
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Yemen (Şan'a')

April 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact-book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area brief • Summary map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Employment • Living conditions • Social problems • Health • Religion • Education • A tistic expression • Public information.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and s ability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • Manpower • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Highways • Poris • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate

Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

This General Survey supersedes the one dated June 1970, copies of which should be destroyed.





YEMEN (SAN'A')

Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval Society
The Legacy of Isolation • The Tenacity of Tribalism • Illiteracy, Superstition, and Qat • Hope for the Fragile Economy • New Republic, Old Problems • Can the New Structure Survive? • The Search for Aid
Chronology
Area Brief 1
Summary Map follows 1
This Country Builds was supposed for the Mi

This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS under the general supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce. Research was substantially completed by Junuary 1973.

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Unfulfilled Revolution in a Medieval Society

An extremely poor country with apparently limited natural resources and isolated in southwestern Arabia away from the main centers of Arab civilization, Yemen has rarely played an active role in the history of the Middle East. Its greatest glory was achieved during ancient times when, from roughly 1200 B.C. to the sixth century A.D., the various kingdoms occupying the region were extensively involved in international commerce. Yemen's period of prosperity was based on trade, most notably in frankincense and myrrh, and on an agriculture largely supported by an elaborate, carefully tended irrigation system dependent on the great dam at Ma'rib. Overland caravan routes to Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia-the "incense trail"—originated in Yemen, while ships plying the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean used its ports. In 24 B.C. the Romans failed in their attempt to subjugate the region. In the sixth and early seventh centuries, however, first Ethiopian and then Persian invaders succeeded in asserting hegemony over Yemen. After the Ma'rib dam finally burst (sometime between A.D. 542 and 570), rendering arid a large area of

**In antiquity the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula was the Yemen, an area which now includes the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) and the western portion of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.). Throughout this General Survey, the word Yemen in discussions of history designates the entire area, but in all other contexts it refers only to the Y.A.R.

Historically, effective power in most of this part of the Arabian Peninsula has rested with local tribes and chieftains. However, the Imams, who reigned in what is now the Y.A.R. until 1962, had considerable authority, sometimes exerc. and under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Turks. The present division of the area dates from 1839 when the British captured Aden, subsequently established treaty relationships with nearby tribal states, and in 1963 formed the Federation of South Arabia, of which the P.D.R.Y. is the historical descendant. The Imams claimed that this territory was part of Yerren, calling it "South Yemen" or "Occupied South Yemen." Now the antipathetic Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. gov. "mments have agreed on "unification." but actual merger is unlikely.

hitherto fertile land, Yemen settled into obscurity and much of the country was reoccupied by bedouin tribes. (U/OU)

Yemen's adoption of Islam in the seventh century did not reduce the country's political and intellectual isolation from the rest of Arabia. In fact, by endowing Yemen with a comprehensive legal and social order "ordained by God," Islam contributed greatly to the development of a closed sociopolitical system. Yemen remained apart from the flourishing civilizations of Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo and in any case was too poor to support more than minimal cultural standards. (U/OU)


Until the revolution of 1962, Yemen was essentially a medieval Islamic state, untouched by the 20th century and, in the view of foreign critics as well as domestic dissidents, backward and primitive. Its theocratic rulers, the schismatic Imams who sought refuge in Yemen late in the ninth century, had gradually sealed off the region from outside influences and from foreign visitors. This isolation was deliberately intensified by the Imams of the 19th century. Contact with the more progressive Arab countries was extremely limited; neither the Arab national awakening nor the Muslim reform movements of the late 19th century reached Yemen. Western technology, except in the form of modern rifles, was hardly appreciated. Telephones, for example, were not introduced until the late 1940's, when a few were installed for the Imam's personal use, and paper money was not issued until 1964. Paved roads were unknown before the 1960's. Even the use of radios was severely restricted until the mid-1950's, while modern newspapers were developed only after the revolution. Agriculture, the country's main industry, was based on techniques developed in pre-Islamic times. A few, beginning in the 1930's, acquired some knowledge of

the modern world through travel or study abroad, but they were closely watched for possible subversive inclinations. (U-OU)

