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Government and Politics

Yemen (Ṣan'a')

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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YEMEN (SAN'A')

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This General Survey supersedes the one dated June 1970, copies of which should be destroyed.

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Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Republican Council (C)

Government and Politics

A. Introduction (S)

For almost 8 years after the traditional Imamate was overthrown, and the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) proclaimed in 1962, a state of civil war prevailed, and the immediate concern of the Y.A.R. Government was survival. However, since early 1970 when a cease-fire was arranged between the republicans and the royalists, considerable progress has been made toward the establishment of modern political institutions.

The constitution of 1970 provided for the creation of an elective legislative body, the Consultative Council. Although the Consultative Council does not play a significant role in the policymaking process and acts chiefly as a check on the executive bodies of the government, its creation signifies a commitment on the part of the republican regime to representative government. The Consultative Council elects the members of the key executive body, the Republican Council.

In the absence of legal political parties and readily identifiable interest groups, political activity in the Y.A.R. has been oriented around individuals rather than ideologies and has been characterized by fierce infighting. As of early 1973 the most important figure on the political scene is President 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Republican Council. His major rivals include former Prime Ministers Muhsin al-'Ayni, Ahmad Numan, and Hasan al-'Amri. Members of the leadership group have differed over the policy to be followed toward the Y.A.R.'s southern neighbor, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.), the structure of the Y.A.R. executive, and the role of the tribes in the political process. The basic differences among the elite, however, have been over their positions of power within the republican government rather than over the direction of its policy.

Despite the commitment of the republican regime to modernism and representative government, tribalism remains a major political force in the country. Members of tribes belonging to the Zaydi sect of Islam continue to occupy the preeminent position in Yemeni society. Since the departure in late 1967 of the Egyptian forces and advisers on whom the regime had depended during its first 5 years, the republican government has become progressively more conservative. Royalists were included in the government formed in 1970, and in many areas the management of local affairs has reverted to the tribes. The Consultative Council is controlled by tribal leaders, chiefly Zaydis, and provides a link between the government and the tribes.

Prior to 1970 the government had developed only the bare outlines of a national policy. Since that time the development of a coordinated national program has received greater attention. San'a's major domestic goal since the end of the civil war has been the successful implementation of a limited postwar reconstruction program.

From 1962 to 1967, the Y.A.R. had no foreign policy of its own, but followed that of Egypt. Since 1967, San'a' has conducted its foreign affairs independently and has been more moderate in its approach. Relations with Saudi Arabia have improved while ties with Egypt have regressed to the level of normal diplomatic relations between independent countries. During most of the period relations with the P.D.R.Y. were strained and both countries helped each other's dissidents. Relations with Aden—the P.D.R.Y.—deteriorated even further in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In the fall of 1972, under pressure from other Arab states to resolve their differences, the two countries signed an agreement calling for unity within a year; but the disagreements between the two states are so basic that unity seems highly unlikely.

Relations with Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, have suffered from San'a's attempts to improve its relations with the West. Popular interest in foreign affairs, however, seldom goes beyond the events of the Arab world. Yemen has supported the Arab position on Israel and has attempted to secure full membership for itself in the Arab community.

Although the volatile nature of the armed tribes upon which the republic depends for support as well as the possibility of dissidence in the armed forces are potential threats to the security of the Y.A.R., the republican government appears in little danger of

being overthrown. The Communist Party of Yemen is small and ineffectual, and for the most part the Communist diplomatic and aid missions in the country seem more interested in cultivating good government-to-government relations than in undertaking subversion. The greatest vulnerability probably lies in the possibility of a small group of dissidents, especially army officers, seizing key positions and securing aid from sympathetic governments before loyal elements could rally to the aid of the republican regime.

B. Structure of government

1. Central government

The governmental structure (Figure 1) of the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) has emerged out of the experience of the country's long civil war and the efforts to effect a reconciliation between the republicans and the supporters of the former Imamate regime. A permanent constitution, which reflects the diversity of political forces in the country, was adopted in 1970. One of its features is an elective unicameral legislative body, the Consultative Council; and although the council's functioning is less than perfect, it does mark a step toward representative government. The executive branch of the central government, under a chairman, is composed of the Republican Council and the Council of Ministers. A former Prime Minister, Ahmad Muhammad Numan, has described



FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U/OU)

the Republican Council as being responsible for decision-making; the Council of Ministers as the policy administrators; and the Consultative Council as the "guardians of the public interest." (U/OU)

The distribution of power between the central government and local areas remains a hotly disputed question; many officials at the local level claim that the central government is too strong and that all decisions are made in the capital. On the other hand, the management of many local affairs has, almost by default, reverted to tribal chiefs and other traditional leaders to whom many people give their primary loyalty. The central government claims that it does not exercise effective control over outlying areas. (U/OU)

a. Constitution (S)

The "permanent constitution" of the Y.A.R. was promulgated on 28 December 1970 by the Republican Council. In an effort to increase popular acceptance, the draft of the constitution had been published in September 1970, the Yemeni public had been asked for suggestions for the document's modification, and a number of meetings had been held with tribal and religious leaders. The Republican Council subsequently made some alterations in the constitution prior to its issuance.

Since the republican revolution began in 1962, there has been a commitment to the idea of a constitutional government embodying some form of democratic representation. Indeed, several "constitutions"—all of them created by decree—were introduced after 1962, though none was ever fully implemented. As Yemen's revolution was encouraged by Egypt and carried out primarily by military men, the first republican constitution had a strong Egyptian coloration. This provisional constitution of October 1962 concentrated authority in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council under the leadership of Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al-Sallal, who was also President, Prime Minister, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It also established a Higher Defense Council composed of regional military governors and important tribal leaders.

A new constitutional document proclaimed in April 1963 gave unlimited powers to the President but established some additional advisory and administrative bodies. This was amended in January 1964, but the principle of a presidential regime was retained. Another constitution was introduced in April 1964, declaring an Islamic republic, somewhat limiting the powers of the President, and differentiating more clearly between the legislative and executive functions

within the government, with the former vested in an advisory council. In May 1965, when intrasectarian cooperation was at a high point, an "interim" constitution was decreed. This constitution, while not otherwise substantially changing the previously established government structure, introduced a Republican Council to share executive duties with the President.

During the tumultuous period from 1964 to 1969, the constitution was almost completely ignored, both by the Egyptians who held the real power until 1967 and by the Yemenis during and after the period of Egyptian domination. When in early 1969 the country finally became quiet enough to once more permit consideration of constitutional government, the Republican Council decided that any new constitution should be based on popular decision. It therefore appointed by executive order a new body, the National Council, and delegated to it the task of producing a viable constitution.

The 1970 constitution is a wordy and in many ways ambiguous document, reflecting the necessity perceived by its authors to appeal to a wide range of opinion, including those conservative tribal leaders who had supported the former Imamate. The constitution's lack of precision is most apparent in the articles which deal with the distribution of power between the Republican Council, Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, and the Consultative Council. The failure to clearly define the powers of these branches and their relationship with each other creates a potential source of conflict. There have been several occasions since the new constitution was adopted when the Chairman of the Republican Council and the Prime Minister clashed because of contradictory views of their prerogatives. In addition, a clash between the Republican Council and the Consultative Council took place in July 1971, when the Chairman of the Republican Council temporarily imprisoned the Deputy Speaker of the Consultative Council for making what was considered an inflammatory antigovernment speech. The Consultative Council threatened to resign unless Chairman Iryani recognized the right of free speech and parliamentary immunity of assembly members. Chairman Iryani responded by threatening to dissolve the assembly and suspend the constitution, telling the Consultative Council that it must recognize the Republican Council's "higher authority."

The constitution describes the country as a "consultative parliamentary republic." Not only is Islam declared the state religion, but it is to provide the framework within which state policy should be made. At the same time, the preamble to the constitution includes the admission that the Y.A.R. can learn from the culture and experiences of scientifically advanced nations. Ties of friendship are proclaimed with fellow Arabs and "friends in both east and west." Recognition is also given to the idea of eventual unity with the neighboring People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.).

The economy of the country, according to the constitution, is to be organized in accordance with a government-formulated plan, although the principle of Islamic "social justice" is to be taken into account. The constitution does provide, however, for private economic activity, and promises protection for private property, but the state is the owner of all mineral resources. Education and health services are acknowledged to be rights of every citizen but only insofar as the country's resources permit. While the constitution permits free expression and communication—within the bounds of the law—partisanship in all forms is prohibited. This is a device to prevent the establishment of political parties. The right to organize trade unions and other associations, however, is guaranteed.

To initiate a constitutional amendment, a request must be submitted signed by a majority of the members of the Consultative Council. The adoption of a proposed change requires the support of two-thirds of the Consultative Council. The Supreme Constitutional Court is authorized to organize the process for amending the constitution.

b. Executive bodies (S)

The key executive body is the Republican Council, which determines general policy and supervises its execution. The Republican Council was created in the mid-1960's; its size and duties have varied since then. During the period of greatest Egyptian influence, the Republican Council served as an advisory body to President 'Abd Allah al-Sallal; following Sallal's ouster in 1967, the Republican Council took over the executive power formerly vested in the presidency. The 1970 constitution states that the Republican Council shall have three to five members; the Consultative Council passed a law setting the membership at three in 1971.

Members of the Republican Council are elected by the Consultative Council for a 5-year term. Vacancies are to be filled by the Consultative Council within 60 days, according to the constitution, although this requirement has not been enforced. From September 1971 until June 1972 the Republican Council had only two members, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani and

Muhammad 'Ali 'Uthman, as the third council member, Gen. Hasan al-'Amri, had been stripped of all his offices and sent into exile after killing a San'a' photographer in a quarrel. In June 1972, 'Abd Allah al-Hajari, who was known to be a supporter of President Iryani, was elected to the Republican Council, and he became Prime Minister in December 1972. Some have advocated the abolition of the Republican Council and its replacement by a single executive, although the plural executive system has its supporters and may be politically advantageous.

The Republican Council elects a chairman from its ranks. The constitution describes the chairmanship as rotating but 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani has held the chairmanship since November 1967. The chairman is considered the head of state, and he is often referred to as the President. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces, which are subject to control by the Republican Council. The workings of the council are unclear but it is believed that Chairman Iryani has been the dominant member of the Republican Council for several years.

The Republican Council can pass decrees with the force of law, even when the Consultative Council is in session, if "anything occurs necessitating immediate action." The decrees must not contradict the constitution or the annual budget bill and must be forwarded to the Consultative Council. If not approved by the legislative body, the decrees lose the force of law.

The Chairman of the Republican Council appoints the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, who must be approved by the Consultative Council, names the members of the Council of Ministers, who must be approved by both the Republican Council and the Consultative Council. The Consultative Council can withdraw its confidence from the Prime Minister by a two-thirds vote, following which he must submit his own resignation and that of the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister functions essentially as an administrative official, chairing meetings of the Council of Ministers, and coordinating the activities of the ministries. The Council of Ministers is responsible for executing the policies of the Republican Council and preparing the draft budget.

The Council of Ministers is composed of the Prime Minister; a deputy prime minister; and other ministers.[1] Ministerial portfolios are as follows: Agriculture, Communications, Economy, Education, Foreign Affairs, Health, Information, Interior, Justice, Local Administration, Religious Endowments (*Awqaf*), Treasury, and Works. There are also four ministers of state. National defense policy is determined by the three-man Republican Council under the leadership of Chairman Iryani.

