Yugoslavia

April 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.
YUGOSLAVIA

CONTENTS

This General Survey supersedes the one dated August 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.

A. Introduction .................................. 1

Preparation for succession to Tito, constitutional reform, decentralization of government authority while insuring party's central force; Tito's political skill, Yugoslavia's combination of communism and independence parallel with worker-managed and private economy; dynamic political life despite one-party system; ideological independence from Moscow; regime policies of moderation and persuasion, popular acceptance of regime but not Communist doctrine; functionalism largely on nationality or republic basis, Tito the ultimate arbiter; international policy of balance between United States and U.S.S.R., nonalignment, commercial links with both West and East, reliance on Soviet military equipment despite neutral stance.

SECRET
B. Structure and functioning of the government

1. Constitution

Revision to provide for succession to Tito, decentralization; constitutions of 1946, 1953, and 1963, the establishment of the socialist federal state and the evolution to self-management, state presidency; constitutional status of League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, and Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia; Constitutional Court; qualified personal freedoms.

2. Structure of the government

Post-World War II totalitarianism under Tito after Soviet pattern; trend toward separation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions and decentralization after 1963; continuing ascendancy of Communist party.

a. Legislature

Responsibility for legislation, selection of membership of executive and courts; chambers, commissions, committees; membership, representation; legislative process; increasingly free debate, principle of executive responsibility to parliament.

b. Executive

(1) Presidency

Device to accomplish succession to Tito; composition and terms of office; functions.

(2) Federal Executive Council

Executor of Federal Assembly's policy; composition, state secretaries; functions and powers; Council of National Defense; Council of the Federation.

3. Republic government

Responsibility for areas of authority not granted federal government; structure generally parallel to federal system—executive council, assembly.

4. Local government

Increasing autonomy, basic responsibility for economic enterprises, social services, requirement to enforce federal and republican legislation; assembly, administrative departments; clash between communal interests and those of the republic or federation, party's role in assuring compliance with policy.

5. Judiciary

Instrument of control despite comparative liberal system in comparison with other Communist states, election and appointment of party members to judgeships and legal posts; Constitutional Court, courts of general jurisdiction for criminal and civil cases, specialized military and economic courts; public prosecutors, criminal procedure, numbers and uneven distribution of lawyers.

C. Political dynamics

League of Communists of Yugoslavia as ultimate source of all political power, relative frank and open political life resulting from decentralized party structure; three major party factions—ultra-liberals, hardline conservatives, Tito moderates; ascendancy of Tito, interplay of politics and regional rivalries, problem of succession.

1. Party development

Communist assumption of absolute control during and after World War II, 1948 break with Stalin and emergence of Yugoslav communism, decentralization of party organization and separation of party and state activities, evolution of Yugoslav communism, continuing anti-Soviet sentiment.

2. Organization

Democratic centralism with party majority decisions binding on all, provisions for dissent; Party Conference, Presidency, Executive Bureau, their functions and composition; dominance by Tito; Commission for Statutory Questions, Supervisory Committee; infusion of younger members into leaderships; republic party organization parallel to federal party; party conference and committee at local level; party organization in the armed forces.

3. Membership

Eligibility, numbers and classifications of members.

4. Other major political organizations

Regime preference for acting through front organizations, control through party members who are also members of the other organizations.

a. Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia

Principal mass organization, successor to Comintern-inspired People's Front; arena of public debate on social-political matters, instrument of popular scrutiny of government work, domain for voting; conference principle of organization; membership trends, relationships to party, other mass organizations, and foreign groups.

b. Federations of youth and students

Transmission belt for party directives, membership and hierarchy, reorganization to overcome ineffectiveness; Federation of Students of Yugoslavia and its parallel problem of youth disaffection; general problem of youth unrest.

5. Electoral procedures

Party supervision of elections through Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia and party-controlled state electoral commissions; transition from single- to multiple-candidate elections; qualifications of voters; nominating procedures.
### D. National policies

Basic objectives of all policy to maintain Yugoslavia's unity and independence and to develop the country's economy; decentralization of government and economy as domestic means to these ends, nonalignment with Communist or non-Communist blocs as international policy.

1. Domestic

   Perpetualism of Communist party rule and socialist system as major political objectives; impermissibility of public questioning of legitimacy of party rule, controlled public participation in political process; problem of regional and nationalist frictions; mixed economic system with goal of creating modern technological society, decentralized economic decisionmaking, problem of uneven economic development; preponderance of private holdings in agriculture despite efforts toward collectivization, goal of increased production; high priority to efficient educational system designed to promote socialist ideals; accommodation with religious groups; cultural freedom within limitations of guidance by party through all media; problem of encouraging ethnic individuality which stimulated nationalist rivalries.

2. Foreign

   "Active coexistence" as avoiding identification with any political bloc but undertaking initiatives; historical fluctuations depending on relations with U.S.S.R.; affinity to Romania, coolness toward East Germany, good relations with Hungary; neutrality in Sino-Soviet dispute; problems with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece; generally good relations with Western Europe and the United States; benefits of nonalignment; trade policy in support of modernization and industrialization; popular acceptance and international benefits.

3. National defense

   Strong military capability to discourage aggression against Yugoslavia, policy of balance between U.S.S.R. and United States also applicable to military, dependence on U.S.S.R. for heavy military equipment; All-People's Defense: army's educational and economic tasks—avenue of political indoctrination and source of cheap labor for public projects, symbol of national unity; displacement of wartime partisan military leadership by post-war professionals, loyalty to state rather than party, concurrent increasing general criticism of defense spending; loyalty to Tito, probable stability in succession; universal liability for military training, image of populace united in defense, civil defense; defense strategy.

### E. Threats to government stability

1. Discontent and dissidence

   Minimal discontent and disillusions because of popular trust for regime and pride in Yugoslavia's accomplishments, avenues for release of popular discontent; persistence of nationality rivalries linked with economic imbalances, possible helpful effect of social mobility and internal migration; uncertainty over succession to Tito; generation gap—impatience and aspirations of youth; churches' opposition to Communist rule.

2. Subversion

   Persistence of subversive activity, effectiveness of government counteraction; great potential because of national rivalries and traditional antipathies; emigre groups, terrorist acts abroad and in Yugoslavia; active Croatian groups, Slovenian and Serbian groups; government success against subversives, wariness toward potentials from Albania, Bulgaria, and the U.S.S.R.

### F. Maintenance of internal security

Mission and general administrative structure at intelligence and security services.

1. Intelligence and internal security

   Prime responsibility of Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs, the State Security Service; Administration XII of the Federal Secretariat of National Defense; Administration for Coordination of the Federal State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs; evolution of intelligence and security services, their status and methods.

2. Police

   Public Security Service, its organization, functions, training, effectiveness.

3. Penal system

   Administration, numbers of prisons, staff, treatment of prisoners.

4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

   Militia's ability to handle emigre-sponsored activities; general trustworthiness and capability of internal security forces.

### G. Selected bibliography

Chronology

Glossary

Page 30

Page 40

Page 41

Page 44

Page 45

Page 47

Page 48

Page 48

Page 49

Page 50

Page 53
## FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 1</td>
<td>Structure of government (chart)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 2</td>
<td>Parliament building, Belgrade (photo)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 3</td>
<td>Prominent government and party officials (photos)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 4</td>
<td>Party organization (chart)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 5</td>
<td>Party membership (table)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 6</td>
<td>Security and intelligence services (chart)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Government and Politics

A. Introduction (C)

Yugoslavia’s political life is in the midst of preparations for the eventual problem of succession. Throughout the country’s postwar history the personality of President Josip Broz Tito has acted as a guiding force and moderating influence on Yugoslavia’s diverse nationalities and their centrifugal tendencies. The time left for Tito, who was 80 in May 1972, to insure the survival of what he has wrought is at best limited. With this in mind, the nation, under Tito’s guidance, is mid-way through a sweeping constitutional reform program and the Communist party is seeking new ways to strengthen its influence and control. This dual process is designed further to decentralize governmental authority, while insuring that the party remains the cementing force of the Yugoslav federation.

Yugoslavia, in its slightly more than 50 years of existence, has grown from a backward Balkan state into a nation which exercises influence throughout the world far out of proportion to its size and power. Credit for this feat rests with one man, President Tito. Tito, a corky, crafty, curious, restless, and gregarious self-made man, possesses rare political skills. He knows how best to use those around him to achieve his ends. But he also has an almost animal-like instinct for sensing danger; he knows how to exercise self-control, knows how to neutralize competing pressures, and is a master at blurring issues. Largely as a result of Tito’s political prowess, postwar Yugoslavia has a record of impressive political accomplishments. Historians may differ on Tito, but all will continue to give him credit for defying Stalin, and for parlaying ambiguous political terms such as “self-management” and “nonalignment” into meaningful political concepts that often capture world headlines. Because of its success in combining Communist rule with independence, Yugoslavia is the secret envy of other Eastern European nations and a curiosity to the West. In the less developed countries of Africa and Asia, where “socialism” is an attractive political term, Yugoslavia’s unique form of worker-managed economy liberally sprinkled with small private businesses is a powerful force.

Despite Yugoslavia’s one-party political system, its political life has a dynamic quality thanks to the regime’s efforts to induce democratic procedures, including open debate and the substitution of persuasion for coercion. As a result, there is a great deal of personal, physical, and intellectual freedom compared with most other East European Communist states. The Communist regime, however, has set limits to the growth of an open political order. No challenge to the one-party system or to Tito’s leadership is permitted, and the Communist party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—LCY) avowedly remains the sole political authority in the country. In foreign affairs Belgrade has tried to maintain a highly flexible policy, which has permitted it to remain politically and ideologically independent of both the Communist and non-Communist power blocs. Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the balance of Yugoslav nonalignment has shifted in favor of the West.

In addition to Tito’s charismatic personality and political skill, the secret to Yugoslavia’s independence also rests with the fact that Communist rule was established with relatively little help from Moscow. Tito’s regime came to power at the close of World War II with only minor assistance from the Soviet army. The party had been locally recruited and trained, and although respectful of the Soviet leadership, a successful guerrilla war made its leaders both popular and confident in their ability to rule. As a result, Yugoslavia showed none of the slavish fealty paid to the Soviets by other Eastern European Communist regimes. Although Yugoslav communism in the immediate postwar years was built on the Soviet model and followed Stalin’s leadership, Tito’s independent attitude and political ambitions in the Balkans quickly raised Stalin’s ire. Tito’s own dreams and goals clashed with the Soviet dictator’s intention to dominate Yugoslavia’s leaders and exploit the country’s economy. The clash led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1948.
Following its expulsion, Yugoslavia began modifying its domestic and foreign policies. The need for popular support at home in the face of Soviet economic and political efforts to topple the Tito regime, as well as for policies which would encourage economic growth, resulted in a search for new socialist forms. Marxism-Leninism was subjected to intense philosophical scrutiny. Claiming that their interpretation rested on the real meaning of Marx and that Stalin was the “revisionist,” the Yugoslavs seized upon the Marxist theory that the state should “wither away” as the basic doctrinal justification for their new independent road to socialism. Regime leaders argued that their new approach, consisting primarily of decentralization of economic and political decision-making, accorded with the withering-away principle. Conversely, Yugoslav theoreticians accused Stalin of ignoring this principle in creating a repressive, bureaucratic state which relied upon police intervention and terror to make it work. This ideological breach between Belgrade and Moscow has never healed—instead, further Yugoslav efforts at decentralization launched in the mid-1960’s have aroused deep misgivings in the U.S.S.R.

The regime has attempted to win support and overcome popular apathy toward communism at home through policies of moderation and persuasion. Police controls are relaxed, greater emphasis is placed on the government’s adherence to its own legal guarantees, and greater freedom is allowed in religious, educational, and cultural affairs. The leadership has encouraged increased popular participation in political life through voluntary activity in mass organizations. As a result, the attitudes of the Yugoslav people have gradually changed from hostility to acceptance of the regime and pride in its economic and political accomplishments, particularly its independence from foreign control. Above all, the policies of the Tito regime have produced a rising standard of living, although at the cost of heavy foreign debt and considerable economic inefficiency.

Tito and company, however, have failed to win the majority of Yugoslavs to communism as a doctrine. The regime’s own efforts to spur economic advancement through greater foreign investments and permissiveness in the realm of private business have disaffected many young idealists. For others, material advancement is too slow. They want all the luxuries of the West, and they want them now. The slowness of communism—in their eyes—to meet these demands has disenchanted them with the system. If the nation’s leadership gets credit for improvements in national life, it also gets the blame for the high level of economic corruption, widespread social and economic inequality, and the social ills typical of a rapidly urbanizing and modernizing society. While many Yugoslavs approve of such achievements as an extensive social security system, low-cost socialized medical care, and an improved educational system, the regime’s continuing control of all organized political life is widely resented.

Although the regime has remained relatively stable under Tito’s leadership, factions have developed with the federal party structure. The divisions are mostly along nationality and republic lines, but conflicting views also exist on centralization or decentralization as the appropriate structure for the Yugoslav party and state system. One of the most serious challenges to federal party authority occurred in 1971 when Croatian nationalism pervaded that republic’s party leadership. The Croats argued that the principle of decentralization, already being implemented in the government structure, should be extended to the party apparatus. Such a move, which would have resulted in splintering the party into six and possibly even nine Communist parties, was unacceptable even in Tito’s pluralistic Yugoslavia. The result was a widespread purge of nationalists from the Croatian party leadership, exceeding in scope and thoroughness even the purge that followed the ouster of former Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic in July 1966.

A party reorganization, begun in October 1966 following Rankovic’s ouster, culminated at the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969, when new, liberal, and federalized statutes were promulgated. It was under these lenient statutes that the Croats began to challenge federal party authority and, as such, Tito’s own influence and power. The result of this challenge appears to be at least a partial reversal of the liberal trend in the LCY and a strengthening of internal discipline and of the party’s control apparatus. In late October 1972, Tito again showed himself to be the ultimate arbiter of the liberal-conservative tug-of-war in the party. At that time, dissatisfied with the slow implementation of his orders that the Serbian hierarchy be shaken up, Tito moved against the Serbian party leadership. Under fire, a number of leading figures, including republic party boss Marko Nikezic, resigned. As of December 1972, the purge in Serbia (Serbia) had stopped far short of reaching the magnitude of the events in Croatia (Hrvatska) in December 1971. The basic question about Yugoslavia’s future, however, still remains unanswered: How will this system, which is obviously tailored to
Tito's own personality and methods, work in the hands of those who follow the 80-year-old President? 2

Ethnic, cultural, and national differences, coupled with wide differences in economic development among the country's nationalities, make the achievement of unity difficult. Separatist sentiments have not disappeared from Croatia and Macedonia (Makedonija), and fear of domination by the Serbs remains among the country's other ethnic groups. These longstanding ethnic and regional antagonisms have been rekindled by economic rivalries and exacerbated by the regime's policy of building up the economically underdeveloped republics at the expense of the more developed ones. An economic reform program launched in July 1965 modified but did not entirely abandon this policy.

Under a program of 23 constitutional amendments adopted in mid-1971, a great deal of federal authority has already been passed to the nation's constituent republics and provinces. A second set of amendments is scheduled to be introduced in late 1973. When these are passed, many of the republics' responsibilities and prerogatives will, in turn, be passed onto the shoulders of the local communes, the lowest level of local government. Plans also call for a complete revamping of the nation's legislative system and redefinition of its powers and rights. Completion of these reforms will in effect mean a whole new constitution for Yugoslavia.

The party is in the throes of redefining its own position within the political system. Until the Croatian political upheavals in late 1971 the LCY had sought to divest itself of the daily running of the country in favor of a policy-oriented role of providing ideological leadership and "guidance." Former Vice President Rankovic's opposition to this trend, as well as to the economic reforms, was a key element in his downfall. Wider popular participation in the process of government and less direct party rule, however, led to the nationalist crises in both Croatia and Serbia. As a result, the problem facing the party is how to insure the continued decentralization of governmental authority, while simultaneously strengthening party control over the implementation of that program.

Yugoslavia's international policies are designed to keep the country independent and socialist. Tito has attempted a balance of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, striving to extract maximum economic concessions from each. Ideologically, Yugoslavia's communism provides a built-in bias in favor of the U.S.S.R. This bias is counteracted, however, by Yugoslavia's wariness of coming under Soviet domination and Moscow's distaste for Belgrade's ideological innovations.

A key element in Tito's international balancing act is his doctrine of nonalignment. By assiduously cultivating the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, Tito garners diplomatic maneuvering room and moral support for Yugoslavia. This policy has not paid off in greatly increased foreign trade, however, and the conflicting national interests of the nonaligned countries have resulted in a lack of cohesion among them.

Although Yugoslavia's ideological bias has led to periods of intense criticism of the West and of the United States in particular, Tito has continued to exhibit a desire for good relations. Yugoslavia still looks to the United States and Western Europe for considerable economic assistance, and about two-thirds of its foreign trade is with non-Communist countries. Yugoslavia maintains full diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level with the European Communities (Common Market—EC). Belgrade also has been successful in negotiating preferential trade agreements with the EC. In an effort to preserve and expand its traditional markets, Yugoslavia has associated itself—as an "observer," not as a member—with the Communist economic organization, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).