External forces, then, exerted only a limited impact on Yemen's internal development. Sporadic occupation by the Ottoman Turks between 1517 and 1918 seems to have had almost no effect on the country's society and politics. The absence of European penetration, except in the form of small trade missions. precluded the need for modernization of any kind, and Turkish influence was too shallow to provide an effective model. Although it initially had little impact on San'a'.2 Britain's conquest of Aden in 1839 ultimately was to prove of great significance to Yemen. A century later. Aden began to attract large numbers of Yemeni laborers and merchants who were then exposed, however superficially, to Western ideas and methods. These men formed the nucleus of the revolutionary movement that helped overthrow the Imamate in 1962. Moreover, Imam Ahmad Hamid al-Din (1948-62) unwittingly helped undermine his own position by accepting arms and technicians from Communist states for use in the struggle against "British imperialism" in the "Occupied South." (C)

Yemen's entry into the "modern" era may be dated from 26 September 1962, when a republican coup d'etat led by Col. 'Abd Allah al-Sallal deposed Imam Muhammad al-Badr. Ahmad's son, who had reigned for only a week. The coup precipitated a bloody civil war that was to last until 1970. In order to shore up his revolutionary regime, which almost immediately came under attack from the Imam's Saudi-backed tribal forces, Colonel Sallal requested the aid of Egyptian troops, who bore the brunt of the fighting on the republican side and whose numbers at one point reached more than 60,000. Although the situation was in fact quite complex, supporters and opponents of the revolution tended to divide along sectarian lines. The Zavdis, members of the schismatic Shia branch of Islam, generally supported their religious leader, the Imam, while the Shafi'is, orthodox Sunni Muslims who constituted a slight majority of the population, backed the republicans. Despite the unpopularity of Sallal, who was President of the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) from 1962 until his ouster in November 1967, his administration of the country resulted in fundamental political changes that made a return to the archaic practices of the 1,000-year-old Imamate virtually impossible. For a time, Yemen became identified with the "progressive" Arab states, but contacts with the Arab world, except for Egypt, remained limited. (C)

 $^2{\rm For}$ diacrities on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself





Imam's palace near San'a'


Between San'a' and Al Hudaydah


The Legacy of Isolation (u/ou)

Geography no less than policy accounts for Yemen's isolation and contributes to its continuing insularity and underdevelopment. The country is not easily approachable from any direction and is far from any other center of civilization except for Aden, to the south. About the size of Illinois. Yemen is hemmed in on the west by the Red Sea, with its hazardous coasts: on the east by the vast desert expanse of the Empty Quarter (Rub al-Khali): on the north by the arid highlands of Asir in Saudi Arabia; and on the south and southeast by the rugged foothills and desolate Hadramaut plateau of Yemen (Aden). The terrain within the country is divided into two main parts: the Tihamah, a hot and almost rainless coastal strip, whose climate is one of the most uncomfortable on earth; and the cooler, more densely populated high plateau, with San'a', the capital, in its center. The sparsely settled eastern part of the plateau slopes gently down and shades into desert. Water is most plentiful in the highlands, which catch the Indian Ocean monsoons; vegetation is generally sparse in other areas. When the rains fail, massive famine sometimes results.

The mountains, the highest in Arabia, rise abruptly from the coastal plain to more than 12,000 feet near San'a', and they have profoundly divided the country and its people, many of whom rarely venture beyond the confines of their native valley floor or hillside. In contrast to the coastal dwellers, largely Negroes and Africans of mixed descent, the volatile Arab highlanders, whose mountain strongholds have frequently discouraged military expeditions, have seldom willingly submitted to control by a central authority. The few bedouins inhabiting the eastern desert border regions also have been reluctant to acknowledge the suzerainty of any government. Under these conditions, the exercise of central authority has been extremely difficult, even in modern times, and the rise and fall of small principalities and tribal states has been a prominent characteristic of Yemeni history.

