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Country Profile

Mozambique

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary • Guerrilla forces





MOZAMBIQUE

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Defying the Odds in Africa

Mozambique is a focal point of the struggle to establish majority rule throughout Africa. To the Portuguese, Mozambique is an overseas state, an integral part of their nation. To black Africa, however, the Portuguese presence in Mozambique is a rank evil, one of the last vestiges of European colonialism, and since 1964 several thousand insurgents have been conducting guerrilla warfare against the well-entrenched Portuguese in the name of African independence. (U/OU)

By almost any standard, Mozambique seems a poor prize for either side. It is a backward land, handicapped by African primitivism and Portuguese penury. Located on the southeast coast of Africa, it is—despite recent progress—anything but a tropical paradise, with its slender agricultural economy, a sparse, largely illiterate, and unskilled population, and primitive standards of health and social welfare. About 97% African, it is ruled paternalistically by an almost wholly white elite controlled by Lisbon. For the Portuguese it is an economic drain and yet they prize it as an outpost of Portuguese civilization and consider it a symbol of Portugal's continuing world importance. (U/OU)

The Portuguese have a strong emotional attachment to their overseas territories, Mozambique included. Beginning with their explorations of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the Portuguese have had an uninterrupted presence in Africa for nearly 500 years. Endurance alone, they argue, is sufficient reason for their being there. Yet, they also see themselves—in a Kiplingesque vision—as the anointed bearers of European civilization, chosen to uplift a primitive society through the application of the modes of a rich culture and the infusion of Christianity, particularly Catholicism, the Portuguese state religion. According to their mystique, they are specially qualified for these tasks by reason of a singular capacity to mix racially and thus produce a peaceful society at a time when conflict based on color is rife. In support of their case, they cite the general mood of calm in Mozambique and contrast it with the periodic political upheavals elsewhere in Africa. Moreover, they claim that Mozambique, unlike most of its black-ruled neighbors, is making economic and social progress, encouraged by a series of Portuguese-sponsored reforms. (U/OU)

Critics of Portugal in general and Mozambique in particular maintain that Lisbon's ideals are not put into practice. In Mozambique they see an overwhelming black majority that is ill fed, ill housed, ill educated, and ill treated. They see a white elite mouthing platitudes while profiting immensely from entrenched privilege, and they see the Portuguese Government making changes—largely cosmetic—only when forced to. "Africa for the Africans" and "self-determination" are the slogans they invoke to convey their desire to put an end to Portuguese rule. (U/OU)

The point remains that the Portuguese in Mozambique are a determined lot, convinced of their own cause and unswayed by what they regard as the passing fancies of the present day. In recent years, the United Nations has repeatedly condemned Portugal's "colonialist" policy. The Third World countries have chimed in, as have the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. Even most of Portugal's NATO allies have sided with the Africans against Portugal, or at least abstained from supporting Lisbon. Only white-ruled South Africa and Rhodesia—somewhat suspect because of their "racist" policies—have rallied consistently behind Portuguese rule in Mozambique. (U/OU)

In response the Portuguese have raised up the twin menaces of Communist and Western imperialism. They have warned of a Communist conspiracy to create turmoil and thereby subvert Mozambique, and they have wondered aloud why the West does not consider Mozambique part of the Free World. Conversely, they have accused the United States of seeking to assert economic dominance over their potentially rich African territories, which they say are now about to pay off. Above all, Portuguese spokesmen aver that the "greatness of their nation" depends on the retention of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea, and that therefore Portugal intends to fight to eternity for its cause. (U/OU)

Half A Millennium in the Tropics (u/ou)

When the Portuguese first landed on the southeast coast of Africa around A.D. 1500, they found themselves in an area long dominated by Arabian traders and merchants, who had built fortified settlements and taught the religion and culture of Islam to those Africans with whom they had come in contact. The region had two main attractions: that it could serve as a base for a commercial empire embracing the Indian Ocean and that it was thought to be rich in gold deposits. During the 17th century gold fever seized the Portuguese, but their efforts were largely defeated by an impenetrable land, raging disease, and personal rivalries—not to mention mines hardly worth exploiting. Of greater significance was the fact that Portuguese control was constantly threatened by its failure to establish more than a feeble population base. On into the 18th century, the Portuguese population of the territory seldom numbered over 1,000; these were chiefly the semidesperado estateholders (*prazeros*) to whom the government had given crown grants in the Zambezi valley or the commercially minded inhabitants of the coastal fortress towns, such as Mocambique,* the first capital, from which the entire area ultimately took its name.

Mozambique was initially important to the Portuguese as a base from which to control the rich trade routes between Europe and the spicelands of India and the East Indies. After the Dutch gained control of the spice trade in the 17th century, Lisbon authorities accorded Mozambique less importance and concentrated their energies on the more accessible Angola as a link to the prized possession of Brazil. The Portuguese were able to maintain a tenuous grip on the land only by a divide-and-conquer strategy against the natives, who, scattered and demoralized, became victims of the thriving slave trade of the first half of the 19th century. Moreover, Christian missionaries practiced their profession over the years in somewhat desultory fashion, gaining relatively few converts.

The major European powers, stalemated in their efforts to dominate Africa, met at Berlin in 1885 to carve up the continent. Portugal's claim to Mozambique and Angola was confirmed, but as it turned out its dream of a trans-African empire connecting the two territories was shattered by the intervention of the far stronger and more aggressive British. Concerned over the covetous British and Germans, the Portuguese in the late 19th century decided once and for all to es-

* For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself

tablish their control over Mozambique, accomplishing this partly by force of arms and partly by the establishment of large concessionary companies charged with exploiting the agricultural lands and mineral resources of the interior.

It was not until around 1920, however, that Portuguese administrators at last acquired almost complete mastery over Mozambique, only to find that political-economic chaos in Portugal itself was undermining their position. With the arrival of strong man Antonio Salazar on the scene in 1928, the long-lost dream of a great multiracial Portuguese nation spread across three continents was revived. The dream turned nightmare, however, when indigenous rebellions broke out in Angola and Portuguese Guinea in 1961 and in Mozambique in 1964. Salazar responded with strong military action, coupled with token acknowledgment of the pressures for self-determination. The franchise was offered to the indigenous peoples, and representation in Portugal's legislative councils was increased. Marcello Caetano, who succeeded the dying Salazar in 1968, seemed momentarily to consider the possibility of eventual independence for the African provinces. However, under strong pressure from rightists in his entourage, he compromised with a promise of semiautonomy for what were now to be designated overseas states of the Portuguese nation.

The centuries-long struggle of the Portuguese for Mozambique probably accounts more for their attachment to the land than the nature of Mozambique itself. Mozambique consists mainly of flat to rolling plains which rise gradually inland from the coast and culminate in rugged ranges of hills and scattered mountains in the north and west, the highest of which Monte Binga (7,992 ft.). Much of the country is forested, although there are large savanna areas, mainly in the south and northeast. Several large streams flow cross country to the coast—most notably the Zambezi, the historic avenue of entry to the African interior, taken by David Livingstone, among others. Largely tropical, Mozambique has two principal seasons: a warm, dry winter from June through September and a hot, wet summer from December through March, when temperatures over 120 degrees can turn a river valley into a steaming green hell.