Yugoslavia's East-West balancing act is also evident in its military policies. Tito has consistently refused to associate with either the Warsaw Pact of the Communist nations or with the West's North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Yugoslavia has sought, with limited success, to diversify its sources of arms. Nevertheless, it has come to depend on the Soviet Union for most modern equipment. There are large quantities of obsolete U.S. equipment in the Yugoslav arsenal as a result of a large assistance program which terminated in December 1957.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)

1. Constitution

Yugoslavia is in the midst of a major constitutional reform. A first set of 23 amendments was adopted in the summer of 1971 and a second set should be ready for passage by the end of 1973. With the promulgation of the second amendments, the nation will in effect have a new constitution. The purpose of the reforms is to prepare Yugoslavia for the succession period after Tito.

The first set of amendments took major steps toward creating a union of nearly autonomous socialist republics, with the federal government's authority
restricted mainly to conducting foreign policy, providing for national defense, achieving a unified economic system, and channeling funds from more developed republics to backward regions—Bosnia and Hercegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina), Macedonia, Montenegro (Crna Gora), and Kosovo. All other functions, duties, and responsibilities, as well as considerable financial resources, are to be passed to the republics. The second group of amendments focus on restructuring and redefining the role of the Yugoslav parliamentary system. In addition, the process of decentralization is to take another step forward, and some powers now held in the hands of the republic governments will be passed down to the local commune level.

The newly evolving Yugoslav Constitution takes into account the wide variety of different elements which make up the state and tries to give each nationality not only a voice in running its own affairs but in that of the country as a whole. The frank, open discussion of ideas and interests beyond those of the Communist party already taking place under the evolving system is far more akin to that occurring in Western political life than to anything known in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.

The old Constitution dates back to 1963 (with major amendments in April 1967 and December 1968). Combining elements from socialist, syndicalist, French, and U.S. political thought, the 1963 Constitution attempts to create a socialist democracy, but by no means a political democracy in the Western mold. Federalism, decentralization of political administration, and workers’ self-management are the central themes of the system. Under Yugoslav socialist theory, these elements provide the mechanism for the eventual “withering away of the state” and are essential to any society. The 1971-72 constitutional reforms are designed specifically to apply these theories to the practical realities of the Yugoslav federation.

When completed, the new amendments will represent the fourth constitution formulated by the Yugoslav Communists since they came to power in 1945. The first, in 1946, closely resembled the Soviet Constitution of 1936. The major innovation of the 1946 document was the creation of a federal system of six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces in order to deal with the country’s divisive nationality question. Despite its federal structure, however, power within the Yugoslav system remained highly centralized. Provisions to protect civil rights (freedom of speech, the press, religion, and assembly) were included, but with the limitation that it was illegal and punishable to make use of civil rights to change or undermine the constitutional order for antideocratic purposes.” In practice, the word “antideocratic” was interpreted to include any opposition to the regime.

The 1953 Constitution—known officially as the Fundamental Law—radically modified the 1946 document to reflect the decentralization of authority which had begun in late 1949. The federal structure was retained, and the six constituent republics gained greater administrative power. For the first time the Constitution provided for a government of enumerated and delegated powers. Both federal and republic governments had only those rights and powers specifically delegated to them. All other power was to be vested in the “working people” as a whole and expressed through local people’s committees and workers councils.

The 1963 Constitution was promulgated in order to realign the federal governmental system with the development of self-management which Yugoslav ideologists deemed to have taken place since 1953. The federal system remained, but a complicated five-chamber legislature, which included four “occupational” chambers, replaced the old bicameral body. The Constitution accentuated the socialist rather than the multinational nature of the state by changing the state’s name from the “Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” to the “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The change also reflected the regime’s claim to the achievement of the “socialist” stage of communism. Of the other socialist countries, only the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Romania claim to have reached that level.

The 1963 Constitution formally introduced the policy of limited terms and rotation in office, mainly in the elective posts, to foster the infusin of new blood into the political system and to counter “bureaucratism” and “patronism.” A complicated nomination and electoral procedure, heavily weighted in favor of indirect election of most assembly deputies, was established at all but the lowest level of government.

The Constitution also heavily emphasized a new leading role for the Federal Assembly, describing it as “the supreme organ of power and organ of self-government.” The assembly’s role in the Yugoslav system is, however, undergoing basic change. A better reading on what duties, rights, and responsibilities it will have, should emerge with the second set of reforms.

One major change under the 1971 amendments is the creation of a 23-member state presidency, made up of three members from each of the nation’s six
republics and two each from the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Tito remains the titular head of state, but much of the day-to-day business falls to the Vice President and others in the presidency. The positions of head of state and head of the government (President of the Federal Executive Council—Premier) were separated in 1963. Until then, the former automatically assumed the latter office. Under the new collective presidency, the president of each republic or provincial assembly is, by virtue of his office, a member of the presidency. The others are elected for nonrenewable, 5-year terms by majority vote in the assemblies. The Constitution gives the President certain decree rights; he may declare war if the Federal Assembly is unable to meet.

The Communist party (officially named the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—LCY) was mentioned in the text of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution for the first time, and called the “leading force,” “the ideological and political guide,” and the “initiator of political activity.” The party’s status, heretofore extraconstitutional, thus was channeled with legality and its monopolistic position made evident. Mention was also made of the important role of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPy), the party’s mass political front organization, and of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY). Indeed, both organizations have stirred to new life in recent years: SAWPy as a genuine forum for discussion and debate, and the CTUY as a defender of worker interests. In the Marxist tradition, there was, in the 1963 Constitution, continued emphasis on the withering away of the state, although the concept was not expressed explicitly in the text. Also for the first time, a section on foreign policy was included, enunciating President Tito’s foreign policy objectives.

In a particularly important innovation, the Constitution created a Constitutional Court. The court replaced the old Constitutional Commission of the Federal Assembly and has the authority to pass on the constitutionality of both federal and republican laws.

Personal freedoms—of speech, thought, abode, religious conviction, press, association, movement, and assembly—first guaranteed by the 1946 Constitution, have only been allowed in practice since the ouster of authoritarian Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966. These freedoms remain qualified to the extent that they cannot be used “to overthrow the foundations of socialist and democratic order” or to openly oppose the basic policies of the leadership. The Constitution expressly guarantees that religious confession shall be the “free and private” affair of the citizen, and that religious communities shall be separated from the state, free to perform religious rites, and permitted to found religious schools. A check rein on church activities was provided, however, by making unconstitutional any abuse of religious rights for political purposes.

Increasing pressure from the republics—particularly Slovenia (Slovenija), Croatia, and Macedonia—for greater authority, the decentralization of economic decisionmaking under the economic reforms inaugurated in 1965, and the fall from power in July 1966 of the centralist-conservative leader, former Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic, precipitated the adoption of a series of constitutional amendments in April 1967 which further diffused authority throughout the system.

The 1971-72 constitutional amendments are intended to adjust once and for all the working relationship between the federal and republic governments. The decentralization taking place has satisfied the vast majority of demands by the constituent republics and provinces for greater autonomy. The two exceptions are the republic of Croatia and the province of Kosovo. In both instances the greater freedoms allowed under the reforms have led to increased demands. In the case of Croatia, resurgent republican nationalism posed a major threat to the Yugoslav system resulting in Tito’s direct intervention in December 1971 and the purge of nationalists from the Communist party.

2. Structure of the government

Yugoslavia’s first post-World War II federal government was patterned after the Soviet system. Following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, and rapidly after 1950, Soviet forms were abandoned and replaced by limited liberalization in the governmental structure. Partly as a reaction against the Soviet model and partly because of concern over governmental inefficiency, the Yugoslavs abolished some ministries after 1948 and relinquished many federal governmental functions to the constituent republics.

In 1950 the regime introduced workers councils, which theoretically were to cooperate in making policy for their constituent economic enterprises, formerly operated by government agencies. At the same time “social management,” or “self-management” as it is now known, was introduced as the “right of the working people to manage organizations and institutions in all fields of social life through self-governing bodies.”
Despite various other changes designed to create at least the appearance of greater democracy, the basic political process in Yugoslavia was initially totalitarian. The party controlled all government activity, since members of its Central Committee filled most of the key posts in the federal and republic governments. Lesser party members exercised similar control at the lower levels. Moreover, President Tito was the final arbiter in all matters. He was simultaneously Secretary General of the party, President of the Socialist Alliance, President of the Republic, President of the Federal Executive Council (FEC), and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav People’s Army.

In 1965, however, a new Constitution was promulgated which sought to separate more clearly the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government and to establish the Federal Assembly as the supreme legislative and political body in the federal government (Figures 1 and 2). Since late 1970, the trend toward greater republic and provincial autonomy, as well as toward greater personal freedoms, has dramatically accelerated. The catalyst for this movement was President Tito himself. Cognizant of the problems which must accompany the transition after his death or retirement, Tito in September 1970 proposed the creation of a collective presidency and a series of constitutional reforms designed to create the machinery for the succession period. The result has been the development of a political system which includes frank, open discussion of ideas and interests beyond those of the Communist party, a political life far more akin to that of Western parliamentary systems than to other one-party Communist states.

The major constitutional reform of 1971 carried this separation even further. Federal authority is now limited to conducting foreign affairs, maintaining national defense, and insuring a unified economic system throughout the country. The role and makeup of the Federal Assembly will not become clear until a second set of constitutional reforms is adopted in late 1973. It is likely that the new parliament will have no more than two chambers and that its authority will be pared down and tailored to reflect the reduced authority and powers of federal organs. The assembly, which has in the past been described as “the supreme body of self-managing enterprises,” may also now include representatives of large self-managing enterprises. Expanding the consultative process in the assembly also provides a formal framework for the resolution of competing group interests.

The party is intent on retaining its controlling role. The party already exercises its influence on the legislature by using party members who sit in the assembly—particularly in its key offices—and by monitoring the national electoral process. The party leadership, after considering the advice of its staff, formulates the broad policy to be enacted into the law by the Federal Assembly and to be carried out by the executive and administrative bodies. The system serves the regime’s major aim of creating the image of public participation in the governmental process, leaving the day-to-day functioning of the government in the hands of better trained administrators, while permitting control of the overall process by the party.

a. Legislature

The Federal Assembly as of late 1972 was empowered with full legislative initiative. A new set of assembly bylaws published in April 1967 widened the ranks of persons and organizations having the right to initiate bills in the assembly. Previously, this had been the prerogative of the FEC (i.e., the government, or cabinet), individual deputies, and other federal organs. Now, economic enterprises, working and social-political organizations such as SAWPY, and even individual citizens may do so.

In addition to its legislative duties, the Federal Assembly has the responsibility of amending the Constitution, calling for referendums, granting amnesties for violations of federal laws, electing and removing the President of the Republic, the President of the FEC, the president and judges of the constitutional, supreme, and supreme economic courts, federal state secretaries and federal secretaries, and the federal public prosecutor. Nominations and dismissals are made by submission of the appropriate proposal to the assembly’s Commission for Elections and Appointments, which returns its recommendations to the assembly. The assembly also is responsible for declaring war, ratifying international agreements, and deciding on altering Yugoslavia’s boundaries.

The Federal Assembly’s unique and complicated structure of five chambers is under intensive review and will undoubtedly be streamlined into a unicameral or bicameral legislature. Until then, however, the Chamber of Nationalities remains the most important house. It considers all legislation and matters of foreign policy, national defense, state security, and “affairs of general internal policy.” It also exercises the assembly’s rights of appointment and dismissal. An exception to this rule is the requirement...
that the entire assembly elect or dismiss the President of the Republic and the assembly’s own president and vice president.

Constitutional changes in December 1968 created the Social-Political Chamber, which is nearly equal in authority with the Chamber of Nationalities. This chamber deals with questions concerning the sociopolitical system, self-management, the rights and duties of citizens, general internal policy, budgetary and fiscal policy, and national defense.

The other three chambers, whose continued existence is in doubt in view of the progressive limitations on federal authority, are specialized both in their composition and legislative focus. Designated the Economic, the Social Welfare and Health, and the Education and Culture Chambers, they deal with
legislation primarily within their specialized fields. Approval by the Chamber of Nationalities and at least one of the other appropriate chambers is necessary to pass legislation.

The assembly as a whole and the individual chambers have substantive commissions and committees to carry out work on behalf of the Federal Assembly. The commissions are autonomous, while the committees only assist the organization to which they are subordinate.

The membership of the Federal Assembly consists of 620 deputies. The Chamber of Nationalities has 140; and each of the other four chambers has 120 deputies. Most deputies maintain their primary jobs elsewhere and are only reimbursed for the time actually spent on assembly business. This system has been the cause of complaints that most deputies are too busy with their outside jobs to carry out their assembly duties, and that attendance at assembly and committee sessions is often low.

Of the 620 deputies in the assembly, 480 are elected in proportion to the population on the basis of five deputies—one in each chamber—to approximately 158,000 citizens. Electoral districts by law are to be as nearly equal in population as possible. Of the 120 deputies in each chamber elected by lower assemblies, 50 are from the republic of Serbia, including 22 from the autonomous province of Vojvodina and six from the autonomous province of Kosovo, 27 from Croatia, 21 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 from Slovenia, nine from Macedonia, and three from Montenegro. The 140 deputies comprising the Chamber of Nationalities represent the republics and autonomous provinces in the ratio of 20 deputies from each republic and 10 from each autonomous province. The overall distribution of deputies in the Federal Assembly is as follows:

- Serbia: 240
- Croatia: 128
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 104
- Slovenia: 60
- Macedonia: 56
- Montenegro: 32

On the basis of deputy strength, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, all with large economically underdeveloped areas, dominate the assembly. The increase in authority of the Chamber of Nationalities partly counterbalances this domination, since the more economically advanced republics of Slovenia and Croatia and underdeveloped Macedonia have 60 out of 140 votes in the chamber. So far, however, bloc voting by republic delegations has been rare. Party discipline insures that the overwhelming majority of deputies will vote on any major issue as the leadership demands.

The assembly does not publish information on the party status of its members, but all the top hierarchy and the great majority of the deputies belong to the party. Since 1963 the regime has achieved some success in its efforts to bring younger, better qualified persons into the assembly. Most of the assembly’s leadership, however, remains in the hands of long-time subordinates of Tito who started their climb to prominence in the 1950’s.

In carrying out its responsibility for “political supervision” as provided in the Constitution, the assembly decides on political matters and determines the foundations of domestic and foreign policy, establishes the duties of federal authorities and organizations which enforce the laws, debates the reports of federal courts and the Federal Public Prosecutor concerning the enforcement of federal laws, enacts declarations and resolutions, and makes recommendations to federal organizations. In keeping with the regime’s efforts to extend the role of the
republics in the policymaking process, the assembly increasingly consults the republic legislatures before making important decisions.

The Federal Assembly's first attempts to exercise its authority under the 1963 Constitution were halting. With the League of Communists' reaffirmation of decentralization and self-management at the Eighth Party Congress in December 1964, however, the legislature began to assert its authority. The social plan for 1965 was returned to the FEC for redrafting 11 times before the assembly accepted it, and adverse reaction in the assembly has forced the government to withdraw several bills from consideration since 1964. By late December of 1970 the Federal Assembly was flexing new political muscle. A government proposal to limit personal income growth for 1971 to 22% was resoundingly rejected by the assembly, which later forced the government to compromise on the issue.

The legislative process envisions three stages: all of which occur within the Federal Assembly: 1) the determination of the need for adopting a law; 2) the examination and adoption of a draft law; and 3) the examination and adoption of the proposed law. In practice, the Federal Executive Council drafts most of the important legislation. Despite efforts to make available to the assembly the services of legal and substantive experts, the deputies remain at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive in preparing coherent alternative legislation or programs to those offered by the government.

Debate in the Federal Assembly has become increasingly free since 1963. Party leaders, such as Kardelj, have emphasized the responsibility of the deputies not only to the party but to their constituents. After the fall of Rankovic, important party figures, such as Milentije Popovic and Krste Grvenkovski, pressed for more real exercise of authority by the assembly. The attempt to bring foreign policy within the purview of parliamentary debate, which started in January 1966 with criticism of certain elements of the periodic policy report of the Federal State Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the assembly, was pressed forward. Tito's independent executive action during the Middle East crisis of June 1967 caused considerable irritation within the assembly and the LCY, both considering his move a deliberate disregard of the parliamentary right of consultation.

As part of the emphasis on the responsibility of the executive to parliament, the 1963 Constitution grants to deputies the right of interrogation of government officials. Even more emphatic in the assertion of parliamentary supremacy are the rules on FEC resignations and votes of confidence contained in the assembly bylaws. The FEC must resign if it does not agree with or cannot put into practice a policy fixed by the assembly. Resignation of the FEC also is called for if the assembly passes a bill not endorsed by the FEC, or if the assembly votes down a government bill. Resignations may be collective or individual. Provision also is made for votes of confidence initiated by the assembly, 10 deputies being needed to ask for such a vote. Upon losing a vote of confidence the government must resign and act as a caretaker until a new one is elected.