Although the civil war between republicans and the royalist followers of the Imam during the 1962-70 period jolted the Yemenis out of their medieval lethargy. Yemen continues to be an inward-looking and primitive land, now preoccupied with its many domestic problems and its unfinished social revolution.





shortage of med cal personnel, the drought-induced famines, not to speak of the ravages of war, have combined to meid a population that is generally inclined to accept the misfortunes of life as ordained by God. The typical villager is locked by ignorance into a timeless world of spirits or demons, called jinns, and of custom. Governed by superstition and fear, he is skeptical of change but not unreceptive if its advantages are clearly demonstrated.

A serious impediment to development is the widespread habit of chewing qat, a mild narcotic shrub grown on the Yemeni hillsides. Between 75%

and 90% of all adult males are said to be habitual users; some estimates place expenditures for qat as high as one-third of the cash income of the average Yemeni. Urban Yemenis, in particular, like to spend the afternoon chewing, smoking the water pipe, and exchanging gossip. Some of these gatherings last well into the evening, inducing a sense of euphoria in the participants but making work nearly impossible. Government efforts to eliminate the cultivation of the bush, announced in May 1972, are likely to prove ineffective, since qat is an important feature of Yemeni social life and a lucrative cash crop.



Antiquated social practices and a rigid social structure intermesh with the country's fragile economic system to limit the prospects of development. There seem to be few economic initiatives that can have major impact in moving the country toward self-sustaining growth, and economic viability is many decades away. At the equivalent of US\$40 to US\$50 per year, per capita income is one of the lowest in the Arab world, and unemployment and underemployment are believed to be considerable. However, for the moment at least, the government seems intent on tackling the country's severe economic difficulties, foreign aid is coming in, and the private sector is being bolstered.

The national budget represents only rough estimates of receipts and expenditures. The latter increased in FY71 to over US\$35 million, but the expansion has been concentrated on defense and internal security. Other uses of budgetary funds are indicated by a remark of a former Prime Minister who likened the

budget to "a fund for the relief of the unemployed, the disabled, and the needy, as well as the source by which the greedy ones get rich." Few people, however, get rich in Yemen.

Although survey missions have located some deposits of copper, coal, and oil, these natural resources have not so far proved to be of commercial significance. In this context, industrialization is virtually out of the question. There are only about 8,000 industrial workers in Yemen, a quarter of whom are employed in the two factories run by the state-owned textile concern.


The republic's first economic priority, then, is agriculture, accounting for about 90% of employment and providing an estimated 70% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Since ancient times, the Yemeni farmer, despite his limited technical knowledge, has ranked among the most skilled in the world. Almost every hillside on which cultivation is possible is elaborately terraced, and the irrigation systems are

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carefully maintained. A variety of crops are produced, including millet, wheat, barley, corn, an assortment of fruits, date palms, and coffee. Nevertheless, under present cenditions Yemeni agriculture can meet the country's demand for food only in unusually good crop years. The shortage of water is a prime reason for the inability to increase production, although groundwater reservoirs in the Tihamah could conceivably be tapped. Moreover, the land is not as fertile as it once was; yields are fairly high only in relation to those elsewhere in Arabia. Combined with the farmer's ignorance of new ogricultural techniques, these factors suggest that, even with extensive foreign assistance, Yemen's green revolution is years away.

Aside from the difficulty of expanding the national product, the ability to augment revenues is severely hampered by an ineffective system of taxation and the public's traditional resistance to government authority. Instead of being taxed, Yemeni tribes expect to be courted with handsome government subsidies. Moreover, for the person who pays taxes, rates often depend on his relationship with the tax collector.


