several marked changes during Khrushchev's rise to full power. The present regime, until 1971, maintained a small majority in the Politburo of full-time party functionaries established by Khrushchev in the late 1950's. In 1971, four new members increased the party representation (10-5). The personnel changes made at the April 1973 Central Committee plenum, however, put the state hierarchy on a basis of virtual parity with party officials. In the past, tension at the top level between party and state representatives has led to bitter quarrels. At present, however, this tension appears to be relatively minor.

The Politburo is believed to meet at least once a week to consider questions of national policy. All Politburo members and candidate members have the right to participate in formal sessions, but only full members can vote. Not all members of the Politburo participate in every session, however. Politburo members who are republic party chiefs, for example, may remain in their local capitals. In such cases, however, they can register their opinion on questions on the agenda of the meeting by telephone. Since the ouster of Khrushchev, most Politburo decisions have been reached by a process of consensus. National security issues are said to be an exception to this procedure, and decisions in this sphere reportedly require a formal assenting vote by all members of the Politburo. This category presumably includes most significant issues of defense and foreign policy.

In addition to the Politburo members themselves, members of the Secretariat and the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers reputedly have the right to



Stalin —Full Member, Politburo, Soviet Communist Party

Brezhnev—Candidate Member, Politburo, Soviet Communist Party

NOTE: Underlined names are included in the present Politburo.

■ Full-time Party Functionaries

■ Full-time Government Functionaries

FIGURE 7. Evolution of the party Politburo, 1952-73 (U/OU)

recommend items for inclusion on the agenda of a Politburo meeting. The members of the Politburo, of course, have the chief responsibility for initiating policy recommendations in areas within their competence as party or government officials. There is considerable overlapping of functions among individual leaders, and this undoubtedly complicates the process of policy coordination and formulation. Primary responsibility in any one sphere, however, seems to lie with one specified leader. Thus, responsibility in defense matters appears to rest principally with General Secretary Brezhnev. He is *ex officio* Chairman of the Defense Council, a civilian-military group which includes some other Politburo members and makes recommendations on defense policy in its broadest aspects for final decision by the Politburo. Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin appears to exercise similar responsibility for questions of economic administration and finance. Figure 8 indicates the general policy responsibilities of members of the Politburo and Secretariat.

The Politburo has no specifically designated "chairman," and in theory its members carry equal weight in the decisionmaking process. As General Secretary, however, Brezhnev acts as *de facto* chairman, convening and chairing Politburo sessions. The General Secretary also plays a key role in determining which questions shall be entered on the agenda of a meeting. In this politically sensitive area, however, he reportedly makes his decisions only after consulting with two other secretaries of Politburo rank, Andrey P. Kirilenko and Mikhail A. Suslov. The central responsibilities of the General Secretary's post make Brezhnev the acknowledged leader of the ruling group.

After Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko are the two most powerful party functionaries in the Politburo. They enjoy considerable personal authority within their spheres—Suslov for ideology and the international Communist movement and Kirilenko for party organization and industrial management. Kirilenko functions as Brezhnev's unofficial "deputy," standing in for the General Secretary when he is unavailable or has a conflicting schedule. Suslov has also acted for Brezhnev on occasion.

Along with these three senior party secretaries, the two senior state officials, Premier Kosygin and "President" Nikolay V. Podgorny, make up the inner circle of the Politburo. Kosygin, in addition to his responsibilities for the economy, has wide responsibilities in the sphere of defense and foreign policy. In the latter regard, he has played a leading role in the execution of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East and

South Asia. Podgorny, as the titular head of state, is also active in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy and has a voice in defense matters.

The other party functionaries represented on the Politburo exercise narrower responsibilities and apparently wield much less actual power. Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev, and Viktor V. Grishin head important regional party organizations. Party Secretary Fedor D. Kulakov has special responsibilities for agriculture. The latter four are relatively junior members, having won their positions only at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. The aged Arvid Ya. Pelshe, who heads the Party Control Committee—a body responsible for overseeing the discipline of party members—is the only veteran of the October Revolution among the present top leaders.

Those members of the Politburo with primarily governmental functions—in addition to Kosygin and Podgorny—are Kirill T. Mazurov, Dmitry S. Polyansky, Andrey A. Gromyko, Andrey A. Grechko, and Yury V. Andropov. Mazurov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and stands in for Kosygin in his absence in much the same way that Suslov and Kirilenko occasionally act for Brezhnev. In addition, Mazurov has a general responsibility for industrial administration.

Gromyko, Grechko, and Andropov are the most junior members of the Politburo, having won their seats only at a Central Committee plenum in April 1973. Their appointment breaks the pattern established in recent years, when the institutions they represent—the foreign affairs, military, and security police establishments—were not represented on the Politburo. If these institutions can maintain their foothold in the Politburo, their direct influence on the policymaking process may increase.

Polyansky and Shelepin have several characteristics in common. They are youthful, able, and ambitious men whose careers appear to be in decline. Until February 1973, Polyansky was a First Deputy Premier and a rival of Mazurov as successor to Kosygin. His loss of that post and appointment as Minister of Agriculture marked a definite setback in his career. Shelepin was an early rival of Brezhnev, but was outmaneuvered by the General Secretary in 1965-67, losing important positions in the party and government and being relegated to the position of trade union chief. Both seem now to be in vulnerable positions. Two other leaders who had suffered similar reversals in the past, Petr Ye. Shelest and Gennady I. Voronov, were forced into retirement at the April 1973 plenum.

Further changes seem likely in the composition of the Politburo. At 16, its membership is comparatively

large and is likely to be reduced. The present even number of members also means that it lacks a tie-breaking vote, a further impetus for change. In addition, the advanced age of some of the veteran members of the Politburo—Suslov, Podgorny, and Pelshe are in their seventies and Kosygin and Grechko will cross that line in 1974—make changes in the near future inevitable.

All these factors suggest that the Politburo is in for a period of greater instability than it has experienced in recent years. The departure of old members and the addition of new ones will mean—as it has in the past—a struggle for influence and advantage within the ranks of the party high command. In any such political struggle the General Secretary will play a key role.

b. The General Secretary (C)

The fact that those members of the leadership who have been adversely affected by the political shifts of the last decade either have retained their seats on the Politburo or have been allowed to go into retirement is a measure of the moderation of the Soviet political style and the strengthening of limitations on the powers of the General Secretary which have taken place since the death of Stalin in March 1953.

Stalin ruled as an absolute dictator, and his voice in policy matters was law. His power had been achieved and was maintained primarily through the secret police, which he used as an instrument of terror and intimidation. For years he either directed or connived at the physical liquidation of his more troublesome or ambitious subordinates. The party was subjected to frequent and massive purges as a means of assuring his complete dominance. The much vaunted supremacy of the party was a fiction; in fact it was subordinated to the secret police and a coterie of Stalin's closest henchmen.

Stalin's survivors made haste to lessen the menace of the secret police. The members of the Politburo combined to bring down Lavrenty P. Beriia, Stalin's police chief, in 1953. Beriia's execution marked the beginning of a decline in the political weight of the security forces, and in the omnipotence of the General Secretary.

Nikita S. Khrushchev won the scramble that ensued after Stalin's death to succeed to the leadership of the party; he became First Secretary in September 1953. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's one-man leadership as the "cult of the personality," and represented himself as a champion of collective leadership. He soon showed that he had more enthusiasm for collectivity as a tactical ploy than as a guiding principle of leadership.

Over the course of the next few years, Khrushchev succeeded in ridding himself of his most powerful rivals. In June 1957, he survived an attempt by a majority of the Politburo to overturn him, and forced the ouster of the so-called antiparty group led by Georgy M. Malenkov, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and Lazar M. Kaganovich. In March 1958, Khrushchev took over the premiership from Nikolay A. Bulganin. He then proceeded to consolidate his triumph by appointing proteges who had worked under him in the Ukrainian party organization. Three of them were Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Podgorny.

Khrushchev increasingly dominated the meetings of the Politburo. He often made policy decisions independently or in conjunction with consultants of his own choosing. Khrushchev's highhandedness, his predilection for high-risk policy gambles, and a series of embarrassing political failures served to unite the other members of the Politburo against him.

In October 1964, Khrushchev was confronted with a demand from his colleagues that he resign. He attempted to defend himself before the Central Committee but that body, which had supported him in 1957, this time rejected him. Following his ouster, an agreement was reached that divided his dual position between Brezhnev as party boss and Kosygin as government chief (Premier). The decision was intended to further genuine collectivity within the party leadership and to prevent the reemergence of a dominant leader in the mold of Stalin or Khrushchev.

Brezhnev soon moved to consolidate his position as party boss, but avoided rousing the sort of fears among party officials that had proved politically fatal to his predecessor. By October 1965, less than a year after Khrushchev's ouster, Brezhnev had all his mentor's positions except that of Premier. He had become chairman of the—now defunct—party Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., head of the Defense Council, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the commission to draft a new constitution for the U.S.S.R.

Brezhnev's preeminent position was enhanced by actions taken at the 23rd Party Congress in March-April 1966 and at the 24th Congress in March-April 1971. At the 23rd Congress he acquired the title of General Secretary, previously held only by Stalin, in place of Khrushchev's title of First Secretary. In addition, a political ally, Kirilenko, was added to the Secretariat, and Brezhnev succeeded better than the other oligarchs in placing his own supporters in the Central Committee. Brezhnev maintained the strength of his clique in the Central Committee at the 24th Congress, and at least two of the four new additions to the Politburo—Shcherbitsky and

Kunayev—must be reckoned as allies of the General Secretary.

The results of a Central Committee plenum in April 1973 represented another net accretion of Brezhnev's power. Two leaders with whom he apparently had crossed swords in the past—Voronov and Shelest—were dropped from the Politburo, and two of the three new members added (Gromyko and Grechko) have been closely associated with the General Secretary and his policies. The changes mean that, at least for the near term, the General Secretary's basis of support within the Politburo should be greater than before.

The enhancement of Brezhnev's political position has been paralleled by an expansion of his sphere of activity into areas which theoretically should be the preserve of his fellow hierarchs. In November 1969 his appearance at the national collective farm (*kolkhoz*) congress took the limelight away from Polyansky, who gave the official address as the *rapporteur*, and he has since continued to dominate the public conduct of agricultural policy. He has been even more assertive in the field of foreign policy, where he has displaced Kosygin and Podgorny in the conduct of summit diplomacy with Western leaders. He holds no state positions which would legally justify his series of meetings since 1969 with President Pompidou of France, Chancellor Brandt of West Germany, and President Nixon. As incongruous as these meetings were in a legal sense, they reflect quite accurately the realities of the political balance sheet in Moscow. Brezhnev, despite his low-key style, is quite clearly the "first among equals" in the Politburo.

Brezhnev has demonstrated considerable skill in his ability to outmaneuver the opposition en route to his present eminence. The adroitness with which Shelest and Voronov were first divested of their power bases, and then deposed from their Politburo seats demonstrated his political skills.

Shelest had been on the Politburo since 1964. His power base was in the Ukraine, where he had headed the republic party organization since 1963. Although originally an ally of the General Secretary, he apparently broke with Brezhnev because of his opposition to detente with the West, his tolerance of manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, and differences over investment policy. He was ousted from his position as chief of the Ukrainian party in May 1972, but was reassigned as a deputy premier in Moscow and retained on the Politburo. Shelest remained in that position until April 1973, even though it involved no clearly defined duties. The April plenum finally sent him into political retirement.

Similarly, Voronov was gradually maneuvered along the same path to political extinction. Voronov

ran afoul of the Brezhnev majority in the Politburo because of controversial reforms of agricultural administration which he championed as an alternative to increased agricultural investment. In July 1971 Voronov was edged out of his power base as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian republic, and named to the ineffectual post of Chairman of the People's Control Committee. Like Shelest, he held onto his seat in the Politburo until April 1973, even though he had been stripped of most of his authority and responsibilities 2 years earlier.

An earlier and more dangerous rival, Aleksandr Shelepin, was dealt with in much the same manner. Shelepin became a powerful figure with a strong base in both the party and state apparatus in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's ouster. He made himself the leader of a Young Turk faction in the party in challenge to Brezhnev's leadership. Shelepin's ability and ambition frightened the other members of the collective, and Brezhnev was able to muster a majority to gradually strip his rival of power. One by one Shelepin lost his significant posts, that of a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee in December 1965, and that of party secretary in 1967. His present post as trade union chief is politically powerless, even though he has retained his seat on the Politburo.

The fate suffered by these three losers in the Kremlin's political wars also illustrates some of the verities of current Soviet politics. Brezhnev was able to cut them off from their sources of political power and deprive them of influence, but he has proceeded further only with great caution. The principal reason for the curious political half-life still enjoyed by Shelepin and until recently by Shelest and Voronov is the apparent delicate balance of power which exists within the Politburo. Changes threaten to upset the balance and weaken the position of each of the other members—an alternative which they have been reluctant to permit. Brezhnev, for his part, has been slow to risk the kind of backlash which could be produced among the other Politburo members by an overly ruthless effort to rid himself of his opponents. He is fully cognizant of the errors which led to his predecessor's downfall.

Politics within the Politburo thus tend to proceed along the lines produced by shifting factional alignments rather than on the basis of a rigid division on issues of principle, "liberals" versus "conservatives." On any particular issue, of course, there may be adherents of a more liberal or more conservative position. These positions, however, are not constants, but reflect the exigencies of politics and personal, political, and bureaucratic rivalries and alliances.

c. Members of the collective (U/OU)

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev
b. 19 December 1906 (C)

General Secretary Brezhnev is an ethnic Russian but retains an identification with the Ukraine where he made his early career as a land reclamation expert, metallurgical engineer, and party official. Brezhnev joined the top party hierarchy at the 19th Congress in 1952, but lost his Politburo candidate membership and Secretariat post in the reshuffle which followed Stalin's death in March 1953. Under Khrushchev, he briefly headed the Navy party apparatus, then was tapped to supervise the Virgin Lands project in Kazakhstan. He rejoined the Politburo as a candidate member at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and became a full member when the Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich "antiparty" group was ousted in 1957. He was sidetracked to the largely honorific post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1960, but bounced back to replace Khrushchev in 1964. He is a consensus-style politician. In the reaction to the iconoclastic Khrushchev, he displayed a tendency toward political orthodoxy and rigidity. Since 1970, however, he has swung around to back consumer-oriented policies at home and foreign policies based on detente with the West—displaying

in the process a notable facility for political flexibility. Long submerged in the collective, he has begun to assert his personal leadership more boldly.



