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Country Profile

Nigeria

February 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area brief • Summary map

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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Background and appraisal • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security


THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, forestry, fisheries, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and developments • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate • Military geographic regions • Strategic areas • Internal routes • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

This General Survey supersedes the one dated December 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.





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
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The twisted branches of this giant baobob tree in northern Nigeria seem to bespeak the harsh struggle for survival that has been the lot of nations as well as of living things throughout tropical Africa. Arab legend holds that the devil plucked up the baobob, thrust its branches into the earth, and left its roots in the air.

The Costly Struggle for National Unity (s)

Nigeria is one of the most colorful and promising young countries in Africa; it has also been one of the most troubled. Although its political, social, and economic problems mirrored those of other emerging nations south of the Sahara, they were compounded by factors unique to the Nigerian scene and by the mistakes of well-intentioned men. (U/OU)

Similar to Oregon in shape but nearly four times bigger, Nigeria is the largest coastal state in west Africa. It gained independence from the United Kingdom in October 1960 as a relatively loose federation of three unequal regions. Three years later it cut its remaining symbolic ties to the British crown, becoming a republic within the British Commonwealth. By far the most populous country in Africa, among the two or three most wealthy in terms of natural resources, and possessed—thanks to its varied climate—of an exceptionally broad agricultural base, Nigeria seemed to have all the prerequisites for viable and increasingly prosperous statehood except one. The critical missing ingredient was—and to some extent remains—the pervasive sense of national identity and pride needed to overcome tribal loyalties and to support the processes of modernization and reform. (U/OU)

Unlike many African states, Nigeria underwent a gradual and relatively thorough preparation for independence. Following World War II, a series of constitutional reforms—based in part on the Australian federal system—gave Nigerian leaders fairly broad experience in internal self-government and fostered development of a competent corps of civil servants. In the absence of a British white settler population, the transition process was relatively smooth—perhaps too smooth. There were no martyrs to a Nigerian struggle for independence. Had there been, perhaps dedication to the concept of "one Nigeria" might have been more widespread. (U/OU)

As it was, the federal system originally adopted by the Nigerians simply perpetuated and reinforced the tribally oriented regionalism fostered by the British to facilitate indirect rule. Termination of colonial status thus brought virtually no change in the life or parochial outlook of the average Nigerian citizen. The situation was inherently unstable. And as the euphoria over independence subsided, strong centrifugal tendencies began to reemerge. (U/OU)

Nigeria is, of course, an artificial creation of the colonial era. Its borders group together highly diverse peoples, divided by language, culture, religion, and tribal animosities. Its original principal political subdivisions and parties reflected the influence of major ethnic groups, while the interests of lesser minorities were relatively neglected. Ethnic antagonism was exacerbated by the prospect of perpetual domination of the central government by a single group—the Hausa-Fulani of the vast Northern Region—and by growing disparities in regional levels of economic development. Under these circumstances, Nigeria's initial experiment with multiparty democracy collapsed after only 5 years. (U/OU)

The end of parliamentary rule was hastened by popular disgust with a system marred by bribery, corruption, nepotism, and the blatant rigging of everything from elections to census results. The coup that brought Major General Ironsi—an Ibo tribesman—to power in January 1966 marked the beginning of a quest for a new formula for uniting and governing Nigeria's disparate peoples. However, Ironsi's solution—the establishment of a unitary state—showed little understanding for the strength and complexity of tribal rivalries. It was viewed in the north as a plot to impose southern domination over the entire country. And it cost Ironsi his life in a second coup led by northern officers in July 1966. (C)

A member of a small northern tribe—and, unlike most northerners, a Christian—Ironsi's successor as head of Nigeria's fledgling military government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, was a less controversial figure. But his efforts to find a way to restore civilian rule—once again within a decentralized framework—were severely complicated by the large-scale massacre of Ibo residing in the north which erupted in the fall of 1966. By May of the following year, it seemed possible that the whole federation might collapse. Gowon's dramatic move at that juncture in dividing Nigeria's existing regions (by then four) into 12 states—thereby ending the monopoly of political power and patronage enjoyed by the nation's major tribes—was sound enough in conception. In fact, it was an action once advocated by the Ibo, among others. Yet in the atmosphere of mutual suspicion which prevailed in the spring of 1967, it simply precipitated the secession of the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra. Civil war followed 2 months later. (C)

The war dragged on for 2½ years before Biafra capitulated to the superiority of federal weapons and manpower. Lagos' victory discredited the concept of secession, but it did not resolve the basic social and economic problems which at one time or another had fanned separatist sentiment among the leaders of all three major tribes—the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo. Gowon was still faced with the delicate task of devising institutions which would ensure some measure of national unity and provide protection to the various mutually suspicious tribes. Moreover, the sudden end of the fighting in January 1970 had brought an array of new problems, including reconstruction, relief, and reconciliation. (C)


Thus it would be unwise to attribute too much significance to the relative domestic calm which has prevailed in Nigeria since Biafra's surrender. In part, it is the result of general war-weariness. In part, it is imposed by the ban on all political and tribal organizations which has been in effect since 1966. And in part, it reflects the dampening effect of Gowon's announcement that there will be no return to civilian government before 1976—and then only if the nine-point program which he set forth in October 1970 has been implemented. (S)