Financial support for development projects must come almost entirely from external sources. The U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China have been Yemen's major sources of aid, and West Germany has replaced the United States as the main Western contributor following the break in U.S.-Yemeni diplomatic ties in 1967. The improved relations with Saudi Arabia since the end of the civil war have stimulated inflows of foreign capital, and many businessmen have fled the highly socialized Yemen (Aden)-the P.D.R.Y.-to come to the Y.A.R. The result has been a commercial surge in San'a' and Al Hudaydah, Yemen's ability to earn foreign exchange is limited, however, as it has an unfavorable balance of trade with almost every country with which it deals. Although imports tripled during the 1964-70 period, exports dropped, largely because of drought years. The stability of the rival, such as it is, has been underpinned over the years by substantial remittances (US\$35 million-\$50 million per year) from thousands of Yemeni emigrants working abroad.



Unless the economic situation improves, it will be extremely difficult to create modern political structures. Operating as a closed system, the Imamate was not required to satisfy economic demands, which were muted in any case. Maldistribution of income was hardly a problem in a country that boasted little in the way of wealth. Even the despotic Imams were not men of great wealth or given to Western luxuries. Maintaining the political balance was a relatively simple

matter of playing off one faction against another and keeping the tribes in line by bribery, cajolery, or military force. So long as outside factors did not intrude, this was a reasonably workable system.

Since the overthrow of the Imamate in 1962, the basic conditions governing political life have not changed substantially. Perhaps the main difference between the old and new regimes is that Yemeuis are, in theory, no longer subjects of the Imam but citizens




overworked high officials to delegate authority. Moreover, the administrative machinery is corrupt and, in the words of a former Prime Minister, characterized by "confusion, lack of discipline, carelessness, and irresponsibility."

In the absence of a stabilizing officialdom, the frequent changes in government (some 21 cabinets in the 1962-71 period) have had an immobilizing effect. This situation would be far more serious, however, were it not for the inertia of the rural areas and the tradition of local government which enables villagers and tribes to conduct their own affairs for prolonged periods without interference or supervision from San'a'. (The apparatus of modern government simply does not operate outside Yemen's three main cities.) Furthermore, the Sharia (Islamic law), still the country's only regular code of law, serves as a weighty stabilizing factor. Recent events suggest not only a

consolidation of revolutionary gains but also a moderation of revolutionary excesses and a reassertion of tradition. An accommodation with the royalists, exclusive of the Imamic family, was achieved in May 1970.

Since then, the Yemeni leadership has been engaged in a more or less systematic effort to restructure the political process and enlarge the framework of public participation. The Permanent Constitution, a rather conservative document declaring Yemen to be an Arab, Islamic state, was proclaimed in December 1970, and popular elections for the new parliament were held in early 1971. In theory, this assembly, the Consultative Council, is to represent all "national tendencies of thought," but it is dominated by tribal leaders, and the censtitutional ban on parties severely inhibits expression of public opinion, particularly by leftwing elements.

Can the New Structure Survive? (c)



The decidedly stronger of the two branches of government is the executive, composed of a Republican Council and a Council of Ministers. The Republican Council, a three-man body appointed by the Consultative Council and presided over by the President, is responsible for establishing and supervising national policy. The Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, is responsible for executing government policy. A third executive agency, an 11-member Supreme Council for Defense of the State, was reportedly established in September 1972, its membership to include the Chairman of the Republican Council, ranking military officers, and prominent tribal leaders.

It is impossible to determine whether this new and rather awkward constitutional structure will survive. Yemen has had no experience with parliamentary government, and lines of authority between the executive and the parliament are not clearly drawn. All may ultimately be overshadowed by the Supreme Council.

As elsewhere in the Middle East, intervention in politics by the armed forces is always possible. In striking contrast to the situation which existed under the Imamate, the military has become an important force in the workings of government. Under the influence of and with aid from the Egyptians and Soviets, the army made great gains after 1962. Some of those gains have now been lost, however; as the army is disturbed by the same tribal and religious divisions which affect the rest of society, its operational and organizational capabilities are limited. In short, the

military would be unlikely to govern the country any more efficiently than the present civilian leadership and would be equally constrained by harsh economic realities.