Although party discipline serves to keep the deputies in line on all important issues, the principle of executive responsibility could lead to a more vigorous parliamentary life, particularly after Tito leaves the scene. In December 1966 the Slovenian republic executive council forced the first government crisis since the pre-World War II era by resigning after one chamber of the republic assembly had rejected an important bill. Although the breach was quickly healed, a precedent had been set. In July 1967 Federal Executive Council President (Premier) Mika Spiljak, under fire by critics of the high unemployment and economic stagnation resulting from the regime's policies, asked for and received a vote of confidence in the government's program for social and economic reform. In mid-November 1970 Vice Premier Nikola Miljanic, in an unprecedented action, resigned when he was unable to win backing for his proposed policy of dinar devaluation.

b. Executive

(1) Presidency—The need to institutionalize the succession process, rather than court chaos once Tito leaves the scene, led to the creation of a collective Presidency in 1971. The body is composed of three representatives from each of Yugoslavia's six republics and two each from the two autonomous provinces. The president of each republic or provincial assembly is automatically a member of this body. Other members are elected for nonsuccessive, 5-year terms by a majority vote in the regional assemblies. Tito retains the titular position of President of Yugoslavia for an indefinite period. Once Tito is gone, however, a president will be chosen from among the other 22 members of the Presidency who are currently in charge of day-to-day executive duties.

The collective Presidency retains considerable powers in representing the country at home and abroad: The titular President is commander and chief of the armed forces; the Presidency has the right to propose policy direction to the Federal Assembly, and can initiate changes in the
Constitution; the Presidency also has the right to propose a candidate for the post of President of the Federal Executive Council (Premier), issues decrees proclaiming federal laws, proposes the election of the President and the judges of the constitutional court of Yugoslavia, nominates members of the Council of the Federation and submits proposals for relieving them of their duties.

(2) Federal Executive Council—The FEC is responsible for executing the policy established by the Federal Assembly in its laws and resolutions. The Premier (President of the FEC) is confirmed by the assembly following his nomination and is responsible to the assembly.

As of late 1972 the FEC consisted of 28 members including the Premier, two vice premiers, and a secretary. There are 10 federal secretaries in the FEC. The major ones are: Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Economy, Finance, Foreign Trade, Labor and Social Policy, and Justice and General Administration. There are an equal number of members from each republic and corresponding numbers from the two autonomous provinces.

The FEC has no decisionmaking powers outside those granted it in federal legislation. The FEC can, however, propose internal and foreign policy to the assembly and prepare drafts of laws, the economic (social) plan, and the budget. It also can ratify international agreements not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly.

In addition to the above duties, the FEC enforces federal law, the federal economic plan, and the federal budget. The FEC also supervises certain functions of the federal administration not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly, proposes officers of the Federal Supreme Court, and through its inter-republic committees works to resolve differences and disputes.

The heads of the different bodies are proposed by the Premier and appointed or dismissed by the Federal Assembly. The federal secretaries are appointed and dismissed by the Federal Assembly on the proposal of the Premier. Higher officials are limited to no more than two consecutive 4-year terms in office. Under the theory embodied in the Constitution, second terms are envisaged as exceptions to the rule.

The federal administrative apparatus has been reorganized on several occasions. In 1967, eight secretariats (justice, education and culture, health and social policy, labor, information, industry and trade, agriculture and forestry, and communications) were eliminated and their functions distributed among other federal bodies or passed down to the republics.

The National Defense Council has a special position. Although characterized by one Yugoslav authority as a body of the Federal Assembly, the Law on the Yugoslav National Defense Council passed in April 1967 describes it only as a "federal organ." The council is headed by the President of the Republic, who may propose one of the council's members to act as his deputy.

The National Defense Council has no executive authority; its function is to coordinate national defense preparations. It must render opinions about pertinent draft economic plans and regulations, particularly those involving funds for national defense. Decisions of the council must be carried out by the Federal State Secretary for National Defense.

The reorganized council is composed of 30 members, including the President, the Federal State Secretary for National Defense, and the armed forces Chief of General Staff. In terms of civilian membership, the council is one of the most prestigious groups within the government. All six of the presidents of the republic executive councils are ex officio members, thus insuring that the views of the republics are adequately represented.

The Council of the Federation, first instituted under the 1963 Constitution, is a consultative body with no administrative, legislative, or executive powers. It is supposed to consider the most important questions of domestic and foreign policy and to advise the President of the Republic, who is also its president. Members of the Council of the Federation are elected by the assembly upon their nomination by the President of the Republic. There is no fixed number of members; after the national elections of 1971 there were 100, including Tito. The council serves as a pool of elder statesmen upon which Tito can draw, and it has been used as a place for honorable retirement for elder functionaries. Its members can be authorized to represent the President of the Republic at home and abroad.

3. Republic government

The relationship between the provincial and republic governments and the federation is undergoing extensive review and revision. The republics and provinces have been granted increased autonomy as the result of the 1971 constitutional reforms. The federal government's authority is limited to maintaining national defense, conducting foreign
policy, the maintenance of a uniform economic system, and the right to channel funds to less developed regions. In theory all other powers pass to the republics. Whereas under the 1963 Constitution the republics could only legislate in areas where they had been given specific authority, the federal government now is bound by that restriction. In the event of disagreements between republics or between the federal government and the republics, there are inter-republic committees in the FEC designed to resolve problems. Should a dispute go to court, the federal Supreme Court has the power to resolve legal disputes or to determine what is or is not constitutional.

Under the 1963 Constitution the Federal Assembly passed “general laws” in such fields as education, culture, health, and social welfare. General laws are not directly enforceable by the federal government, thus leaving room for genuine republic legislation, as long as the legislation follows the basic policy set forth in the federal general laws. The constitutional amendments due to be published in late 1973 should continue to give the Federal Assembly a guiding role in passing general laws which in turn will be adopted, modified, or adjusted to fit republic and provincial needs.

The republic assemblies generally resemble the Federal Assembly in structure and methods of operation, with the exception that no republic has a chamber of nationalities. Since the republics are not truly sovereign entities, they have no chiefs of state equivalent to the President of Yugoslavia, although Slovenia has proposed the creation of a collective executive body paralleling the federal collective presidency. In each republic the top governmental leader is the president of the republic assembly, and, by virtue of this office, is an ex officio member of the federal collective Presidency.

Each republic has its own executive council. The basic structure of government administration is the same in each republic except for minor differences in keeping with local conditions. The republic executive councils perform all the functions falling within republic jurisdiction as specified by the federal and republic constitutions, laws, and decrees.

Republic executive councils are elected by the respective republic chambers from among the membership of the entire republic assembly. The membership of the assemblies is elected by local governmental assemblies for 4-year terms.

The two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo have their own government structures, but they are also tied to the republic of Serbia. Both passed constitutional laws in 1969 institutionalizing the increased autonomy granted them by the 1968 changes in the federal Constitution.

In the past, federal supremacy over the republic governments was insured by the power of the federal administrative organs to stay the execution of acts of the republic governments which conflict with the federal laws. Under the 1971-72 constitutional reforms this supremacy has limitations and pertains to areas where the federal government has specific authority, such as in the realm of foreign policy and the economy. Similarly, control over local governments by the republics is undergoing revision and will be altered by the constitutional reforms of 1973. In the past it operated through the power of the republic to oversee the organization and operations of local administration.

4. Local government

Local government in Yugoslavia consists of only one major level, the commune (opština). A district (stol) level, formerly intermediate between the commune and the republic, was abolished throughout the country by 1967. Larger cities, however, have special arrangements. For example, Zagreb is one large commune, with subordinate units similar to the wards found in U.S. cities. In keeping with the regimes efforts to streamline all levels of government by reducing the number of separate jurisdictions, the number of communes was reduced from 1,479 in 1956 to 501 in 1968, and may be reduced even further by the 1973 constitutional amendments. This consolidation was meant to give more decisionmaking power to self-management bodies at the lowest levels.

A major aspect of the 1973 constitutional reforms will be greater autonomy for the communes. Thus the relationship between the communes and the republics, as well as between the communes and the federal government, will be redefined.

As the basic territorial unit in Yugoslavia, the commune is designed to be more than a device for local self-government. Yugoslav officials describe it as the “fundamental cell of future socialist society... a structure removed from state control... made up of autonomous economic organizations (enterprises and cooperatives) and these autonomous institutions providing social services (schools, cultural and artistic institutions, hospitals, health establishments, and community institutions)’. The scope of the
The commune's varying activities has been summarized by Yugoslav authorities as follows:

The commune is completely autonomous as regards the establishment of its economic plan and budget and the setting up of enterprises and communal institutions.

The commune adopts its own regulatory provisions, which include administrative penalties.

The commune applies directly the laws, rules, and regulations laid down by higher authorities; it is also responsible for administrative proceedings of first instance, and other administrative functions in all matters, except where the application of laws, rules, and regulations has been entrusted to other lower organs.

The commune decides on the organization and operation of its organs and institutions, appoints its employees, and initiates proceedings for appeal for the protection of the rights of self-government in cases where rule or regulation or any other act of the higher organs of the state violates one of its legal rights.

The commune may repeal or declare null and void the unlawful acts of an economic organization or autonomous institution.

Every commune passes its own statutes, based on federal and republic constitutions. Constitutional provisions bind the communes to enforce federal and republic laws. The highest communal body is the two-house communal assembly, composed of a communal chamber and a chamber of working communities. Members are elected directly by local registered voters for 4-year terms. The communal chamber is elected by all of the voters, the chamber of working communities is chosen by workers in both business and "non-economic" enterprises. The communal assembly elects its president from among its own membership. The president in turn appoints a communal secretary who is in charge of the communal administration.

Each commune has several administrative departments concerned with carrying out the policies and decisions of the communal assembly. Councils act as intermediary units between the assembly and the various administrative bodies, setting broad policy for the administrative organs and the local specialized professional agencies. The councils, composed of members appointed by the assembly and by organizations directly involved in the appropriate field, also monitor the activities of the various enterprises within the commune.

Each commune assembly plays a significant role in administering the economy within its territorial jurisdiction. The 1963 Constitution gives communal delegates a position in the appointments commissions which select the directors of economic enterprises after preliminary public competition for the jobs. The commune also may supervise the legality of the acts of workers councils and administrative committees of enterprises, as well as their performance of obligatory responsibilities and financial operations. The commune assembly, however, is not authorized to interfere in the internal organization and daily operation of economic enterprises.

Federal legislation in 1964 and 1965 attempted to curb the communes' investment-making functions, which local authorities had fulfilled by draining of enterprise funds through taxation. The restrictive legislation complemented the measures contained in the 1965 economic reforms which left more investment funds in the hands of the enterprises. Communal investment was limited to "noneconomic" projects, such as schools, housing, and public utilities.

A persistent and major problem in the Yugoslav communal system has been the clash between local communal interests and those of the republic and the federation. Control over the communes to ensure compliance with the policies of the central regime usually has been exerted indirectly, through the SAWPY, the trade unions, and federal investment legislation. As a last resort, Communist party discipline may be invoked to subdue recalcitrant localists.

The institution of the communal system was meant to provide a uniform system of local administration sensitive to local peculiarities but still carefully controlled. Differences in the level of economic development among the communes, however, have made their performance uneven. The wealthier communes usually operate effectively. The performance of those in the underdeveloped areas is often poor. Some local governments cannot offer minimal health or utility services. The constitutional guarantee of financial aid to such communes is often left unfulfilled.

Low educational levels continue to handicap communes in discharging their complicated tasks. Many assemblies, especially in the more backward rural regions, have been dominated by their administrative apparatus, and particularly by the communal secretary, who usually has high standing in the local Communist party organization. The development of autonomy among the communes and their assumption of increased tasks also has produced a sharp increase in the number of local government employees. The economy drive, which started with the economic reforms in July 1965, has not yet seriously reduced this relatively large bureaucracy.
5. Judiciary

The Yugoslav judicial system was completely revised and reformed under the 1963 Constitution. The most important revisions were the establishment of the Constitutional Court—to rule on the constitutionality of all laws and regulations—and an attempt to create an independent court system. Constitutional courts were also established in each republic. The federal Constitution granted greater autonomy and independence to lower courts and increased their authority to settle a wide variety of cases.

Since the purge of Rankovic in 1966, the emphasis in Yugoslavia has been on rule by law. Under this system the courts have steadily increased in importance. Reforms initiated in the immediate post-Rankovic period increased the rights of the accused in criminal cases and curtailed the authority of the secret police.

Although the changes in the judicial system since 1963 represent a liberal trend, other factors continue to make the legal system an instrument of control. The regime still adheres to the tenet that socialist law is an "instrument in the hands of the ruling socialist forces." The Communist party maintains control over the court system through the election and appointment of its members to judgeships and other legal posts.

Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court is an institution not found in other Communist countries and differs in important aspects from constitutional courts based on English common law. It is composed of a president and 13 judges. In keeping with the policy of balanced representation in all federal organs, the court's members include two judges from each republic and one from each province. The Constitution specifically grants them "immunity" from arrest and trial for actions taken in performance of their duty. Although the court has as one of its main functions the task of ensuring that laws and regulations conform to the Constitution, the court is at the same time a political entity with nonjudicial functions. These include the responsibility to keep itself informed about matters pertaining to "the attainment of constitutionality and legality." The Constitution also gives the court the responsibility for protecting "the rights of self-government and other basic freedoms and rights established by the Constitution." In performing these tasks the court does not require that a case be brought before it in order to render a decision. Not only may it act on its own initiative, but it has a responsibility to do so.

In keeping with the court's advisory role, all draft federal legislation is sent to it for informal inspection and approval. The Constitutional Court also conducts an extensive program of research, investigation, conferences, reports, and negotiations on many aspects of government.

The Constitution makes the court responsible for deciding on the conformity of federal, republican, and local laws with the federal Constitution, for resolving disputes on rights and duties between the federation and a republic, between republics, and between other social-political communities on the territories of two or more republics. The court also is responsible for protecting the workers' councils and self-management bodies from encroachment and arbitrary actions by governmental organs.

In an attempt to open the court's activities to public inspection, its rules of procedure provide that most hearings will be public, that they may be televised or broadcast, and that hearings need not be held in the court's main offices in Belgrade. This stress on publicity is consistent with the regime's emphasis on publicity and public participation in all of Yugoslav political life.

The court's early decisions were in favor of the rights of individuals and workers councils. The court caused a small sensation in December 1964 when it annulled a governmental regulation—the first time this had happened under Communist rule in Yugoslavia. The court, however, has never challenged the government on an issue of major importance to the regime. Its most useful: "motion has been as a safety valve for the grievances of the population and as an influence toward the rule of law in a one-party state.

There are two broad categories of courts: courts of general jurisdiction that deal with most criminal and civil cases, and specialized courts—military and economic. The courts of general jurisdiction exist on the communal, provincial, republic, and federal levels, and include the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia and republic supreme courts. The republic and provincial supreme courts are charged with establishing and safeguarding the uniformity and constitutionality of republic laws.

The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in the general jurisdiction system and has the primary function of insuring the uniform application of law by all courts, to review the decisions of republic courts, to revise the decisions of lower courts which violate federal law, and to adjudicate conflicts of jurisdiction between republic courts. Matters of constitutional interpretation which arise in the course of the Supreme Court's proceedings are referred to the federal
Constitutional Court. In this way the Federal Supreme Court connects and unites all the other courts, except the Constitutional Court, into one juridical system.

The lower courts of general jurisdiction deliberate on three fundamental types of cases: criminal, civil, and administrative. Criminal cases are those in which the courts pass judgment on criminal offenses and carry out the laws and regulations which describe which acts are punishable, under what conditions, and according to what procedure. Civil cases primarily involve litigation on property, family, and personal rights. Administrative suits are those brought at the request of a person who challenges the lawfulness of a decision passed by an administrative body.

The economic courts have fundamental jurisdiction over economic acts, damage suits, maritime suits, and criminal suits pertaining to economic offenses. The highest such court is the Supreme Economic Court. Permanent arbitration boards, which act as courts, handle many economic disputes. Although not as important as the courts of general jurisdiction, economic courts are growing in importance, particularly at the local levels, where the self-management responsibilities of economic organizations have resulted in competition and rivalry. The Foreign Trade Arbitration Board is responsible for resolving economic and maritime disputes in the field of foreign trade.

The military court system is made up of the Supreme Military Court and various courts at lower levels. Their competence is limited to criminal cases involving military personnel. Yugoslav military personnel have the right to a civilian as well as a military lawyer when being arraigned before a military tribunal. The civilian may be excluded from the hearings if military secrets are discussed.

Judges for courts of general jurisdiction are nominated and elected by the assemblies of the appropriate sociopolitical communities, according to the prescriptions of republic laws. Judges cannot be members of the assemblies which elect them, nor can they perform other duties or functions which conflict with their court functions. A Yugoslav citizen who is a graduate lawyer can be elected as judge of general jurisdiction.

Prosecution of criminal cases rests in the hands of public prosecutors. Constitutionally their office is autonomous, entrusted with criminal prosecution, and responsible for assuring the uniform enforcement of law and the promotion of legality. A separate military prosecutor exercises similar functions in the armed forces. The military courts, in addition to trying military personnel, are authorized to try nonmilitary persons for all criminal acts committed against the armed forces. Public prosecutors have the power to demand information from state bodies and institutions and from economic and social organizations. There is a disciplinary court to try offenses committed by prosecutors or their employees.

The FOC nominates the Federal Public Prosecutor. After discussing the nomination, the Federal Assembly Commission for Elections and Appointments submits it to the vote of the Federal Assembly. A constitutional amendment passed in April 1967 invests the various republic assemblies with the authority to appoint or dismiss republic public prosecutors, thus widening republic authority over law enforcement. Previously, the republic prosecutors had been named by the Federal Public Prosecutor with the approval of the pertinent republic executive council.

