Yugoslavia

April 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

CONFIDENTIAL
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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.
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The Society

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The Yugoslav federation—ethnically, culturally, and socially the most heterogeneous European country west of the U.S.S.R.—is a microcosm of the complexity derived from the varied cultural influences and diverse political heritage of the whole Balkan Peninsula. The Yugoslav (South Slav) state, created only after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the realignment of great power influence in the Balkans following World War I, is a compact of convenience for five South Slav nationalities who form the majority of the population and several non-Slavic peoples who make up a minority. As a result, differences of religion, language, and culture divide its peoples, each of whom is jealous of its separate identity while seeking to play an important role in the difficult process of forging a united, Yugoslav national consciousness. Yugoslavia’s unity is thus fragile, and dependent largely on the realization by each of its constituent nationalities that, in striving to insure the viability of the Yugoslav state, each must forego some of its traditional, national separateness in order to retain the greater measure of it.

Of the five major nationalities in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are numerically the largest three. None, however, constitutes a majority of the more than 20 million inhabitants. The peoples of Yugoslavia are for the most part the descendants of Slavic tribes who migrated into the Balkans sometime in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. In the course of the subsequent 200 years they were converted to Christianity, but at no time prior to 1918 was the territory of present-day Yugoslavia politically united. Even the introduction of Christianity to the Balkans divided the South Slavs: the Croats and Slovenes were converted by emissaries from Rome, while the Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins fell under the influence of missionaries from Byzantium. The schism that divided the Christian world in 1054 formalized this division, sowing seeds of hatred, controversy, and conflict which still plague the Yugoslav state.

Since the church was the main vehicle for cultural advancement in the Middle Ages, the South Slavs developed along the respective lines of the two Christian worlds. To the north and west, the Slovenes and Croats identified with and participated in the cultural development of Western Europe. To the south and east, the Montenegrins, Serbs, and Macedonians in the Byzantine tradition—before falling prey to five centuries of oppressive Turkish domination and the introduction of Islam into an already divisive religious context.

There were brief moments of glory for some of the South Slavs. From 925 to 1102 an independent Croatia flourished before being acquired by the king of Hungary. The Serbs’ national consciousness was fostered when in 1219 they were granted an independent archbishopric. A short-lived Serbian state blossomed in the 14th century before falling under Turkish rule after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The only people to avoid foreign domination at any time were those Serbs who migrated to the barren Black Mountains—Montenegro. The region’s isolated, nearly inaccessible mountain valleys helped the Montenegrins to resist Turkish assaults, and to maintain their independence.

The struggle for independence which led to the emergence of modern Yugoslavia began with the spread of nationalism in intellectual circles in the late 18th century, and was given impetus by Napoleon’s creation of the Illyrian provinces in the early 1800’s. Two uprisings in Belgrade, in 1804 and 1813, dramatically awakened Serb nationalism. It was not until 1867, however, that Turkish garrisons were withdrawn and the Serbian princedom became truly independent. From then until the first World War, nationalism was the driving force in the region. The peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Herzegovina) rose in revolt against the Turks in 1875. The result, however, was only the exchange of one foreign master for another, as Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave way to domination by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nationalism in both Montenegro (Crna Gora) and Serbia (Srbija) burgeoned in the early 20th century as both states joined forces on several occasions to push the Turks farther south and to annex large chunks of Balkan...
territory. Secret patriotic organizations fanned national passions and fostered cultural separatism, while working clandestinely to arouse the Slav minorities in Austria-Hungary. The fateful result of this activity was the assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914—sparkling the first World War. Serbia paid dearly in material and human losses during the ensuing conflict, but by the end of 1918 the Serbs' heroic resistance had won for them the admiration of other South Slav peoples. On 1 December 1918, after more than a thousand years of separate cultural, social, and political development, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was officially proclaimed under the Serbian royal house. The task of governing these diverse and discordant South Slavs proved difficult.

Throughout the interwar period, internal frictions arising from differences of political experience and tradition were aggravated by the system of centralized control from Belgrade. The Croats in particular came to hate the interbellum period as a time of subjugation to the Serbs. Less numerous than the Serbs but highly Westernized, they felt culturally superior to the rest of the South Slavs (save the Slovenes) and strenuously resisted subordination to the Serbian royal house. The resulting pent-up hostility and frustration burst forth with a vengeance during the Nazi occupation. From 1941 to the close of World War II, hundreds of thousands of Croats and Serbs lost their lives in a bloody civil war fought under the banners of fascism and communism that often as not merely masked traditional ethnic hatreds.

In the immediate postwar period the Communist regime's federalist solution to the thorny nationality problem met with considerable success. Since the early 1960s, however, national antagonisms have increased. Fueled by economic rivalries, the nationality issue has erupted to the fore in the midst of the nation's political and economic decentralization. In 1971, excessive Croatian nationalism presented the regime with one of its most serious challenges, which was brought under control only after Tito's personal intervention.

Postwar attempts to force Yugoslavia social and cultural life into a unified doctrinaire Communist pattern failed. The main reason for this was the regime's concessions to nationalism and traditional cultural values in order to garner popular support after Yugoslavia's ouster from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in mid-1948. From 1948 on, Belgrade began to develop its own particular brand of socialism, known as self-management. Self-management as a social and political system is based on a wide range of workers' councils, housing committees, and a host of other local organizations which manage such matters as economic and cultural development, education, public health, social insurance, and public entertainment. Because it is based on a philosophy of decentralized, local control and development, self-management fosters rather than diminishes existing regionalism and social and cultural individualism.

Despite the regime's successes in industrialization and modernization since 1945, there are still too many Yugoslavs for the economy to support at levels of living as high as those in Western Europe. According to preliminary 1971 census figures, the population surpassed 20.5 million and it is growing at a rate exceeding that of most European countries. Surplus labor is a problem of the regime, and temporary economic emigration is encouraged. Some 900,000 Yugoslavs were working abroad in 1971, most in Western Europe.

Living conditions in Yugoslavia vary sharply from one region to the next, according to degree of urbanization and industrialization, and the educational and cultural background of the area's population. The northern republics of Slovenia (Slovenija) and Croatia (Hrvatska) and the metropolitan region of Belgrade in Serbia enjoy higher standards of living than the southern regions or rural areas. One main goal of the regime's current 5-year plan is to develop the nation's backward areas sufficiently to reduce the gap between the nation's "have" and "have-not" regions.

Rapid urbanization has accompanied industrialization, and labor has left the land at a rapid pace since 1945, creating increasing social problems in the expanding cities. Traditional family relationships and peasant values have been undermined, with no new value system to take their place. As a result of the regime's abandonment of farm collectivization in 1953, agriculture has remained the stronghold of private enterprise; about 85% of the arable land is privately held.

Economic development has helped create a new socialist middle class, composed of party functionaries, technicians, and business officials. The upper echelons of this new white-collar group have more and more become a social elite running the country. Entrance into the circle is based on political and business connections and, increasingly, on education. The demand for better educated personnel to run an ever more complex economy and society has created tension between the new young technocrats, who believe their talent is underutilized, and older party and partisan veterans, who believe that they earned
their present economic and social status by their sacrifices during World War II. Added to this has been a student outcry against arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic authority, and calls for more educational opportunity for working-class students as a means of lessening the gap of the "new class" on society.

Advances in education have been achieved by making free schooling available to all, encouraging higher education, and granting government stipends and scholarships. The educational system, however, has tended to become divided between the children of the workers and peasants, who receive vocational education, and the children of the white-collar group, who have greater opportunity for higher education. Overcrowded classrooms and lack of qualified teachers, moreover, limit educational achievement. As a result, the educational system has done little to break down social elitism and distinctions both between developed and underdeveloped parts of the country and between rural and urban areas.

Although the regime attempts to limit the influence of religion and, where possible, to use it for its own purposes, there is religious freedom in the sense that public worship is permitted without undue interference. Religious organizations are officially discouraged from taking stands on important public issues at variance with the state, and the regime has consistently opposed the Roman Catholic Church's attempts to expand religious education or to move into the areas of social welfare and health. Relations with the Vatican, however, have improved dramatically since 1970, when the Holy See and Belgrade upgraded their relations to the ambassadorial level. In early 1971 President Tito became the first head of state of a Communist nation to pay an official visit to the Vatican.

After 27 years in power, the Communists are still trying to forge a viable nation out of a crazy-quilt patching together of peoples, traditions, and interests, and to persuade the country's constituent ethnic groups to set aside their regional prejudices in the interests of the Yugoslav federation. Though the obstacles are great and success is by no means assured, there has been progress toward that goal. Moreover, Yugoslavia's postwar history has taught its friends and adversaries alike that the Yugoslav social and political system, albeit lacking order, has a resiliency that has repeatedly enabled it to resolve both domestic strains and foreign crises. The flexibility of the Yugoslav system in absorbing open criticism and adjusting to domestic complaints has led to the development of a relatively open society, and constitutes a major step forward in giving Yugoslavia that element of democracy which makes it at once a maverick and an attraction within the Communist world.

B. Structure and characteristics of the society (U/OU)

Deep-rooted nationality rivalries have hindered the development of a unified Yugoslav society since the creation of the country at the end of World War I. Despite the total control of the state achieved after World War II by the Communist regime, it too has been handicapped in creating a unified Yugoslav national consciousness by the country's diverse political, ethnic, cultural, and religious heritage. In the late 1960's and early 1970's the interplay of government reforms, continuing economic problems, and a freer political climate has led to a resurgence of bitter regional and nationality animosities. These antagonisms threaten President Tito's efforts to build a system that will promote the survival of an independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia once he leaves the scene.

In its simplest form, the Yugoslav nationality problem has been a struggle by non-Serbs against Serbian hegemony. During the period between the two World Wars, the ruling Serbian monarchy viewed and treated Yugoslavia as an extension of greater Serbia. The resentment, suspicion, and distrust resulting from that experience still color the outlook of many other Yugoslav nationalities—most particularly the Croats. Following their victory at the close of World War II, the Communists erroneously believed that the establishment of six republics and two provinces—roughly corresponding to the boundaries of Yugoslavia's major nationality groupings—would solve the nationality problem. The problem did in fact fade during the first two decades of Communist rule, but this was more the result of Tito's personal leadership than of the system of Communist rule.

Yugoslavia thus remains a crazy quilt of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. No other country in Europe is as ethnically heterogeneous. The sharp differences in the regional topography of Yugoslavia have accentuated and abetted the divisions of the people. A precipitous mountain range extending the entire length of the country aggravated the linguistic and religious differences by inhibiting cultural interchange. The same geographic factors also resulted in large disparities in the standard of living between the inhabitants of the mountainous regions of
the center and south and the more prosperous population of the fertile valleys and plains of the north and northwest.

1. Ethnic and linguistic divisions

To the north and west are the Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats, whose historical ties to the West and to economically more advanced societies nurture feelings of superiority. To the south and east are the generally Orthodox Serbs around whom modern Yugoslavia was formed. The Serbian monarchy dominated the interwar Yugoslav Government, and the Serbs—many of whom feel they have been chosen to play a leading role in the nation—still predominate in the federal administration. There are the Albanians in Kosovo, who demand national recognition and equality; Montenegrins, with a proud and independent past all their own; and Macedonians, whose national consciousness has been encouraged in Tito’s Yugoslavia.

The Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians, as well as the Muslim Albanians, share a Byzantine heritage that helped them endure 500 years of Turkish rule. Muslim culture and religion took firm root in Bosnia, where a large Muslim Slav minority remains. Divisions of culture and religion are reinforced by those of language. Yugoslavia has five official languages, of which three are Slavic—Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian—and two non-Slavic—Albanian and Hungarian.

Language, along with religion, is one of the main determinants of nationality among the South Slavs. Serbo-Croatian, which serves as the lingua franca of the country, is spoken in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenian is used mainly in Slovenia and Macedonians in Macedonia. Albanian is spoken in the autonomous province of Kosovo, while Hungarian is widely used in the autonomous province of Voivodina.

All the major Slavic languages are related closely enough to enable people from different parts of the country to understand each other. Although Serbian and Croatian are not identical and are written in different alphabets—Cyrillic for Serbian and Latin for Croatian—Serbo-Croatian is considered one language by terms of an agreement signed in the city of Novi Sad in 1954. It has many dialects which are mutually understandable and which shade into one another. The Yugoslav Constitution makes Serbo-Croatian the language of military command, drill, and administration, although all the languages of Yugoslavia are recognized as equal and training manuals are printed in all five languages. Non-Serbo-Croatian soldiers may use their native languages when off duty, but they are required to learn enough Serbo-Croatian to carry out their military duties.

Slovenian, which is more akin to Russian than to Serbo-Croatian, is written in the Latin alphabet. Macedonian, close to Bulgarian and written in Cyrillic, was before World War II considered a Bulgarian dialect even in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and Greece, with their Macedonian minorities, still do not recognize Macedonian as a separate language. Since the establishment of the Macedonian republic by the Yugoslav Communist regime in 1944, the Yugoslavs have pushed for international recognition of the language as part of their campaign to legitimize the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality and culture.

The use of minority languages is guaranteed by the Constitution, but only in the late 1980’s was this principle gradually put into practice. In 1966 the faculty of law and economics in Prishtina, the capital of heavily Albanian Kosovo province, began lecturing in Albanian. In addition, the Communist party in Kosovo has been urging major Yugoslav universities to offer entrance examinations in the Albanian language. Simultaneous translation of Yugoslav Federal Assembly debates into Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian started only in 1967; previously only Serbo-Croatian had been used.

Religion is an equally divisive factor in Yugoslavia’s complex nationality problem. The distribution of the religious groups throughout the country is based upon the historical development of the various peoples and is a factor that divides the population. The majority of the population professes to belong to one of the several religious groups: Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic. Traditionally, being a Serb meant being of the Orthodox faith and being a Croat meant being a Roman Catholic.

2. Physical characteristics

Most Yugoslavs belong to the Dinaric racial classification. They are the most numerous and characteristic inhabitants of the Dinaric zone, which stretches from southern Germany to the Greece border and which centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. The typical Dinaric is tall, long-legged, and large boned but spare. His head is small to moderate in size, wide in relation to length and flat in the portion behind the ears; the nose is prominent and the jaw line, wide. Pigmentation and hair color vary from light to dark, and eyes are usually blue or brown.

Each South Slav nationality possesses its own distinct physical characteristics, presumably acquired
through long isolation and inbreeding. Slovenes are almost indistinguishable from their Austrian neighbors. They are of medium height (5'6''), have moderately round heads with rather small facial dimensions, and are predominantly blond. Croats have similar pigmentation, but are taller (5'7'') on the average. Serbs are about the same as Croats in their body measurements, but differ by having a preponderance of high broad heads with faces smaller but longer than those of the Slovenes. The Serbs usually have a high-rooted nose with a downward turning tip, and are darker than the Croats. Macedonians usually are shorter and more darkly pigmented than other Yugoslavs, although some are tall and blond. The range of physical types is shown in Figure 1.

The Montenegrins are probably the tallest and heaviest people in Europe, with a mean stature of 5'10'' and an average weight of 160 pounds for a 40-year-old man. They are thickest, with large frames, wide shoulders and deep chests. Heads are correspondingly large. Their faces have a rugged bony structure, heavy jaws, and a large hawklike, beaked nose. They are lighter in color than Serbs and darker than Slovenes.

Intermarriage and large-scale migration within the country have made many of Yugoslavia's national minorities almost indistinguishable from the surrounding population. Peculiarities of dress have declined as a method of identifying various nationalities as relatively uniform dress has spread from the cities to the countryside.

3. Social classes

Before World War II, the various national divisions that make up Yugoslavia were predominantly peasant societies. The Turkish conquest in the 14th century wiped out the old Serbian nobility. The petty landed gentry who survived this slaughter eventually became the nucleus around which a new nobility emerged in the early 1800's—eventually to form the Serbian monarchy and aristocracy in the interwar period. The native aristocracy in Slovenia and Croatia virtually disappeared under Austro-Hungarian rule. Only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the heretical medieval nobility embraced Islam to preserve their lands, did an influential local aristocracy survive into the 20th century.

Between the wars, society was dominated by the upper echelons of a small middle class. At the top of the social structure stood persons in governmental services, including the army. Since education was needed to perform higher government jobs, classical
European education became a status symbol. At the bottom of society were the millions of mostly illiterate peasants and workers.

The Communist takeover during 1941–45 deprived the old social elite of its political power, and nationalization stripped it of economic power. The society that emerged is composed of broad occupational groups, the major ones being peasants, blue-collar (industrial) workers, independent craftsmen, and white-collar workers. Within these broad categories there are marked differences in social prestige, income, privileges, and opportunities to participate in major decision-making.

At the broad base of the Yugoslav social pyramid remain the peasants and the workers. Although they constitute the largest social group in the country, both are underrepresented in the seats of power. The peasantry, in particular, has undergone significant diminution in size, prestige, and importance since World War II. Partially as a consequence of this situation, a new group of peasant-workers has emerged, consisting of those who work in factories and return to their farms daily or on weekends. In 1964, there were about 1,300,000 such peasant-workers performing unskilled jobs in industry.

Independent craftsmen, caterers, and truckers form a second major category. Their number is growing to meet the increasing demand for craftsmen such as plumbers, carpenters, and electric appliance repairmen. Most such craftsmen, however, have remained at the mercy of the taxpaying power of local officials and have little or no political influence as a group.

The upper levels of Yugoslav society are occupied mainly by white-collar workers, whose ranks extend from lowly clerks to influential professors and party functionaries. This broad group comprises 8% to 10% of the total active population. Among them, social distinctions generally derive from occupation, educational level, and the relative importance of their jobs. The white-collar group is mainly drawn from wartime partisan leaders—many of whom are of peasant background—the postwar generation of students, and remnants of the prewar middle class.

The leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (L.C.Y.)—from the political elite down through the members of the central committees of the republics and provinces—stands at the top of the social pyramid. This group makes up the white-collar elite. They enjoy certain social privileges and a living standard considerably higher than that of the lower, white-collar workers. Moreover, educational opportunity depends to a large extent on money and influence, both of which lower class families often lack. Children of blue-collar workers are most numerous in the apprentice schools. Children of white-collar workers predominate in the general secondary schools which prepare students for advanced education. One of the demands voiced by the rioting Belgrade University students in June 1968 was for increased opportunities for the children of peasant and worker families to acquire higher education; they also demanded more worker representation in the party.

The conditions for high social mobility exist in theory and law in Yugoslavia. In reality, connections (beze) remain important. Social mobility is greater for those who know the right people, join the party, and contrive to acquire an education. Although party membership is no longer the overwhelming criterion for success, it still is a passport to the top of Yugoslav society.

4. The family and the individual

The pressures of urbanization, industrialization, and Communist ideology have accelerated the transformation of Yugoslav family life from the traditional extended patriarchal system (zadruga), which was rooted in rural life, to the modern family concept. The continued influence of some zadruga traditions, however, can be seen in the ability of most Yugoslavs to recite intricate lists of family and clan relations. Family life has continued to be more cohesive in rural than in urban areas, and even though migration to the cities is slowly changing their attitudes, many peasant-workers maintain ties with rural relatives.

The emphasis on male dominance in the pre-World War II family left women in a subordinate legal and social position. Since then, the Communists have emphasized legal and social equality between the sexes. The regime encourages women to work outside the home and to be active in sociopolitical affairs. In 1967 Croatia became the first republic to name a woman premier. The drive has been most successful in Croatia and Slovenia and in the cities. In the underdeveloped rural republics, particularly those influenced by Muslims, unwritten social restrictions on women are fading only slowly.

The regime also attempts to use the family to provide a basis for social stability. The long-term trend is to smaller families. The endemic housing shortage, however, often forces young couples to live with their parents. Elaborate social insurance schemes weaken interdependence within the family, while more
widespread education undermines the deference paid by the young to the opinions of their often poorly educated elders.

Marriage and divorce are under civil jurisdiction, although religious rites often follow the obligatory civil ceremony. There are liberal grounds for divorce and the number of divorces has risen from 14,807 in the 1952-54 period to 29,984 in 1968. Most divorces occur among urban blue- and white-collar workers. The relatively low divorce rates in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro probably reflect the influence of traditional mores in rural regions.

5. Social values and attitudes

Urbanization, industrialization, and socialist practice under Communist rule has severely strained the traditional peasant-derived value system. Not all Yugoslavs have accepted the accompanying demands for a change in outlook, and some have resisted. Many Yugoslavs ascribe to Marxism most of the ills attendant upon rapid secularization and urbanization.

Ideologically the regime is antagonistic to the traditional peasant culture but understands its deep roots and attempts to use its values to gain regime ends. Despite conservative peasant resistance to rapid social change and continuing wide urban-rural and also regional differences, Yugoslav society is moving in the direction of a single dominant industrial culture and value system. The major unifying factors in this evolving culture are the expansion of primary education based on an increasingly standardized curriculum; the development of mass media conveying similar ideas, norms, and goals; and improved communications and transportation, which foster increased interaction between urban and rural areas and between the various republics.

Traditional peasant culture involved a strong attachment to the land and association with an extended kinship group. Even though these ties usually involved identification with a broader religious or ethnic group, the Yugoslav peasant’s outlook remains very localistic. The social system stressed the values of self-reliance, independence, work, cooperation, and submission to the will of God.

The Marxist ideology stressing man’s ability to master nature and shape society and his own fate clashes with the peasant’s tendency to attribute change to the will of God. After an initial period of rigorous persecution of religion, the regime accommodated itself to the peasant’s basic religious beliefs, hoping to exploit religiously derived values such as humbleness, loyalty, justice, and self-sacrifice in building a socialist society.

Despite the exhortations of the Communist leadership that party members should be models of social responsibility and that they should respect the rights and opinions of others, self-interest still dominates most personal conduct. In the economy, self-management can be vitiated by local party cliques, and business corruption often occurs.

The failure of the party to live up to its proclaimed standards has reinforced the traditional Balkan cynicism of much of the population. Apathy and frustration are particularly apparent among the youth. Despite their basic acceptance of the regime, many young people are skeptical about the validity of Marxist ideology and are concerned primarily with their own material well-being.