The jurisdictions of the individual ministries have never been clearly defined, leaving overlapping areas of responsibility. Few of the ministries are well organized internally. This confused situation results largely from the general unfamiliarity with modern governmental organization and an almost complete absence of trained civil servants.

The republican government has also created ministerial-level committees and other administrative agencies to perform some functions. A committee to oversee the government's economic and financial machinery was created in September 1971 and was attached to the Prime Minister's Office.

In January 1972 a ministerial-level Higher Committee for Development and Planning Affairs was created, along with a new Central Planning Agency.

Chairman Iryani and leading tribal and military leaders met in September 1972 and reportedly decided to form a new decisionmaking body which would take precedence over the Council of Ministers. The new body, called the Supreme Council for the Defense of the State, has 11 members representing the tribes, the military, and the Republican Council.

c. Legislative branch (S)

The unicameral Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), created by the December 1970 constitution, is the legislative branch of the Y.A.R. Government. It is not powerful enough, however, to play a consistent part in the determination of national policy. The council's secondary responsibility is to supervise and check the country's executive branch. Composed of 159 members, elected for 4-year terms, the Consultative Council replaced the appointive National Council, which had been set up in 1969 in an advisory capacity to the Republican Council. The National Council was short-lived, but it did participate in the drafting of the permanent constitution and, in April 1970, endorsed the government's efforts to effect a reconciliation with the royalists.

The membership of the Consultative Council is largely comprised of tribal leaders and notables whose position and prestige are independent of their membership in it. With a few exceptions, none are well-known national political figures. The Speaker of the Consultative Council is 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar,

[1] For a current listing of government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation. He was also speaker of the preceding National Council.

Legislative proposals may be initiated by the Consultative Council or by executive authorities. A bill approved by the Consultative Council is transmitted to the Chairman of the Republican Council for action. He can approve the bill or, within 30 days, return it to the legislature with a request for its modification. If the Consultative Council repasses the bill in its original version by a two-thirds vote, it becomes law. The Consultative Council can be dissolved by the Republican Council, but the dissolution announcement must set a new election within 90 days or the old body reconvenes.

d. Judicial system (S)

Although the several constitutional documents issued since the 1962 Yemen revolution all called for an independent judiciary and the reorganization of the rudimentary Ministry of Justice which existed under the Imamate, few modifications have actually been made in this branch of government. This has led to some complaints about the workings of the judiciary, especially about delays. The old judicial pattern, with Islam being the major source of law, has been retained and it will be a long time before it can be replaced by a secular legal system. In fact, the constitution of 1970 stipulates that membership in the judiciary is to be restricted to Sharia (the Islamic law code) scholars. On the other hand, there have been many government decrees and enactments since 1962, and they constitute a fairly large and growing body of secular law to which judges look for guidance.

Shortly after the revolution, state security courts in which Islamic law was not applied were created to try crimes against the state or against public order. The state security courts were established under the pressure of wartime psychology and were undoubtedly inspired by Egyptian frustration with the traditional legal system in Yemen (San'a'). They were simply courts appointed by the head of state to deal with "enemies" of the state, who sometimes were merely political opponents of the republican regime. These special courts were drumhead tribunals, in which confessions were extracted from the accused and summary sentences were issued subject only to reprieve or modification by the head of state. Their introduction reportedly was the cause of widespread popular disapproval, and they now seem to have disappeared.

The 1970 constitution called for the creation of a Supreme Constitutional Court, and enabling legislation was adopted in December 1971. Reference is also occasionally made to a Supreme Court of Appeals, and a president of that court was appointed in February 1972. It is not known whether the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals are the same judicial bodies. The Supreme Constitutional Court is described as consisting of seven members to be elected by the Consultative Council from 14 candidates nominated by the Chairman of the Republican Council. The judges, who must be Sharia scholars, will serve 4-year terms. The Supreme Constitutional Court is to be involved in determining the legitimacy of laws and resolutions, presiding over trials of members of the Republican Council and Council of Ministers, and hearing election disputes.

Islamic law is applied throughout the country, although the Zaydi and the Shafi'i parts of the population follow different schools of jurisprudence, and the tribes living outside the settled areas use their own common law, known as *'urf*. The Sharia is not "law" in the Western sense of the word, nor is it "canon law" in the sense that it governs only religious matters. It is rather regarded as the revealed law of God, making no distinction between the religious and the secular and regulating all aspects of political, social, family, and private life.

In Muslim theory, the key link between the Sharia and the state is the ruler, who is, by consensus of the community of Muslims, the enforcer of God's will on earth, and before the revolution this theory was accepted almost literally by most Zaydis. The ruler appoints the religious judges, or *qadis*, who are charged with determining the application of the Sharia, and he also enforces the judgments of the Sharia courts. Since the advent of the Yemen Arab Republic, the head of state, through the Ministry of Justice, has taken over the function of appointing and paying judges and administering the courts. The appointment, transfer, and promotion of judges is defined by laws adopted by the Consultative Assembly. The dismissal of judges is proscribed by the constitution.

The number of courts in Yemen is not known. Generally speaking, a court is found wherever there is a population large enough to justify one. Usually Sharia law, distinct from *'urf*, is enforced in those relatively settled areas where a representative of the government is present.

When an offense is reported and charges instituted, the *qadi* informs the local representative of the government, and this official issues orders to have the persons involved appear at court. After hearing their arguments, the *qadi*, who has no enforcement powers,

again sends his decision to the official, together with his recommendations for punishment, based on the Sharia. The official then carries out the punishment, if he agrees it is necessary, as the agent of the plaintiff.

Appeal is seldom made on legal grounds, although on rare occasions a judgment may be questioned by one of the parties involved. In such instances, the case may be sent forward to a *mufti*, a jurisconsult trained in law, who states his interpretation of how a specific part of the Sharia may be applied. Alternatively, it may be sent to a council of *qadis* who review the matter from a legal point of view. These *muftis* and *qadis* are usually, but not necessarily, government officials as well as religious men. All appeals, however, are forwarded through state administrative channels, and hence are subject to political pressure. Most commonly, appeal is made on a personal basis to the local administrator who is the enforcer of the Sharia. Government officials have wide latitude, both legal and political, in exercising leniency.

Punishment for those found guilty of offenses is severe and prompt. In tribal areas, the families of the plaintiff often prefer to carry out sentences themselves, particularly if capital punishment is involved, for this allows them to carry out the dictates of their personal and tribal moral code for blood revenge. If the punishment requires imprisonment, the prisoner is expected to be cared for by his relatives. In the case of minor crimes it has been customary to confine the prisoner's ankles in heavy leg-irons and turn him loose to procure his own food (Figure 2). Corporal or capital punishment can legally be replaced by the *diyyah* (bloodwit or fine), and financial settlement may even be preferred by both sides. While lashing, mutilation, stoning, and other forms of corporal punishment are sanctioned by the Sharia and still applied, the republican regime is moving to modernize the system by introducing more humane methods of punishment and in July 1972 a decree was issued abolishing the chaining and branding of prisoners. Meanwhile, putting the severed heads and limbs of criminals on display over the main gates of cities is considered a deterrent to potential criminals, and public executions and mutilations are still carried out (Figure 3). Major prisons are in Ta'izz, Ibb, and San'a'; an attempt is being made to eliminate small jails in the dwellings of judges, prefects, and some other government officials.

The tradition of tribal independence and the endemic state of anarchy that prevailed over the centuries gave rise to a system of common law known as *'urf*, which has little connection with Sharia. Used by many tribes outside the settled areas, it is a collection of unwritten laws, usages, and traditions, passed down orally from generation to generation, embodying the decisions of tribal chiefs and wise men. The *'urf* is intended to maintain order by applying sanctions to those who, either intentionally or accidentally, have caused damage to others. It also permits the tribes to regulate without undue bloodshed disputes over water rights, grazing grounds, personal quarrels, debts, and other intratribal disagreements which may arise. The chief of the tribe acts as "judge"; no special training is necessary for this role as the tribal leader's reservoir of accumulated experience is sufficient. The dominant principles of *'urf* are revenge and reparation. Another important principle is that of collective responsibility by a tribe or clan, for it is the clan or family kinship group which is the unit to be protected, not the individual. From this concept, it is a short step to the blood feud, one of the damaging characteristics of the *'urf* system. There is a strong emphasis on the right of the clan to settle arguments and on the redress of wrongs. Consequently, Yemeni tribesmen are contemptuous of men who permit someone else to set their laws and right their wrongs; the concept of committing a crime against a state (i.e., an outside legal or moral force) is alien to them.

The desert bedouins in the Ramlat as Sab'atayn area of eastern Yemen practice a variation of *'urf* known as the *manqad* system. In it, the chief *manqad*, or tribal judge, is elected by his tribe. He in turn freely chooses others from outside his own clan to assist him in making his decisions. These assistants all receive the title of *manqad* and, either separately or together, they perform the functions of a final court of appeal. No tribesman having put his case to a *manqad* may withdraw it or refuse to abide by the decision without forfeiting tribal honor and being considered guilty of a great shame. Generally, this is strong enough punishment to insure compliance.

Intertribal crime in tribal areas is usually adjudicated by a government official or a religious man—both acceptable arbiters as they are believed to be above tribal rivalries. If the arbitration fails, a feud between the families, clans, or even the tribes may result. Little effort has been made by the government to modify the *'urf*, for fear of alienating tribesmen. The government seldom interferes in intertribal affairs, though when it is aware of criminal activity at this level it may try to levy fines or settle disputes forcibly.

2. Provincial government (S)

The structure of provincial government has not changed significantly since the revolution of 1962. In some respects, it goes back to arrangements predating Ottoman rule. The constitution of December 1970 stipulates that the number and boundaries of provincial administrative units are to be subject to determination by law. It also indicates that administrative units are to have local councils "in which the affairs of the regions shall be administered in a democratic manner." These constitutional provisions have not been implemented, and the provincial system is largely untouched.

Yemen is divided into eight provinces called *liwas*. Based largely on the old Turkish *sanjaks*, their boundaries are not fully delineated. They are: Ta'izz,

FIGURE 3. Heads of convicted lawbreakers placed on public view (U/OU)

FIGURE 2. Prisoner wearing leg-irons (U/OU)

San'a', Al Hudaydah, Ibb, Sa'dah, Hajjah, Rida', and Al Bayda' (see the Summary Map at the end of the Country Profile chapter).

The governor of a province is usually called an emir (*amir*). These officials were formerly appointed by the Imam for an indefinite term. Since these were highly important administrative posts, they were usually held by members of the Imam's family or one of the trusted sayyid families, a special group bound together and to the ruler by an alleged common origin: direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. They were directly responsible to the Imam, and as his surrogate each emir tried to create a small court around himself, made up of his clerks, servants, and bodyguards; in some cases he was lent small units of the Imam's army for tax-collecting and ceremonial purposes. A governor's enforcement of justice was conditioned by the political importance of the case and by his distance from the capital. A similar pattern was repeated in each lower level of the administration.