A Y-shaped land of some 300,000 square miles, Mozambique is bordered on the north by Tanzania, on the north and west by Malawi and Zambia, on the west by Rhodesia, and on the west and south by South Africa and Swaziland. Adjacent to the busy shipping lanes of the Mozambique Channel, it has strategic importance as a surveillance station for the western Indian Ocean. Eight and one-half times the size of Portugal itself, Mozambique—if superimposed on the eastern United States—would stretch from the Canadian border to northern Florida and from western Indiana to the Atlantic Ocean. Mozambique's population as of June 1973 was estimated at 8,698,000 (about the same as Portugal's), or a sparse 28 persons per square mile. Population figures are suspect, however, given the migratory habits of the African tribes, the vagaries of the census takers, and the secretiveness of Portuguese officials.

Both primitive and modern, Mozambique is a study in contrasts. Along the coast there are great port cities, principally Lourenco Marques and Beira. The former—the capital, major metropolis, and principal industrial-transport center—has a sophisticated, almost continental atmosphere, with sleek office buildings, shady avenues, sidewalk cafes, first-class hotels, and Riviera-like beaches attractive to vacationing Rhodesians and South Africans. The cities, largely bastions of the white population, are now being ringed by slums inhabited by a flood of Africans in search of jobs. In quest of a better life, they have abandoned the misery and boredom of the small towns, native villages, plantations, and mining communities that make up the back country. They have also left behind the tsetse fly, wild animals, poisonous plants, and other hazards of the bush.

Until recently Mozambique's development as a unified nation was hampered by a transportation network that, because of geograpic and economic necessity, ran mainly east-west. In part to foster the economy and also as an aid in combating the native insurgency, the government has sought to upgrade and expand the rail, road, and air systems. Travel is still a hazardous proposition over single-track rail lines and one-lane dirt roads that not only are subject to washouts but may also contain landmines planted by guerrillas. Destinations frequently are more safely and expeditiously reached via small commercial aircraft, which fly from one remote grassy strip to another.

Blacks, Whites, and Others (u/ou)

Friends and foes of Mozambique tend to agree that its greatest virtue is an absence of strong conscious racial antagonisms. The Portuguese are colorblind by comparison with most other Europeans. In fact, by law racial discrimination is both illegal and immoral, and as a practical matter segregation does not exist in Mozambique. However, after 500 years, multiracism, the cornerstone of Portuguese social policy, still remains more myth than reality. The absence of overt discrimination in no way indicates that the African is considered the equal of the European. While the Portuguese seem to have a genuine fondness for blacks, they also tend to treat them paternalistically as primitive people. As the representatives of an old and rigidly stratified society, the Portuguese in Mozambique base social status on family background, wealth, and education—criteria that in the end generally separate blacks from whites. Thus, the two may mix unaffectedly in public life—in schools, government, business, athletics, and the military—but in private go their separate ways.

Perhaps as justification for the continued rule of Mozambique from Lisbon, the Portuguese like to tell themselves and a somewhat skeptical world that they are building a racially mixed society along the lines of that found in Brazil. In fact, while miscegenation is officially approved, it is little practiced in Mozambique, and most mixing of the races has taken place extramaritally. Most of the approximately 40,000 mulattoes in Mozambique today are descended from white men and black women. By and large, the mulatto bears no stigma, but only rarely does he attain high standing in the community.

By comparison with the mulattoes and especially the whites, the blacks are just beginning to gain status in Mozambique's modern society. All Africans indigenous to Mozambique are considered to be Bantu, a major linguistic grouping also characterized to some degree by physical similarities. Tribal distinctions are difficult to make, however, because of a continuing process of amalgamation and separation among the various groups and the fact that their geographic location frequently transcends modern-day national boundaries. As a general rule, the people of the north tend to be agriculturalists, Muslims, and practitioners of the rules of matrilineal descent, whereas those of the south are more often involved in cattle raising as well as agriculture, are animists, and trace their descent from males. There are in Mozambique no truly dominant tribes to upset the social balance. At the same time, however, ancient rivalries do persist—such as that between the fiercely independent and generally anti-Portuguese Makonde and the more passive Macua, who tend to be pro-Portuguese. On the whole, it is dif-

ficult to assess the attitutes of the blacks, but few appear to have any special sense of being "black African," and even fewer identify themselves as "black Portuguese."

Africans were kept in inferior status for years by their own backward ways and by Portuguese administrative statutes. Under terms of the Native Law (*Estatuto Indigena*) an African could enjoy the full privileges of modern society—that is, could become an *assimilado* with full rights of Portuguese citizenship—only by proving that he spoke Portuguese, did not live in native style, and was economically self-sustaining. With some logic the Portuguese stated that the law was meant to encourage the African to aspire to greater heights, but the fact that only a few thousand ever attained the status of *assimilado* seemed to negate this argument. The law was repealed in 1961, but many of the barriers of black advancement remain. Lack of education, for example, still keeps blacks from most of the better paying jobs. Even when the black can compete successfully, he may be paid half or less of what the white earns. The Portuguese can cite the histories of an increasing number of Africans who have applied themselves, striven upward, and been accepted into the establishment—although usually at its lower and middle echelons.

At present, Mozambique remains predominantly the domain of the white Portuguese. Many, like their explorer forefathers, have gone to Africa on a short-term basis to promote their fortunes. Others were born there, claim descent from the crew of Vasco da Gama, consider themselves more Mozambican than Portuguese, and at times resent "interference" from Lisbon. The "better" whites live in fine homes, are waited on by an array of servants, and have their own clubs. Another side of Portuguese life in Mozambique is represented by the laborers and peasants, who are constantly being enticed by Lisbon to try their luck overseas (and thus reinforce Portugal's presence in Africa). What at least a few discover, however, is that Mozambique by nature and climate is inhospitable to the working-level white European immigrant. These people frequently are failures at home, and therefore do not constitute good pioneer stock. Here they compete with the educated Africans, in the process producing incipient racial ill will. Typically, they complain of food shortages, bad roads, high prices, and insensitive officials. Ultimately some develop feelings of alienation from the homeland—a circumstance that could bode ill for long-range stability in the overseas state. Also resident in Mozambique are pockets of "old school" German and English colonialists, remnants of the days when their nations were powers in the region, plus small numbers of Asians, principally Chinese and Indians, whose commercial prowess frequently irritates white shopkeepers and whose wealth and influence tend to antagonize aspiring blacks.

Rebellion and Reform (s)

A certain number of black Mozambicans, outraged by "European colonialism" and despairing of its end by peaceful means, have been conducting guerrilla warfare against the regime since September 1964. As of 1973, the native insurgency movement had become more active and widespread but was still restricted to the largely underdeveloped northern sector of Mozambique. There, neither side can be said to have control. Rather, areas of influence exist, with the situation otherwise deadlocked.