Nevertheless, the civil war and its outcome have provided the Nigerians with the opportunity to make a fresh start—and on somewhat sounder foundations than before. The hundreds of thousands of citizens who fought and suffered for the preservation of one Nigeria, and who saw the war prolonged as the result of foreign intervention, have emerged from their ordeal with a greater sense of national identity and patriotism. Conversely, Ibo bitterness toward Lagos has been mitigated by unexpectedly generous and sympathetic treatment. Furthermore, the exigencies of the conflict spurred the development of Nigeria's petroleum and manufacturing industries, thus providing Gowon with impressive and growing financial resources with which to tackle economic problems and grievances. Finally, the need to counter Biafran initiatives and to secure adequate supplies of military equipment and weaponry forced Lagos to break out of its relative isolation. Gradually, Nigeria developed a new image as an active and influential member of the nonaligned club. And this in turn, coupled with Gowon's efforts to play a leading role in African affairs, has contributed to the growth of Nigerian nationalism. (S)

Nigeria's chances of success in meeting its many problems are uncertain. Gowon's plans for political reform and for reshaping the country's swollen military establishment are still vague. The organizational changes he has introduced have yet to be fully tested in practice. And as the history of a number of other nations attests, it is extremely difficult to devise a

mutually satisfactory balance between the central and regional authorities in a federally structured heterogeneous state. The following discussion is, therefore, more concerned with a description of the factors which have shaped the Nigerian scene and which will affect the country's future than with prophecy. (S)

A Nation of Contrasts (u/ou)



Nigeria is a geographer's dream. The country's physical, sociological, and economic zones are fairly well defined, but their number and variety would challenge the analytical and graphic skills of the most imaginative social scientist. In time, Nigeria's diversity could prove to be the source of considerable economic

strength and political vitality. But so far, at least, its net effect has been to greatly complicate the problem of welding the country into a single nation-state.

The Land: Geography has played an important role in fostering and preserving the heterogeneous and regionally oriented character of Nigerian society. The climate is tropical throughout the country, but considerable differences in temperature, humidity, and rainfall exist between the north and the south. Separated from the beaches and mangrove swamps of the coast by a 100-mile wide belt of tropical rain forest, the upland plains and grassland savanna become gradually more arid to the north. Northern geography favored the development of pastoral pursuits, caravan trade, and large but loosely knit empires dependent on cavalry to police their vast domains. With southward trade and expansion



Savanna Vegetation



Tropical Vegetation

inhibited by a tsetse fly-infested belt just north of the forests, the region had a natural orientation to the north. In fact, by the time the first European ships appeared off the Niger Delta in the 15th century, trans-Saharan trade links and the introduction of Islam had already made much of northern Nigeria heavily influenced by Arab culture.

Heavy rainfall in the hot and humid southern third of Nigeria permitted more intensive cultivation and, in consequence, the area has been able to support a higher density of population than in the north. The inhabitants of the south, however, were for a long time less mobile than the northern tribes. The tsetse fly, dense vegetation, swamps, and a myriad of creeks and rivers made the area unsuitable for horses. Difficulty of travel and the ready availability of adequate food supplies favored the development of smaller, urban-based kingdoms as well as the proliferation of independent—and often mutually hostile—minor tribal groups with widely varying customs and languages.


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Starting in the mid-19th century, geography began to lend new economic dimensions to Nigeria's incipient regionalism. The gradual introduction of cash crops and the development of unevenly distributed natural resources sharpened the differences between north and south and, to a lesser extent, between east and west. The north concentrated on the production of peanuts and cotton, the west on cocoa and rubber, the east on palm products. The bulk of Nigeria's known inorganic mineral deposits lie in the north, while its oil fields and timber reserves are in the south.

The People: The Nigerians themselves are as varied as their environment, although their tribal groups are divided more by language, culture, and history than by physical characteristics. Altogether, some 250 tribes and an approximately equal number of separate languages or dialects have been identified. In fact, there is still no single language which is understood throughout Nigeria—not even the official one, English.

Moreover, there is no substantial area in present-day Nigeria in which ethnic loyalties are unmixed. No matter how the country is ultimately divided up for administrative purposes, there are certain to be potentially dissatisfied minority groups in virtually every jurisdiction. But Nigeria's ethnic problem is less a function of the number of its tribes—some of which are very small indeed—than of the rivalries and the social and economic differences which generate friction among the larger and more important groups. Here, history has not been kind. For hundreds of years, the impact of two major external influences, Islam and Europe, widened the divergence between northern and southern tribes. And partly because of this, 20th century modernization, has had a markedly uneven—and therefore potentially disruptive—effect.

There are perhaps 10 tribes in Nigeria which number more than 500,000 members. But of a population which may now exceed 58 million, nearly two-thirds belong to one or another of the three major groups cited earlier. The largest of these, the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani amalgam, is centered in the far north. The Yoruba, the most urbanized and religiously mixed (animist, Muslim, and Christian) of the major tribes, live in the southwest. The homeland of the third major group, the largely Christianized Ibo, is in the southeast. The three, each of which came to dominate one of



Nigeria's original postindependence regions, are very different. In fact, both the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani show closer cultural similarities to major groups outside Nigeria than they do to the Ibo or to each other.