Provincial government under the republic retains many of the basic features of the Imamate system. There was initially, however, an effort by the republican government during the civil war to give responsibility for local affairs to local notables rather than attempting to impose outside representatives as the Imams had been doing. The governors and subordinate officials are under the authority of the central government, but the government gives sanction to the natural and traditional local leaders. The central government adopts the suggestions of local leaders and backs their actions on local matters; in return it expects their support in national affairs. The effectiveness of this system is insured to some degree through the stationing of army units in provincial capitals and through the local offices of some of the more important ministries, such as Treasury, Public Works, and Health. These offices provide funds, jobs, and other assistance at the provincial level.

The provinces are divided into a number of administrative subdivisions. The primary subdivision is the *qada'*. During the Imamate, the chief of a *qada'* was usually a sayyid, but by 1970 most of these posts had probably reverted to local notables.

The next smaller unit is the *nahiyah*. A *nahiyah* is subdivided into *'izlahs*, units which have loose relationships to tribal territories or to towns within the unit. Towns are governed as part of an *'izlah*, while larger cities are treated as equivalent units. Confusion often arises concerning the terminology applied to the leaders of these local units. The title *'amil* is used both for the head of a *qada* and of a *nahiyah*, although the head of a *qada'* is often called *qadi*, which is an honorific usually denoting a person learned in Islamic law or a judge in an Islamic court. In Yemen (San'a') the term *qadi* is also used to designate a commoner who has been elevated to a responsible position in the government. The head of a *nahiyah* is variously called a sheikh (*shaykh*), an *'aqil*, or a *hakim*, depending on the tribal area. These subdivisions are microcosms of the larger administrative units, although with greatly reduced powers and services.

Traditionally, each tribe and village in tribal areas freely selected its own chief, although tribal leadership in most cases was held within sheikhly families. During the 1930's and 1940's, the Imam imposed a new system under which officials of small towns and villages were nominated by the emir of the province and confirmed by the Imam. The tribes objected violently to this new policy, and it took over 20 years for the Imam to assert fully his right to select local leaders. This strengthening of the central government and reducing the independence of the smaller units was a contributing factor in the 1962 revolution, and the subsequent years of civil war saw power progressively returned to local leaders. The chiefs of the larger tribes deal with the central government almost as equals.

3. Civil service (S)

One of Yemen's more serious problems is its lack of a professional civil service and its shortage of trained and competent government personnel. In the days of the Imamate, the administration of government functions was carried out largely by the sayyid class. Their hold on government offices was the result of the Imam's religious and practical obligation to support the sayyids, as well as his desire to place his own kind in positions of responsibility. Because of the great influence they wielded, the sayyids were almost universally feared and hated. They were killed in large numbers during the revolution, and many of those who survived either fled the country or attempted to hide their identity. With their disappearance, Yemen lost all personnel who had anything more than the most rudimentary knowledge of government operations.

After 1962, the republican government sought to fill the void by calling home educated Yemenis living in exile or attending school abroad. In addition, Egyptian advisers were brought into Yemen in great numbers and installed in practically every government office of any size. Key ministries were virtually run by Egyptian experts. These were often well-trained men who honestly attempted to organize the central

government along more efficient lines, as well as to serve as agents of the Egyptian Government. Even the best intentioned Egyptian efforts met strong resistance from the xenophobic Yemenis, however, and their proposed improvements were frequently undercut by resentful Yemeni employees in the ministries.

Since the withdrawal of the Egyptians in 1967, the lack of personnel familiar with modern administrative procedures has hampered the government. There is also a rapid turnover among new personnel who quickly become frustrated with the involved political maneuvering that dominates the atmosphere.

In October 1971 a civil service code and a General Civil Service Council were established to handle administrative problems and to assist in the internal organization of the ministries. These replaced an earlier law and an employee affairs organization created in 1963. The most immediate problems the General Civil Service Council faces are the lack of cooperation on the part of the ministries themselves, the absence of clear lines of authority, and superfluous underemployed personnel, especially at the lower levels. In addition, it faces a long-established system of petty and major corruption, a general acceptance of nepotism, and a culture which encourages the evasion of responsibility. This situation encourages the perpetuation of widespread dishonesty, despite calls by high officials for investigations of malfeasance and a number of arrests each year on charges of embezzlement of state funds. Civil servants receive extremely low salaries, and even these are often not paid regularly. In July 1971, a strike of government employees took place in San'a'. Demands were presented to the Consultative Assembly for payment of salary in arrears and an end to corruption, but little resulted from the employees' action.

The official civil service exists primarily in the large urban centers. In FY70 the central government had approximately 13,500 employees. In the provinces, local authorities have their own coterie of unofficial civil servants comprised of their personal supporters.

C. Political dynamics

Since the republican regime replaced the Imamate in 1962, the foundations of a modern political system have evolved very slowly. In the period immediately after the revolution, the government was concerned with conducting a civil war to insure its continued existence and there was little movement toward the building of permanent political organizations. After the cease-fire between the royalists and the republicans in early 1970, royalists were included in the Council of Ministers as part of the agreement to end hostilities, and the legislative body formed under the new constitution represented all regions of the country, including those formerly under royalist control. Despite the tendency to return to traditional patterns following the end of the civil war, the republican regime remains committed, at least in principle, to modernization and to the establishment of a representative government. (U/OU)

Progress toward this goal, however, has been hindered by tribalism and absence of an effective bureaucracy. The fall of one Prime Minister, Ahmad Numan, was due at least in part to his unwillingness to recognize the tribal institutions and their importance as a political force of the country. In addition, the viability of the government continues to a large extent to be dependent on the presence of leaders capable of bringing together the disparate elements of Yemeni society. President 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani is the foremost figure on the Yemeni political scene and the only Yemeni leader believed able to command widespread respect. Iryani, however, is reported to be in poor health, and his departure from office is likely to lead to a period of intense maneuvering on the political scene and could even trigger hostilities between competing groups. (S)

1. Revolution, civil war, and reconciliation (S)

The 1962 revolution that touched off Yemen's long civil war was rather similar to earlier revolts in 1948, 1955, 1960, and 1961 in that it was an effort to overthrow the autocratic government of the Imams and to regain for the tribes some of their lost prerogatives. This revolt, however, was directed against a regime which was not deeply entrenched. It occurred only 8 days after Imam Badr succeeded his father, Imam Ahmad, who had died after years of illness. Moreover, it was led by a group of Zaydi army officers, headed by Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al-Sallal, who modeled themselves on the Egyptian Free Officers Movement of the 1950's and who were able to generate extensive foreign support, notably from Egypt.

The 1962 revolution began on 26 September with the shelling of the Imam's palace in San'a', the appointment of a Revolutionary Council, and the proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic. The new regime received foreign support almost immediately. Egypt, the U.S.S.R., and most other Communist countries extended diplomatic recognition on 29 September; in December, the United States recognized the republic, the United Nations seated the republican delegation in place of the royalist one, and

FIGURE 4. Imam Badr (*center left*), now believed to be in Cairo, discussing military operations with other members of the Hamid al-Din family at his headquarters during the civil war (C)

the countries recognizing the republic as the legal government of the country numbered more than 50. The clique of Zaydi army officers who staged the coup had received encouragement from Cairo in their plotting, and this was followed up a few days after the revolt by active Egyptian military assistance.

Imam Badr was originally believed to have been killed in the attack on the palace, but he escaped and a few weeks later reappeared in the northern part of the country where he could count on enlisting some tribal support. In addition, he invoked Saudi Arabian military aid for the royalists (Figure 4).

The republicans, with Egyptian help, won the initial phases of the civil war which ensued. They secured the main towns and roads, introduced the use of combat aircraft, and forced the royalists back into the highlands. By early 1963, the war was in a virtual stalemate, with the republicans controlling the coastal lowlands and the royalists controlling the highlands.

Between 1963 and 1966, military action sometimes took second place to diplomatic maneuvering. On the republican side, most foreign support came from Egypt, which poured in troops and arms in support of the military effort, and increasingly assumed the management of the government through civilian advisers who filled the gap left by the ouster of the traditional bureaucrats, the sayyids. In the spring of 1964 the President of the Y.A.R. visited the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, including China, signing treaties of friendship as he went. Saudi Arabia was the primary benefactor of the royalists, supplying arms, money, and a safe haven. For a time, the United Nations maintained a Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) that had been sent to oversee a futile disengagement agreement negotiated in 1963.

The first major break in the situation came in the fall of 1964. The UNYOM was withdrawn and a new cease-fire was arranged by the first direct negotiations between the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The relaxation of the military front stimulated a political reaction by San'a' to the Egyptian domination and caused an extensive reshuffle of the government that had been in power since the revolution.

Confusion in the republican camp assisted the royalist offensive undertaken after the collapse of the cease-fire. By August 1965, the royalists had regained about one-third of the area formerly held by the Egyptians and had control over half of the country, with other large areas in doubt. The change in the military situation led Egyptian President Nasir to agree with Saudi Arabian King Faysal to institute another cease-fire and to make plans for the holding of a peace conference. Yemeni leaders from both sides met at Harad in November 1965 but were unable to reach an agreement. After this abortive effort to end the war, Egypt sent still more troops into the YAR—reaching a maximum of about 60,000—and pledged that these forces would remain until the new nation could defend itself. The royalists also intensified their efforts and recaptured additional territory in the north and east. About March 1966 in a maneuver called "the long breath," the Egyptians drew back all their troops from outlying areas, concentrated them in the "iron triangle" formed by the cities of San'a', Ta'izz, and Al Hudaydah, and abandoned the idea of winning a complete victory. For the next year, the

Egyptians held the royalists back in the mountains, primarily by means of aerial bombardment.

The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 had little immediate effect on the Y.A.R. The Egyptians withdrew some troops and equipment to bolster the home front, but they still had sufficient forces in Yemen to control the areas they occupied and to keep up their bombing pressure on the royalists. At the Arab summit conference in Khartoum after the war, however, Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed that Egypt would withdraw all its troops from the Y.A.R. and that Saudi Arabia would cease giving assistance to the royalists. The Egyptian departure was completed by mid-December 1967.

The royalists pressed in to besiege the capital of San'a' in December 1967 and early 1968; they blocked the roads between San'a' and Ta'izz and San'a' and Al Hudaydah for months. The republicans barely managed to hang on, but were saved by large emergency injections of arms and planes from the Soviet Union, with which they were able to put together an air force of MiG's flown by pilots from Syria, Iraq, the Y.A.R., and probably even the Soviet Union.

On 8 February 1968, the Al Hudaydah road was opened and the siege of San'a' was lifted. Throughout the spring, the royalist threat was gradually eroded by dissension and defections among the royalists, while unity increased among the republicans. Numerous royalist tribes, led by the tribal leader who had for years been the main threat to San'a', defected to the republicans as the Saudis drastically curtailed their financial aid.

By the end of 1968 the civil war seemed to be dissipating, and it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between republican/royalist fighting and purely tribal conflicts. There were some battles in the northern part of the country during 1969-70, and the city of Sa'dah changed hands several times before, in February 1970, it fell to royalist forces who were temporarily receiving Saudi Arabian assistance. Most of this lingering fighting was sustained by Saudi Arabia's desire to maintain a buffer zone against potential contagion from radicalism in southern Arabia and to give the royalists a position of strength from which to negotiate the settlement.

