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Government  
and Politics

# Yemen (Aden)

July 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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# YEMEN (ADEN)

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# Government and Politics

## A. Introduction (S)

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.)<sup>1</sup> is ruled by a single-party government of Marxist orientation. That government, the National Front (NF), has been in power since the P.D.R.Y. won independence in November 1967 after a bitter terrorist campaign against the British, who had governed the city of Aden for over a century and the remainder of what is now P.D.R.Y. territory since the 1930's.

Aden was first captured by the British in 1839, and until 1937 it was ruled as a part of British India. Thereafter it became a Crown Colony administered directly by the Colonial Office. To protect this foothold in Aden, the British found it necessary to establish their authority in the hinterland and gradually concluded treaties of protection with the local rulers. These treaties gave the United Kingdom full responsibility for the conduct of the local states' foreign relations and defense in return for protection against other powers. Between the 1930's and the early 1950's, British influence with the local rulers increased with the signing of supplementary treaties by which the rulers agreed to accept British advice in matters of internal administration; those rulers who did not accept the advice were deposed. In a treaty of February 1959 with six states of the Protectorate of South Arabia, the British pledged that Aden Colony and the Protectorate would be made ready for full independence. Under this same treaty, the six states joined to form the Federation of South Arabia, which was formally inaugurated in January 1963. In the end, 16 states and Aden Colony joined the federation.

<sup>1</sup>Until 1970 the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.) was known as the People's Democratic Republic of Southern Yemen. In this General Survey chapter the country will be referred to as Yemen (Aden); the government, the P.D.R.Y.; and the capital city, Aden.

British efforts to prepare the federation for independence by the target date of 1968 were confounded by the enormous differences in levels of development between the people in the modern port of Aden and those in the traditionally oriented sheikhdoms and sultanates of the Protectorate. An additional complicating factor was the rising tide of Arab nationalism, whose advocates came into open conflict with both the British rulers and the traditional chieftains. In the face of rising violence in the city of Aden, the British began withdrawing their troops in the fall of 1967. Federal rule collapsed, and the British, having announced their intention of dealing with any indigenous group capable of forming a new government, subsequently negotiated a transfer of power to the National Liberation Front (NLF), a political party which had succeeded in establishing its authority at the expense of the other nationalist groups.

The NLF, which later changed its name to the National Front (NF), formally took over the government on 30 November 1967. It inherited a country in economic and political chaos, and it has done little to improve the situation in its 5 years in office. Aden's once-thriving economy was damaged severely by the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967, and the forced departure of the British later in the same year compounded the fledgling nation's economic problems. The country has never recovered. Large numbers of businessmen and the wealthy fled the country after the NF takeover for political as well as economic reasons, and the economy has stagnated and reverted to dependence on subsistence farming despite government pledges to industrialize.

The NF has had somewhat more success in easing the political chaos of the preindependence and immediate postindependence periods—at least as far as quieting domestic discontent and active internal

dissidence is concerned. Most dissidents have left the country. Some have formed armed groups which, with Saudi Arabian backing, conduct forays into P.D.R.Y. territory; their disunity, poor discipline, and poor planning, however, have weakened their ability to threaten seriously the NF government. Internal discontent also exists, but the NF has successfully neutralized the most powerful of the discontented, and the remainder are too diverse and too weak to threaten the government.

Within the NF's own ranks, and thus within the government, the last 5 years have witnessed a remarkable degree of internal rivalry which has often virtually paralyzed the governing apparatus. The party has been divided into bitterly opposing factions since its creation 10 years ago, and centers of power and party loyalties are in a continual state of flux. One faction overthrew another in a bloodless coup in 1969, and the victorious faction itself has since become irrevocably split into groups of differing regional backgrounds and ideological outlooks. Although the southern Yemeni, pro-Peking group led by the P.D.R.Y. President is currently the more powerful, its position is by no means assured. Indeed, if any threat exists to the continued rule of the present NF government, this threat is posed not by discontented nonparty elements, but by elements within the party itself who alone are capable of overturning the faction in power.

The P.D.R.Y. signed an agreement in October 1972 pledging to work for unity—to be implemented within a year—with the neighboring Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.). The two countries have talked about unity since each was founded and have maintained contacts of one sort or another for years; the borders are usually open to travelers from either side, there is regularly scheduled air traffic between the two capitals, and officials of each government, up to the two Presidents, meet periodically. At the same time, however, an apparently unbridgeable gap exists between the Marxist regime of the P.D.R.Y. and the more moderate Y.A.R. government, and the incursions of Adeni dissidents operating from bases in the Y.A.R. have often led to border fighting between the regular forces of the two countries. Although neither country wants full-scale war—and thus both welcome the respite from fighting which the unity agreement provides—neither has any intention of accommodating to the ideology of the other. The P.D.R.Y. is just as hopeful of imposing its type of government on the Y.A.R. as the latter is of overthrowing the NF radicals. True unity is thus unlikely to be accomplished under present circumstances.

## B. Structure and functioning of the government (S)

The governmental structure of the P.D.R.Y. (Figure 1) has changed radically in the years since independence in 1967. The most significant development occurred in 1970 when, in an effort to ease domestic discontent and lessen foreign criticism, the National Front regime adopted a new constitution. While it creates the impression of a more broadly based and representative government, this document was clearly designed to allow the National Front to retain control of the government.

Although the new constitution provides for an elected, unicameral legislative body—the People's Supreme Council (PSC)—the members of the new council have been appointed by the NF, and scheduled elections have yet to be held. The other major organizations, the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers, also remain under the domination of the NF; the chairman of the Presidential Council is Salim Rubay'i 'Ali,<sup>2</sup> who heads the dominant pro-Peking faction of the front.

### 1. Central government

#### a. Constitution

The British prepared a provisional constitution prior to independence, but this was ignored by the NF, which declared that it would govern until a new constitution was drawn up. On 30 November 1970, the third anniversary of the establishment of the country, the NF General Command promulgated its own constitution. At the same time, the name of the country was changed from the People's Republic of South Yemen to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In an effort to increase popular acceptance of the draft constitution, which had been released in the preceding August, the NF promoted public discussion in mass meetings throughout the country and blanket coverage in the press.

The constitution of 1970 stresses Yemeni unity (unity of the P.D.R.Y. and its northern neighbor, the Y.A.R.). The first article states that the goal of the state is to bring about a "united, democratic Yemen." The constitution also aims "to make a revolutionary contribution toward the Arab revolutionary movement . . . and to establish a democratic, united Yemen as a preliminary step toward democratic Arab

<sup>2</sup>For a current list of key government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.






FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U.O.U)

unity." The Yemeni people are described as united in a common struggle for "final relief from the causes of partition and for the restoration of normal conditions for uniting the territory."

The leftist political orientation of the constitution's drafters is readily evident in its revolutionary Marxist-style rhetoric. According to the constitution, the political authority of the state is to be exercised by the working people, and the basis of the national democratic revolution is described as the alliance between the working class, farmers, intelligentsia, small businessmen, soldiers, women, and students. The historical role of the working class is described in traditional Marxist terms—i.e., as ultimately

composing the leadership class of the country. The organization and administration of the authority of the state are said to be governed by the principle of democratic centralism. What this means essentially is that the NF dominates and controls all political life, and the front, in fact, is declared to be the means by which the democratic forces of the people express themselves.

The constitution may be amended at the initiative of the Presidential Council, the Council of Ministers, or one-third of the members of the national legislature (the People's Supreme Council). Ratification of any proposed changes in the basic law of the land requires

the approval of two-thirds of the representatives in the national legislature.