The insurgency has been led principally by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), operating out of sanctuary in Tanzania (and sometimes Zambia), and to a small extent by the rival and much smaller Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), based in Zambia. FRELIMO is estimated to have 7,000 to 8,000 trained guerrilla fighters, plus the verbal and sometime material support of the Organization of African Unity, the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic, the East

European nations, militant Arab states, and private Western sources. In recent years it also has received "humanitarian" support from specialized agencies of the United Nations and several Scandinavian states, including three of Portugal's NATO allies. Glorified by admirers as an army of hard-bitten young patriots who would single mindedly undergo almost any hardship to liberate their homeland, FRELIMO has been plagued by the rivalries of a number of would-be leaders, including some with Communist ties. Originally directed by the American-educated Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969, FRELIMO is now led by Moises Samora Machel, a skilled military tactician whose bolder, more aggressive moves have kept the Portuguese somewhat off balance.

In brief, the fighting in Mozambique arouses memories of Vietnam, featuring as it does rough jungle terrain, hit-and-run thrusts, no true battlefront, heavy use of propaganda, a grubby existence for all participants, and no promise of an early end. By most accounts, the 50,000 to 60,000 Portuguese troops in Mozambique—a surprisingly large number of them black—have acquitted themselves well under the circumstances. Tough and well conditioned, they have become increasingly skilled in counterinsurgency methods. They have established several hundred fortified villages (*aldeamentos*) in the north and exploited the hatred of other local tribes toward the Makonde, the principal insurgent element. Mozambique has received considerable encouragement, but minimal direct support, from South Africa and Rhodesia. It is unlikely to ask soon for much greater assistance, for in this as in other regional events Mozambique prefers to "go it alone," out of fear of eventual economic domination by its white neighbors, distaste for their racial policies, and resentment of their inclination to look down on the dark-skinned "lazy Latins" of Mozambique.

Within Mozambique, the vast majority of the African population has not been involved in the insurgency and seems largely indifferent to it. In fact, an increasing number of blacks appear to be participating more fully in Portuguese-directed affairs, if only to profit from the social reforms that the insurgency and adverse world comment evidently have forced the Portuguese to undertake. In a larger sense, their participation probably derives more from an acquiescence in Portuguese domination than an opting for Portuguese rule, but in any case the reforms, incomplete as they are, are at last beginning to give the Africans a semblance of the civilized status long promised them.

For centuries, one of the chief anomalies of the Portuguese "mission" in Mozambique was the promise of enlightenment and the reality of illiteracy, still estimated to be between 80% and 90%. Until the 1960's basic education consisted of "adaptation" schools—run principally by Catholic missionaries—which offered African children little more than an indoctrination in Christian principles and a brief introduction to the Portuguese language. In 1964, the "adaptation" schools were abolished by law, and regular primary education became available—at least in theory—to all children without racial distinction. An increasing number of Africans are going on to secondary level training, which offers some hope of economic and social attainment in skill-short Mozambique. Still, much of the indigenous population is handicapped by the simple fact that tribal existence is poor preparation for a Portuguese-style education. And since Lisbon is interested in turning out black Portuguese—not black Africans—progress necessarily will be slow.

Lacking education, Africans over the years have been relegated to the most menial jobs such as plantation hands, roadbuilders, and miners. The slave trade was officially abolished in the Portuguese overseas territories in 1875, but a system under which "all natives of Portuguese overseas provinces" who were unemployed—i.e., virtually all black men who lived on the tribal economy—could legally be forced to work continued until 1962, when the Rural Labor Code was enacted. The Rural Labor Code banned this new form of slavery but did not entirely deter some Portuguese from coercing the African to work. The justification, as the Portuguese state it, is that work is personally ennobling and helps the African build the advanced civilization he needs to insure his greater happiness. Overall, progress has been made in terms of greater job opportunities, higher wages, and improved work standards, but reform has not gone so far as to

allow free trade unions, collective bargaining, or strikes.

Risk, however, may not be a compelling factor for an African, who more often than not exists from day to day and who has an average life expectancy of only about 40. Until recently, health, welfare, and even basic sanitation facilities were far scarcer in Mozambique than schools, and the African by and large relied on ancient tribal remedies in the event of disease—including such major afflictions as malaria, schistosomiasis, infectious hepatitis, enteric infections—and other health problems. Since the mid-1960's sundry clinics have been opened in the towns and villages, while "psychosocial service teams" have been dispatched, Peace Corps fashion, to remote areas where they attempt to combat illness and upgrade African work habits and skill in Portuguese. As a result, the quality of life in Mozambique has improved, though only commensurate with the slim resources of metropolitan Portugal, itself mired in poverty and drained by persistent colonial wars.

Such funds as the Portuguese have available for development in Mozambique are frequently channeled into public works projects and new agricultural settlements. State officials have enthusiastically portrayed these settlements as thriving biracial communities that allow Africans to learn advanced farming techniques and absorb Portuguese values from their white cosettlers. However, the settlement schemes—such as that begun in the Limpopo valley in 1953—have yet to fulfill their promise for several reasons: a paucity of Africans capable of undertaking such a venture, an unwillingness on the part of most Portuguese farmers to emigrate to Mozambique, and a propensity on the part of some responsible officials to implement their somewhat visionary plans either lethargically or hardly at all.

The Rulers and Their Institutions (c)

Mozambique leads a humble political existence as a child of mother Portugal. Most important decisions are made in Lisbon by the government of Marcello Caetano, and those made in Lourenco Marques are subject to Lisbon's approval. This arrangement, according to the Portuguese, is justified because Mozambique, as an overseas state of the sovereign Portuguese nation, is part of a single national community which is juridically one despite geographic separation.

Portugal and its overseas states are administered in accordance with the authoritarian philosophy of the New State (*Estado Novo*), originally propounded by Antonio Salazar. The thrust of this concept is to place the state in the hands of a small number of corporate bodies pledged to the primacy of its interests. The individual is represented in government primarily through his affiliation with a corporate body, possibly a labor syndicate, industrial organization, or church group. In practice, a strong executive is required to lead the "corporate state," which he proceeds to do with the broad advice and consent of an upper stratum



of business, church, and military men. Political activity that fails to reflect the consensus of the establishment is generally regarded as tantamount to treason. Political parties are throttled, the media are censored, and the electorate is held down to a small minority. Elections are held chiefly to confirm government policy.

Supreme authority within Mozambique is wielded by the Governor General, who is appointed by and answerable to the Lisbon cabinet. He serves as the chief local administrator, appoints most lesser state administrators, prepares the state budget, supervises expenditures, looks after the indigenous population, and interprets Portuguese directives to the general populace. He is assisted by a cabinet of state secretaries and backed up by a partially elected but mostly powerless Legislative Assembly and by a Consultative Council, largely representative of Mozambique's elite.