A new code of criminal procedure which went into effect on 1 January 1968 is designed to better protect the rights of the accused. The conduct of preliminary investigations to secure evidence for indictments has been taken away from the public prosecutors and internal affairs organs and vested in the courts. Previously the public prosecutor had held a privileged position during an investigation and trial. Under the new legislation, the defense attorney may examine the records of the investigation and cannot be prohibited from communicating with his client if the latter is held in custody. The accused must be informed of his right to legal counsel during interrogations, and defense counsel may submit questions at an interrogation. Those summoned must attend an interrogation but need not answer any questions. The time limits for confinement during an investigation have been reduced from 9 to 6 months, and the court or appropriate organ of internal affairs is obliged to notify the family of a person held in custody within 24 hours of his confinement.

The new code of criminal proceedings balanced the extension of the rights of the accused, however, by extending the legal obligation to report criminal acts to include all working and other organizations, in addition to state agencies.

The changes in criminal procedure have placed a considerable strain on the Yugoslav judicial system which is short of personnel, particularly the newly important investigative judges. The new prerogatives given to the defense have increased the willingness of some lawyers to engage in practice, however, thus partially alleviating the shortage of lawyers. There were about 3,044 lawyers in Yugoslavia in 1970, more than 700 more than in 1966. Lawyers tend to settle in
the larger urban areas, however, leaving many rural
communes with no practicing lawyers at all.

Jury trial in the Western sense does not exist in
Yugoslavia. Instead, a system of lay judges is used in
association with the body of professional judges,
particularly in the lower courts. These laymen are
supposed to have an equal vote on the outcome of the
trial. Theoretically, the laymen can force an opinion
counter to that of the professionals, although this is
almost unheard of in practice. The 1963 Constitution
encouraged an increase in the number of such courts
and in the types of cases to be tried in them.

Despite the regime’s continued determination to
maintain control of the judicial apparatus, the
Yugoslav courts have demonstrated some indepen-
dence from political control. In quashing one of
the government’s changes against maverick intellec-
tual Mihajlo Mihajlov in 1965, the Supreme Court of
Croatia contradicted Tito’s publicly implied desire to
jail the young man.

C. Political dynamics (C)

All political power in Yugoslavia ultimately rests
with the Communist party, officially the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The fact that
Yugoslavia is a one-party state, however, has not
prevented the emergence of political pressure groups,
such as the trade union organization, which do
influence the country’s political dynamics. The
decentralized structure of the LCY itself and the
party’s decision to rule indirectly by influencing
various mass organizations and self-managing bodies
has led to a frank and open political life not known
anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

The process which has led to a political style is
typical for a Communist state began in the years
following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform
in 1948, when the party began drastically to alter its
original Soviet style of rule. The party was repeatedly
reorganized and reformed to reflect both in theory and
practice an increasingly decentralized and self-
managed economic system. These changes, including
the removal of party hacks from direct administration
of the economy, were the nucleus for what was to
become extensive public participation in Yugoslavia’s
political life. The trend became more pronounced
after the purge in July 1966 of Aleksandar Rankovic,
Tito’s long-time organizational chief and leader of the
conservative, centralist wing of the party.

Until the early 1960’s the LCY remained
remarkably stable. With the increased emphasis on
decentralization and democratization, however, three
distinct, but informal, groups have emerged in the
party. First, there are the ultraliberals who wish to
push for maximum democratization, even to the point
of advocating a multiparty system within a socialist
context. Opposite these ultraliberals are the hardline
conservatives, once led by Rankovic, who backed a
more centralized party government and economic
system. The third major intraparty group, probably
the largest of the three, falls in the center, and is
led by Tito. It rejects both Western liberal democracy and a
tightly controlled centralist system.

Although these ideological differences have been
developed over many years, they have been reflected
in ruptures in the top party hierarchy only twice since
the break with Moscow. In 1954 Milovan Djilas was
politically excommunicated for having “revisionist”
ideas and advocating a multiparty system. In 1966
Aleksandar Rankovic was driven from his party and
government offices for engaging in a “power struggle”
to insure his succession to Tito and for leading the
conservative, centralist opposition to Tito’s economic
and political reforms. In the cases of both Djilas and
Rankovic, relatively few members of the party elite
were immediately purged. After the fall of Rankovic, a
3-year campaign, culminating in the Ninth Party
Congress in March 1969, brought a greater number of
younger, third-generation Communists into the
leadership. Tito generally has been able to surround
himself with loyal subordinates, whose careers have
depended on his favor. Self-interest is reinforced by
the bonds of common Communist objectives. In
addition, mutual respect forged during the hardships
of the partisan struggle during World War II still plays
an important role.

The ouster of Rankovic has not ended the resistance
of the conservative centralists, who draw most of their
strength from the ranks of ex-partisans, middle and
lower level party officials, and ill-educated older party
members. Although many such persons back the
reforms, many prefer to insure the party’s continued
domination by the more traditional methods of force,
pressure, and “political intervention.” Also involved is
the fear that many-anti-reformers have for their jobs
and economic and social status. Having lived on their
partisan merits for 20 years, many lack the skills
necessary to manage an increasingly sophisticated
society and economy.

Cutting across ideological considerations and
breaching the solidarity of the LCY are growing
economic and nationalist rivalries among the
country’s five major nationalities. The LCY is made
up of six republic and two provincial parties (the latter
two are under the suzerainty of the Serbian party
organization). The interplay of party and government reforms and the freer political climate which has emerged in Yugoslavia have contributed to the surfacing of bitter, deep regional rivalries. This problem of maintaining the LCY as a unifying factor continued throughout 1972. Tito’s insistence on bringing the regional organizations to heel, and the Serbian party leadership’s resistance to decentralization brought the crisis to a head again in the fall of 1972. On 21 October Tito carried the day, and party boss Marko Nikezić as well as his second in command, Latinka Perovic, resigned.

The Serbian leadership’s demands were more the outcome of a dispute over what form the LCY should take and how tightly it need be organized than one of strong republic nationalist demands.

At the heart of the Croatian demands, however, was the long-festerling feud between the republic and the federal government over how much of its foreign currency earnings the republic should be allowed to retain. The Croatian complaint characterizes only one part of the nation’s economic problem. In order to overcome the economic disparity between the underdeveloped republics—Macedonia, Montenegro, and parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Serbia—and the more highly developed ones, the regime drains off investment funds generated by the prosperous republics of Croatia and Slovenia. *Even under the 1971 constitutional reforms which strip the federal government of much of its former power and authority, Belgrade still retains the right to direct these funds to regions such as the economically depressed province of Kosovo.*

Theoretically, progress toward complete socialism and a high stage of economic development was to be simultaneous, with all the republics reaching that distant goal at the same time. Given the pragmatic nature of the Yugoslav system, however, socialism and economic development increasingly are not in step with each other. Increasingly, the regime is giving priority to economic performance over ideological considerations. Businessmen as well as government and party officials in Croatia and Slovenia resent the imposed commitment to subsidize the often economically irrational development of the poorer regions of the country. The political and economic reforms of the 1960’s and early 1970’s were in response to these complaints. Conversely, many Communist Serbs, Montenegrins, and officials in Bosnia and Hercegovina fear that the increased emphasis on profitability will eventually spell the end to federal aid to the underdeveloped regions.

Intellectual ferment has given added momentum to the movement toward political decentralization and democratization in Yugoslavia. The intellectuals, however, have also added to the nation’s disunity. The Zagreb University faculty was a center of Croatian nationalist agitation which led to the crisis in December 1971. Similarly, the faculty at Pristina University in Kosov province is sharply divided along nationality lines, i.e., the Albanian majority versus the Serb minority.

Despite fluctuations in Tito’s popularity over the years, he remains the most powerful and only widely accepted leader in the country. His defiance of the Soviet Union in 1948—and subsequently his condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968—have earned him the respect of most of his people. Tito has personally built the party and personifies the system which now bears his name—Titoism. Having led the country through the crucial World War II years, he was a national figure by the end of the war, with a personal following that extended well beyond the Communists. He directed the unification and reconstruction of the country after a bloody fratricidal war and provided the leadership for the establishment of a new and unique system of socialism. Tito has been called the only true Yugoslav, and his efforts : an emphasis on “brotherhood and unity” have given the country an aura of Yugoslav nationalism which had not existed before.

Tito’s position as the indispensable man in Yugoslavia was reinforced again in December 1971 when he personally intervened to settle the Croatian crisis. His indispensability, therefore, makes the question of who will succeed him of crucial importance. Although apparently in good health, Tito’s advanced age (80 in 1972) and occasional illnesses periodically arouse speculation that he is about to die or retire. Since the mid-1960’s he has dealt less and less with the day-to-day details of government, reserving his energy for the conduct of foreign affairs and for acting as arbiter in party factional disputes.

The succession of power in the government was spelled out in the 1971 constitutional reform. A collective Presidency of 23 men was created. From this body a Vice President is chosen who will act for the President if he should die or be unable to fulfill his tasks. Once Tito is gone, a President will be chosen from this body to hold office for 1 year.

In the party, where the real power rests, the succession is less clear. A 15-member collective body called the Executive Bureau was created at the Ninth
Party Congress in 1969. This body, however, proved unwieldy and became a forum for regional bickering, for example during the Croatian crisis. As a result, the bureau has been pared down to eight members: one from each of the six republics and one from each of the two provinces. Slovenian Stane Dolanc, as the Executive Bureau’s secretary, has emerged as the key figure in this body. No single individual has emerged as heir to replace Tito in the party. The creation of the party Executive Bureau in fact suggests that a collective party leadership will replace Tito. Moreover, unlike Tito, no individual is likely to hold both the offices of President of the Republic and leader of the L.C.Y. Among those who are likely to play key roles in some form of collective leadership are Executive Bureau members Stane Dolanc, Kiro Gligorov, and Jure Bilic; Federal Assembly President Mihaelko Todorovic; collective Presidency members Kiste Crvenkovski, Hamdija Pozderac, and Vidoje Zarkovic; Serbian party leader Marko Nikezic; and Presidium member and chief ideologue Edward Kardelj (Figure 3). With local nationalism undermining the usefulness of the party as a unifying element, the army and its leadership may wield considerable political power should Tito die in the first half of the 1970’s.

1. Party development

During and immediately after World War II the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (almost completely domestic in origin, training, and experience) used harsh police-state methods to insure its absolute control. A People’s Front was established as a Communist-dominated political grouping that included fellow-traveling representatives of non-Communist parties. Every mass organization was dominated by Communist elements, and party cells were established in all public organizations. All opposition was eliminated as reactionary or collaborationist, and the party quickly took control of the economy and the judiciary.

In mid-1948, however, the bitter argument between Tito and the Soviet leadership over the question of the subordination of national Communist parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union resulted in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform (successor to the Comintern). Stalin began to apply an economic blockade, threatened troop maneuvers on Yugoslavia’s frontiers, and issued propaganda calling for the overthrow of the “Belgrade clique.” The Yugoslav regime, however, successfully defied Stalin and embarked upon a thorough overhaul of the theory and practice of communism as it applied to Yugoslavia.

Realizing the need for popular support, the regime introduced a series of measures between 1950 and 1953 which increased its popularity. The activities of the secret police were curtailed, legal procedures were strengthened, compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce were stopped, peasant collectives were allowed to disband, and such Soviet trappings as “socialist realism” in the arts were deemphasized. In a surprise move the regime also called for the elimination of special privileges for party members, declaring that the legal position of Communists was exactly the same as that of non-Communists and that party members were to use persuasion, not force, in achieving their goals. Concomitantly, the regime instituted a broad program of local self-management in the economy and decentralization of government administration. Workers councils were instituted to supervise the management of economic enterprises.

With these moves, the regime changed its tactics toward the Soviets from defensive to offensive. Stalin’s “state capitalism” and “bureaucracy” were sharply criticized and compared unfavorably with the new Yugoslav system of decentralization and social self-management. Among the center of the Yugoslav attack was its argument about the need for the state to begin “withering away immediately” as called for by Lenin, rather than having this postponed to some indefinite time in the future. Moreover, at the Yugoslav Six Party Congress in November 1952 Tito went so far as to say that the party itself would “wither away.” By 1966, however, Tito and his lieutenants were denying that the party or state bureaucracy would soon completely vanish, asserting that both would be necessary for some time in the development of Yugoslav socialism.

The June 1952 directives of the Central Committee established modifications in party theory and practice. The secretaries of local party organizations were ordered to give up their positions as heads of local governmental institutions in order to eliminate the “bureaucratic caste system.” The directives also ordered party officials to limit their interference in economic operations, and gave local party units more autonomy in order to increase intraparty democracy in ideological and educational work.

The Sixth Party Congress put the stamp of approval on these changes. Specifically, the congress proclaimed that the party would confine its activities to political and ideological education and would no longer seek to impose its will on governmental and other state activities by direct order. Party deliberations were to be open to the public, and party members were told to exert influence not by the
FIGURE 3. Yugoslav government and party leaders (U/OU)

JOSIP BROZ TITO
President of Yugoslavia and President of the party
(Croat) Age: 80

KRSTE CRVENKOVSKI
Member of the Collective Presidency (Macedonian)
Age: 50

EDVARD KARDELJ
Member of the party Presidium, Chief ideologue and close confidant of
Tito (Slovene) Age: 62

STANE DOLANC
Secretary of the party
Executive Bureau (Slovene) Age: 47

RATO DUGONJIC
Vice President of Yugoslavia
(Serb from Bosnia and Herzegovina) Age: 56

KIRO GLIGOROV
Member of the party
Executive Bureau (Macedonian) Age: 55

JURE BILIC
Member of the party
Executive Bureau (Croat) Age: 51
weight of their party position but by functioning as influential individuals in society. To lessen the party’s direct control of state activities, the party reorganized itself to include a network of party organizations based on territorial subdivisions in addition to those organized according to the functional principle.

The Sixth Party Congress also changed the name of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and replaced the Politburo with an Executive Committee. In his speech to the congress, Tito underlined the more restricted role of the party by calling on the People’s Front to take an active part in various political activities that in the past had been directly controlled by the party. He suggested that the front’s name be changed to the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPP) to conform more closely to its new place in the country’s political, economic, and social development.

These changes in party practice and theory led to confusion and political apathy among the party’s rank and file. Some members assumed that the changes were mere propaganda, while others thought that the attempts at intparty democracy did not go far enough. The trial and imprisonment of Milovan Dijas in 1956 for his “revisionist” ideas underlined the demand of top party leaders for unwavering conformity despite the more liberal front they were portraying. Dijas, who had been high in the party hierarchy for many years, was to remain in prison from 1956 until 1961, when he was again imprisoned, after a brief period of freedom, this time for publishing state secrets in his book Conversations with Stalin. There he remained until December 1966, when he again was released but forbidden to be active in politics or journalism.

Dijas is Yugoslavia’s leading political heretic, and party theorists still launch occasional attacks on his criticisms of the Titoist system. The attempts since 1966 to open up Yugoslav political life have partially reunited him to the regime, but his doctrines of a socialist multiparty system and the existence of a “new class” in the form of a privileged Communist bureaucracy remain anathema to Tito. Most recently he ran afloat of the regime following the publication of The Unperfect Society in 1969. He was scheduled to visit the United States in March of 1970, but Yugoslav officials lifted his passport on the ground that Dijas had not kept his promise—probably a reference to the order preventing him from publishing until 1972. The move against Dijas may have been a smokescreen to ward off Soviet displeasure at the release of Mihajlo Mihajlov. Mihajlov, after having served 3½ years for spreading “false information about the Soviet Union and publishing banned articles abroad,” was released from prison 1 day after the action against Dijas. Although Dijas has publicly speculated that he may return to political life, such a move is highly unlikely. The regime has effectively isolated Dijas in Yugoslavia to the degree that he is far better known abroad than at home and has no power base or following with which to stage a political comeback, at least in the foreseeable future.

The program and statutes adopted at the Seventh Party Congress in 1958 defended Yugoslavia’s “separate road to socialism” against its Sino-Soviet critics. Regime spokesmen said that the program contained the basic principles of Yugoslav state and party theory, and, except for minor adjustments, would serve as the guidepost for the country’s future political and social development. The party program addressed itself to the future of capitalism, the development of socialism, the revisionism of Stalin’s bureaucratic deformations, and Yugoslavia’s route to social democracy. It reasserted the basic need for the state to begin withering away immediately. It also included the concept that had created difficulties in 1952—that the party too would ultimately wither away.

The Yugoslavs claimed then, as they do now, that this program is only for them. Nevertheless, they are more than willing to explain their brand of socialism to all interested nations, in particular to those of the third world. The Seventh Party Congress insisted that Yugoslavia’s was the only far-reaching Communist party program since that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1939. The congress contended that the Yugoslav program had adjusted theory to conform to the current life in Yugoslavia and that no other party had attempted to do so.

The Eighth Party Congress, held in December 1964, reaffirmed the liberal program adopted in 1958 and called for its updating and application to fit the new conditions in Yugoslavia. To this end, the party amended its statutes to enforce the policy that the party should become the “guiding” rather than the “directing” force in society.