For many years, Yemeni political life will reflect the character of its deeply conservative Muslim society. Modernization will proceed only fitfully, and rapid transformations in any sector are not to be expected. Were Marxist-oriented radicals of the Yemen (Aden) stripe to assume power, it is doubtful whether their control could be imposed without stimulating the rebellious instincts of the "anti-Communist" tribes

and prejudicing the developing rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, whose friendship is important to Yemeni stability. A radical program might also frighten away the commercial interests on whom the present government has come to depend for support. On the other hand, a more "rightwing" course runs the risk of alienating educated youths anxious to put an end to Yemen's backwardness, as well as important groups in the military and civil services. Dissident groups have already denounced President Iryani as a rightist and warned against "reactionary, in perialist plots" against the revolution.



Delegation arriving in China

The Search for Aid (c)

In line with changing domestic policies, foreign alignments also are beginning to shift. Yemen's primary international concerns are related to a search for foreign aid and the need to stabilize relations with its neighbors. According to the Foreign Minister in 1971, Yemen's policy is to remain friendly with all countries, but in order of importance the Arab states rank first, the socialist countries second, and the Western powers last. With the partial exception of the

Arab countries, however, Yemen has no natural affinity with any state or bloe. Its people have little understanding of either democratic or Communist political systems. During critical stages of the civil war, the republicans leaned heavily on the Soviets, who have since shown considerably less interest in the country, but acceptance of Soviet aid was basically a tactical consideration, as was the Imam's fliration with the Communist countries in the 1950's. By the

same token, Yemen's opening to the West beginning in the late 1960's and culminating in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in July 1972, implies no moral commitment to Western patterns of development or politics, which are essentially inapplicable in any event. It does underscore the need for Western aid in the form of technology and equipment and emphasizes the growth of a more pragmatic government outlook that stands in sharp contrast to past government policy, including that of the period Egyptian domination.

Relations with other Arab nations have been characterized by suspicions only slightly less deep than those directed toward the non-Arab world. During the civil war, the royalists and tribesmen generally viewed the Egyptians as occupiers; even many republicans resented their heavy hand. Yemen has traditionally viewed Saudi Arabia as an enemy, fighting and losing a war with it in 1934 and, as recently as early 1970, bombing border towns because of Saudi support of Yemeni royalists. With the end of the civil war, however, relations improved, and Saudi Arabia has become an important source of aid.

After Yemen (Aden)-formally the P.D.R.Y.gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1967, relations with the south grew progressively worse, reaching a low point in October 1972 when Aderi dissidents, apparently encouraged by San'a', seized Aden's Kamaran Island and captured some Adeni soldiers. Soon thereafter, however, delegations from San'a' and Aden, meeting in Caise at the behest of the Arab League, reached agreement on the settlement of most differences and worked out a unification plan. The agreement according to which the two Yemens are to become one by the end of 1973 was signed by the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. presidents at a summit conference in Tripoli, Libya, on 28 November 1972, but it is questionable whether the two countries. with divergent histories and political coloring, can ever achieve a true merger.

Yemen's future will be determined by its ability to secure and utilize development assistance and, more importantly, by its success in accommodating the imperatives of the modern world with its ancient traditions. There is virtually no precedent for Yemen's contemporary situation. Although the country is no longer officially isolated, it is far removed from the mainstream of world affairs. While it is beginning to educate its children, it has few employment opportunities for them beyond traditional pursuits. Moreover, the country's prospects are overshadowed by its tendency toward divisiveness. The nation has a firm grounding in more than 3,000 years of history, but Yemen's revolutionary brand of nationalism has failed to bridge the gap between town and country, highland and coast, north and south, Zaydi and Shafi'i, tribe and nontribe. The revolution may have liberated the people from the yoke of the Imams, but the people have not yet decided where they are going or how they will get there.

Chronology (u/ou)

628

Yemen is converted to Islam.

907

The Zaydi sect, which became the basis of the theocratic Imamate, is introduced.

1517-06

First Ottoman occupation of Yemen.

1840-1918

Second occupation by Ottoman Turks.

1911

Treaty of Da'an, between the Turks and the Imam, is signed, granting special rights to the Zaydi tribes.

1918

Yemen becomes independent, except for a coastal strip retained by the United Kingdom until 1925.