Although the Communist-inaugurated federal system has helped ease some interregional conflicts, the nationality problem remains dangerous. Most people still think of themselves primarily as Croats, Serbs, or members of one of the other national groups rather than as Yugoslavs. The onset of economic and political decentralization in the early 1960s allowed a slow surfacing of regional particularism. This process was accelerated in late 1970 when President Tito encouraged public debate of major moves toward governmental decentralization. One result was an alarming rise of regional chauvinism in Croatia, which ultimately impelled Tito to purge some 400 local officials.

The old national antagonisms were based on ethnic and religious grounds. The new rivalries are primarily economic. In the case of Croatia, retention of a larger share of foreign currency earnings was the major demand articulated by the republic’s nationalists in 1971. As the national republics competed for investment funds and the means for faster economic growth, the old ill-feelings reasserted themselves in sports, cultural activities, commerce, historiography, and politics. In addition, the outbursts of regionalism since 1970 were based on interrepublic rivalry for the powers hitherto exercised by the central government and now developing in the individual republics.

In the case of the Serbs, however, there appears to be an undercurrent of opposition to the decentralization by unspecified officials who prefer a more orthodox, centrally controlled, Communist state. The Serbs, in addition to emphasizing the sacrifices they have made for the Yugoslav idea in both world wars, apparently are also fearful of losing at least some of the economic benefits accruing to them from a centralized system run from Belgrade, the capital of both Serbia and Yugoslavia.

The Croats and Slovenes, by contrast, are suspicious of a centralized system, believing that it siphons off
resources from their relatively developed economies to subsidize the nation’s underdeveloped regions. Croat officials in particular loathe the interwar period as a time of subjugation to the Serbs. Less numerous than the Serbs, the more Western-oriented Croats feel culturally superior to the rest of the country (Slovenia excluded) and are determined to push for nearly full autonomy through decentralization. Because Slovenia as an entity is relatively new—there was no Slovene state until the 20th century—the Slovenes are particularly sensitive to such things as the treatment of their language and the preservation of their considerable, essentially central European, intellectual heritage.

The Montenegrins, situated in a small quarter of Yugoslavia along the Adriatic coast bordering Albania, are ethnic Serbs who settled in the Black Mountains in the Middle Ages. They successfully fought off the Turks and remained independent throughout the 500 years of Turkish dominance in the Balkans. These tough mountaineers thus view themselves as superior to the rest of the Yugoslavs.

Montenegro harbors strong pro-Russian sympathies dating to the days of Tsar Peter the Great when sailors of the first Russian navy trained in Montenegro. Subsequently, Montenegro and Russia periodically joined in waging war against the Ottoman Empire. Even under Communist rule there are similarities between the Soviet and Montenegrin viewpoints. The Montenegrin Communist Party, for example, remains one of the most conservative in Yugoslavia and favors many elements of a more orthodox Communist political and economic system.

The rise of Macedonian national consciousness is closely linked with the existence of a Yugoslav state. Situated at the southeastern end of the country next to Bulgaria, the republic of Macedonia was established as a component of the Yugoslav federation after World War II. Only through membership in the federation has the distinct character of the Macedonians been recognized and allowed expression. Bulgaria refuses to recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation, culture, or language—a refusal most Yugoslav Macedonians read as an expression of age-old Bulgarian claims to the region. Bulgarian needling over the “Macedonian question” has only heightened the republic’s sense of national identity and solidified its ties to Yugoslavia. Although Macedonia may have partially sympathized with the Croatian nationalist position in the late months of 1971, the republic’s nationalism has never run counter to the basic interests of the federation.

Many Yugoslavs are proud of the Communist regime’s achievements in industrialization, mass education, and social welfare, and of the high esteem Tito has won for Yugoslavia in much of the world. Tito’s defiance of Stalin in 1948 earned him immense popularity, much of which he has retained. Tito’s person is a major unifying force which is buttressed by the popular desire to maintain independence from outside control.

Yugoslavia’s foreign policy of nonalignment and balancing between East and West has helped satisfy the public’s craving for prestige. Since the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Belgrade’s nonalignment has tipped in favor of the West. Culturally, most Yugoslavs already lean toward the West, and the nation’s intelligentsia and the youth avidly pick up Western styles and trends in literature, clothing, and music. Infatuation with Italian (and French) fashions, in fact, has helped mitigate the traditional Yugoslav contempt for Italians.

Hostility of the population toward Germany is strong in some areas, but it is mixed with admiration for German technical and economic achievements. Thousands of Yugoslavs find temporary employment in West Germany. Past economic, technical, and humanitarian aid has fostered a favorable attitude toward the United States, and the study of English is increasingly popular in many parts of the country. Pro-Soviet feeling is strong among the older Communists, who sometimes feel a nostalgic pull toward the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, however, by the behavior of its troops in 1945, its treatment of Yugoslavia after the break with Stalin, and its brutal intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has squandered the good will it earned in World War II.

The Yugoslav public’s attitudes toward their immediate neighbors are affected by historical antipathies and cultural differences. There is still some residual distrust of Italians and Hungarians. Romanians are tolerated as allies. Greeks usually are regarded as friends. Bulgarians are distrusted as traditional rivals in the competition for Macedonia. The attitude toward Albanians, usually one of hostility, has improved in the wake of the mutual decision in February 1971 to raise diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level and to improve general relations.

The regime’s policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence accurately reflects the public attitude toward international conflict. Influenced by national suffering in two world wars, most Yugoslavs condemn anything that threatens to generate another conflict. The regime fully supports the United Nations as an instrument of peace. There is little opposition to compulsory military service, which has been reduced from 2 years to 18 months. The memory of foreign
invasion is still strong, and Yugoslavia maintain an army which is large in relation to the country's size. Additionally, the army is vitally important for indoctrinating recruits with the concepts of Yugoslav national unity.

The general attitude toward civil defense has improved dramatically since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia has adopted a program of nationwide mobilization called all-people's defense. Should Yugoslavia be invaded, every person between 18 and 60 would assume a specific defense assignment. The first large-scale joint maneuvers of the army and local defense units—Freedona 71—was held in September 1971. Eyewitness observers report widespread enthusiasm on the part of the participants.

C. Population (U/OU)

Yugoslavia recorded a population of 20,504,516 in the 31 March 1971 census. This figure represents an increase of 1,955,225 over the 1961 census, and the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (FDAD), U.S. Department of Commerce, estimates that by 1 January 1973 the population had increased another 336,500, to 20,841,000. The 1971 census employed a complicated questionnaire designed to provide long unavailable data on educational attainments, migration, characteristics of the labor force, and nationality. Both before and after the census a great deal of controversy arose over these forms, particularly concerning the question on nationality. The term "Yugoslav" was criticized by many because it seemed to encourage individuals to give up their specific national identity. In Croatia, charges arose that inclusion of terms such as "Dalmatian" in the nationality category was implicitly anti-Croatian. The end result of the bickering was the delay of the full publication of the census results until 1973.1

Of the seven countries which border Yugoslavia—Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Romania—both Italy and Romania have larger populations. Yugoslavia ranks fourth in size, after the Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania, of the Communist-ruled countries in Eastern Europe. In land area, Yugoslavia's more than 98,700 square miles rank third in Eastern European Communist countries behind the Soviet Union and Poland. Yugoslavia's

1In this chapter, 1971 census returns are used where available; otherwise, the latest estimates are used.

FIGURE 2. Population and population density, Yugoslavia and selected European countries, 1971 (U/OU)

population density of 208 persons per square mile is roughly similar to that of neighboring Bulgaria and Romania, but there are many more people per square mile in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and more than twice as many in East Germany (Figure 2).

Population density, according to the 1971 census, is relatively high in the northern and eastern interior and along the borders of Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is low in districts along the Adriatic coast and in the mountains which parallel this coast, although densities along the narrow coastal plain are often high. Except for sparsely populated Montenegro, the range of densities among the larger administrative divisions is not great; those with the largest populations are also the largest in area (Figure 3).

Serbia, the largest and most populous of the six federal republics which make up Yugoslavia,
contained 8.4 million persons in 1971, or slightly more than 41% of the total population (Figure 4). Croatia, with 4.4 million, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 3.7 million, were the second and third most populous republics respectively, but their combined populations totaled less than that of Serbia. Macedonia registered 1.6 million inhabitants and Slovenia 1.7 million. Montenegro, the smallest and least populous of the republics, contained only 530,000 people and accounted for less than 3% of the total population.

Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 when the national aspirations of several different Slavic peoples in the area coalesced, and its administrative divisions still reflect its ethnic diversity. Each of the six republics has its own history, traditions, and cultural peculiarities, as do the two autonomous regions of Serbia—Vojvodina and Kosovo, the latter often called the Kosmet. There are five “Yugoslav nationalities,” to which about 90% of the people belong.

The 1971 census figures on the nationality makeup of Yugoslavia have yet to be published. Nevertheless, the basic pattern of ethnic population distribution in 1961, as shown in Figure 5, remains valid. It is clear, however, that the highest rate of population increase among Yugoslav nationalities during the decade ending in 1971 occurred among the Albanians in the province of Kosovo. The province registered an increase of 29% between 1961 and 1971, far outstripping its closest rival, Macedonia, which registered a 17% increase. In general, each of the five basic nationality groups—Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin—is concentrated in the republic which bears its name. The peoples of the sixth republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, are not identified as a separate nationality group. The republic is a three-way mix of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims of unspecified nationality. Bosnia and Herzegovina was created in part to terminate rival Croat and Serb
FIGURE 4. Population by administrative division, 1971 (U/OU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>AVERAGE DENSITY PER SQUARE MILE</th>
<th>AREA IN SQUARE MILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,725,088</td>
<td>223.5</td>
<td>7,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,422,564</td>
<td>203.6</td>
<td>21,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3,742,832</td>
<td>189.6</td>
<td>19,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>8,436,547</td>
<td>247.3</td>
<td>34,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia Proper</td>
<td>5,241,524</td>
<td>242.9</td>
<td>21,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>1,950,285</td>
<td>232.0</td>
<td>8,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1,244,755</td>
<td>301.8</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>530,361</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>5,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1,647,104</td>
<td>185.9</td>
<td>9,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,504,516</td>
<td>298.0</td>
<td>98,564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

claims to the area and also to give recognition to its unique historical development.

The last official statistics to be released on the national minority groups are those of the 1961 census. At that time these national minorities comprised about 10% of the population. The two largest groups were the Albanians (915,000 or about 5% of the total population) and the Hungarians (500,000 or about 2.7% of the total population). There were 15 other smaller minorities, the largest of which were Turks (183,000), Slovaks (86,000), Bulgarians (65,000), Romanians (61,000), Czechs (30,000), and Italians (26,000). Most of the people belonging to these minorities live in border regions in the northern and southern portions of Yugoslavia. With the exception of the Albanians, and despite the overall growth of the Yugoslav population since the 1941 census, the country's nationality structure has remained proportionately about the same since 1941.

Yugoslavia is a land of small rural settlements, but the number of large towns and cities is on the increase as a result of continued rural to urban migration. In 1961, approximately 28% of the Yugoslav population lived in urban areas. Since then, this figure undoubtedly has become higher. Preliminary returns from the 1971 census show that 35% of the population lives in cities of more than 20,000—compared with 15.7% in 1961. Macedonia has the highest percentage—50%—of persons living in towns of 20,000 or more. The province of Vojvodina is second with 31.3%, and Croatia is third with 30.2%. The lowest percentage of urban population—15%—is found in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Although figures for cities proper are not available, statistics for the 10 largest metropolitan areas—a city and surrounding county or counties (opština)—show their growth from 1961 to 1971 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>942,190</td>
<td>1,304,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>457,404</td>
<td>602,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skopje</td>
<td>270,299</td>
<td>387,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>213,101</td>
<td>292,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubljana</td>
<td>206,305</td>
<td>257,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novi Sad</td>
<td>162,075</td>
<td>214,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nis</td>
<td>146,524</td>
<td>193,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split</td>
<td>132,873</td>
<td>183,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maribor</td>
<td>152,939</td>
<td>172,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijeka</td>
<td>127,029</td>
<td>100,630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The irregular shape of Yugoslavia's population pyramid (Figure 6), clearly reveals the impact of wars and changing levels of fertility and mortality rates upon the country's age and sex composition. There is some lingering effect of deaths in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and in World War I in the narrow shape of the pyramid above age 60, especially on the male side. The losses during World War II are represented by the deep indentation between ages 45 and 59 years. The deficit of births during World Wars I and II is sharply delineated by the small numbers at ages 50-54 and 20-29. A long-term decline in fertility, which appears to have begun in the 1920's (though it was heavily influenced by the sharp drop in births during World War II and a postwar boom in births immediately after it), has given the pyramid a fairly slender contour; it has a much narrower base than is characteristic of populations with high and relatively stable levels of fertility.
higher in the 0-14 age group. Because the mortality rate is higher for males than for females, the number of males relative to the number of females usually drops in each successively older age group.

Toward the end of the 19th century both birth and death rates were still high and relatively stable, but at about the beginning of the 20th century the death rate began to decline rapidly, followed, after a lag of about two decades, by a decline in the birth rate. The course of the trend in both vital rates has been affected by World War II and its aftermath, so that neither has been consistently downward. The death rate has declined from about 29 per 1,000 population at the beginning of this century to 9.0 in 1969, while the birth rate has dropped from about 42 per 1,000 population at the turn of the century to 17.8 in 1969, as shown in Figure 7.

Although Yugoslavia's birth rate is half that of neighboring Albania, it is still higher than the average for European countries and the United States. Because the birth rate has been considerably higher than the death rate throughout the 20th century, Yugoslavia has experienced a relatively high rate of natural increase (Figure 8). Life expectancy was 62.4 years for males and 56.6 for females in 1961-62, according to official Yugoslav figures. Improvements in medical care since then allow an estimate of 67.3 for males and 74.2 for females as of 1968.

Birth rates vary significantly within Yugoslavia. In 1970, for example, the birth rate ranged from a high of 36.4 per 1,000 population in Kosovo to a low of 13.0 in Vojvodina. In general, populations living in the poorest and most backward areas have birth rates

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**FIGURE 5.** Distribution of the population in administrative divisions by ethnic groups, 1961 (U/OU)

Yugoslavia's population is young by European standards; the median age was estimated at 24.3 years in 1968. Because of this relatively low median age, the dependency ratio is correspondingly higher. In 1968, there were 690 persons in the dependent ages (0-14 and 65 and over) per 1,000 population; Bulgaria had 270 and Hungary 394.

Females outnumbered males in Yugoslavia in 1961, when there were 95 males per 100 females. While statistics on the male-female ratio from the 1971 census have not been released, FDAD estimates the 1973 ratio at 97 miles per 100 females. It is a universal phenomenon that more boys are born than girls so that the number of males per 100 females is typically

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**FIGURE 6.** Population by age and sex, Yugoslavia and the United States, 1972 (U/OU)
which rank among the highest in Europe, whereas those living in the more economically and culturally advanced areas have birth rates typical of those in Western Europe. Although death rates also varied within the country, the range was not nearly as wide as that for birth rates. Death rates ranged from 10.5 per 1,000 population in Slovenia to a low of 6.5 in Montenegro, with most of the administrative divisions reporting rates close to 9.0 per 1,000.

There are extremely wide variations in rates of natural increase within Yugoslavia. In 1970, the high fertility areas had rates of increase double those in the low fertility areas. Whereas in Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Serbia proper, natural increase amounted to between only 3 and 6 per 1,000 population, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, natural increase ranged between 13 and 16 per 1,000 population, and in Kosovo, where the birth rate was very high, it was nearly 28 per 1,000 population.

Since at least the latter part of the 19th century, Yugoslavia has consistently lost population through emigration. Although the size of the movement cannot be accurately determined before the 1920's, it is known that emigration was relatively heavy during the first decades of the 20th century when hundreds of thousands left what is now Yugoslavia in search of work. Most went to the United States and Canada. During the 1930's, emigration declined as a result of the worldwide depression and the imposition of restrictions on immigration by the United States and other countries which made emigration on the pre-World War I scale impossible. European countries, particularly Turkey and Germany, became the principal destination of Yugoslav emigrants.

Emigration from Yugoslavia was extremely large during and after World War II, amounting to a net loss estimated at between 600,000 and 700,000. These people were primarily Yugoslav citizens of German
descent. Italians from territory acquired by Yugoslavia after the war, and Yugoslavs displaced during the war who did not return after the cessation of hostilities.

Although no official data exist for the period 1948-53, an analysis of intercensal population change by the U.S. Bureau of the Census indicates a difference of 146,000 between the population that could be expected according to vital records and the enumerated population. Some of this difference may be attributed to varying degrees of accuracy in the 1953 and the 1948 censuses, but the major part must be attributed to net emigration. Some of the components of this migration can be identified and are estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrants:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returning Yugoslavs</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees from East European Communist countries</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigrants:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews to Israel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians expelled to the U.S.S.R. or escaping West</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs escaping West</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians to Italy</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans resettling in the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net emigration: 67,000

Yugoslav demographers have made estimates of international migration by republic for the intercensal period 1953-61, apparently based upon official migration data. They show population losses as follows:

- Slovenia: 14,000
- Croatia: 56,000
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 41,600
- Serbia: 960
- Montenegro: 160,000

Macedonia experienced the greatest loss, principally due to the exodus of Turks.

The volume of emigration has declined markedly since the 1953-61 intercensal period, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Net Emigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>7,891</td>
<td>7,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>8,061</td>
<td>7,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>7,107</td>
<td>6,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>9,071</td>
<td>7,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>10,583</td>
<td>9,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1962 and 1968, net emigration amounted to 38,928 persons, or an average loss of less than 8,000 persons per year. In 1970 only 3,808 persons emigrated, and the figure for net emigration was even smaller because 793 persons immigrated during the year.

Yugoslavia has had one of the most rapidly growing populations in Europe. In December 1918, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created, there were an estimated 11.6 million persons in the area that was to become Yugoslavia. The first census, taken in 1921 after the Yugoslav borders had been established, recorded a population of 11,985,000. The history of population change is primarily one of high natural increase, but a minor part of the growth was due to territorial acquisitions. On 10 February 1947, Yugoslavia acquired the major portion of the Istrian Peninsula (the Julian March) and several islands, with a combined territory of 2,971 square miles and a 1948 population of about 446,000. After the partition of the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1954, Yugoslavia acquired 202 square miles with an estimated population of 61,000.

The data from various censuses since 1921 have been adjusted to the 1961 area so that rates of growth during this period can be indicated for a comparable area, and they are shown in Figure 9. Between 1921 and 1931, the population grew at an average annual rate of 1.5%, a high rate for a European country during this period. Although the population grew somewhat more slowly after 1931, estimates indicate that it grew more rapidly between 1931 and 1939 than in any other country west of the U.S.S.R. except Albania and possibly Greece. Moreover, all of its growth was due to natural increase.

Yugoslavia suffered one of the greatest population losses sustained by any country during World War II; only the U.S.S.R. and Poland lost greater proportions of their population. About 1.7 million persons were killed, expelled, fled, or refused repatriation—a loss of more than 10% of the population. In addition, there

---

**FIGURE 9. Population increase, 1921–71 (U/OU)**

*(Adjusted to territory of 1961)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENSUS DATE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1921</td>
<td>12,545,000</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1931</td>
<td>14,534,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1948</td>
<td>15,841,566</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1953</td>
<td>16,991,449</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1961</td>
<td>18,549,291</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1971</td>
<td>20,504,516</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... Not pertinent.
was an estimated loss of 600,000 due to increased mortality under conditions of severe hardship and to a deficit of births. Thus, at the war's end the population was about 2.3 million persons less than might have been expected had there been no hostilities. Because of these losses, the rate of population increase between the censuses of 1931 and 1948 averaged only 0.5% per year.

Between 1948 and 1953 the increase in the birth rate raised the level of population growth to an annual rate of 1.4%. As the birth rate declined during the 1950's, the annual rate of increase fell to 1.1% for the period 1953-61. Data since 1961 are incomplete, but suggest a further slight decline.

Fertility in Yugoslavia is still high by European standards, however, and as the country becomes increasingly urbanized and industrialized a decline in fertility, which generally accompanies these phenomena, may be expected. Furthermore, the wide differences in fertility within Yugoslavia suggest that many people are already limiting the size of their families and that others may be expected to do so in the future. Family planning, however, has met with only modest success. Basic problems in achieving an adequate birth-control program stem from continued reliance on abortion as the principal means of family planning, and the lingering attitude of a male-dominated society—especially in the underdeveloped republics—that women should be kept barefoot and pregnant. If social forces in Yugoslavia operate to bring about a 15% decline in fertility by 1978 and then maintain this level through 1987, while net migration remains negligible and mortality declines as it has in other European countries since World War II, Yugoslavia's population would total about 24,112,000 in 1987.

Yugoslavia emerged from World War II as an economically and socially backward country with a rapidly growing population and a large surplus agrarian population. Subsequent rural to urban migration has diminished the problem of agricultural overpopulation but has led to increased unemployment in the nation's cities. Between 1953 and 1971 the agricultural population declined from 60.7% to 36.4% of the total population. For many enterprising young Yugoslavs leaving the farm the answer was not to go to Belgrade or Zagreb but to seek employment in the West as a temporary worker. It is estimated that in 1971 about 900,000 Yugoslavs were gainfully employed in the West, most of them in West Germany.

The Yugoslav Government has not formulated any precisely defined programs aimed at regulating population growth. Various economic, educational, and especially health and social policies initiated essentially for nondemographic reasons, have been demographic in nature; some encourage, while others discourage, population growth. Social insurance measures which provide free maternity care, compensation for worktime lost because of pregnancy, and free medical care for infants under 1 year of age, coupled with a system of family allowances in which the rate of compensation increases with the birth of each additional child, indirectly encourage population growth. Liberal abortion laws and the widespread dissemination of contraceptives and birth control information and advice are, in contradistinction, measures which would tend to limit population growth.

D. Manpower and labor

1. Manpower resources (U/OU)

Yugoslavia's economically active population was estimated at 9,702,000 persons in 1971. Of that total, 4,706,000 (48.5%) were employed in agriculture and 4,996,000 (51.5%) in nonagricultural endeavors. The 1971 labor force was estimated at 47.2% of the total population and 72.5% of the working age (15-64) group.