The revised party statutes provided that the influence of party members on the decisionmaking process in the government and economy was to be determined by their individual ability to solve problems. Greater internal democracy in the party was stressed by adoption of the principle of rotation in party offices; the statutes required replacement of one-fourth of the membership of the Central Committee at each party election and periodic replacement of
members of the Executive Committee. The statutes also called for party members to follow democratic procedures in dealing with other than party problems. They stated, for example, that all decisions on other than strictly party matters were to be the result of full and democratic debate among all officials concerned—both party and nonparty—and to be open to public scrutiny.

The statutes also allowed for some degree of independence for local party organizations, providing that they should organize their own meetings and be responsible for adopting party guidelines and proposing solutions to problems to the next higher body. Local party members were urged to be loyal to party policies but were no longer called upon to submit to party decisions without question.

In addition to adopting the new party statutes, the Eighth Party Congress adopted guidelines which called for further decentralization of the governmental apparatus and greater attention to the relaxation of economic controls in order to give market forces greater influence over prices, wages, and investment. President Tito was the first to endorse further decentralization at the congress.

Despite some gains, the moderate and liberal forces at the Eighth Party Congress were forced into compromises. While the membership of the powerful Executive Committee was expanded from 14 to 19 members, only one member of the committee elected at the Seventh Party Congress in 1958 failed to be reelected at the eighth. This old-line membership included the conservative, centralist leader Rankovic. Although the enlarged Central Committee underwent a more thorough change in membership of nearly 50%, Rankovic, as party organizational and security chief, had to approve most of the new membership.

Between the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses an important event took place which set the LCY on a more liberal path. This event was the purge of Rankovic in mid-1966. Rankovic and his followers were the leading conservatives in the Yugoslav system and their removal and enforced obscurity through retirement paved the way for the events at the Ninth Party Congress.

The Ninth Party Congress met in mid-March 1969. The Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia was barely 6 months old, and against a backdrop of strong anti-Soviet sentiment the LCY strongly reaffirmed Yugoslavia’s independence in the Communist world. The LCY categorically rejected the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, as well as the concept that one state, i.e., the U.S.S.R., can play a leading role in the socialist movement.

Many prominent but aging party functionaries were replaced by younger, capable, more liberal persons. In addition to creating a party Executive Bureau, the Ninth Party Congress expanded the Presidium from 35 to 52 members. The Central Committee was formally abolished. Its functions have been assumed by the Presidium or by the Party Conference, a new organ created in 1969, which meets once a year. The statutes adopted at the congress incorporated most of the longstanding demands of the liberals: a greater voice for the rank and file in party matters, strengthened regional party organizations, no penalties for resigning from the party, and permission for individuals and organizations to criticize some of the party’s policies.

The liberalizing trend which held sway at the Ninth Party Congress has suffered a setback as a result of the Croatian and Serbian crises. Expressions of discontent with party programs, as well as republic nationalism are closely watched in an effort to prevent a repeat of the 1971 excesses. In October 1972 Tito moved against the Serb party leaders who had balked at his demands for tighter discipline. Several prominent Serb leaders resigned, but, as of late 1972, the purge did not appear to be reaching the magnitude of the Croatian upheaval. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the liberal reform—a greater voice for the republic and provincial party organizations not only in running their own affairs but in deciding LCY policy, and the practical adaptation of communism to the realities of its environment and the peculiarities of Yugoslavia and its people—remain intact as the basic premise behind Yugoslav communism for the foreseeable future.

2. Organization

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia traditionally has been organized on “Leninist principles,” with small party cells at the bottom of a hierarchical structure. The principle of democratic centralism based on the compulsory implementation of decisions of higher party organizations by the lower bodies provided the necessary unifying element. The higher organizations had the right to annul the decisions of lower bodies if they conflicted with the program, statutes, and line of the national party.

The principle of democratic centralism was reiterated when the party adopted new statutes at the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969. Decisions adopted by a party majority are obligatory for all members. The new statutes strike a democratic note, however, by using intraparty relations on “a democratic method in the preparation and adoption of views, on respect for scientific knowledge, on free
expression, and on the confrontation and struggle of views through principled discussion.

Despite some potentially restrictive clauses, the new LCY statutes are the most liberal ever adopted by a ruling Communist party. However, the prohibition against criticism of the party's principles and platform has been retained. Although a member may disagree with party policy, he is still under pressure to agree publicly and to carry it out. Failing this cooperation, a member can be criticized or even expelled from the party.

After the ouster of Rankovic, high-level party officials quickly denounced "false unity" in the LCY, and the bolder among them, such as Macedonian party chief Kstpe Crvenkovski, called for a new type of democratic centralism which would allow open dissent within the LCY as long as the dissenters did not thwart the implementation of decisions agreed upon by the majority. Tito, however, takes a more traditional view of democratic centralism. While denouncing usurpation of all decisionmaking by the leadership, Tito in the last resort insists on complete fidelity to the party line and party sanctions against those who disagree too stubbornly.

The new party statutes widened the former provision for rotation in office to insure the replacement of one-third of the membership of party organs at every level at regular elections, which are now by secret ballot. A supplementary provision was added stating that no party member can simultaneously carry on executive functions in the LCY and in a sociopolitical organization.

The statutes also provide for collective and individual resignations from elective party organs if the individual or organ cannot carry out assigned tasks or is unable to accept assigned policies. Conversely, members of the executive organs may be replaced if they fail to carry out party policy or disregard the views of those who elected them. Party punishments run from criticism, disassociation from a member's concepts or actions, through reprimands, to expulsion. Appeals are allowed to comradeley courts. An individual may resign from the LCY, and he has the right to participate in hearings concerning his party status.

The federal party structure as of mid-1973 consists of a 52-man Presidium, an eight-man Executive Bureau, and a 280-delegate Party Conference (Figure 4). With the exception of the 1971 reorganization of the Executive Bureau and a reduction in its membership from 15 to eight, this structure represents the hardihood of the Ninth Party Congress. The Presidium is the party's main policymaking body, while the Executive Bureau is designed to give executive guidance to the party apparatus and to carry out policy.

**FIGURE 4. League of Communists of Yugoslavia (UJOU)**
According to the statutes, the congress is the top authority of the LCY. It determines the party program and statutes, elects the LCY President, and verifies the composition of the Presidium. Congresses must be held at least every 5 years. An extraordinary congress may be convened by the Presidium on its own initiative, upon the demand of the LCY conference, or upon the demand of a congress of a republic party.

The 280-member Party Conference, which must meet at least once a year, oversees party work and determines LCY policy between congresses. It also verifies changes made between congresses in the membership of the Presidium and other high party organs. Such changes cannot exceed one-third of the total membership of the higher party organ concerned.

One-fourth of the membership of the conference serves the full 5-year span between congresses. This "permanent" group is appointed by the LCY congress on the basis of elections in the republic and provincial parties. No more than one-third of the "permanent" membership of the conference can be changed between congresses. The decision to convene a conference is adopted by the Presidium, or taken at the behest of the conference of a republic party.

Under the new party statutes the LCY Presidium has assumed most of the duties of the defunct Central Committee. It implements the policies determined by the congress and conference, and may itself determine policy and make political decisions. The composition of the 52-member Presidium is determined on strictly federalist lines—each republic party is entitled to seven members, each provincial party to three. The only exception to this pattern is the presence of an "appropriate number" (three in 1972) of representatives of the party organization in the army. The remaining member is the LCY President. Included in each republic delegation is its party chairman as an ex officio Presidium member. Republic and provincial congresses elect their Presidium delegations on the basis of nominations by communal party conferences. The LCY congress—or the conference between congresses—verifies the elections.

The creation of the Executive Bureau at the Ninth Party Congress was an attempt to give the party a strong center. Executive Bureau members had to reside in Belgrade and—unlike ordinary members of the Presidium, who may hold high office in other sociopolitical organizations or government bodies—may not hold dual office. The bureau, however, did not live up to Tito’s expectations. Former Croatian member Mijo Tripalo refused to attend a number of sessions; when he did attend, he adopted a Croatian-first attitude, insisting that the federal party be further decentralized. His strong republic nationalism finally spelled his political doom; Tripalo was the highest ranking party official to be purged in December 1971.

President Tito is the guiding force in the party. This fact was dramatically illustrated by his personal, direct intervention in the purge of December 1971, when the federal party proved unable to cope with Croatian nationalism. As President of the LCY, Tito presides over Presidium sessions, guides its work, and raises issues for discussion.

The LCY also has a Commission for Statutory Questions which acts as the party’s "constitutional court" in interpreting the party statutes. In addition, there is a Supervisory Committee, which manages the party’s finances. The membership of both bodies is based on the same principles as that of the Presidium.

The reorganization effected at the Ninth Party Congress reflects an attempt to achieve a balance between greater republic party authority and the need for strong centralized leadership in a multinational organization. Other major goals at the congress were the creation of institutions to take the LCY through the succession crisis which will follow Tito’s departure, and the infusion of younger blood into the upper ranks of the party.

Use of the federal principle in organizing the highest party bodies has increased the potential power of the republic parties and has institutionalized the previous informal balance within the hierarchy among the various nationalities. The Executive Bureau is designed to counterbalance tendencies toward republic party separatism by moving entrenched republic leaders to Belgrade, where they must deal on an all-Yugoslav basis with the problems of party unity and federal cohesiveness.

The Executive Bureau will also hopefully provide the framework for the transition to collective leadership in the post-Tito era. The position of chairman of the bureau has been abolished, instead, there is a secretary. Tito remains the unquestioned leader of the party and in this role oversees the operation of the bureau.

While Tito retains a group of seasoned older comrades around him, such as Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakaric, and Mijalko Todorovic, the emphasis is on bringing younger people into the party elite. Many of the old guard, such as former defense chief Ivan Gosnjak, ex-Serbian party leader Jovan Veselinov, and former trade union leader Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo are now retired. Only 13 members of the previous 35-member Presidium retained top positions after the Ninth Party Congress.

The personnel turnover at the republic congresses was
even higher. For example, nearly 80% of all top functionaries in the Slovenian party are new, generally younger people.

Prior to 1968, the six republic parties were organized roughly along the same lines as the federal party. The Slovenian and Croatian party congresses of late 1968 effected reorganizations of their parties to their own liking. The republic parties attained increased autonomy under the policy of decentralization and, in the case of Croatia, this new-found authority only whetted appetites for more and stimulated long-smoldering Croatian nationalism within the party leadership as well as the rank and file. The end result was the crisis and purge of December 1971. The banner of those favoring greater regional party autonomy then passed to the Serbian leadership. It was not until the political turnover in Serbia in October 1972 that Tito appeared to have carried the day and to have firmly set the course for tighter central party controls and discipline.

The convening of the republic party congresses before the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969 marked the first time such congresses were held before the all-Yugoslav congress. This new procedure allows a fuller hearing for the views of the republic parties than did the previous system, under which the republics held their congresses after the LCY congress in order to ratify the decisions of the central leadership.

The restructuring of the local communal party organizations occupied most of the last half of 1967 and was largely completed early in 1968. The changeover generally complied with the LCY theses on party reorganization. The main communal party body is the party conference, which is elected every 2 years and is composed of all the party members or their delegates. The conference elects a communal committee to act as its executive organ. The party conference includes party members from locally based army units. Party members in the military are enjoined to participate fully in local party affairs.

During the early months of 1969 the LCY carried out an extensive reorganization of the party apparatus in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The move was intended to restructure the army's party organization along lines parallel to the civilian party organization. The basic policymaking body of the party in the armed forces is the LCY conference, whose 156 members serve for 2 years. Delegates to the conference are nominated at brigade, division, garrison, and intergarrison conferences, and are elected at conferences of the army, military-naval regions, the air forces, and border units, and the Federal State Secretariat for National Defense. The conferences in the army districts elect committees, statutory commissions, supervisory committees, and other bodies. The central committees of the republics where the armies or other units are located send up to five delegates to these district conferences.

The LCY conference for the JNA elects its own executive-political body of 35 members, called the committee. The committee is roughly comparable to a republic central committee. The LCY conference also elects a statutory commission and supervisory committee. The LCY Presidium empowers up to nine of its own members to sit on the LCY conference in the armed forces.

Under the new LCY statutes, the party conference in the JNA determines the organization of the LCY in the military. The statutes also require the central committees of the republics to maintain cooperative ties with party organizations in army units. The major change in the party organization in the armed forces was the decision to allow Communists in the military to choose their own party officials. Previously, the main party organ in the armed forces was the plenipotentiary committee, appointed by the LCY Central Committee. Its successor, the conference, is larger than the old 40-member plenipotentiary committee, although its exact size is not known.

The reorganization is intended to strengthen the role of the party in the armed forces, to integrate the JNA into Yugoslav society, to bring the party organization in the military more fully into the main body of the LCY, and to ensure that the armed forces do not become a bastion of conservative opposition to social and economic reform. Militating against the achievement of these goals is the JNA's new authority to elect its own party apparatus, which may increase the army's consciousness of being a separate entity within the party. With three members in the LCY Presidium, the JNA already equals the representation accorded the party of an autonomous province.

3. Membership

According to the party statutes, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia is the organized political force of the working class and working people of Yugoslavia," and anyone who endorses the program and statutes of the LCY and its stand on all questions of the building of socialism and the modern workers' movement is eligible for membership.

Despite its assertion of working class origin and interests, workers constituted some 30% of the total membership in April 1972 (Figure 5). The number of workers who are members of the LCY has increased from 71,177 in 1946 to 399,943 in 1972. No statistics
FIGURE 5. Claimed membership in the Yugoslav Communist party from its founding in 1919 to 1971 (U/OU)

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<td>1956 (June)</td>
<td>633,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>687,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>829,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>935,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,006,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,035,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,018,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>1,013,500</td>
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<td>1,140,084</td>
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<td>1,111,682</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,116,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,025,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE—Except as indicated, all figures are believed to refer to end-of-year membership.

have been released for 1972 on the size of the white-collar group or the number of peasants in the party. In 1968, however, the number of white-collar members stood at 408,378 and in 1967 the number of peasants was only 77,134. In the latter case this was a sharp decline from the 1946 figure of 130,157.

In the fall of 1968 party membership shrunk by more than 100,000 to nearly 1,150,000. The major portion of this decline occurred immediately after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav criticism of that action, and it probably was patriotically motivated. Since then, however, a downward trend has set in as a result of general apathy and disillusionment on the part of many Yugoslavs over the LCY’s inability to come to grips with the nation’s major economic problems.

Membership in the party has been relatively difficult to obtain, and there are indications that the criteria for membership are being tightened even further. In the past it has been necessary for a candidate to have two or more sponsors who had known him for at least 2 years and who had been party members themselves for 2 years. A candidate for membership also had to be accepted by a basic organization, which had the exclusive right to accept or reject applicants. The criteria in the new party statutes are vague, stating that candidates for membership must accept the policy of the LCY, work for its implementation, and have “...won with their social activity and moral-political qualities the confidence of the community in which they live.” Requests for membership may be made directly by individuals or on their behalf by LCY members, a political or social organization, a work community, or a self-management organization.

4. Other major political organizations

The Communist regime in Yugoslavia prefers to rule indirectly through a network of organizations covering all facets of political, social, and economic life. Party control is exercised through party members who are also members of these other organizations. Although the system usually works smoothly, the regime’s decentralization program has raised some problems—the striking of a proper balance between outright party control of the organizations, allowing them the necessary freedom to assure popular support of regime policies, and the growth of organizational interests different from those of the LCY.

a. Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia

The regime’s main mass organization, SAWPY, traces its history back to the Comintern-inspired popular front period of the 1930’s. It retained the name People’s Front until 1953, when it was redesignated. Since 1953 the regime has attempted to make the SAWPY an important link in the system of self-management, as a forum for public opinion.

In theory, the goal of Yugoslavia’s Communists is a “nonparty” system, not the single-party system they now have nor the multiparty systems they denounce as bourgeois frauds. The regime, however, has fostered the concept of SAWPY as an arena for the clash and eventual synthesis of opinions and interests. In 1971 SAWPY was entrusted with the responsibility of handling the political debates on the constitutional amendments. At the same time SAWPY began actively seeking across-the-board ties with the socialist parties throughout the world as well as with
Communist parties which find themselves in disagreement with the Soviets.

The 1963 Constitution already enshrined the alliance as "the broadest base of social-political activity and social self-management of working people." Through SAWPY, citizens are to discuss social-political matters, scrutinize the work of the government, and exercise their voting rights. The Constitution also states that the Federal Assembly's Commission for Elections and Appointments must contain members delegated by the alliance, which has an important role in organizing elections. The alliance also controls most major newspapers in Yugoslavia.

The last SAWPY congress was the sixth congress held in June 1966. That gathering effected a major overhaul of the organization. The old federal board, SAWPY's central committee, was replaced by a federal conference. A 43-member presidium replaced the former executive committee, and an 18-member executive committee replaced the old executive committee secretariat.

Although provision was made for holding future SAWPY congresses, it is envisioned that such gatherings will rarely be held. Instead, the federal conference is to meet at least once a year, or whenever necessary to discuss topics of unusual importance.

The conference principle has been extended all the way to the basic units in the communes. Each commune has its own SAWPY conference composed of representatives from local organizations. Republic conferences are comprised of delegates from the communal level. In order to insure more direct influence by republic SAWPY organizations the federal conference is composed of delegations from the republic-level organizations. A more formal note of federalism was thus injected into SAWPY to replace the old informal nationality balance which had been effected when republic and federal SAWPY congresses elected the old federal board from lists of candidates. At least two-thirds of the members of the republic delegations to the federal conference must be elected by communal conferences, and only one-third by republic conferences.