Nikolay Viktorovich Podgorny
b. 18 February 1903 (C)

Podgorny, the titular head of state, is a Ukrainian. He made his early career in his home republic. In the 1930's and 1940's he held several technical and governmental posts connected with the food processing industry in the Ukraine and in Moscow. He was transferred to party work only in 1950, after holding a variety of government and technical posts. He became the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party in 1957, a Politburo candidate member in 1958, and a full member in 1960. He reached the apex of his power in 1963, when he became a party secretary in addition to his seat on the Politburo. He was considered a potential contender for the top leadership post for a short period after Khrushchev's ouster. However, he lost his Secretariat post in 1966, after having replaced the old party veteran Anastas Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1965. Podgorny has shown an ability to bend with the wind and appears reconciled to his loss of political stature. Under Khrushchev he was identified with relatively

liberal views on domestic issues, but he has more or less reflected Brezhnev's positions since then—orthodox at first, becoming more "liberal" since 1970.



Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
b. 21 February 1904 (U/OU)

Premier Kosygin is an ethnic Russian who began his career in Leningrad. He has been a member of the Central Committee and an official in the central state apparatus in Moscow since 1939. Kosygin first gained Politburo status as a candidate member in 1946, and became a full member in 1948. However, he was demoted to candidate status in 1952, and dropped completely in 1953 after Stalin's death. He lost his post of Deputy Premier briefly in 1956—a position he had held since 1940—but regained it in 1957. He again became a candidate member of the Politburo after the ouster of the "antiparty" group in June 1957. Kosygin became a First Deputy Premier and full member of the Politburo in 1960, and replaced Khrushchev as Premier in 1964. Kosygin combines an

interest in rationalizing planning, developing a balanced economy, and achieving detente with the West.



Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov
b. 21 November 1902 (U/OU)

Suslov, an ethnic Russian, is a leading representative of the party intelligentsia. He, Pelshe, and Shelepin are the three Soviet leaders who have a classical university education (as opposed to a technical one). Suslov was a teacher at Moscow University in the 1920's, entered the ranks of full-time party workers in the 1930's, and moved up to hold a variety of important posts, generally concerned with ideology and propaganda. He became a member of the Politburo in 1952, but was one of the many dropped in 1953. However, Suslov held onto his Secretariat post and regained his Politburo seat in 1955. Suslov alternates with Kirilenko as Brezhnev's "deputy." He is the party's high priest in doctrinal matters, and has a special interest in the international Communist movement. In spite of his ideological bent, he has shown considerable flexibility of mind and an acute sensitivity to the prevailing tides in the leadership. His political skills are demonstrated by his

uninterrupted 26-year career on the Secretariat. Suslov is a champion of collectivity in the leadership and has been careful to maintain an independent position in the political maneuvering in the Kremlin.



Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko
b. 9 September 1906 (U/OU)

Kirilenko has ties of long standing with Brezhnev. Like the General Secretary, he is an ethnic Russian with strong ties to the Ukraine where he began his career as an aircraft designer and local party official. He became a candidate member of the Politburo after the ouster of the "antiparty" group in 1957, lost this position briefly in 1961, but came back to win it and the number two post in the party's now-defunct Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R. 6 months later. He won his Secretariat post at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966. Kirilenko alternates with Suslov as a "deputy" for Brezhnev. During the Khrushchev years Kirilenko demonstrated an interest in consumer needs, but this has since been replaced by an emphasis on ideological orthodoxy and defense needs. He apparently continues to support Brezhnev.



Arvid Yanovich Pelshe
b. 7 February 1899 (U/OU)

Pelshe, an ethnic Latvian, is the only one of the current leaders whose party membership predates the October Revolution. He began his career in the secret police and as a political commissar in the armed forces, and moved on to hold teaching posts in party institutes. He became First Secretary of the Latvian party in 1959, at a time when many Latvian officials were being attacked for nationalism. He became a full member of the Politburo at the 23rd Congress in 1966, at the same time that he gained his present position in the Control Commission. He may have ties to Suslov.



Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov
b. 7 April 1914 (U/OU)

Mazurov is a Belorussian, and made his career in that republic until he moved to Moscow in 1965. In

the 1930's he worked variously as a highway official, Komsomol worker, and in the army. Mazurov spent most of World War II as a Komsomol worker organizing partisan resistance to the German occupation. He entered the republic party apparatus soon after the war, and rose to become Premier of the Belorussian Republic in 1953, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1956, and First Secretary of the Belorussian party in 1957. He became a full member of the Politburo in March 1965, when he was reassigned to Moscow as a First Deputy Premier. He is Kosygin's deputy. He has evidenced a strong interest in rationalization and modernization of the economy, and, uniquely among the present leaders, has called for a "systems analysis" approach to economic planning.



Dmitry Stepanovich Polyansky
b. 7 November 1917 (U/OU)

Polyansky is a Ukrainian, who began his career as a Komsomol official in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov¹ in the late 1930's. He spent most of the war years as a party official in the Novosibirsk *oblast*, was a Central Committee official in Moscow from 1945-49, and held party posts in Russia and the Ukraine in the 1950's. In 1958 he became Premier of the Russian republic and a candidate member of the Politburo, and in 1960 a full

¹For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of the chapter.

member of the Politburo. He became a Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R. in 1962, and a First Deputy Premier in 1965. In this capacity, he was responsible for the supervision of the agricultural sector and alternated with Mazurov in deputizing for Premier Kosygin. In February 1973 he was relieved of his post as First Deputy Chairman and appointed U.S.S.R. Minister of Agriculture. Polyansky has been a zealous champion of investment in agriculture, and of strong central management of the economy. He has highly orthodox views, tempered by an interest in doing business with the West, especially for the needs of Soviet agriculture. His transfer to the Agriculture Ministry would appear to have been a demotion.



Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin
b. 18 August 1918 (U/OU)

Shelepin is an ethnic Russian. Along with Pelshe and Suslov, he has had the benefit of a classical university education. Shelepin made his early career as an official in the Komsomol. Having caught Khrushchev's eye, he began a swift rise in April 1958 when he was made head of the Central Committee's Party Organs Department. In December of that year, he was placed in command of the KGB, where he supervised a general housecleaning. He became a

Central Committee Secretary in 1961, and a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee in 1962. He was made a full member of the Politburo in November 1964, evidently for services rendered in the October coup against Khrushchev. His rise alarmed the Brezhnev group in the leadership, and he was deprived of his Deputy Premier and Party-State Control posts in December 1965. He was removed from the Secretariat in September 1967, a few months after having been named to head the trade union organization. Shelepin is interested in administrative efficiency and modern management methods. During his period of ascendancy from 1964 to 1967, he was identified with neo-Stalinism and a tough, chauvinistic foreign policy line. Since his fall from grace, he has shifted to a moderate position on domestic issues, and has even courted liberal intellectuals.



Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin
b. 14 September 1914 (U/OU)

Grishin is a Russian who has made his career in the Moscow region. He became a Politburo candidate member in 1961, and Moscow party chief in June 1967. He acquired the latter post in a shakeup that followed the Arab-Israeli war, and succeeded a Shelepin associate who allegedly had criticized the

leadership's handling of the crisis. He gained full Politburo membership at the 24th Congress in 1971.



Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev
b. 12 January 1912 (U/OU)

Kunayev is an ethnic Kazakh whose entire career has been spent in his native republic. He began as a metallurgical engineer, and served as a Deputy Premier of Kazakhstan, President of the Republic Academy of Sciences, and republic Premier before being elected to the Central Committee in 1956. He became the Kazakhstan party chief in 1960, lost the post in 1962, and regained it in 1963 after the fall of Khrushchev. Kunayev won a candidate membership in the Politburo at the 23rd Congress in 1966, and full membership at the 24th Congress in 1971. He has ties with Brezhnev dating back to the latter's service in Kazakhstan in the mid-1950's, and seems to be one of the General Secretary's most loyal political allies.



Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky
b. 17 February 1918 (U/OU)

Shcherbitsky is a Ukrainian with links to Brezhnev's old home base of Dnepropetrovsk. Shcherbitsky began his career in Dnepropetrovsk as an engineer in the late 1930's. He returned there after the war to begin a long climb through the city and provincial party organizations, becoming the provincial First Secretary in 1955. He rose to the rank of a Ukrainian Party Secretary in 1957, and became Premier of the Ukraine in 1961. In this post, he won Central Committee membership and the rank of a candidate member of the Politburo in 1961. There are signs of a longstanding rivalry between Shcherbitsky and former Politburo member Shelest, with the former being dropped back to his old post of Dnepropetrovsk party chief in July 1963 at the same time that Shelest was becoming the Ukrainian First Secretary. Shcherbitsky lost his candidate membership on the Politburo at the end of the year, but came back in 1965 to regain both the Ukrainian premiership and his Politburo candidate membership. He became a full member of the Politburo at the 24th Congress in 1971, and replaced his old rival Shelest as Ukrainian party chief in May 1972. Shcherbitsky too has strong ties to Brezhnev.



Fedor Davydovich Kulakov
b. 2 February 1918 (U/OU)

Kulakov is a Russian with ties to the northwestern area of the Russian republic and a background in agriculture. He was a party official responsible for agriculture in Penza *oblast* during and after the war. In the 1950's he served successively as chairman of the Penza *oblast* council, a Deputy Minister of Agriculture, and R.S.F.S.R. Minister of Grain Products. After being named party chief of Stavropol *krai* in 1961, he was made a member of the Central Committee at the 22nd Congress in 1962. Kulakov became head of the Central Committee's Agriculture Department in 1961, and a Secretary in 1965. He was added to the Politburo as a full member (without having been a candidate member) at the 24th Congress in 1971. His authority over the agricultural sphere would appear enhanced by Polyansky's apparent loss of broad authority in the field.



Yury Vladimirovich Andropov
b. 15 June 1914 (U/OU)

Andropov is a Russian with ties to the northwestern areas of the Russian republic. He organized partisan units during World War II, and served as Second Secretary of the former Karelo-Finn republic until 1951. He arrived in Moscow in that year, and was assigned to work on Komsomol and cadres affairs. He was concerned with Soviet relations with the East European countries from 1953 to 1967 in a variety of capacities—as a charge d'affaires and Counselor of Embassy in Hungary (1953-54), Ambassador to Hungary (1954-57)—during the Hungarian uprising—and chief of the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Ruling Communist Parties (1957-67). With the latter appointment, Andropov began to rise to the top of the party leadership. He became a Central Committee member in 1961, served as a party secretary from 1962 to 1967, and became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1967 after replacing a Shelepin associate as chief of the KGB. In April 1973 he became a full member of the Politburo. He now seems to be neutral in Kremlin politicking. He has a

reputation of being relatively sophisticated and openminded.



Andrey Antonovich Grechko
b. 17 October 1903 (U/OU)

Grechko is a Ukrainian and a career soldier. He was a colonel general and commander of the 18th Army in World War II (where Brezhnev served with him as the political commissar). He became a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955, a member of the Central Committee in 1961, and served from 1957-67 as a First Deputy Minister of Defense. He was named Minister of Defense in 1967. He became a full member of the Politburo in April 1973, only the second professional military man to be brought into the policymaking circle (the other was Marshal Zhukov in 1937). Grechko seems to be on good terms with Brezhnev. He has favored curbs on party meddling in military affairs, but not on civilian control over the military.



Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko
b. 18 July 1909 (U/OU)

Foreign Minister Gromyko is a Russian and a career diplomat with long experience in U.S. affairs. He joined the Foreign Ministry in the 1930's, and became head of the American Countries Division of the ministry in 1939. He subsequently served as Counselor of Embassy in Washington, Ambassador to the United States (1943-46), and the first Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1946-48). He became a First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1953, a member of the Central Committee in 1956, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957, and a member of the Politburo in April 1973. He is widely respected as a diplomatic expert, and has worked effectively with successive party leaders and premiers.

C. Structure and functioning of the government

1. Constitution (U/OU)

The Soviet constitution of 1936 gives a faulty and misleading picture of the system it purports to establish and describe. Earlier Soviet constitutions, those of 1918 and 1924, did not mention the source of supreme political authority in the country—the Communist Party. The present constitution, promulgated in 1936, mentions the party in a single reference, declaring that the CPSU, composed of “the most active and politically conscious citizens, is the leading core of all organizations of the working

people, both public and state.” The constitutional statement that “all power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the soviets of working people's deputies,” in fact, means as represented by the party. Similarly, the constitution lists a number of “fundamental rights and duties” that purportedly insure civil rights—including freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and demonstrations—provisions which have served as models for other Communist constitutions. These rights, however, are qualified as “guaranteed by law,” so that the enabling regulations can and do limit such personal expression to whatever is judged by the party to be appropriate. Again, this “Stalin constitution,” as it is still referred to unofficially, outlines a federal union in which individual republics are given the right to secede, although the U.S.S.R. is actually a highly centralized state and most of the republics were incorporated into the union, and kept in it, by force.

One of the chief functions of the constitution is to serve as a propaganda weapon, both at home and abroad; it is used by Soviet propagandists to perpetuate the fiction that the U.S.S.R. is an advanced democracy. The idea that the constitution as a legal document should limit the operations and powers of government is foreign to Soviet communism, since it implies restraints on the will of the party. In application, the constitution serves to limit the rights and powers of the people, not of the government, and to emphasize the duties of citizens to the Soviet Government. The concept of unconstitutionality, therefore, has no practical meaning in terms of the system's operation.

The constitution is notable for the frequency and ease with which it is amended, although the changes normally apply to minor details of governmental structure not found in most other constitutions. The only difference between ordinary lawmaking and constitutional amendment in the U.S.S.R. is that the latter requires the approval of two-thirds of the members rather than a simple majority in the Supreme Soviet. The requirement is of no significance, however, since the Supreme Soviet invariably approves unanimously whatever legislation is set before it.

The party leaders for several years have indicated an intention to introduce changes into the constitution. Nikita Khrushchev first broached the idea of a new constitution in 1959 at the 21st Party Congress. Responsibility for preparing basic provisions was assigned subsequently to the Institute of Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. In April 1962 the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet created a commission to draft the new constitution and elected Khrushchev its

chairman. Brezhnev officially replaced Khrushchev as chairman of the commission in December 1964, and a year and a half later he declared that the new constitution would "crown" the 50th anniversary of the country. This was widely interpreted as referring to the 50th anniversary of the party which was celebrated in November 1967. That date passed without the appearance of a new constitution, however, and no new deadline was set until December 1972. At that time, Brezhnev, speaking in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the U.S.S.R., proclaimed that the draft of the new constitution was expected to be ready before the next party congress, i.e., before 1976.