The colorful history of the Nigerian peoples is marked by centuries of tribal warfare and slave raiding and by the rise and fall of numerous powerful kingdoms. By the 18th century, the general contours of the country's current regional and tribal rivalries were beginning to emerge. By that time, most Yoruba were united within the Kingdom of Oyo. The Ibo, while disinclined to form political units above the level of a grouping of villages, controlled the east through the enterprise and ingenuity of the priests and traders of their Aro clan. However, the Hausa—still distinct from the Fulani tribesmen who had begun to filter into the north about 400 years earlier—held sway only in the far northwest.

In the early 19th century, the religiously zealous city-dwelling branch of the Fulani tribe rose in holy

war (jihad) against its less devoutly Muslim Hausa overlords. Victorious, the Fulani established a feudal theocratic empire of emirates owing allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto. Inter-marriage produced a Hausa-Fulani aristocracy, and extension of the holy war soon brought most of the pagan tribes of the so-called Middle Belt under its control. In 1808, the Hausa-Fulani defeated and temporarily occupied the great Bornu Kingdom of the Muslim Kanuri tribe. For the first time in Nigeria's history, almost the entire north was dominated by a single group.

The approaches to the southeast blocked by the determined resistance of the Tiv tribe, the Hausa-Fulani then pressed their attack to the southwest, cutting deep into Yoruba territory. Their progress was eventually arrested by the advent of the British, but the Hausa-Fulani continued to raid and harass their southern neighbors until well into the 20th century. It is little wonder that some southerners feared that the departure of the British in 1960 had opened the way for the resumption of the jihad.

The Colonial Heritage (u/ou)



Trading expedition on the Niger in the early 1800's

Nigeria's experience with British colonial rule was brief—and almost accidental. Attracted by the lucrative slave trade inaugurated by the Portuguese around 1500, British vessels were visiting the coast of Nigeria in some number by the 17th century. But it was the Dutch, not the English, who soon thereafter wrested preeminence in the area from the Portuguese—only to be challenged in turn by a half-dozen or so other European powers. By the 18th century, Britain and France had emerged as the principal competitors in west Africa, with the British dominant in the Guinea coast area. Throughout the long period of unrestricted slave trade, however, no European nation attempted to bring any part of Nigeria under its control. The climate and terrain were too inhospitable.

For nearly 400 years, then, Europe's impact on the Nigerian scene was largely indirect. Fear of disease and attack led even the most venturesome traders to anchor in harbors and river mouths along the coast and to conduct the bulk of their business through African middlemen. Efforts to explore the hinterland were not pressed until the mid-1800's, when discovery of the prophylactic qualities of quinine vastly improved the chances of survival. Thus, beyond the confines of such major trade centers as Lagos and Old Calabar—where the inhabitants were long exposed to a wide assortment of European merchants and missionaries—the white man's influence was felt primarily in the disruptive effects of the slave trade. Not that

this type of commerce was a European innovation in West Africa, but the increased demand for slaves made this trade so profitable that it diverted whole tribes from their normal pursuits and triggered the internecine warfare which was largely responsible for the decline and breakup of the great forest region kingdoms.

While very active in the slave trade, the British did not play a particularly distinctive or critical role in Nigerian history until the early 19th century. At that time, sentiment was running high in England against both slavery and imperialism. Ironically, it was London's new determination to bring an end to traffic in human cargoes which set the English on the road toward adding Nigeria to their empire. British warships bent on halting the slave trade began patrolling off the Nigerian coast, occasionally bringing force to bear on local chieftains. The reassuring presence of the Royal Navy brought English traders (now seeking palm oil and other "legitimate" commodities) and missionaries to the area in greater numbers. Pressure for providing additional protection for British lives and business interests began to grow.

English involvement in the affairs of the coastal tribes assumed a more formal and continuous character in 1849 with the appointment of a British Consul for the Bights of Biafra and Benin with headquarters on the island of Fernando Póo.* Twelve

*For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.

years later, this official—acting on London's instructions and backed by the Royal Navy—occupied Lagos and annexed it as a British colony. By then, the mood in England was changing. Anti-imperial sentiment was beginning to abate, and concern over French and German colonial ambitions was mounting. The race to carve up Africa was soon in full swing. And in 1885, Nigeria's fate was sealed when Britain's claim to an exclusive sphere of influence in the area around the Niger River and some smaller rivers to the east—then referred to as the Oil rivers—was recognized by the Berlin Congress.