Yugoslavia's labor force participation rate (i.e., labor force as a percent of the total population) is among the lowest of all the countries in Eastern Europe, in large part because of the lower participation rate of women. This relatively low rate results primarily from deeply rooted cultural attitudes which confine women to home and household activities. Resistance to female employment is greatest in the Muslim areas of the south, especially in Kosovo. Post-WW II industrialization and improvements in education have resulted in the gradual entry of women into nonagricultural occupations and in a growing tendency on the part of urban women to remain in the labor force while raising a family.

The last official breakdown of the total labor force (the 1961 census) indicated that 2% of the nation's working population was under 15 yrs of age and 4% was 65 or older, as shown in Figure 10. Labor force participation by children aged 10-14 has declined sharply (from 20% in 1953 to 10% in 1961) because of

This term is used synonymously with "labor force." The Yugoslav definition of the economically active population includes all persons, regardless of age, who are engaged in "socially useful" work, including those temporarily not exercising their occupation (the unemployed, prisoners, and members of the armed forces).
the considerable increase in educational facilities, especially in isolated and underdeveloped areas. Improvements in the pensions system resulted in a modest decline in labor force participation by persons aged 65 and over during 1953-61. In 1961 about 60% of the males, but only about 31% of the females, were economically active.

In 1971 there were an estimated 3,675,000 economically inactive persons of working age. Many are of military age, with an educational and skill level that is, on the whole, superior to that of their elders. Nearly all of the economically inactive males aged 15-24, and about a third of the females, are still in school and could readily be transferred to the armed forces or to industrial or agricultural occupations. Only a small proportion of the economically inactive males 25 years of age or above would be physically capable of entering the labor force on a full-time basis, since this group is made up largely of war invalids, disabled workers, and old-age pensioners.

Inactive females aged 25-64 comprise the remainder of the labor reserve. Most are housewives with only a modest education and no industrial skill or experience. Younger women, however, could replace men on the farms or perform other manual work requiring little training or skill and some would take up arms in the event of war. Yugoslavia has a more readily accessible reserve in its unemployed labor force, which in 1970 totaled about 320,000.

2. Characteristics of the labor force (U/OU)

There has been a significant decline in agricultural employment since World War II as a result of the government’s industrialization effort. Agriculture’s share of the total labor force has fallen from 66.8% in 1953 to 48.5% in 1971, while nonagricultural employment stood at a new high of 51.5% (Figure 11). The actual number of agricultural workers is difficult to determine since this is overwhelmingly a private sector of the economy. The problem is complicated by the existence of numerous small truck farms, which are family enterprises and whose male workers may also hold jobs in nearby industrial enterprises. According to the 1961 census, there were more agricultural workers in Serbia than in any other republic, but the autonomous province of Kosovo had the greatest percent (70.8%) of its labor force in agriculture while Slovenia had the lowest (37.9%) of all the republics. There is considerable geographic variation in the pattern of agricultural activity. For example, peasant...
owners operate small farms and orchards throughout Serbia proper and Vojvodina, whereas in Vojvodina, the country’s richest crop area, most of the paid agricultural labor force are workers on large, highly mechanized state and collective farms. In the inhospitable mountains of Kosovo, livestock raisers, barely able to eke out a living, predominate. Forestry is concentrated in the mountainous regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and fishing along the Dalmatian coast.

Private ownership predominates in agriculture, and small and scattered holdings farmed by owner-operators with the assistance of family members are characteristic of most of the area. By law the size of private farms is limited to 10 hectares (approximately 24 acres). In 1960, approximately 96% of the agricultural labor force of 3,308,000 was employed in the private sector. Employment in the socialized sector of agriculture dropped precipitously when the collectivization drive initiated in 1948 was abandoned in 1953. Employment on state farms and collective farms (peasant work cooperatives) rose, however, from the mid-1950s until 1965, when it reached a peak of 284,000, before declining to 208,000 in 1969.

The 1970 work force in manufacturing and mining was estimated at 1,154,000 persons, about 26% above the 1960 figure. Nearly all manufacturing and mining workers are in paid employment. In 1970, the leading industries in this branch of economic activity, according to numbers of employees, were metalworking (1,853,800), primarily metal processing and machinery and equipment manufacturing; textiles and apparel (229,200); woodworking (306,000); food and beverages (121,000); electrical equipment (91,200); and chemicals (84,000). Employment in the petroleum, metallurgical, electrical products, and rubber industries is concentrated in large enterprises situated in the north. The building materials, textiles and apparel, and food processing industries, however, are dispersed in numerous smaller enterprises throughout the country.

Approximately 254,000 persons were engaged in crafts in 1970, compared with 251,000 in 1961. Craft activities—such as metalworking, leatherworking, and woodworking—in Yugoslavia are distinguished from manufacturing not only by the predominance of handwork but also by the performance of the entire production process by one worker, or a few at most, and by production to fill individual orders. Although private artisans are permitted by law to hire as many as five workers, only about a fourth of the craftsmen in the private sector are paid employees. Since 1963 the government has sought to encourage the expansion of private craft activities, and paid employment in private workshops has risen from 33,000 in 1963 to 41,000 in 1970. Nevertheless, the total number of artisans (employers, self-employed, wage and salary earners, and unpaid family workers) in the private sector—many of whom are near retirement age—is continuing to decline.

The labor force in services has grown substantially since 1961, when it totaled 728,000 persons. Paid employment increased during 1961-70 in virtually all service activities, with the notable exception of government administration. Roughly 95% of the labor force engaged in services is in the socialized sector. Domestic servants, restaurant owners and their employees, and self-employed professionals (physicians, lawyers, artists, and journalists) account for most of those in the private sector. Members of the armed forces numbered over 234,000 in 1972, or over 2% of the total labor force.

The distribution of the labor force by class of worker has probably changed little since 1961. At that time nonagricultural workers comprised about 42% of the total, and males outnumbered females in all categories except unpaid family workers, as shown in the following tabulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage and salary earners</td>
<td>2,596</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>3,530</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,387</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>8,340</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wage and salary earners, nearly all of whom work in the socialized sector, are employed primarily in nonagricultural occupations. Unpaid family workers and self-employed persons work almost exclusively in private agriculture, while the majority of private employers are artisans and craftsmen. Mining, manufacturing, and crafts accounted for 38% of all wage and salary earners in 1961. While the number of wage and salary earners in the private sector (35,000 in 1970) has more than doubled since 1952, their share of total wage and salary-earning employment has remained about the same—2.3% in 1970 compared with 2.5% in 1952. Craft workers and domestic servants together accounted for about 76% of the 1970 total in private paid employment.

The latest available statistical information concerning apprentices was released in 1967. The
number of registered apprentices had then reached 145,000, a 39% increase over 1961, when they constituted only 1.3% of the labor force. The educational qualifications of apprentices have improved considerably; in 1967 about 99% had completed primary school as compared with 81% in 1961 and 49% in 1954. Of those in training, 32% were in manufacturing and mining, 30% in crafts, 14% in trade, 7% in construction, and 7% in agriculture and forestry. The announcement in 1963 of government measures aimed at encouraging private craft activities halted a steady decline in the number of young people apprenticed to private employers, and their number nearly doubled between 1963 and 1967, when almost 25,300 were in the private sector.

Craftsmen, production process workers, and general laborers comprise the largest occupational group outside agriculture, and in 1961, they formed 20% of the total and 45% of the nonagricultural labor force. Yugoslavia has a relatively small percentage of its labor force in the professional and technical and in the administrative, executive, and managerial groups. In 1961, approximately 469,000 persons (or 5.6% of the labor force) were placed in the professional-technical group, and about 94,000 (1.1% of the labor force) were considered administrators, executives, or managers. Comparable percentages for Hungary, for example, were 8.2% and 1.5% of its labor force in 1963.

The government’s considerable effort to upgrade the qualifications of the labor force has begun to pay dividends. As of December 1968 only 9% of the total labor force had never attended school or at most had completed 3 years of primary classes. Although 92% of the labor force has finished secondary schools, lack of education is still characteristic of workers 40 years of age and older. This situation is a result of the limited educational opportunities before World War II and the chaotic conditions which prevailed during the war. The qualifications of younger workers improved markedly in the postwar period as a result of the expansion of educational and vocational training facilities. After-hours classes and on-the-job training have enabled a substantial number of workers to upgrade their qualifications. Workers are required to pass special examinations in order to be certified as skilled or highly skilled; such certificates were awarded between 1965 and 1967 to approximately 183,000 skilled and 39,000 highly skilled workers.

Training has not kept pace with the needs of the economy, however, and one out of every five paid employees is reportedly working in a job for which he is not adequately qualified. A survey conducted in March 1967, which divided paid employees into wage earners and salary earners, placed the majority of the former in the skilled and semiskilled category and indicated that the majority of the latter had received secondary education (Figure 12). On the basis of this survey, however, it was estimated that 34% of the jobholders in white-collar positions requiring university training and 39% of those working in highly skilled trades lacked formal qualifications. Of the 251,000 salary earners who had actually completed higher education on the survey date, approximately 64% were employed in services. Some 41% of the 199,000 wage earners who qualified as highly skilled workers were in manufacturing and mining.

Registered unemployment has been on the increase since the late 1950’s but has trended sharply upward since economic reforms began to take effect in 1965. The number of registered unemployed rose from a monthly average of 67,000 in 1955 to 319,000 in the first half of 1968, and the unemployment rate

---

**FIGURE 12. Employment by branch of economic activity and level of skill or training, March 1967 (U/OU)**

(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAGE EARNERS</th>
<th>SALARY EARNERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highly skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and manufacturing</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All branches</td>
<td>158.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Figures exclude apprentices.
FIGURE 13. Average monthly registered unemployment, 1961–70 (U/UO) (Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>HIGHER OR SECONDARY TRAINING</th>
<th>HIGHLY SKILLED AND PROFESSIONAL</th>
<th>SEMISKILLED AND UNSKILLED</th>
<th>LOW EDUCATION</th>
<th>TOTAL*</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

(registered unemployment as a proportion of paid employment excluding apprentices) reached about 9%. Since then, average monthly unemployment has remained within the range of 320,000 to 330,000, as shown in Figure 13. There is a pronounced seasonal swing in unemployment, due in large measure to the curtailment during the winter months of construction, forestry, and other activities. Unemployment registrations normally rise sharply in January and reach a peak during February and March; the low occurs in July and August. There are remarkable regional variations as well. The unemployment rate in Slovenia is the lowest in Yugoslavia, while in Macedonia and Kosovo it is the highest. Unemployment in the south results principally from village-to-city migration. Population pressure is considerable in the predominantly Muslim areas and drives many of the men to abandon subsistence agriculture. Wage-earning employment opportunities are severely limited, however, for the region remains largely unindustrialized.

Persons with no marketable skills accounted for 80% or more of the registered unemployed until 1965, but this percentage had declined to 75% by June 1969. This downward trend results in part from an absolute decrease, since 1965, in the number of unskilled females registering at government employment offices. At a time when employment prospects are especially poor, many housewives appear to have withdrawn from the labor market.

The number of secondary school and university graduates unable to find jobs has soared upward since 1965, as shown in Figure 13. The problem is severe in Belgrade (where the last accurate data showed that in 1967 graduates comprised about 21% of the city's registered unemployed), and in other cities with large student populations. School graduates with specialities in commerce, administration, the humanities, law, and economics encounter the greatest difficulty in finding jobs. Joblessness has risen steadily but less rapidly among skilled and highly skilled workers. Of the skilled workers, the highest incidence of unemployment occurs among officeworkers, followed by drivers, mechanics, carpenters, farmers, foresters, fishermen, tobacco processors, and metalworkers. This reflects the streamlining of government administration and cutbacks in industries where business activity is lagging.

The government clearly regards the employment of young professional and skilled workers as a matter of urgency. The outbreak of student unrest in June 1968 hastened the adoption in midyear of measures aimed at guaranteeing jobs for skilled and qualified young people and at stimulating an overall increase in employment. A hitherto ineffective law was amended, in effect to compel enterprises to establish training programs and to accept qualified youths as trainees. A related measure requires craftsmen in both the private and socialist sectors to hire apprentices. Another 1968 measure requires enterprises to draw up job classification systems which clearly specify the qualifications required for the job. This requirement, and a companion measure which guarantees priority of employment to individuals with the highest qualifications, is intended to curtail the widespread practice of filling vacancies on the basis of "connections" and in some cases even bribery.

Underemployment is prevalent in both agriculture and industry. Yugoslavia's high rate of population increase and retarded economic development prior to World War II resulted in a considerably larger population in agriculture than could be efficiently
utilized in farm work. While the large-scale movement away from the land since the war has diminished agricultural overpopulation to some extent, roughly 12% of the 1961 population in agriculture was estimated to be surplus. A substantial reduction of underemployment in industry (about 10% of the industrial work force in early 1966 was considered redundant) is one of the cardinal aims of the economic reforms, and is being achieved to some extent through dismissals and reassignments.

3. Labor productivity and working conditions (U/OU)

Productivity levels in agriculture and industry have been low throughout the postwar period. Although some improvement has taken place in industry in response to government efforts, the level of labor productivity in Yugoslavia remains well below that in many other European countries.

The low productivity of agricultural labor in the private sector is linked with village-to-city migration, low farm income, inadequate utilization of technological advances, sociological attitudes, and skill shortages. The movement away from the land is gradually depriving the agricultural labor force of its most productive members, for migrants to the cities consist almost entirely of the young and able-bodied. The manpower shortage in some villages has forced older peasants to cut back production or sell their land. Few private farmers have the cash for substantial investment in improved seeds, fertilizers, or equipment, and the small size of their holdings frequently precludes potentially productive mechanization. Among the older peasants there is considerable resistance to change in farming techniques which have been handed down from generation to generation. Distrust of the government because of frequent changes in its agricultural policy also contributes to low productivity. While productivity is much higher on the large mechanized farms in the socialized sector than it is in private agriculture, the shortage of skilled personnel and carelessness in the use of farm machinery lessen the effectiveness of agricultural investment.

The productivity of industrial labor lagged seriously until the early 1960's when the government launched a series of economic reform measures which culminated in the reform of July 1965. Having identified high production costs as a leading cause of Yugoslavia's economic difficulties, the government moved forcefully to establish profitability as the criterion for successful business performance. Tax measures introduced in 1961 provided management with a strong financial incentive for economizing on manpower, investing in more modern equipment, and otherwise increasing labor productivity. The federal government's labor productivity agency was reorganized extensively in the same year, and its research, publishing, and consultative activities were stepped up.

Wasteful utilization of manpower is a leading cause of low labor productivity in industry. A substantial degree of overstaffing resulted from the irrational and uneconomic hiring practices which prevailed. The harmful effects of redundancy were largely ignored because of the government's desire to maintain full employment. Beginning in 1962, however, enterprises were encouraged to dismiss surplus workers and to keep new employment to a minimum. The workers councils, which must approve dismissals, proved fiercely protective and tended to ignore financial and other inducements to dismiss surplus workers until stronger measures were introduced in 1965. Mass dismissals since 1965 have become a source of blue-collar discontent and have evoked criticism from the usually acquiescent trade unions, but the government appears determined to continue its attack on redundancy.

The irrational utilization of skilled personnel which results from favoritism in hiring and placement has also come under attack from the government. In 1968 the regime moved to assure priority in employment to the most suitably qualified job applicants. Many enterprises, however, continue to reject job applicants with impressive technical or managerial credentials and to accept less qualified candidates with connections or "pull."

Chronic absenteeism and excessive labor turnover contribute to the low productivity of industrial workers. The problem is greatest in the recently industrialized areas, but also exists in Slovenia and Croatia, where the tradition of industrial labor dates back to the last century. Throughout the country the large-scale movement of peasants into nonagricultural occupations creates problems of industrial discipline. The newcomers' lack of industrial experience is manifested in lack of punctuality and reliability and in generally poor working habits. The widespread practice of holding two jobs—one in the socialized sector, which provides social insurance benefits, and another, often more lucrative, in the private sector—results in fatigue, carelessness, and lack of diligence.

Strikes are not legally sanctioned in Yugoslavia, but "work stoppages" are tolerated as an acceptable expression of worker discontent and usually result in at least partial concessions to the workers' demands. The
duration of the stoppages, however (most last only a few hours, or a few days at most), do not have significant economic impact. The second Self-Managers Congress of May 1971 was originally slated to propose some form of legalization of work stoppages but at the last moment shield away from making such a proposal.

Yugoslav industry is in the midst of a changeover from a 48- to a 42-hour workweek which began in late 1965. Full implementation of the shorter workweek has been delayed, however, by the failure of many enterprises to register commensurate productivity increases as required by the government. The switch to shorter weekly working hours is being supervised by the government to ensure that overtime does not rise as working hours are reduced.

Usual working hours in firms which are still on the 48-hour week are from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (including a 30-minute paid luncheon period), 6 days a week. Afternoon and evening hours are frequently used for moonlighting or attending classes. Most enterprises on a shorter workweek have reduced the number of hours worked on Saturday; some have eliminated Saturday work altogether. Workers in government offices and public institutions, who have been on a standard 42-hour, 6-day week since 1957, no longer enjoy the leisure of long afternoons. Their daily schedule was changed in 1967 to 9 a.m.-4:30 p.m.

Output per man-year is not reduced by excessive leave and holiday arrangements. Annual leave of 14-30 working days per year, depending on length of service, is granted to all wage and salary earners who have completed at least 11 months of continuous employment. Leave is also granted for special purposes (military service, appearance at legal proceedings, important family occasions) and on public holidays, which are celebrated on 1 and 2 January, 1 and 2 May, 4 July, and 29 and 30 November.

Standards of industrial health and safety are generally low. In 1967, which was proclaimed Labor Safety Year in connection with an international labor safety congress hosted by the Yugoslavs, official attention was directed to the high accident rate and deplorable safety conditions which prevail in many branches of industry. Losses arising out of industrial accidents averaged about the equivalent of US$400 million annually during the 1960's.

A 1965 law on labor safety prescribes standards for safe and healthful working conditions, requires the use of protective clothing and equipment in hazardous occupations, and redefines the responsibilities of the labor inspectorate, which has functioned since 1950. Safety regulations tend to be ignored by labor and management alike; the government inspectors' warnings are frequently disregarded, and many workers are careless with machinery, ignorant of its hazards, and fatalistic about the "inevitability" of accidents. Although the number of work injuries and fatalities is considered excessive by Yugoslav safety officials, there has been a decline in the 1960's. The industrial accident rate was 63 per 1,000 workers in 1965, compared with 87 per 1,000 in 1961. According to the latest available social insurance data, the annual number of work accidents declined from 307,000 in 1961 to 231,000 in 1967, with fatalities declining from 681 to 438.

Yugoslavs move readily from one occupation to another and tend to advance rapidly within the industrial hierarchy if they possess marketable skills. The shortage of skilled workers and of competent professional, technical, and managerial personnel provides opportunities for rapid upward mobility. The government has led the way in advancing workers, technicians, and administrators who display initiative and promise. While good performance is a primary criterion for advancement, personal connections are often essential, and demonstrated political reliability is required as well for appointment to responsible posts in government and industry.

The unwillingness of most Yugoslavs to settle outside their native region limits the movement of qualified workers to areas which suffer acute skill shortages, and contributes to an oversupply of certain skills in some of the large cities. Government attempts to promote geographic mobility have been largely ineffective. Slovenes and Croats in particular are reluctant to leave their native republics for work in other parts of the country, including the capital. For students and workers from elsewhere in Serbia and the south, however, the lure of Belgrade often overcomes regional attachment.

Rising unemployment in the latter half of the 1960's led the government to encourage temporary migration abroad. The number of Yugoslavs employed abroad reached over 800,000 in late 1970 (nearly all in Western Europe, including some 425,000 in West Germany). Since then, partly in response to complaints, notably from Croatia, that skilled workers were being lost, there has been an effort to encourage some workers to return, particularly those who have developed skills that are needed at home. Relatively few of these workers take up permanent residence outside Yugoslavia, but many do remain abroad for several years.
Government employment offices work closely with foreign firms in need of labor and assist Yugoslav jobseekers in obtaining passports, visas, work permits, and other documents. The regime attaches great importance to formal intergovernmental agreements, which are designed to regularize the status of Yugoslavs who have entered other countries illegally, to provide a regular procedure for entry and employment, to assure foreign countries of a steady flow of Yugoslav labor, and to protect Yugoslavs abroad with respect to wages and social insurance. Such an agreement was signed with France in 1965 and with West Germany in October 1968. Representatives of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia frequently meet with Italian and West German trade union officials in order to guarantee the rights of Yugoslav workers in those countries.

4. Income (U/OU)

Living levels in both the rural and urban areas have improved markedly since 1950 and are considerably higher than in pre-World War II Yugoslavia. Peasants in even the poorest parts of the country have been drawn into the money economy and have cash at their disposal for the purchase of clothing, furniture, and consumer durables which traditionally had been a rarity in most peasant households. The disparity between living levels in the countryside and in the cities, however, is still great. Urban workers' incomes are far higher than peasant incomes, and city dwellers are more consumption-oriented, buying heavily and often on credit.

The variety and quality of goods available to the Yugoslav consumer compares favorably with other Eastern European countries, and prices are generally lower relative to wages than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Compared with Western Europe, however, Yugoslavia is a high-cost country. The prices of refrigerators, TV sets, automobiles, and other consumer goods coveted by the Yugoslav worker are at least as high as in Western Europe, while Yugoslav wages are far lower. In many instances, however, an apartment is included with the workers' job at a nominal rent. With his income free of onerous housing expenses, the average Yugoslav is thus able to buy more of the consumer goods available. Real income in Yugoslavia deteriorated sharply in 1965, 1966, and again in 1972 as a result of currency devaluations. As a result, widespread dissatisfaction with spiraling living costs continues to be expressed through work stoppages and criticism of prevailing wage levels.  