The obvious procrastination which has plagued the project suggests that the document has been considered a political Pandora's box to be approached only with the greatest of caution. The vague statements about the projected constitution thus far relate primarily to doctrinal points and statements of goals and give little reason to expect meaningful changes in the existing system. Brezhnev, in his 50th anniversary speech in 1972, said the new document should take into account the social, economic, and political developments which have allowed the party to draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union has acquired the status of a developed—rather than a developing—socialist society.

The governmental system of the U.S.S.R. includes legislative bodies, executive agencies, and courts. The Soviet regime explicitly rejects, however, any theory of the separation of powers. The Supreme Soviet and also the lower soviets are not merely legislative assemblies but bodies combining all types of governmental functions. The constitution nowhere describes the soviets as legislatures or parliaments, although they are the only bodies constitutionally qualified to enact "laws" (*zakony*). This provision is observed formally. Many of the edicts (*ukazy*) issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and decrees (*postanovleniye*) issued by the Council of Ministers, however, deal with matters as significant as those treated in laws and all have the force of law. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, it is true, is authorized by the constitution to annul decrees and regulations of the Council of Ministers if they are not in accord with the law, but this authority has never been exercised. Instead, the "law" has been changed to comply with the provisions of the decrees.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. is the most important of the many agencies by which policies determined by the Communist Party are carried into effect. Soviet sources are explicit on the point that the

party is primary and the government secondary, i.e., that the party has the policymaking prerogative and the government the role of execution. Little initiative in important matters is left to government officials (particularly those lacking parallel party positions of authority). Moreover, the government is structurally so extensive and the level of training compared with that of the West so low that actual administrative efficiency leaves much to be desired.

Party influence may be transmitted directly to the heads of governmental agencies, thence vertically through the lower echelons of the agencies, or it may pass vertically through the party structure and laterally to the several levels of the nonparty structure. Most often, both channels are in operation simultaneously. The hierarchical relationship of the party and government structures is shown in Figure 2.

Party control of governmental agencies is simplified by the presence of party officials in key positions at all levels of government; the higher one ascends, the closer the connection becomes. The relationship at the highest party and government levels is shown in Figure 1.

2. Central government (C)

The constitutional position of the branches of the Soviet Government contrasts markedly with their real position. The constitution designates the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of power, its Presidium as an ancillary body subordinate to it, and the Council of Ministers as an appointed instrument subordinate to both. In reality, however, the order of importance of the three bodies is roughly reversed. It is not that constitutional provisions are violated—they are adhered to in form—but that the constitution suggests only vaguely the actual moving forces behind the government. For example, the Supreme Soviet, a bicameral body consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, is actually of no real importance as a legislative body. Normally the Supreme Soviet meets about twice a year for a few days each time and passes unanimously the budget and other laws placed before it. Each chamber of the Supreme Soviet has standing commissions with statutory authority to exercise some legislative initiative and to supervise the work of the government's executive agencies. The October 1967 regulation on the commissions, however, does not spell out their powers sufficiently to make a reality of the Supreme Soviet's constitutional prerogatives in these matters. Data on the Supreme Soviet are shown in Figure 9.




FIGURE 9. Representation and structure, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, July 1973 (U/OU)

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is of somewhat greater importance. It directs and coordinates the activities of the standing commissions and otherwise conducts business between sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Certain powers are conferred on the Presidium alone, such as the issuance of edicts, ratification and denunciation of treaties, appointment and removal of the command staff of the armed forces, and declaration of war or mobilization. These acts are not subject to later ratification by the Supreme Soviet. The significance of even the Presidium, however, stems not from its constitutional position but from the presence in it of persons of indisputable political power achieved through activities in other more important jobs. In 1973 the Presidium consisted of a chairman, 15 deputy chairmen (one from each of the union republics), a secretary, and 20 other members.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet officially represents the Soviet state in international affairs. Its chairman receives the credentials of foreign

diplomatic representatives, greets visiting delegations from foreign governments, and affixes his signature to certain international agreements. A member of the Communist Party Politburo (Nikolay V. Podgorny in 1973) fills this position. The incumbent usually has been considered titular chief of state.

Brezhnev also has acted in the capacity of the chief of state in meetings with important foreign leaders. For example, he has acted as host to French, West German, and U.S. leaders, and when he has traveled outside the bloc—to France, West Germany, and the United States—has received most of the honors due a chief of state. Although the chief-of-state honors given Brezhnev on these occasions accord with the realities of power and prestige within the Soviet Union, he holds no formal position to justify the practice.

The Council of Ministers is the most important agency in the governmental structure. Its 84 members (as of May 1973) includes a chairman, deputy chairmen, ministers, and heads of state committees




FIGURE 10. U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, July 1973 (S)

and agencies (Figure 10). In addition, the chairmen of the 15 republic councils of ministers are *ex officio* members.²

In theory, decisions are made by the Council of Ministers meeting as a whole; in fact, the council meets irregularly, and decisions are usually made by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a little-publicized "inner cabinet" which includes the chairman, the first deputy chairman, all deputy chairmen, and probably, in most sessions, the Minister of Finance, with the heads of appropriate ministries or other bodies participating as consultants. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, which meets at least once a week, may from time to time delegate responsibility to ad hoc commissions it creates for special purposes. It is supported also by permanent commissions which coordinate administration on a broad, supraministerial level in certain areas of the economy; each of these commissions probably is headed by a deputy premier (Figure 8).

Under Stalin and for some time after his death, most industrial and other economic enterprises were subordinate to ministries in Moscow. "All-Union" ministries administered affairs in the republics through direct representatives appointed by national agencies; affairs of the central "Union Republic" ministries were administered in the republics through counterpart ministries staffed by men formally appointed by the individual republic governments with the concurrence of the central ministry and responsible both to the republic council of ministers and to the central ministry.

The industrial ministries were abolished in a reorganization of industrial management beginning in 1957. Most of the former ministries were converted into state committees, whose chairmen continued as members of the Council of Ministers. These state committees performed planning, research, development, and certain other functions considered best performed centrally. The managerial functions formerly vested in the ministries were transferred to regional councils of national economy (*sovmarkhozy*) which administered most of the economic life of the country according to the state plan. These councils initially were subordinate to the republic council of ministers, but later modification of the system led to some dual subordination, primarily to a U.S.S.R. *sovmarkhoz* which coordinated *sovmarkhoz* activities on a national level.

²For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

The post-Khrushchev regime has recreated the ministerial system much as it had existed prior to 1957. Seven ministries involving the major defense and defense-related industries were reestablished in March 1965, and the entire *sovmarkhoz* system was completely abolished the following October, with industrial state committees being replaced by ministries. In early 1973 there were 29 central ministries—including 28 "All-Union" and 31 "Union Republic"—compared with 52 at the time of Stalin's death. These ministries are listed in Figure 10.

3. Lower governmental structure (U/OU)

The chief administrative units below the national level are the union republic (U.S.S.R.), the *oblast*, and the *rayon* (Figure 14). Most of the union republics include at least one preponderant ethnic group and a number of lesser minorities. The larger and more socially developed an ethnic group, the higher the governing unit that serves it. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), as the largest republic, is the nucleus of the nation. It is twice as large in area as the other 14 republics combined and has 53.8% of the total U.S.S.R. population. The other republics are the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirgiz, and Kazakh S.S.R.'s.

The union republics have their own constitutions, supreme soviets (unicameral), and councils of ministers, and have otherwise been invested with some of the trappings of sovereign states. (Indeed, it is on this premise that Stalin based his politically motivated bid after World War II to win Allied approval for the separate membership in the United Nations of the U.S.S.R.'s constituent republics. A compromise resulted in this status being accorded the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, in addition to that of the U.S.S.R. as a whole.) The powers listed in Article 14 of the Soviet constitution as being exclusively within the competence of the central government are, however, so sweeping that the actual autonomy of the republic governments is severely circumscribed. The scope of the activity of republic ministers, including those concerned only with local matters and lacking counterparts at the U.S.S.R. level, is determined by the plans drawn up by the central government, by the national budget implementing them, and by decrees of the All-Union Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. All republic ministries are likewise subject to party control by the republic central committee, exercised through the party

organization within governmental bodies and by direct intervention.

The principal political administrative unit below the republic is the *oblast*. An *oblast* in the R.S.F.S.R. is roughly comparable to a state in the United States. The components of the *oblast* governments, though bearing different names, correspond to those on higher levels. Their soviets are analogous to the supreme soviets, and the executive committees elected by them correspond in function to the councils of ministers. The *kray*, most of which have subordinate *oblasts*, is an administrative-territorial unit that exists only in the R.S.F.S.R.

Ethnic minorities have been settled, in most cases, in distinct administrative territories, the so-called autonomous republics and autonomous *oblasts* and the national *okrugs* (regions). The governments in these territories, all of which are located within union republics and the majority within the R.S.F.S.R., are similar in form to those of the parent republic but enjoy far less power; the constitution of an autonomous republic, for example, must be confirmed by the supreme soviet of the parent republic. In actuality, therefore, the minority groups have no real opportunity for autonomous self-government.

Below the level of the *oblast* is the *rayon*, which is generally analogous to a U.S. county (urban *rayons* correspond to the boroughs or wards of large U.S. cities). The *rayon* is the lowest level at which the subordinate agencies of the ministerial structure are found and the level with which the citizen most often deals.

4. Judicial system (U/OU)

Soviet courts, according to the constitution of 1936, are to be "independent and subject only to the law." However, Soviet theory on the administration of justice requires also that the court serve an educative function and holds that the concept of the apolitical judge belongs to "bourgeois mythology."

The Soviet judicial system is also distinguished by the quasi-judicial powers enjoyed by the security police apparatus which has tended to usurp the competence of the courts. Before 1953 most political cases were in fact handled by the security police without benefit of the judicial process. Since then there have been efforts made to regularize prosecution, to restrict the activities of the security police, and to pay generally greater attention to juridical forms. However, the security police, with party support, continues sometimes to flout provisions of the law, especially in politically sensitive cases. The

organizational structure of the Soviet court system is shown in Figure 2.

The institution with the broadest authority in the Soviet judicial system is the Office of the U.S.S.R. Procurator General. Since 1936, this office and its investigative apparatus have been independent of all other judicial organs. As redefined in a 1955 statute, the powers of this agency extend to virtually all organizations and persons in the U.S.S.R., and its agents are not subject to any local authority. The agency has two functions: supervision over the administration of justice, and general supervisory authority designed to insure conformity with the law by all organs of government. In carrying out the first of these functions, a procurator is responsible for the investigation, prosecution, and appeal of cases which violate the criminal code; he may sometimes intervene in cases concerning violations of the civil code.

The Procurator General exercises complete control over the procurators below him. He names the republic and *oblast* procurators; the republic procurators appoint the *rayon* procurators with the approval of the Procurator General. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. formally appoints the Procurator General, who serves a 7-year term; all the other procurators serve 5-year terms. The present Procurator General is Roman Andreyevich Rudenko (age 66) who has held this office since June 1953, his terms in office being renewed at the 7-year intervals. His present term is due to expire in 1974.

Supervision of court decisions rests ultimately with the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court and the U.S.S.R. Procurator General. The Supreme Court serves as the final court of appeal for lower courts, both general and special. Supervision and training of court personnel and general administration of the court system—but without the legal right to interfere directly in any court case—was formerly the responsibility of the republic ministries of justice. These ministries were abolished during 1956-63, and other organs (usually the republic supreme court) assumed their functions. However, in August 1970 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet reestablished the Ministry of Justice. Similar ministries have since been established in the various union republics.

After the death of Stalin the Soviet legal system underwent a series of reforms that culminated in a major revision of the principles of criminal law and procedure in December 1958. These principles, as revised, contained a number of liberalizing provisions, and set the basis for new legal codes in each union republic. For example, the courts alone were given the competence to decide the guilt or innocence of the

accused and to pass sentence. Moreover, the position of the accused was strengthened, especially in that the burden for proving guilt was placed on the procurator. Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence is still not clearly embodied either in law or in practice. Despite liberalizations, certain crimes are still loosely defined, and the accused has no right to counsel during the period of investigation—which can last up to 9 months while the accused is under detention. An example of the serious abuse that remains possible was the detention of four dissidents for 1 year before they were brought to trial in January 1968.

The Soviet court system does not employ a jury, but follows the continental European practice in employing a panel of judges. The Soviet system differs from standard practice, however, in the use of lay judges (formally known as People's Assessors). All courts of first instance consist of one professional, legally trained judge and two elected People's Assessors, each of the three having an equal voice in the conduct of a trial. The lay judges are not included on the judicial panels of appellate courts.

The procedure differs in some cases of antisocial behavior not involving criminal liability which are decided on the republic level by so-called comrades courts. These are assemblies of hand-picked Soviet citizens, who seek to "rehabilitate" the defendant by means of exposing him to the public censure of his peers. After public discussion of the case, the court reaches a decision by a "vote" taken among its chairman and his assistants, usually two or three lay assessors. These lay judges of the comrades courts, whose decisions are not subject to appeal to the regular Soviet courts by the defendant, can impose a variety of minor punishments. The role of the comrades courts has declined considerably from the high point it had reached in the late 1950's. However, the involvement of these and other extrajudicial institutions in administering justice—for example, local executive committees which have the authority to assign persons avoiding "socially useful labor" to work in a local enterprise—continues to detract from the modest gains in judicial reform since Stalin's death.

5. Electoral procedures (U/OU)

Since 1936 the right to vote has been conferred on a very large proportion of the Soviet population, without the discrimination against social origins formerly in effect, and without regard to race, nationality, sex, or religion. In addition, direct popular elections were extended from the lowest echelon in the Soviet governmental structure—the rural and urban soviets—to all governmental levels. Long before 1936,

however, elections had ceased to be a medium for expressing popular opinion and had become a propaganda device for conveying the impression of solidarity between the people and the regime.