*b. Executive bodies*

The most important body in the P.D.R.Y.'s plural executive is the Presidential Council, which consists of a chairman and from two to six members. The Presidential Council has had as many as four members in addition to the chairman, but as of November 1972 it had only three. Salim Rubay'i 'Ali has been chairman of the council since its inception, and 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il has been a member for the same period. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad Hasani became Prime Minister and a member of the council in August 1971.

The chairman and members of the Presidential Council are elected by the People's Supreme Council (PSC) from among its members; a new Presidential Council is also selected whenever the PSC holds new elections. The chairman of the Presidential Council acts as the official representative of the state in its foreign relations. The Presidential Council hears reports from the Prime Minister on the conduct of the country's affairs and advises the PSC on domestic and foreign policy. The constitution provides that if the chairman and members of the Presidential Council desire to resign, they must submit their resignations to the PSC; two-thirds of the members of the PSC must vote in favor of accepting the resignations before they can be declared valid. Once the resignation of the chairman of the Presidential Council has been accepted, the other members of the council must also resign.

The chief administrative body of the state is the Council of Ministers, consisting of the Prime Minister and his ministers. As defined by the 1970 constitution, the chief task of the council is to implement the general policies laid down by the legislative arm, the People's Supreme Council. The Council of Ministers is empowered to propose the broad lines of domestic and foreign policy and to submit draft legislation to the PSC. The council approves international treaties and agreements before they are presented to the PSC or the Presidential Council.

Resolutions of the Council of Ministers are binding on leading government officials, including governors, commissioners, and deputy commissioners. In the event the Prime Minister resigns, he must submit his resignation to the Presidential Council, which in turn forwards the resignation along with the its views to the PSC. The PSC may accept the resignation or withdraw its confidence from the Prime Minister by a two-thirds vote. A member of the Council of Ministers must submit his resignation to the Prime Minister and to the

PSC which may accept it with a majority vote. Should the Prime Minister resign, the Council of Ministers is also required to resign. The term of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers expires upon the election of a new PSC.

*c. Legislative branch*

The unicameral People's Supreme Council (PSC), created by the November 1970 constitution, is the legislative branch of the P.D.R.Y. Government. The constitution describes the council as the "supreme instrument" of the authority of the state. The PSC elects the chairman and members of the Presidential Council and approves the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers selected by the Presidential Council.

The PSC decides the foreign and domestic policy of the state and "defines the principles of the work" of the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers. It approves the annual budget submitted by the Council of Ministers and approves international political and economic treaties. A state of defense (similar to martial law) can be declared only with the approval of the PSC, which also has the responsibility of defining the extraordinary powers to be exercised by the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers during a state of defense.

According to the constitution, the 101 members of the PSC are directly elected for a term of no more than 3 years. The PSC may pass a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister, who must then resign. According to the constitution, the PSC shall be dissolved and new elections held, if the no-confidence motion is passed on more than two occasions during the term of the PSC.

The work of the PSC, as specified in the constitution, will be directed by a Standing Committee which the PSC will elect from its own members. A Constitution and Legal Committee examines proposed legislation and submits recommendations to the PSC. Laws may be enacted by the Presidential Council but must be submitted to the PSC for approval. If the PSC fails to approve such laws by a majority, they are considered revoked. Draft legislation may be presented by both the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers to the PSC which refers it to an appropriate committee for recommendations. Members of the PSC may propose legislation with the approval of one-third of that body. Public organizations may submit proposals regarding legislation to the Standing Committee of the PSC.

In March 1971, the General Command of the National Front chose 86 of the 101 members of the council, while the right to choose the remaining 15

members was reserved for the trade unions. Peasant organizations were assigned 12 representatives from the 86 chosen by the NF, the security organizations and the armed forces 10, women's organizations 5, and professional organizations 3 representatives. Despite the fact that a number of members of the council are not members of the National Front, the diffuse membership of the PSC has made it easy for the front to maintain control. The first PSC, which was selected by the NF ostensibly as an interim measure, was to be a provisional legislature with the primary responsibility for drafting the laws and regulations governing general elections which were to be held in October 1971. The elections were never held, however, and the original PSC was still in office as of April 1973. The elections apparently were postponed because of disagreements in the NF over the number of seats to be allocated to the Ba'ath and the Communist parties. An elected PSC could produce an organized political opposition within the governmental structure.

#### *d. Judicial system*

Prior to independence, the judicial system was divided between secular courts set up by the British and the Muslim religious Sharia courts, which handled matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In the former unfederated protectorate states, local customary law and tribal law were also applied. In January 1968, a Supreme State Security Court was established to try high-level political offenders, and a number of former rulers and government officials were sentenced.

The constitution of 1970 provides for the creation of a high court, and press reports in early 1972 revealed that a Supreme People's Court in Aden was "reviewing" cases. It is not clear whether the Supreme People's Court has original jurisdiction in any cases. A number of People's Courts have been established by the Prime Minister, and an official resolution issued by the chairman of the Presidential Council in early 1972 makes reference to appellate courts. It is not clear what types of cases are reviewed by the appellate courts or whether these courts have original jurisdiction over any cases. Press reports do reveal that sentences passed by People's Courts are at least in some instances forwarded directly to the chairman of the Presidential Council for review. The constitution also provides for the establishment of special courts, such as military courts and arbitration tribunals, but it is not known if any were in existence as of November 1972.

In addition to a civil court system, a Sharia court system continued to exist in 1972 despite the absence of any provision for it in the constitution. Press reports in early 1972 also revealed the existence of a Sharia Appellate Court. In addition, tribal and local customary law are almost certainly still applied in sectors outside heavily populated areas.

The 1970 constitution states that the state shall gradually issue democratic civil, labor, family, and criminal laws, and that in cases where no laws have been enacted judges shall be guided by the spirit of the constitution. Laws and procedures enacted before independence remain in effect unless they conflict with the principles of the constitution. Trials are to be public except where special circumstances require otherwise or where state security or public morals are threatened.

## **2. Regional and local government**

In the structure of the British Protectorate of South Arabia, regional divisions conformed more or less to the tribal divisions of the country, thus reinforcing the hegemony of local sheikhs and sultans. Following independence, the new government, in an effort to weaken these divisions, divided the state into the following six governorates:

I. The area of the former Crown Colony of Aden and the islands of Perim, Kamaran, and Socotra. (The Khuryan Muryan islands,<sup>2</sup> which were ceded by the United Kingdom to Muscat and Oman in November 1967, but whose cession is not recognized by Yemen (Aden), are nominally included in this governorate. Kamaran Island was occupied by Y.A.R. forces in October 1972.)

II. Lahij, Subayhi, Haushabi, 'Alawi, Radfan, Shu'ayb Halimayn, and Maflahi.

III. Upper and Lower Yafa'i, Fadhli, 'Audhali, Dathina, and Lower 'Aulaqi.

IV. Bayhanal Qisab, Upper 'Aulaqi, Al Wahidi, and the northwest Hadhramaut.

V. Hadhramaut, excluding the northwestern areas.

VI. Al Mahrah.

In early 1972, certain small areas of the Third Governorate were made parts of the Second and Fourth Governorate, and a small area of the Fifth was made part of the Sixth Governorate. Each governorate is headed by a governor and is subdivided into districts headed by commissioners. Districts are further subdivided into centers or posts headed by deputy commissioners. Theoretically these officials administer their governorates and districts directly, under the

<sup>2</sup>For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.

authority they derive from the central government. In actual fact, the regional and local NF commands, which parallel the more formal government organizations, exercise more real authority than their governmental counterparts.