London quickly established a coastal protectorate extending from the Niger Delta to Old Calabar, subsequently expanding it to include all of southern Nigeria except the colony of Lagos. By early 1900, having settled the last of a series of local border disputes with France and having formed a separate Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from lands theretofore administered under charter by the Royal Niger Company, the British Government had assumed direct responsibility for nearly all the territory enclosed within the borders of present-day Nigeria. Nigeria was then not one but three separate entities: the colony of Lagos plus the southern and northern protectorates. Moreover, 50 years of increasingly active British involvement in the area had widened regional divergencies. By 1900, effective British control extended beyond the borders of Lagos to the far reaches of the old southwestern kingdoms of Oyo and Benin. Recalcitrant chiefs had been deposed. African middlemen had been squeezed out, and the Yoruba had been Christianized in considerable numbers. In the virtually unexplored wilds of the southeast, however, the Ibo still retained their autonomy and their traditional customs. And the north, except for the Middle Belt emirates of Ilorin and Nupe which had fallen before the Royal Niger Company's private army, was a British possession in name only. The treaties which the Royal Niger Company had negotiated with a few Hausa-Fulani emirs in an effort to block French expansion had resulted in no practical diminution of those local leaders' sovereignty. Nor had they brought an end to the slave trade in the area.

London's initial approach to the problem of consolidating its control over its new and disparate Nigerian possessions was to give its principal representatives in the field free rein to seek their own solutions. In the north, British High Commissioner Frederick Lugard established an effective system of

indirect rule based on the existing Muslim emirates. Partly because of this and partly because declining revenues from trans-Saharan trade limited the funds available for modernization of local services and facilities, the extension and consolidation of British control brought little social change to the area. For example, the power and activities of the emirs were left largely undisturbed, and since Lugard discouraged Christian penetration of Muslim areas in the belief that it would disrupt the indigenous culture, the north did not profit from the educational and medical services offered by missionaries.

In contrast, Lugard's counterpart in the south, Ralph Moor, was moved both by personal inclination and by the fragmented nature of many of the societies in his region to establish a more direct form of rule. Moreover, Moor did not share Lugard's concern about the potentially destabilizing effects of Christianity. Missionaries penetrated deep into Yoruba and Ibo territory, winning converts and establishing schools as they went. At the same time, funds derived from customs duties and the growing palm oil trade permitted the construction of roads and railways, laying of telegraph lines, and dredging of harbors. Growing commercial activity advanced the process of urbanization, and comparative economic well-being began to further differentiate the south from the north.

Lagos was joined to the southern protectorate in 1906, and the merger of Britain's remaining two Nigerian jurisdictions was effected—under Lugard's guiding hand—in 1914. But while unification opened the way for faster economic development in the north, the policies pursued by Lugard and his like-minded successors tended to reinforce Nigeria's regional differences and rivalries.


With a view to minimizing the disruptive effects of economic progress and "modern" southern values on the feudal northern emirates, the boundaries of the former northern and southern protectorates were preserved and the two administrations were kept separate. The ban on missionary activity in Muslim areas of the north was continued, and tribal jealousies grew as disparities in levels of education widened and as better trained southerners—particularly members of the Ibo group—began to fill key civil service and commercial positions throughout the country. Furthermore, efforts to extend indirect rule to the south were only partially successful. West of the Niger, the British managed to resurrect a rather pale version of the long-defunct Oyo Kingdom of the

Yoruba. But east of the river, attempts to manufacture hierarchies of "warrant chiefs" out of village elders of the decentralized Ibo and Ibibio tribes met with considerable resistance. And in 1939, the British gave formal recognition to the differing nature of Ibo and Yoruba-controlled lands by dividing southern Nigeria into separate eastern and western administrations.

Following World War II, Nigeria's three existing administrative regions became the basis for planning for independence as a federal state. As Nigeria moved closer to self-government, tribally based parties emerged to contest regional and national elections. Inevitably, the political scene in each region was

monopolized by the party dominated by the major tribe in the area. Moreover, the pace of political development in the three constituent states of the emerging federation continued to be uneven. The Eastern and Western Regions became self-governing shortly after Nigeria gained almost complete autonomy in August 1957. The Northern Region, however, did not request similar status for another 2 years. Thus, while all three regions adhered to parliamentary forms and enjoyed equally semiautonomous relations with the central government in Lagos when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, there were still numerous differences of detail among their systems of administration.

The Richest of the Poor (c)



While British policy frequently tended to aggravate centrifugal forces operating within Nigerian society, Lagos' colonial legacy also included an impressive

economic infrastructure, well-developed administrative institutions, the most sophisticated financial middlemen south of the Sahara, and widespread entrepreneurial skills. Even before independence, these assets had combined with Nigeria's abundant natural and human resources to yield the highest GDP in black Africa. And up until the outbreak of the civil war, the country's economy continued to grow at an average rate of over 5% a year.

Agriculture is still the backbone of the Nigerian economy. While no longer the principal source of export earnings, agricultural pursuits account for nearly half of the country's GDP and furnish employment for nearly 70% of the labor force. Crop yields remain low because of the continued use of primitive methods, but even with less than half its arable land under cultivation, Nigeria is nearly self-sufficient in food and agricultural raw materials. Moreover, Nigeria is among the world's leading exporters of peanuts, palm products, cocoa beans, and rubber. Cotton and sesame seeds also rank among its principal agricultural exports. Some 120,000 square miles of forest support foreign sales of some two dozen varieties of hardwood logs, plywood, and sawn timber. And while meat products are not exported in appreciable quantities, the million or so cattle slaughtered annually in the north sustain a valuable trade in leather and raw hides.