The party and government devote a great deal of attention to getting out the vote, and consequently the percentage of the electorate who vote has always been large. In the 1970 Supreme Soviet elections, for example, 99.96% of the 153,237,112 registered voters were reported to have participated. The deficiencies of the suffrage in the U.S.S.R. do not arise from discrimination or inequalities but from the lack of meaning of the ballot. No meaningful choice is given the voter because only one person is permitted to run for each office, and the voter may simply approve or disapprove his candidacy. All candidates for public office are officially described as candidates of the "bloc of Communists and nonparty persons."

On the surface, the nomination system used in Soviet elections appears to involve some public participation, but in reality the candidate is picked in advance by local or higher party officials and approved by the appropriate unit in the executive staff of the party in Moscow. The nominating procedure, as an analysis of the Soviet press reveals, is as follows: the voters in each public organization, plant, or other institution in a constituency meet to nominate a candidate, and then the representatives of these groups of voters meet again to discuss and settle upon a candidate whom all will support. Almost invariably the various organizations have nominated the same person. Where there are several nominees, all except one are leading party workers who are "honored" with nominations in many constituencies. Since no one can "run" in more than one constituency, the "honorary" nominations must be declined, leaving only the one approved candidate with a place on the ballot.

Provision is made for secret voting, but the act of entering a booth marks the voter as a person of doubtful loyalty, since his presumed purpose is to vote against the candidate by scratching through the name.

Soviets up to the level of *oblast* are elected every 2 years. Republic Supreme Soviets and the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are elected at 4-year intervals. Following elections, the legislatures appoint their own officers and the government officials at the corresponding level. Thus, President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin serve 4-year terms; their present term runs from 1970 to 1974.

D. National policies

Underpinning all national policy objectives of the Soviet Union has been a consistent determination on

the part of the nation's leaders to insure the preeminent authority of the Communist Party and the unquestioning implementation of its decisions at all levels of government. The successful pursuit of this aim, together with the effective restrictions on public dissent, has given unity and cohesiveness to the various programs of national policy, both domestic and foreign. (U/OU)

The Soviet leaders' preoccupation with power originated in the circumstances under which the Communist Party seized control of the Russian state in 1917. Although a small minority, the Communists came to power determined that they alone must rule and that a new political, social, and economic order would be established throughout the world in accordance with their ideological conceptions. In pursuit of these goals, the party brought the Russian people under its absolute control by military force, police coercion, and discriminatory economic pressures, coupled with messianic promises of deliverance from exploitation. During the Stalinist era, police terror became the prime instrument of rule and dissent in any form was ruthlessly eliminated. (U/OU)

Under Khrushchev, the regime sought to eliminate many of the more irrational and counterproductive features of the police state established by Stalin. Curbs were placed upon the powers of the security apparatus, and the Stalinist practice of targeting entire social strata and professional groups for police repression was ended. In the interests of generating a degree of popular support, Khrushchev went so far as to relax some of the draconian restrictions that Stalin had placed upon the freedom of expression of Soviet intellectuals. At the same time, the more prominent features of the dictatorial system established by Stalin were retained: the one-party state; the maintenance of an extensive police apparatus for domestic repression; suppression of dissident opinion; and state controls over intellectual life. In general, however, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev may be said to have begun a transition from a totalitarian to a bureaucratic-authoritarian order. (U/OU)

The present regime has modified, but not entirely reversed, the policy lines laid down by Khrushchev. It has continued, and even intensified, the trend toward establishing an orderly system of bureaucratic rule. Like Khrushchev, the present leadership has demonstrated an interest in broadening its base of popular support, and to this end has measurably improved the economic lot of the Soviet consumer. Unlike Khrushchev, however, it has shown no interest in relaxing the controls on freedom of expression. Instead, it has demonstrated a fear of the political risk

inherent in such moves, and has tightened controls in an effort to eliminate expressions of dissident opinion. (U/OU)

1. Domestic (U/OU)

With the abolition of the remaining opposition parties in the early 1920's, the CPSU established itself as the indispensable foundation of the Soviet state. All aspects of national life have been subordinated to the political aims of the party's ruling group. These aims are stated and explained in terms of "Marxism-Leninism," the only officially approved political philosophy in the U.S.S.R.

Under Stalin, the U.S.S.R. embarked in the late 1920's on comprehensive and ruthlessly enforced programs of industrialization and agricultural collectivization, which are still the cornerstones of the Soviet system. Virtually all means of production were placed in the hands of the state, and all economic planning of any consequence was centered in Moscow. For several decades, successive production plans, normally of 5 years' duration, have governed economic activities. Heavy industry and defense-related production have expanded at a rapid rate, while gains in agricultural production and living standards have been more moderate. Trade unions were turned into mere instruments of the party. Private farming, except for small household plots, has not existed since the peasants were forced to join collective farms in the collectivization campaign begun in 1929. Private retail trade, except for the collective farm markets and, occasionally, experimentation in small-scale vending, was abolished and the citizenry must buy most consumer goods from state stores.

The post-Stalin regimes have devoted much effort to rationalizing the economy and increasing productivity. Although continuing to give priority to heavy industry and defense, they have given more public attention to the goal of improved living conditions. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, in particular, the regime has sought practical solutions to redress the imbalance in economic priorities, to improve administrative efficiency, and to deal with the perennial problem of technological lag in the economy. To date, these efforts have had mixed results and, indeed, have been pursued with varying degrees of consistency and enthusiasm.

One of the current leadership's first economic decisions, in March 1965, was directed at strengthening the agricultural sector. Agricultural investments have continued to grow in succeeding years, but this policy has been neither unanimously approved nor has

it proved to be a panacea for the ills which plague Soviet agriculture. Opposition to the agricultural investment program, for example, appears to have been one of the factors responsible for the political decline and fall of Politburo member G. I. Voronov in 1971-73. The shortfalls in agricultural production that occurred in 1972, moreover, demonstrated that increased investments alone were not the answer to the agricultural problem.

In September 1965 a reform of industrial management and planning provided for considerable decentralization of economic decisionmaking. At the same time, however, the central ministerial apparatus was reestablished, with the result that the reform was fulfilled more in the letter than in the spirit. Complaints of overcentralization and crippling of individual initiative persisted even in the controlled Soviet press. Central agencies continued to make pretty much the same broad range of decisions as before. The result was a continuing inability of the economy to respond either to the demands of technological change or to increasingly sophisticated consumer tastes.

The continuing problems of the Soviet economy led to another attempt to invigorate industrial management through reorganization in April 1973. Under the new scheme, industrial enterprises and corresponding research and development facilities are to be consolidated into production associations, which will assume basic managerial powers. The role of the ministries is to be limited to the formulation of general policy and long-range goals.

The prospects for economic success of the new reform, as of the old, are questionable. The ministries and enterprises certainly will resist ceding their powers to the associations. The prospect of economically unsound combinations of enterprises also threaten the viability of the reform. Similar attempts at organizational reform have in the past foundered on these obstacles.

The basic problem of the Soviet economy is more fundamental, however, than mere faulty investment allocation or shortcomings of the managerial structure. The Soviet leaders, despite their interest in improving the efficiency and technological base of the economy, are reluctant to fully back the kind of decentralization and economic incentives that would contribute to this end, mainly for fear that this would inevitably dilute their monopoly of political power.

In lieu of basic economic reform at home, the present leaders have begun to turn to the West as a source of modern technology and improved managerial methods. The desire for access to Western

goods and methods is certainly an important factor in the complex of motivations which underlay the bid for detente with Western Europe and with the United States which began in 1969-70.

Despite the innate conservatism of the Soviet leaders, there have been significant improvements in the economic sphere. Renewed emphasis has been placed on scientific and technological progress; minimum wages have been raised; more consumer goods, such as major household appliances and even autos, have been made available; the construction of new housing has been accelerated (although housing standards remain grossly inadequate); and an effort has been made to refine the use of material incentives. Moreover, Brezhnev, in his report to the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, publicly committed the regime to improving the material lot of the Soviet people. The alacrity with which Moscow moved to make up for the agricultural shortfalls of 1972 by massive grain purchases in the West is sufficient proof of the leadership's desire to avoid a politically dangerous drop in living standards. Yet, it was the consumer sector which again had to bear the brunt of budget cuts necessitated by the straitened circumstances in which the Soviet economy found itself after the 1972 harvest.

Nevertheless, living conditions have improved and popular grievances are less acute, even though the lot of the Soviet consumer remains drab by U.S. or West European standards. Per capita consumption is only one-third that of the United States. By Soviet standards, however, the material level of living is tolerable. Most significantly, it is better than at any time since the Revolution. There is no evidence that such economic grievances as exist, have had any particular political significance.

In the societal area, the regime has expressed concern over the persistent problem of social stratification, an obvious contradiction to the egalitarian ideals of Soviet society. It has taken measures—in part designed to boost agricultural production—to make the peasant a more respected and better rewarded member of society. Related reforms in education have included the introduction of courses in industrial and agricultural arts in the general schools. While education itself is free, the children of poorer parents are given assistance to encourage them to continue their education, if only on a part-time basis. Special programs have been developed to prepare the children of working-class and rural parents for institutions of higher education. Studies produced by the fledgling corps of Soviet sociologists indicate, however, that despite all these

official efforts the differences between the major social classes—the workers, peasants, and the “intelligentsia”—have not been significantly reduced.

The party continues to propagate atheism and seeks to eliminate religious beliefs through propaganda and harassment, including the closing of churches. Nevertheless, many churches remain open and in use, and Jewish prayer books, the Bible, and the Koran have been printed in limited editions. Many measures designed to protect the family as an institution and offset the libertarian practices of the early days of the Soviet regime are still in effect. Some of Stalin's stricter measures have, however, been modified; divorce is somewhat easier to arrange, and abortions have been legalized once again.

Nationality problems are always potential sources of concern for a multinational state such as the U.S.S.R. Historically, Soviet policy has oscillated between facilitating the Russification of minority nationality groups and encouraging the development of national cultures (as distinct from the consistent suppression of all manifestations of political independence). Elements of both policies are manifested in current Soviet practice. Minority nationalities are well represented at all levels of the party and government, in addition to the official autonomous territorial organization permitted the more significant nationalities. At the same time, the Great Russian culture is clearly dominant. Official propaganda emphasizes both the importance of Russian as the common language of the country and the alleged merger of all the nationalities into one “Soviet” people.

Soviet policies in this regard have had mixed results. On the one hand, the Soviet leaders are not faced with any pressing national dissent, with the exception of the Jewish minority, which represents a chronic problem. On the other hand, recent events—such as disturbances in Lithuania in May 1972—indicate that the potential for unpredictable flareups of nationalist sentiment remains.

Since the late 1960's, the Soviet Union's large Jewish minority has presented the Soviet leaders with an increasingly vexatious problem. Fired by the Israeli military triumphs over the Arab forces in June 1967, overt Zionist and pro-Israeli sentiments have grown rapidly among Soviet Jews. They have been manifested in demands for greater opportunities for the development of Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. and for the right to emigrate to Israel. Soviet leaders at first sought to repress the burgeoning Jewish nationalism, but in early 1971 opened the gates to large-scale Jewish emigration, presumably in the hope of ridding themselves of the most militant members of the Jewish

community. Emigration soon grew to such levels as to become an embarrassment, surpassing 30,000 in 1972. To this the authorities have responded by attempting to retard the flow through administrative means; beginning in August 1972, prospective emigrants were required to reimburse the Soviet state for the cost of their education. The prohibitive rates, constituting a form of exit tax, slowed but did not eliminate emigration, and complicated Moscow's relations with Western countries where sympathy for the Jewish cause is high. The Soviets have since retreated and allowed the exit fees to lapse. Controls continue to be exercised through the selective withholding of exit visas.

The Soviet authorities have shown an increased willingness in recent years to issue exit visas to permit the reunion of families and to allow Soviet citizens to visit relatives in the United States. The number granted, however, remains very small. Nevertheless, the Soviet government since the early 1960's has permitted and even fostered the expansion of contacts with the outside world. Western delegations and tourists have been visiting the Soviet Union in large numbers, although their itineraries and contacts with Soviet citizens are closely controlled. The number of Soviet specialists traveling abroad has also increased, and small groups of Soviet tourists, considered reliable by the regime, have been permitted to travel abroad. Although censorship continues to be pervasive in Soviet information media, jamming of Western radio programs has, on the whole, been reduced, access to Western literature has been somewhat improved, and the Soviet press has given a broader and slightly less distorted view of the world outside.

In spite of these departures from the extreme rigors of Stalinist controls, the regime continues to give the highest priority to efforts to isolate the Soviet population from foreign ideological contamination. Indeed, the Soviet leaders' external policy of detente with the United States and other Western countries has been accompanied by an intensified drive for domestic ideological vigilance.

The leadership continues to rely on an elaborate system of controls over the whole range of social activity to enforce its authority. The surveillance of persons, institutions, and ideas by the security forces of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and of the ministries for the civil police is pervasive, extending throughout Soviet society. All communications media are controlled by the state and function primarily in order to insure that the dissemination of information is kept within limits acceptable to the party.

Limits on the freedom of expression of Soviet intellectuals remain narrow. Following a period of relaxation which began after Stalin's death, the current leadership has taken new steps to deal with the phenomenon of dissidence in the intellectual community. These have been primarily in the form of political trials, detention in labor camps or, increasingly, in psychiatric institutions, and the encouragement of emigration—indeed, a form of expulsion—of dissidents.

Beginning in 1971, the regime began a concerted effort to suppress politically motivated *samizdat* (illegal "self-published" materials). These various efforts have resulted in some disorientation and fragmentation of the dissident movement, but they have not been successful in wholly suppressing it.

2. Foreign (S)

a. General

Soviet foreign policy is compounded of Communist ideology, Russian national interests, and the requirements imposed by internal conditions in the U.S.S.R. The ideology underlies much of the expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy, assuming as it does the inevitable and continual growth of Communist power at the expense of the non-Communist world. When the demands of revolutionary Communist doctrine conflict with the interests of the Soviet state, however, the problem is almost always resolved in favor of the latter. The internal factors affecting foreign policy may vary somewhat with time as they do in Western countries. Typically, however, the Soviet leaders show a strong compulsion to weigh a policy in terms of its effect on their ideological and power monopoly.