The constitution of 1970 provides for the establishment of local People's Councils as local legislative bodies to "administer and control" local administration. These councils are to be elected in free, general, equal, and direct elections. According to the constitution, the central government shall endeavor gradually to transfer the authority of the state for local administration to the People's Councils. As of April 1973, it was unclear whether any local People's Councils had yet been established.

### 3. Civil service

The shortage of trained and competent personnel constitutes a serious problem for the P.D.R.Y. Prior to 1967, many of the important administrative posts were held by British nationals. With their departure, the P.D.R.Y. lost all personnel who had anything more than the most rudimentary knowledge of government operations. In late 1972, the government still did not exhibit a clear policy with regard to the civil service and remained desperately short of top management and technical personnel. No civil service regulations to replace those existing prior to independence had not yet been drafted.

The Establishments Department, which is directly responsible to the Prime Minister, is the main instrument by which the government exercises control over the civil service. This department promulgates the rules and regulations of the civil service and carries out routine personnel duties such as recruitment, promotion, discipline, retirement, and maintenance of records. A Public Service Commission, composed of five members who belong to either the Council of Ministers or the NF General Command, decides on appointments to public office, promotions, firings, and other matters affecting the civil service.

### C. Political dynamics (S)

The recent history of politics in the P.D.R.Y. is one of extreme leftist, one-party domination highlighted by continual internecine strife and a severely strained financial and economic situation. The National Front, a Marxist-oriented party which has ruled the country since independence in November 1967, is virtually the only political party in the country; although other parties exist, they are small, few in number, and able to operate only at the sufferance of the NF. Like that

of ruling parties in Communist countries, NF structure parallels that of the government, and at lower levels of the administration, where constitutional provisions for the establishment of local government structures have not yet been carried out, local NF chapters are the governing bodies.

The NF's rule has not been an easy one. The party has been plagued since its founding in 1963 by serious internal divisions. A split originally developed between a radical and a moderate faction, resulting in the overthrow of the ruling moderates by the party's radical wing in 1969. This was followed almost immediately by a further split among the radicals that has developed over the past few years into a bitter, apparently irreconcilable break along both regional and ideological lines. Amidst this internal bucking, the party has had to contend with a severe economic crisis, a degree of popular discontent not sufficient to threaten government stability but great enough to cause nagging problems to a regime beset by larger worries, and a continuing border war with dissidents who fled the P.D.R.Y. after the NF takeover and have since launched frequent incursions into P.D.R.Y. territory from bases in Saudi Arabia and the YAR. Despite all these problems, the chief threat to the regime's security comes from among the ranks of the NF itself. No force outside the party seems strong enough to overthrow the government, but the party is so divided internally that a coup or similar power move by one faction against the faction currently in power is a distinct possibility.

#### 1. National front

##### a. History and internal politics

The NF was founded in 1963, under the name National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Yemeni South (NLF), by Qahban al-Sha'bi, the P.D.R.Y.'s first president until his overthrow by a rival faction of the NLF in June 1969. From the mid-1950's until late 1960 or early 1961, Sha'bi was affiliated with the South Arabian League (SAL), an anticolonial, nationalist organization whose principal aim was to achieve independence for South Arabia. After quarreling with the SAL leadership, Sha'bi broke away and formed his own group, the NLF, which he described as the Arab South branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The ANM, which had regional organizations in a number of Arab countries, was an outgrowth of a student organization founded at the American University of Beirut in the late 1940's. This group preached Arab unity and revenge against

Israel. The NLF-ANM tie was broken in 1969, and the ANM itself is now virtually defunct.

After the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic in September 1962 and the arrival of Egyptian forces in that country to aid the regime of Y.A.R. President Sallal, Sha'bi and his followers went to the Y.A.R. to seek training and other assistance in ousting the British from South Arabia. The NLF became the chosen instrument of Egyptian intelligence against the British, and until late 1965, Egyptian intelligence officers in the Y.A.R. undertook full responsibility for the planning, direction, training, and arming of the NLF. With this aid, the NLF developed into an organization capable of striking both at South Arabian Army posts in the outlying states of the Federation of South Arabia and at individual security personnel in Aden.

When the rival Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) was formed in January 1966 through the amalgamation of a number of nationalist groups, including part of the NLF, Egyptian support for Sha'bi's NLF ended. Cairo's support for FLOSY also soon ended, however, after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Egyptian withdrawal from the Y.A.R. As a result, the NLF seized the initiative in the terrorist war against the British. It was assisted in its campaign by the fact that it had more sympathizers in the army and among the tribes of the Protectorate than did FLOSY and was regarded by the British, because of the severance of its ties with Egypt, as the lesser of the two evils. When the British forces began to withdraw from the Protectorate states in August 1967, the NLF took over without any opposition from the army. The army tried to mediate between the NLF and FLOSY, whose rivalry had degenerated into virtual warfare, but when these efforts failed, the army declared itself for the NLF.

After establishing an NLF-dominated government following independence in November 1967, the NLF quickly squared off into rival moderate and radical factions. The former was led by Qahtan al-Sha'bi, who had been appointed President of the new People's Republic of South Yemen, and by his cousin Faysal al-Sha'bi, the Prime Minister and number two man in the NLF. This faction was more concerned about the immediate problems of establishing a viable government and salvaging the economy than about carrying out the party's longer term socialist, anti-imperialist objectives, as spelled out in the NLF charter. The more leftist, doctrinaire faction, on the other hand, advocated a more rapid advance toward the establishment of a Marxist, socialist state. By various tactics, such as using the press to propagate its

ideas and arousing public opinion over the 1968 trials of persons who had played prominent roles in the government during the period of British control, the leftist faction was able to insinuate itself increasingly into the governing apparatus.

The conflict between the two factions came to a head at the NLF congress in Az Zanjabar in March 1968. Moderates won most of the seats on a 41-member NLF General Command elected at the congress, but the communique issued at its termination indicated a policy shift to the left and a victory for the radicals. Among other things, the communique recommended a purge of the armed forces, virtually the only force for conservatism in the country, and the appointment of political instructors in all military units. The army reacted, in what appeared initially to be a coup attempt, by arresting a number of the NLF leftists. A compromise was eventually worked out by which the army and the NLF agreed not to meddle in each other's internal affairs, but basic disagreement remained over the policies adopted at the Az Zanjabar congress.

A number of the radical NLF leaders participated in abortive tribal uprisings in July and August 1968, and, as a result of this and of their increasing dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Sha'bis and the influence of the army, many went into exile, particularly to the Y.A.R. Their cooperation was regarded by the moderate Sha'bi faction as essential to NLF cohesion, however, and in October 1968 the government declared a general amnesty for all exiled NLF leaders to which a large number responded. Further shifts occurred in the respective viewpoints and policies of both the moderate and the radical factions in succeeding months; by mid-1969 the moderates had taken on a more leftist coloration, while the radicals had come to recognize the practical problems confronting any attempt to implement socialist doctrines at the P.D.R.Y.'s stage of development. These changes in attitude were not enough to permit a reconciliation, however, and the strain was further aggravated by the increasing tendency of the Sha'bi cousins to make policy decisions without prior consultation within the NLF. With the return of the radical exiles after the government's amnesty, the leftist faction by June 1969 constituted a majority of the NLF General Command members actually in Aden. They were thus able to overthrow the Sha'bis in a coup on 22 June.