Mozambique sends representatives to Portugal's legislative and advisory chambers and also may communicate with Lisbon through the Portuguese Minister of Overseas. But, in the final view, it is Lourenco Marques' role to propose and Lisbon's to dispose. Promises made by Prime Minister Caetano to allow the overseas states greater autonomy have gone largely unfulfilled. New administrative statutes promulgated in late 1972 made a few cosmetic changes in the mainland-overseas state relationship but failed to alter the all-important veto power held by Lisbon.

For the time being, life in Mozambique goes on as usual. Day-to-day affairs are dealt with circumspectly—some would say indolently—by a highly regimented coterie of public servants, mostly white. Any situation out of the ordinary is likely to be referred back to Lourenco Marques and on to Lisbon. This constant need to get "the word from headquarters" irritates the local residents, who find that their problems remain unattended because of inaction and indecision. Moreover, new directives once issued by central authorities may be sidetracked by a petty bureaucracy suspicious that "progress" is a codeword for revolution.

The citizenry has limited means of redress, for popular opinion in Mozambique, unlike that in a true democracy, has only imperfect means of making itself known. The National Popular Action (ANP) is the only legal political movement in both Portugal and Mozambique. Moreover, the ANP is not so much a political party as a patriotic society dominated by influential whites who support the system. As for the Africans, aside from voting in very limited numbers, they generally refrain from overt political activity, lest they invite the surveillance of the police.

Apart from the insurgency-wracked northern districts, dissidents appear to have little chance in Mozambique. Security forces are large, and they are thorough to the point of being oppressive. In addition to a regular police force backed up by a large militia, there exists a special service of the sort normally found in totalitarian states. Called the Directorate General of Security (DGS) it is charged with rooting out subversion wherever it may be found. Employing the tools of intimidation, the DGS—nominally under the Mozambique authorities but in fact controlled directly from Lisbon—may violate with virtual impunity ordinary civil rights in the name of state security.

The moderating influence of a free press is barely felt in Mozambique. Public information media are for the most part owned or controlled by establishment loyalists and thus display little diversity in viewpoint. Then, too, the swift application of the censor's blue pencil has discouraged all but the mildest criticism of government policy. Some broadcasts are beamed into Mozambique from the neighboring black African countries, but it is not known to what extent they are heard. Other than this, a handful of radio stations, a few newspapers and magazines, and an occasional library, museum, or bookstore constitute the available reservoir for popular enlightenment. Meanwhile, the government propagandizes in its own behalf and bars entry to foreign officials or journalists who may challenge the official line too vocally.

In further support of their case, Portuguese authorities sponsor the word of Catholic Christianity, which they regard as an integral part of the Western ethic they seek to implant in Mozambique. Although the far greater number of Mozambicans, probably upward of 5 million, still adhere to tribal religions after centuries of missionary effort, the Roman Catholic Church remains the dominant spiritual ally of the state in Mozambique. It alone among religious bodies is subsidized, and it alone has the ear of the Governor General on a regular basis. In return for such privileges, the church, despite the protests of occasional priestly reformers, preaches to the natives that they should conform with the dictates of the state. By contrast, the Protestant churches—comprising a much smaller entity—are regarded in official circles as the purveyor of an alien philosophy and at time even as representatives of FRELIMO. From time to time both Mozambican and foreign Protestant ministers have been arrested and/or expelled from the country.

The Economy: Key to the Future (c)

Mozambique is poor even by African standards, although it has potential and is considered by some to be a sleeping giant. At present, however, it is far from being a mature, self-sustaining state. Trade, for example, is a conglomerate of primitive and modern patterns of exchange. Barter trade, though somewhat on the wane, still is strong in rural areas, whereas European and Asian merchants operate up-to-date commercial establishments in town. Overall, the economy struggles on, making some progress—the GNP has grown at about 5% a year over the past decade—despite a lack of industrialization, a low percentage of skilled workers, and a heavily adverse balance of trade. Over the past two decades, Mozambique has striven to build a stronger economy. It has established agricultural settlement areas. It has improved rail and harbor facilities to promote increased transit traffic from upcountry South Africa and landlocked Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland. It has fostered tourism and expended industrial installations, particularly agricultural processing plants.

Just as Mozambique is considered politically a part of the Portuguese nation, so is it economically coupled with the European homeland. Mozambique would not now be viable without this link, but with it have come regulation and exploitation that adversely affect Mozambique's longer range prospects. More than one-third of Mozambique's external trade is with Portugal. More importantly, most of the major enterprises in Mozambique are controlled by organizations in the metropole. Banking has been governed primarily by one institution, the Overseas National Bank, which is based in Lisbon and is highly conservative in its policies and practices. Only recently has local manufacturing that would compete with that of Portugal been encouraged. And only because of the insurgency in the north has a greater African stake in the economy been promoted.

Economic development in Mozambique has been slowed by several factors: the redtape involved in a Portuguese-run economy, the failure of many absentee owners to reinvest in Mozambique, the discouragement until recently of foreign investments (lest they detract from Portuguese control), and the diversion of funds into the counterinsurgency campaign. Above all, external trade remains in dire imbalance. Despite strenuous government efforts, imports have exceeded exports by an ever widening margin—in fact, by a ratio of 2 to 1 in 1971. Lisbon has placed restrictions on Mozambique's imports and on currency exchange transactions, but these moves have served at best only as palliatives.

Port of Lourenço Marques



Mozambique's economy remains heavily dependent on agriculture. Unfortunately, the most fertile land and favorable climate are in the north and west, which are not only the least accessible areas but are those most exposed to insurgent attacks. While about a third of the country is arable, only about 2% is under cultivation. Much of the agricultural output, especially that of Africans, is consumed on the farm, contributing little to the state economy. Cash crops—cotton, sugar, cashew nuts (consumed largely by Americans), copra, sisal, tea, and rice—are, with the notable exception of cotton, grown on European-owned plantations and provide the bulk of Mozambique's exports.

The Portuguese, inveterate fishermen in their homeland waters, have done little to exploit the coastal regions of Mozambique. In addition, little has been done to reap profits from Mozambique's extensive forests, although some use has been made of the hardwoods, so richly prized by American furniture makers. Various mineral resources are available, but only coal is mined to any extent. Inadequate transportation facilities, low ore concentrations, and insurgent activity have discouraged exploitation of underground wealth such as iron, copper, fluorite, manganese, titanium, and pegmatite.

Only in the 1960's did Portugal finally allow Mozambique to compete with it in the industrial sector—chiefly in the interest of establishing an economic base that would help counter the FRELIMO insurgency. Industry, however, continues to be on a small scale, principally producing goods for local consumption. Most finished goods are still imported—from Portugal or another of its overseas states, from South Africa, and from Rhodesia. Supplies of consumer items are frequently limited, and with the considerable growth in demand in Mozambique in recent years, runaway inflation has been a constant threat.