The line between a Soviet policy which satisfies ideology and that which serves strictly national interests is often indistinguishable. The extensive Soviet land grabs in Eastern Europe during and just after World War II filled both needs but could have occurred just as well under the tsars. The attempts to expand the areas of Communist influence or control in more distant places, such as Africa and Asia, fall more readily into the realm of ideological endeavor. Here too, however, Soviet interests have a direct bearing on the ideological position assumed by Moscow. Support for wars of national liberation, for example, has been determined in large measure by considerations of how such support will affect Soviet relations with the United States or with the often friendly governments in power in countries where such wars occur. More recently, Moscow has also had to be concerned about

where the particular national liberation group stands with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The finer points of ideology come into play most clearly in the U.S.S.R.'s relations with other Communist states. Disputes over aid to national liberation movements, the correct road to socialism, independence within the "Communist camp," and numerous other contentious issues have led to divergencies in world communism. Communist states are increasingly twisting the concepts of Marxism-Leninism to suit the ambitions of their leaders and the particular demands of their societies. The U.S.S.R., which has come to have a larger stake in the *status quo*, tends to interpret the Communist ideology with less revolutionary fervor than China or Cuba. The U.S.S.R. has seen obvious advantages to itself in trying to maintain a unified world Communist movement, but most smaller, less powerful countries, such as Yugoslavia and Romania, feel that their role in such a situation can be only a restricted, subservient one. China, of course, rejects Soviet leadership altogether.

The ideological split in the movement has also affected Moscow's dealings with the nonruling Communist parties. Although an overwhelming majority of parties remain responsive to Soviet advice or direction, Moscow has had to loosen its grip and in some cases has lost control completely. The days when Moscow could force the majority of the world's Communist parties to espouse policies not in their own interest have long since passed. This lesson was brought home to the Soviets by the refusal of many Communist parties—even those normally subservient to Moscow—to support or condone the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

An exaggerated concern with national security has traditionally characterized Russian policy, and this has been true of the Soviet regime. Protection of the homeland is the decisive reason why Soviet leaders have given high priority to retaining close control over the states of Eastern Europe and to gaining more formal Western recognition of the postwar *status quo* in Europe. Similarly, with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet ideological clash, the Soviets have conducted a major program to strengthen their defenses in the areas bordering China.

The priority attention given to Eastern Europe and China is, of course, a function of geography. Geography also gave rise to the now well-worn phrase "warm-water ports," to which the growth and activities of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, starting the last half of 1967, lent new currency. There are other and perhaps sufficient reasons to account for the acute interest the Soviets have shown in the

strategic lands of the Mediterranean littoral since the late 1950's, but year-round access to the the oceans of the world is at least a subsidiary goal of Soviet foreign policy in the area.

Some of the internal factors which, along with Communist ideology and Russian national interests, shape Soviet foreign policy are obscured by the secrecy that surrounds so many of the Soviet regime's actions. The Soviets have sometimes, as a consequence of an internal power struggle, given the world an insight into the decisionmaking process in Moscow, when the winners and losers are identified *ex post facto* with correct and incorrect policies. The general lack of open discussion when policy is actually being made, however, inhibits external analysis of the factors which influence decisions. Nevertheless, it is clear enough that the preoccupation of the Soviet leaders with preserving their supremacy in party and government is, more than in most countries, a powerful determinant. This often works to the U.S.S.R.'s disadvantage, hindering as it does the adoption of flexible foreign policies, especially toward the non-Communist world. It places restrictions on the influx of ideas and information, especially of the kind that would test or bring into question any aspect of the Soviet system. There has been a gradual but erratic and carefully limited loosening of these restrictions as the U.S.S.R. has come to accept the need for beneficial exchanges with other nations, particularly those which can help advance Soviet technology and science. Nevertheless, the continuing restrictions on the free flow of ideas of a political nature, from the outside or domestically generated, continue to rob Soviet policymakers of an important ingredient of effective statecraft.

Stalin's successors in 1953 saw that his militant, uncompromising policies had tended to unite the West, isolate the U.S.S.R., and lessen Soviet prestige and influence. They have been less rigid and doctrinaire, more practical, and, indeed, more realistic. It was not until the 20th Party Congress—the scene of Khrushchev's "secret speech"—in 1956, however, that the change from Stalinism was formally enunciated and given the necessary theoretical underpinning. Brezhnev took another major step at the 24th Congress in March 1971 when he enunciated the Soviet "peace policy" which provided the justification for the development of a detente relationship with the United States and the West.

Propaganda directed abroad continues to be an important adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. The scope of Soviet efforts ranges far beyond the normal use of mass communications media in the Western sense.

Diplomatic notes, speeches, trade, troop movements, cultural and scientific exchanges, and "spontaneous" popular demonstrations in the U.S.S.R. are conducted in a manner calculated to influence world public opinion.

The official news agency TASS serves as the main information channel with other countries in distributing information on the U.S.S.R. abroad and disseminating foreign news in the Soviet Union. A second news agency *Agentstvo Pechati Novosti* (APN), also known as *Novosti*, supplements TASS' work. Official statements lay great stress on APN's alleged independence as a "public" organization in contrast to TASS which is admittedly a government agency. In fact, however, APN is subject to the same propaganda controls as other elements of Soviet society. Radiobroadcasts of Soviet propaganda are beamed to foreign audiences primarily by the official *Radio Moscow* International Service and the regime's unofficial voice *Radio Peace and Progress*. A notable trend since 1958 has been the increase in Mandarin-language broadcasts to Communist China.

Soviet foreign propaganda is also conducted covertly, appearing—without attribution to its Soviet origins—in publications of local Communist parties, "friendship" societies, and international front organizations. Soviet propaganda also finances publication of pro-Communist articles in foreign journals, covert support of strikes and popular demonstrations, and clandestine broadcasting as well as manipulation of foreign news media, both Communist and non-Communist.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of Soviet foreign propaganda is complicated by its close relationship to diplomatic activities, so that the problem frequently becomes one of assessment of the total impact of Soviet foreign policy. Another complicating factor is that much of the Soviet image abroad is created by Western reporting of Soviet developments, both successes and failures. As a rule, Soviet foreign propaganda has been most effective where it has essentially reflected the actual state of affairs or where it has conformed to and exploited existing attitudes and events.

b. Soviet policy toward the West and Japan

The post-Stalin leaders have intermittently followed policies of detente toward the West in order to lessen the dangers of armed confrontation and to further various Soviet objectives. In 1954 the Geneva Conference presided over the French withdrawal from Indochina; the Austrian State Treaty, ending Allied occupation, was signed in 1955; a limited relaxation in

relations was apparent following a Four-Power (United States, United Kingdom, France, U.S.S.R.) summit conference in July 1955 and during the Soviet campaign leading up to the proposed summit conference in Paris in May 1960.

Khrushchev's disruption of the May 1960 meeting, using the U-2 incident as a pretext, ended the detente period and ushered in a new, more militant phase of Soviet foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. broke off negotiations on disarmament, gave strong encouragement to Castro in his hostility toward the United States, shot down an American RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the Arctic Ocean and imprisoned the two surviving members of its crew, vigorously supported the Lumumba faction in the Congo, and opposed U.N. activities in that country. To a large extent, this heightened intransigence reflected a need to counter Chinese Communist charges of Soviet capitulation to the "U.S. imperialists."

The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought another sharp turn in Soviet policy toward the West. Since that event the Soviet Government has generally displayed greater caution in its international commitments and shown an inclination to stabilize power relationships.

The renewed Soviet emphasis on a detente policy has been most marked in Western Europe. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team which ousted Khrushchev in 1964 has sought whenever possible to reassure the Western Europeans that the days of the cold war are over and that there is much mutual profit to be gained from an accommodation. Moscow has encouraged and sought to portray the independent policies of France as an example of the kind of cooperation which has become possible between the Western European states and the U.S.S.R.

Moscow's primary interests are to legitimize the existing political and territorial divisions in Europe—particularly those in Germany—and to reduce and perhaps ultimately to supplant U.S. influence. They have been pursuing these goals by a combination of bilateral negotiations and multinational conferences. In 1969, the Soviets began negotiations with the West Germans on a treaty renouncing the use of force. It was signed in Moscow in 1970 and ratified by both sides in 1972. They also encouraged the negotiation of a similar West German-Polish treaty which was ratified the same year. The primary Soviet motive in both cases was to win from Bonn a final and legally binding recognition of postwar borders.

In an effort to win general recognition of East Germany as a legitimate and sovereign country, the U.S.S.R. also encouraged the inter-German negotiations and treaties of 1972, by which Bonn conceded *de*

jure recognition of the existence of two German states. Moscow had earlier signed the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin which defined the relationship between West Berlin and West Germany.

Apart from direct negotiations with the states of West Europe, the Soviets pushed hard for the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow sought to have all interested European countries and the United States and Canada take part in the Conference which was to put a formal seal of approval on the *status quo* in Europe. By November 1972 preliminary talks on the CSCE had begun in Helsinki with the full Conference intended for mid-1973. Initial talks on mutual and balanced force reduction between many European states, the United States, and Canada also got underway in January 1973.

While generally continuing the more moderate policies toward Western Europe that marked the latter days of the Khrushchev era, his successors' policies toward the United States were initially somewhat less forthcoming. The new rulers moved to reassert Moscow's leadership in the Communist world by restoring a more even balance between Soviet efforts at detente with the West and support of Communists throughout the world against the "imperialists." With this objective in mind, the Soviets increased their support for North Vietnam despite Hanoi's failure to accept Soviet counsel on the best way to pursue its aims. Soviet support for the North Vietnam war effort caused problems in relations with the United States, but the lines of communication were kept open and there were instances of cooperation, for example in drafting the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which was opened for signature in 1968.

As Soviet relations with China continued to deteriorate during the Cultural Revolution—culminating in the armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969—the Soviet leaders clearly came to perceive China as their most pressing international problem. They began to tailor their other foreign policies accordingly, and the China impasse helped stimulate in particular a new desire for accommodation with the U.S. The Soviet willingness to engage in new understandings and agreements with the West was set out most authoritatively in Brezhnev's "peace program" presented to the 24th Party Congress. The announcement, in July 1971, that President Nixon would visit China gave new reason for Moscow to seek improved relations with the United States. A high-water mark was reached at the Moscow summit meeting in May 1972 (Figure 11) where major agreements limiting offensive and defensive nuclear



FIGURE 11. The Moscow summit meeting, 29 May 1972. From left: Kosygin, Podgorny, President Nixon, Brezhnev, Secretary of State Rogers. (C)

strategic arms were signed. A series of agreements on other topics ranging from space cooperation to joint studies of ecology were also signed. Contacts and negotiations between the two countries throughout 1972 produced a major new trade agreement in October. Though the trade agreement has been viewed by the Soviets as a major impetus to increased economic dealings with the United States, Moscow has been simultaneously concerned that Washington may not be able to live up to the agreement's promises, particularly the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to the U.S.S.R. This issue has become linked with Soviet emigration policy and Moscow's willingness to ease its restrictive practices on the emigration of Soviet Jews.

During the first part of 1973, both Moscow and Washington took steps to give added momentum to the process of detente. Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June was concluded by the signing of a number of new agreements, including a declaration on the prevention of nuclear war, a statement on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), and an understanding to work jointly at accelerating the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The SALT series, the most important accomplishment of the move toward accommodation, will resume in Geneva in September with both sides having pledged at the Washington summit to achieve major new agreements by the end of 1975.

Moscow's policies toward Japan have been characterized by ambiguity, suspicion, and caution. The U.S.S.R., cognizant of Japan's growing economic strength, has been interested in expanding trade

contacts and attracting Japanese capital for the development of the raw material resources of Siberia. At the same time, Moscow has viewed the conservative Japanese Government as the U.S. surrogate in Asia and has displayed concern over Japan's military and political intentions in the Far East. In addition, Tokyo's demands for the return of what it calls the Northern Territories—the southern Kuril Islands seized by the U.S.S.R. from Japan at the end of World War II—has been a brake on improving relations. Moscow displayed growing interest in establishing friendly ties with Tokyo in the late 1960's and early 1970's—going so far as to hint at some flexibility in its position on the Northern Territories—in part to hinder development of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The Soviets were accordingly distressed at the rapid progress in the Tokyo-Peking relationship in 1972, and the form this relationship may take in the future remains one of Moscow's principal concerns.

c. The Soviets and the Communist world

The Sino-Soviet dispute reached critical proportions in 1960. In the summer of that year Khrushchev suspended Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists, which only deepened their antagonism. In November, 81 Communist parties met in Moscow where the Chinese, supported by Albania, North Korea, and several delegations from non-Communist countries, carried on the attack against the Soviet effort to dictate to the movement. The intrabloc conflict was only papered over by the conference's concluding statement, which militantly reaffirmed the

ultimate goal of a worldwide Communist system and asserted that the transition to such a system, though by peaceful means ("peaceful coexistence"), was the trend of the times.

Khrushchev persisted in an effort to secure another world Communist meeting that would in effect read the Chinese out of the movement. The leadership which ousted him in October 1964 was compelled to follow through to the extent of holding a consultative meeting of 19 parties in March 1965. Its inconclusive results were embarrassing to Moscow, and the failure of the Soviet effort to reassert leadership in the Communist world only aggravated the problem.

Kosygin's trip to Hanoi in February 1965 had been undertaken to counter Chinese influence there. Moscow's hope was to move North Vietnam back toward a more nearly neutral position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Soviet calculations were temporarily upset by the chain of events set in action by a Viet Cong attack on U.S. installations in South Vietnam and the retaliatory U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam while Kosygin was in Hanoi. The failure of the Soviets to respond in some dramatic manner laid them open to further Chinese charges of capitulation to the United States.

During the following year, Soviet assistance to Hanoi grew, as did the dispute with China. The Soviets accused the Chinese of hampering North Vietnam's war effort by refusing to associate themselves with a united Communist aid program and claimed that the Chinese had in fact interfered with Soviet shipments through China. When China's self-discrediting Cultural Revolution got under way, Moscow began talking again of a new world Communist conference.

By marshaling the support of the loyal Eastern European parties and a host of nonruling parties, the Soviets eventually managed to stage the second consultative meeting of over 60 parties in Budapest in February 1968. No Far Eastern parties—except Mongolia's—were among the delegations, and the Cubans, who had attended the March 1965 gathering, also were absent. At the meeting the Soviets used pressure tactics to secure a communique calling for preparations for a world Communist conference in Moscow. The International Communist Conference—without the participation of China—finally met in June 1969, but the victory was only a Pyrrhic one in terms of Soviet efforts to reestablish their primacy in the world movement.