The last official figure (1969) for SAWPY membership put the total at 8,500,000. Although this represents the organization's peak membership, SAWPY has not yet regained its earlier relative share of the voting population, which was as high as 80% in 1949. After its initial membership gains in the early postwar period, enrollment fell to around 5,000,000 in the early 1950's, or less than half the voting population. By mid-1964 membership had risen to 7,545,000 or about 65% of the voting population.

The relationship of the alliance to the party is ambiguous. Yugoslav theoreticians hope to make SAWPY a vehicle for controlled dissent: the party is to gain acceptance of its policies through persuasion within SAWPY. The I.C.Y. however, is to remain the leading element in the alliance. The party leadership turned aside suggestions made at the sixth SAWPY congress in 1966 that the alliance have its own political program and complete independence. The leadership of the alliance is composed overwhelmingly of Communists. Veljko Milatovic was elected president of the conference at its fifth session in July 1969. Esad Ceric was elected vice president.

The principle of autonomy also is supposed to underlie the relations between the alliance and the other main mass organizations, such as the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY), the Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia, and the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia. Before 1956 these organizations were "associate members" of SAWPY. Since then they have not been included in SAWPY but coordinate their activities with the alliance by sending representatives to any meeting of interest held by a SAWPY organ. These representatives participate in the meetings with the same rights as the regular SAWPY personnel. The regime's mass women's organization, the Conference on the Social Activity of Women, has remained an integral part of SAWPY.

The alliance performs a useful function in foreign affairs for the regime through its commission for international relations, which is used to maintain contact with non-Communist political movements. SAWPY and the other mass organizations send and receive many delegations from similar organizations all over the world. Although such contacts also are maintained with the mass front organizations of the other East European Communist states, SAWPY is particularly engaged in maintaining contacts with what the Yugoslavs call "progressive" groups in Western Europe and the less developed areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

b. Federations of youth and students

The Yugoslav party has no youth auxiliary such as the U.S.S.R. has in its Komsomol, but the regime attempts to control the nation's youth through two organizations, the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ). The prewar Federation of Communist Youth, founded in 1919, combined in 1948 with the anti-Fascist youth group developed by the partisans during the war to
form the People's Youth of Yugoslavia. The People's Youth became the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia in 1963. Both the SOJ and the SSJ were originally created to perform as "transmission belts" for party directives. Numerically, at least, the SOJ has been a success; the latest available figures on membership are for December 1967 and show a total of 2,085,456, which includes about two-thirds of all Yugoslavs between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the organization's inability to accurately reflect youth attitudes has grown steadily over the years, however, and much of the organization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ has become a byword for careerism and a haven for young party hacks.

The party's decision to change its role from a directly ruling organization to one of ideological leadership led to confusion about the role of the SOJ. Many young people wanted the SOJ to reflect the views and interests of its membership, not those of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to respond to pressure from below. Its leadership, moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to overprofessionalization.

In the aftermath of the Rankovic affair the secretariat of the SOJ was dissolved for incompetence and heavy-handedness. The federation was put into a form of receivership in order to prepare for its reorganization, which took place at the eighth SOJ congress in February 1968.

To restore the federation's effectiveness, a new statute was enacted to decentralize the administration, presumably to render it more responsive to the membership. The SOJ central committee was replaced by a conference as the chief organ. The executive arm of the conference is the 30-member presidium, which is elected on a federal basis—three members from each republic, one from each autonomous province—with 10 ex officio members. Presidium members are ex officio members of the conference but cannot comprise more than one-third of the total conference membership. The other conference members are not permanent; they are delegated by the republic organizations for specific questions to be discussed at the conference meetings. The age limits for membership in the SOJ were set at 14 to 27.

This attempt to revitalize the SOJ has fallen short of its mark. The students and youth in both Kosovo and Croatia are imbued with local nationalism, and, unless officials of their liking control the local youth organizations, they simply boycott SOJ gatherings. An LCY conference was slated for July 1972, specifically to discuss youth problems. The gathering, however, was postponed until the fall of 1972 because youth leaders claimed they needed more time to prepare themselves.

The Federation of Students of Yugoslavia (SSJ) suffers from much the same malady as the SOJ. The last available statistics for SSJ membership show that it had 110,000 members in 1966. The Zagreb wing of the SSJ was particularly unruly in 1971, was taken over by Croatian nationalist elements, and became a prime force behind that republic's drive for greater autonomy. The regime had granted the SSJ greater autonomy in order to bolster sagging morale and attract new members, but in the aftermath of the Croatian crisis tighter controls are being reintroduced, even at the expense of alienating future intellectuals and technocrats.

Regime control of the students through the SOJ and the SSJ temporarily broke down during the Belgrade student riots in June 1968. Both organizations were reduced to supporting ex post facto the student demands for more jobs, more financial aid to students, greater decentralization, and an end to economic and social privilege. Although the SSJ and SOJ slowly reassessed their influence with the young people by siding with them, it is uncertain whether or not either organization has recovered a firm grip on its membership. The party's attempts to tighten its control of youth activities at the universities in Zagreb and Belgrade were facilitated by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. As a result, the regime, appealing to patriotism, was able to quiet dissenting student elements—at least until 1970 when opposition and discontent again surfaced.

Most students and nonstudents among Yugoslav youth share a mutual desire for the better life and seek to emulate American life styles. They continue to press hard against the entrenched authorities, mostly on local levels. Although there are a small number of radical dissidents who are hostile toward both the United States and Soviet Union and who look to Peking for inspiration, they have no chance even to influence the thinking of the majority of youth.

The Yugoslav leadership is well aware of the unrest among the country's youth and the need to alleviate student grievances. In most cases, however, the steps taken only whet appetites for more. One factor that works in the regime's favor and which keeps the uneducated youth apolitical and committed to the status quo is the continued chance the youth has to work abroad for hard currency earnings. Nevertheless, the regime still is faced with the problem of stimulating support among the youth for party programs, of harnessing the energies of the country's youth, and, most important, of finding a place and a
way to establish a dialogue with the students other than in the streets.

5. Electoral procedures

Despite a one-party system and tight party control, elections in Yugoslavia are characterized by a degree of political contest and popular participation that stands in sharp contrast to the sham electoral procedures of other Eastern European states. Moreover, the party attempts to exercise control over the process by indirect means. For example, it works through SAWpy, which organizes and supervises the elections, and through state electoral commissions (usually made up of trusted party members selected from among the judiciary), which must finally approve all candidates before they can stand for election and conduct a campaign. In its search for popular support the regime has made some concessions to democratic procedure. Moreover, as the leadership has perfected its techniques and become more entrenched, it can afford to make concessions without seriously jeopardizing its position. Thus, over the years the regime has attempted to provide the voters with a slowly increasing choice of candidates, all of whom support the Yugoslav system and the party’s basic program, but who may differ on methods, emphasis on policy, claims to their own effectiveness, and simple popular appeal.

The elections of 1945 and 1950 were carried out under the harsh features of Yugoslavia’s early postwar Stalinist period. The Communists assured their victory by passing legislation restricting electoral freedom, directly controlling the electoral machinery through party organizations, and using violence and intimidation. Since the party’s mass organization was the only one that could register a list of candidates, the crowded electorate could either vote for this list—by dropping a rubber pellet in the right box—or drop a pellet into the opposition box. Since all voting was closely observed by party and police officials, almost all voters voted for the party list, although a few abstained by staying away from the polls.

The elections of 1953 were held under a revised election law that reflected Yugoslavia’s turn toward the concept of self-management. Nomination of candidates was made less dependent on SAWpy proposals and more open to the electorate at voters’ meetings. Paper ballots were introduced and voting was conducted in separate closed booths. Reflecting the new emphasis on liberalization, the law also provided for more candidates than positions, and in fact there were a few instances where ranking incumbents faced opposition. There was an atmosphere of active campaigning and competition. The new law, however, continued strict party control over the final selection of candidates, and the regime’s choices invariably won.

Although the electoral law of 1958 was virtually the same as that used in 1953, the party considerably tightened its control of the entire electoral process to avoid a repetition of the disheartening features of the more liberal 1953 elections. The pre-election campaign and the election itself indicated that the regime had succeeded in reducing electoral opposition and in increasing the number of voters. In spite of inclement weather, the number of abstentions dropped almost by half, compared with 1953, and the total opposition vote decreased from 14.5% to 9.1%.

In November 1964 the Federal Assembly amended the electoral law to allow for more than one candidate to compete for each seat in the assemblies at all levels. The election of March 1965 brought forth for the first time an avalanche of nomination proposals from the electorate. The party quickly evidenced its concern that liberalization had gone too far and made clear its desire to dampen the electorate’s enthusiasm. This concern proved premature when the elections passed without mishap and with 93.1% of the registered voters voting. The decreased participation rate compared with 1963’s 95.2% was attributed by the Yugoslav press to a new election law which no longer permitted voting by citizens who were outside their home districts on election day.

The 1967 general elections were held under the most unrestricted circumstances since the Communists assumed power in 1945. Starting with the registration of candidates, there was an outpouring of potential nominees—almost 2,000 for the 295 vacant Federal Assembly seats alone. Voters’ meetings then nominated candidates for the communal chamber of the local assembly, the republican or provincial chambers of the republic or provincial legislature, and for the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly. Candidates for the corporate chambers were elected at the voters’ meetings in the enterprises.

For the elections through 1967 the communal assembly acted as both a nominating body and an electoral college. From the list of nominees prepared by the workers’ meetings, the assembly elected deputies to the corporate chambers of the higher level assemblies. From the list of nominees compiled at the voters’ meetings, the assembly prepared a final list of candidates to the political chambers of the republic and federal assemblies. These candidates were then submitted to a general election. In 1963 and 1965 deputies for communal assemblies were elected in the
first round of voting, and the new communal assemblies elected the deputies for the higher political chambers. In 1967, the old communal assemblies performed this function.

The 1967 elections saw an unprecedented number of candidates and contested elections. The 60 vacant seats in the Federal Chamber were sought by 81 candidates, the 325 vacant seats in all six of the republic chambers by 428 candidates. There were about 40,000 candidates vying for about 20,000 vacancies in the communal assemblies throughout Yugoslavia. Only Montenegro and Macedonia had no more candidates than seats at the federal level. Some elections at the republic level had to be repeated for lack of a clear winner.

The 1967 election brought a turnout of 89% of the registered voters, and also the defeat of several regime-backed candidates. In contested elections at the republic level, approximately 30% of the regime's candidates failed to win. The surprise winners generally were older ex-Partisan heroes who opposed the regime's economic reform program. In several cases regime pressure resulted in the recall of some of the more objectionable new deputies in 1968.

The experience of the 1967 elections led the party once again to seek tighter control of the electoral process. A new electoral law formally shifted the responsibility for executing electoral procedures from the communal assemblies to SAWPY. The 1969 elections, which involved all of the seats in all of the assemblies at every level, took place in April and May under an extremely complicated system. Elections were held in four phases: 1) election of deputies for the corporate chambers of the communal assemblies; 2) election by direct secret ballot of deputies to the Social-Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly, to the republican and provincial chambers of each republic or provincial assembly, and to the communal chambers of the bicameral communal assemblies; 3) election of deputies to corporate chambers of the federal, republican, and provincial legislatures (this phase was conducted by the communal assemblies plus delegates sent by working organizations; deputies also were elected at this time to the republican equivalents of the Federal Assembly's Social-Political Chamber); and 4) election of deputies to the Chamber of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly by the republican and provincial assemblies.

The election laws may be drastically revised with the introduction of the second set of constitutional amendments in late 1973. As of late 1972, however, the Constitution prescribes single-member constituencies, based on population, at the republic and federal levels. Each electoral unit is thus represented in the Federal Assembly by four deputies, one in each chamber, with the exception of the Chamber of Nationalities, which is composed of delegates from the republics and provinces. Every Yugoslav citizen 18 years of age and over, except private farmers and artisans, has two votes: one as a citizen, the other based on his means of livelihood. As a citizen he votes for deputies of the political chambers of the legislatures, i.e., the Social-Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the republican and the provincial chambers of those assemblies. As a "working man," he votes for deputies of the three corporate chambers, i.e., the Social Welfare and Health, Education and Culture, and Economic Chambers of the Federal Assembly and their counterparts in the republic and provincial assemblies.

The nomination system continues to be the most important part of the overall electoral procedure, for it is here that citizens have been able to exercise their greatest amount of choice. Prior to the promulgation of the 1963 Constitution and the changes in the electoral law in 1964, nominations were made either by various SAWPY constituent organizations or by groups of individuals at meetings of voters. This procedure was amended in 1958 so that voter meetings chose only delegates to nominating conferences, which in turn nominated the actual candidates. The nominees were then placed before the voter meeting, which approved or rejected them by a simple majority. The successful nominees then had to be approved by state electoral commissions. As of late 1972 the nomination process was divided into three phases:

1) Prenomination meetings of citizens register as many potential nominees as they wish. SAWPY usually convokes these meetings when nominees for the political chamber, i.e., the Social-Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly or comparable chambers of the lower assemblies, are to be discussed. The trade unions or enterprise workers councils are in charge of the meetings to register nominees for the corporate chambers. Any citizen can propose a candidate at prenomination meetings. The electoral authorities are forbidden to interfere at this stage.

2) Nomination conferences of SAWPY call the list of nominees proposed by the prenomination meetings. The nomination conferences are not obliged to accept the nominees selected at the earlier meetings and may substitute their own nominees. Selection of nominees by the conferences is by secret ballot. A majority of votes is necessary for nomination. If no one receives a majority, the nominating conference must propose new nominees and vote again. The local electoral commission must confirm the slate of nominees selected by the conference.
3) The next hurdle for potential candidates is the voters’ meeting, convoked by the local communal assembly. A meeting can be held with any number of local voters present. The voters’ meeting discusses the list of nominees for the Social-Political Chamber of the Federal Assembly sent forward from the nomination conference, and may add its own nominees to the list. Each voter may move for the rejection of any nominee sent forward. Such a rejection must be seconded by at least nine persons at the voters’ meeting. If a majority vote by show of hands supports the rejection, a nominee is stricken from the list. Such a rejection is valid, however, only if one-tenth of all the locally registered voters participate in the voters’ meeting. The voters’ meeting also may select its own nominee, whose nomination is accepted if seconded by four citizens at the meeting.

Nominations for deputies to the corporate chambers are carried out in generally the same manner as those for deputies to the political chambers. Nominations for deputies to the Chamber of Nationalities are proposed by republic and provincial nomination conferences of SAWPY, which submit the lists to the communal nomination conferences. The communal conferences may not reject the lists but may add to them. Those nominees receiving at least one-third of the votes of all the communal nominating conferences in a republic or province become candidates for the Chamber of Nationalities.

D. National policies

President Tito, Yugoslavia’s undisputed leader, has forged a unique political structure, gradually discarding some of the more doctrinaire tenets of communism in favor of a more open, decentralized, participatory setup. The movement in this direction was dramatically accelerated in September 1970 when Tito—with an eye toward his eventual demise—called for the creation of a collective Presidency representing all interests and invited nationwide discussions of his proposal. (C)

The response was far broader than the then 78-year-old chief executive had expected. Tito’s invitation to talk about the implications of succession surfaced a wide variety of long-simmering demands for political reform, for greater republican and provincial autonomy, and for an extension of personal freedoms. The ensuing debates, arguments, and give-and-take have resulted in formal moves to adopt a far-reaching political reform that should streamline and revolutionize the Yugoslav system. (C)

The frank, open discussion of ideas and interests beyond those of the Communist party is far more akin to the public dialogues occurring in Western political life than to anything currently known in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. If Belgrade succeeds in its goal of creating a decentralized socialist state—one that takes for granted wide-ranging freedom of expression not only for individuals but for power groups such as trade unions—the impact on the Communist world will ultimately equal—if not surpass—that resulting from the Tito-Stalin break of 1948. Such a development probably would insure the continuation of a democratized Yugoslavia no longer dependent on Tito’s presence for survival. (C)

In its simplest terms the basic objectives underlying the domestic and foreign policies of the Yugoslav Communist regime are to maintain and develop the Yugoslav version of socialism, to maintain the country’s unity and independence, and to develop the national economy. To attain these goals Tito since the early 1950’s has pursued policies of decentralization of governmental and economic authority, combined with the development of economic and social affairs. In foreign affairs, Yugoslavia has attempted to maintain a nonaligned stance between Communist and non-Communist power blocs and aspires to a leading role among the world’s neutral nations. (C)

1. Domestic (S)

The major domestic political objectives of Yugoslav policy are to perpetuate the rule of the LCY, create a unique sovietist system, and in so doing to assure the survival of this system once Tito is gone.

Since 1952 the party has pursued these goals by a combination of policies designed to make the party’s rule effective, but not conspicuous, and to encourage social and economic innovation. The permissible limits of public discussion have expanded considerably, to a point not known anywhere else in the Communist world. Wide as the limits of public debate and intellectual life have become, however, they have not been allowed to extend to public questioning of the legitimacy of the LCY’s rule or the goals of socialism. Even the basic policies of the regime, however, undergo critical scrutiny and have been altered as a result of this criticism.