In March 1970, under the cover of participating in an Islamic Conference, the republican Prime Minister, Muhsin al-'Ayni (who was also acting as Foreign Minister) went to Saudi Arabia to begin the negotiations which ultimately ended hostilities. The negotiations almost foundered over an attempt by the royalists, who were represented by their Foreign Minister, Ahmad al-Shami, to achieve a compromise whereby the Imamate as an institution would be preserved within the structure of the republican government. Shami finally abandoned his support of Imam Badr, however, when he realized that the only alternative open to him was to find a formula by which the more progressive royalists could return to San'a'. As part of the final settlement, royalists were included in the Republican Council and the Council of Ministers, but Imam Badr and the rest of the Hamid al-Din family were forced into exile. The success of the negotiations was due in large part to the Saudis, who had withdrawn financial support from the royalists and who hoped to use the Y.A.R. as a base for operations against the more leftist regime in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.). On the republican side the army commander, Hasan al-'Amri, initially refused to agree to a reconciliation with the royalists, but was eventually persuaded to do so by Prime Minister al-'Ayni. Although elements from both the republican and royalist camps threatened for some time not to observe the peace agreement, they took no action.

With the end of the civil war, republican leaders, who had been largely concerned with insuring the survival of the regime, could give their attention to establishment of a constitutional government. The first administration, headed by Ahmad Numan and installed in the spring of 1971, faced the perennial problems of reconciling the interests of the tribes and the central government, resisting pressures by leftist elements in the civil service and the army, dealing with a hostile regime in Yemen (Aden), and overcoming a serious financial crisis. A moderate, Numan's failure to adopt leftist policies caused dissatisfaction among young radicals in the republican ranks, while his refusal to restore tribal privileges and subsidies antagonized conservatives. His inability to persuade the tribally controlled Consultative Council to accept a Saudi loan to meet Yemen's pressing financial problems forced Numan to resign in July 1971.

Numan's successor, Hasan al-'Amri, a ruthless and unpredictable figure who was chief of the armed forces and a member of the Republican Council in addition to being Prime Minister, was forced to resign after less than 2 weeks in office when he murdered a local photographer over a misunderstanding. 'Amri had demanded more authority from President Iryani than the latter was willing to give to a recognized political opponent. The murder of the photographer provided 'Amri's opponents, including Iryani, with a pretext for removing the ambitious general from the scene. In late

1972, 'Amri was in exile in Cairo. He was succeeded in office in mid-September 1971 by Muhsin al-'Ayni, who displayed more success than his predecessors in dealing with the country's pressing economic and political problems. 'Ayni insisted on economic reforms, including a ban on tribal subsidies and a curtailed military budget, and he was successful in obtaining the much-needed loan from Saudi Arabia.

2. The ruling leadership (S)

a. Personalities

In the absence of political parties and readily identifiable interest groups, political activity in Yemen has tended to revolve around individuals rather than ideology. The republican leadership has never been particularly cohesive and, as conditions within the country have changed, the changes have been reflected in shifts in the leadership. The dominant figure from the time of the 1962 revolution until 1967 was 'Abd Allah al-Sallal. His harsh administration and his close identification with Egypt generated considerable resistance to his rule and, in late 1967, he was deposed while on a trip to Iraq. Sallal went into exile in Cairo. Late in 1972 he was reported to have joined with politicians from both Yemens to form a new political organization called the Nationalist Democratic Yemeni Front.

Since Sallal's ouster, the foremost personality in the Y.A.R. has been 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Republican Council, de facto head of state, and a highly esteemed *qadi* (judge). He is a Zaydi but is also highly respected by Shafi'is. During the civil war he was a spokesman for a more independent policy toward Egypt, an issue that caused some friction between him and Egyptian President Nasir and resulted in Iryani's detention in Cairo for some time, ostensibly for medical reasons. An advocate of reconciliation with the royalists, he has been described as one of the few men in San'a' who commands the respect of the disparate elements on the Y.A.R. political scene. Iryani, who is about 62 years old, has been reported to be suffering from heart disease, however, and on several occasions his resignation for reasons of ill health was said to be imminent. Observers have speculated that his departure from office would at least bring about a major realignment on the political scene and could trigger hostilities between competing groups.

Muhsin al-'Ayni (Figure 5), who served as Prime Minister between September 1971 and December 1972, has been one of Iryani's political rivals. He has denied allegations that he is a member of the international Ba'th Party, and there is no indication that he maintains any links with Ba'thists. Like Iryani, 'Ayni is a Zaydi. He had served previously as Prime Minister before taking office in 1971 and during his last term in office presided over the successful conclusion of the civil war. Among the republican leadership, 'Ayni is generally regarded as a conservative. 'Abd Allah al-Hajari, who became Prime Minister in December 1972, is also a Zaydi and a conservative.

The most important Shafi'i on the national level is Ahmad Numan. The first Prime Minister under the new constitution, Numan is respected by both Zaydis

FIGURE 5. Prime Ministers of the Yemen Arab Republic. Reading from left to right: 'Abd Allah al-Hajari, appointed in late December 1972; Muhsin al-'Ayni, Prime Minister preceding Hajari; Ahmad Numan, first Prime Minister under the 1970 constitution; Hasan al-'Amri, former Prime Minister, now in exile in Cairo. (C)

and Shafi'is, but is said to lack forcefulness. He does not have a strong backing among tribal elements and is generally regarded as an urban politician. During the civil war he was an advocate of direct negotiations between the republicans and the royalists. In January 1972, Numan was named by the Consultative Council as an adviser to the Republican Council after he had failed to secure election to that body. In republican circles Numan is regarded as moderate. Approximately 72 years of age, he is considered too old to again contend for the post of Prime Minister.

The most extreme of the republican leaders has been Hasan al-'Amri. Despite his ouster and exile (noted above), the reappearance of 'Amri on the Yemeni political scene cannot be ruled out entirely.

b. Issues

The major issue over which members of the ruling republican leadership have differed is the policy of the government toward Yemen (Aden), or the P.D.R.Y. Relations between the two governments have never been good, but beginning in the late 1960's they grew progressively worse, culminating in a series of border clashes in 1971 and 1972. In November 1972, under pressure from other Arab states to resolve their differences, the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y. signed an agreement calling for unity within 1 year. As of late 1972, however, the disagreements between the two states were so basic that unity seemed highly unlikely.

Prior to this, some republican leaders, including the chief of staff of the Yemeni Republican Army, Husayn al-Masrawi, and the governor of Al Hudaydah Province, Sinan Abu Lahum, had argued that San'a' should undertake a military campaign against Aden. The former commander in chief of the army, Hasan al-'Amri, had also argued for such a course before his exile. Saudi Arabia also urged the San'a' government to take a direct role in Saudi-sponsored efforts to overthrow the Adeni regime, but both President Iryani and former Prime Minister Muhsin al-'Ayni resisted such pressures, although the latter did agree to allow Adeni exiles to launch border raids from San'a's territory.

The ruling leadership has also differed over the reorganization of the executive branch of the government. Muhsin al-'Ayni, Prime Minister until he was replaced by Hajan in late December 1972, advocated the abolition of the three-man Republican Council and its replacement by a single executive. President Iryani, on the other hand has favored the continuation of the present system.

Members of the ruling leadership have also split over the role of the tribes in the governmental process. The more traditionalist members of the elite, including Iryani, 'Ayni, and former Prime Minister al-'Amri, have relied on the tribes for support and recognize the tribes as a major factor in Yemeni politics. Others, including former Prime Minister Numan and Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Hamdi, are among those who have been suspicious of tribal influence on the government. Even tribally oriented members of the leadership, however, are generally opposed to granting the tribes any significant role in the decisionmaking process.

3. Political forces

a. Tribalism versus centralism (C)

Although the traditional tribal system has been weakened to some extent since the 1962 revolution, tribalism continues to be a major force in Yemen and the power of the central government, particularly outside the urban areas, remains limited. About 75% of Yemenis consider themselves to be members of a particular tribal group. Those tribes which are members of the Zaydi religious sect form a significant power base in the Y.A.R. because of their great numbers and their fighting ability. Generally located in the central and northern highland regions, the Zaydis have for centuries been more warlike and more politically motivated than those tribes which belong to the Shafi'i religious sect and which are distributed throughout the southern and coastal areas. The Zaydis are members of the Shia branch of Islam, and the Shafi'is are Sunnis, but the doctrinal differences which have divided Sunnis and Shias in other Muslim countries are not pronounced in the Y.A.R. Feuding between the two groups, which has been a part of the history of the area since the introduction of Islam, tends to be based more on social and economic differences than on religion. Zaydi society is more distinctly tribal. In general, the Shafi'is have constituted the agrarian and mercantile sector of society, and the Shafi'i community has long been led by town dwellers and nontribal elements.

Prior to the revolution, the Imamate was dependent upon the loyalty of the Zaydi tribes. Between 1948 when Imam Yahya died and 1962, however, the pattern of tribal loyalty underwent a considerable change, with many Zaydi supporters of the Imamate being alienated by Imam Ahmad's arbitrary and despotic rule. Despite the involvement of some Zaydis in the coup against Imam Badr, however, most of the Zaydi tribes rallied to the support of the Imamate after the coup, especially when the Egyptians became involved on the side of the republicans. During the

civil war, royalist forces consisted almost entirely of Zaydi tribesmen who continued to follow their religious leader. However, the toughest tribal forces on the republican side were also Zaydis who opposed the Imam.

Since the end of the civil war, the Zaydis have regained their preeminent position in the Y.A.R., although the Shafi'is have managed to increase their relative importance since the 1962 revolution. Because the majority of Zaydis sided with the royalists during the war, the republicans leaned heavily on the Shafi'is for support. During the initial enlargement and modernization of the army, the number of Shafi'is in the army increased. Some Shafi'i units were disbanded after an unsuccessful mutiny in 1968, however, and the Zaydis generally regained their prominence. Nevertheless, a significant number of Shafi'is remain in the army and the status of the Shafi'is is higher than before the revolution.

Prior to 1962, the Imams had imposed their control over local affairs by appointing local leaders against the will of the tribes, and by appointing relatives or trusted aides to high administrative posts, such as governor of a province. The republican government has restored to some degree responsibility for local affairs to traditional tribal leaders, but still attempts to retain some influence. The Consultative Council which came into being after the elections in the spring of 1971 is, like its predecessor the provisional National Council, largely controlled by conservative tribal leaders and has been referred to by some as a "tribal debating society." While the council does not have an active role in policy formation, it does act as a link between the government and the tribes. The most important member of the Council and the de facto spokesman of the tribes, is its speaker, Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar (Figure 6), paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation.

FIGURE 6. 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar, Speaker of the Consultative Council (U/OU)

b. The role of the army (S)

Under the republic, the old army of the Imamate has been transformed from a sorry group of tribesmen, serving for life and poorly paid and fed, into an organized military force, with a present-day outlook, but with World War II vintage equipment. The Egyptians had a great deal to do with this change, and the present army illustrates their influence. Because of the Egyptian withdrawal in 1967, the mutiny of some Shafi'i units in 1968, and the declining Soviet aid and influence experienced in the 1970's, some of the gains made as a result of Egyptian aid were lost, but the army nevertheless has become a force in the political dynamics of the Y.A.R. Army men are accorded a place in the highest government bodies, and the army's possession of heavy ordnance and the air force's few aircraft make the military a force to be reckoned with, even for tribal warriors who outnumber it.