The coup was a bloodless one, and the Sha'bis and many other members of their faction, although taken into custody, were able to maintain contact with elements, particularly in the army, who were

sympathetic to them. 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il (Figure 2), a leader of the radical faction and the moving force behind the coup, moved quickly to consolidate his position. He sealed off NLF headquarters to all but those members of the NLF General Command who were personally loyal to him—approximately 20 of the original 41 members—and within a few days of the coup, he had been appointed to the new post of NLF secretary general. Although Salim Rubay'i 'Ali (Figure 3), as chairman of the new five-man (later reduced to three men) Presidential Council, held the highest government position, Isma'il was the country's most powerful figure by virtue of his position as party secretary general; Isma'il was a member of the Presidential Council but held no other formal government position.

Isma'il retains the post of party secretary general, and 'Ali remains the Presidential Council chairman—indeed, most party and government posts remain unchanged—but a series of bitter internal party disputes and constantly shifting loyalties have resulted in a marked reversal of the power positions of the two men. 'Ali is at present the dominant figure, although his position is by no means secure: his attempts in the last year to undermine Isma'il's power have left the secretary general in a weakened but not totally powerless position.



FIGURE 2. NLF Secretary General  
'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il (C)



FIGURE 3. President Salim Rubay'i 'Ali (U/OU)

The 'Ali-Isma'il power struggle developed only slowly. 'Ali, a former terrorist leader during preindependence days, was a virtual nonentity at the time of and immediately after the coup: he enjoyed limited influence in the government and the party and apparently had little interest in acquiring more power. Although his outlook was generally more moderate than Isma'il's, for the most part he remained neutral in the several internal disputes which plagued Isma'il almost from the start.

Despite Isma'il's rapid moves to consolidate his position and eliminate the influence of the Sha'bis, the party soon broke down into two factions: a pro-Isma'il radical group and a group of "pragmatists" led by Prime Minister Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, who took a generally more moderate approach to solving the country's problems and were more conciliatory toward the Sha'bi faction. The army, still a conservative force and unhappy over the coup against the Sha'bis, was maneuvering against the new party and government leader. In addition, the country's continuing financial difficulties further threatened the new establishment.

In an attempt to combat these problems, the party began negotiations in August 1969 with Faysal al-Sha'bi in an effort to bring the ousted moderate group back into the government and party. The negotiations broke down, however, over Sha'bi's demand that

Isma'il's appointment as NLF secretary general be annulled. Sha'bi, who was under arrest at the time but able to make contact with political and military cronies, apparently believed that the army was prepared to move against Isma'il, which probably contributed to his adherence to a hard bargaining position. Isma'il, however, caught wind of the same coup rumors and, using the public security forces, which were loyal to him, arrested almost 100 Sha'bi supporters in late August. Although many of these were released within a few days by President 'Ali—who apparently favored a more conciliatory approach toward Sha'bi but took no part in any anti-Isma'il plotting—Isma'il's prompt action eliminated the immediate threat to his position.

A cabinet reshuffle and the appointment of 'Ali 'Antar (Figure 4), a former anti-British commando leader and a pro-Isma'il radical, as army commander in December 1969 further strengthened Isma'il's position, undercutting the influence of the "pragmatists" and of the army conservatives. An NLF reorganization in the same month (during which the



FIGURE 4. Army Commander 'Ali 'Antar (U/OU)

party's name was changed to National Front, formally expelled the Sha'bi and 19 of their supporters from the party and reorganized the Executive Committee of the party's General Command, adding two members to the original seven. The committee has become the effective ruling body in the PDRY.

Isma'il's days of unchallenged power, however, were numbered. In March 1970 over 180 officers from the PDRY Army and public security forces were arrested for complicity in an alleged Saudi Arabian plot to instigate tribal uprisings and create other disorders as a prelude to an army coup. Whether this coup plot was real or imagined, it provided Isma'il with a pretext for purging the army and security forces of suspect elements. It also, however, revealed the extent of the opposition to Isma'il, as many of those arrested were supporters of Prime Minister Haytham.

This division was intensified as it began to take on regional, in addition to ideological overtones. Isma'il, a northern Yemeni, found most of his supporters among fellow northerners, and as these elements assumed more and more power at central and local levels of the party hierarchy, the gap between Isma'il and Haytham and their respective northern and southern supporters widened. During internal party elections in April 1970 for local NF branch committees—many of whose members were slated later to assume positions on the People's Supreme Council, the constitutionally established legislative body eventually organized in mid-1971—large numbers of Haytham supporters and other party members of long standing lost their seats to pro-Isma'il northerners or to unknowns believed to be tools of Isma'il.

The situation deteriorated further when Isma'il left the country on a medical visit to Moscow for 2 months in mid-1970. Left to its own devices without guidance from Isma'il, the NF hierarchy soon fell to internal squabbling, each member pursuing his own personal interests, and became so faction ridden that effective decisionmaking proved a near impossibility. Not only did the Haytham faction attempt to advance its position, but there were indications of a developing power struggle within Isma'il's own faction. Isma'il failed to reassert his authority when he returned in June 1970, and for the next several months the situation remained chaotic.

Until late 1970, President 'Ali continued to maintain an essentially neutral stance, apparently making no effort either to enhance his own position or to advance the interests of anyone else. In October, however, a series of land reform measures instituted by Isma'il resulted in the seizure of land from a group of

Ali's supporters, and its redistribution to friends of Isma'il, and an armed clash broke out in the Third Governorate between the two groups. A total of 60 civilians were killed in the clash before the army intervened to end it. This incident apparently marked the beginning of what ultimately emerged as a bitter rivalry between Ali and Isma'il and the start of Ali's greater participation in Aden's political affairs.

Ali paid a visit in mid-1970 to Peking, and the Maoist ideas which he absorbed during the trip aggravated his relationship with the Isma'il faction which had become increasingly pro-Soviet in outlook. When Isma'il himself left the country for another extended visit to Moscow around April 1971, Ali used the opportunity to begin implementing his newly acquired Maoist doctrines. Despite admonitions from other NF leaders that an overly hasty introduction of agrarian reforms and other measures would only create further havoc, Ali began with an ardor bordering on fanaticism to organize peasant uprisings. Landless laborers seized land, boat crews seized fishing boats, and homes were confiscated by poor peasants. Revolutionary groups were formed in schools, factories, and government offices. Ali also bypassed both the administrative machinery loyal to Prime Minister Haytham and the local NF committees loyal to Isma'il and established a number of "peasant committees" which were responsive to him alone.

This series of revolutionary measures aroused bitter opposition, and the situation soon degenerated to one of armed conflict. Sporadic clashes erupted between Ali's supporters and opponents, which soon created a crisis for both the government and the party. Despite extensive opposition to Ali's moves among NF Executive Committee members, the committee proved powerless to stop him, and in protest over its inaction, Prime Minister Haytham and six cabinet ministers submitted their resignations in late April. Haytham, who continued to enjoy some support among moderates in the army, apparently believed that under his influence the army could forcibly halt Ali's rampage. Ali, however, had won over Army Commander Ali 'Antar—the formerly pro-Isma'il radical appointed in December 1969 to offset the conservatism of the army—as well as the Minister of Interior and the principal leaders of the security forces. As a result, Haytham's protest proved to be in vain, and he and the other opposition ministers remained in the government.