The purposeful decentralization of decisionmaking has not lessened Tito’s authority to make major decisions and to have them enforced. Whenever his position or policies have appeared endangered, either by liberals, republican nationalists, or Rankovac-style conservatives, Tito has been able to act decisively to preserve his power. Moreover, decentralization, while diffusing all power but Tito’s, has not lessened the party’s ultimate grip on the country. Instead, it has
helped foster the growth of a lively, and at times cutthroat, political life within the party, and it has helped obtain mass backing for the regime by allowing the public actively to participate in a carefully controlled political milieu.

Tito's policy of balancing between rival groups and factions has worked well for him, although it has created potential difficulties for his successors—as attested to by the Croatian and Serbian crises of December 1971. The system has depended heavily on his gifts as a leader and arbiter. In order to diffuse power, Tito has instituted the rotation in officeholding and has separated the holding of government and party functions. This policy, however, did not prevent the rise of republican nationalism within the ranks of the Croatian and Kosovo party organizations in 1971. The solution of the Croatian crisis necessitated Tito's personal intervention and the purge of more than 200 republican party and government officials.

Regional and nationalist frictions thus constitute the major obstacle to Tito's goal of rapidly revamping the system in order to insure its survival when he leaves the political scene. The interplay of government reforms, the nation's economic problems, and the freer political climate have contributed to surfacing deep-rooted bitter regional rivalries and nationality animosities. Dark events of the past have not been forgotten. During the Nazi occupation of World War II, for example, the Yugoslav peoples turned on each other with a vengeance. Hundreds of thousands of Croats and Serbs lost their lives in a civil war fought over fascism, communism, and national hatreds.

Yugoslavia's overall economic policy goal is to create a modern technological society which will produce an abundance of goods and rapidly raise the standard of living. As the vehicle for gaining this objective, the regime has created a mixed economic system which combines a relatively small amount of central planning and control with decentralized economic decisionmaking in a so-called free socialist market. The scheme is meant to increase economic efficiency by using the profit incentive to influence enterprise business decisions. Wage-leveling has been renounced in an effort to stimulate labor productivity.

Although workers councils were created in the early 1950's to decentralize economic decisionmaking, the main impetus for meaningful enterprise autonomy has come from the economic reforms instituted in July 1965. Under the reform program the federal government largely gave up its control of investment funds and investment decisionmaking. Contributions and taxes of various sorts levied against the enterprises were reduced or abolished, leaving more money in the hands of the workers councils and the newly independent banking enterprises to dispose of as they saw fit. A larger amount of private enterprise was encouraged in handicrafts and in catering to tourists.

The reform program's emphasis on profitability and economic rationality immediately clashed with the precarious condition of the many politically inspired but economically unsound factories in Yugoslavia. Such enterprises are prevalent in the underdeveloped regions of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Conversely, the reforms were welcomed by the more advanced areas of Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina. Demands for government intervention and protective tariffs soon poured in. The course of economic policy since 1965 has demonstrated that although Tito will continue to pursue reform, the need to combat unemployment, raise living standards, and protect infant industries (in order to avoid more unemployment) means that government intervention in the economy will continue indefinitely. The basic means of governmental control probably will continue to be monetary policy (with occasional reliance on fiscal controls), the indirect steering of major investment decisions, and indirect wage and salary limitations.

Yugoslav agricultural policy has consistently aimed at eventual complete collectivization, but the regime has renounced the use of coercion to achieve it. The break with the Cominform in 1948, severe droughts in 1949 and 1950, and Tito's need for peasant support caused a reappraisal of collectivization policies. Peasant resistance was so great by 1951 that the government suspended forced collectivization. Under a new policy peasants were allowed to leave the collectives, and the equipment and land which they owned previously were restored to them. Collectivization had never left less than about 73% of the arable land in private hands. About 85% of the land is now privately owned. A 10-hectare limit on private holdings is in force, although many peasants attempt to evade it.

The regime seeks to build socialism in the countryside by encouraging private peasants to cooperate with each other and with the remaining large cooperatives. The cooperative farms also slowly expand the socialist sector through purchases of land from the peasants, particularly the elderly, whose offspring have succumbed to the lure of the city.

Increased production has become a more important immediate objective than further collectivization. Policies designed to increase production include increased prices for farm products, greater mechanization (even if the farm machinery is privately owned).
more extensive use of fertilizers, land reclamation, and the use of better seeds, livestock, and pest controls.

The regime also has given high priority to the creation of an efficient educational system designed to indoctrinate students with socialist ideals, induce them to support the Titoist system, and develop the skills and talents needed by a modern economy. Although the commitment to free general education remains a basic regime policy, financial limitations on the part of both the state and the parents of many children have hindered fulfillment of this goal. Moreover, teaching assignments and the promotion of students have often been governed by party rather than educational criteria.

The policies of the government toward organized religious groups are characterized by an effort to reach an accommodation with them. The regime, having failed to stamp out religious influence in the immediate postwar years, now stresses the legal guarantees offered to the churches—as long as they refrain from critical public comment on the regime and its policies. Regime spokesmen periodically denounce increased church activity, especially in heavily Roman Catholic Slovenia and Croatia. The official view remains that religion is “spiritual backwardness and a delusion.” The regime is still determined to keep religious activities under the scrutiny of the state.

The Communists have allowed a growing amount of cultural freedom in Yugoslavia, although the mass communications media—the daily press, periodicals, radio and television, and the cinema, all of which are under party guidance—are supposed to foster the regime’s objective of “socializing” mass culture. The boundaries of the permissible have steadily expanded, and with this expansion has come an influx of Western influence. In Belgrade, for example, “Jesus Christ Superstar” opened to packed audiences in mid-1972. Whatever cultural policy guidance does exist is formulated and controlled in Belgrade and disseminated through various “cultural-educational” and “cultural-artistic” societies. The large role of the government and SAWPY in subsidizing book publishing and buying works of art helps the regime exert some control, although it has not been able to completely stop the publication of controversial works. For example, Miodrag Bulatovic’s novel A Hero on a Donkey, although banned from publication in 1966, was published by 1968.

The inclusion of all citizens in a comprehensive system of health protection, unemployment compensation, child allowances, accident insurance, disability payments, old-age and survivors pensions, and death benefits is a basic objective of the regime in the social welfare field.

The regime’s most difficult policy decisions concern nationality relations within Yugoslavia. Nationality antagonisms—specifically the Serb-Croat rivalry—have threatened President Tito’s efforts to build a system that will promote the survival of an independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia once Tito leaves the scene.

In its simplest form, the Yugoslav nationality problem has been a struggle by non-Serbs against Serbian hegemony. During the period between World Wars I and II, the monarchy treated Yugoslavia as an extension of greater Serbia. The suspicion and distrust resulting from that experience still color the outlook of many Yugoslav minorities—most particularly the Croats. At the close of World War II the Communists believed that the creation of a federal government of six republics and two provinces would solve the nationalities problem. The problem did in fact fade during the first two decades of Communist rule, but this was more the result of Tito’s leadership than the system. The upsurge of nationalism that rocked Croatia in 1971 as well as the purge in Serbia in October 1972 have set back Tito’s efforts to create a decentralized socialist state which would grant widespread freedom of expression. An LCY already shaken by the Croatian events was again rocked by Tito’s move against the Croatian leaders, whom many viewed as capable and mature politicians operating within the spirit of the reforms. Once again the party is looking for a way to enable the more than 15 nationalities within the Yugoslav borders to live and work together in harmony. The party, moreover, must recognize the paradox in its past attitude toward the nationalities: the encouragement of ethnic individuality works at cross-purposes with Yugoslav unity. As long as this paradox exists, nationality tensions will continue.

Local cultures are allowed to develop and, more important, the Communists have pledged to develop rapidly the economies of the underdeveloped areas. It is usually in these areas, with their many “political factories” (i.e., uneconomic enterprises established under political criteria) that opposition to economic reforms is strongest. Indeed, as part of their price for acquiescing to regime economic policy, the underdeveloped areas in the early days of the 1965 reforms forced the creation of a federal fund for investments in those regions. In the 1971 reforms, the underdeveloped areas again insisted that the federal government retain the powers to direct funds to these regions.
Most Slovenes and Croats do not support the extremist separatist tendencies voiced by some elements in Croatia in 1971. While demanding greater republic autonomy and resenting direction from Belgrade, they recognize that their national aspirations are not attainable outside the Yugoslav federation. Another national issue, and probably the most sensitive one, is the status of the Albanians living in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Having been long repressed by the Rankovic-dominated police, they are demanding improved living conditions. Nevertheless, the desire for continued union is general, fostered by the popular memory of the bloody civil war which accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1941.

Those regime policies which result in a freer or more prosperous personal life have been welcomed by most Yugoslavs. There is no widespread popular sentiment to return to the unitary state or economic system of the prewar era. Policies limiting the power of the secret police, increasing the availability of consumer goods, and giving even a limited amount of political choice, are generally well received. More mixed, and at times hostile, is the public perception of policies resulting in slower economic growth, unemployment, and inflation. These are likely to be received coldly and at times with outbursts of popular dissatisfaction manifested in strikes, popular criticism of the leadership, and occasionally, as in the case of students in Belgrade in June 1968, riots.

2. Foreign (S)

Yugoslav foreign policy has reflected the difficulties encountered by a small nation trying to maintain its independence. Although the rise of the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—has widened the stage of Yugoslav foreign policy from Europe to embrace the entire world, the Communist regime faces much the same geopolitical dilemmas as its royal predecessor. Yugoslavia traditionally has sought safety either under the wings of a more powerful patron or by balancing precariously between competing powers.

Yugoslav foreign policy has been described by President Tito as “active coexistence”; in practice, this means that Yugoslavia has avoided identifying itself formally with any political bloc. Convinced that Yugoslavia’s national interests—to remain independent and to prosper—can be best served in a general state of world peace, the regime has sought to establish good working relations with individual countries in both the Soviet and Western blocs and with neutral countries. Tito has argued that “bloc mentality” is an underlying cause of world tension and has defended Yugoslavia’s close ties with diverse countries and political movements by saying that advocates of peace and progress are not found only in one or another military-political camp. Active coexistence also means that Yugoslavia takes initiatives on world issues, both unilaterally and in conjunction with other neutral countries.

Foreign policy has been greatly influenced by the fluctuating status of relations with the Soviet Union. Whenever Tito believes that he is threatened from the Soviet side, he assiduously improves relations with the West, particularly the United States, and trumpets the doctrine of nonalignment. When relations with the U.S.S.R. are good, Tito increases criticism of the United States as the leader of “imperialist machinations” aimed at toppling “progressive” regimes. Since both the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies are of considerable importance to the Yugoslavs in their efforts to modernize their economy, Tito is continually involved in a balancing act meant to extract the maximum gain from both sides.

Yugoslavia has actively sought support for its position among most of the nations of the world, and has established a network of diplomatic missions far in excess of what one would expect of a small Balkan state. As of March 1972 Yugoslavia had diplomatic relations with 114 nations, although several of these did not have resident ambassadors. Tito has especially sought support among the newly emerging and underdeveloped states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Although Yugoslavia’s own economic underdevelopment militates against extensive economic relations with many of these countries, which have not developed into the lucrative markets Tito hoped for, their response to Yugoslavia as a fellow neutral has been substantial.

Prior to World War II Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was conditioned by European power relationships and the fear of the territorial claims of its neighbors. During the interwar period Yugoslavia joined Czechoslovakia and Romania in the Little Entente, a grouping aimed at forestalling Hungarian attempts to regain territories lost to the three allies. The patron of the Entente was France. By the mid-1930’s, however, Yugoslavia was oriented politically toward France and the United Kingdom but economically toward Germany and Italy. A side effect of Hitler’s triumph at Munich in 1938 was the gutting of the Little Entente. The attempt of Regent Paul to keep Yugoslavia out of World War II by granting the Axis concessions in March 1941 was undone by a military coup in
Belgrade later the same month. By mid-April Yugoslavia was overrun by Axis forces. Throughout World War II a royal government-in-exile in London followed an anti-Axis policy but was continually thwarted by strife among ethnic and religious groups in the homeland. The royal regime could not match the advantage of Tito’s Partisans of being on the scene within Yugoslavia, and the Communists, almost without Soviet aid, were able to seize power.

In the immediate postwar period, Tito’s foreign policy sought to fulfill traditional Yugoslav claims against Italy, Austria, and Bulgaria. Although Yugoslavia failed to gain territory in Carinthia from Austria, it did manage to make good its territorial claims against Italy in Istria. Soviet reluctance to give full backing to Belgrade’s claim to Trieste, as well as Tito’s plans for a South Slav federation, were important elements in the worsening of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which culminated in Yugoslavia’s expulsion in 1948 from the Cominform. The Trieste issue was finally settled in 1954, with Yugoslavia receiving the hinterland around the port while Italy regained the city itself.

Tito’s emphasis on Yugoslav independence and the ideological innovations of Yugoslavia’s Communists on the one hand, and Belgrade’s efforts to maintain good relations with Moscow and its client states on the other, have led to a series of ups and downs in relations with the U.S.S.R. From 1945 to 1948 relations were close but slowly deteriorating. The period 1948 to 1953 was one of extreme hostility, barely short of war. Moscow used economic pressure, attempted political infiltration, vituperative propaganda, and menacing military maneuvers in its attempt to bring down the Tito regime.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade in 1955 inaugurated a brief period of rapprochement between the two regimes. By 1958, however, differences over the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Yugoslavia’s continued “revisionism” had led to increasing mutual hostility. The latest era of good feeling between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. began in 1962 and came to a close in mid-1968. The rapprochement was marked by the closest Yugoslav-Soviet ties since 1948, although Tito retained complete independence of action. The first cooling of the new friendship followed the inauguration of the Yugoslav economic and social reforms in July 1965 and the ouster a year later of Rankovic. Despite Rankovic’s harsh repression of Cominformists after 1948, the Soviet leadership apparently regarded him as the most acceptable candidate to succeed Tito. Thinly veiled criticisms of the Yugoslav reforms appearing in the Soviet press were followed by increasingly pointed Yugoslav declarations of their intention to pursue their own path.

The slight cooling in relations with Moscow abruptly ceased in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. Tito rushed to Moscow to help give evidence of support for Egyptian President Nasir, whose political demise, coupled with the earlier political exits of such stalwarts of nonalignment as Nkrumah in Ghana, Sukarno in Indonesia, and Ben Bella in Algeria, Tito feared would wreck the policy of nonalignment. Soviet-Yugoslav relations became even closer: Yugoslav observers attended Warsaw Pact exercises; Soviet warships increased their visits to Yugoslav ports; and Tito increased his propaganda campaign, alleging a Western imperialist plot to overthrow regimes such as his. Even at the height of the rapprochement, however, Tito refused to move closer to the Soviet bloc in any formal way. The Yugoslavs stayed away from the European Communist conference at Karllov Vary in April 1967 and gave notice that they would not attend the world Communist conference then planned by the Soviet Union and subsequently held in Moscow in June 1969.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 ended that attempt at rapprochement. Tito believed that the leaders of the Czechoslovak reforms were kindred spirits and fully backed the Dubcek regime. The Yugoslavs went so far as to entertain hopes for close cooperation among Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Tito denounced the invasion and threatened armed resistance to any similar move against Yugoslavia, rejecting the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which asserts the duty of the U.S.S.R. to intervene in socialist countries it deems endangered by “reactionary” forces.

Soviet-Yugoslav relations remained cool until September 1971, when Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev paid an official visit to Yugoslavia. Neither side gave ground on the basic issues that separate them, but the visit did improve the atmosphere considerably, as did Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union in June 1971. The Soviets have cleared the atmosphere by granting sizable credits to the troubled Yugoslav economy and have generally avoided raising contentious issues in their dealings with Belgrade.

The periodic improvements in relations with the U.S.S.R. usually have taken place when Tito believed that Moscow was adopting his concept of independent Communist countries cooperating voluntarily and on an equal basis. Khrushchev’s acceptance after 1955 of Yugoslavia as a legitimate socialist country was an
important concession in Tito’s eyes. Tito’s revisionist
domestic policies, however, and his efforts to exert
significant, if often indirect, influence in the
Communist world, particularly Eastern Europe, have
usually met with a suspicious response from the
Soviets. Moscow has never fully overcome its
misgivings about the effect of Tito’s liberal
experiments on the rest of Eastern Europe.

Yugoslav relations with the other East European
states remain closely bound to the course of Belgrade’s
relations with Moscow. Yugoslavia’s closest associate
in the area since 1964 has been Romania. The driving
force behind this cooperation is their mutual fear
about Moscow’s hegemonic tendencies. The views
of Tito and Ceausescu, who were 80 and 54 years of
age respectively in 1972, further coincide in their oft-
expressed conviction that every Communist party and,
indeed, every nation is equal and the master of its own
house.

Committed to noninterference in the affairs of other
parties, the two Balkan states have demonstrated their
convictions by readiness to cooperate in resisting
Moscow’s will. Although Yugoslav-Romanian
cooperation predated the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
that event markedly increased their apprehensions and
broadened their community of interests. Numerous,
frequent consultations between Tito and Ceausescu as
well as their representatives underscore this closer
cooperation. These meetings usually have led to
agreement between the two leaders on most major
issues confronting the international Communist
movement.