In general, the army has attempted to expand its influence within the republican government and so far has avoided the Middle Eastern pattern of military coups. In 1971 and 1972 groups within the army were reported to have been plotting against the regime and a number of persons were arrested. The subversive threat to the regime from these groups is probably the greatest one the government faces (see below, Threats to government stability).

c. Potential political forces (C)

A new educated class will ultimately constitute a significant political force. The intelligentsia under the old regime consisted largely of the sons of prominent families who were sent abroad to school to cultivate the traditional Arab art of writing and reciting classical poetry. During the final years of the Imamate, the first agreements arranging for modern academic, military, and technical training were signed between Yemen and various Communist countries. As a consequence there developed an extensive educational program which was still in effect in 1972.

A similar trend has developed with regard to training and education in other Arab countries. Egypt, in particular, has provided Yemenis with large-scale training programs, many of a short-term nature with lenient academic standards and a great deal of emphasis on military training.

Such tremendous increases in training and education are certain to become a factor in Yemeni political life. Newly educated Yemenis have been taking over the administrative posts left vacant by the ouster of the sayyids during the revolution. Inevitably, the younger managers have run into problems in trying to apply their new skills within the traditional political and social framework in Yemen. Those who have become disenchanted—or who have failed to find employment compatible with their new skills—have emigrated to other Arab countries in fairly large numbers. However, as more educated young men return to Yemen, they may begin to seek political power as an intellectual class.

Prior to the enactment of the constitution of 1970 there were a few small identifiable political organizations in the Y.A.R. The new constitution, however, prohibits partisanship in all forms, and political parties as such do not constitute a force on the Yemeni political scene. The organizations that do exist are by definition subversive and are also treated under Threats to government stability.

4. Elections (C)

The election of the 159 members of the Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*) in March and April 1971 marked the first organized elections held in Yemen. They were conducted under rules laid down by an election committee appointed by the Republican Council. There was some criticism about the way the election committee apportioned the Consultative Council seats: San'a' and Ta'izz were allocated three seats each and Al Hudaydah two seats, but the smaller town of Al Bayda' was given five seats. No information is available on the electoral procedure or the voter turnout, but it is believed that the government was determined to insure the election of a conservative legislative body and was prepared to reject electoral results if they proved unsatisfactory.

The constitution includes a section which permits the Chairman of the Republican Council to appoint 20% of the members of the Consultative Council, but this power was apparently not exercised at the time of the parliamentary elections in 1971, nor are there any known rules to guide the procedure.

Future parliamentary elections are to be held during a 60-day period prior to the expiration of the term of the incumbent legislature. According to this schedule, the next election will take place in 1975. A council's term can be extended for 3 months if the election process has not been completed or has been postponed.

D. National policies

1. Domestic policy (S)

The first priority in the Y.A.R.'s domestic policy since mid-1970 has been the successful implementation of the accord to end the civil war and effect a reconciliation with the tribal supporters of the deposed Imam Badr. By early 1972, the nation had weathered the first difficult period in which a new constitution and an untried electoral mechanism were put to the test. The reasonably normal internal situation that evolved following the reconciliation with the royalists has allowed the government to turn its attention to matters other than the almost total preoccupation with maintaining internal stability that was characteristic of the civil war period.

The government has adopted a program for postwar reconstruction. No overall plan for alleviating the ravages brought on by the war has been made public, however, and projects are being undertaken on a random basis as funds and circumstances permit. The prevailing shortage of funds and trained personnel limits the programs that can be initiated, while the population's habit of self-sufficiency keeps demand for government services at a low level. Most goverment projects in the early 1970's were therefore modest and were largely accomplished through local self-help efforts. Roads and bridges were repaired, wells were cleaned, irrigation canals were restored, mosques and public buildings were repaired, and air and surface transport services were renewed.

Other more ambitious aims are set forth in the 1970 Y.A.R. constitution, but government leaders appear to realize that current limitations prevent their complete implementation. Education is described as a guaranteed right of all citizens but only insofar as the country's resources permit. Health services are also promised all citizens, but again only within the capability of the nation's limited resources.

In the field of economics, the new constitution describes the basis for the economy as being the principle of Islamic social justice. Improving and developing production and raising the standard of living is described as a basic goal of the government. The protection of private property is pledged, as is the freedom of private economic activity.

An urgent concern of the government since the end of the civil war has been the search for foreign aid to

help in the development of the economy. The government is desperately in need of financial assistance, a situation which is essentially a long-term problem and which will involve heavy dependence upon external aid for many years to come. Since 1967 the Y.A.R. has sought to lessen its dependence on aid from Communist countries and has courted Western support. Although some much-needed aid has been received, the response to San'a's overtures to the West has been limited and a disappointment to many Yemenis.

In addition, the regime has attempted to institute austerity measures by levying direct taxation on the income of nongovernment workers, restricting imports to a list of specified articles, and making the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development the sole agent for dealing in foreign exchange. The country's long range policies stress the modernization of the country and increased administrative efficiency. The government is also attempting to attract foreign investors and to encourage locals to take an active part in economic development. A law promulgated in 1970 offered special guarantees and incentives to encourage investment in the economy. Some success in emphasizing the free enterprise nature of the economy has been evident since that time. Foreign capital has come from Saudi Arabia, and refugee businessmen and capital from the highly socialized People's Democratic Republic of Yemen have caused a commercial surge in the Y.A.R.'s port city of Al Hudaydah.

The republican regime is still insecure as a result of the civil war. Defense policy, therefore, is directed chiefly toward acquiring enough military strength to maintain the regime in power, pacify the population, and guard against border penetration. To this end, the regime welcomes foreign military material aid and training, the bulk of which has been provided by the Soviet Union. Although Yemen has made considerable progress toward building a modern army since 1962, it would still have to rely on tribal levies in the event of a major upsurge of hostilities.

2. Foreign policy

Since the 1962 revolution San'a's foreign policy has passed through two phases. During the period of Egyptian domination, it was a faithful copy of Egyptian foreign policy. It called for unity among the Arab states, pursuit of hostilities with Israel, support for "national liberation movements" in the conservative Arab states, harassment—mainly by propaganda—of "imperialist" Western powers, and nonalignment in East-West issues. Largely because of Egyptian ambitions, the Y.A.R. had poor relations with its immediate neighbors—Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Aden), then the Protectorate of South Arabia and now the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.). (S)

After Egyptian withdrawal at the end of 1967, the Y.A.R.'s foreign policy began to moderate. More effort was put into ending the civil war and to working out a *modus vivendi* with neighboring Arab countries. Relations with Saudi Arabia improved as the royalist-republican reconciliation agreement of 1970 was implemented. San'a' has also attempted to cultivate ties with Western nations, while maintaining its relationships with Communist countries, in order to garner sorely needed economic assistance from both camps. This objective, in fact, is perhaps the primary foreign policy goal in the early 1970's. Aside from this, the Y.A.R.'s foreign policy is also concerned with its relations with other Arab countries. It accepted Arab mediation efforts toward ending the civil war, it participates in most major international Arab gatherings, and it fully supports Arab opposition to the existence of Israel. Yemenis, like many other Arabs, warm to the idea of Arab unity. They briefly associated themselves with Egypt in the early 1960's; and the talk of union with Yemen (Aden) which has continued even during periods of stress between the two countries has culminated in plans for unification in 1973. Otherwise, little concern is shown in foreign affairs aside from matters directly affecting the Y.A.R. Yemenis have described San'a's international position as positive neutrality, a practical application of the principle of nonalignment. This stand is outlined in the nation's new constitution which pledges the Y.A.R. to "obtain wisdom wherever it is found and strengthen our ties with our brothers the Arabs and between ourselves and our friends in both the East and the West." (S)

a. Arab states (S)

(1) *Egypt*—By early 1972 the once intimate ties between the Y.A.R. and Egypt had lapsed into normal diplomatic relations. San'a' continues to look to Egypt as the acknowledged leader of the Arab world, especially in the struggle against Israel. The Y.A.R. normally follows Egypt's lead in international and inter-Arab debates, although it has little capability for supporting action. Bilateral relations are correct but have receded from the pre-1967 situation in which the Y.A.R. Government was virtually an extension of the Egyptian Government. On occasion, where self-interest is clearly involved, the government has

adopted a policy that conflicts with the wishes of Egypt, as, for example, when it reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States.

(2) *Saudi Arabia*—Saudi Arabia is the Y.A.R.'s largest, richest, and most powerful neighbor. In the past it was the principal supporter of the royalist cause, and it has been the source of aid for tribal activities against the regime in neighboring Aden. The settlement of the civil war in 1970 opened the way for the development of a new relationship between San'a' and Jidda, and following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Saudis extended some economic assistance to the republican regime. Saudi aid, both potential and actual, is a major element influencing the thinking of government leaders. The level of Saudi assistance, however, has disappointed many officials in San'a' who had hoped for large monetary loans on easy terms.

The nature of the relationship with Saudi Arabia is likely to remain of utmost importance to the Y.A.R. for the foreseeable future. Saudi economic assistance carries considerable weight in San'a' political circles and adds to the influence Jidda wields through the support it provides to government officials and tribal leaders. Saudi Arabia's continuing role in support of dissident activities against the Adeni regime also increases its capability to influence events in the Y.A.R.

Nevertheless, some suspicion continues to inhibit full mutual accord between the Y.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. San'a's ties with Communist countries generate considerable apprehension among conservative Saudi officials, as does the political orientation of some high-level Y.A.R. officials. Evidence of difficulties in normalization of the relationship can be found in the fact that although diplomatic relations had been established in 1970, the Saudi ambassador to San'a' was not named until early 1972.

(3) *People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.)*—The Y.A.R. has long claimed that Aden and the rest of the territory that now comprises the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is historically part of Yemen, calling it "South Yemen" or "Occupied South Yemen." Armed conflict between tribes living on both sides of the only partially demarcated border was an intermittent source of tension while the United Kingdom administered Aden and the former Protectorate of South Arabia, and the ill-defined border remains the cause of intermittent friction.

Beginning in 1962 the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y. made a practice of aiding each other's dissidents. In February 1963, the Y.A.R. Government established a Ministry for the Occupied South, whose primary function was to distribute material to P.D.R.Y. rebels. Egyptian officers played a conspicuous part in the activities of this ministry, presumably as a part of Egypt's anti-British campaign. Subsequently, the Y.A.R. and Egypt sponsored an organization of tribal dissidents from the protectorate called the National Liberation Front (NLF). Part of this organization later merged into the Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South (FLOSY), which was organized and trained in the Y.A.R. Provided with arms and military training by Egypt, FLOSY was responsible for numerous acts of terrorism throughout the protectorate.

Following the British departure and the formation in November 1967 of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (later renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), relations between San'a' and its southern neighbor improved somewhat. The Aden government soon fell into the hands of a radical faction, however, while the government in San'a' became progressively more conservative. Consequently, relations between the two nations deteriorated in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

Strains between the two nations continued to build. Y.A.R. officials interpreted Aden's change of name in late 1970, which omitted the term "Southern," to mean that the P.D.R.Y. regime was intending to speak for both Yemens. In early 1971, moreover, the loosely organized P.D.R.Y. dissident organization, the National Unity Front (NUF), began launching guerrilla attacks against Adeni territory from bases in the Yemen Arab Republic. Sporadic border clashes occurred and in October 1971 P.D.R.Y. troops crossed the border to raid dissident bases in Y.A.R. territory. The border situation subsequently eased somewhat, but in February 1972 the killing of an important tribal chief from the Y.A.R. led to a renewal of tensions as Y.A.R. tribes demanded revenge. In October 1972, relations between the two Yemens reached a new low when Adeni dissidents, apparently encouraged by San'a', seized Adens Kamaran Island and captured about 20 Adeni soldiers. Soon thereafter, however, delegations from both countries, meeting in Cairo at the behest of the Arab League, reached agreement on settlement of most differences, and in November Presidents Iryani and Salim Rubay' 'Ali, at a meeting in Tripoli hosted by Libyan head of state Qadhafi, signed an agreement to unify the countries in 1973.