Upon his return from Moscow in mid-July 1971, Isma'il apparently hoped to resolve the Ali-Haytham crisis and reassert his own authority by first throwing his weight behind Haytham and when Ali had been

put down. Later dropping Haytham, thus assuring his own ascendancy, he found Ali too strong, however, and consequently joined forces with him, probably hoping eventually to turn the tables on Ali. As a result of the temporary Ali-Isma'il alliance, the forces opposed to Haytham were at last strong enough to dispose of the Prime Minister; Haytham had long been at odds with much of the NF hierarchy, but until this point his influence had apparently been too great to permit a move against him. In early August a cabinet reshuffle and a simultaneous realignment of the NF Executive Committee resulted in Haytham's ouster from both bodies. Minister of Defense Ali Nasir Muhammad Hasani (Figure 5) replaced Haytham as Prime Minister and took his seat on the Executive Committee.

Hasani appears to have been a compromise choice. He had been a close friend of Haytham's and a member of the moderate faction. Despite the strength of the combined Ali-Isma'il forces, there were immediate indications that the army and the air force, where Haytham enjoyed some residual influence, might revolt in protest over his ouster. Quick moves by Army Commander Ali 'Antar prevented this, but the ruling NF faction probably viewed the appointment



FIGURE 5. Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad Hasani (U/OU)



of Muhammad as necessary to hold off further trouble from the military. Hasani, a moderate, was not identified with any particular faction in the NF, and the NF hierarchy may have regarded him as a more malleable figure and less a liability than his predecessor. In fact, Hasani has proved to be not particularly troublesome to any of the contending factions in the continuing NF power struggle.

The 'Ali-Isma'il alliance—never more than an expedient arrangement by which Isma'il hoped to gain the upper hand and which 'Ali probably felt could only benefit his own position—was not long-lived and, contrary to Isma'il's expectations, did not materially enhance his standing. Within a few months, relations between the two leaders had become strained because of 'Ali's pro-Peking bias and Isma'il's warm feelings toward Moscow. The strains were aggravated by ideological-regional factors—the pro-Peking faction was composed largely of southern Yemenis, while the northern Yemenis tended to be pro-Soviet in outlook. It was becoming increasingly clear that 'Ali, as a southerner, was solely interested in domestic affairs and that he firmly opposed northerner Isma'il's policy of seeking to subvert the Y.A.R. Government.

'Ali gradually strengthened his position throughout 1971, but the going was not easy. He lost the support of some cabinet ministers to Isma'il over the question of whether the center of NF power should be Aden or the rural areas. As a southerner 'Ali favored the rural areas, while Isma'il believed the center of NF strength should be Aden where most of his support was concentrated. Isma'il also won support from the leader of Aden's security forces and from the commander of the army's elite 22d Brigade, whose members were handpicked for their political reliability. 'Ali's pro-Chinese policy also incurred the displeasure of the Soviet Union which, nevertheless, has continued to provide aid to the P.D.R.Y. In all probability, the presence of Soviet advisers and the influence exerted by Moscow may have been the decisive factors deterring 'Ali from instituting certain Maoist-inspired policies and moving to eliminate Isma'il as a political rival.

Despite opposition, 'Ali was able to strengthen and consolidate his position with the rural masses throughout much of 1971. This was reflected in the elections to the fifth NF congress held in March 1972, at which time the 'Ali faction won a large majority of the delegate seats. Last held in March 1968, the congress had been postponed repeatedly since its originally scheduled convening in late 1969. Although Isma'il was reelected at the congress to his position as

NF secretary general and a number of the more influential Isma'il supporters were reconfirmed in their positions in the NF hierarchy, 'Ali's supporters succeeded in winning a majority on the NF General Command (renamed the Central Committee and expanded to include 31 full and 14 candidate or alternate members) and on the seven-member Executive Committee (renamed the Political Bureau and reduced in size from nine members). The congress communique also affirmed NF support for 'Ali's Maoist policies, specifically with respect to agrarian reform and the establishment of peasant cooperatives.

'Ali has been able to consolidate his position still further since the congress, to the point where he now enjoys probably as firm a hold on the reins of power as is possible given the vicissitudes of P.D.R.Y. politics. Soon after the conclusion of the NF congress, Isma'il again made the mistake of departing the country, this time for a month-long trip to China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, and 'Ali again seized the opportunity to move against his rivals. Several of Isma'il's supporters, including the commander of the security forces, were arrested; the property holdings of many other Isma'il backers were nationalized; and, in a clear attack on pro-Isma'il trade unionists, several workers' control committees were established, purportedly for the purpose of "purging reactionary elements" among the laboring forces.

Since mid-1972, the P.D.R.Y. political scene appears to have stabilized somewhat, probably in part because the border war with the Y.A.R. in September and October and the subsequent negotiations toward unifying the two countries have necessitated a more united P.D.R.Y. front. The P.D.R.Y.'s heavy and increasing dependence on the Soviet Union for economic and particularly military assistance has probably also been a significant factor contributing to moderated his Maoist views, probably to accommodate his country's Soviet benefactors—and no doubt to preserve his own position—and, although the 'Ali-Isma'il rivalry still exists, Soviet influence may have been a factor in forcing a modus vivendi between the two men.

Whatever the forces behind the present calm, the P.D.R.Y.'s past record militates against a firm prediction of lasting stability. President 'Ali currently retains predominance in the party and thus also in the government, but Isma'il is undoubtedly only biding his time, waiting for an opportune moment to challenge 'Ali's control. NF politics seem likely to remain in disarray for the foreseeable future.

### ***b. Membership and organization***

Most of the present NF leaders are former terrorists with no experience in government. Many are important tribal leaders in their own right or have personal connections that enhance their standing. The bulk of the rank-and-file membership comes from the lower classes in Aden and the hinterland, and many support the party simply because their tribal leaders support it and are in a position to hand out patronage.

The NF has retained essentially the structure it had in preindependence days. The basic unit, the cell, is subordinate to the branch, which in turn is subject to the authority of the local district command. The various district commands report to the governorate command, which is responsible to the party's General Command, now called the Central Committee. Before the establishment of the Supreme People's Council in 1971, the Central Committee served as the country's legislative body, and it probably retains this function, in fact if not legally, since large numbers of its members sit on the Council. The Central Committee's Political Bureau, formerly called the Executive Committee, is composed of seven Central Committee members who form the party's, and in effect the government's, governing body.

### **2. Other political groups**

Both the Communist Party and the Ba'ith Party have been allowed to operate openly since independence, but neither organization has played a particularly significant role in the country's political life. After the June 1969 coup against the Sha'bis, NF Secretary General Isma'il brought both parties into an alliance with the NF; a Communist was named Minister of Education and a Ba'ithist became Minister of Economy and Industry. Neither party has exercised more than limited influence, however, in the face of NF dominance and, although they maintain a separate existence and are represented in the government and the People's Supreme Council, even their early influence has been diminished. The Communists, for instance, were formerly closely allied with Isma'il's pro-Moscow NF faction, but when President 'Ali's Maoists, who had never favored the NF-Communist alliance, became predominant in 1971, the Communists stopped or at least limited their cooperation with the NF.

### **3. Elections**

Although the constitution grants the vote to all citizens at age 18, popular elections have yet to be held in Aden. Elections for the People's Supreme

Council are called for in the constitution, but the council's initial membership was appointed by the NF—largely from among the members of its own Central Committee—and there is no evidence that this council has been or is likely to be replaced by an elected body.