The Sino-Soviet dispute took a new, dramatic turn in the spring and summer of 1969 when a series of clashes occurred along several disputed sections of the

Chinese-Soviet border. The Soviet leaders combined threats of military action against China with proposals for negotiations in an attempt to force the Chinese to resolve the frontier dispute. Peking finally agreed to the Soviet demand for talks in the fall of 1969, but the negotiations have dragged on into 1973 with no significant progress. Nonetheless, Moscow and Peking sought to reduce the level of tension that had prevailed during the border fighting and took some steps, such as exchanging ambassadors, designed to put state-to-state relations on a more normal footing.

Sino-Soviet trade, which had plummeted to an annual level of about US\$50 million in 1969-70, has revived somewhat and may reach about US\$350 million in 1973. Despite this increase, the U.S.S.R. is presently involved in only 3% of total Chinese trade, compared with 40% to 50% during the 1950's. The latest formal trade agreement was signed in June 1972, and a long-term general trade agreement was being negotiated in early 1973. Despite this modest improvement in bilateral ties, however, the U.S.S.R. and China remain at an impasse on more sensitive issues, including the border dispute. Although there has been no major trouble along the frontier since 1969, both countries continue to maintain and improve their military posture in areas near the border.

Since late 1972, relations between the U.S.S.R. and China have been marked by intense competition for influence in such key areas as the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, accompanied by a fresh outbreak of public polemics. Faced with verbal attack and China's more sophisticated and successful effort to cultivate friends in the West, the Soviet leaders seemed to conclude that there was little point in turning the other cheek. They have responded in kind, returning to a rehearsal of grievances which they had laid aside when the border talks began. By the beginning of 1973 relations had sunk to their lowest point since 1969.

The Soviet decision to press for as much conformity within the Communist world as possible at the 1968 multiparty meeting in Budapest was not prompted solely by the Chinese heresy; it was probably influenced greatly by problems closer to home. The ouster of Antonin Novotny from control of the Czechoslovak party in January 1968, the concurrent signs of unease in Poland, Romania's determination to flaunt signs of independence, the progress of West Germany's new policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe, and, not least of all, the intellectual ferment within the U.S.S.R. itself evidently persuaded Moscow that it was necessary to tighten its grip on those parties it was still able to influence.

The 1968 Budapest consultative meeting was followed in quick succession by two sessions of the Warsaw Pact nations which again illustrated Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe. The first, in Sofia in late February, found the Romanians once more at odds with the Soviets and refusing to join the other six pact members in approving the U.S.-Soviet draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation.

The second was a closely guarded gathering of the six in Dresden, East Germany, in late March. The main subject was the problem presented by the liberal reform program being espoused by the new party hierarchy in Czechoslovakia led by Alexander Dubcek. The Soviet, Polish, and East German regimes apparently feared that the program could lead to demands in their own countries for a similar relaxation of Communist party control. Further, despite repeated official Czechoslovak professions of friendship and solidarity with the U.S.S.R., the temper in Czechoslovakia appeared to foreshadow a more independent line in foreign affairs, especially economic, that would run counter to Moscow's policy of containing West Germany and might undermine the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviets responded to Czechoslovakia's growing assertiveness by leading their loyal Warsaw Pact allies in a campaign of increasing political and military pressure. Warsaw Pact troops massed on the Czechoslovak frontiers, and the Czechoslovak reformers were subjected to a growing torrent of propaganda attacks and other pressures which culminated in the meetings between Czechoslovak and other Warsaw Pact leaders in late July in Cierna, and in early August in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. The failure of the Czechoslovaks to heed warnings conveyed at these meetings confronted the Soviets with a choice of allowing the Czechoslovaks to pursue their own path or of resorting to force to eliminate the danger that they would spark an uncontrolled political evolution in the socialist camp. The August 1968 invasion demonstrated that Moscow believed its vital interests were threatened.

The Soviet rationale for this action was enunciated in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, or "doctrine of limited sovereignty," which alleges that the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states have the duty and obligation to intervene in defense of socialism anywhere it may be threatened. The "doctrine" underscores both Moscow's determination to maintain its hegemony in Eastern Europe and the essential fragility of its position. With the passage of time the "doctrine" has been downplayed by the Soviets but never repudiated.

The invasion preserved the Soviet position in Czechoslovakia (Figure 12), but meant a setback for

Moscow in other foreign policy areas. As a result, Moscow has been concerned to avoid a repetition, and the greater caution induced by the invasion among the Eastern Europeans has helped. The net result has been to create a situation in which the Soviets exercise their authority and the Eastern Europeans pursue their national interests by more subtle means.

Moscow appears willing to tolerate a degree of deviation from the socialist norm by Eastern European countries who wish to do so, provided the deviation remains within certain overall limits. Thus, Hungary conducts a somewhat experimental economic policy and, like the new Polish regime, exercises virtual domestic autonomy. Both countries, however, follow the Soviet lead closely in foreign policy. Romania pursues a somewhat independent foreign policy while maintaining orthodoxy in its internal affairs. Moscow remains the final arbiter and does not hesitate to show its disapproval, as in the "war of nerves" with Romania in 1971. That situation was made more acute by apparent Chinese meddling in the Balkans. Soviet-Romanian relations became more normal as the Chinese "threat" receded, but a renewal of Chinese activity in Eastern Europe would call forth a firm Soviet response.

The Soviets have also sought to develop less heavyhanded methods of coordinating bloc policies. One new approach has been the conferences of party leaders held in the Crimea in 1971 and 1972. More attention has been focused on economic cooperation, applied thru the mechanism of CEMA. Socialist economic integration is much stronger on paper than in practice, however. Moscow at times speaks of a "socialist commonwealth" but clearly would not accept the reduction in its role and influence that true collegiality would entail.

Since 1968, and particularly since 1971, the Soviets have made a concerted effort to improve relations with Yugoslavia, highlighted by the Brezhnev-Tito exchange of visits in 1971 and 1972. Moscow has accepted Yugoslavia's nonaligned status for the present and seems primarily concerned with building economic and political assets that will enable it to exercise its influence in the post-Tito era.

d. Soviet policy toward the less-developed world

Stalin's successors undertook a concerted economic and political offensive in the less-developed countries of Africa and Asia designed to supplant the influence of the West and, as much as possible, to align those countries with the U.S.S.R. Military aid, starting with the first large arms deal with Egypt in 1955, has proved to be Moscow's most effective instrument.



FIGURE 12. In Eastern Europe, emphasis on stability and detente: Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders in 1971. From the left: K.F. Katushev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary in charge of bloc liaison; Vasil Bilak, Secretary in charge of international relations in Czechoslovak Party; Gustav Huzak, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; Brezhnev and Kosygin; and Alois Indra, member of the Czechoslovak Party Presidium. (C)

Economic aid has been used more sparingly. Soviet economic resources are constantly strained by domestic demands, and the U.S.S.R. has generally avoided making the kind of commitment in these areas that might saddle it with the additional burden of underwriting the economies of struggling and often unstable countries.

A dynamic aspect of post-Stalin foreign policy has been this effort to identify the U.S.S.R. with the aspirations of the developing countries and to gain influence with nationalist, anticolonialist movements and governments. Stalin had generally regarded the "bourgeois" leaders of the Afro-Asian countries as members of the enemy camp. His successors decided to work with them wherever possible, hoping at least to insure their neutrality and to help limit or lessen Western influence. In fact, when forced to choose between supporting the local Communists or an anti-Communist, neutralist, or anti-Western group in power, the U.S.S.R. has often sacrificed the Communists.

In resorting to conventional diplomacy in much of the less-developed world, the U.S.S.R. has often varied

its tactics according to the nature of the individual country's ties with the West. To neutrals, the U.S.S.R. offers generous terms on military and, to a lesser degree, economic assistance, emphasizes frequent cultural exchanges, and generally does its utmost to keep official relations friendly. Toward pro-Western countries, Moscow has increasingly made conciliatory gestures, including offers of economic assistance, with the obvious intention of loosening the target countries' ties with the West. When a country with a traditionally fixed inclination toward the West appears susceptible, however slightly, to a change of orientation, Moscow sometimes offers a wide range of enticements, including military aid.

In the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. after the mid-1950's allied itself with Arab national interests, whose rallying point was the struggle against the remnants of Anglo-French imperialism and against the state of Israel. Apparently feeling that the area's natural resources, strategic location and, in many countries, lingering hostility toward the West offered unique opportunities, the Soviets have shown a willingness to involve themselves to an extent unmatched outside the

Communist world. This has included the extension of considerable military and economic aid and in some cases the direct involvement of Soviet military personnel. Moscow has thus been able to make considerable gains in supplanting Western influence but it has not been able to escape the pitfalls that come with abetting a radical nationalism which is hostile to outside pressure.

Just as Egypt has been the centerpiece of Soviet efforts in the region, so has it been the area of Moscow's greatest disappointments. In 1958 the Soviets were clearly chagrined when Egyptian President Nasir became President of the United Arab Republic and promptly suppressed the Syrian Communists, whose steadily increasing strength Moscow had been watching with approval. Moscow was further upset later in the same year by Nasir's all-out propaganda attacks on communism, which were motivated by his concern over Soviet support for the pro-Communist Qasim regime in Iraq. The ensuing public exchange of charges between Khrushchev and Nasir did much to inoculate Arab public opinion against communism and encouraged Arab skepticism

about Soviet motives. The Soviets have since shown more sensitivity to the danger of overtly supporting Arab Communists and have encouraged local party members to join forces with indigenous "progressive" elements, such as Egypt's Arab Socialist Union. This more prudent Soviet behavior, however, did not prevent Moscow's most severe setback, when Egyptian President Sadat unceremoniously sent Moscow's military advisers and operatives packing in 1972.

The Soviets had moved rapidly to revalidate their credentials after the quick Israeli victory over the Arabs in June 1967 by mounting a rapid military resupply operation. They also began a continuing series of "friendship" visits to Arab ports by units of their greatly enlarged Mediterranean squadron, and acquired increasing use of Egyptian ports.

With the breakdown of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal in 1969, Israel began damaging and humiliating air strikes deep inside Egypt. The Soviets acted quickly to provide additional military assistance in support of a state so vital to their position in the Middle East (Figure 13). In early 1970, Moscow sent Egypt a large number of SA-3 missiles manned



FIGURE 13. Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in happier times (C)

initially by Soviet crews and established several Soviet-piloted fighter squadrons to fly defensive patrols. These measures, while providing security against Israeli attacks, also led to a serious heightening of tension in the area as the possibility of a major Soviet-Israeli clash mounted. Tensions eased considerably when Egypt and Israel accepted the U.S. cease-fire proposal in August. However, Egypt's frustration over its inability to achieve any diplomatic or military gains against Israel after the cease-fire was instrumental in the subsequent expulsion of Moscow's military personnel.

Since the Arab-Israeli war, the U.S.S.R. has also been active in other parts of the Arab world. In late 1967 it reacted in surprisingly rapid and thorough fashion to a call for help from the newly established Yemen Arab Republic, whose position vis-a-vis the royalists had been weakened by the withdrawal of Egyptian troop support following the war with Israel. Soviet aircraft transported military supplies and such basic material as oil to the beleaguered republicans, and for a brief time Soviet pilots even gave air support to republican fighting forces. The U.S.S.R. also was able to capitalize on the general anti-Western sentiment in the Sudan following the war, by replacing the West as Khartoum's primary source of military equipment. The gains in Yemen and Sudan proved to be elusive, however; Sudanese President Numeiri was embittered by a Communist-supported coup attempt against him in 1970, and relations with Yemen deteriorated because of frictions between Sana and the leftist government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden).

Despite this mixed record in the area, Moscow continues to pursue an active policy in the Middle East. It sought increased use of Syrian port facilities following its ouster from Egypt and stepped up the shipment of military supplies to Syria. It maintains an active program of military aid to Iraq and signed a friendship treaty with that country in 1972. Even with basically pro-Western countries such as Iran, Jordan and Lebanon, Moscow has expended considerable energy on improving relations.

The expansion of Soviet influence among African states has leveled off since the Khrushchev era. The Soviets have become much less inclined to count on local radical or "liberation" movements, apparently feeling that few of them offer any prospect of early success. Moscow continues to finance various African Communist parties, but none of these is much of a threat to the local government. The military overthrow of the strongly Soviet-supported Nkrumah government in Ghana in 1966 was a discouraging and

embarrassing blow and a lesson in the dangers of heavy investment in an unstable, albeit radical, regime. The Soviet image in Africa has suffered also from the open competition with Communist China, most notably in the power struggle which split the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and reduced it to almost insignificant proportions. The public airing of Sino-Soviet differences and the consequent baring of their ambitions disillusioned many Africans.

The Soviets are still giving assistance to some of Africa's more promising rebellious groups. This has involved the supply of some military equipment (through neighboring sympathetic governments), propaganda, funds, and even guerrilla training, but the main Soviet effort to influence local events is made through the normal channels of diplomacy and economic and cultural exchanges. The most dramatic instance of Soviet military assistance on the African continent occurred in late 1967, when the Soviets airlifted fighter aircraft and other material to help the federal government of Nigeria during the civil war. On a more sustained basis, the Soviets have provided military assistance for Somalia's armed forces and gained in return some useful access to ports and other facilities in that country. Nevertheless, the Soviets have tightened their purse strings throughout most of Africa and weigh carefully the merits of any investment of prestige as well as money.

In Latin America, the Cuban revolution in 1959 gave the U.S.S.R. a chance to show its support for a socialist country within the shadow of the United States. Castro's radicalism, however, came into conflict with larger Soviet interests in the area. The Soviets believed that Castro's revolutionary tactics were quixotic and historically untimely in relation to present conditions in Latin America. Although they tried privately and publicly to disassociate themselves from his philosophy of "exported" revolution, they did not lessen their vital economic and military support. Cuba's economy is unique in its almost total dependence on Moscow.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship began to improve after the death of Che Guevara, which prompted Castro to reexamine his revolutionary strategy for Latin America and to place less stress on violence where conditions were unfavorable. The improvement in relations also owed much to Castro's qualified endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Castro visited the U.S.S.R. twice in 1972. One consequence of the first visit, Cuba's entry into the Moscow-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) served to further

underscore Cuban dependence on Soviet support. In the wake of Havana's decision to join CEMA, the Soviets provided some additional economic aid, but there continue to be signs that both sides are uncomfortable with the extent of Cuba's economic dependence on the U.S.S.R.