1928

Yemen is recognized by the Soviet Union.

1934

Saudi Arabian-Yemen war is won by Saudi Arabia, which waives any territorial claim.

1946

Yemen is recognized by the United States.

1947

Yemen is admitted to the United Nations.

1962

September

Imam Ahmad dies of natural causes and is succeeded by Imam Badr on 19 September. Eight days later a coup, led by Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al-Sallal and others, overthrows the Imamate and proclaims the Yemen Arab Republic. Yemen is recognized by Egypt and the U.S.S.R. before the end of the month. Civil war between the republicans and the royalists begins.

December

The republican government is recognized by the United Nations, and its representatives are seated in the U.N. General Assembly.

1963

July

U.N. Yemen Observation Mission begins its operations, which continue till September 1964.

1964 March

President Sallal tours European Communist capitals and signs a 5-year treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R.

Tune

Sallal visits Communist China, where he signs a treaty of friendship.

October

Peace conference is held in Sudan under auspices of the Arab states; a ceasefire is agreed to but not observed.

Desemb

Serious opposition to Yemen's virtual occupation by Egyptians surfaces when 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani and Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri resign from the government.

1965

August

Egyptian President Nasir and Saudi Arabian King Faysal agree on a ceasefire in Yemen and begin plans for a peace conference.

November

First session of Yemeni peace conference held at Harad fails to reach agreement and never reconvenes.

1967 June

Yemen breaks relations with the United States over the Arab-Israeli war.

September

Egyptian troops and advisers begin to withdraw from Yemen.

Novembe

Pro-Egyptian President Sallal is ousted. He is replaced by a "Yemen first" regime under a three-member Republican Council headed by Iryani.

December

Egyptian withdrawal is completed.

1968 February

February

The royalist seige of San'a' is lifted with the reopening of the Al Hudaydah road.

Augus

Mutiny of predominantly Shafi'i shock troops is broken by tribal forces.

12

1969 March

Provisional National Council, which serves as a consultative quasi-legislature, meets, attended by tribal chiefs and other notables.

September-December

Saudi Arabia temporarily resumes aid to royalists who eventually regain Sa'dah.

1970 March

March

Peace agreement between republicans and royalists finally achieved at conference in Jidda.

May

The government adds ex-royalists to the Republican Council, cabinet, and the National Council.

December

New constitution is promulgated.

1971

March-April

Consultative Council is elected, first elective legislative body.

1972

July-October

Dissident forces from Yemen (Aden)—the P.D.R.Y.—spark military engagements; San'a' takes Kamaran Island.

November

P.D.R.Y. and Y.A.R. Presidents meet in Tripoli, Libya, and ratify agreement to unify countries in 1973.

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Area Brief (u/ou)

LAND

Size: About 75,000 sq. m⁴. (parts of border with Saudi Arabia and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen undefined)

Use: 20% agricultural, 1% forested, 79% desert, waste or urban

Land boundaries: 950 mi.

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. Coastline: 325 mi.

PEOPLE

Population: 6,074,000 (mid-1972 est.); average annual growth rate, about 2.9%

Ethnic divisions: 90% Arab, 10% Afro-Arab (mixed)

Religion: 100% Muslim

Language: Arabic

Literacy: 15% (est.)

Labor force: Almost entirely engaged in agriculture and herding, about 8,000 in industry, 400,000 in commerce and construction

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Yemen Arab Republic

Type: Republic

Capital: San'a'

Political subdivisions: 8 provinces

Legal system: Based on Turkish law, Islamic law, and local customary law; first constitution promulgated December 1970; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: President, Prime Minister, Republican Council, Consultative Council

Government leader: President 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani Communists: Few known

Member of: Arab League, FAO, ICAO, 1TU, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO

ECONOMY

Agriculture: Sorghum and millet, qat (a mild narcotic), cotton, coffee, fruits and vegetables; self-sufficient in food only in very good crop years