## **D. National policies (S)**

The policies of the P.D.R.Y. Government, as spelled out both in the National Front charter and in the resolutions adopted at the fourth party congress in March 1968, are vaguely phrased in Marxist terminology and include such objectives as building socialism, furthering anti-imperialism, and maintaining close relations with Communist countries. More specific policies were enunciated at the fifth party congress in March 1972. Reflecting the inclinations of the pro-Peking faction of the NF, led by President 'Ali, these policies are focused primarily on domestic problems, although they also include statements which confirm the P.D.R.Y.'s narrow view of the world and reaffirm its alliance with the socialist camp.

### **1. Domestic policy**

At its fifth party congress, the NF affirmed its commitment to support "the leadership role of the working class and its allies the peasants." In furtherance of this "leadership role," the congress called for the urgent promulgation of a labor law and an agrarian reform law, urged the formation of peasants' federations and agricultural councils, and reaffirmed the policy of developing state and cooperative farms.

During the period when President 'Ali's Maoist policies were fashionable, the NF government was primarily concerned about establishing its base of support among the peasants. In 1971, following a visit to Peking, 'Ali instigated a series of "peasant uprisings" throughout the country which resulted in widespread seizures of property from landowners, homeowners, and small businessmen. The seizures continued at least through mid-1972, although at a somewhat slower pace. In August 1972 the government expropriated, apparently without compensation, all privately owned commercial buildings and residences; property owners have been allowed to retain one house for their own personal use, while the rentals from the expropriated properties are now collected by the government.

'Ali's policies are actually a continuation of somewhat less radical domestic policies carried out by the NF government since independence. Some of the

more recent nationalization measures have been purely vengeance moves—a reflection of the power struggle within the NE and a handy means used by one faction to seize property from supporters of the other. Nonetheless, most of these actions have been carried out in accordance with the government's Marxist precepts and in furtherance of its aim of establishing a socialist state. In late 1970 the government issued a land reform ordinance which provided for the expropriation of all land owned by the amirs and sultans who had constituted the traditional local ruling elite in pre-independence days; many of this group had fled the country after the NE takeover. The ordinance placed restrictions on private ownership of land and provided for distribution of land to poor peasants. A number of so-called "peasant cooperatives" have been established in rural areas, and a "Lemon cotton farm" modeled on a Soviet collective farm exists in at least one area. In addition, a number of commercial enterprises in Aden, from advertising agencies and small businesses to hotels and theaters, have been nationalized, and several social and fraternal organizations have been forcibly abolished and their property confiscated.

The government's principal domestic concern beside that of establishing a socialist state is the strengthening of the economy and the stabilizing of the nation's shaky financial situation. The PDRY is still in the midst of an economic crisis which was brought on by the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 and the British departure the following November. Up to this time Aden had been a thriving port, its wealth based on the supply of goods and services to the British forces, on the large amounts of money pumped into the economy by the British on a sizable tourist trade made possible by shipping through the Suez Canal, on a major bunkering business, and on its role as an entrepot for the YAR and east Africa.

The large number of foreign residents who formerly lived and did business in the PDRY have left the country, as have native professionals and more well-to-do citizens, all have taken much needed capital with them. The government has a sizable budget deficit, and unemployment is high, although each figure has been reduced gradually in the years since independence; there seems every prospect that both will remain substantial problems for the foreseeable future.

Efforts by the government to promote industrialization of the economy, as it had pledged to do after independence, have been unsuccessful. Consequently the government will probably continue to lack the

financial resources required to support its ambitious domestic programs and appear destined to operate at a continual deficit. In fact, in a surprising admission of failure in a country which often claims an industrial base, a government controlled Aden newspaper noted in a September 1972 article that imports constitute everything found in the market. We are, however, looking forward to the day when we can limit imports or discontinue them, that is when our industrial base is founded in the coming years.

## 2. Foreign policy

The ruling National Front regards the PDRY as a member of the socialist camp and on international issues takes a clearly pro-Communist and anti-Western stand. The extreme radicalism of the PDRY and the dispute with the neighboring Yemen Arab Republic have largely isolated Yemen Aden from its fellow Arab states. The Arab states have never been particularly forthcoming with financial or technical aid for Yemen Aden, originally because of the NE's instability and its ties with the Arab Nationalist Movement, which had tried to oust the ruling parties in several Arab countries. The estrangement has been aggravated by the PDRY's adoption of more radical policies and its support for revolutionary movements in the Persian Gulf. These actions contrast markedly with the trend toward moderation in the rest of the Arab world and have influenced many Arab states in their relations with the two Yemens to opt for the more palatable alternative of indicating their support for the moderate policies pursued by the Yemen Arab Republic.

PDRY relations with the Persian Gulf states are particularly bad. The government's vocal and material support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PELOAG) has set it at odds not only with Oman, the chief target of PELOAG's subversive activities, but also with virtually all other Gulf states, the overthrow of whose governments PELOAG regards as a longer range goal. The front operates primarily in Oman's Dhofar region, which lies on the PDRY eastern border, and PELOAG guerrillas maintain bases and training camps with the full knowledge and support of the PDRY Government in the PDRY's easternmost province. PELOAG maintains its headquarters in Aden.

The PDRY also supports and provides staging bases for the Ethiopian separatist movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front, although this backing is not as extensive as that provided PELOAG. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) maintains

an office in Aden and the PFLP and P.D.R.Y. have exchanged assistance: the PFLP is reported for instance to have provided pilots for the Aden air force and the P.D.R.Y. has allowed PFLP members to use Aden passports.

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the P.D.R.Y.'s most determined foe in the Arab world. The conservative Saudi regime has been suspicious from the start of the P.D.R.Y.'s leftist inclinations, and it has had little reason to feel reassured in recent years. The Saudis regard the P.D.R.Y. as a subversive influence and a force for revolution on the Arabian Peninsula which must be overthrown. Although they have hesitated to declare open warfare on the P.D.R.Y., they have encouraged and are continuing to support the Aden dissident groups which have for the last several years launched small-scale harassing operations into P.D.R.Y. territory from bases in Saudi Arabia and the Y.A.R.

Following an outbreak of fighting between the two Yemens in the fall of 1972—fighting touched off by the dissident groups—the P.D.R.Y. signed an agreement on 28 October to unite with the Y.A.R. within a year. As envisioned by the agreement, the new state created through unification will be a single Yemeni nation with one executive, one legislature, and one constitution. The goal is extremely visionary, and in fact neither side expects that real unity will result. Each would accept unity on its own terms—if, that is, its own form of government and ideology could be imposed on the unified state—and each probably hoped at the start of the negotiations that this could be accomplished. The basic reason, however, for both the P.D.R.Y.'s and the Y.A.R.'s acceptance of the unity agreement was the prospect it offered of a respite from fighting which neither was militarily or economically capable of sustaining. Aden is using the respite to build up its military strength, while it is also conducting a campaign of sabotage and subversion against the Y.A.R.

The NF's attitude toward the West was shaped by 4 years of revolution against the British; the leaders indicate the belief that all or almost all Western states are bent on subverting and subjugating Yemen (Aden). According to the NF, the United Kingdom owes the P.D.R.Y. compensation for years of colonial exploitation, but the British reduced their aid from \$56 million in FY67 (1 April-31 March) to \$28.8 million in FY68, and negotiations for further aid were broken off in May 1968.

Initially after independence, NF policy toward the United States wavered between one advocating the development of friendly relations and one which

viewed the United States as an imperialist imperialist power. Relations deteriorated as the view became prevalent in the P.D.R.Y. that the United States, in alliance with reactionary Saudi Arabia, was seeking to overthrow the NF government. The P.D.R.Y. broke off diplomatic relations in October 1969 and continues to denounce the United States directly and indirectly for its alleged "imperialist-Zionist" designs on the Arab world.