Elsewhere in Latin America, the Soviets continue to cultivate improved relations on the basis of the conventional tools of diplomacy. A relatively recent development in Moscow's policy has been its changed attitude toward military regimes. The military government of Peru has been singled out by Moscow for special praise. The election of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as President of Chile in 1970 has been viewed by the Soviets as a vindication of their thesis that electoral tactics by Marxist parties can be successful in parliamentary democracies. Nonetheless, the Chilean economy is in serious trouble, and Soviet aid to Allende has been grudging at best.

e. International organizations

The Soviet Union has been a member of the United Nations and most of its subsidiary and related organizations since 1945. Although outvoted by wide margins in the early postwar years and casting more than 100 vetoes in the Security Council during that period, the U.S.S.R. has benefited from the subsequent expansion of U.N. membership and now regards the organization as a useful forum in which to launch various "peace initiatives." However, Moscow has retained a most conservative attitude toward the assumption of real power by the U.N. It has opposed any substantial amendment of the 1945 Charter in this direction, and has insisted that peacekeeping operations be controlled by the Security Council where Moscow could exercise its veto.

Since the late 1950's, the U.S.S.R. has devoted considerable attention to international disarmament negotiations. A series of talks with the United States at that time led to the superpowers' call for convening an 18-nation Geneva disarmament conference in 1962. That body, which has since then grown to 25 participating states, has negotiated the ~~(Anti)~~ Space Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, ~~the~~ treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor, and a convention curbing biological weapons. The last of these is not yet formally in force. In each case, the United States and Soviet negotiators worked out many of the details in private, but their allies and the nonaligned members also made significant contributions. The U.S.S.R. continues to give the Geneva forum priority despite its propagandistic support for a world disarmament conference.

The Soviet attitude toward regional organizations is ambivalent. Moscow is nominally a member of some of the regional economic organizations subordinate to the U.N., but it has not been very active. Many other existing regional organizations were created or expanded by one side or the other during the period of the cold war, with the Soviet effort guided by the desire to preserve and expand its hegemony. The Soviets have, of course, been especially critical of military alliances, such as NATO, aimed at restricting Communist advances. Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact, created in 1955 as a counter to NATO, has been exercised as much for political as for military ends.

More in a state of flux at present is the Soviet attitude toward the European Economic Community. The development of this organization, particularly its expansion to nine member-states on 1 January 1973, has forced a reexamination of Soviet policies. The U.S.S.R. realizes that it can no longer hope to reverse the development of the EC, but it continues to seek ways to limit the political integration of Western Europe. One way the Soviets have sought to counter the trend toward West European integration is by pressing for bilateral economic agreements with individual countries and seeking equal status for CEMA.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

The attitude of the majority of the Soviet citizenry toward the regime ranges from pride in its achievements to passive acceptance of its political and social strictures. The dissatisfaction and cynicism engendered by the pervasive shortfalls and imperfections of Soviet life are not of a magnitude necessary to inspire a broad-based and active opposition. Outspoken dissent is rare, and confined to individuals or groups particularly sensitive to inequities. The latter category includes intellectuals and members of national minorities, such as the Jews.

The evident contradictions between the proclaimed ideals of the regime and the realities of Soviet life are at the root of much dissidence. The unwillingness of the regime to brook any opposition or even the expression of dissent to its policies contrasts sharply with the lipservice it pays to concepts of socialism, democracy, equality, and human rights. The Soviet intelligentsia has produced a small corps of active and bold individuals who are unwilling to tolerate in silence this discrepancy between ideals and practice, and who demand that the proclaimed rights and

freedoms of the Soviet citizen be accepted and respected by the state. These demands, and criticisms of official abuses, have been expressed in a variety of *samizdat* (self-published) publications, such as the *Chronicle of Current Events* founded in 1968.

As a multinational but highly centralized state, the Soviet Union is susceptible to the pressures generated by the resentments of its minority nationalities against the central system dominated and represented by the Great Russians. The Soviet response to the problem of multinationalism has been the establishment of autonomous territorial units for significant national minorities and far-ranging legal guarantees for the free development of diverse national cultures. However, the purported autonomy enjoyed by the minority peoples is largely theoretical and is considerably limited by controls exercised from the center—a factor rooted in the fundamental intolerance of the system to any form of genuine local self-rule, whether based on cultural differences or not.

As a result, nationalist sentiment of various kinds continues to be endemic to many of the minority republics. Nationalist feelings and anti-Russian sentiment have been particularly marked in the Baltic states, the western Ukraine and Moldavia, and may be evident in parts of Central Asia as well. Lithuania was the scene of violent public disturbances in 1972, and the circulation of massive petitions decrying oppression of the national Catholic faith demonstrated the depth of feeling in that republic. Public disturbances are also reported to have occurred in the Central Asian cities of Chimkent and Tashkent in 1968 and 1969. The Crimean Tatars, expelled from their homeland to Central Asia after World War II, have presented another small but irritating problem to the Soviet authorities because of their persistent demands to be allowed to return to the Crimea.

The Soviet Union's Jewish minority, even more than the populations of the national republics, has presented an unsettling challenge to the regime. Jewish pride and interest in the Israeli state and Jewish culture and history rose sharply after the Israeli victory in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Jewish national feeling found concrete expression in demands to be allowed to leave the Soviet Union and emigrate to Israel.

Jewish agitation, combined with widespread support in the West for the Jewish cause, impelled the authorities to permit a significant relaxation of the barriers to emigration. Jewish emigration in 1971 totaled more than 14,000, and in 1972 about 32,000. The dimensions of the Jewish exodus caused the regime in August 1972 to place new and indirect controls on emigration through the imposition of high

exit fees, but this measure has not yet appreciably affected the emigration. Since then, these financial controls have been tacitly ended, largely in response to external pressures, and replaced by reliance on the state's control over exit visas.

The Jews—and, to a lesser extent, the other nationalities—have compounded the anxieties of the regime by making common cause with the intellectual dissidents. Soviet willingness to tolerate Jewish emigration probably has been in part determined by the leadership's interest in weakening this informal alliance of interests by permitting the departure of Jewish activists.

The blend of repression and tolerance which has characterized Soviet handling of the Jews has also typified its attempts to cope with the intellectual dissidents. A few have been sent into *de facto* exile in the West. Others, such as Petr Yakir, the most recent reputed unofficial leader of the Moscow dissidents, have been subject to investigation, arrest, and imprisonment. Beginning in 1972, Soviet security forces have made a persistent and systematic effort to wipe out the more conspicuous underground publications, particularly the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Their efforts have met with some—but not complete—success in reducing the flow of dissident protest materials to the West.

The forceful but essentially pragmatic response of the regime to the problem of dissidence and agitation has so far proved capable of holding the most active sources of discontent and dissidence within tolerable limits. Moreover, the regime's policy has been deliberately divisive. Neither the intellectuals nor the dissidents of minority nationalities have managed to establish the sort of broad-based support among the rural or urban masses which would permit them to pose any threat to the stability of the regime.

In spite of the prevailing political inertia of the Soviet masses, considerable discontent does exist. The evidence suggests, however, that this discontent is basically economic in nature, and does not represent political alienation that might develop the capability to challenge the foundations of Soviet power. The Soviet leadership is aware of the need to prevent economic discontent from being converted into active protest. It has repeatedly proclaimed its intention of improving the situation of the Soviet consumer, most conspicuously at the 24th Congress in 1971. The rise in overall living standards has been slow, but appreciable enough to keep the population quiescent. Despite the locally adverse effects of the 1972 agricultural shortfalls on consumer welfare, there was no evidence

as of early 1973 that resulting sporadic economic discontent would be translated into meaningful political strains.

2. Subversion

No organized subversive groups of any real significance are known to exist in the U.S.S.R. This, of course, does not prevent the regime from regarding as subversive a wide variety of special interest groups that have proved resistant to central control. These include nationalistic groups such as Lithuanian and Ukrainian dissidents, religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Baptists, and the various intellectual and dissident groups.

Representatives of all these categories have been arrested and tried for allegedly hostile or anti-Soviet activities. There is no evidence, however, that their activity has posed any threat to the regime's political or social stability.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The regular, uniformed police are a component part of a system of internal security forces subordinate to the primary law enforcement agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). In addition to the police, the MVD controls the functions of several militarized and semimilitarized internal security forces, such as the Interior troops, convoy guards, and the like. However, the Frontier Troops—charged with border control and the physical protection of state frontiers—are subordinate to the primary security and intelligence agency, the KGB. The functions and investigative work of the MVD are generally limited to cases of a nonpolitical nature, although it sometimes assists the KGB in the investigation of cases involving state security.

The local agencies of public order under the jurisdiction of the republic MVD's have a very wide sphere of responsibility. They are responsible not only for the normal maintenance of public order including traffic control in the cities, but are also in charge of firefighting, the maintenance of governmental archives, and administration of the penal system. In addition, they are charged with responsibility for combating various lesser forms of social misconduct. Juvenile delinquency and public drunkenness are the two prime problem areas in this category. Alcoholism—a widespread social problem in the U.S.S.R.—has been a particular target of propaganda and police action since 1970, but with few signs of success. The

problem of drug addiction is still a relatively minor one in the U.S.S.R. There are indications, however, that it is one of growing proportions in some areas, particularly in the Caucasus and in the Asian republics. The efforts of regular police units in combating social ills of this type are supplemented by the activities of citizen volunteers. Such groups lack the full authority of the regular police but are nevertheless in a position to detain offenders and exert social pressure.

The primary function of the police—the maintenance of public order and security—is focused on the application of a stringent system of internal controls. Much of their time is spent on the operation of an elaborate and rigorously enforced internal passport system. In "controlled areas," such as Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, major urban areas, and the entire border zone, settlement is tightly controlled and local MVD sections issue passports which residents must carry at all times. All Soviet citizens must register with the local MVD any change in residence exceeding 3 days in cities and 30 days in rural areas.

The MVD is in charge of applying controls on emigration and travel abroad through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR). This office maintains branches in all major urban centers, and is responsible for issuing passports and exit visas for foreign travel. It is also responsible for administering the education fees which have been imposed on emigrants to "non-socialist" countries since August 1972 but are now suspended. These fees, which may total up to 30,000 rubles for university graduates with advanced degrees, function as an indirect brake on emigration. Jewish emigrants, who form by far the largest single element in the flow of emigration, have been particularly affected.

In addition, the MVD administers the extensive Soviet penal system, which houses both criminal and political offenders. Prison camps, or "corrective labor colonies" are still a prominent feature of the Soviet penal system. They no longer play as significant a role in the Soviet economy as they did during the Stalinist era, when prison labor was used for some of the major construction projects of the period. Prison sentences, which may range from 3 months to 15 years, are normally served in a labor camp. Regular prisons, in the general Western sense, are normally used for pretrial detention and for the confinement of violators of camp discipline.

Labor camps are divided into four categories in accordance with the severity of the regimen: general, intensified, strict, and special. The most severe are the

special camps, which are generally reserved for criminal recidivists and some political prisoners. Although the number of inmates is much smaller than it was in the Stalinist era, when estimates ranged as high as 20 million, it is still quite large. It is estimated that the total population of the Soviet penal system is more than 2 million, with the great majority (about 1.8 million) in labor camps. Prison labor still enjoys local economic significance in some areas, particularly in bleak and inhospitable areas of the North and Far East where there are serious shortages of free labor.

As a rule, the officials and uniformed police of the MVD appear to perform their duties without undue harshness. Nevertheless, they do not enjoy a particularly good public image, because of a widespread reputation for incompetence. From the viewpoint of the leadership, however, the police force constitutes a reliable bulwark of the regime. The MVD is completely responsive to the control of the party leadership, and there are no known problems of morale of any significance.

2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The Soviet police and the KGB have proved themselves to be reliable and relatively efficient instruments for the containment and suppression of dissidence. The activities of the most serious sources of oppositionist activity in the Soviet Union—the dissident intellectuals and the more militant national groups—have been held within tolerable and easily controllable limits. The KGB campaign against the intellectuals took on renewed impetus in 1972 with the opening of the so-called Case 24, an effort to put an end to the *Chronicle of Current Events*, the most significant of the regularly published *samizdat* journals. The KGB campaign has not succeeded in completely eliminating *samizdat*, but it has produced many arrests, sent many of the most prominent dissidents into semivoluntary exile, and frightened others into silence.

The security forces have also enjoyed relatively good success in damping down national agitation. The most activist ethnic minority, the Jews, forms a special category. The regime has reacted to the pressures of this group—and their foreign supporters—by permitting them the escape hatch of emigration, thus lessening the control problems of the police and security forces. Manifestations of discontent by other minority groups have been dealt with more harshly, and apparently effectively. Disturbances in Lithuania in 1972, for example, were localized and prevented from spreading, and many of the participants were arrested and sentenced to prison terms.

The work of the security forces is greatly facilitated by the control apparatus of the Communist Party and its subsidiary organizations, such as the Komsomol and the trade unions. All have a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the existing order, and exercise significant control functions over their members. In addition, powerful social inhibitions against dissidence are at work in Soviet society. The would-be dissident is threatened with the loss of livelihood, public denunciation and excoriation, and exclusion from all professional contacts and from the formal mainstream of society.

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Chronology

400-700

Territory of present day European Russia is settled by Eastern Slavs.

700-800

Prosperous mercantile state with Khazar hegemony over Slavs is established between lower Volga and Dnepr rivers.

800-912

Vikings under Rurik use river routes to penetrate Russia; Kiyev becomes center of their dominion.

990

Christianity is introduced by Vladimir the Saint.

1237-1240

European Russia is conquered by the Mongol Golden Horde, beginning two centuries of Tatar rule.

1380

Prince Dmitry of Muscovy inflicts first defeat on Tatars in Battle of Kulikovo Field, laying basis for rise of Muscovy in 15th century.

1533-1584

Ivan the Terrible reigns, proclaiming self tsar of the "third Rome," Muscovy, and beginning settlement east of Urals.

1637

Russian pioneers reach Pacific coast of Siberia.

1689-1725

Peter the Great reigns, embarking on far-reaching reforms to "Westernize" Russia and founding Saint Petersburg (now Leningrad).

1762-1796

Catherine the Great continues "Westernization" of Russia, partitions Poland to increase European Russian territory, inaugurates Russian drive for warm-water ports by acquiring Crimea.

1801-1825

Alexander I reigns, withstanding Napoleonic invasion which reaches Moscow and in the wake of which the Russian army penetrates France.