But agricultural production has been increasing relatively slowly, and for the past few years, mining and manufacturing have been the principal engines of

economic growth in Nigeria. Here, too, the country has benefited both from the experience and physical facilities inherited from the colonial period and from the wealth of its natural resources. Nigeria is the only west African country that has all forms of primary energy in excess of internal consumption requirements. Its chief mineral resources include petroleum, natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, and limestone. Tin ingots and, to a lesser extent, columbite have long been substantial earners of foreign exchange. Small-scale enterprises predominate, but the ready availability of raw materials has encouraged both the construction of a number of large cement, glass, and textile factories. Despite the relatively high phosphorous and sulfur content of Nigeria's iron ore, active consideration is being given to the possibility of establishing a steel industry. Far and away the most important development, however, has been the rapid growth of the young oil industry. It is now unquestionably the most significant single dynamic force in the Nigerian economy.

The scope and pace of the oil boom have, in fact, come as somewhat of a surprise to everyone. Nigeria's oil has the advantages of being light, relatively sulfur free, and convenient to major European markets. But it was not discovered in commercial quantities until 1956, and actual production did not begin until 1958. Moreover, the proven reserves established during the course of subsequent surveys were small by world standards. Thus, while 11 foreign firms were involved in developing Nigeria's original fields in the coastal areas adjacent to Shell-BP's 1956 Niger Delta find, it seemed unlikely that oil receipts would soon do much more than offset the losses Lagos had suffered as the result of a sharp decline in cocoa prices. In June 1967, the last full month before the outbreak of the civil war seriously disrupted the activities of all but one of the foreign oil concerns operating in Nigeria, production had reached 467,000 barrels a day. Had that level been sustained throughout the remainder of the year, Lagos' net annual foreign exchange earnings from petroleum would probably have been in the neighborhood of \$150 million.


Fortunately for Nigeria, the civil war did not result in a total moratorium on new foreign investment. On the contrary, it spurred development of new onshore and offshore oilfields outside the general area of hostilities. In consequence, prewar levels of petroleum were regained by the spring of 1969. Then, in 1970, when the older fields were brought back into full

production and the refinery at Port Harcourt was reopened, Nigeria's oil boom began to gain momentum. By mid-1972, Nigeria ranked eighth among the world's oil-producing nations with a daily output of 1.8 million barrels. As the result of renegotiated price and payment schedules, earnings had increased even more dramatically than production figures. By the end of 1971, net foreign exchange receipts had risen to over \$1 billion, i.e., more than double the receipts from the export of all other forms of goods and services. Oil's contribution to government revenues had jumped from \$38 million, or 9% of total revenues, in 1966 to \$983 million, or well over half of total revenues in 1971. And it is now expected that by 1975 production will reach at least 2.4 million barrels a day and that oil's contribution to government revenues will have increased by approximately 40%.

But Nigeria is not another Libya. Even by the most conservative estimates, it has a population of over 50 million, and oil revenues, while very important, will not provide a financial panacea. Per capita GDP is currently estimated at about \$100. Even if, as seems likely, Nigeria's economy expands to three or four times its prewar dimensions by 1985, the country will not be rich by any standards other than those of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, the oil industry is still a largely exogenous factor in the Nigerian economy, with top management, policy direction, technical know-how, and sales revenues being for the most part derived from outside the country. The Nigerian Government can, of course, affect oil revenues by demanding price or taxation revisions or more participation in the running of the industry. But growth prospects for Nigeria as a whole—including employment prospects—will depend more heavily on achievements outside the oil sector and on the efficiency with which government revenues are disbursed to meet federal and state requirements than on the sheer size of the country's net income from petroleum.


While Nigeria's GDP grew at above plan rates in both 1970 and 1971, Lagos has encountered some difficulty in implementing its 1970-74 development program. It has been faced with a number of economic and related social problems—some old, others stemming from the civil war—which have strained the treasury, impeded foreign trade, upset investment schedules, and threatened to rekindle regional discontent and animosities. The older

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Secondly, the Yoruba took advantage of the involuntary departure of Ibo officials to occupy an increasing number of lower and middle level civil service jobs in Lagos and in the north. All this has raised fears of Yoruba domination and of a return to big-tribe politics. As a result—and also because of factional strife among the Yoruba themselves—there has been agitation for dividing Western State into two or more separate jurisdictions. Moreover, there has been a growing and somewhat startling tendency in the north to hire non-Africans or even Ibo, rather than readily available Yoruba, to fill vacancies for which there are no qualified northern candidates.

The impact of the war on Nigeria's world outlook was also quite marked. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Nigeria played a modest role in African affairs, even less on the world scene. While officially a member of the nonaligned club—it abrogated its defense pact with the United Kingdom in 1962 and soon thereafter opened diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of Communist countries—

Nigeria maintained a moderate and generally pro-Western posture. But the unwillingness of Western powers to furnish aircraft and other major military items to the Gowon regime in its time of need left this field open to Moscow. While Soviet aid was limited to sales of equipment and provision of technical assistance, all paid for in hard currency, the Soviets were able to trade on Nigerian gratitude to enlarge their presence and influence to Lagos.