The per capita income of peasant households, is only half to three-fourths as much, on the average, as that of nonagricultural households. According to a 1966 survey of peasant households, average annual income in the countryside totaled 11,693 dinars (US$393.44) for a family of 4.7 members. Money income from working the family landholding amounted to only 35% of peasant household income in 1966, while paid employment in industry provided 21% as shown in the following tabulation, in dinars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>Amount (Dinars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sale of agricultural produce</td>
<td>4,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources of money income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid employment in industry</td>
<td>2,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid employment in agriculture</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family allowances</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,162</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value of income in kind</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,443</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,693</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Money wages have moved upward since the early 1960's, and virtually skyrocketed from 1964 until early 1967, when inflationary curbs imposed by the government began to take effect. Money earnings in the nation as a whole rose by 38% both in 1965 and 1966, but by only 14% in 1967. The sharply rising cost of living has, however, largely counteracted the post-1965 gain in money earnings, and the gap between money and real earnings has widened. The guaranteed monthly minimum wage was raised in 1968 to 300 dinars (US$24), but actual wage rates generally exceed the guaranteed minimum by a substantial amount. Average monthly earnings (base pay plus overtime pay, premiums, awards, bonuses, and residual income shares) increased from 204 dinars in 1961 to 787 dinars in 1967. This average rose to 1,175 dinars in 1970. Slovenia outranks the other Yugoslav republics, with a monthly per capita income of 1,376 dinars, while Kosovo has the lowest income rate, 967 dinars. Average monthly income by economic sector in 1970 is shown in the following tabulation, in dinars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Average Earnings (Dinars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and forestry</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
<td>1,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and crafts</td>
<td>1,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and public utilities</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and social services</td>
<td>4,473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Income figures are given at the dinar rate for January 1966 (12.5 dinars = US$1.00).

*Income figures are given at the 1970 rate of 15 dinars = US$1.00.
There is considerable variation within each industrial branch, resulting primarily from differences in the structure of the work force. Coal and coke mining and the printing and publishing business rank among the most highly paid branches in manufacturing and mining, with average monthly salaries in 1970 ranging from 1,434 to 1,684 dinars. Earnings are lowest in the textile and leather industries and in tobacco processing, ranging from 857 to 988 dinars.

Wage differentials rewarding level of skill are fairly narrow in Yugoslavia. In 1966 highly skilled workers employed in the socialized sector earned less than twice as much as the unskilled. The earnings ratio between persons with university-level training and the unskilled was 2.7:1. The charge of inequitable income distribution is aired frequently in the press, and underpaid workers complain bitterly of the "exorbitant" salaries commanded by top-ranking personnel. Wage data indicate, however, that such salaries are relatively uncommon and that skill differentials do not provide sufficient incentive for the acquisition of additional qualifications. The problem is more properly one of rapidly rising living costs and increasing hardship for workers in the lowest income brackets. The highly paid group included many enterprise directors, top party officials, and other members of Yugoslavia's "new class," whose influence entitles them to vacations, housing, and trips abroad on a scale which is far beyond the reach of the population at large.

The cost of fringe benefits was estimated in 1967 at approximately half the total wage bill. The social insurance system, which is financed by employers at a maximum rate of 20.5% of gross payroll, is the largest single expense. These social insurance benefits, however, are playing a decreasing part in family income. They amounted to 5.4% of the 1967 income of a four-member worker's family, compared with 9.3% in 1965. Other fringe benefits provided by large enterprises include low-rent housing, medical services, vocational training, subsidized restaurants, transportation, and vacation and recreational facilities.

5. Labor problems (C)

The low level of labor productivity is a serious and persistent problem. Even more urgent, however, are increases in unemployment and living costs which have emerged as dominant issues since the mid-1960's, with political as well as economic implications.

Productivity levels seriously ...it Yugoslavia's ability to compete on the world market and generally impede economic growth. They are linked with the inadequate education and training and poorly developed skills of much of the work force, the careless working habits of the relatively large number of industrial workers who have but recently left traditional agriculture, and glaring deficiencies in business organization and management.

The government is under growing pressure from the trade unions, students, and the populace at large to alleviate the unemployment situation, and demonstrations in June 1968 by students in Belgrade and elsewhere focused attention on the bleak employment prospects for Yugoslav youth. The unemployment problem results basically from the inability of the nonagricultural sector to absorb the steadily growing number of labor force entrants. A large proportion of these are rural youths, with no industrial skills or experience, who seek employment doing menial tasks in the cities and towns. Those who find jobs in industry tend to be among the first laid off or dismissed, but they usually maintain their ties with the village and can, if necessary, retreat to the family farm. Most worrisome, however, is the increasing scarcity of jobs for skilled workers and for professionally qualified secondary school and university graduates. Their plight points up a serious deficiency in Yugoslav manpower planning: thousands of young people are being trained in occupations with which the economy is adequately supplied, while shortages persist in other fields.

Measures designed to open up job opportunities for skilled workers and qualified professional personnel were adopted in 1968, but job prospects for the unskilled remain poor. The government is committed to the implementation of the 1965 economic reforms—an ambitious attempt to lower production costs, rationalize the price structure, and achieve economic stability. If the program continues to be implemented, the primary stress will be on modernization rather than sheer economic expansion, and the government will try to resist demands for assistance on the part of ailing industries and enterprises. This would mean slower growth and a continued high level of unemployment by past Yugoslav standards. The government has warned that full employment may not be achieved for a decade or more.

The wage level has also become a source of serious discontent, and brief wildcat strikes protesting wage policy have occurred with increasing frequency. The trade unions do not condone strike action and the government is embarrassed by it, but strikers are rarely punished, for the regime moves cautiously, as a rule, in dealing with expressions of popular discontent.
6. Labor legislation (U/OU)

Governmental control over labor is far less stringent in Yugoslavia than in other Communist countries. The government eschews compulsory allocation of manpower and relies on the operation of a free labor market to direct workers to occupations and industries where they are most needed. Federal legislation guarantees all wage and salary earners minimum standards of protection with respect to wages, working conditions, occupational safety, and social insurance, but the detailed regulation of all employment matters is left to the discretion of the individual enterprise or private employer. Enforcement of labor legislation however, is barely adequate. Violations of the safety regulations are especially numerous, and evasion and manipulation of the regulations on wages and dismissals also occur.

The single most important labor law is the Basic Law on Labor Relations, which has been substantially amended since its adoption in 1965; nearly all of the major labor legislation was redrafted in 1965-66. The Basic Law on Labor Relations applies to all wage and salary earners; it governs hiring and dismissal procedures, hours of work, periods of rest and leave, special protection for women and young workers, the method of wage determination, labor discipline, and grievance procedures. This law is couched in general terms, however, and is supplemented by implementing directives and decrees, by republic and local laws, and by enterprise regulations on labor relations, wages, and other matters. Responsibility for formulating and giving final approval to these regulations rests with the workers council, elected by the entire work force in each enterprise.

Active participation by the work force (through the workers council and its executive organ, the management board) in many of the decisions customarily reserved to management was introduced on a limited basis by a law of 1960. The system of workers' self-management has undergone almost continuous modification since then, mostly in the direction of ever greater independence and responsibility for the workers councils and other self-management organs, and it now embraces the entire socialized sector. Workers' self-management is undoubtedly the most distinctive feature of the Yugoslav industrial scene and plays a prominent role in the regime's ideological explanation of its "separate road to socialism."

Yugoslav legislation contains only brief and scattered references to grievance procedures and labor disputes. There is no law governing collective bargaining or strikes. The 1963 Constitution names the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY) as the organization through which workers may seek to improve their living and working conditions, but trade union rights and responsibilities are not defined in any of the legislation currently in effect. This legislative neglect reflects a conviction that smooth functioning of the system of workers' self-management eliminates all areas of disagreement and dispute.

7. Labor relations (C)

The Yugoslav system of economic self-management centers on the workers councils. The councils were established by law in 1956, and their legal basis was embodied in the Constitution of 1963, which states that:

The basis of the social-economic system of Yugoslavia is free, associated work with socially owned means of labor, and self-management of the working people in production and in distribution of the social product in the working organization and social community.

Self-management in the working organization shall include in particular the right and duty of the working people to manage the working organization directly or through organs of management elected by themselves.

Each business enterprise, and public institution elects a workers council once a year. No more than one-third of the members of the council may be retained for consecutive terms. In large enterprises component work units elect their own councils, which send delegates to compose the overall enterprise council. Nominations can be made by the enterprise trade union branch, the existing workers council, or a group of at least 5% of the total number of workers in the enterprise. A majority of votes is needed to win a place on the council. Voting is by secret ballot.

The council elects a managing board as its executive arm to oversee the implementation of its decisions. Three-fourths of the managing board's membership must be composed of workers engaged in production, but the chairman of the workers council may not be a member. The managing board chooses its own chairman, who may not be the enterprise director.

The workers council makes basic decisions on the enterprise economic activity, organization, internal relations, and personnel policy. It also selects the director of the enterprise. The enterprise must publicly advertise opening positions for the position of director, who is then selected from among the applicants by the workers council.

As an institution, the council has had varying success in actual operation. Some have worked well;
others have not been equal to economically wise decisions when facing such choices as higher salaries versus the purchase of modern equipment. Where self-management has been applied to institutions such as hospitals, a frequent complaint is heard that workers are making decisions in areas where they are totally unqualified. Although it is unconstitutional to impair the function of self-management, the Yugoslav press has been full of denunciations of party or technocratic interference with the decisions of workers councils.

With the evolution of the workers' management system, the role of the trade unions has undergone substantial change. Originally, the unions, under the leadership of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia were a strong arm of the regime, entrusted by the Communist Party with controlling the workers to stimulate productivity, to assist party control of production, and to carry out state social welfare policies. The introduction of the workers council marked the beginning of a general decline in the importance of the trade unions that lasted into the mid-1960's. Since that time there has been considerable ferment in the CTUY as it has sought an ever expanding role as protector of worker interest. The result has been that the CTUY, with 3,448,072 members in 1970, has become the third largest, and one of the most important, mass organizations in Yugoslavia.

Trade union objectives are still determined in general terms by the party, and the CTUY recognized in its revised statute of 1964 the leading role of the party. The regime itself has sought to use the unions as a check against the workers councils in order to prevent these organs from exceeding the limitations which the party feels appropriate. But the advent of the economic reforms of 1965 and the fall of Tito's conservative heir apparent Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966 has led the CTUY to insist on more independence for itself than the regime envisaged.

The union's leadership has more and more taken the side of the workers in the grievances against the government. Union leaders were particularly concerned over the fact that the 1965 reforms initially resulted in higher prices, a temporary decline in the standard of living, and widespread layoffs. Salaries of managerial personnel tended to remain steady or even to increase with the cost of living, while workers' salaries in unprofitable enterprises often dropped or delays occurred in payment of wages.

In late 1966 and early 1967 the CTUY leadership was already beginning to take an independent stance. At that time the CTUY took issue with government spokesmen who blamed wage increases in excess of gains in productivity for causing inflation. They also fought government attempts to economize by trimming social security benefits.

Despite this support, worker dissatisfaction with the trade union leadership burst forth publicly at the sixth congress of the CTUY in June 1968. For the first time the congress was relatively open and the voting for the new leadership was conducted by secret ballot. Union reformers and activists worked for a militant union more independent of the LCY and protective of worker interests. Delegates demanded more equitable income distribution and an end to the privileges of the government, party, and economic bureaucracy.

The sixth congress also adopted a new CTUY statute in an effort to inject more flexibility into the organization. A new trade union conference was instituted, to meet at least once a year to consider problems of working conditions. The old council was reduced in membership from 183 to 107 members and renamed the Council of the Trade Union Federation. The presidium, however, which is elected by the central council, was retained. The position of CTUY deputy secretary general was abolished, being replaced by a new vice presidency.

The year 1971 was particularly noteworthy for increased trade union activity on behalf of Yugoslav workers. The CTUY openly opposed price hikes, criticized the government for overlooking worker interests, defended the interests of Yugoslavs employed abroad, and came out strongly in favor of improving the social and material position of the workers in Yugoslavia. In the past the CTUY has been, in part, the victim of the Yugoslav self-managing system, which implicitly questions the rationale for a trade union's existence since enterprises are managed by, and labor relations vested in, the workers themselves.

With new problems involving Yugoslavs employed in the West and inflation eroding workers' earnings at home, the CTUY is beginning to emerge as a strong power factor in a dramatically changing Yugoslavia. The CTUY's new role on national social and economic issues, however, must adjust to the position of the Communist party as it emerges from the current political reforms. With the ongoing debate over whether decentralization should be extended to include the party, the potential importance of the CTUY in playing a unifying role in Yugoslavia on a class basis—cutting across regional boundaries and differences—could be enhanced.

The CTUY continues to press for a greater role on behalf of the workers. At the trade union conference in March 1972, bread and butter issues and the union's role as defender of worker interests were dominant.
themes. The conference proposed that the union have a constitutionally sanctioned political role. A demand was also voiced for a change in housing policies as well as for increased educational opportunities for workers' children.

Basically, workers are organized into six large functional unions, which have republic affiliates; these in turn form federations. Underlining the growth in importance of the republican trade union bodies, the Croatian trade union organization decided in October 1968 to change its name from the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions for Croatia to the Croatian Federation of Trade Unions.

The Communist regime uses the trade unions as an instrument of foreign policy, annually sending numerous delegations to the less developed countries of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. Efforts are also made to maintain labor’s relations with the socialist countries and the West. The Yugoslavs studiously avoid close identification with either East or West, and are not members of either the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)—although they send observers to WFTU meetings—or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

E. Living conditions and social problems

1. Levels of living (U/OU)

The standard of living in Yugoslavia differs markedly from one region to another. Conditions in industrialized, culturally Western, and prosperous Slovenia, where education is high and unemployment low, approach a favorable comparison with those of Western Europe. On the other end of the scale is the economically depressed, rural, and heavily Muslim autonomous province of Kosovo which suffers from chronic unemployment. Firm statistical data relating to living standards are often not available or are not very useful because they contain fragmentary information or averages. Certain indexes of levels of living in Yugoslavia may be compared with those of selected other countries, however, as is shown in Figure 14.
Despite the wide regional differences, the standard of living in all areas of Yugoslavia has improved considerably since World War II. Under the 5-year plan the regime is channeling funds into less developed regions to narrow the gap between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the federation.

In urban areas consumer goods are readily available. Stores in Belgrade as well as in republic and provincial capitals are relatively well stocked, although the variety is at times limited, and open-air peasant markets coexist with modern supermarkets (Figure 15). Good housing is still at a premium, and overcrowding is common even in Belgrade where much new construction has taken place. Despite the completion of some 248,990 housing units throughout the country in 1968 and 1969, the construction industry has failed to keep pace with the demand for housing. At the root of this problem has been the large and continuing migration of peasants to the cities with the resulting heavy demand for urban living quarters.

Major differences in urban and rural housing relate not only to availability of dwelling space but also to quality of dwellings, the urban type being considerably superior to the rural (Figure 16). Housing conditions in the countryside, however, are gradually approaching urban standards. New rural housing is increasingly electrified, although indoor plumbing is still rare. Wells and outhouses, when they exist, are usually found in surrounding gardens. In contrast to most urban dwellings, rural dwellings tend to be privately owned.

Urban housing since the war mainly takes the form of multistoried apartment buildings. Dwelling units are relatively small, usually with one or two rooms. In 1963, the latest figures available, of the 1,638,000 dwellings in cities, most (1,535,000) had electricity, less than half (709,000) had toilets, some 809,000 had running water, and more than half (834,000) had access to a sewerage system. Electricity, running water, and a sewerage system are usually absent in prewar urban housing, which in 1961 accounted for 64% of all urban dwellings. The standard of urban housing is significantly higher in the north than in the south. Most urban dwellings throughout the country have electricity. More than 50% of the urban dwellings in Slovenia have water and sewerage systems, but elsewhere the figure is far less than 50%.

Nearly all Yugoslavs, from all walks of life and from all the diverse regions of Yugoslavia recognize that the regime has improved their levels of living. There are, however, serious problems which remain sources of popular discontent. The per capita income in 1971 stood at about US$1,000, but the regime’s inability to curb spiraling inflation, which wipes out gains in income faster than they accrue, is one sore spot. Moreover, it is estimated that some 50% of a workers’ earnings are spent just on food. At the root of the problem is the wide range of economic conditions between different parts of the country, as well as the general urban-rural cultural dichotomy. These factors, under the impact of peasant migration into the cities and increasingly modern commercialization, generate dissatisfaction with living conditions among the “have-nots” as they become aware of the level of living of the “haves.” Despite the regime’s efforts toward economic equalization, regional and urban-rural jealousies, based also on cultural factors, persist and hinder improvements in living standards.

2. Social Welfare (U/OU)

Since World War II, Yugoslavia’s social insurance system has been vastly improved and extended into an all-encompassing insurance system that includes health insurance, old-age and survivor’s insurance (known in Yugoslavia as pension insurance), disability insurance, children’s allowances, and unemployment compensation. Total expenditures for health insurance alone were the equivalent of US$452 million in 1968.

Before World War II, about 17% of the population was covered by benefits; by 1963 the regime had extended some form of social security to nearly all the people and about half were covered by full social insurance.

Social insurance coverage is not uniform, differing as applied to wage and salary earners, independent professional persons, and private farmers. The differences in coverage reflect regime attitudes toward the various socioeconomic groups. Wage and salary earners—the “working class”—received full coverage early and, in line with Communist ideology, are the most favored group. They are automatically covered by social security upon employment.

Independent professional persons are covered by contracts between their professional associations and an institute for social insurance. Such contractual insurance has been secondarily useful in pressuring professional people to join the Communist-controlled professional associations. Artists, including writers, musicians, and actors, are insured by special legislation. Compulsory health insurance for private craftsmen was introduced only in 1962, and compulsory pension and disability insurance in 1965.

Compulsory health insurance for private farmers was established in 1959. Private farmers are not covered by compulsory pension and disability
insurance, and they must arrange for coverage by contract. Health insurance has become the most widespread type of social insurance in Yugoslavia, embracing in some form about 98% of the country's population. Pension and disability insurance are less widely distributed, but they cover more than 50% of the population.

Under the pending government reorganization, which will give more authority and power to the republics, the organization and financing of Yugoslavia's social insurance, which is already based on the principles of self-management and self-financing, will be decentralized even further. The 1962 Law on Organization and Financing of Social Insurance, giving the government policymaking and supervisory control, will be drastically revised to give a greater voice in social insurance policy to local officials.

The principal self-management bodies for the insurance system are so-called communities of social insurance, established at the federal, republic, and communal levels. Separate communities of social insurance exist for workers (including independent professional persons and private craftsmen), and for farmers. Each community of social insurance has an elected assembly through which insured persons are supposed to exercise their self-management rights. The assembly of a communal community is elected by workers councils in enterprises, trade unions, organizations of private employees, professional associations, pensioners' associations, and similar organizations. The assembly of a republic community of social insurance is elected by the communal communities. The assembly of the Yugoslav community of social insurance is chosen by the assemblies of the republic communities. As the basic organs, communal communities collect and provide funds for health insurance and are responsible for vocational rehabilitation and reemployment of disabled workers. Republic communities are responsible for pension and disability insurance policy. The Yugoslav (federal) community of social insurance coordinates matters of common interest for all communities.

The operational side of social insurance is conducted by institutes for social insurance at the communal, republic, and federal levels. These institutes implement the policies determined by the social insurance communities.

The social insurance system is supposed to be self-financing. Increased costs for medical insurance and pensions and inflation, however, have resulted in deficits. The deficits usually have been covered by loans. Funds for social insurance expenditures are formed separately for each branch of insurance. The funds accrue principally from contributions for wages and enterprise funds. For workers and employees in the socialized sector, economic enterprises and government agencies pay the contributions out of personnel cost funds. Private employers pay for their insured employees. Self-employed persons and those with contractual insurance pay their own contributions.

Health insurance benefits comprise health protection, compensation for loss of earned personal income due to illness or pregnancy, compensation for travel expenses connected with health protection, and grants for the birth of a child or the death of an insured person. Coverage extends to members of the insured's immediate family and dependent relatives. Although most medical services are free, the insured pays part of the cost of drugs, voluntary immunizations, and dental and orthopedic supplies. Health insurance is carried out on the basis of contracts between communal social insurance institutes and health institutions. This arrangement does not deny those insured the right to select their own physicians, but failure to obtain treatment on the basis of the contract may require the insured to pay an additional share of the expense.

The increasing expense of the health insurance system, which more than doubled between 1964 and 1970, has led to suggestions that the insurants pay more of the cost of medical care. Although contracts between health insurance institutes and medical facilities sometimes work well, they usually lead to inefficiency and do not stimulate better care. Some enterprises are considering contracting directly for medical services for their employees, bypassing the social insurance institutions.

Eligibility for old-age pensions is determined by age and length of covered status. Pensions normally are payable to men at age 60 after 20 years of coverage and to women at age 55. The amount of pension is based on average monthly earnings and the duration of coverage. Periodic adjustments are made to account for inflation. Dependents have the right to a family pension upon the death of an insured person.

Pensions are used by the regime as a method of rewarding its followers. Armed forces and internal security personnel, veterans of the partisan movement, and prewar party activists receive increased pensions.

The expense of the country's pension system skyrocketed between 1963 and 1968, from the equivalent of about US$135 million to nearly $620 million. Despite this increase, the pension system fails
FIGURE 15. Modern supermarket and traditional peasant market (U/OU)

FIGURE 16. New urban housing and typical village dwellings (U/OU)
to provide a living income for many of its beneficiaries. In addition, abuse of the system is widespread, and businesses often use pensions to rid themselves of surplus manpower. There is little uniformity in the dispensation of pensions, and no reliable data are available. In 1967, however, about half of all pensioners received no more than the equivalent of $20 per month.

Full disability protection is offered to the usual categories of insured. Major benefits include disability pensions, disability payments for serious physical injuries, occupational rehabilitation with cash grants during training, and suitable employment with supplementary compensation.

Children’s allowances were introduced in the early 1950’s, but this form of insurance has lost much of its importance as a source of income. Not only have increases in the amount of the allowances failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living, but new restrictions have cut the number of beneficiaries from a 1966 high of 1,505,653 to 873,719 in 1968. Benefits and coverage for peasants owning private plots generally lag behind, even though the rural community makes up about half of the population.

The unemployment compensation system was revised in March 1965, in time to meet the considerable additional unemployment which accompanied the economic reforms. Unemployment, which stood at 266,900 in 1965, had climbed to 315,600 by 1969, and would have been far greater if it were not for the more than 30,000 Yugoslavs employed in the West. The unemployment compensation system is supervised by communal and republic employment bureaus. The republics determine the contribution rates and level of monetary compensation. Eligibility requirements are stringent, and probably less than half of the unemployed receive benefits.

Social protection involves assistance to the aged and indigent, minors, handicapped children and adults, disabled veterans and families of fighters killed in the war, and victims of natural catastrophes. Since no comprehensive program exists and communal authorities supply the funds and administration, social protection is uneven and usually inadequate. Facilities and personnel for social work are in short supply, mainly because of lack of funds.