Portugal has staked much of its fate in Mozambique on the success of a giant dam project at Cabora Bassa gorge on the Zambezi River. Lisbon hopes that this effort—estimated to cost several hundred million dollars and will be mightier than Aswan when completed—will spur the economic development of Mozambique and, eventually perhaps, even transform it into a prosperous agricultural-industrial state that will serve as a bastion against black African incursions from the north, thus strengthening Portugal's ability to remain in southeast Africa. With progress on or ahead of schedule, Mozambique plans to start transmitting power in March 1975 over lines that extend principally to South Africa. Only FRELIMO can thwart this effort, and it is already trying.

The Path Ahead: Portugal or Africa (c)

From the viewpoint of Portugal, Mozambique's future lies in its ability to stifle the FRELIMO movement and its capacity to absorb such political and economic changes as are promulgated by Lisbon. Although many observers believe Lisbon has only limited time to demonstrate its capacity to hold onto Mozambique and bring it into the modern era, the Portuguese seem to feel no great sense of being overtaken by circumstances. Having been in Africa for the better part of five centuries, they tend to discount such oft-stated imperatives as "urgently needed reform" and "African self-determination." They proceed in their usual deliberate way, offering promises and making improvements, but ever so slowly. At the same time, among the European faction in Mozambique there is some lingering doubt that Prime Minister Caetano is prepared to maintain complete Portuguese domination of Mozambique at all costs—particularly if this overseas state becomes an increasing drain on Portugal's limited reserves and sparks sizable protests from an as yet latent opposition to "the interminable wars in Africa."

From the viewpoint of Mozambique insurgents, the issue is whether they can exploit Portuguese

procrastination and ultimately outlast the Portuguese in the military phase of the struggle. After trying for a dozen years, the insurgents may have cause to wonder, and yet they keep on trying. The one thing Portuguese officials say they will never do is negotiate the independence of Mozambique with the rebels. Yet, it is conceivable that to close out a long debilitating war, Lisbon would be willing to accept a Mozambique based on at least partial black rule within a framework of a Portuguese commonwealth of states.

Whether such an outcome would be acceptable to FRELIMO is highly doubtful. Eduardo Mondlane, the would-be father of his country, declared that Mozambique should be a black-ruled, single-party state built on socialist principles and divorced from all foreign influence. His successors can hardly settle for less. Yet, the promise of independence was nowhere close to realization as of 1973. Only a major intervention by the United Nations supported by major world powers—a most unlikely event—could swiftly bring it about. Still, like most revolutionaries who have faith in their ability to move mountains, FRELIMO forces continue to forecast victory in their battle of attrition.

Should the Portuguese falter and verge on being overcome, it is possible that Rhodesia and South Africa would intervene strongly, each with the intent of protecting its economic interests—especially transit routes for goods—and bolstering its political integrity. After building a buffer state in the strategically important south, they could afford to allow the north to go its own way as a black nation.

Some sort of independence movement on the Rhodesian plan is also an outside possibility. It likely would be fueled by white rightists, disenchanted with Lisbon and backed by local military forces. Such a breakaway by Mozambique, however, depends largely on the chance that Lisbon, increasingly torn between living with Europe or Africa, would—chiefly out of economic necessity—choose Europe and allow white Mozambican rebels to go their own way.

For the time being, it is most likely that the *status quo* will be maintained in Mozambique, but with a slow evolution toward greater autonomy. Even now the groundwork is being prepared. Increased economic and social benefits are being provided the Africans to cement their allegiance to the state. Also, the Portuguese are finally demonstrating their faith that considerably greater numbers of Africans can be assimilated into their culture without tipping the current balance of affairs in Mozambique. Moreover, the Portuguese believe that Mozambique, with its considerable stretches of virgin land, rivers suitable for irrigation and power production, sizable reserve of minerals, and growing capacity to serve as the commercial hub for southeastern Africa, can yet be made into a paying proposition—if they persevere. Portugal, on the basis of its record, appears to be determined not to be counted out of Africa. Rather, it seems that the Portuguese—if such ventures as Cabora Bassa are any indication—are planning on a long future there. To most outside observers, however, Lisbon is building on an impossible dream—one in which Mozambique will some day realize the Portuguese ideal of a cultured, brotherly, multiracial society that will bridge the gulf between the black and white communities.

Chronology (u/ou)

1498

Vasco da Gama lands at Mozambique Island in first Portuguese contact with Mozambique.

1885–86

Treaty of Berlin fixes boundaries of Mozambique and other Portuguese territories in Africa putting an end to period of Portuguese expansionism in Africa.

1926

May

Military coup overthrows parliamentary government in Portugal.

1930

Colonial Act of 1930 defines Mozambique's political status.

1932

July

Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar becomes Prime Minister and dictator of Portugal.

1933

July

Portuguese constitution embodying theory of "corporate state" comes into force.

1951

June

Portuguese constitutional revision incorporates Colonial Act of 1935, which is a modification of the 1930 act, and restores to overseas possessions their former status of Overseas Provinces.

1955

July

Statutes issued by Minister of Overseas Provinces provide for limited amount of administrative decentralization for Overseas Provinces.

1961

September

Moreira reforms abolish legal distinction between "assimilated" and "nonassimilated" Africans.

1962

April

New rural labor code abolishes the system of enforced contract labor in Mozambique.

June

Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) formed by several African exile groups.

1964

January

New 1963 Organic Law for Portuguese Overseas Provinces goes into effect, repealing the Native Statute and making all Mozambicans Portuguese citizens.

September

FRELIMO begins military phase of operations in northeastern Mozambique.

1965

June

COREMO formed by a breakaway group from FRELIMO.

1968

May–June

FRELIMO begins operations in northwestern Mozambique.

September

Marcello Caetano succeeds Salazar as Portuguese Prime Minister following the latter's stroke.

1969

November

Government reorganizes PIDE, renaming it the Directorate General of Security (DGS).

1970

July

Former Prime Minister Salazar dies.

1971

July

Constitutional changes provide possibility of increased local autonomy for overseas territories.

1972

April

New revised Organic Law for the Overseas continues Lisbon's control.

December

New political-administrative statute gives Mozambique honorary status of a state within the unitary Portuguese nation.

1973

March

Majority of nonwhites elected for first time to Legislative Assembly.

Area Brief*

LAND

Size: 303,769 sq. mi.

Land boundaries: 2,875 mi.

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 6 n. mi. (fishing, 12 n. mi.)

Coastline: 1,535 mi.