At the same time, the airing of their dirty linen and effective Biafran propaganda at the United Nations and in the world press heightened the Nigerians' sensitivity to slights by foreigners. Lagos' wartime experience also thrust it more directly into the mainstream of African affairs. In consequence, Nigerian pronouncements began to take on a more sharply nationalistic and xenophobic tinge—less pro-Western and more pro-African. And while Gowon has been careful to avoid overly offending his Western creditors, he has preserved Nigeria's wartime shift toward militant nonalignment as a basic element in Lagos' current foreign policy posture.

New Directions (s)



In the space of 6 short years, Gowon has developed into a confident and charismatic leader. He has built a constituency among the many small tribes in Nigeria—particularly those in the north and the east—and he also has strong support from one faction of the Yoruba tribe. Despite his many titles—he is chief of state, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, and President of the Federal Executive Council—he continues to live a comparatively simple life and to avoid identification with the blatant corruption characteristic of much of the military and political hierarchy. He seems to view himself as a mediator who operates by consensus. But while he is known to have been successfully pressured to change his position on a few specific issues, Gowon generally determines what the consensus will be on subjects about which he feels strongly. He respects the views of the predominantly civilian Federal Executive Council, and he presents all decrees to the more powerful Supreme Military Council for its approval. The key decisions, however, are either made by Gowon himself—with the help of a group of unofficial advisers who occasionally meet

with him in closed session at Lagos' Dodan Barracks—or are left, with Gowon's concurrence, to senior civil servants.

Gowon's blueprint for Nigeria's future rests on his dedication to what he views as the inseparable concepts of a multistate federation and a strong central government in which minor tribesmen play a key role. And while his repeated disavowals of any personal political aspirations may be genuine, he has made it abundantly clear that there will be no hasty return to civilian rule. Even his announced target date of 1976 remains in doubt, because it rests on prior fulfillment of nearly all of the objectives contained in the nine-point program he set forth in October 1970. This program, which extended the existing bans on strikes and political parties, covers 1) reorganization of the armed forces, 2) implementation of the Second National Development Plan (1970-74), 3) eradication of corruption in political life, 4) settlement of the question of the creation of more states, 5) preparation and adoption of a new constitution, 6) introduction of a permanent revenue allocation formula between the federal and state governments, 7) conduct of a national population census, 8) organization of genuinely national political parties, and 9) organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and at the center.

Gowon's program has generated some dismay among Nigeria's sidelined civilian politicians, who, naturally enough, would prefer to see the military step aside without much further delay. His critics—citing, *inter alia*, the government's failure to move more resolutely against corruption and the deliberate deferral of the sensitive additional states issue until 1974—maintain that Gowon is avoiding difficult or potentially unpopular decisions and is seeking to divert attention from pressing problems through grandstand plays in the foreign policy area. And it is true that progress toward achievement of the military government's stated objectives has been almost imperceptible in some fields. Moreover, the pace of change has suffered to some extent from Gowon's frequent trips abroad. Although the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Major General Ekpo, reportedly is empowered to act for him during his absences, in practice all important decisions must await Gowon's return. On balance, however, Gowon's deliberate approach to his country's domestic problems seems well suited to Nigerian circumstances.

While he has not spelled it out in every case, Gowon has worked his objectives into a relatively firm order of priorities. For the present, his primary objectives are to maintain internal stability while strengthening the economic and psychological foundations of national unity. Hence implementation of the 4-year development plan, consolidation of the new state bureaucracies, and cultivation of patriotic fervor take precedence over the removal of corrupt—but influential and hard to replace—officials.

Each of Gowon's moves has been carefully tailored to promote the idea of one Nigeria. An interim formula for a more equitable distribution of federal revenues was adopted in April 1970. Coordination of the economic plans produced by the individual states was effected at the federal level later that year. For its part, the federal development plan stresses expenditures on infrastructure, new industry, and agricultural projects which are either of obvious common benefit or which promise to narrow the gap between the richer and poorer states. And all this has been combined with a strong dose of economic nationalism. By joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and through a series of unilateral enactments and tough negotiating sessions, the Nigerians have underscored their intent to secure a much greater degree of participation in foreign business than exists at present. The same spirit is reflected in Lagos' decision to further distance itself from its colonial past by decimalizing its currency and system of measurement.

Like his domestic policies, Gowon's approach to foreign affairs has been conditioned by his desire to develop Nigerian unity and economic independence. Although his extensive travels—he has visited some 20 African countries in the past 3 years—have occasioned a good bit of grumbling within the political and military elite, his overall performance has yielded some gratifying results. Western investment and loans continue at high levels. The Soviets, while under something of a cloud since they were caught funding the activities of a number of leftist labor leaders last year, have extended a \$6.7 million credit for, and are currently busily engaged in conducting, an extensive geological survey in the north. Further financial assistance has been tendered by China. Prospects for obtaining petroleum technology from India, the U.S.S.R., Romania, France, and Japan have been opened up. Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbors have improved to the point where it seems possible that Lagos may eventually surmount existing

currency zone barriers and join with French-speaking states in some form of regional economic grouping. Within the OAU, Gowon has won acclaim for the vigor of his anticolonial rhetoric and for his efforts to mediate disputes both within and beyond the borders of Africa. And the publicity accorded his words and actions has had its desired effect at home. The Nigerian public is evidencing a growing pride in their country's new and brighter image.