Protection of the aged and indigent is based on communal statutes and ordinances. Financial aid in the form of permanent assistance or lump-sum payments is the most important type of social protection. Because of restrictive eligibility requirements and insufficient local budget appropriations, many needy persons are excluded from social assistance. Placement of aged and infirm persons in institutions usually is limited to the most pressing cases. Institutions for the aged are limited in number and expanding slowly.

Communal welfare services undertake the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents and care for orphans. Maintaining institutions for young people and supplying school lunches are other important forms of social assistance. The most important establishments for children are the day care centers for children of the employed. In the past, families in the upper income brackets have been the main benefactors because parents must share the cost of these centers. In February 1972, however, the Assembly of Self-Managers in Zagreb, in the republic of Croatia, went on record in favor of reforming the child care center system. Under their proposal, parents with low incomes would not be charged for placing their children in nurseries and kindergartens.

Legislation involving protection of disabled war veterans and their families comes exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly. The program of benefits, which started in the early postwar years, has constantly expanded, the whole cost being borne by the federal budget. Among other benefits, disabled veterans have a lifetime right to free medical care. The Federation of Disabled War Veterans offers its members reduced rates at convalescent homes.

3. Social Problems (C)

The impact of rapid postwar industrialization and socialization on an economically backward nation has resulted in a disruption of traditional cultural values and aggravation of major, chronic, social problems: alcoholism, illiteracy, inadequate housing, and unemployment. As the Yugoslavs have attempted rapidly to pull themselves into the 20th century, they have also encountered typical modern social problems: an increase in certain types of crimes, juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, alcoholism, and disturbed family relations. Only in the latter part of the 1960’s was the regime seriously beginning to look for ways to combat these problems. In February 1972 Yugoslavia became the first Eastern European country to introduce legislation prohibiting the advertising of tobacco and alcohol in the public media.

The chief factor compounding the social problems of the post-World War II period has been the migration of thousands of literate and semiliterate peasants from rural to urban areas. The increased employment of women outside the home and the decline of the extended patriarchal family have added
to the migrants’ problem of adjusting to urban life. The regime’s discouragement of religion and attempts to keep religious influence at a minimum has weakened traditional values of society. In most instances, however, the regime has not totally succeeded in replacing such traditional values with new ones.

Laws on criminal offenses in Yugoslavia are a curious mixture of the traditional and the modern. In 1968, for example, only 186 Yugoslavs were convicted of various crimes against the state, while 37,802 persons were convicted of crimes against “honor and reputation.” Adult crime in general has tended to decline in recent years. For example, the total number of persons convicted for all crimes fell from 133,714 in 1960 to 118,824 in 1968. During that period the number of adult women convicted of crimes declined from 25,774 to 20,692. Only two major categories of crime showed increases, crimes against civil liberties and rights and crimes against the economy.

Lengthy prison sentences are unusual and most frequently are meted out for crimes against life and limb or property. Short sentences of 15 to 30 days or of 3 to 6 months are the rule. Many sentences are in the form of monetary fines, and suspended sentences are common.

In contrast to the traditional criminal acts, economic crime generally has increased. Such shady practices as bribery in commercial transactions, embezzlement, tax evasion, and unjustified price increases are relatively common. In early 1972, a major investigation of tax evasion appeared headed for a large-scale scandal in Skopje. In 1968, 6,205 individuals were found guilty of economic offenses. Moreover, most illegal practices go undetected and politically influential persons usually escape punishment, unless the regime determines to make examples of them. Public awareness of the situation helps breed cynicism toward the regime’s administration of justice.

The steady increase in violations labeled “hooliganism” and in traffic violations has evoked a public outcry. As a result, the criminal code was amended in April 1967 to provide stiffer penalties and more flexibility in meeting both types of transgressions.

The growth of juvenile delinquency, although still low by Western standards, has aroused the regime’s concern. In 1958, 3,000 juveniles were sentenced for various crimes. By 1968 the number had jumped to 6,468. Most convictions were for crimes against property, including an increasing number of auto thefts. Belgrade is plagued by young thieves who prey on the diplomatic community by stealing cars, appliances, and clothing. The incidence of juvenile delinquency is highest in the more urbanized areas—Croatia, Slovenia, and parts of Serbia proper—than in the more rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina.

Students comprise the largest group of convicted juvenile offenders, and most of the delinquents come from reputable families of middle income, as well as from the families of high party officials. Yugoslav authorities emphasize that strained family relations are a major factor in juvenile delinquency.

Alcoholism is a growing problem in Yugoslavia to which the regime is giving greater attention. It has been a major social problem even since World War II, but only in the later 1960’s did the regime begin to examine the roots of the problem. Excessive drinking underlies many of the country’s social and economic problems and undermines labor productivity. Although accurate statistics on alcoholism are unavailable, it apparently is the main social problem in Bosnia. In the Kakunj mining center there are individual workers who spend up to 60 percent of their personal income on alcohol. Regime efforts to stem alcoholism through associations to combat it and treatment centers have been inadequate.

4. Drugs and narcotics (C)

Yugoslavia is a leading European producer of raw opium as well as a major transit point for drugs smuggled out of Turkey and the Middle East to Western Europe. In 1947, Belgrade, Ankara, New Delhi, and Teheran signed an international convention limiting their poppy and opium production to amounts needed for medicine. Since then, opium production has been sharply reduced in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, officials in Belgrade estimate that between 1965 and 1970 some 35,000 kilograms of opium were illegally produced in the country.

Drug addiction is on the rise in Yugoslavia. A leading Zagreb daily in August 1971 estimated the number of drug users in the city to be near 5,000. Nevertheless, smuggling of drugs rather than domestic addiction is considered the major problem confronting the government. Drugs transiting Yugoslavia find their way into the United States either by direct smuggling or distribution to U.S. servicemen in Western Europe. The Yugoslav Government is concentrating its antismuggling effort in Macedonia, which borders on Bulgaria and Greece. Here, republic inspectors and officials of the Public Security Service have compiled dossiers on known or suspected smugglers. In addition,
federal officials are cooperating in the campaign. The use of trained dogs to uncover concealed drugs has been especially successful. In January 1972, 16 drug smugglers were arrested and 250 kilograms of drugs were confiscated at the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border town of Dimitrovgrad. This amounted to one-half the total confiscated for all 1970.

Only since about 1970 have Yugoslav officials publicly acknowledged that they have a drug abuse problem at home, although the total number of addicts has never been revealed. The most recent and significant move by Belgrade aimed at combating the problem came on 12 May 1971, with the announcement of the formation of a Federal Narcotics Commission. Creation of the new commission, coming in the midst of a major government reform, underscores Yugoslavia's serious concern over the problem. The new federal body is designed to develop and coordinate intensified research on narcotics addiction, and to organize a massive educational effort among social and professional institutions for medical treatment of addicts. In addition, the new commission is slated to redefine health care regulations to allow treatment for addiction as one of the citizen's rights under the country's health program, and to encourage development of specialized institutions for the treatment of addicts. Due to a shortage of funds and lack of trained personnel, it is unlikely that the new narcotics commission will have an early and effective impact on Yugoslavia's drug-related problems.

F. Health (U/OU)

1. Medical care

The postwar development of public health services has been predicated on two basic principles—decentralization of operations and health insurance. Under this decentralized system, however, each local commune plans and administers its own public health program, relying mainly on its own financial resources. As a result, there is a wide disparity in the quality, availability, and administration of medical care. In Slovenia and Croatia, as well as in large urban centers throughout the country, medical care is adequate, although below the standards of Western Europe. Elsewhere, health care is uneven at best and wholly lacking at worst. In most southern and rural communes of the country, for example, there is an almost total lack of medical facilities and trained personnel.

Because of the Yugoslav regime's commitment to local autonomy, i.e., decentralization, the public health system is characterized by a proliferation of small, separate, regional health institutions, each with limited resources, facilities, and personnel. Efforts have been underway since the early 1960's to integrate these small units into larger ones, but progress has been slow. For example, not even the blood transfusion service has been coordinated on a national basis. Each republic has its own regulations and systems of operation, and the quality of the equipment and service varies considerably. Periodic shortages of blood occur, and Yugoslav authorities believe it would be necessary to double the amount of blood now obtained in order to fill national requirements. The Yugoslav Red Cross is the primary agent for soliciting donors, but apparently it has no nationally coordinating role. The Institute for Blood Transfusion of Serbia is the principal procurement and production facility for blood and blood products.

National health policy is formally determined by the Social Welfare and Health Chamber of the Federal Assembly. Most federal health legislation, however, is prepared by the Council for Health and Social Policy, which replaced the former Federal Secretariat for Health and Social Policy in April 1967. The Council for Health and Social Policy functions more as a coordinating body than did the old secretariat. Most activity in public health matters has been relegated to the republics, each of which has a secretariat dealing with health matters. Republic assemblies (parliaments) also have a social-health chamber as one house of their legislatures.

The health insurance program covers nearly 90% of the population. On an average, 5% of a worker's wages go for insurance premiums. Health institutions, although nominally independent, self-managing entities, are obliged to honor the rights of the insured. As a result, curative services have been emphasized in practice at the expense of preventive medicine. The health insurance program also influenced the concentration of most health facilities in industrial and urban centers, where, until the introduction of health insurance for agricultural workers in 1959, most of the insured lived.

Despite the qualitative and organizational shortcomings of the Yugoslav health system, health care since World War II has improved dramatically. The death rate for the country as a whole fell from 12.7 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1947 to 8.7 in 1968. Infant mortality dropped from 116 per 1,000 live births in 1953 to 59.8 per 1,000 for males and 54.3 per 1,000 females in 1968. These rates, however, fluctuate widely from region to region relative to the republic's
development. In economically advanced Slovenia, the infant mortality rate in 1968 was 26.8 per 1,000; in underdeveloped Bosnia and Herzegovina the rate was 62.6 per 1,000 (down sharply, however, from 80.0 per 1,000 in 1966). In Kosovo, the nation's poorest region, the infant mortality rate in 1968 was 118.5, a figure that in fact represents an increase from the 1966 level of 111.2 per 1,000 live births.

In 1970 Yugoslavia had 259 hospitals with 106,726 beds of which 138 were general hospitals with 73,941 beds. There were also 245 medical centers with 8,287 beds. In 1970 the bed to population ratio was 1:180. To ease the load on the civilian hospitals, military hospitals (24 in 1966) often provide their facilities for treatment of the civilian population. In 1965 (the latest available data), more than 32,700 civilians were treated in military hospitals throughout Yugoslavia. The military health system, which, unlike the civilian service, has the advantages of nationwide organization and a greater uniformity of standards, may be thus attempting to correct the wide disparity in the availability of civilian medical care. To what degree this is a regime-inspired policy and the precise magnitude of the military's role in providing health care for the civilian population are not known.

There were 20,369 physicians in 1970, or about 1 for every 1,010 inhabitants. Most of the physicians remain in the urban centers or medium-sized cities, resulting in a lack of medical personnel in rural areas, particularly in the south. The shortage of dentists and oral physicians is not so severe; the country had 3,401 dentists in 1970. The latest available data indicate that there were 2,242 stomatologists and 2,687 dental technicians in 1968. In 1970 there were also 3,616 pharmacists, 4,077 veterinarians, 2,957 midwives, 26,731 nurses, 1,941 assistant midwives, and 18,409 assistant nurses.

Medical training in Yugoslavia lags behind that available in Western Europe. There are eight medical faculties in the country, although two, in Novi Sad and Nis, graduated their first class only in 1965. The whole system graduates about 1,300 to 1,500 physicians per year. Medical courses last 5 years, followed by 1 year of compulsory internship. At most medical institutions, however, a detailed internship program does not exist.

Many of the regime's general policies with regard to the medical profession and the health system as a whole have tended to discourage entrants into the field and to exacerbate existing deficiencies. The socialization of the medical services—virtually all physicians (95%) work in socialized institutions—and the abolition of private practice since 1958 are the most important factors. The proscription of private practice, including the strict prohibition against collecting fees on an individual basis from patients, is a particular issue of contention between the regime and the medical profession. In March 1971 a group of physicians in Belgrade demanded a restoration of the right of private practice, but received no encouragement from the government. This situation has only added to the shortage of doctors throughout the country, since many professionally trained men and women prefer to emigrate to the West where opportunities for advancement are better. The government's curtailment in the hiring of new physicians, a result of an economy drive associated with the economic reforms of the mid-1960's, has intensified the outflow of trained doctors. Unsatisfactory salaries are also a major cause of discontent among the Yugoslav medical profession; delays in salary payments generated a short strike by all medical personnel in Ljubljana in April 1968.

Diseases susceptible to relatively simple preventive measures have been effectively combated. Compulsory vaccination has greatly reduced the incidences of diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, and whooping cough. Malaria was virtually eliminated by 1962. The first smallpox epidemic in 40 years broke out in the province of Kosovo in March 1972. Fourteen cases and one death were reported in the first 3 weeks of that month. The disease was apparently introduced by Muslim pilgrims returning from Mecca. A nationwide vaccination campaign was initiated and travelers leaving and entering Yugoslavia as of mid-1972 were required to have a valid vaccination certificate. There were a total of 173 cases with 34 deaths.

The remaining major diseases are closely linked with congested living quarters and unsanitary handling and storage of food and drinking water. Heart disease is the major threat to national health, with an unusually high death rate (Figure 17). Gastrointestinal disorders strike even more of the population, but account for few deaths. Hepatitis is common, often occurring in localized epidemics. In 1968, gonorrhea was the fourth most widely reported infectious disease.

Other major disease threats are amebiasis and shigellosis, infectious jaundice, and scarlet fever. An estimated 25% of the country's rural population suffers from a mysterious kidney disease, endemic nephropathy, apparently unknown outside the Balkans. Nephritis also occasionally becomes widespread, as in Bosnia in December 1965. In 1967,
rodent-borne hemorrhagic fever reached epidemic proportions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which reported 156 ill and two deaths.

Animal diseases of importance in Yugoslavia are essentially the same as those of other countries of southeastern Europe. Yugoslavia has generally made more headway toward control of infectious diseases than other Balkan countries and about the same progress as those of northern Europe. The country is still confronted with some animal disease conditions which are also public health problems. A major source of concern is infected milk from tubercular cows. Among the most prevalent animal diseases are anthrax, Q fever, and rabies. Occasional outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease usually are quickly localized and brought under control.

The principal diseases in Yugoslavia which may be transmitted from animals to man are rabies, anthrax, and brucellosis. Control measures, such as vaccination and elimination of stray dogs and other animals, are applied with varying degrees of success.

Harmful insects and plants abound. Of the various species of mosquitoes, 35 have been identified and are particularly prevalent in the marshlands and lowlands. Extensive use of insecticides has greatly reduced the mosquito population and the incidence of diseases spread by them. Other harmful insects and animals include flies, fleas, lice, ticks, mites, reptiles, and rats. Possibly as many as 3,000 species of medicinal and toxic botanical drugs and plants are found in the country.

2. Sanitation

Yugoslavia has made some progress in improving sanitation and food handling methods, at least on the level of legislation; enforcement has been vested in the Federal Council for Health and Social Policy since 1967. In practice, however, neither personnel nor equipment is adequate to insure sanitary food distribution. In large urban centers U.S.-style supermarkets have adequate refrigeration, but in rural areas hygienically poor conditions are the rule. Laundry facilities and even water are sometimes lacking, as well as adequate storage space for food. Some cattle or hogs are slaughtered by the peasants and the meat is placed on the market with little or no veterinary supervision or control. Milk is often delivered to households in bulk and is frequently unsafe for drinking unless boiled.

A central sewage system is available in only about a dozen urban centers, and even in cities where a system is operational not all buildings are tied in. Principal cities depend largely or entirely upon surface drainage for the disposal of liquid wastes. In coastal towns sewage is sometimes discharged into the sea. Throughout most of the country, garbage is dumped into pits or piled up at distances sometimes less than one-third of a mile from human habitation. Most of the dumped garbage remains uncovered. Local and national programs for improving waste disposal have progressed slowly because of the cost and public apathy.

Lack of sewerage facilities remains a nationwide problem. In Belgrade, as many as half the city’s buildings are not hooked in to the sewerage system. In the south, particularly in rural areas, the general lack of proper sanitation facilities, especially waste disposal, increases the likelihood of serious disease in exactly those areas least able to bear the cost of prevention and cure.

Water supplies generally are adequate, but sources vary from region to region. Most of the population satisfies its water requirements from wells, springs, and central water systems, although some use ponds, streams, and cisterns. Piped water is available to about one-fourth of the country’s population, but only about one-fifth is served by piped distribution systems. The
potability of water varies greatly, as do the standards and efficiency of water treatment plants in the major cities.

In many areas methods of storage and distribution of water are primitive and highly unhygienic, although water control regulations are applicable to those in the United States have been on the statute books for years. More often than not the water comes from contaminated sources. In rural areas night soil is employed as fertilizer and pollution is common. Limestone springs and wells are often contaminated by polluted surface water.

Legislation on the control and curbing of various forms of air pollution is on the books, but appears to be largely ineffective. The failure of the authorities to monitor flagrant industrial violators, the vague provisions of the law itself, lack of funds and staffing to assure prosecution, and public apathy are all factors vitiating pollution control. All industrial centers have major air pollution problems; as of mid-1972, foreigners suffering from respiratory conditions were being advised not to reside in Belgrade.

In the event of a national disaster, Yugoslav civil defense authorities have at their disposal all personnel and pertinent installations of the federal and republic health services. In addition, the services of the nation's veterinary facilities, the army, the security police, the Yugoslav Red Cross, and the nation's mass organizations are immediately available.

3. Nutrition

The diet of the population, although slowly improving, is—outside the urban areas—modest and for the most part monotonous. The average diet in adequate in terms of total caloric intake (3,190 calories per day in 1968), but remains deficient in meat and dairy products. The unsatisfactory protein content of the average diet reflects excess dependence on cereals and high carbohydrate foods. A major problem in limiting protein intake is the soaring cost of meat.

Large areas of Yugoslavia—the western karst areas and the barren mountains of southern Serbia—are food deficit areas. The populations of these regions depend largely upon Vojvodina and eastern Croatia to augment their food supply. While the Yugoslavs are attempting to become self-sufficient in grain production, periodic droughts and flooding force purchases of foreign grain. Annual purchases from the United States under Public Law 480 supplied much of the deficit until 1966, when Yugoslavia ceased to be eligible for the program.

Vegetables, such as potatoes, kidney beans, peas, cabbage, kale, tomatoes, carrots, onions, green peppers, garlic, and lentils, and cantaloupes and watermelons are grown, but not always in sufficient quantity to satisfy the domestic market. Mediterranean crops—olives, grapes, and citrus fruits—are grown along the Adriatic coast.

Pork is the most popular meat among the non-Muslim population, with beef the second most widely consumed meat. Sheep also constitute an important source of food among the peasants. Despite Yugoslavia’s long Adriatic coastline, fish occupy only a minor place in the Yugoslav diet. Poultry is generally available, and game is abundant in forests and marshes.

G. Religion (U/OU)

1. Religious influence and the state

Religion has strong roots throughout Yugoslavia. The Serbian Orthodox Church was for centuries a rallying point against Turkish rule. The Roman Catholic Church, particularly under the influence of Archbishop Strossmayer of Zagreb, was a leading force in the renaissance of Croatian culture and nationalism in the 19th century. The Muslim religion became entrenched in Bosnia and Herzegovina and among the Albanian minority. In addition to the three main affiliations—Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim—there are 30 other religious communities in Yugoslavia. The geographic distribution of the three dominant religions is shown in Figure 18.

Although the Communist regime openly attempts to diminish the influence of religion in Yugoslavia, it nevertheless allows greater religious freedom than exists in any other Communist country. Some indirect controls, such as various degrees of dependence on state subsidies, continue to restrict church activities, but virulent antireligious propaganda has disappeared and obstruction of purely religious observances has ceased.

The atmosphere of relative freedom in which religious services are conducted and their large attendance is startling—particularly in Catholic Croatia and Slovenia. In these two republics, as in Poland, religion is closely tied to nationalism and religious rites assume strong nationalistic overtones.

The regime’s emphasis on permitting Yugoslavia’s various nationalities a wide latitude of cultural expression has directly buttressed religious freedom in Yugoslavia. Because the diverse historical and cultural traditions that characterize Yugoslavia’s many nationalities are inextricably intertwined with specific religious influences, it follows that the more permissive the regime has become toward expressions of national

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particularism the more toleration it has had to display toward religious practices. Figure 19 shows the diverse cultural influences in Yugoslavia, as reflected in religious architecture.

The Communist regime’s early postwar drive against religion was aided by the discrediting of the churches as a result of the collaboration of some of the clergy, particularly in Croatia, with the Axis occupiers. Church lands were confiscated and confiscatory taxes levied on church income. Communist-dominated religious associations were organized to split the clergy from the hierarchy and to insure compliance with regime directives. By the early 1960’s the associations embraced virtually all of the Muslim religious leaders, about 85% of the Orthodox clergy, and 35% of the Roman Catholic. Since then, the associations have lost influence, particularly in the Roman Catholic Church, which resisted them the most.

The regime’s reversal of its initial policies toward both institutional religion and religious practice was a gradual process, basically rooted in and starting with Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948. Since then the situation of the churches has gradually improved, persecution has stopped, and mutual toleration has developed. The change in policy sprang from the regime’s need for popular support in its struggle with Stalin and its desire to improve Yugoslavia’s image in the West. The regime also hoped to use traditional Christian values of self-sacrifice and brotherhood to help build a socialist Yugoslavia. Even though the
FIGURE 19. Religious diversity reflected in architecture (U/OU)
Communist party still recognizes no ideological peace with religion and insists that party members must adopt the materialistic tenets of Marxism; in 1964 the party statutes dropped the old statement concerning the incompatibility of party membership and religious affiliation.

There are, to be sure, definite limitations on what is acceptable to the regime. Except for marriages and other family rites, religious ceremonies legally are restricted to religious buildings, churchyards, cemeteries, and public places adjoining churchyards. Local authorities, who usually are the most antireligious, must approve processions and the conducting of rites outside those places. A civil marriage must precede a religious ceremony, and christening can only take place after a civil birth registration. The consent of both parents and the prospective pupil is necessary for attendance at religious classes of all those 18 years of age and under.