Support for military operations against the P.D.R.Y. regime by the Y.A.R. has fluctuated and a source of contention within government circles in San'a'. Some Y.A.R. officials have wanted to provide only indirect aid to the dissidents, but others pressed for more active and direct official participation in the campaign. Saudi Arabia has been the primary source of support for the Adeni rebels, and many highly placed Yemeni officials, particularly those in the military, have benefited from the flow of money and material to the dissidents. The Y.A.R. Government, like that of Saudi Arabia, has distrusted the ambitions of the Marxist-oriented regime in Aden and wanted to see it changed. Differences arose, however, over how to accomplish this. Although some Yemenis opposed the Y.A.R.'s involvement in military activities against the P.D.R.Y., they were aware of the nation's need for Saudi support, and consequently reluctant to anger Jidda by refusing to allow Saudi-backed dissidents the use of Y.A.R. territory for sanctuary. In any event, San'a's control over the areas along the border with the P.D.R.Y. has been far from complete, and the unpredictable tribal elements there are not wholly responsive to government direction.

(4) *Other Arab states*—Yemen is a member of the Arab League and participates in the meetings of the league and its committees. Its primary concern is to make a place for Yemen in the community of Arabs, from which it was largely absent during the self-imposed isolation of the Imamate. Aside from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, however, the Y.A.R.'s ties with the states of the Arab world have been relatively minor. San'a' looks to virtually every friendly Arab state as a source of economic or technical aid of one sort or another. Kuwait has aided in manpower and education projects, Libya has extended help in the search for water supplies, and the states of the Persian Gulf have provided a variety of economic assistance. Syrian and Iraqi teachers replaced many Egyptians shortly after 1967, but the number of Egyptians has been increasing again since 1971. In January 1968 Algeria provided Yemen the equivalent of US$3 million and subsequently concluded an agreement for further economic assistance. Iraq in November 1971 profferred economic aid worth $9.8 million.

In order to reap the maximum benefits possible, Yemen seeks to be nonaligned in Arab quarrels and maintains close relations with the radical Arab countries while attempting to renew its former good relations with the moderates. While it is emotionally drawn toward the slogans of Arab nationalism, Yemen by preference seeks out friends who can help it exist as a nation without imposing their own policies on Yemen.

Yemeni officials are careful to pay lipservice in support of the Arab cause against Israel, but their actual participation is minimal. Delegations of Palestinian fedayeen visit San'a' periodically but elicit only pro forma support from the Yemenis. In June 1970 the then Prime Minister publicly offered to provide troops to fight for the rights of Palestine, but his offer was not implemented.

b. Western countries (S)

Western countries have played a relatively small part in Yemen's foreign policy, but the establishment of profitable relations with the West is currently a primary goal of the Y.A.R. Diplomatic relations with West Germany, broken in 1965 over that country's recognition of Israel, were restored in 1969, at which time the Germans agreed to provide US$6.2 million in aid. The Y.A.R. was not recognized by the United Kingdom until 1970 and by France until early 1971. Italy has been virtually the only country to maintain a continuous presence in Yemen and has thus been the principal representative of the West for some time.

The Y.A.R. and the United States reestablished diplomatic relations on 1 July 1972, when Secretary of State William Rogers made a short visit to San'a'. Thus it was the first Arab state to restore relations severed at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967.

The United States first recognized the Yemen Arab Republic on 19 December 1962, some 5 days after the government had threatened to close the embassies of all countries which did not do so. During the early years of the civil war, the United States made several efforts to bring about a settlement. In 1963, President Kennedy sent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to the Middle East, where he was able to obtain commitments from both Egyptian President Nasir and Saudi Arabian Prince Faysal to begin a disengagement; however, the effort ultimately failed. Yemen, due largely to Egyptian influence, believed that the United States—with its close association with both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and its unwillingness to undertake new aid programs—was not giving wholehearted support to the republic and that it was especially reluctant to pressure Saudi Arabia to cease aiding the royalists.

In the spring of 1967 the Yemeni Government accused the United States of actively engaging in opposition to the republic. As a result of an incident involving a guerrilla attack on an Egyptian camp near Ta'izz, the Yemenis arrested two officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)—who were later released—and ordered the mission out of the country. Only a short while later the Arab-Israeli war led to a complete break in relations.

The principal U.S. projects carried out in Yemen were initiated under the Imamate; they consisted of a road connecting Mocha, Ta'izz, and San'a' and a water supply system for Ta'izz. There was also some P.L. 480 food assistance.

c. Communist countries (S)

The Y.A.R. policy of "nonalignment" in foreign policy has in practice meant close relations with the major Communist countries and, in the past at least, almost automatic support for their policies in international forums. The regime, however, in an attempt to end its complete dependence on Communist support, has sought to broaden its ties with the West.

The Soviet Union and most of the other Communist countries granted recognition to the Y.A.R. almost immediately after the 1962 revolution. Only the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic, and Czechoslovakia maintain resident diplomatic missions in Yemen, while East Germany and Yugoslavia have consular representation. Yemen has small diplomatic missions in a few Communist countries and a consulate general in East Berlin. East Germany has not been officially recognized by Yemen, but in other respects relations are fairly active between the two countries.

All the main Communist countries have at one time or another sent visiting missions to Yemen and invited Yemeni groups to participate in various celebrations, international gatherings, and trade fairs. No Communist country has ever sent a high-ranking delegation to Yemen, although China had announced plans for a chief-of-state visit in 1964 that later were dropped. Former President Sallal made one long tour of Communist countries in 1964, during which he visited the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and China. President Iryani also visited Moscow in December 1971, seeking fresh commitments of military and economic support. A new agreement for additional military materiel was reportedly concluded, but there has been no evidence of deliveries under this accord.

The Y.A.R.'s dealings with Communist countries have been primarily concerned with acquiring aid and only secondarily with political affairs. The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic have been responsible for the principal aid projects such as the Chinese-built Al Hudaydah–San'a' road and the Soviet-built Al Hudaydah port, a road to be built between Sa'dah and San'a' by China, and construction of some hospitals by the U.S.S.R. In addition, the Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, provide hundreds of scholarships annually for Yemenis to attend technical and academic courses in their schools and universities. The Chinese have earned an excellent reputation for the speed and quality of their work projects in Yemen. This contrasts with the aid programs of the Soviet Union, which have been implemented slowly and inefficiently, and have—usually unsuccessfully—been used in attempts to gain political leverage on the Yemeni Government. This behavior has helped to enhance the Chinese reputation in the Y.A.R.

Several factors have caused a loosening of San'a's ties with the Communist countries—particularly the Soviet Union—in recent years. Included among these are the reversion to a more traditional style of government in the Y.A.R., San'a's efforts to improve ties with the West, and the emergence of a radical regime in the P.D.R.Y. which provides the Communists with a more compatible friend in the area. In late 1971, Soviet-Yemeni ties were further cooled by Moscow's military support for the P.D.R.Y. and the activities of Soviet military advisers in support of Adeni military operations against Y.A.R. territory. Additionally, Soviet reluctance to fulfill Yemen's arms requests and pressure for the payment of outstanding debts owed the U.S.S.R. contributed to the strains between the two countries.

d. United Nations (C)

Yemen has been a member of the United Nations since 1948. In December 1962, after more than 50 countries had recognized the republican government, the General Assembly seated the new delegation in place of the representatives of the Imamate. Yemeni representatives usually attend all U.N. sessions but rarely take an active part except to second resolutions offered by other Arab states. The Y.A.R. usually follows the lead of Egypt in U.N. forums. Unlike Cairo, however, it has not accepted Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a basis for settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Yemen is a member of several U.N. affiliates, notably the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Several of these now run training and advisory programs in Yemen, or have done so in the past. U.N.-sponsored projects have included a girls' training school, a health center and training school, a public administration institute, a

nutrition program, and a famine relief program. Since the Egyptian withdrawal from the Y.A.R., interest in the U.N. programs appears to have slackened, as Egypt originally arranged for much of the U.N. assistance and provided most of the Arabic-speaking U.N. staff that operated the projects. Yemen, however, did join the IMF and the IBRD in May 1970.

The most important United Nations' involvement in the Y.A.R. occurred in mid-1963, when the Security Council created the U.N. Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in connection with other international efforts to arrange a settlement of the civil war. The UNYOM began operations on 4 July 1963 and after several extensions of its mandate, it was terminated on 4 September 1964, largely because of its ineffectiveness. Headed by a succession of commanders, the observation team was drawn from Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. The mission set up observation posts in San'a', Qizan, Sa'dah, Al Hudaydah, and in Jidda and Najran in Saudi Arabia, manned checkpoints at the main border crossings, patrolled other land areas, and flew air patrols.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

Since most of the population of the Y.A.R. is tribally oriented, habitually armed, and hostile to governmental interference in local affairs, popular disaffection is always capable of being translated into armed violence against the government. Historically, much of the unrest in Yemen (San'a') has arisen from the refusal of warlike tribes to submit to the will of the central government. During the last years of the Imamate there were a number of revolts stemming from a variety of specific complaints, such as tribesmen's resentment over interference with their traditional rights of taxation and law enforcement, townsmen's irritation with arbitrary government actions, and the Shafi'is' desire to regain some of the freedom from Zaydi domination that they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule.

a. Tribal dissidence

The principal tribal groups capable of armed dissidence are the powerful Hashid and Bakil confederations in the Zaydi highlands. For centuries, these tribesmen have made and broken governments in Yemen. For the most part, they backed the royalists in the civil war and strengthened their capabilities as belligerents in doing so. While they suffered heavy casualties, they also gained practice in confronting a modern army, acquired modern weapons, and added to their tribal treasuries through booty and subsidies. Since 1970 the government has increasingly restored the semiautonomy of the tribes, an act which has had the short-term effect of lessening tribal hostility toward the central government.

Another potentially dissident group is drawn from the Shafi'i population. Shafi'i resentment of the central government is rooted in Yemeni history. The Shafi'is once had an important culture of their own in southern Yemen, and many among them still comprise the most cultured, educated, and wealthy segment of all the population. They thus resent their status as second-class citizens vis-a-vis the Zaydis.

The 1962 revolution attracted the Shafi'is originally because it overthrew the Zaydi oligarchy which had been oppressing them and because it offered the Shafi'is greater opportunity to have a voice in the government. During their years of influence in the country, the Egyptians, many of whom are, like the Shafi'is, adherents of the Sunni sect of Islam, gave considerable support to their Yemeni coreligionists.