Major industries: Cotton textiles, leather goods, cement, aluminum products

Electric power: 4,000 kw. capacity (1970); 14 million kw.-hr. produced (1970), 2 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: About \$6 million (1970)—qat, coffee, hides, rock salt

Imports: About \$88 million (1970)—manufactured consumer goods, petroleum products, sugar grain, flour and other foodstuffs

Major trade partners: Trade with Aden 25% of total, others include U.S.S.R., Japan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, France

Monetary conversion rate: 1 Yemeni riyal=about US\$0.20 as of late 1972

Fiscal year: 1 July-30 June

CON UNICATIONS

Railroads: None

Highways: 2,160 mi.; 290 mi. bituminous; 270 mi. crushed stone and gravel; 1,600 mi. earth roads and motorable tracks

Ports: 3 major, 2 minor

Civil air: 8 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 24 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway over 12,000 ft., 6 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 12 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.

Telecommunications: Systems among Mideast's worst; consists of meager open-wire lines and low-power radio communication stations; principal center, San'a', secondary centers Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz; 3,550 telephones; 25,000 radio receivers (approx.); 2 AM radio-broadcast stations

DEFENSE FORCES


About 1,470,000 males 15-49 (July 1972 est.); 53% fit for military service; about 31,000 in armed forces; approximately 50,000 reach military age (18) annually


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
CONFIDENTIAL


Places and features referred to in the General Survey (U/OU)


	COORDINATES					c	оопрі	RDINATES		
		'1				•	'N.	0	''	
Abā as Su'ūd, Saudi Arabia				-06	Kirsh, Yemen (Aden)			46	45	
Ad Dali'			44	43	Madiq Kamaran (channel)			42	38	
Aden, Yemen (Aden)			45	01	Mafhaq	15	07	43	54	
Ahmadi			42	57	Manákhah	15	07	43	44	
Al Bayda'			45	36	Ma'rib	15	30	45	21	
Bayt al Faqih			43	17	Maydi	16	18	42	48	
Al Hudaydah			42	57	Mocha				15	
Al Luhayyah			42	42	Najran, Saudi Arabia (oasis)				10	
Al Luhayyah (port)	15	42	42	42	Perim, Yemen (Aden) (island)				25	
Ar Råhidah	:3	20	44	17	Qa'tabah				42	
Asir, Saudia Arabia (region)	19	00	42	00	Qizān, Saudi Arabia				32	
As Salif	15	18	42	41	Ramlat as Sab'atayn (dunes)				00	
At Ta'if, Saudi Arabia			40	24	Ridā'	14	28		53	
At Turbah	13	02	43	54	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	94	38		43	
Az Zaydiyah	15	18	43	04	Rub' al Khali (desert)				00	
Bab el Mandeb (strait)			43	20	Sa'dah			43		
Bahrain (island)			50	30	Salif, Ra's as (point)			42		
Bājil	15	04	43	17	San'a'	15	22	44		
Balaq	15	19	45	23	Ta'izz	19	20	44		
Bani al Harith	15	38	44	10	Tihāmah (area)			47		
Bani al Harith (tribal area)				10	Uqdah, Saudi Arabia			43		
Barat				39	Wādi Zabid (wadi)	14	00	43		
Da'ân				50	Zabid	11	10	43		
Dhamār				23	Zahrān, Saudi Arabia					
Dhofar, Saudi Arabia (region)				10		11	40	43	30	
Hadhramaut (region)				00	Selected Airfields					
Ḥajjah				34	Al Bayda					
Harad				04	Al Hudaydah Nam	14	06	45		
Harib				30	Al Hudaydah New	14	45	42		
lbb				12	As Salif East	15	18	42		
Jiblah			44		Qalat Marinaf	16	00	43		
Jidda (Juddah), Saudi Arabia			39		Rawdah	15	28	44		
lişayn			44		Sadah New	16	58	43		
Kamarān, Yemen (Aden) (island)			42		Sana South	15	19	44		
Khawr Kathib (bay)			42		Sukhne	14	48	43		
	1.4	114	42	31	Taizz New	13	4 I	44	08	











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Summary Map