Religious profession and practice and church-state relations are regulated by two basic documents—the 1963 federal Constitution and the basic law on the legal position of religious communities enacted in 1965. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, proclaims the separation of church and state, and bans the abuse of religion for political purposes. The latter prohibition has served as a useful catch-all to rein in the church whenever the regime desires. It did not, however, prevent the Catholic Church from taking a strong antiabortion stance in Yugoslavia in the late 1960’s. The 1965 law notes that all religions enjoy equal rights and defines church rights in publishing, training clergy, religious instruction, and the performance of rites. Penalties are provided for violations.

The main government agency dealing with religious affairs is the Federal Commission for Religious Questions. Each republic has a similar body. Its president invariably is a Communist. The commission prepares and enforces all legislation relating to religious communities and advises the government on religious matters.

The last official data on Yugoslav religious affiliation comes from the 1953 census. At that time 12.3% professed no religious belief, 42% werelisted as Serbian Orthodox, 32% as Roman Catholic, and 12% as Muslim. Slightly under 2% were listed as Protestants. (According to a public opinion poll taken in 1970 by the Belgrade Center for Public Opinion Research of the Social Sciences Institute, 39% of Yugoslavia’s citizens declared their belief in God. In rural communities the proportion of affirmative answers was 50%. The Yugoslav Jewish community, never large in relation to the total population (72,000 in the prewar period), has been decimated by war and emigration. About 7,000 Jews remain, largely in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade. Only one aged and infirmed rabbi is available and the community faces gradual extinction or assimilation.

There were about 14,000 churches, monasteries, and mosques in Yugoslavia in 1969 (2,786 of which are national monuments)—6,936 Roman Catholic, 4,154 Orthodox, and 180 Islamic. Forty-two religious schools of all denominations were in operation with over 4,800 students in 1969. The Roman Catholic Church led with 30 schools containing 3,359 pupils, followed by seven Serbian Orthodox schools with 785 pupils, two Islamic institutions with 420 pupils, and three other schools of undetermined religious affiliation with 260 pupils. In 1965 about 1.3 million religious works were published in Yugoslavia, with the Roman Catholic Church accounting for 11 million of the total. Circulation figures for major religious publications are shown in Figure 20.

2. The Orthodox churches

The Serbian Orthodox Church, the major religious group in Yugoslavia, has reached an uneasy accommodation with the regime, but has lost the most influence of any of the country’s several denominations. The church is independent, but it recognizes the spiritual authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch as first

**FIGURE 20. Circulation figures for major religious periodicals, 1969 (U/OU)**

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<th>PUBLICATION</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian Auto-Cephalic Orthodox Church:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vjesnik (monthly)</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Religious Community:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glednik islamke zajednice (monthly)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(calendars, yearbooks)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian Evangelical Church:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evangelistički glavnik (quarterly)</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist Church:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glas evanjeljaka (bimonthly)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Reform Church:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformatorski list (bimonthly)</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

na Data not available.
among equals of all Orthodox patriarchs. Although the Serbian Patriarch heads the church and is elected for life by the Holy Episcopal Council, his authority is not absolute and the church is governed on a conciliar basis. Executive authority is invested in the Holy Episcopal Synod, comprised of the Patriarch and four bishops. The church has 20 eparchies (bishoprics) within Yugoslavia and several outside the country, including three in the United States. Of the 20 eparchies in Yugoslavia, four are presided over by a metropolitan (archbishop) and 20 by the bishops. Metropolitanans and bishops are elected for life by the Holy Episcopal Council. At both the eparchial and parish levels laymen serve on church councils and administrative committees.

The appeal of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a national institution has not been strong enough to maintain its prestige and influence in the postwar period. Lack of funds and a shortage of trained personnel are the church’s most pressing problems. Although the church receives donations from abroad, its national basis and the loose organization of world Orthodoxy makes it dependent on domestic income. Like most of its sister churches, the Serbian Orthodox Church is a member of the World Council of Churches.

With full regime support, the Macedonian Orthodox Church declared its complete independence from the Serbian patriarch in July 1967, thus creating a schism which divides Orthodoxy in Yugoslavia today. The Serbian church refuses to recognize the separation and the whole affair has heightened nationalist feeling in both Serbia and Macedonia—even among some party members. The regime’s strong support for a separate Macedonian Orthodox Church is motivated not only by a desire to divide and thus weaken the Serbian church, but in the case of Macedonia to reinforce the claim to national existence of the Communist-created Macedonian republic.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church is headed by a metropolitan who serves as a chairman of the National Ecclesiastical Council. A layman acts as deputy chairman. The council includes the bishops and elected clerical and lay representation from the eparchies. A synod, headed by the metropolitan, oversees spiritual affairs.

In addition to the schism, Orthodoxy in Yugoslavia suffers from a variety of other problems, most of them stemming from its doctrinal rigidity. The Orthodox confession has remained unchanged for centuries and is considered by many Yugoslavs to be an example of the church’s inability to make even minor adjustments to accommodate itself to the modern world. As a result, the church has lost touch with most of the younger generation.

3. Roman Catholicism

Although not numerically the largest, the Roman Catholic Church is the most influential and organizationally cohesive religious force in Yugoslavia. Catholicism is the dominant religion in Slovenia and Croatia. Since the middle of the last century, when the Catholic Church played a leading role in the reawakening of Croatian national consciousness, it has been virtually synonymous with Croatian culture and nationalism.

This close link between Catholicism and Croatian national identity was a major contributor to the bloody civil strife which racked Yugoslavia during the Nazi occupation. Between 1941 and 1945 some 600,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives in a struggle abetted by the rivalry between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In Bosnia, where Yugoslavia’s major religions and cultures meet, the Muslims joined forces with Catholic zealots and slaughtered Orthodox Serbs by the thousands.

Because of the wartime collaboration of some Catholic and Orthodox clergy with the Axis occupiers and the Croatian Fascist Ustasi, the regime jailed hundreds of priests and thousands of prominent laymen. The most prominent prelate involved was Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac of Zagreb, who was tried on charges of collaboration in 1946 and imprisoned. Released under house arrest in 1951, he died in 1960. Stepinac’s elevation to cardinal in 1952 led the Yugoslav Government to break relations with the Vatican.

As the regime moderated its antireligious campaign, church-state relations improved. Stepinac’s successor, Cardinal Franjo Seper, sought a modus vivendi with the regime, although refusing to barter away the church’s legal rights. Relations were eventually restored between the Yugoslav Government and the Vatican in June 1966 and raised to the ambassadorial level in August 1970. The Yugoslav regime has guaranteed the Roman Catholic Church its full constitutional rights, and the Vatican has undertaken to stop the antiregime activities of emigree clerics and to stay out of political life. The rapport between Belgrade and the Vatican which developed in the late 1960’s was climaxd on 24 March 1971 when President Tito became the first Communist chief of state to pay an official visit to the Vatican and to be granted a papal audience.
The improvement in church-state relations has resulted in a marked increase in religious and social activities by the Catholic Church in its strongholds of Slovenia and Croatia. Communist officials in both republics are alarmed at the church’s attempts to fill gaps in the social welfare system and dispense medical care. The Catholic Church also has made a concerted effort to keep in touch with youth. In 1968 alone, Catholic priests in Slovenia organized 16 private vocal and instrumental groups aimed at the musical tastes of young people. Catholic religious schools now provide instruction on the electric guitar. The archdiocese of Zagreb also publishes a biweekly newspaper Glas koncela (Voice of the Council), with a circulation that rose from 180,000 in 1969 to nearly 300,000 in 1970. Although the Roman Catholic press in Yugoslavia practices considerable restraint in criticizing the regime, it represents the only “opposition press” in the country. The still-unmet goals of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia include construction of more churches, obtaining permission to use radio and television, expansion of church social work, and an expanded role in education.

The highest advisory body of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia is the plenary conference of bishops, which meets under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of Zagreb. Between meetings, current business is conducted by the executive council of the episcopate. Archbishops and bishops are appointed by the Pope.

The church’s most acute administrative problem is lack of funds. Apart from a state subsidy for the seminaries, the church derives most if its income from private gifts and donations. Funds are particularly needed for the construction of new churches in growing urban and industrial areas.

The period of church-state rapprochement has not been altogether smooth. On several occasions Glas koncela has been banned, among other things, for carrying articles laudatory of the late Cardinal Stepinac. On several occasions priests have been arrested and accused of distributing emigree literature. Despite these irritants, however, relations between the Communist regime and the Catholic Church in 1972 appeared to have reached a postwar high point.

4. Islam

Of all Yugoslavia’s diverse religious groups, tradition is strongest among the Muslims. Based on a patronymical social order and belief in submission to the will of Allah, Islam is diametrically opposed to the materialistic tenets of communism. Despite the strong Muslim antipathy to Communist atheism and the regime’s condemnation of the Muslim collaboration with the Croatian Fascists during the war, the Islamic religious community has seemingly reached an exemplary modus vivendi with the regime. One of the most backward components of the old Yugoslav society, the Muslims stood to gain the most from the regime’s determination to close the gap between the nation’s economically developed and underdeveloped regions, especially in terms of educational and health services. Moreover, the Muslims believe that, for the first time since the Turkish withdrawal in 1878, they have achieved equality with Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.

Islam is strongest in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. It is organized into a network of community committees supervised by a smaller network of trusteeship commissions whose members are appointed by assemblies in each of the four republics having a sizable Muslim population. Each republic assembly has an executive body called “the authority.” Several Muslim units on the federal level, located in Sarajevo, are at the apex of the organizational structure. The highest Muslim legislative and administrative body is the Supreme Assembly of the Yugoslav Islamic Community. The Supreme Islamic Authority constitutes the assembly’s executive body and is the highest organ with respect to religious matters. Heading the Supreme Islamic Authority is the chief ulama (reis-ul-ulema), who is elected for an indefinite period by a body composed of all the members of the Supreme Assembly, the republic authorities, and the directors of the Islamic schools. Vacancies in the leadership ranks of the Muslim community are filled by the students who attend one of the two Islamic schools in Yugoslavia. There is no Muslim higher theological school in the country, but since 1962 a small number of advanced students have been studying in Cairo, Tunis, and Istanbul.

Probably the poorest religious organization in Yugoslavia, the Islamic religious community is the only one not receiving material assistance from abroad. It is, therefore, highly dependent upon its state subsidy. Testifying to the resilience of the Muslim religious community is the fact that in the country’s poorest region, the autonomous province of Kosovo, some 55 religious structures were built or renovated between October 1968 and October 1969. The community maintains its own publishing house in Sarajevo, which publishes—in Serbo-Croatian and Arabic—religious books, textbooks, and the quarterly Glasnik Islamske Vjerski Zajednice (Herald of the Islamic Religious Community).
Several hundred Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca each year. The regime's reaction to efforts by the Muslim community to expand religious teaching among the young, however, is the same as its reaction to similar attempts by other religions—dogged opposition. Except during the holy month of Ramadan, most Muslims do not observe the religious proscriptions against gambling and the use of alcoholic beverages. In many cases, attachment to Muslim congregations is more a matter of tradition and of pride in heritage than of religious zeal.

H. Education

1. General (U/OU)

The Yugoslav educational system has made great strides under communism in opening schools to the broad masses, but academic accomplishments are generally mediocre. Through education the regime has tried to create a citizenry dedicated to the ideals of Yugoslav socialist society, capable of engaging in social self-management, and skilled to perform economically useful work. Despite the progress, the educational level of the Yugoslav population remains relatively low by European standards. The illiteracy rate in the late 1960's was estimated at about 13% to 20%. Despite literacy campaigns among the older generation and better quality education among the young, nearly half of all the illiterates reportedly are under 50 years of age.

Popular attitudes toward the value of education vary sharply throughout the country. Among some segments of the population, particularly in rural areas and among Muslims, tolerance of illiteracy, especially among women, lingers. Even among these groups, however, the regime's efforts at education are producing gradual changes in traditional family relationships and the status of women. Moreover, education is the key to the better paying jobs in urban areas which have attracted many peasants. Education has become an important determinant of social stratification. Under the 1965 economic reform, professional qualification is emphasized over the older criterion of political acceptability. Despite the emphasis on vocational training, however, the educational system has failed to produce a satisfactory number of trained specialists, and cooperation has been poor between the economic consumers of trained manpower and the educational system.

Although the school system is supposed to foster dedication to the ideals of Yugoslav socialism, the average school curriculum devotes relatively few hours to the study of socialism per se. Instead, ideology permeates the teaching of most subjects, but particularly the humanities. On the whole, students appear bored with Marxist indoctrination and repeated explanations of official ideology. The regime, however, has had a measure of success in creating acceptance among youth of the Yugoslav socialist system. When the students of Belgrade University noted in June 1968, their demands were not aimed at the overthrow of the socialist system but at making the Tito regime live up to its promises. Subsequent student demands have repeatedly pressed the regime to live up to the tenets of socialist equality and have vigorously opposed what they term the "red bourgeoisie," i.e., the privileged new class of Communist functionaries and managers.

Differences in economic and cultural development underlie the differences in the level of education among Yugoslavia's various regions. Illiteracy is least pronounced in the economically advanced and Western-oriented regions of Slovenia, Vojvodina, and Croatia. It is highest in the underdeveloped areas of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Throughout the country, but particularly in the underdeveloped areas, women lag behind men in educational achievement.

The effects of economic inequality among the country's regions and between urban and rural areas also is reflected in the inequality of educational opportunity. Nationwide, about 50% of the country's 3.5 million wage and salary earners have not completed elementary school. The dropout rate is approximately 51%. In order to achieve equal educational opportunity, the underdeveloped areas secured in the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution a provision obliging the republics to subsidize communes lacking funds for adequate primary schools. The federal government similarly is obliged to subsidize republics in need of school funds. How efficiently and evenly these provisions are carried out is open to question.

The decline in the system of student stipends and the high cost of obtaining a higher education are responsible for the persistent class division in education. The number of students receiving stipends dropped from 20,910 in 1964/65 to 10,254 in 1970/71. During the same period the number of full-time university students increased from 106,959 to 136,885.

The Yugoslav Constitution of 1963 gives the republics considerable leeway in the administration of education. In the federal legislature, the jurisdiction over education belongs primarily to the Education and Culture Chamber, which is composed of elected...

The law on education passed in May 1966 puts the main burden for financing basic schooling on the communes. Previously, most funds for education had been acquired by syphoning money from enterprise profits. Under the new law, local tax money is used. The enterprises are encouraged to supply scholarships and stipends and to conclude pupil training agreements with the local communes. Total educational expenditures constituted somewhat less than 6% of the national income in 1964, but fell to 4.7% in 1966, and slipped further to 3.9% in 1971. Because of the rush to the cities, overcrowding is especially acute in urban schools, where construction is lagging. Almost all primary and secondary schools operate on two, and sometimes three, shifts. Throughout the educational system there is a shortage of textbooks and teaching aids. Laboratory and workshop equipment is often obsolete.

2. The educational system (U/OU)

Until 1958 the Yugoslav educational system retained the main features of the centralized, prewar educational structure, whose core was a 1929 law providing for an 8-year, free, compulsory education. The law, however, was enforced only in the economically well-developed areas of the country, and most children in rural districts and in the underdeveloped regions received only 4 years of elementary education. Below the university level, the gymnasium (gymnazi[a]), or general secondary schools, dominated the educational system.

The extensive reorganization and expansion of the Yugoslav educational system, initiated by the General Law on Public Education of 1958 and amended since then, has been characterized by flexibility and decentralization; both these factors have imbued the system with some advantages and some drawbacks. In line with the increasing trend toward political decentralization throughout the country, the federal government has become responsible only for the basic guidelines of education, while most of the executive powers as well as funding resources are in the hands of local authorities. The one common element of the whole educational system is, therefore, the principle of self-management. The management body of every school is composed of the school board, the teachers' council, and the director of the school. The board is the school's executive body, regulating all activities, including coordination with such external institutions as different elements of local government.

Because of the different levels of economic development among different regions of Yugoslavia, however, the decentralized educational system has a built-in drawback of frequently inadequate funds—and hence a poorer educational standard—precisely in those areas most in need of quality education. Moreover, the progress of the educational reform since 1958 has been slow and uneven. As late as November 1966, the President of the Federal Executive Council acknowledged that budgetary problems precluded guaranteeing to each child the prescribed 8 years of elementary education. It is estimated that a 4-year education is still the standard for most rural children. Figure 21 shows a modern urban elementary school and a traditional rural elementary school.

Despite its shortcomings, the new Yugoslav educational system has provided vastly expanded educational opportunities to increasing numbers of children on all socioeconomic levels, and offers a flexible system from preschool and child welfare programs through the compulsory 8-year elementary schools and various secondary academic and vocational schools to universities and postgraduate studies. In addition, there is an extensive system of adult education with both full-time and evening courses for those who are employed. Throughout the educational system, the language of instruction is generally that of the dominant ethnic population of the area, although minority groups within a larger ethnic group may use their own language in their own school.

The major components of the Yugoslav educational system (Figure 22) are: voluntary preschool institutions for children age 3 to 7; the 8-year primary school for pupils 7 to 15; secondary schools, the most important of which are the 4-year gymnasiums; schools for skilled workers and vocational schools; higher education institutions, such as faculties, art academies, high schools, and higher schools. There are also special schools for the mentally retarded. The number of different schools, students, and teachers as of 1969/70 are given in Figure 23.

The 8-year primary schools and the gymnasiums are the only schools in the Yugoslav system devoted mainly to general education. The primary school curriculum emphasizes mathematics and instruction in the pupil's native language. The curriculum also allocates time for "productive work" performed either in school workshops or on experimental agricultural plots.
The main purpose of the 4-year gymnasium is to prepare students for university studies. The curriculum consists of two parts—a 1-year general study program for all pupils and a 3-year elective program. During the 3-year elective portion, students specialize either in social sciences and languages or in natural sciences and mathematics. The number of course hours per week averages approximately 31 during each year of the 4-year program. Compulsory productive work lasts 15 days during the school year and is arranged in collaboration with local industrial and communal bodies.

More than two-thirds of Yugoslav secondary school students, however, attend one of an extensive network of vocational schools rather than the academically oriented gymnasiums. Schools for skilled workers are apprentice schools and schools with practical training. The course of study usually takes 3 years, although some vocations require only a 2-year period. Technical and vocational schools offer training in specific fields such as agriculture, building, forestry, veterinary science, transportation, economics, medicine, library science, and hydrometeorology. These schools were initially designed to train middle-level technicians and administrators. Technical schools also provide some general education and practical training, however, and more than half of their graduates go on to higher education. Courses at these schools generally last 4 years and offer practical theoretical instruction. Productive work is accomplished during the school year and for a 30-day period during summer vacation.

School centers are a relatively new concept used to make the facilities and workshops of each component available to all. The centers follow no fixed organizational structure and are a combination of various types of existing vocational schools in a
form a university), art academies, high schools, and higher schools. A three-level system has been introduced, offering a complete education and training in a given specialization and also preparing the student for continued study at the next higher level. The duration of study at each level usually is 2 years. The first level is carried out in the higher schools, the second level in all institutions except the higher schools, and the third level in faculties and specially authorized high schools.

Institutions of higher learning are open to all those who are capable of qualifying for them, irrespective of their school background. The increasing demand for scientists and engineers has led to the establishment of new faculties and schools of advanced engineering, and a new scholarship policy has greatly increased enrollments at these institutions. A relatively new feature of higher education is the 2-year postsecondary school (junior college) created in response to the needs of industry and social services.

Technical sciences, economics, and medicine have grown the most since the prewar period, mainly at the expense of law. Law studies remain relatively popular, however, because lawyers are in demand as business and communal administrators. In the social sciences, instruction in Chinese and Japanese was introduced in early 1972 at Zagreb and Belgrade Universities. When necessary, the government can stimulate the development of particular disciplines by its scholarship and student-aid policies. Student employment after graduation often is unrelated to academic training. To avoid working outside the larger cities or in the production branches of the economy, many graduates accept jobs for which they have had no special preparation.

In the absence of standard regulations, entrance requirements, curriculums, and examinations in institutions of higher learning tend to differ considerably from republic to republic and even from institution to institution. All students, however, must master a course in the social sciences. The course has a Marxist foundation and emphasizes such aspects of Yugoslav socialism as self-management and the communal system.

The regime also has developed an extensive system of adult education. The most important organizations in this field are the schools for adult education, which offer a single type of general or vocational education, and the people’s universities and workers’ universities, which provide different types of instruction at various levels. The schools for adult education have the same rank as similar schools for young people. Classes are held after the day’s work and some of the schools give correspondence courses.
3. Problems in education (C)

The rapid expansion of education in Yugoslavia has created a number of weaknesses and imbalances in the system—for example, shortages of space, equipment, and trained personnel. In addition, institutions of higher learning have been slow to respond to the demands of science and technology. The lack of qualified teachers is a major stumbling block to qualitative improvement in the standard of education. Low teacher salaries, moreover, discourage high-caliber young people from entering the teaching field.

The average student finds himself the victim of the system. Because of inadequacies in the field of instruction and frequent poor teaching methods the student finds himself ill-prepared for his studies. The net result is a high number of college dropouts and an even higher number of students repeating courses. Some Yugoslav educators contend that as the number of weekly lessons has grown the students are overloaded with work. Students must pass completion examinations before graduation, but the high proportion of "excellents" scored probably indicates that the examinations are too easy.

A major weakness in the educational system is that it is a dead end for many students. Over 275,000 pupils were enrolled in schools for skilled workers in 1969/70. These types of schools provide only a skimpy general education and usually do not furnish an adequate foundation for higher education.

The teaching profession, although not apparently hostile to the regime, has become increasingly restive since 1966. In the autumn of that year there were successful teachers' strikes in some areas of Serbia. The main point at issue was increased pay for teachers. The inflation which occurred in the first year of the economic reform outran teachers' salaries, which were relatively low to begin with.

Another sore point was teacher resentment at party interference in the educational system. Although such interference in day-to-day teaching operations is negligible, many teachers want an end to party control of teacher placement, and university professors resent having unqualified students forced on them by party officials. The widespread faculty support given the striking students at Belgrade University in 1968 was symptomatic of the situation.