PEOPLE

Population: 8,698,000 estimated June 1973; density 28.8 persons per square mile; 10% urban, 90% rural

Ethnic groups: African Bantu, 96.8%; white, 2.4%; mulatto, 0.5%; Indian, 0.3%; and Chinese, 0.4%

Religion: African tribal religion, 65.6%; Roman Catholic, 17.7%; Muslim, 10.5%; Protestant, 3.8%; other, 2.4%

Language: Portuguese is official language; however, an estimated 95% of Africans speak some 20 Bantu languages with nearly 100 dialects. Swahili also used as a trade language on the north coast area

Literacy: Estimated at between 7% and 10% for the population as a whole, but one estimate goes as high as 20%; higher than 50% among the ethnic minority groups, collectively

Health, nutrition, and sanitation levels: Low

Labor force: Only 10% to 15% of the population are wage earners; unemployment and shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers are serious problems; most native Africans provide unskilled labor or remain in subsistence agricultural sector

Organized labor: Approx. 47,000 at end of 1970; 75% are white

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: State of Mozambique

Type: Overseas state of Portugal

Capital: Lourenco Marques

Political subdivisions: 10 districts administered by district governors; municipalities governed by appointed official

Legal system: Based on Portuguese civil law system and customary law

Branches: Governor General appointed by Lisbon is chief executive officer for internal administration; he also has certain legislative powers which he exercises with a legislative assembly; all action in state may be vetoed by Minister of Overseas in Lisbon; judiciary is constitutionally independent

Government leader: Governor General Manuel Pimentel dos Santos

Suffrage: All adults able to read and write Portuguese and in full possession of political and civil rights

Political parties and leaders: National Popular Action (ANP), formerly the National Union (UN); no legal opposition political parties

Communists: None known

Other political or pressure groups: The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), led by Moises Samora Machel, operates from Tanzania and Zambia; less significant Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), led by Paulo Gumane, based in Zambia

ECONOMY

GNP: $2.1 billion (1972), about $240 per capita

Agriculture: Cashew nuts, cotton, copra, sisal, sugar, and tea

Mining: Coal and iron ore

Main industries: Food processing (sugar, cashew shelling, tea), petroleum refining, construction materials, textiles

Exports: $169 million (1971), mainly cashews, cotton, sugar, tea, copra, refined petroleum, timber

Imports: $354 million (1971), mainly textiles, metals and metal products, transportation equipment, machinery, electrical equipment, wheat

Main invisible earnings (net): Transportation $87 million (1971); tourism $4 million (1971)

Trade: Mainly with Portugal; United States and South Africa also important trading partners

Electric power: Installed capacity 232,000 kw. (1971); production 550 million kw.-hrs., 68 kw.-hr. per capita (1971)

Exchange rate: US$1 = 27.25 escudos

Fiscal year: Same as calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 1,965 route miles; 1,877 miles 3'6"-gage and 88 miles 2'5½"-gage, all single track

Highways: 20,000 miles; 1,740 miles paved, 18,260 miles other (mostly earth)

Inland waterways: 2,330 miles of navigable routes

Ports: 3 major (Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nacala) and 13 minor ports

Civil air: 12 major transports

Airfields: 303 usable; 18 with permanent-surfaced runways; 4 with runways 8,000–11,999 feet, 29 with runways 4,000–7,999 feet; 41 sites; 5 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Better than the average African system of open-wire lines, radiocommunication stations, and radio-relay and tropospheric-scatter links; principal center Lourenco Marques, secondary centers Beira, Nampula, and Quelimane; 28,000 telephones; 125,000 radio receivers; 10 AM, 2 FM, and no TV stations

DEFENSE FORCES

Personnel: Army, 43,000; navy, 3,500 (including 800 naval riflemen, or "marines"); air force, 3,500 (including 900 paratroopers); Public Security Police, estimated 21,400 (includes 600 from metropolitan Portugal and 15,300 in the intervention militia); Fiscal Guard, 700; protection militia, estimated 15,000; Special Groups and Special Parachutist Groups, 4,000; Port and Railroad Police, 500 (S)

Major ground units: 39 battalions or battalion equivalents (S)

Ships: 2 coastal escorts, 6 patrol boats, 1 miscellaneous auxiliary, 1 surveying ship, 1 utility landing craft, 4 mechanized landing craft, 3 vehicle, personnel landing craft (S)

Aircraft: 105 (11 jets) (S)

Supply: Dependent upon Portugal for materiel (S)

Rebel Forces: FRELIMO, 7,000-8,000 (S)

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Mozambique is an overseas state under Portuguese control and its security services are an extension of those of Portugal (S)

*Unless otherwise indicated, data are unclassified/official use only.

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)

	COORDINATES			
	°	'S.	°	'E.
Alto Ligonha	15	31	38	16
Angoche, Ilha (*isl*)	16	20	39	51
Arusha, Tanzania	3	22	36	41
Augusto Cardoso	12	43	34	49
Bagamoyo, Tanzania	6	26	38	54
Bandula	19	01	33	09
Beira	18	04	33	13
Binga, Monte (*mt*)	11	52	35	02
Blantyre, Malawi	15	48	35	02
Boane	25	02	32	19
Bons Sinais, Rio dos	18	03	36	56
Border Siding, Malawi (*rr siding*)	17	09	35	12
Búzi, Rio (*strm*)	19	52	34	46
Cahora Bassa (*gorge*)	15	34	32	50
Caia (*rr sta*)	17	50	35	20
Cambine (*mission*)	23	36	35	15
Capoche (*strm*)	15	23	32	53
Catembe	26	00	32	33
Catur	13	45	35	37
Changara	16	50	33	16
Chicoa	15	36	32	21
Chicomo	24	59	33	06
Chinde, Rio (*strm*)	18	33	36	28
Chirua, Lago (*lake*)	15	12	35	50
Chiuta, Lago (*lake*)	14	55	35	50
Chiveve, Rio (*strm*)	19	50	34	50
Cochemane	16	57	32	51
Dona Ana	17	25	35	04
Espírito Santo, Estuário do (*estuary*)	25	59	32	37
Feruka, Southern Rhodesia (*rr siding*)	18	58	32	33
Fingoe	15	10	31	53
Furancungo	14	54	33	37
Gaza	18	34	34	40
Goba	26	12	32	08
Gôndola	19	05	33	39
Gorongosa, Parque Nacional da (*park*)	18	45	34	20
Inchope	19	12	33	56
Incomati, Rio (*strm*)	25	46	32	43
Inhambane	23	52	35	23
Inhamitanga	18	13	35	11
Inharrime	24	28	35	01
João Belo	25	04	33	39
Kaapmuiden, South Africa	25	32	31	19
Kongwa, Tanzania	6	12	36	25
Lebombo Mountains (*hills*)	26	15	32	00
Licuare, Rio (*strm*)	17	54	36	49
Limpopo River (*strm*)	25	12	33	32
Lindi, Tanzania	10	00	39	43
Lourenço Marques	25	58	32	34
Lugenda, Rio (*strm*)	11	26	38	33
Lumbo	15	00	40	44
Lúrio, Rio (*strm*)	13	31	40	32
Machipanda (*rr sta*)	19	00	32	41
Macomia	12	15	40	08
Macondes, Planalto dos (*plateau*)	11	30	39	00
Macossa	17	54	33	56
Macuse, Rio (*strm*)	17	45	37	13
Malvernia	22	05	31	40
Manga	19	47	34	53
Manjacaze	24	43	33	50
Maotas	25	53	32	37
Mapai	22	51	31	58
Maputu, Rio (*strm*)	26	11	32	42
Marromeu	18	17	35	56
Matola, Rio (*strm*)	25	59	32	27
Matola-Rio	25	49	32	27
Mau-épole	24	21	34	06
Mbeya, Tanzania	8	54	33	27
Milange	16	05	35	47
Moamba	25	36	32	15
Moçambique	15	32	39	51
Moçambique, Ilha de	15	03	40	45
Mocímboa da Praia, Baía (*bay*)	11	20	40	25
Mohoro, Rio (*strm*)	17	03	38	53