Nevertheless, Gowon's firm plans probably extend no farther than his second priority objectives, e.g., the holding of an impartial census (now scheduled for 1973). For even if he negotiates those hurdles, how and when he tackles his final reform goals seem likely to depend upon: the degree of success he has by then achieved in meeting his economic targets, in developing popular confidence in the central government, in dampening pressure for an unwieldy proliferation of states, and in building a broad consensus on the proper direction of constitutional changes.

Gowon's position is not threatened at the moment, but the relative stability of Nigeria's postwar domestic scene is still fragile. Given the delicacy of the problems he will be facing by 1974—particularly with respect to

developing truly national political parties in an environment characterized by a lack of strong ideological currents and the persistence of strong tribal allegiances—Gowon is undoubtedly concerned by Yoruba factional infighting, the growth of anti-Yoruba sentiment in the north, the emergence of shadow organizations based on the old political parties, and the existence of discontented factions in the army. Thus, while he has established the general parameters of Nigeria's future political evolution, it seems doubtful that he will soon abandon his current cautious and flexible approach to reform.

In fact, no matter how happy the solutions which Gowon ultimately may find to the problems entailed in reshaping Nigeria's political system, it is quite possible that he will need more time to effect an orderly return to civilian rule than his countrymen have been told to expect. And even when the handover does take place, the army will probably not bow out completely. Whether or not Nigeria's projected new constitution makes temporary provision for some members of the armed forces to be ex officio members of the government, it seems likely that the army will long play the role of an alternative government which could appear from the wings in the event that the political process once again threatens to break down.



Chronology (U/OU)

- 1553**
First English ships reach Bights of Benin.
- 17th century**
Nigeria becomes a center of west African slave trade.
- 1849**
First British consul appointed for Bights of Biafra and Benin.
- 1861**
Lagos is annexed as British colony.
- 1886**
Royal Niger Company is granted royal charter.
- 1912**
Frederick Lugard named governor of Nigeria.
- 1914**
Lagos colony and interior protectorates amalgamated as Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.
First Legislative Council established.
- 1923**
First elected members join Legislative Council.
- 1947**
House of Assembly created for each province.
- 1954**
Federation of Nigeria created.
- 1958**
Oil production begins.
- 1959**
December
First direct elections for House of Representatives are contested by the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG).
- 1960**
October
Nigeria becomes independent under NPC-NCNC coalition government.
- 1962**
First National Development Plan adopted.
- 1963**
August
Mid-Western Region formed out of eastern part of Western Region.
- 1964**
February
Government announces controversial results of 1963 census.
- December**
Parliamentary elections held; boycotted in Eastern Region.
- 1965**
March
Government formed including representatives of all regions and all major parties except AG.
- October**
Western Region parliamentary elections held, followed by violence over election irregularities.
- 1966**
January
Army coup led by Ibo; parliament is dissolved and Federal Military Government is established; political parties are abolished.
- July**
In military coup against Ibo leadership, minority tribesmen gain power.
- 1967**
January
Federal military leaders meet in Ghana in an effort to agree on powers of federal and regional military leaders.
- May**
Federal government decrees 12 states will replace former four regions; state of emergency declared.
Eastern Region secedes as Republic of Biafra.
- July**
Federal forces invade Biafra and civil war begins.
- 1968**
July
France announces support for Ibo "right to self-determination."
- 1970**
January
Civil war ends with Biafran surrender.
- October**
General Gowon reveals "nine-point program" and sets 1976 as target date for return to civilian rule.
- November**
Second National Development Plan announced.
- 1971**
July
Nigeria joins Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
- October**
General Gowon appoints reconstituted Federal Executive Council.

AREA BRIEF*

LAND

Size: 357,000 sq. mi.

Use: 24% arable (13% of total land area under cultivation), 35% forested, 41% desert, waste, urban, or other

Land boundaries: 2,507 mi.

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 30 n. mi.

Coastline: 530 mi.

PEOPLE:

Population: About 58,020,000^a average annual growth rate 2.7% (current)

Ethnic divisions: 250 tribal groups, of which most important are Hausa-Fulani (north), Ibo and Yoruba (south); these 3 groups total over 60% of population; about 27,000 non-Africans

Religion: 47% Muslim, 34.5% Christian, 18.5% other

Literacy: Est. 25%

Language: English official; Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo also widely used

Labor force: Approx. 22.5 million, about 41% of total population; only about 700,000 are wage earners, of whom 8% are in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing; 7% in mining and quarrying; 8% manufacturing; 22% construction; 2% electricity; 8% commerce; 8% transportation and communication; 37% services

Organized labor: About 530,000 wage earners belong to some 700 unions

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Federal Republic of Nigeria

Type: Federal republic since 1963; under military rule since January 1966

Capital: Lagos

Political subdivisions: 12 states, 11 headed by a military governor and one by a civilian administrator

Legal system: Based on English common law, tribal law, and Islamic law; new constitution to be prepared

Branches: Federal Military Government, administered by Supreme Military Council and largely civilian Federal Executive Council

*The material in this brief is drawn from the January 1973 issue of the semiannual NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook; it is unclassified/official use only unless otherwise indicated.