1825

Revolt of Decembrists, a small group of noblemen favoring social reform, fails.

1825-1855

Nicholas I institutes reactionary regime based on autocracy and Russification, inaugurating systematic use of secret police against the people.

1857-1861

Alexander Herzen's revolutionary thought in the weekly *Kolokol* (The Bell) is published abroad with profound impact on Russian intellectuals.

1861

Serfs are emancipated and commune-type system of peasant social organization is established.

1876

First Russian revolutionary party, called Land and Liberty (later People's Will), is formed by Populists.

1881

Mounting revolutionary activity of Populists culminates in assassination of Alexander II.

1881-1894

Alexander III initiates severe repressions of revolutionaries and fosters pan-Slavism.

1898

March

First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), identified by Soviet Communist Party as its first congress, is held in Minsk.

1903

August

Second Congress of the RSDLP is held in Brussels and London, ending in split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions.

1905

October-December

First Russian Revolution results in a constitutional reform.

1914

August

Germany declares war on Russia.

1917

March

February Revolution results in abdication of tsar and formation of Provisional Government.

November

Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution and Lenin becomes Premier.

1918**March**

Signing of Treaty of Brest Litovsk removes Russia from war. Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party renames itself the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

1918-1921

Bolsheviks ultimately prevail over foreign intervention and civil war.

1921**August**

New Economic Policy (NEP) is introduced.

1922**April**

Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

December

Founding congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) is held.

1924**January**

Lenin dies.

1928**October**

NEP is abandoned. First Five-Year Economic Plan (1929-33) goes into effect.

1929**January**

Trotsky is exiled from U.S.S.R.

1930**January**

Forced collectivization of peasantry begins.

1932-1933

Millions die during serious famine.

1934**December**

Kirov, Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, is assassinated; Stalin starts "great purge" and resign of terror.

1936**December**

"Stalin Constitution," which with minor modifications is still in effect, is adopted.

1939**March**

18th Congress of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is held.

August

Stalin-Hitler pact is signed.

September

Soviet troops occupy eastern Poland.

November

U.S.S.R. invades Finland.

1940**March**

Finns cede territory to U.S.S.R.

August

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are incorporated into U.S.S.R.

1941**April**

Nonaggression pact is signed with Japan.

June

Germany invades U.S.S.R.

1945**February**

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin attend Yalta Conference.

July-August

Truman, Attlee, and Stalin attend Potsdam Conference to draft World War II peace settlements.

U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan.

1947**September**

Zhdanov's "two camps" speech intensifies opposition to West and leads to establishment of Cominform.

1948**March**

Allied Control Commission ceases to function in Berlin.

June

Cominform announces expulsion of Yugoslavia.

August

Soviet blockade of land access to Berlin by French, U.S., and U.K. occupation forces becomes total.

1949**January**

Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is created to promote intrabloc cooperation and to counteract Marshall Plan.

February

Anti-Jewish campaign results in arrest and execution of numerous authors.

May

Moscow agrees to lift Berlin blockade.

September

First nuclear explosion takes place in U.S.S.R.

October

Communist regime is recognized by U.S.S.R. as sole government of China.

1950**February**

Thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance is concluded.

1952**October**

19th Party Congress (first since 1939) renames party "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (CPSU), revises party rules, and renames Politburo "Presidium."

1953**January**

Soviet doctors, mostly Jewish, are charged with plot to kill Soviet leaders on orders of Western intelligence.

March

Stalin dies; Malenkov is named chairman of Council of Ministers and dropped from Party Secretariat, leaving Khrushchev the senior secretary.

April

Doctors' Plot is reversed.

June

Police chief Beriia is arrested for plotting to seize power.

July

Korean armistice is signed.

August

First thermonuclear device is detonated in U.S.S.R.

September

Khrushchev is named First Secretary of CPSU.

December

Execution of Beriia and top associates is announced.

1954**March**

Central Committee approves increased grain production by "opening up virgin lands." Committee for State Security (KGB) is established.

April-July

U.S.S.R. participates in Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference on Korea and Indochina, which concludes agreements on Vietnam and Laos.

1955**February**

Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Chairman of Council of Ministers.

May

Warsaw Pact establishes joint command over most Soviet bloc armed forces.

Austrian State Treaty is signed 15 May, ending Allied occupation.

Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade to patch up Yugoslav-Soviet feud.

July

Big Four Summit conference at Geneva attempts to facilitate solution of East-West problems in Europe.

1956**February**

20th Party Congress convenes. Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech.

April

Dissolution of Cominform is announced.

October

Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov visit Poland in effort to reverse Gomulka's liberalization measures; Soviet leaders accept Gomulka measures upon being made aware of their need to prevent revolt and when assured of Poland's continued loyalty to U.S.S.R.

October-November

Hungarian revolt is crushed by Soviet troops.

1957**February**

Khrushchev's scheme for reorganization of industrial management is accepted by Party Central Committee.

June

Majority in Party Presidium votes to oust Khrushchev, who turns the tables by appealing to Central Committee. So-called antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov is then expelled from Party Presidium and Central Committee.

October

Soviet Union launches first earth satellite.

Central Committee expels Marshal Zhukov from Party Presidium and calls for tightening of party controls over armed forces.

1958

March

Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Chairman of Council of Ministers while remaining Party First Secretary.

September

Khrushchev proposes reform to improve Soviet educational system by increasing vocational training.

November

Khrushchev demands termination of Western occupation rights in West Berlin.

1959

January

U.S.S.R. launches "cosmic rocket."

January-February

21st Congress of CPSU approves Seven-Year Plan and attacks "antiparty" group.

September

Soviet moon rocket is successfully launched. Khrushchev pays official visit to United States.

September-October

Khrushchev visits Mao Tse-tung in Peking during festivities marking 10th anniversary of Chinese People's Republic.

1960

January

U.S.S.R. announces plan to cut armed forces by 1.2 million.

May

Khrushchev announces downing of U.S. U-2 plane. Big Four Summit meeting on Germany, Berlin, and disarmament canceled.

June

Sino-Soviet dispute flares at Bucharest blocwide conference and World Federation of Trade Unions General Council session, Peking.

July

Soviet fighter shoots down U.S. RB-47 plane over international waters; surviving crew is imprisoned.

September-October

Khrushchev attends U.N. General Assembly in New York, caters to African nations, and demands U.N. reorganization.

November-December

Moscow conference of Communist parties attempts to resolve Sino-Soviet dispute.

1961

April

First manned space vehicle is orbited.

June

Khrushchev meets in Vienna with President Kennedy on East-West issues.

August

Berlin wall is built, stopping refugee flow from East Germany.

October

22d Party Congress adopts new party program to replace one adopted in 1919 and revises party rules.

1962

March

U.S.S.R. participates in 18-nation disarmament talks which open in Geneva.

October

Soviet missiles in Cuba create crisis.

November

Party is reorganized into virtually separate organizations for agricultural and industrial affairs.

1963

March

Government is reorganized; Supreme Council of National Economy is formed.

June

Brezhnev and Podgorny are added to Party Secretariat.

U.S.S.R. and United States agree to establish direct teletype communication link ("hot line") between Moscow and Washington.

August

U.S.S.R. and United States agree to ban all nuclear testing except underground explosions.

September

U.S.S.R. begins purchase of an ultimate 12.5 million tons of wheat from abroad after disastrous year in grain and fodder production.

October

Khrushchev launches major chemical industry program with strong accent on chemical support for agriculture.

1964

April

U.S.S.R. announces agreement to reduce production of fissile materials for weapons.

October

Three-man vehicle carries pilot, engineer, and medical doctor into space.

Khrushchev is ousted from party and government jobs, being replaced as Party First Secretary by Brezhnev and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Kosygin.

November

November 1962 party reorganization is reversed.

December

New U.S.S.R. regime postpones—until March 1965—meeting of 26 Communist parties called for December by Khrushchev to prepare for convocation of world Communist meeting on Sino-Soviet dispute.

1965

February

Premier Kosygin visits Hanoi, Peking, and P'yongyang in effort to heal disunity in Communist movement.

March

Nineteen Communist parties attending "consultative" meeting disband without agreement on date for world meeting.

Brezhnev launches massive new program promising government support to agriculture on a scale unprecedented in Soviet history.

Soviet cosmonaut accomplishes first "walk in space."

September-October

Government is reorganized; national and regional councils of national economy (*sovmarkhozy*) are abolished and pre-1957 ministerial system is reestablished; role of profit as measure of economic success is recognized.

December

Brezhnev announces separation of party-state control functions; Nikolay Podgorny replaces retiring Anastas Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

1966

February

Soviet dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel are imprisoned for antistate activities in first such political trial of intellectuals since Stalin's death.

Unmanned spaceship makes "soft landing" on moon.

March

U.S.S.R. achieves first landing of probe on Venus.

April

23d Party Congress approves directives of 1966-70 economic plan; Party Presidium is renamed Politburo; Brezhnev receives Stalin's old title of General Secretary.

December

Brezhnev reports to Central Committee on deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution; he receives mandate to proceed with plans for an international Communist conference.

1967

March

Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West.

April

Brezhnev endorses broad united front tactics for Europe at Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties.

June

Premier Kosygin seeks political settlement of Israeli-Egyptian military clash in U.N. General Assembly and in talks with President Johnson at Glassboro, N.J.

October

Soviet Government reveals cutback of agricultural investment goals approved in March 1965; Deputy Premier Polyansky publicly dissents.

November

Brezhnev presides over Moscow celebrations on 50th anniversary of Russian revolution.

1968

January

Leading members of intellectual community protest trials of young dissidents for "anti-Soviet" activities.

February

Budapest consultative meeting of some 60 Communist parties, without Far Eastern, Albanian, or Cuban representation, endorses Soviet call for late 1968 international conference; Romanian delegation walks out, charging Soviet use of pressure tactics.

August

Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops (except Romanian) occupy Czechoslovakia.

1969

January

Attempt to assassinate Soviet leaders at Kremlin fails.

March

Soviet and Chinese border troops clash on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River.

June

International Conference of Communist Parties meets in Moscow.

October

Sino-Soviet border talks open in Peking.

November

U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations open in Helsinki.

December

Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is deposited at United Nations.

1970

January

Moscow moves to provide air defense for United Arab Republic.

March

Second essay by physicist Andrei Sakharov details the need for economic and political reform in the U.S.S.R. if the Soviets are to keep pace with the West.

April

One hundredth anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth is celebrated.

August

Soviet-West German Renunciation of Force agreement is signed in Moscow.

1971**March-April**

24th Party Congress is held in Moscow. Kunayev, Kulakov, Shcherbitsky, and Grishin added to the Politburo.

May

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Egypt.

July

Politburo member Voronov demoted from post of Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. to Chairman of the People's Control Committee.

August

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with India.

September

Moscow signs Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

October

Brezhnev travels to France for summit talks with Pompidou, his first trip to the West as party chief.

December

KGB opens "Case 24," a campaign to suppress the leading samizdat journal, the *Chronicle of Current Events*.

1972**April**

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Iraq.

May

Politburo member Shelest demoted from post as head of Ukrainian party and named Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R.

Brezhnev receives President Nixon for summit talks in Moscow. The accords signed include an ABM agreement and an interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons.

July

U.S.S.R. begins massive grain imports to compensate for harvest failures.

Soviet military advisers ousted from Egypt.

Castro visit to Moscow results in the admission of Cuba to CEMA.

September

Candidate Politburo member Mzhavanadze loses his seat after expose of corruption in the Georgian republic; the first member to lose his post since 1966.

1973**February**

Politburo member Polyansky demoted from post of First Deputy Premier to Minister of Agriculture. Incumbent minister, Matskevich, is fired in the aftermath of the harvest failures.

March

Party card exchange, aimed at weeding out marginal members, begins.

April

Central Committee plenum announces "retirement" of Politburo members Voronov and Shelest, and the addition of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB chief Andropov to the Politburo.

May

Brezhnev travels to West Germany for summit talks with Brandt.

June

Brezhnev makes official visit to United States 18-25 June.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	RUSSIAN	ENGLISH
APN.....	Agentstvo Pechati Novosti.....	News Press Agency
AUCCTU.....	Vsesoyuznyy Tsentralnyy Sovet Professionalnykh Soyuzov	Council of Trade Unions
CEMA.....	Sovet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi...	Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
CPSU.....	Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuz	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
KGB.....	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.....	Committee for State Security
MIN.....	Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del.....	Ministry of Internal Affairs
OVIR.....	Otdel Vysov i Registratsiya.....	Office of Visas and Registration
R.S.F.S.R.....	Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
TASS.....	Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuz...	Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
V.L.K.S.M. (u/ Komsomol)	Vsesoyuznyy Leninitskiy Kommunisticheskii Soyuz Molodezhi	All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth (Communist Youth League)

SECRET

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.
Armenian SSR.....	40 00	45 00
Azerbaijan SSR.....	40 30	47 30
Belorussian SSR.....	53 00	28 00
Estonian SSR.....	59 00	26 00
Georgian SSR.....	42 00	43 30
Kazakh SSR.....	48 00	68 00
Kirgiz SSR.....	41 00	75 00
Latvian SSR.....	57 00	25 00
Lithuanian SSR.....	56 00	24 00
Moldavian SSR.....	47 00	29 00
Tadzhik SSR.....	39 00	71 00
Turkmen SSR.....	40 00	60 00
Ukrainian SSR.....	49 00	32 00
Uzbek SSR.....	41 00	64 00
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.....	48 09	17 07
Brest.....	52 06	23 42
Chimkent.....	42 18	69 36
Crimea (regn).....	45 00	34 00
Damansky Island (in Ussuri River).....		
Dnepr (strm).....	46 30	32 18
Dnepropetrovsk.....	48 27	34 59
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.....	50 13	12 54
Kazakhstan (regn).....	48 00	62 00
Khar'kov.....	50 00	36 15
Kiyev.....	50 26	30 31
Leningrad.....	59 55	30 00
Minsk.....	53 54	27 00
Moscow.....	55 45	37 35
Novosibirsk oblast.....	55 00	80 00
Penza oblast.....	53 00	44 30
Siberia (regn).....	60 00	100 00
Stavropol kray.....	45 00	44 00
Tashkent.....	41 20	69 18
Ukraine (regn).....	50 00	32 00
Urals (mts).....	60 00	60 00
Uzbekistan (regn).....	43 00	60 00
Volga (strm).....	45 55	47 52
Ussuri River (strm).....	48 28	135 02




Figure 14

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