The departure of the Egyptians and the resurgence of conservative Zaydi influence in the government left the Shafi'i population with a new sense of insecurity. Among the manifestations of Shafi'i unrest, the most serious was the mutiny of Shafi'i troops in San'a' in August 1968. A group of Shafi'i officers, when ordered by the Prime Minister to relinquish their commands on 20 August, refused to do so. The officers apparently acted in the belief that if they complied with the order the Shafi'is would lose what political influence in the government they still had. After an initial attempt by the army command to force the officers to step down resulted in a clash, Zaydi troops and tribesmen were ordered to enter the capital. Heavy fighting erupted and continued until 28 August. During this period approximately 1,200 people, 900 of whom were from Shafi'i units, were killed. San'a' suffered heavy damage to its business and government sections. Tribesmen broke into the city and looted shops and private homes at will. By the end of the month the government had crushed the rebel units and had restored its authority in the military units in the capital.

To some extent, the Shafi'i threat has been blunted by the fact that Shafi'i tribesmen are usually more concerned with local struggles for power than with national affairs; they have only a tenuous relationship with Shafi'i townsmen. The more sophisticated Shafi'is in the towns have become prime targets for other more political forms of subversion, such as the

various clandestine movements which rise and fall in the area, but they tend to dissipate their strength in competitive groups. Shafi'i tribesmen, like Zaydi tribesmen, made some notable advances during the civil war in terms of improving their fighting skills, gaining administrative experience, and augmenting their financial resources.

The P.D.R.Y. has supported Shafi'i tribal dissidents in the eastern and southern portions of the Y.A.R. for the past several years. Such tribal groups have often combined banditry with anti-Y.A.R. operations. In mid-October 1971 the government conducted a 4-day operation with approximately 3,000 troops to flush many of these groups out of hiding. There have also been P.D.R.Y.-instigated incidents in urban areas. A bomb explosion on 24 June 1971 in the border town of Al Bayda', which serves as the principal operational base for P.D.R.Y. dissidents preparing to infiltrate into the southern republic, resulted in the deaths of 50 persons and the serious injury of another 30. In late September and early October 1971 a series of explosions occurred in San'a' and Ta'izz around public buildings and the homes of prominent supporters of the government. In late October a band of men using small artillery pieces and mortars attacked the government radio station in Ta'izz. Nevertheless, the Zaydi-dominated regime probably still possesses the strength to counter any Shafi'i subversive movement.

b. Military dissidence

Of major concern to the central government is the danger of dissidence and subversion in the army. Concerned with the struggle against the royalists throughout the civil war, the army had little time to plot against the regime. With the reconciliation between the royalists and the republicans in 1970, however, the army returned to its less demanding role of maintaining internal security. Soon afterward the first signs of dissension appeared. Several hundred army officers were dismissed by the commander in chief of the army, Hasan al-'Amri, in January 1971, allegedly for security reasons. In addition to being personally opposed to 'Amri, the dismissed officers apparently were opposed to the rapprochement that was taking place with Saudi Arabia. As most of the officers were Shafi'is, there may have also been religious motivation in their opposition.

A small-scale political crisis began to develop during July and August 1971 when Prime Minister Numan resigned and several weeks passed before a successor was named. Rightwing officers—including Muhammad al-Iryani, who was then the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—reportedly began making plans to impose a military regime. The conspirators apparently had the support of all important units in the Y.A.R. Army except for two brigades in San'a'. The coup threat had dissipated by late August, however, when Armed Forces Commander in Chief Hasan al-'Amri was appointed Prime Minister. Two different leftist groups also were reported to be plotting against the government at about the same time. On 25 July 1971 seven officers who had been trained in the Soviet Union were arrested as they left the Soviet Embassy in San'a' and accused of conspiring with Soviet and Iraqi diplomatic officials to overthrow the government. On 22 August 1971 yet another group of leftist officers were arrested after they too had contacted the Soviet Embassy. Later in the year, in December 1971, a third group of approximately 20 leftist officers who were members of an armored battalion stationed on the outskirts of San'a' were arrested. This group of officers, said to be Shafi'is, were believed to be in contact with the P.D.R.Y. Government.

In early 1972, when tensions between the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. were high because of dissident raids across the border, a number of Y.A.R. Army officers were arrested and charged with plotting against the San'a' government. The officers, most of whom were Shafi'is, were reportedly dissatisfied with their positions in the army and had established contact with the P.D.R.Y. They reportedly had plans to disrupt and cripple San'a' in the event of hostilities between the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y.

Despite government success in uncovering subversive elements in the armed forces, the possibility of a small group of military officers seizing power and obtaining foreign support before forces loyal to the government could rally probably constitutes the greatest threat to the republican regime.

2. Subversion

Ideologically oriented political groups have had little success in Yemen, where they must compete with traditional tribal and religious loyalties. While some of these groups exist as legitimate political parties in some other Arab countries, they are regarded as clandestine organizations in the Y.A.R. because of the ban on political parties. The number of subversive organizations is small, and the total number of people attracted to them probably does not exceed a few thousand, of whom only a small percentage could be called hardcore activists. Their subversive potential lies in their willingness to use illegal and violent means to advance their own interests.

a. The Ba'th Party

The Ba'th Party of Yemen (BPY) is probably the most important leftist group in Yemen. There is no accurate estimate of its membership. The BPY has no tightly knit party organization, and some members of the present republican government are alleged to have Ba'thist connections.

The BPY is a direct offshoot of the Ba'th Party formed by Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar among students in Syria in 1943. The basic principles of the Ba'th Party are Arab nationalism and unity, socialism, liberty, and revolution. In theory, the party is highly organized and tightly disciplined, with a structure copied from that of Communist parties. In keeping with its doctrine that all the Arabic-speaking states form one nation, its top leadership is international.

Factionalism has intermittently plagued the Ba'th Party, which has experienced a number of splits, the most recent and important in 1963. Ba'th Party groups which had seized power in Syria and Iraq disagreed on how fast the two countries should be socialized and how exclusive Ba'th control should be. In addition, the Syrian Ba'thists, who were dogmatic Marxists and predominantly military men, chiefly from the minority Alawite religious sect, took issue with the administration of the more pragmatic Iraqi Ba'thists who were dominated by the civilian element of the party. The rift between the two wings of the party was still evident in mid-1972.

In 1972 the BPY was sponsored and supported by the ruling Ba'th Party of Iraq and composed largely of intellectuals and educated men. It has gained a good reputation in Yemen for probity and honesty. Its members are concentrated in the three main cities—San'a', Ta'izz, and al Hudaydah—without any of the three being a predominant center. Little is known of the BPY's organization, but it is far looser than that of Ba'th parties elsewhere. The party is apparently merely a collection of people, some of them having connections with the Ba'thist movement or some sympathy with its aims. In 1971 Iraqi teachers in the Ta'izz area were reportedly attempting to create a more formal organization.

b. P.D.R.Y.-sponsored parties

Several other minuscule subversive organizations have been noted from time to time. For the most part, these have been founded and financed by the P.D.R.Y. to hamper the activities of P.D.R.Y. dissidents operating from Y.A.R. territory. In early 1972 the most important of these groups was the *al-Shabiba* (Youth) Party. Its membership was composed of students and politically active leftists. The party is ideologically close to the extreme leftist doctrines of the P.D.R.Y. regime.

Many of these same people are also members of another P.D.R.Y.-supported group, the Peoples' Resistance Front (*Al-Jabhah al-Muqaqama al-Sha'biya*), which was founded as a nationally based popular organization in 1967 to encourage the Yemeni public to resist the royalist forces during the last stages of the civil war. It lost its popular character after its leadership was infiltrated and dominated by persons affiliated with the now defunct Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the Communist Party of Yemen.

Another P.D.R.Y.-supported group is the Yemen Democratic Party (YDP). Although it ceased political activity for a short while after it was officially banned in mid-1968, by 1971 the YDP was again engaged in political activity in the Ta'izz area, albeit covertly. The Yemen Democratic Party's membership is composed primarily of leftists, Communists, and former members of the Arab Nationalist Movement. The party claims to have cells of supporters in the armed forces, as well as among students and educated Yemenis.

Several individuals connected with another subversive organization, the Democratic Front (*Al-Jabhah al-Dumuqratiyya*), are also known to be working for the P.D.R.Y. Founded in Cairo in October 1971, the organization as of early 1972 had not publicized either its structure or membership. The Democratic Front has distributed pamphlets in Ta'izz and San'a' calling for a reorganization of the government so as to provide for a Zaydi president of the republic and a Shafi'i vice president. It has also called for an end to tribal and reactionary control of the government.

c. Saudi and Iraqi subversion

Other Arab countries have attempted to influence the internal affairs of the Y.A.R. Saudi Arabia has been especially anxious to maintain its influence in the country and as late as mid-1972 was providing subsidies to conservative groups. Dissident tribal leaders in the northern provinces have received Saudi aid as have influential political and military leaders, especially those who support Saudi plans to overthrow the P.D.R.Y. Government. The Saudis have also given political asylum to individual opponents of the government who have escaped from detention.

The Ba'thist regime in Iraq views the present government as unacceptably rightist and is critical of

the Y.A.R. attempt to develop closer ties with Western powers. Iraqi agents have cooperated with representatives of the Egyptian and Syrian embassies to determine the feasibility of organizing a clique of leftist Y.A.R. Army officers to overthrow the present regime.

d. Communist subversion

(1) *Communist Party of Yemen*—The Communist Party of Yemen (CPY) consists of a small group of individuals who are or profess to be Communists. Many of these have been associated with other groups as well, making it difficult to tell where their true allegiance lies. The CPY is not openly recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but is believed to receive some covert support from it.

The CPY is an offshoot of the Communist movement in Aden. It was founded in Ta'izz in late 1959 when 'Abd Allah al-Razzaq Ba Dhib, a Communist trade unionist, settled there after having been forced to leave Aden. A few months later he was joined by some 40 alleged Communist and pro-Communist Yemeni and Adeni students who had been expelled from Cairo after a series of confrontations with Egyptian students. Communist diplomatic missions in Yemen encouraged the movement and were especially forthcoming with assistance for sending students to Communist countries. After the 1962 revolution, the small Yemeni Communist movement enjoyed a fairly high degree of influence; at one time during the early days of the republic four suspected Communists held ministerial posts and 25 others held high government positions.

Under the increasingly moderate trend which has characterized the Yemeni regime since late 1967, the indigenous Communist movement has declined greatly. Among the factors responsible for this decline were the diminished importance of other leftist organizations which the Communists had infiltrated; the imprisonment or exile of many suspected Communists for subversive activities by conservative governments; and the decreased popularity of foreign Communists in Yemen. In early 1972 there was only a handful of suspected Yemeni Communists and none of these was in a position of power. The lack of information on communism in Yemen since 1969 is believed to be an accurate reflection of Communist inactivity.

(2) *Foreign Communist subversion*—While official Communist activity, on the surface, has been directed toward fostering good government-to-government relations with Yemen and cultivating a popular image of friendly interest in the country, the Soviet Union has been involved in a number of subversive activities which have been uncovered by the Y.A.R. Government. In May 1971 officials of the Soviet Embassy in San'a' began meeting with diplomats from the embassies of radical Arab states to discuss the feasibility of action against the Y.A.R. Government. Soviet officials were also meeting with leftist Y.A.R. officers to discuss the possibility of organizing a coup. In July 1971 Y.A.R. President Iryani protested these activities in a strongly worded note to the Soviets and specifically forbade contact by Soviet officials with Y.A.R. military officers. Later that month seven Y.A.R. officers were arrested as they were leaving a party at the Soviet Embassy and charged with plotting to overthrow the Y.A.R. Government. The San'a' government also demanded that the Soviet Union cease distributing propaganda from its cultural center in Ta'izz.