Government leader: Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head of Federal Military Government and Commander in Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces

Suffrage: Universal adult suffrage (except for women in former Northern Region)

Elections: Promised for 1976

Political parties and leaders: Political parties and politically active tribal societies were dissolved by decree on 24 May 1966; some sub rosa political activity continues

Communists: The banned Socialist Workers and Farmers Party and the Nigerian Trade Union Congress have a limited political following

Member of: Commonwealth, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, OPEC, IMF, ITU, OAU, Seabeds Committee, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger River Commission, ECA, African Development Bank

ECONOMY:

GDP: \$6.8 billion (FY71-72 est.), about \$100 per capita; 12% est. growth rate FY71-72

Agriculture: Main crops—peanuts, cotton, cocoa, rubber, yams, cassava, sorghum, palm oil and kernels, millet, corn, rice; livestock; almost self-sufficient

Fishing: Catch 156,000 metric tons (1970 est.); imports \$4.1 million (1970)

Major industries: Processing industries—oil palm, peanut, cotton, rubber, petroleum, wood, hides, skins; manufacturing industries—textiles, cement, building materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, printing, ceramics; mining—crude oil, natural gas, coal, tin, columbite

Electric power: 1,113,000 kw. capacity (1971); 1.7 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971); 30 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: \$1,659 million (f.o.b., 1971); oil, peanuts, palm products, cocoa, rubber, cotton, timber, tin

Imports: \$1,507 million (c.i.f., 1971); machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, textiles, chemicals

Major trade partners: U.K., EC, U.S.

Aid: (received) U.S. (economic) 1949-71 \$338 million authorized; Poland, \$28 million extended (1971); Czechoslovakia, \$14 million credit extended (1965); U.K. (1964-68) est. \$99.4 million; other donors include IBRD, West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, U.S.S.R., U.S. (military), \$2 million (1962-71); (extended) \$3 million loan to Dahomey (1972) (S)

Monetary conversion rate: 1 Nigerian pound = US\$3.04 (official)

Fiscal year: 1 April-31 March

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS:**Railroads:** 2,178 route mi.; 3'6" gage**Highways:** 55,400 mi.; 9,500 mi. paved (mostly bituminous surface treatment); 45,900 mi. laterite, gravel, crushed stone, improved earth**Inland waterways:** 5,330 mi. consisting of Niger and Benue rivers and smaller rivers and creeks; additionally, the newly formed Kainji Lake has several hundred miles of navigable lake routes**Pipelines:** Crude oil, 580 mi.; natural gas, 40 mi.; refined products, 3 mi.**Ports:** 2 major, 10 minor**Merchant marine:** 15 cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 83,605 GRT, 122,340 DWT (C)**Civil air:** 13 major transport aircraft**Airfields:** 77 usable; 12 with permanent-surface runways; 4 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 25 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane stations**Telecommunications:** Composed of radio-relay links, open-wire lines, and radiocommunication stations; principal center Lagos, secondary centers Ibadan and Kaduna; 80,000 telephones; 1.3 million to 3 million radio receivers, 75,000 TV receivers; 25 AM, 6 FM, and 8 TV stations; 2 submarine cables**DEFENSE FORCES:****Personnel:** Army 256,400, navy 2,200 (including 14 British advisers, 13 Indian officers), air force 5,500 (plus 28 Soviet, and 5 Egyptian technicians and pilots), police force 32,000; males 15-49, 13,365,000; 6,475,000 fit for military service (C)**Major ground units:** 3 infantry divisions (24 brigades, 149 infantry battalions); 1 reconnaissance battalion; 1 field artillery battalion; 1 field engineer battalion; 1 signal battalion; 1 independent garrison command (S)**Ships:** 1 destroyer escort, 10 patrol, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious warfare, 5 auxiliary, and service craft (C)**Aircraft:** 95 (37 jet, 50 prop, 8 helicopters) (S)**Supply:** Army materiel imported primarily from Algeria, U.K., U.S.S.R., and West Germany; dependent for ships primarily on U.K. and U.S.S.R.; received aircraft from Czechoslovakia, Egypt, and the U.S.S.R. (C)**Military budget:** For fiscal year ending 31 March 1973, \$497,000,000; 18% of total budget (C)**INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:**


Special Branch of Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps, and Research Division of Ministry of External Affairs, intelligence; Nigerian Police Force, security (S)

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
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
Vegetation




Economic Activity




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Population



Tribal Groups




PRINCIPAL TRIBES


- Hausa and Fulani (inter mingled)
- Ibo
- Yoruba

MINOR TRIBES

- Kanuri
- Edo
- Ibibio-Efik
- Nupe
- Tiv
- Ijaw
- Other


Summary Map






Nigeria

- International boundary
- - - State boundary
- ⊙ National capital
- ⊕ State capital
- +— Railroad
- +— Surfaced road
- · · · · Unsurfaced road
- ⊕ Airfield
- ⚓ Major port



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative





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