	COORDINATES			
	°	'S.	°	'E.
Mozambique Channel (*strait*)	20	00	43	00
Mtwara, Tanzania	10	16	40	11
Mucanha, Rio (*strm*)	15	39	31	35
Mucêlo, Rio (*strm*)	17	38	37	02
Muda	19	23	34	25
Mueda	11	39	39	33
Mzinga, Tanzania	6	53	37	37
Nacala	14	33	40	40
Nacala, Porto de (*bay*)	14	31	40	39
Nacala-Velha	14	33	40	36
Nachingwea, Tanzania	10	23	38	46
Namaacha	25	58	32	01
Namapa	13	43	39	50
Naniala	14	55	39	59
Nampula	15	07	39	15
Namuiranga	10	32	40	23
Nayuci, Malawi	14	58	35	52
Nova Freixo	14	49	36	33
Nova Sofala	20	10	34	44
Nyassa, Lake (*lake*)	12	00	34	30
Odzi, Southern Rhodesia	18	58	32	23
Odzi, Southern Rhodesia (*strm*)	19	47	32	24
Ponta Dobela (*point*)	26	31	32	54
Porto Amélia	12	57	40	30
Púngoè, Rio (*strm*)	19	50	34	48
Quelimane	17	51	36	52
Ressano Garcia	25	27	32	00
Revuè	19	25	33	22
Ficatla, Lagoa (*lake*)	25	46	32	37
Rovuma, Rio (*strm*)	10	29	40	28
Salamanga	26	29	32	39
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	17	50	31	03
Save, Rio (*strm*)	21	00	35	02
Sena	17	28	35	02
Shire Bridge Siding, Malawi (*rr sta*)	15	18	35	04
Songea, Tanzania	10	41	35	39
Sunate	13	06	39	59
Tembe, Rio (*strm*)	26	00	32	29
Tete	16	10	33	36
Umbelúzi, Rio (*strm*)	26	01	32	28
Umpala	26	03	32	19
Umtali, Southern Rhodesia	18	58	32	40
Vila Cabral	13	18	35	14
Vila Caldas Xavier	14	24	33	01
Vila de António Enes	16	12	39	54
Vila de Mocímboa da Praia	11	20	40	21
Vila de Mocuba	16	51	36	56
Vila de Sena	17	26	35	02
Vila do Chinde	18	34	36	27
Vila do Dondo	19	36	34	44
Vila Fontes	17	49	35	23
Vila Franca do Save	21	09	34	33
Vila Gouveia	18	03	33	11
Vila Luísa	25	44	32	41
Vila Moatize	16	10	33	46
Vila Paiva de Andrada	18	41	34	04
Vila Pery	19	08	33	29
Xinavane	25	02	32	47
Zambezi River (*strm*)	18	50	36	17
Zóbuè	15	36	34	26

Selected Airfields

Beira	19	48	34	54
Lourenco Marques	25	55	32	34
Lumbo	15	02	40	40
Marrupa	13	14	37	33
Mocimbao da Praia	11	21	40	21
Mueda	11	40	39	34
Mutarara	17	22	35	02
Nacala	14	29	40	43
Nampula	15	08	39	17
Nova Freixo	14	49	36	32