The P.D.R.Y.'s relations with Communist countries have probably not been as close as the NF government might wish, but it does receive aid from a wide spectrum. The Soviet Union is the P.D.R.Y.'s closest Communist ally and is depended on heavily for military and economic assistance, although there is some strain because of the high visibility of the People's Republic of China and President Ali's clear preference for Chinese over Soviet methods of operation. The P.D.R.Y.-Soviet relationship developed in 1968 when the USSR agreed to replace the P.D.R.Y. Army's British equipment and sent a military training team to Yemen (Aden). Soviet advisers continue to work with the army, and in the years since 1968, the Soviets have supplied aircraft, including MiG-17's and IL-28 bombers, as well as anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, and other heavy weapons. In the economic field, the Soviets have extended credits totaling approximately \$24 million since 1969 and recently agreed to provide assistance in installing a high-powered radio transmitter in Aden. Czechoslovakia is similarly installing a transmitter at Al Mukalla, and other East European countries have been active in the economic and technical assistance fields. East Germany, in particular, has provided some \$22 million for small development projects, and several East Germans act as advisers to the P.D.R.Y. security services.

The Chinese have been particularly active in economic assistance programs in the P.D.R.Y. They have contributed \$55 million in aid, much of which has gone to a roadbuilding project; they are also involved in other civil engineering projects, and they operate a medical clinic in Aden. Chinese advisers, in addition, are believed to be training PFLQAG guerrillas in the eastern section of the P.D.R.Y. for operations into Oman. Although relations with the Chinese are reasonably good, there is some indication that the Chinese are displeased with what they regard as the NF's overly hasty introduction of Maoist principles, the feeling apparently being that President Ali would have been well advised to resort to coercion only after persuasion had failed to achieve desired goals. Among other Asian nations, the P.D.R.Y.

maintains diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and North Korea. It has often expressed solidarity with the Vietnamese people's struggle against the United States, and it extended recognition to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam shortly after its establishment in June 1969. Relations with North Korea are particularly close; the Koreans were among the first to establish a diplomatic mission in Yemen (Aden) after independence. They have contributed agricultural aid in the form of tractors and various farm implements and have recently built a plant which produces spare parts for farm machinery.

### E. Threats to government stability (S)

The continuing economic crisis and the political chaos in the PDRY would appear to provide fertile ground for popular discontent and an active dissident movement. Indeed, large numbers of Yemenis have left the country to form a disparate force of armed dissidents which conducts guerrilla-type operations into PDRY territory. There is, however, no active dissidence of any significance inside the PDRY. Discontent certainly exists, but the dissatisfied are neither strong enough nor well enough organized to pose a serious threat to the continued rule of the NF.

#### 1. Discontent and dissidence

Unemployment is probably the principal source of discontent in the urban areas. Although little current information is available on the extent of unemployment in the country, the figure for Aden a few years ago ranged up to 25% or 30%, and there appears to have been little improvement with time. Even those fortunate enough to have relatively regular employment are frequently in difficult straits because of the large wage cuts which they suffered following the gradual scaledown of British businesses in the late 1960s and because of the heavy income tax bite. Few among the middle class elements who remain in Aden support the government or number themselves among NF party members; the bulk of Aden's middle class supported the rival FLOSY organization before independence, and the NF government has undoubtedly not endeared itself to these elements by its large-scale expropriation of property and heavy peasant-oriented policies.

As an economy measure, the government in the summer of 1972 sharply reduced the salaries of NF party members at all levels of the hierarchy, as well as those of civil servants and most categories of professionals. The reduction was unquestionably neither a popular move nor one calculated to fan the

revolutionary ardor of even the most dedicated party cadre. Similarly, the series of nationalizations carried out over the last 2 years—although probably helpful to the economy and, in the case of the land reform provisions, beneficial to the average peasant—have further alienated the urban middle class and the amir class. This last group constituted the traditional local ruling elite in preindependence days and retains some influence in the hinterland even though many of its number fled the country after independence.

Despite the numerous causes for discontent, there appears little prospect that the overthrow of the NF government will be attempted in the foreseeable future. Too few of the urban middle classes have remained in the country to form a cohesive antigovernment force. The tribal amirs who remain and who have not already allied themselves and their tribes with the government are too scattered to act effectively; tribal uprisings still occur from time to time, but these are isolated and easily put down by the army. Moreover, there seems little possibility that such disparate elements as the urban middle class and the rural tribes could reach agreement to unite against the government.

The NF, furthermore, has insured that the better organized groups which could threaten the party's rule and which once were effective political forces have been brought under NF control. The labor unions, which played an important role during the nationalist uprising against the British, have gradually lost their political significance since independence. The membership of the unions has been cut considerably with the contraction of the economy and the return of many workers to their homes outside the city of Aden. Labor leaders who favored FLOSY, which the NF defeated in a power struggle in 1967, have gone into exile, and the pro-NF labor unions are under virtually total party control. Some union leaders have protested the party's tight control and have attempted to organize protest strikes, but their actions have been ineffectual. The army—formerly a conservative force which invariably supported the moderates in intraparty and interparty struggles—has similarly been brought under control. Through command shuffles, purges, and heavy indoctrination, the NF has converted the army into a relatively docile instrument of its will. The army could conceivably lead or participate in a coup against one faction or the other of the NF, but it is highly unlikely that it would move against the NF as a whole in an effort to change the PDRY's form of government or its ideological orientation.

## 2. Subversion and insurgency

Lack of numbers, lack of organization within or between discontented social groups, and tight party control of formal organizations have served to discourage the development of indigenous activity. However, a large number of exiles from the P.D.R.Y. are operating from bases in neighboring Arab states where they have been engaged in active, if ineffective, armed insurrection against the NF regime. These exiles break down into several groups varying in strength, political outlook, and dedication. All share a common hatred for the NF government—virtually the only thing they have in common—and all enjoy, or have enjoyed, moral, financial, and material backing from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have viewed the P.D.R.Y. with suspicion since it came to power in 1967, and when the P.D.R.Y. launched an attack into Saudi Arabia 2 years later, the Saudis turned their resources actively toward subverting the NF.

There were indications as early as 1968 that a group of P.D.R.Y. exiles, composed primarily of members of FLOSY and the South Arabian League (SAL) living in the Y.A.R., had established a National Unity Front (NUF) whose aim was the overthrow of the NF government. It was not until 1970, however, that the exile's activities began to gather steam. By this time, the NUF had added to its ranks several former members of the NF who had fled the P.D.R.Y. after becoming disillusioned with the NF's increasing radicalism. Chief among these was Husayn 'Uthman 'Ashal (Figure 6), former commander in chief of the P.D.R.Y. armed forces, who took over direction of the NUF. The NUF was organized in such a way as to give each of its component elements equal representation; a 12-man High Command, divided equally among NF, FLOSY, and SAL representatives, was the principal command element of the front, and seats on the four NUF committees for political, military, information, and financial affairs were also allotted evenly to the NUF components. Manpower for the NUF military forces came primarily from levies of tribal mercenaries from both sides of the border.