Regulations concerning teacher training and qualifications vary from republic to republic. Previously, teachers for grades one through four were trained in a secondary-level course. These schools are gradually being phased out and teachers of grades one to four, like specialized teachers in grades five to eight, are being trained at higher education institutions,
mainly 2-year pedagogical schools. Secondary school teachers normally must have finished the second level of instruction at an institution of higher education.

Much of the teaching staff at all educational levels is substandard in quantity and quality. The teacher shortage remains severe, despite some decrease in student-teacher ratios. The ratio in elementary schools declined from 30 pupils per teacher in 1963/64 to 24 per teacher in 1969/70. The student-teacher ratio in the gymnasiums has decreased from 19 pupils per teacher in 1963/64 to 18 per teacher in 1969/70.

The main reason for the teacher shortage has been the decline in prestige of the teaching profession as a result of low pay and limited advancement opportunities. The shortage is greatest in the rural and economically underdeveloped areas, which lack adequate financial resources and the physical amenities to attract qualified personnel. To stimulate efficiency and raise teachers’ salaries, the regime has introduced distribution of income according to work. The scheme attempts to measure each teacher’s level of responsibility and effectiveness. In general, the new system is not popular with the teachers and has led to such policies as holding the professors of Belgrade University responsible for any lack of success in teaching students.

The socioeconomic composition of student enrollment in secondary and higher education further reveals the inequality of educational opportunity which has developed. About three-fourths of the children of workers’ families in Serbia go to vocational schools, while the children of specialists, artists, and members of the party elite mainly go to the gymnasiuims. The latter have become more and more class institutions. As the only secondary schools which give broad preparation for higher education, they have acquired considerable social prestige. The emerging class educational division continues in institutions of higher education. In the late 1960s it was estimated that only about 13% of the children of blue-collar workers were receiving higher education. In Zagreb, the largest industrial center in Yugoslavia, only 16% of the students at the university were children of blue-collar workers. The children of the peasants, still the bulk of the Yugoslav population, have even more difficulty in continuing their education.

4. Students and their attitudes (C)

The Yugoslav educational system provides a wide variety of officially sponsored extracurricular activities. The primary objective of all free time activities is to indoctrinate the student into the socialist self-management system. Various organizations operate within the scope of the regime’s mass front, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia. The Pioneers, for children up to 14 years of age, function in the primary schools. The Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) takes in young people from 14 to 27. Its membership in
December 1967 was 2,085,456. Students in institutions of higher education usually join the smaller (110,000) Federation of Students of Yugoslavia (SSJ). Membership in both organizations tends to be opportunistic—undertaken for the small material benefits to be conferred. Both organizations suffer from apathy among the rank and file members, who usually regard the SOJ and the SSJ as tools of the regime. The political indoctrination efforts of both organizations are relatively ineffective and neither of them can be counted upon to insure regime control of youth or students.

Yugoslav youth can be divided into three main groups with regard to their involvement and activity in politics. The first is a small but growing number of radicals who seek drastic, fundamental changes in the Yugoslav system. To the embarrassment of many top officials, some of their own sons and daughters, disillusioned and impatient with the Yugoslav system, have turned to this group as offering the only solution to the country’s ills. Members of this group, however, often have different motivations, ranging from philosophical idealism to economics and nationalism. The role of the highly nationalist students at Zagreb University in the Croatian political crisis in December 1971, for example, has renewed regime interest in students as a political force. The second group consists of the bulk of the politically active youth. While more moderate in outlook, they nevertheless are highly critical of and do not accept much of the party line. The third and largest group is the apathetic youth.

Contributing to student frustration and unrest are Yugoslavia’s economic problems—specifically the country’s spiraling inflation. The gains which have been made—including salaried work agreements for some students in the sciences—are being wiped out by the rapidly rising cost of living.

The increase in unemployment which followed the 1965 economic reforms resulted in a decrease in the employment of new university graduates. Lack of job opportunities was a major issue underlying the student riots at Belgrade University in June 1968. Inability to find suitable or sufficiently remunerative employment has prompted many university graduates in the professions to leave the country for work in Western Europe. This Yugoslav version of the "brain drain" has caused considerable concern among the Yugoslav leadership.

One manifestation of student frustration is the growing use of drugs, a situation acknowledged by regime leaders who are concerned over a sharp increase in the use of narcotics by many young Yugoslavs. As a result of this serious situation, the government has imposed harsh new penalties for drug pushers and users, and has expressed a willingness to cooperate with international efforts to halt illegal drug traffic.

Student discontent also has been stimulated by the party’s reluctance to loosen its grip on the universities. Although “self-management” and university control of its own finances has been constantly extolled, university party organizations have usually had to bow to the wishes of their superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate but “safe” intellectuals. In July 1969, the Serbian assembly amended the law to allow faculties and students a free hand in university elections, but without specifically explaining how the elections would be conducted. As a result, the Belgrade University council adopted a complicated and indirect method of election, thus assuring election results acceptable to the party.

I. Artistic and cultural expression

1. The regime and culture (C)

Yugoslavia’s lively, open cultural life is as diverse as the nation’s complex ethnic makeup. Unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, traditional cultural expression blends with the modern to produce a vitality and spontaneity that are not tolerated by other Communist regimes. Nowhere is this curdled blend better seen than in the village cultural center, where displays of traditional handicrafts stand alongside modern abstract art (Figure 25). An avant-garde theater thrives in Belgrade with state backing. Western music is popular and readily available, and, in art, abstract expression is freely practiced and admired in intellectual circles. Citizens of Zagreb and Belgrade, the nation’s two largest cities, enjoy a continuous stream of Western musical and theatrical productions. This high degree of freedom in cultural expression is highly valued by the Yugoslav people, who view it as an indication that their country is in the mainstream of Western cultural life. Conversely, most Yugoslavs view the lack of such cultural freedom in the Soviet Union as an expression of archaic orthodoxy.

Immediately after coming to power in 1945, the Communists introduced centralized control over cultural life and exalted artists and writers to abide by the tenets of socialism and socialist realism. After the break with the Cominform in 1948, regime interference in cultural life abated and was exercised only by setting general cultural policy and by manipulation of subsidies and other financial inducements.
The relaxation of restrictions on artistic and intellectual expression was followed in the 1950's by the decentralization of administration. This allowed Western cultural influence to seep back in and cultural regionalism to reassert itself. A regime drive to create a unified Yugoslav culture and to stem Western influence in the early 1960's succeeded in reaffirming the regime's cultural policy but failed to effect a permanent reorientation in cultural life.

The regime does, however, reserve the right to set limits on cultural expression, particularly that which is explicitly critical of socialism or the Yugoslav system. In doing so, however, the leadership rarely uses direct censorship or imprisonment to suppress adverse views. Instead, the regime prefers indirect pressure, such as persuasion by party officials, legal harassment, party disciplinary measures, and regime control of publishing subsidies to silence those who exceed the bounds of acceptable criticism.

Nevertheless, an important segment of the intelligentsia remains determined to establish its right to complete freedom of expression, including the right to criticize the regime. Dragoljub Golubovic is an example of one such intellectual. Before his ouster from the Politika publishing house in 1969, he was considered one of Yugoslavia's ablest and most enterprising journalists. Golubovic's troubles began in mid-1966 when he wrote a stinging attack on the special privileges of the Communist leadership, such as villas, expensive cars, and servants. He was reprimanded by the Serbian party and instructed to avoid sensitive topics. Thereafter, an uneasy truce between Golubovic and the party continued until the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969, when he addressed a passionate appeal to the conclave to remove all restrictions on the press. The result of his effort was his removal from the Politika staff altogether.

Imprisonment is used on occasion, however, as a last resort. The case of Mihajlo Mihajlov, a young university instructor from Zadar, is an example of the way the Tito regime silences those of its overly zealous critics who refuse to heed warnings. Mihajlov was first arrested after criticizing Stalinism in the Soviet Union in a series of articles published in Yugoslavia early in 1965. His successful legal appeals resulted in a suspended sentence. In August 1966, however, Mihajlov was rearrested on charges of spreading false news about Yugoslavia and quickly sentenced to 1 year in prison. His real crime had been his public advocacy of a multiparty system for Yugoslavia and his effort to start an opposition journal. In April 1967 Mihajlov was retried on the more serious charge of spreading hostile propaganda and received a 4 ½-year sentence, later reduced by 1 year. Mihajlov's troubles with Yugoslav officialdom continue, however. In
February 1972 he was sentenced to 30 days in jail for violating the terms of his release from jail, which banned him from publishing until 1974.

More serious than Mihajlov's case, and more difficult to handle from the regime's point of view, has been the type of intellectual dissent symbolized by the philosophical review Praxis (Practice). Founded in 1964 by the Croatian Philosophical Society and edited by young professors at the faculty of Zagreb University, Praxis emphasizes Marxist humanism and stresses the concept of individual rights. The periodical has been a bête noire to authorities. Some of its articles have questioned the authority of the Titoist one-party system and have called for a greater role for intellectuals in Yugoslav society, thus undermining the jealously guarded leading role of the party and Communist politicians. Recently, in July 1972, it was temporarily banned for defending the rights of Belgrade Prof. Mihajlov Djunic who was tried and sentenced to 2 years in jail for alleged Serbian nationalism. From its first issue, Praxis has been publicly criticized by leading party figures, including Tito himself. Threats to suppress the magazine by cutting off its subsidy have recurred periodically. After the Belgrade student riots of 1968, which were accompanied by murmurs of discontent among the students at Zagreb University, the journal came under even more severe attack. Its leading editor, Gajo Petrovic, was expelled from the Communist Party and those associated with Praxis have been accused of being Western agents.

As the treatment of both Mihajlov and Praxis reveal, the ideological and political monopoly of the party leadership falls outside the limits of intellectual debate allowed in Yugoslavia. The party leadership is particularly sensitive to any effort by dissenting intellectuals to recruit the support of workers by pointing to their economic grievances. High-ranking Slovene Communist has remarked that such a development was the reason for the banning of the intellectual review Perspektive in Slovenia in 1964.

An equally sensitive subject is cultural nationalism. The Communist leadership has periodically denounced "cultural chauvinism," but efforts to foster a "Yugoslav culture" have been abandoned. In the latter half of the 1960's the regime began to encourage open expressions of regional cultural identity. The emphasis was placed on fostering the concept that Yugoslavia was a union of equal nationalities and that these groups could best express their identity within rather than outside the federation. The use of the term "Yugoslav" was even dropped from the 1971 census form.

That the policy of encouraging regional cultural expression has its pitfalls was demonstrated by the Croatian crisis of December 1971. In the cultural sphere it was already evident in the spring of 1967 that the Croatian intellectual community was unhappy with Croatia's position vis-a-vis the federation. In April of that year a group of Croatian intellectuals, some of them long-term party members, issued a manifesto calling for equal treatment of the Croatian language, which they alleged was being overshadowed by Serbian. (Croatian and Serbian have been treated as variations of one language, Serbo-Croatian.) The leadership used party sanctions and expulsions to silence the controversy. One of those who left the party because of the controversy was leading poet and dramatist Miroslav Krelja, who had backed the Communist cause since the interwar period.

2. Cultural heritage and traditions (U/OU)

Yugoslavia's diverse cultural heritage is rooted in the native traditions of its numerous ethnic groups. Cultural development, therefore, reflects two interrelated processes—the separate artistic and intellectual development of each nation as well as the gradual absorption of superimposed foreign cultural influences into native forms. During the middle ages the Latin-oriented Croats, the Byzantine-oriented Serbs and Macedonians, and the Bosnians, who had embraced the Bogomil heresy from Asia Minor, each produced a distinctive religious art. Serbian and Macedonian culture reached its early high point in the 11th to 13th centuries. Based on Byzantine models, religious architecture and painting flourished. The church at Graenica, built during this period, is considered by some art critics to be the finest Orthodox church in the Balkans. Medieval Serbian churches were adorned with magnificent frescoes, some of which have survived to become treasured cultural monuments under the Communists.

Croatia's early cultural development was along the Adriatic coast and expressed a Venetian-Slav synthesis (Figure 26). Although the Renaissance generally bypassed the southern Slavs, some of the Venetian-dominated coastal cities were affected. Dubrovnik produced a distinctive Serbo-Croatian literature, which reached its peak in the works of Ivan Gundulic (1598-1638) and in particular with his epic, Osman.

Stilled by the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish conquests between the 15th and the 19th centuries, native artistic expression found its only outlet in folk culture. Oral poetry became the mainstay of literary endeavor. Epic poems about heroic deeds in the struggle against the Turks helped keep alive the spirit
of resistance to foreign domination. These epics had great political effect during the Serbian uprisings of 1803 and 1815, which put the Serbs on the road to complete national independence. The epic tradition in Serbian literature was revived during World War II with themes devoted to Tito and his partisans.

Serbian culture revived under the influence of the 18th century enlightenment, producing the first modern major Serbian literary figure, Dositej Obradovic (1782-1811). The resurgence did not take place first in the old Serbian homeland, however, but in Vojvodina, then under Austro-Hungarian rule. Novi Sad became a Serbian cultural lighthouse and retains some cultural importance to this day. It still is the location of the Serbian cultural organization known as Matica Srpska, which was founded in 1826. After the achievement of Serbian independence in the mid-19th century, however, Belgrade rapidly replaced Novi Sad as a center of culture.

The South Slav cultural revival in the 18th century soon came to reflect increasing national consciousness. Major foreign influences derived from contemporary trends in Western Europe and a lesser extent from Eastern Europe. During the 19th century, Serbian literature, with some time lag, reflected trends prevailing in French and Russian literature. During this romantic period poems and folk themes flowered, and the Illyrian movement worked for unification of all the South Slavs and the standardization of their languages. Leaders during this era were Vuk Karadžić, a Serb; the Croat Ljudevit Gaj; the Slovene Jernej Kopitar; and the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petar Njegos, who wrote one of the classic epics in Yugoslav literature, Gorski Vjenac (The Mountain Wreath). Opposing the imitation of folk literature was the Slovene Franc Preseren, who wrote his lyrics in the classical style then popular in Europe.

During the decline of romanticism and the appearance of realism in the second half of the 19th century, poetry yielded to the novel, short story, and drama as the most prominent genres. About the turn of the century French literary influence gained ground in Serbia, although the Balkan Wars (1912-13) occasioned an outburst of nationalistic literature.

3. Literature (U/OU)

Two main groups of young writers currently are discernible in Yugoslavia. The first, and more radical, are those who do not belong to the party, who feel there is no chance of gaining more liberty through a one-party system, and who want radical changes in the Yugoslav system. This group usually expresses its
views in the Zagreb philosophical journal *Praxis*. The second group consists of those who believe they can work within the system and change it through constructive criticism. Their views usually appear in the Belgrade journal *Književne novine*.

Among the current leading Serbian novelists is Ivo Andric. A realist, most of his works deal with the life and history of his native Bosnia. Andric received the Nobel prize in literature in 1961 for his work *Bridge on the Drina*. Other leading Serbian writers are novelists Dobrica Cosic and Grozdana Oluje and poets Vasko Popa and Oskar Davico. Popa was the leader in the winning fight by the modernist poets in Yugoslavia against their socialist-realist rivals.

Surrealism in Yugoslav literature first appeared in the 1930’s among a group of surrealist writers in Belgrade; many of them later joined the party. The most noted contemporary surrealist is Montenegrin author Miodrag Bulatovic. His first book, *The Red Cock Flies to Heaven*, gained widespread international acclaim—it was published in France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 14 other countries—and won for Bulatovic the reputation of one of Europe’s most brilliant avant-garde novelists. A later book, *A Hero On a Donkey*, was banned in Yugoslavia as being “too lascivious.” In reality the censors took exception to Bulatovic’s irreverent portrayal of Tito’s partisans during World War II. The work, however, has been published in Germany, France, and the United States. As the public has tired of accounts of partisan war exploits, erotic poetry and sex novels have become popular.

Modern Croatian literature was profoundly influenced by Western and central European literary movements. The “Croatian moderna” around the turn of the century, however, had strong nationalist overtones. The most noted modern Croatian literary figure is Miroslav Kraljez, who came to prominence during the interwar period. An expressionist poet and dramatist, Kraljez is probably best known for his drama trilogy on the Glmbaj family, which depicts life among the degenerate Croatian aristocracy.

4. Music and the theater (U/OU)

Modern Yugoslav music, as distinct from folk music, at various times has come under Czechoslovak, German, Austrian, French, and Russian influences. At first, Yugoslav composers sought to create a national style by incorporating folk melodies into their serious compositions. Outstanding exponents of this school were Stevan Hristic and Jakov Gotovac. Serious music

![FIGURE 27. Atelje 212, avant-garde theater in Belgrade (U/OU)](image-url)
in Yugoslavia appeals to a very limited audience. Most Yugoslavs prefer folksongs and contemporary popular music. The most popular folk melodies are those from the republic of Macedonia which show a lively Turkish influence. The young particularly enjoy such Western forms as rock-and-roll. The British group “Blood, Sweat, and Tears” played to packed houses in Yugoslavia in 1970 and were acclaimed by critics everywhere.

The 19th century theater, like literature, also owed much of its development to its usefulness as a vehicle of nationalist expression. Leading playwrights of the past include the Serbian satirists Jovan Popovic (1806-56) and Branislav Nusic (1864-1936); the Croatian Ivo Vojavic (1857-1929); and the Slovene Ivan Cankar (1876-1918). Contemporary drama is best represented by Krleza. There are professional theaters in all the large Yugoslav cities and towns. Attendance is fairly large, particularly for satirical cabaret shows which have become popular since 1963.

Belgrade has become the center of avant-garde theater in Eastern Europe. In 1969, the theater Atelje 212 (Figure 27), which receives a city and state subsidy, broke the nudity gap by opening a Serbian version of “Hair.” President Tito himself gave roaring approval to “Hair” in a private showing before the production opened, and the play was still being presented to packed houses in late 1971. In 1970, the play “Opereta,” by Polish emigree writer Wiltold Gombrowiez, opened. As in “Hair,” “Opereta” contains a nude scene, when at the close of the play the heroine rises from a black coffin and poses for 12 minutes nude.

The last significant clash between the regime and the theater was in October 1969 when Dragoslav Mihailovic’s work, “When the Pumpkins were in Bloom,” was produced by the Yugoslav Drama Theater. The play defended the “victims” of Tito’s efforts to weed out Stalinist agents at the time of his break with the Kremlin in 1948. The production was stopped after causing an uproar and being labeled a rehabilitation of cominformism.

5. Art and architecture (U/OU)

Yugoslavia has produced one of the world’s giants of 20th century sculpture, Ivan Mestrovic (1883-1962). Mestrovic, a Croat from the Dalmatian coast, studied and worked in Vienna and Paris. He was a close friend of Rodin, who at one point in their friendship described him as the “greatest phenomenon among sculptors.” Nationalistic and religious themes dominate Mestrovic’s works (Figure 28). Despite his strong aversion to communism, Mestrovic is
recognized and revered by the government for his enormous talent, and his works are closely guarded as part of Yugoslavia’s national treasure.

Contemporary Yugoslav painting has reflected all the trends of the 20th century, but, unlike sculpture, has gained only limited international recognition. The best known and most original Yugoslav painting comes from country villages, such as Hlebine and Kovacic, where self-taught peasant artists paint in the primitive or naive style to create unique images of Yugoslav life. These artists deal with man in his surroundings and how he solves everyday problems, instead of depicting human passions. Yugoslav primitive or naive art has been exhibited in the United States and Western Europe. One of the most noted of these artists is Martin Jonas (Figure 29), whose brightly colored paintings depicting village life have won him international recognition. Despite the dislike of several leading regime figures, including Tito, for abstract expressionism, artistic and intellectual circles prefer that style. The museum of modern art in Belgrade contains an excellent collection of 20th century Yugoslav art (Figure 30).

The Second World War devastated Belgrade, leaving the city few architectural monuments of note. In their postwar reconstruction of Belgrade, the planners stressed functionalism of design, with the result that there is a degree of monotonous uniformity to the buildings erected during this period. In addition, the haste with which many of the buildings were erected and the desire to keep down costs encouraged poor construction practices and shoddy workmanship. Zagreb, on the other hand, suffered little under the German occupation and retains some fine examples of baroque architecture—as does Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia.

J. Public information

1. The media, the regime, and the public (C)

The Yugoslav news media have long been an anomaly in the Communist world for their objective, critical reporting. Since the late 1960’s the media have been divested of even more of the remaining restraints on their activities, with the result that news coverage by the Yugoslav press, radio, and television is often equal to Western media in objectivity and depth of coverage. Although the party still does not permit an opposition press, the permissible limits of press freedom have been so expanded as to constitute an open forum from which only criticism of the Yugoslav system and of Tito himself are banned.

Yugoslav journalists and others involved in the dissemination of information have jealously guarded their independence, which was established only after long years of whittling away at official censorship. In 1965 the Union of Yugoslav Journalists adopted the “Code of Yugoslav Journalism,” which outlines minimum ethical and professional standards and enjoins journalists to be objective and accurate. This
code was reaffirmed in 1969, as was the right to withhold the identity of a source upon the source's request.

The regime, after its near brush in 1966 with a Stalinist coup led by former Vice President Rankovic, agreed that an open press was necessary to assure the development and safeguarding of Yugoslavia's brand of socialist democracy. In mid-1971 the journalists union openly called for complete freedom of action by claiming the right of access to all sources as well as the right to print conflicting views. The Slovenes, in particular, have been active in pressing for greater press freedom. Because of Slovenia's geographic location next to Austria and Italy, the news media of those two countries are readily available. Slovene journalists argue, therefore, that if they are to compete they must be free to report as they see fit, and must have direct uncensored access to foreign press services. Access to foreign wire services, up to the present, has been only through the Yugoslav Press Agency TANJUG in Belgrade.

The role of the press in the Croatian crisis of late 1971, however, raised many questions in official circles about the responsibility of the press. Tito personally condemned the media for the wide publicity given to the nationalistic excesses of the Croatian affair, and sharply rebuked certain journals by name. Tito's criticism launched a campaign of reprimand against the press which peaked in early 1972 with threats to give district courts a de facto censorship role over local newspapers. As of mid-1972, Yugoslav journalists seemed resigned to accept some new, indirect, and largely self-imposed restrictions on their freedom, both to ward off direct censorship and to assure themselves of having a voice in shaping any new press regulations that the regime might impose.