Alto Ligonha	15 31	38 16
Angoche, Ilha (*isl*)	16 20	39 51
Arusha, Tanzania	3 22	36 41
Augusto Cardoso	12 43	34 49
Bagamoyo, Tanzania	6 26	38 54
Bandula	19 01	33 09
Beira	18 04	35 13
Binga, Monte (*mt*)	11 52	35 02
Blantyre, Malawi	15 48	35 02
Boane	26 02	32 19
Bons Sinais, Rio dos	18 03	36 56
Border Siding, Malawi (*rr siding*)	17 09	35 12
Búzi, Rio (*strm*)	19 52	34 46
Cabora Bassa (*gorge*)	15 34	32 50
Cais (*rr sta*)	17 50	35 20
Cambine (*mission*)	23 36	35 15
Capoche (*strm*)	15 23	32 53
Catembe	26 00	32 33
Catur	13 45	35 37
Changara	16 50	33 16
Chicoa	15 30	32 21
Chicomo	24 59	33 06
Chinde, Rio (*strm*)	18 33	36 28
Chirua, Lago (*lake*)	15 12	35 50
Chiuta, Lago (*lake*)	14 55	35 50
Chiveve, Rio (*strm*)	19 50	34 50
Cochemane	16 57	32 51
Dona Ana	17 25	35 04
Espírito Santo, Estuário do (*estuary*)	25 59	32 37
Feruka, Southern Rhodesia (*rr siding*)	18 58	32 33
Fingoe	15 10	31 53
Furancungo	14 54	33 37
Gaza	18 34	34 40
Goba	26 12	32 08
Gôndola	19 05	33 39
Gorongosa, Parque Nacional da (*park*)	18 45	34 20
Inchope	19 12	33 56
Incomati, Rio (*strm*)	25 46	32 43
Inhambane	23 52	35 23
Inhamitanga	18 13	35 11
Inharrime	24 28	35 01
João Belo	25 04	33 39
Kaapmuiden, South Africa	25 32	31 19
Kungwa, Tanzania	6 12	36 25
Lebombo Mountains (*hills*)	26 15	32 00
Licuare, Rio (*strm*)	17 54	36 49
Limpopo River (*strm*)	25 12	33 32
Lindi, Tanzania	10 00	39 43
Lourenço Marques	25 58	32 34
Lugenda, Rio (*strm*)	11 20	38 33
Lumbo	15 00	40 44
Lúrio, Rio (*strm*)	13 31	40 32
Machipanda (*rr sta*)	19 00	32 41
Macomia	12 15	40 08
Macondes, Planalto dos (*plateau*)	11 30	39 00
Macossa	17 54	33 56
Mucuse, Rio (*strm*)	17 45	37 13
Malvernia	22 05	31 40
Manga	19 47	34 53
Manjacaze	24 43	33 59
Maotas	25 53	32 37
Mapai	22 51	31 58
Maputu, Rio (*strm*)	26 11	32 42
Marromeu	18 17	35 56
Matola, Rio (*strm*)	25 59	32 27
Matola-Rio	25 49	32 27
Mau-é-ele	24 21	34 06
Mbeya, Tanzania	8 54	33 27
Milange	16 05	35 47
Moamba	25 36	32 15
Moçambique	15 32	39 51
Moçambique, Ilha de	15 03	40 45
Mocímboa da Praia, Baía (*bay*)	11 20	40 25
Molócuè, Rio (*strm*)	17 03	38 52
Monapo	14 55	40 18
Montepuez	13 07	39 00
Mopeia Velha	17 59	35 43
Morogoro, Tanzania	6 49	37 40
Moshi, Tanzania	3 21	37 20
Mozambique Channel (*strait*)	20 00	43 00
Mtwara, Tanzania	10 16	40 11
Mucanha, Rio (*strm*)	15 39	31 35
Mucôlo, Rio (*strm*)	17 38	37 02
Muda	19 23	34 25
Mueda	11 39	39 33
Mzinga, Tanzania	6 53	37 37
Nacala	14 33	40 40
Nacala, Porto de (*bay*)	14 31	40 39
Nacala-Velha	14 33	40 36
Nachingwea, Tanzana	10 23	38 46
Namaacha	25 58	32 01
Namapa	13 43	39 50
Namialo	14 55	39 59
Nampula	15 07	39 15
Namuiranga	10 32	40 23
Nayuci, Malawi	14 58	35 52
Nova Freixo	14 49	36 33
Nova Sofala	20 10	34 44
Nyassa, Lake (*lake*)	12 00	34 30
Odzi, Southern Rhodesia	18 58	32 23
Odzi, Southern Rhodesia (*strm*)	19 47	32 24
Ponta Dobela (*point*)	26 31	32 54
Porto Amélia	12 57	40 30
Púngoè, Rio (*strm*)	19 50	34 48
Quelimane	17 51	36 52
Ressano Garcia	25 27	32 00
Revuè	19 25	33 22
Ricatla, Lagoa (*lake*)	25 46	32 37
Rovuma, Rio (*strm*)	10 29	40 28
Salamanga	26 29	32 39
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	17 50	31 03
Save, Rio (*strm*)	21 00	35 02
Sena	17 28	35 02
Shire Bridge Siding, Malawi (*rr sta*)	15 18	35 04
Songea, Tanzania	10 41	35 39
Sunate	13 06	39 59
Tembe, Rio (*strm*)	26 00	32 29
Tete	16 10	33 36
Umbelúzi, Rio (*strm*)	26 01	32 28
Umpala	26 03	32 19
Umtali, Southern Rhodesia	18 58	32 40
Vila Cabral	13 18	35 14
Vila Caldas Xavier	14 24	33 01
Vila de António Enes	16 12	39 54
Vila de Mocímboa da Praia	11 20	40 21
Vila de Mocuba	16 51	36 56
Vila de Sena	17 26	35 02
Vila do Chinde	18 34	36 27
Vila do Dondo	19 36	34 44
Vila Fontes	17 42	35 23
Vila Franca do Save	21 09	34 33
Vila Gouveia	18 03	33 11
Vila Luísa	25 44	32 41
Vila Moatize	16 10	33 46
Vila Paiva de Andrada	18 41	31 04
Vila Pery	19 05	33 29
Xinavane	25 02	32 47
Zambezi River (*strm*)	18 50	36 17
Zóbuè	15 36	34 26

Selected Airfields

Beira	19 48	34 54
Lourenco Marques	25 55	32 34
Lumbo	15 02	40 40
Marrupa	13 14	37 33
Mocimbao da Praia	11 21	40 21
Mueda	11 40	39 34
Mutarara	17 22	35 02
Nacala	14 29	40 43
Nampula	15 06	39 17
Nova Freixo	14 49	36 32
Porto Amelia	12 59	40 31
Quelimane No. 2	17 51	36 52
Vila Cabral	13 17	35 15
Vila Coutinho	14 43	34 22
Tete/Moatize	16 06	33 38


Tanzania
Songea
Mbamba Bay
Lake Nyasa
Chama
Nkhata Bay
Mpika
Chisamulo I. (Mal.)
Likoma I. (Mal.)
Cobue
Mecula
Lundazi
Zambia
Malawi
Augusto Cardoso
LIVINGSTONE-NYASSA
Niassa
Kasungu
Nkhota Kota
Vila Cabral
Marrupa
Seronin
HIGHLAND
Chipata
Salima
Lilongwe
Dedza
Mandimba
Mangoche
Lake Malombe
Furancungo
ANGONIA HIGHLANDS
TETE HIGHLANDS
Tete
Nova Freixo
Lake Shirwa
Zomba
Shire Bridge Siding
Vila do Zumbo
Cabora Bassa
Songo
Zobue
Blantyre
Thyolo
Mulanje
Milange
SHIRE HIGHLANDS
Rio Mecumbura
Vila Mouzinho
Tete
Benga
Rio Luenha
Zambezi
Changara
Zambezia
Vila de Mocuba
Chemba
Vila de Sena
Zawi
Shamva
Namacurra
Salisbury
Vila Gouveia
Vila Fontes
Mopeia Velha
Quelimane
Marromeu
Southern Rhodesia (U.K.)
Vila do Chinde
Beira
Vila de Manica
Umtali
Machipanda
Vila Pery
Vila Machado
Umvuma
Vila do Dondo
Rio Revue






Southern
Rhodesia
(U.K.)
Salisbury
Shamva
Umvuma
Fort Victoria
Shabani
Nandi
Mbizi
Beitbridge
Beira
Vila do Sena
Vila Fontes
Lacerdonia
Inhaminga
Marromeu
Quelimane
Namacurra
Vila do Chinde
Vila Paiva de Andrada
Gouveia
Vila de Manica
Machipanda
Umtali
Vila Pery
Inchope
Vila Machado
Vila do Dondo
Manga
Beira
Dombe
Vila
Pery
Espungabera
Chibabava
Nova Sofala
Nova Mambone
Vila Franca do Save
Jofane
Massangena
Inhassoro
Ilha do Bazaruto
Vilanculos
Ponta São Sebastião
Malvernia
Pafuri
Mapai
Inhambane
Gaza
Massinga
Ponta da Barra
Maxixe
Inhambane
Pandaje
Louis Trichardt
Republic of
South Africa
Tzaneen
Phalaborwa
Steelpoort
Graskop
Lydenburg
Vila Alferes Chamusca
Vila de Chibuto
Chicomo
Inharrime
Quissico
Chidenguele
Vila de Macia
João Belo
Xinavane
Magude
Vila da Manhiça
Komatipoort
Ressano Garcia
Moamba
Nelspruit
Kaapmuiden
Belfast
Barberton
Vila Luisa
Baía de Lourenço Marques
Lourenço Marques
Lourenço Marques
Namaacha
Boane
Goba
Bela Vista
Salamanga
Catuane
Mbabane
Manzini
Swaziland
Ermelo
Piet Retief
Rep. of S. Africa
Indian Ocean
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative
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



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