Also by 1970, the NUF had obtained the tacit backing of the Y.A.R. Government, through which Saudi Arabian materiel and financial aid was funneled. San'a's support, however, was not wholly enthusiastic. Its involvement with the exiles came about in 1970 largely through the efforts of the then Prime Minister and Commander in Chief, Hasan al-'Amri, a determined foe of the P.D.R.Y. leftist regime who arranged covertly with the Saudis for the transfer of money and supplies to the exiles through him and



FIGURE 6. Husayn 'Uthman 'Ashal, commander of NUF military forces (U/OU)

his subordinates. Y.A.R. President Iryani, however, opposed any active involvement by the Y.A.R. and repeatedly urged the Saudis to carry on their business with the NUF directly. Although he was less opposed to allowing the exiles to operate from bases in the Y.A.R., he also tried to persuade them to move their bases into P.D.R.Y. territory. His efforts were unsuccessful; even after 'Amri's ouster in September 1971 and despite similar misgivings on the part of 'Amri's successor, Prime Minister Muhsin al-'Ayni, about the involvement of the Y.A.R., Saudi aid continued to come, at least in part, through the Y.A.R. military with the full knowledge and approval of the military leadership. Y.A.R. involvement with the NUF ended with the signing of the Yemen unity agreement in the fall of 1972, and the NUF has halted operations into the P.D.R.Y. from Y.A.R. territory, although NUF units still maintain bases in the Y.A.R.

Although the NUF is and has been by far the largest of the exile organizations, other such groups exist, formed largely at the instigation of the Saudis and subsisting almost totally on Saudi subventions. Around 1970, the Saudis organized a force of expatriate Hadrami tribesmen, from the Hadhramaut region in the P.D.R.Y.'s Fifth Governorate, into the so-

called "National Salvation Army" whose aim was reportedly to split the Hadhramaut off from the rest of the P.D.R.Y. and establish a separate secessionist regime there. Tribesmen in the National Salvation Army, said to number about 2,000, received paramilitary training in southern Saudi Arabia, and the organization was financed directly by the Saudis. Among still other groups supported by the Saudis were some independent tribal forces associated with former Yemen (Aden) sultans exiled after the NF takeover in 1967.

In late 1970, the Saudis developed an ambitious plan to launch a several-pronged attack into the P.D.R.Y. designed to bring down the NF regime and establish a moderate government in its place or, failing this, to capture large portions of P.D.R.Y. territory and gradually whittle the remainder away from NF control until the regime eventually collapsed. The Saudi plan envisaged an NUF attack in the western section of the P.D.R.Y. and simultaneous attacks in the central and eastern sectors by a tribal force loyal to a former sultan and by the National Salvation Army. The plan aborted, primarily because of disagreements among the exiles, and no more than a few uncoordinated

forays across the border came out of the Saudis' elaborate plans.

Indeed, friction among the exiles has from the start hampered the effective planning and prosecution of operations against the P.D.R.Y. Disagreements among the exiles stem from a variety of causes. The various elements of the NUF have never overcome a mutual hostility which dates back to preindependence days, when the NF and FLOSY fought each other for dominance of the anti-British movement and when both resented the SAE's failure to participate at all in the struggle against the British. Each of these elements, in turn, harbors a deep distrust for any individual or group associated with the P.D.R.Y.'s former sultan class, and the NUF has consistently refused to cooperate with the Saudi-backed dissidents from this class. The NUF has also been hurt by traditional tribal animosities which have hampered its recruitment efforts and have often facilitated countersubversive operations by the efficient P.D.R.Y. intelligence apparatus (Figure 7). Jealousies among the exiles have even led to distrust of their Saudi mentors; during the planned attack into Yemen (Aden) in 1970, for instance, the NUF, apparently



FIGURE 7. Dissidents who redefected in 1972 to the P.D.R.Y. (U/OU)

resentful of the diversion of money and supplies away from its own organization, balked at Saudi support for the Hadrami tribesmen and the National Salvation Army.

The Saudis have returned the ill feeling in full measure. Repeatedly frustrated in their attempt to meld the exiles into a unified force, the Saudis have often in the last few years cut off funds to the various organizations. Their desire to undermine the P.D.R.Y., however, outweighs their dissatisfaction with the only instrument available to them for accomplishing this, and they have always renewed their subsidies to the exiles.

The most recent Saudi ultimatum to the NUF came in mid-1972, when the NUF appeared on the verge of collapse. Throughout the first half of the year, the NUF was in continual ferment, reorganizing and attempting, by its own efforts and under pressure from the Saudis, to unify its apparatus. Early in the year, 'Abd al-Qawi Makkawi (Figure 8), FLOSY leader who had been in exile since 1967, first in the Y.A.R. and later in Cairo, returned to the Y.A.R. and became involved in the NUF, with which he had previously refused to be associated. After months of considerable backing and filling, much internal bickering, and mounting Saudi pressure, the NUF reorganized in mid-1972. Other dissident groups, such as the

National Salvation Army, were brought into the NUF, at least nominally. Makkawi was appointed NUF president; 'Ashad was made NUF commander in chief and a Revolutionary Command Committee-in-Exile, in effect a government-in-exile, was established again with Makkawi at its head. At about this same time, Saudi Arabia—as well as Libya, which had also been funding the NUF since 1971—threatened the organization with a final cessation of all money and supplies unless it could unite and prove its mettle by conducting successful raids into Yemen (Aden). The NUF responded with a series of cross-border forays in mid-September which provoked large-scale fighting between the regular forces of the P.D.R.Y. and of the Y.A.R. This in turn led to the agreement of 28 October to work for the unification of the two Yemens—hardly a goal originally envisioned by either the NUF or Saudi Arabia.

The NUF has continued in existence—and Saudi aid to the exiles has been maintained—despite the fact that the unity agreement has undercut the exiles' efforts. Although they have suspended their operations from Y.A.R. territory, those exiles based in Saudi Arabia have continued forays into the eastern portion of the P.D.R.Y. Everyone on all sides of the Yemen conflict pays at least lipservice to unity, but the exile leaders have grown accustomed to war and its profits and will not willingly cease their operations in the interests of an illusory reunification which promises little hope of eliminating the leftists in Yemen (Aden). Nonetheless, there is also little prospect that the exiles will ever develop into an effective insurgent force capable of conducting more than the sporadic guerrilla raids which they have been launching to little avail for the past several years. Their own shortcomings and the absence of adequate support and guidance from either the Y.A.R. or Saudi Arabia virtually assure this.

## F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

### 1. Police

The paramilitary Public Security Force (PSF) and the armed forces bear the primary responsibility for internal security in the P.D.R.Y. The 5,000-man PSF is responsible for domestic security and routine police control. It is under the control of the Ministry of Interior, and its director reports to the deputy minister for security affairs. As of late 1971, the director of the PSF was 'Ali Shaykh 'Umar.


The PSF is organized into three divisions, the Armed Police, the Rural Police, and the Urban Police. The



FIGURE 8. NUF leader 'Abd al-Qawi Makkawi (C)




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### Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	ARABIC	ENGLISH
ANM.....	<i>Harakah al-Qawmiyin al-'Arab</i> .....	Arab Nationalist Movement
ELF.....	.....	Eritrean Liberation Front
FLOSY.....	<i>Jabha li-Tahrir Janub al-Yaman al-Muhtall</i>	Front for the Liberation of occupied South Yemen
MIS.....	.....	Military Intelligence Staff
NF.....	.....	National Front
NLF.....	<i>Al-Jabha al-Qawmiyah Li-Tahrir Janub al-Yaman al-Muhtall</i>	National Front for the Liberation of occupied South Yemen
NUF.....	.....	National Unity Front
PFLOAG.....	.....	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf
PFLP.....	.....	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PSF.....	.....	Public Security Force
PSC.....	.....	People's Supreme Council
RSS.....	.....	Revolutionary Security Service
SAL.....	.....	South Arabian League

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