Constitutional grounds for control of information media are quite broad but vague. The Constitution states only that the freedom granted to the media must not be used to overthrow the socialist system, disseminate national or religious hatred, incite to crime, or offend public decency.

The Law on Press and Other Forms of Information of 1960 is more specific. It prohibits dissemination of information that:

- Constitutes a criminal act against the people, state, or armed forces; communicates military, official, or economic secrets; transmits false or alarming news or threatens public order; directly disturbs the maintenance and development of friendly relations between Yugoslavia and other countries; injures the honor and prestige of the Yugoslav peoples, their supreme representative bodies, or the President of the Republic, or the honor and prestige of foreign nations, heads of state, or their diplomatic representations; seriously injures the morals or is detrimental to the upbringing of children; or harms the interests of justice.

Both the Constitution and the press law guarantee the right of public reply—by citizens as well as state agencies and economic and social groups—to disseminated information injurious to human personal rights or interests. The right of reply applies to all the media.

There is no direct censorship body which controls the press, radio, and television in Yugoslavia. Instead, the regime exerts its influence through a system of legal regulations, indirect controls, and pressures on individual editors for self-restraint, to assure relative conformity to its line. The only central control organs in existence are film boards—the Federal Commission for Films exercising control over the importation of foreign films, and republic film boards controlling distribution of domestic motion pictures.

Such direct control over the press as exists is derived from the 1960 press law, which enables a public prosecutor to issue a temporary injunction against the publication or distribution of any book, magazine, film, or TV broadcast which he considers to be in violation of the law. A permanent injunction can be issued only by a court after a hearing, and either side may appeal against an adverse decision. Final decisions banning publication appear in the official gazette and are a matter of public record.

Another method of control is through the mass organization Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). SAWPY controls most of the important daily newspapers and publishing houses, supervises the activities of various social organizations sponsoring media enterprises, and has jurisdiction over the business and professional associations connected with the mass media.

The regime is able to maintain effective control over the press by exercising financial leverage. Since most publishing ventures in Yugoslavia lose money, government subsidies, generally granted at the republic level, are necessary to keep them afloat. Tightening of the purse strings thus becomes an extremely effective method of enforcing indirect censorship. As a last resort, the public authorities may simply ban the publication or distribution of an offending journal or book.

Enterprises concerned with the mass media are independent self-managing bodies, each with a workers council, managing board, and director. News media enterprises each have an editor who is responsible for the information disseminated. Directors, responsible editors, and other leading personnel are appointed by the enterprise owner or sponsor. Each enterprise also has a special council which includes elected representatives of the workers in the enterprise, government officials, sociopolitical
figures, and cultural representatives. The council, although an advisory body, reviews publication policy, thus indirectly acting as a censorship board. The participation of party members at every level is supposed to insure observance of the correct party line. Further regime control is exercised through media business and professional associations.

Surveys of the impact of mass media throughout the country show, as would be expected, that the inhabitants of the less developed regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are the most poorly informed on current events, while those living in large cities such as Belgrade and Zagreb are well informed on current events.

For the average citizen, however, news reporting, particularly of domestic events, is not the main attraction of the press or radio. Those using these media to obtain information are liable to be the better educated, older people, or members of the League of Communists. Most Yugoslavs use the press or radio as a source of entertainment. Whenever available, however, motion pictures and television surpass radio and the printed word as sources of entertainment.

2. Press and publishing (U/OU)

Twenty-three principal daily newspapers and more than a thousand other local and special-interest newspapers are published in Yugoslavia. A poor rural distribution network and increased prices have reduced circulation, which fell from 9,817,000 in 1965 to around 8,000,000 in 1970. During the same period the actual number of newspapers of all kinds increased from 1,171 to 1,381. Another factor underlying poor circulation has been the neglect of local issues by the press. With few exceptions, Yugoslav newspapers usually are dull by Western standards. Data on principal daily newspapers are given in Figure 31.

The most important dailies are Borba, with its evening tabloid Vecernje Novosti, and Politika, with its evening tabloid Politika Express. The official organ of the SAWPY, Borba probably is the most authoritative newspaper in Yugoslavia, but it is dull and generally unimaginative. It has suffered from a sharp decrease in circulation in recent years. Borba’s major rival, Politika, is a better seller and has a reputation for good news coverage and greater independence in news reporting and analysis.

**FIGURE 31. Principal daily newspapers, 1965–69 (U/OU)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>LANGUAGE</th>
<th>PUBLISHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vecernje Novosti (Belgrade)</td>
<td>269,500</td>
<td>341,900</td>
<td>261,400</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>SAWPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politika (Belgrade)</td>
<td>290,500</td>
<td>273,422</td>
<td>281,589</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>SAWP, Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vjesnik (Zagreb)</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>106,782</td>
<td>105,034</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>Politika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politika Express (Belgrade)</td>
<td>117,500</td>
<td>97,412</td>
<td>131,627</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>SAWP, Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecernje list (Zagreb)</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>88,990</td>
<td>97,077</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>Vjesnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borba (Belgrade, Zagreb)</td>
<td>149,500</td>
<td>85,032</td>
<td>44,513</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>SAWPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolo (Ljubljana)</td>
<td>81,500</td>
<td>82,677</td>
<td>81,836</td>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>SAWP, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sportke Novosti (Zagreb)</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>74,451</td>
<td>99,087</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>SAWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>58,261</td>
<td>58,957</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>SAWP, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport (Belgrade)</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>56,683</td>
<td>72,722</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Borba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecer (Maribor)</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>49,829</td>
<td>50,450</td>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>SAWP, Maribor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubljani Novine (Ljubljana)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>47,740</td>
<td>37,687</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>SAWPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srbobrana Dalmacija (Split)</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>34,984</td>
<td>40,996</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>SAWP, Dalmatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar Isto (Novi Sad)</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>32,962</td>
<td>32,515</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>SAWP, Vojvodina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Macedonija (Skopje)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>26,686</td>
<td>28,033</td>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>SAWP, Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecernje Novine (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>27,117</td>
<td>30,811</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>SAWP, Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnevnik (Novi Sad)</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>24,348</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>SAWP, Vojvodina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova List (Rijeka)</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>20,984</td>
<td>27,426</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>SAWP, Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolinda (Pristina)</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>10,073</td>
<td>9,930</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>SAWP, Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privredni Prilog (Belgrade)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>9,430</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>SAWPY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecer (Skopje)</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>7,960</td>
<td>8,285</td>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>Nova Macedonija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glav Slavonije (Osijek)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,880</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>SAWP, Vojvodina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Voz del Popolo (Rijeka)</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,634</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>SAWP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1,526,000 1,569,227 1,028,588

*SAWPY—Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.*
Next in importance to the daily press are several large circulation weeklies, particularly Vjesnik u Srijedu (Wednesday Messenger). Other major weeklies are Rad (Labor), organ of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia; Mladost (Youth), organ of the Federation of Youth; and Komunist, the official party weekly. Komunist underwent a facelift in early 1968 in an effort to increase its circulation, which had dropped from 220,000 in 1964 to 169,000 in 1966. The format was altered and the weekly began actively to solicit advertising. In line with the regime’s emphasis on minority-language rights, Komunist is also published in Albanian and Hungarian editions in addition to the three major national languages.

Despite their wide variety and number, periodicals are of secondary importance in the media system. Their number grew from 1,022 in 1965 to 1,387 in 1968, and circulation increased from 3,900,000 to 10,046,000. For the most part, periodicals serve a specialized leadership and deal with political, economic, and social questions and the arts and sciences. However, literary reviews such as Književne Novine (Literary News) and scholarly journals such as Praktis sometimes assume an important political role.

The most popular weekly in Yugoslavia, akin to Time or Newsweek, is Nin (Weekly Information Journal). Formerly a conservative and unimaginative magazine, Nin was completely revamped in the spring of 1970 and nearly doubled its circulation as a result. Leaning toward the sensational, Nin tackles even risky subjects. Readers have also been won over with a heavy sprinkling of articles from popular Western journals such as Der Spiegel and Time.

A total of 61 newspapers and periodicals are published in the languages of the minority populations. The three major minority-language dailies are Magyar Szó (Hungarian), Rilindja (Albanian), and La Voce del Popolo (Italian).

The importation of foreign publications in any of the Yugoslav languages, or those especially designed for Yugoslav readership, requires an entrance permit from the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. The larger newsstands in the major cities sell major foreign newspapers, however, such as the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune, The Times of London, and the Soviet Union’s Pravda.

The official Yugoslav press agency TANJUG receives information to the mass media. TANJUG channels information through a network of correspondents at home and abroad and from exchange agreements with about 26 foreign news services, including Reuters, United Press International, Agence France-Presse, and TASS. A second Yugoslav news service, Pres Sertis, deals mainly in scientific and special news, such as economic reporting. Many major world news agencies and leading foreign newspaper maintain offices or have correspondents in Belgrade.

Publishing enterprises and institutions are the basic elements in the Yugoslav book industry. Government agencies and economic and social organizations may also publish books, but they are limited to subjects related to the work in which they are engaged. Although the Business Association of Publishing Enterprises and Organizations attempts to coordinate publishing operations, there is some duplication. The number of books and brochures published in Yugoslavia rose from 8,019 in 1964 to 8,708 in 1969. The number of copies printed increased from 59,417,000 in 1965 to 63,868,000 in 1969.

Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana are the three major publishing centers, but a number of publishing houses thrive in other cities. Books are published in all of the languages of the country, including the minority languages (Figure 32). Despite the relatively large output, the publishing industry has not been able to meet the shortages in scientific, professional, and children’s books, and in textbooks. Regime spokesmen intermittently criticize the publishing industry for catering to the public taste for Western crime stories and sex novels. The industry usually responds that such schund (trash) sells best.

Yugoslavia’s library network is small and generally underdeveloped. The main components are scientific-
technical libraries, general public libraries, and school libraries (Figure 33). In 1968 there were 1,895 libraries with combined holdings of over 12 million volumes. Closings of small libraries and the consolidation of their holdings in local administrative centers, plus the acquisition of new holdings, have decreased the number of libraries and increased their individual size. Among the largest Yugoslav libraries are those of the universities of Zagreb (800,000 volumes) and Belgrade (500,000 volumes), and the National Library (550,000 volumes). Each republic operates a central library in its capital city and also maintains a bibliographical institute to coordinate the cataloging and acquisitions of the various libraries.

There were a total of 284 museums in Yugoslavia in 1968, which included 31 art, 15 natural history, 15 economic and technical, 87 sociohistorical, and 136 general museums. The number of visitors to these facilities increased from 3,129,000 in 1959 to 5,176,000 in 1968.

3. Motion pictures, radio, and television (U/OU)

The Yugoslav motion picture industry, founded in 1946, has achieved modest success. Besides producing films for the domestic and foreign market, it prepares films for the country’s TV system and provides production facilities for foreign film companies. Although quality, both technical and artistic, is generally below Western standards, some Yugoslav productions have won prizes at international film festivals. The cartoons of Dusan Vukotic are particularly well done and are well known outside Yugoslavia.

In 1968 there were 24 enterprises in Yugoslavia for the production of films. That year a total of 306 films were produced, including 27 of feature length and 116 documentaries. There were 1,645 movie houses in Yugoslavia in 1969, up from 413 in 1939. Although movies are a major source of entertainment, attendance dropped from 121,000,000 in 1965 to 90,339,000 in 1969. This drop undoubtedly reflects the inroads made by Yugoslavia’s expanding TV network as well as restricted budgets under the economic reforms.

Foreign-produced films make up the bulk of movies shown in Yugoslavia. American films are highly popular and have won critical acclaim. At the 1971 Belgrade Film Festival U.S. films took six of nine top awards. In 1969, a total of 303 films were imported, with U.S. film producers supplying 79 of that total. In descending order, other principal sources were France, Italy, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom.

The distribution of films is carried out by independent enterprises established by republic authorities. Exhibiting firms may be created by a communal government, an institution, or an economic or social organization. The exhibiting firms and the
theaters they operate fall under the supervision of communal authorities. Unlike other information media, films are subject to predistribution censorship.

Radiobroadcasting has grown from a single Belgrade transmitter in 1928 to eight main stations and 141 local stations in 1970. Many of the local stations act merely as relay points for programs originating in the large cities, while others may transmit locally originated programs of special regional interest. Total broadcasting time for all the stations amounted to 210,000 hours in 1970, continuing the upward trend since the mid-1960's; broadcast time amounted to 119,000 hours in 1966. The total number of radio subscribers has similarly increased from 2,186,000 in 1966 to 3,500,000 in 1972.

A recent phenomenon in radiobroadcasting has been the emergence of illegal stations, particularly in Croatia. These stations, which may total as many as 100, are proving highly popular. They feature folk music, local farm news, and unvarnished commentaries on contemporary local affairs. The regime has not chosen to clamp down on them, tolerating their existence because to date the stations have shunned political issues.

Because of the different language groups in Yugoslavia, there is no uniform "national" program as in most other Communist countries. Each of the main stations broadcasts in the predominant language of the republic in which it is located, a fact which insures the predominance of Serbo-Croatian. A common program for the Serbo-Croatian area is broadcast for several hours a day by the Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Zagreb stations. Several stations, particularly Radio Pristina and Radio Novi Sad, broadcast in minority languages (Albanian and Hungarian respectively). The sensitivity of the language issue also affects broadcasting policy. In 1967 and 1968 the Slovenes pressed for more broadcasting in their native language.

Programming generally reflects the listeners' preferences. Musical programs accounted for 105,000 hours of broadcast time in 1969; other types of programs by the major stations totaled 63,000 hours. News reporting and political commentary depend heavily on TANJUG and Pres Service contributions and on the editorials of major newspapers and magazines.

Radio broadcasts heard at foreign audiences generally are carried by Radio Belgrade. Most of these transmissions are in English, Russian, Spanish, and Albanian. Radio Skopje is heard in Bulgaria and northern Greece and Radio Pristina in Albania.

The first Yugoslav TV program was transmitted from Zagreb in May 1956, and in November 1956 Zagreb began regular broadcasts of domestic experimental programs. The first joint hookup on Yugoslav television was a program between Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana on 28 November 1958. Television links also exist for the transmission of programs of Eurovision (Western European television) and Intervision (the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). Television subscribers in Yugoslavia in 1972 numbered 2,050,000, up from just over 1.5 million in 1969.

Yugoslavia has embarked on an ambitious TV expansion program. By 1977, TV stations are scheduled to be operating in the cities of Novi Sad and Pristina. The Novi Sad operation will be unique, because programs will be carried in five languages (Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Ruthenian). A second national TV network is being planned, and funds have been appropriated by the Federal Assembly to import needed equipment.

4. Propaganda (C)

One of the more important concerns of Yugoslav officials has been to obtain the support of the media in disseminating propaganda furthering the regime's domestic and foreign policies and objectives. The Yugoslav Communists use propaganda as a means of explaining an elaborate and changing ideology to the working class as well as to other social groups in order to change established ways of thinking.

The regime's efforts have met with varying success. Belgrade has had its greatest propaganda success in selling its concept of nonalignment. Of those Yugoslavs responding to a public opinion poll in the mid-1960's, three-fourths professed to believe that the nonaligned countries exercise a definite influence toward maintenance of world peace. Even in foreign affairs, however, regime propaganda is not always effective. For the most part, public opinion apparently rejected Tito's strong pro-Arab stand during the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.

The regime has always regarded propaganda as an important means by which to maintain party discipline and inspire and indoctrinate the party membership. Party ideology and the "general line" at any particular time are constantly drummed into members in order to enlist their support and to prevent deviations. Even in this important area, however, the propagandists have not fully succeeded. The Croatian crises in December 1971 left the federal party confused and demoralized. The degree to which the Croatian leadership had bucked federal authority—to the point where Tito's personal intervention was necessary—dramatically illustrated the party's failure
to indoctrinate its members in this republic. Moreover, constant references by regime spokesmen to the "political underground," and appeals to fight "bureaucrats" indicate that propaganda has not succeeded in eliminating opposition to Tito's reform program among some of the party rank and file.

The Communists have deprived the non-Communist elements of society of virtually all legal means of disseminating propaganda. The only regular organized voice of opposition to regime policies is represented by the publications of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy must be careful, however, not to challenge the regime directly on major issue. As late as 1967 and 1968 priests were arrested for publicly voicing views on the U.S.-Vietnam unacceptable to the regime.

Since 1948 official propaganda has undergone some important modifications. It shows more tolerance, breadth, sophistication, and realism than that of the other Communist-controlled countries in Eastern Europe. Criticism of domestic corruption and of bureaucratic bungling has long been a staple of Yugoslav journalism, and since 1966 the regime has allowed a more searching discussion of its approach to certain issues. Discussion now revolves around methods for reaching the regime's goals, however, and only rarely concerns the appropriateness of the goals themselves.

The regime's editorial guidelines are somewhat broader for foreign than for domestic reporting. More latitude is allowed for comment on events in the West than on developments in the East. Whenever it serves its interests, however, the regime turns its media guns on the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Yugoslav press criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was voluminous and pointed.

Yugoslav propaganda attempts to influence as many leaders of other countries as possible, especially those of the neutral Afro-Asian countries. Through exchanges of visits and views it also seeks to influence leaders of certain socialist and Communist parties and some foreign labor leaders. Attention is also paid to foreign intellectuals.

Yugoslav workers temporarily employed abroad are another target group. Propaganda directed toward them is meant to counter experiences gained in the more open political-economic systems of the West, to forestall foreign attempts to recruit espionage agents from among the workers, and to negate the efforts of antiregime emigree organizations to recruit adherents.

The party defines the general propaganda line and activity but seldom engages in direct propaganda efforts. It relies on the government apparatus, mass social organizations, vocational and professional associations and societies, and the self-managing enterprises to reach the public at large and the specific target groups. The propaganda activities of these bodies are guided by relatively well-indoctrinated,

**FIGURE 34. Radiobroadcasts to and from Yugoslavia, 1972 (U/OU)**
experienced, and obedient party members, who hold positions at all levels and who serve as the coordinating and driving force.

The most widespread propaganda medium is radio, followed by the press, and television. The higher a person's educational level, the more likely he to be exposed to all three media. At the lower educational levels radio is the principal medium of information.

Radio broadcasting also is the medium most extensively used by the Yugoslavs to disseminate their propaganda abroad. Belgrade broadcasts about 76 hours a week in nine languages (including shortwave broadcasts of the regular Belgrade domestic program in Serbo-Croatian), and Skopje International Service broadcasts 10 hours a week in three languages (Figure 34). The major portion of the broadcasting has been aimed at the countries of Eastern Europe. Organizations used for distributing propaganda overseas include Yugoslavia's international press service TANJUG; the country's diplomatic missions abroad; tourist bureaus; and the personal contacts of numerous delegations.

Yugoslavia has been subjected to a considerable volume of propaganda from abroad. In January 1972 Yugoslavia was the target of 15 countries which directed almost 180 hours a week of radio broadcasting to the country. A flood of material is also sent into Yugoslavia under the guise of scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges. In the months preceding the political upheavals in Croatia in late 1971, Yugoslavia was subjected to an unusually high amount of emigree propaganda. Most missions from foreign countries also disseminate propaganda through information centers maintained in Yugoslavia, usually in their embassies.

With some exceptions, the Yugoslav Government has permitted foreign propaganda to enter the country in order to enhance its own image as a free and open society and as a gesture of friendship. Soviet propaganda is generally fairly heavyhanded and influences few Yugoslavs (Figure 35). Western information programs are inclined to stress the achievements of Western countries and present information in a relatively factual manner. The Western programs have been fairly successful in influencing the population, particularly the nation's youth. The Yugoslav Government has not made a concerted effort to prevent the distribution of materials from Western countries. Although the regime has been known to restrict the sale of publications which offend the hierarchy, Western publications are imported and can be found on the newsstands in major cities. A wide segment of the population listens daily to foreign broadcasts by the
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and the countries bordering Yugoslavia without fear of police reprisals.

K. Selected bibliography (U/OU)


The outstanding work on pre-World II Yugoslavia is Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon; A Journey Through Yugoslavia (Viking Press, 1941). The book is an excellent study of Yugoslavia, its land and people, their turbulent history, politics, religion, and customs. The Native’s Return by Louis Adamic (Harper and Brothers, 1934) is a firsthand account of a Yugoslav emigre’s return home to Slovenia in the troubled 1930’s. It is an easy book to read and an interesting look at Yugoslav society during the interwar period.

A detailed but somewhat dated look at Serbia is contained in the History of Serbia (G. Bell and Sons, 1919). An excellent glimpse at early Slavic history is found in The Slavs by Roger Portal (Harper and Row, 1969).

The leading postwar Yugoslav novelist is Ivo Andric, whose work Bridge on the Drina won the Nobel prize in 1961. The book is a fascinating history of the currents in Bosnia from the Middle Ages to World War I.

The novel A Hero on a Donkey by Montenegrin writer Miodrag Bulatovic, (World Publishing Company, 1969), is a fascinating glimpse at contemporary, surrealistic Yugoslav literature. For a well-illustrated look at Yugoslavia’s naive artists, the best available source is Yugoslav Naive Painting (Galerije Grada Zagreba, Spektar, Stuarnost, Zagreb, 1969). A very good look at current intellectual trends in Yugoslavia is contained in Yugoslavia’s Young Intellectual Rebels, a paper given by Ilya Yoksimovic at the Slavic Studies Conference in Knoxville, Tennessee, in October 1969. Mestrovic, Sculptor and Patriot by Lawrence Schmeckebier (Syracuse University Press, 1959) is a prolifically illustrated biography of Yugoslavia’s world-renowned artist. The standard work on the Byzantine artistic and architectural heritage in Serbia is Serbian Legacy by Cecil Stewart (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959).

Statistical material may be gleaned from such standard sources as the Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije (1971) and the Demographic Yearbook 1970 (United Nations, 1971).
**Glossary (u/ou)**

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<tr>
<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>SERBO-CROATIAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTUY</td>
<td>S vows sindikalna Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>LCY</td>
<td>S vows komunista Jugoslavije</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>SAWPY</td>
<td>Socjalisticki sows radnog naroda Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>SOJ</td>
<td>S vows omladin Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>SSJ</td>
<td>S vows studenta Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Federation of Students of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>TANJUG</td>
<td>Telegrafjska agencija nove Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Yugoslav News Agency</td>
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**Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U/OU)**

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