Communist personnel, especially those from the Soviet Union and Communist China, have the opportunity to cultivate individual Yemenis employed on Communist-sponsored projects. The embassies of both countries are relatively active in sponsoring cultural programs.

The most likely targets for Communist subversion are the Yemeni students attending courses in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Accurate figures are not available, but in 1969, the latest date for which there are statistics, there were approximately 420 Yemenis studying in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European universities, where they received theoretical and practical instruction in Marxism along with their regular classes. A large number of those Yemeni students who have completed their studies in Communist countries have not returned home to settle permanently. Of those that have returned, very few seem to have become Communist sympathizers.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

Police organizations, in the modern sense, are relatively new to the Y.A.R.; they were introduced by the Egyptians after 1962. Until that time, police and security responsibilities had fallen largely to the Imam's troops and his personal security guards and, in the provinces, to military troops assigned to the governor. Paid informants were regularly used for solving crimes and controlling subversion. After the revolution, Egypt took on the responsibility for

directing police operations and intelligence collection. The Ministry of Interior, with jurisdiction over the activity of the police, was established as part of the first revolutionary cabinet and was manned largely by Egyptian advisers until a staff of Yemenis had been trained.

Until the establishment of a police academy in 1964, the first police recruits were trained locally on an informal basis or sent to Egypt. By mid-1964, the Y.A.R. had an estimated 3,000 policemen, 900 of whom were stationed in San'a'. In many provincial capitals, however, army troops under local military commanders performed police functions. An 11-man class completed the police academy's first training session for enlisted men in June 1965, and a 6-month course for officers and noncommissioned officers graduated at the same time. By 1966, the enlisted men's class had grown to 60, and it was expected that over 100 would be graduated annually. The police course has since been expanded to cover 2 years.

Recent estimates of police strength are not available. In late 1966, Y.A.R. Government publications reported the total force at approximately 4,300 men, of whom 1,200 were officers and noncommissioned officers.

The Office of General Security (OGS), under the Ministry of Interior, constitutes the Y.A.R. police force and is charged in general with the physical security of the country. This includes routine police work—traffic control, maintenance of checkpoints, and riot control—which comes under the direction of the OGS's Internal Security Branch, and criminal investigation, which is the responsibility of a second OGS component, the Criminal Investigation Department. Both of these OGS subdivisions have branches in each of Yemen's major cities. Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Hilali heads the Office of General Security; Lt. Col. Yahya al-Masyabi, the Internal Security Branch; and Muhammad al-Qatta, the Criminal Investigation Department.

The Central Security Force is another police-type organization under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. The units of this force, which carry out physical security functions in the major cities, are elite paramilitary groups drawn from the military. They patrol the cities and are armed with jeep-mounted automatic weapons. The units are commanded directly by Deputy Interior Minister Col. Muhammad Salih al-Kuhali.

The police are generally considered to be well trained, equipped, and motivated and better able than any other government organization to cope with emergencies. The popular attitude toward the police and the security forces in general can probably best be described as one of apathy. Although, as in most underdeveloped countries, the people are usually suspicious of the government, they do not appear to live in particular fear of security organizations. Opinions are expressed with relative freedom and without fear of reprisal, and security forces are not a pervasive element of society.

The penal system in the Y.A.R. is nonetheless harsh and primitive, a holdover from the Imamate period. There have been promises of greater respect for citizens' rights, and in early 1971 the government promised a reform of the prison system. Little improvement is evident, however, and prisoners are still kept in ancient dungeons, sometimes centuries old and usually ill-lighted and provided with no conveniences. Food—usually provided by the family—and water are lowered to the men below, but death often comes before the sentence has ended. It has been customary for those with light sentences to be released from jail during the day in leg irons and forage for themselves.

The technical aspects of public security, such as files and fingerprints, scientific investigation, electronic surveillance, and modern interrogation techniques, were introduced by Egyptian advisers and initially were often carried out by Egyptian security services operating in the Y.A.R. After the departure of the Egyptians, security services may well have given up using all but a few of the Egyptian refinements and items of sophisticated equipment, but the presence of Soviet advisers with the public security forces, particularly the Criminal Investigation Department, in recent years has probably led to a further technical improvement.

2. Intelligence and security services

The National Organization for General Intelligence and Military Security is, as the name suggests, the military organization responsible for combined security and intelligence duties within the armed forces. The office reports directly to the general command of the armed forces and is composed of approximately 600 officers and men assigned to units throughout the Y.A.R. Thirteen military intelligence offices in various areas of the country supervise military intelligence personnel in military units. The office is commanded by Col. Ahmad al-Sunaydar. A separate military police organization with arrest and investigative powers is responsible for physical security in the armed forces.

The civilian intelligence organization, the Office of National Security, is directly responsible to the

Republican Council. This office collects intelligence on political developments and personalities and mounts clandestine operations against civilian targets, both within and outside the Y.A.R. Approximately 300 strong, the office is also responsible for granting clearances to government employees. Sallam al-Razihi, Minister of Interior until April 1972, is the Director of National Security.

3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The Y.A.R. has no separate organization for countersubversion; countersubversion and counterinsurgency functions are handled, in a generally capable manner, by existing intelligence and security services. Coordination is often necessary among the various security and intelligence organizations; for example, the Office of General Security must coordinate frequently with the armed forces general command in its function of maintaining physical security, and the Office of National Security and the military intelligence organization often work in conjunction with each other on intelligence matters. This coordination appears to proceed smoothly—although usually on an officer-to-officer basis rather than as a matter of organizational policy—and there apparently is no serious rivalry among the various organizations.

Egyptian influence and advisory efforts within the Y.A.R. security and intelligence apparatus have given way in recent years to Soviet efforts, although to a much lesser extent. The Soviets are thus far the only foreign advisers present in the apparatus. They are not popular in the Y.A.R.; the government is suspicious of Soviet activities, particularly in view of Soviet support for the rival P.D.R.Y. regime; and thus there are no Soviets in sensitive positions within the Ministry of Interior or elsewhere in the security and intelligence apparatus.

Soviet advisers are present in the Criminal Investigation Department and among the traffic police—neither of which is involved in political work—and they have offices in the Ministry of Interior. No Soviets are involved in the area of political security, and there are none in the Office of National Security. Many of this office's employees have been trained in the U.S.S.R., however, and it is possible that the Soviets have clandestine sources in the organization. Soviet advisers also train Y.A.R. officers in tactical military intelligence collection, but it is not believed that they are involved in the military intelligence organization's work in the area of political security.

Possibly in an effort to offset Soviet influence, the government in early 1972 approached West Germany and Great Britain about possible assistance with police and internal security. English-language training is also being given to Ministry of Interior personnel.

G. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

Official U.S. Government sources provide fuller coverage of contemporary political developments in Yemen (San'a') then is elsewhere available. Among the available nongovernment studies are the following:

O'Ballance, Edgar. *The War in the Yemen*. Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books. 1971. A comprehensive treatment of the Yemeni civil war through 1968.

Schmidt, Dana Adams. *The Unknown War*. London: Bodley. 1968. A balanced account of the civil war through 1967 by a U.S. news correspondent.

Wenner, Manfred W. *Modern Yemen, 1918-1966*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. 1967. A scholarly and detailed treatment of Yemen since World War I with only brief attention given to the period since 1962.

Chronology (u/ou)

628

Yemen is converted to Islam.

897

The Zaydi sect, which became the basis of the theocratic Imamate, is introduced.

1517-96

First Ottoman occupation of Yemen.

1840-1918

Second occupation by Ottoman Turks.

1911

Treaty of Da'an, between the Turks and the Imam, is signed, granting special rights to the Zaydi tribes.

1918

Yemen becomes independent, except for a coastal strip retained by the United Kingdom until 1925.

1928

Yemen is recognized by the Soviet Union.

1934

Saudi Arabian-Yemen war is won by Saudi Arabia, which waives any territorial claim.

1946

Yemen is recognized by the United States.

1947

Yemen is admitted to the United Nations.

1962
September

Imam Ahmad dies of natural causes and is succeeded by Imam Badr on 19 September. Eight days later a coup, led by Brig. Gen. 'Abd Allah al-Sallal and others, overthrows the Imamate and proclaims the Yemen Arab Republic. Yemen is recognized by Egypt and the U.S.S.R. before the end of the month. Civil war between the republicans and the royalists begins.

December

The republican government is recognized by the United Nations, and its representatives are seated in the U.N. General Assembly.

1963
July

U.N. Yemen Observation Mission begins its operations, which continue till September 1964.

1964
March

President Sallal tours European Communist capitals and signs a 5-year treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R.

June

Sallal visits Communist China, where he signs a treaty of friendship.

October

Peace conference is held in Sudan under auspices of the Arab states; a ceasefire is agreed to but not observed.

December

Serious opposition to Yemen's virtual occupation by Egyptians surfaces when 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani and Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri resign from the government.

1965
August

Egyptian President Nasir and Saudi Arabian King Faysal agree on a ceasefire in Yemen and begin plans for a peace conference.

November

First session of Yemeni peace conference held at Harad fails to reach agreement and never reconvenes.

1967
June

Yemen breaks relations with the United States over the Arab-Israeli war.

September

Egyptian troops and advisers begin to withdraw from Yemen.

November

Pro-Egyptian President Sallal is ousted. He is replaced by a "Yemen first" regime under a three-member Republican Council headed by Iryani.

December

Egyptian withdrawal is completed.

1968
February

The royalist seige of San'a' is lifted with the reopening of the Al Hudaydah road.

August

Mutiny of predominantly Shafi'i shock troops is broken by tribal forces.

1969
March

Provisional National Council, which serves as a consultative quasi-legislature, meets, attended by tribal chiefs and other notables.

September-December

Saudi Arabia temporarily resumes aid to royalists who eventually regain Sa'dah.

1970
March

Peace agreement between republicans and royalists finally achieved at conference in Jidda.

May

The government adds ex-royalists to the Republican Council, cabinet, and the National Council.

December

New constitution is promulgated.

1971
March-April

Consultative Council is elected, first elective legislative body.

1972
July-October

Dissident forces from Yemen (Aden)—the P.D.R.Y.—spark military engagements; San'a' takes Kamaran Island.

November

P.D.R.Y. and Y.A.R. Presidents meet in Tripoli, Libya, and ratify agreement to unify countries in 1973.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	ARABIC	ENGLISH
ANM	*Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-'Arab*	Arab Nationalist Movement
BPY	*Al-Hizb al-Ba'th al-Yamani*	Ba'th Party of Yemen
CPY	*Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Yamani*	Communist Party of Yemen
FLOSY		Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South
NLF		National Liberation Front
NUF		National Unity Front
OGS		Office of General Security
PDRY	*Jumhuriyat al-Yaman al-Dimuqratiyat al-Sha'biyah*	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
UNYOM		United Nations Yemen Observer Mission
YAR	*Al-Jumhuriyat al-'Arabiyat al-Yamaniyah*	Yemen Arab Republic
YDP	*Al-Hizb al-Dumuqratiyya al-Yamani*	Yemen Democratic Party

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