Improved Yugoslav relations with Poland under
new party leader Edward Gierek culminated in Tito’s
visit to Warsaw in June 1972. Belgrade’s relations with
East Germany have remained frosty since the
occupation of Czechoslovakia. Relations with
Hungary have remained good, partially because of the
Hungarian regime’s obvious reluctance to take part in
the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and
Communist China, the Yugoslavs have remained
neutral. Sino-Yugoslav relations were not warm
throughout most of the 1960’s, but this did not prevent
Belgrade from defending China’s rights to formulate
its own policies. In November 1969 Belgrade and
Peking announced their intentions to exchange
ambassadors. The subsequent improvement in
relations has centered mainly on expanded economic
ties.

Yugoslavia’s relations with Albania have improved
considerably since the two exchanged ambassadors in
February 1971. Relations with Bulgaria appeared to
be on the mend in 1971 after renewed squabbling over
the Macedonian question in the late 1960’s. In the
case of Bulgaria, however, Sofia’s continued
reluctance to recognize the existence of an
independent Macedonian language, nation, and
culture, prevents any lasting, meaningful improve-
ment in relations.

Relations with Greece were very good until the
military coup in Athens in April 1967. Yugoslavia
attacked the ‘regime of the colonels’ in its press and
was outraged when the new Greek regime abrogated a
border traffic treaty. The Greeks in turn were
suspicious of Belgrade’s designs on Greek Macedonia,
which includes the area’s historical cultural center,
Thessaloniki. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
however, Greek-Yugoslav relations improved as the
Yugoslavs sought assurances for the safety of their
southern frontier.

Yugoslav relations with Western Europe are good.
The basic reason for Belgrade’s improved relations
with the West is Yugoslavia’s inability to reach a clear
understanding with the U.S.S.R. that the factors
which impelled Moscow to intervene in Czechoslo-
vakia are not applicable to Yugoslavia. Traditional
quarrels with Italy and Austria have been pushed into
the background. Since the break with the Cominform,
economic aid and trade from the West have made an
irreplaceable contribution to the development of
Yugoslavia’s economy, and its technology is based
primarily on equipment imported from Western
nations. As part of the economic reforms, the
Yugoslavs adopted a law in 1967 permitting private
foreign investment in Yugoslavia. Although the new
legislation has not attracted a great number of
Western investors, the Yugoslavs are hopeful that the
improving economic situation and continuing efforts
to heighten economic efficiency will bring more offers.
After nearly 2 years of uncontrolled inflation, the
Yugoslav economy has begun to show signs of
improvement. The United States and other Western
nations are providing the necessary assistance by
granting new hard currency credits and by
rescheduling existing debt repayments.

The most noticeable improvement in Yugoslav
relations with a West European nation has been with
West Germany. Relations with Bonn had been
troubled by a dispute over Yugoslav recognition of
East Germany in 1957, which caused the West
Germans to break off diplomatic relations, and by the
West Germans’ refusal to pay certain war indemnity
claims. In January 1968 diplomatic relations were

\footnote{For discrepancies on place names see the list of names at the end of
the chapter.}
restored. The West Germans agreed to grant the Yugoslavs credits to approximately the amount of the indemnity and also to enter into negotiations for an agreement to regulate the status of the thousands of Yugoslav workers temporarily employed in West Germany. West German willingness to crack down on various anti-Tito emigre organizations in the Federal Republic also helped improve mutual relations. As of mid-1972, however, war reparations remained the one outstanding issue marring the otherwise good relations between Belgrade and Bonn.

Because of the position of the United States as the strongest economic and military power in the world and its usefulness as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union, Tito has been sensitive to his relations with Washington. Periods of close alignment of Yugoslavia’s policies with those of the Soviet Union have occasionally threatened, but failed to interrupt, Belgrade’s efforts to maintain the good relations with the United States that have developed since the early 1950’s. U.S. complaints over sometimes virulent anti-American propaganda in the Yugoslav press have usually been met with the argument that Yugoslavia and the United States should not allow different points of view about world events to cloud their mutual friendship.

Nevertheless, Yugoslav-American relations have mainly suffered when the Yugoslavs have considered it necessary in the interest of their own!! foreign policy objectives to criticize U.S. actions around the world. After the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, the Tito regime launched a propaganda campaign alleging that the United States was leading an “imperialist counteroffensive” against all progressive regimes, including Tito’s. An officially inspired spy scare, which included accusations of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in espionage in Yugoslavia, accompanied the propaganda barrage. In Zagreb in December 1967 and in Belgrade in April 1968 regime-inspired demonstrations were directed against U.S. diplomatic installations.

Yugoslavia has been particularly critical of U.S. actions in Vietnam, claiming that the United States has played into the hands of the Communist Chinese by forcing the Soviet Union to come to the aid of a “fellow socialist state” (North Vietnam) that was under attack by “an imperialist power.”

Further irritants to U.S.-Yugoslav relations were the Congressional decision to exclude Yugoslavia from eligibility for purchase of surplus agricultural commodities under the provisions of Public Law 180 and Washington’s refusal to reschedule Yugoslav debt payments for 1967. Belgrade protested that both moves undermined its efforts at economic reform and hinted that they were a form of pressure on Yugoslavia to adopt viewpoints on international events more pleasing to the United States. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito’s hopes for more financial aid from the United States rose again as he portrayed Yugoslavia as a potential victim of Soviet economic pressure; later in 1968 Washington agreed to reschedule Yugoslav debt payments due in 1969.

By 1970 U.S.-Yugoslav relations were greatly improved. President Nixon became the first U.S. President to visit Yugoslavia when he stopped there from 30 September to 2 October 1970. The following year, in September, Tito paid his first official visit to the United States. Yugoslavia welcomed the U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Soviet summits of 1972, but with the qualification that these newly developed relationships should not be allowed to be detrimental to the small nations of the world.

Tito’s effort to maintain good working relations with both the Soviet and U.S. power blocs coincides with his emphasis on nonalignment as the basis of Yugoslav foreign policy. The Yugoslav leader, although denying that he seeks to mold a third, nonaligned bloc, has long asserted that the uncommitted nations can and should play a significant role in international affairs, provided that they coordinate their actions on major issues. Since the mid-1950’s Yugoslavia has steadily promoted efforts to develop such coordination. The Yugoslavs owe a great deal to nonalignment, since it has given the nation influence and prestige in the third world far beyond its size and power. Moreover, psychologically, nonalignment has made it more difficult for Moscow to bring overt pressure on Belgrade to rejoin the Communist bloc.

As originally defined, the doctrine of nonalignment included the concepts of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social and economic systems, solutions of international problems through the United Nations, and opposition to colonialism. Emphasis was placed on the independence and equality of all states, with each state free from external interference. Voluntary cooperation would provide collective security.

Nonalignment originally meant that its adherents belonged to no power bloc or military alliance, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact. Since the early 1960’s Tito has theorized that the great power blocs are in the process of dissolution. French policies toward NATO and Romania’s attempt to achieve de facto independence
within the Warsaw Pact are cited as proof of this thesis.

The belief that the breakup of the power blocs was close at hand in 1967 and 1968 led the Yugoslavs to refine the doctrine of nonalignment to account for the changed situation. The definition of nonalignment was altered to embrace all "progressive forces," regardless of their membership in a bloc. This redefinition had the virtue of sanctioning Tito's attempt to engage other socialist states more directly in the struggles of the nonaligned world against the "imperialist offensive."

The expanded concept of nonalignment also fit well with Yugoslavia's increased interest in Western Europe. Belgrade's attempts to sell nonalignment in Europe have met with only limited success. Beginning in 1966 the Yugoslavs have sporadically, but unsuccessfully, attempted to convene a pan-European interparliamentary meeting. They also were among the first proponents of the Rome conference of "progressive movements" held in April 1968. Belgrade had hoped that, by securing at this meeting the attendance of both Communist and non-Communist organizations, the conference would serve as an example of nonaligned principles in action. Instead, the Yugoslavs found their initiative seized by the Italian Communists and the meeting dominated by Communist and extreme leftwing elements. The Yugoslavs revealed their disenchantment by refusing to sign the meeting's final communique because it failed to call for the withdrawal of both the Soviet and U.S. fleets from the Mediterranean, a statement desired by the Yugoslavs because of their alarm over the increase in Soviet naval strength in the area.

In September 1971, after months of Yugoslav prodding, the third nonaligned summit was held in Lusaka, Zambia. Belgrade began preparing for the nonaligned summit as early as 1968, and the push coincided with renewed Yugoslav concern over Soviet motives toward Eastern Europe. Prior to the 1971 Lusaka summit, two of Tito's major efforts to show the world the vitality of nonalignment were the nonaligned conferences which he arranged in Belgrade in 1961, and in Cairo in 1964. It was not until 1971, however, that Tito was able to attract interest in Latin America. Eleven nations from Central and South America attended the Lusaka summit as observers, but only Cuba had a full-fledged delegate. Continued Latin American interest in nonalignment was reflected at the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972. Belgrade was represented by Foreign Minister Tepavac, who used the forum to express Yugoslav interest in the creation of permanent nonaligned bodies. Tepavac's statement was a reversal of Belgrade's previous position against the institutionalization of the movement.

Foreign trade policy is geared to foster the rapid industrialization and modernization of the country, and one of Yugoslavia's greatest fears is that of being frozen out of its traditional markets by the policies of the European Economic Community (EC) and the Soviet-dominated CEMA. To counter this danger, Yugoslavia, in the fall of 1968, became the first Eastern European nation to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with the EC. In September 1964 Belgrade secured an agreement for limited participation—as an observer—in CEMA. Yugoslavia also is an associate member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a full member of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

As in domestic policy, popular acceptance of foreign policies depends heavily on their effect on the material well-being and personal freedom of the individual Yugoslav. Such measures as the abolition of rigorous frontier and foreign travel controls are well received, as are trade policies designed to add to the supply of consumer goods and thus raise the standard of living. For most Yugoslavs, particularly those in Slovenia and Croatia, policies which emphasize good relations with the West are preferable to those which tighten relations with the Soviet Union.

Tito's penchant for personal intervention in foreign policy decisions and his pride of authorship of the doctrine of nonalignment invest foreign policy with great sensitivity in Yugoslavia. Previously, public criticism of the usefulness to Yugoslavia of a policy of non-alignment, or its continued viability, was considered public criticism of Tito himself, something that was almost never done. Since the mid-1960's, however, public discussion of foreign policy has been encouraged by SAWPY, although most of the discussion is superficial and is aimed at creating the illusion of public support for policy decisions that have already been taken. Some Yugoslavs have questioned the necessity for Tito's grandiose foreign policies and the usefulness to Yugoslavia of his expensive foreign trips and farflung diplomatic establishment, but such views are not publicized. Tito's sometimes abrupt interventions in foreign policy decisionmaking, such as his hasty decision to go to Moscow in the wake of the Arab defeat of June 1967, also have encountered criticism within the party, reportedly much to his discomfort. Tito's extreme pro-Arab stand has not been popular in Yugoslavia. Conversely, Yugoslavia's
internationalism is obviously a source of pride for most Yugoslavs.

Tito’s use of the idea of nonalignment, despite that doctrine’s shaky premises, has resulted in a net gain for Yugoslavia. His policies have secured diplomatic and moral support for his country, furnished Belgrade with diplomatic maneuvering room for its balancing act between East and West, and have made Yugoslavia important out of all proportion to its actual size and power.

3. National defense (5)

Yugoslavia’s success in making credible its determination to resist any invader by force of arms has been a major mainstay of its independent domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the role of the Yugoslav military as a buttress to foreign policy, as well as a major force for national unity at home, places the armed forces—and their indirect political influence—in a special position vis-à-vis national policy as a whole, a position in sharp contrast to that of the military in other Communist states.

It has been Tito’s consistent policy to maintain a sufficiently strong military capability to discourage aggression against Yugoslavia from any quarter, while shunning military commitments to either major power bloc. In general, the policy of balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is pursued in defense matters. From 1963 to 1968, however, the rapprochement with the Soviets was soon accompanied by increased military contacts. During that period, due mainly to economic considerations and nonavailability elsewhere, the Soviets became almost the sole supplier of modern heavy or expensive military equipment to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav-Soviet military relations became particularly amicable after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, but quickly ceased following the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia.

In August 1968 Yugoslav defenses shifted from concern about an “imperialist offensive” from the West to the danger of invasion from the East. By the end of 1968, Yugoslav fears of an immediate Soviet attack had passed, and the army returned to its pre-August status. Belgrade moved cautiously to maintain both its independence and correct contacts with Moscow, and the Soviets did not terminate their deliveries of military equipment.

Yugoslav determination to resist a possible Soviet move, however, remained undaunted. In December 1968 the regime proposed the policy of total mobilization to resist invasion, a defense strategy that has become known as “all-people’s defense.” Under this program, all Yugoslavs between the ages of 16 and 65 may be assigned specific responsibilities. The first real test of this defense strategy was highly successful, according to reports on the “Freedom ‘71” joint army-all people’s defense exercise held in September 1971.

In addition to its military defense role, the army also has important educational and economic tasks. Political indoctrination stressing the unique features of the Yugoslav federation is an important part of training. Armed services technical schools help provide such personnel as medical technicians. The army is a source of cheap labor for the construction of roads, railroads, and public works, and performs important rescue and relief duties in cases of natural disaster. The army also is used as a symbol of national unity and to inculcate in its personnel a belief in the “brotherhood and unity” of the Yugoslav nationalities. This aspect of policy was somewhat undermined by the decision taken in late 1967 to allow 25% of all conscripts to do their military service in their home republic.

Until the start of the economic reforms in July 1965, the army had been the pampered pet of the Tito regime. The financial retrenchment accompanying the economic reforms was accompanied by the first overt criticism in the Federal Assembly of the high level of defense spending. The military did not get all that it asked for in the 1967 and 1968 budgets, although a large supplemental appropriation was added to the defense budget in late 1968 to pay for that year’s partial mobilization.

Despite the grumbling in parliament about defense costs, most Yugoslavs probably approve the policy of maintaining a large defense establishment. Memories of fighting four wars and facing two invasions since 1900 have reconciled the man in the street to conscription. Increasing prosperity has not led to more complaints about compulsory military service, but has reduced the influx of career volunteers from Slovenia and Croatia. This has prevented the regime from achieving the national balance it seeks in the officer corps, since recruiting is not difficult in Serbia and Montenegro, where prosperity is less widespread and the military profession is traditionally held in high esteem.

The new criticism of defense spending coincided with the beginning of important changes in the nature of the army. Communist leadership of the national resistance during World War II had insured a tight interconnection between the army and the party. Many Communists who became important party and government officials after 1945 had achieved high rank in the Partisan army, upon which the new army was to be built. For example, Tito himself emerged
from the war a marshal; Koca Popovic, a wartime Partisan general and Chief of General Staff from 1945 until 1953, later served as Federal State Secretary for Foreign Affairs for 12 years until 1965. Over the years, however, the proportion of wartime Partisan officers still on active service has steadily declined; by 1967 postwar cadres comprised about 60% of the officer corps. As in many aspects of Yugoslav life, a generation gap is also developing within the armed forces. Those who hold the most powerful positions, such as Federal State Secretary for National Defense, General Ljubieic, and Chief of General Staff, Gen. Milos Sumonja, are ex-Partisans. But an increasing number of lower ranking officers are postwar career men who have a somewhat different outlook from that of their seniors. The younger men are often less ideologically motivated, even though party members, and more inclined to view themselves as professionals, pledged to fight for Yugoslavia, not necessarily for the party.

During the investigation which furnished the evidence to sanction Rankovic's downfall, there were indications that Rankovic and his lieutenants had attempted to widen their influence in the army. Some Serbian generals, including Milivoj Milojovic, who was forced into retirement in late 1965 or early 1966, probably had close ties to the Rankovic group. This example of Serbian chauvinism in the military may have increased Tito's resolve to dump Rankovic. Despite occasional signs of clashes of viewpoint, there is complete loyalty to Tito within the military. This loyalty was an important element in Tito's relatively easy ouster of Rankovic in 1966 and his purge of the Croatian party leadership in 1971.

The years 1967 and 1968 saw several signs that the Yugoslav liberals who helped bring down Rankovic were attempting to insure friendly control of the armed forces after Tito's eventual demise. A reorganization of the LCY in the armed forces in early 1969 attempted to bring the structure and role of the party in the military apparatus more in line with the organization and function of the party as a whole, as established at the Ninth Congress of the LCY. Party discipline—about 93% of the officers and 76% of the noncommissioned officers are party members—and a series of pay increases since 1965 have helped keep the army generally apolitical. The armed forces remain aware, however, of their continued indirect importance to national stability, and of the potential increase in their unifying role after Tito's demise.

The national defense law of February 1969 established a two-tiered defense force and gave the concept of all-people's defense its legal basis. Great emphasis is placed on the principle of the "nation in arms," with both men and women liable for defense duties. Everyone between the ages of 16 and 65 is required to undergo training in military tactics, first aid, and the use of weapons and the strategy of collective defense. With the extension of all-people's defense throughout Yugoslavia the regime builds the image of the military and populace united in defense of the homeland, and confronts the enemy with a formidable force, at least in terms of sheer numbers.

Creation of an effective civil defense organization is an integral part of the Yugoslav adoption of the all-people's defense concept. Under the 1969 law on national defense heavy emphasis is placed on the civil defense obligations of all citizens.

Although the old 1955 law on national defense provided for an organized civil defense program, large-scale preparations and mass public instruction in civil defense techniques did not begin in earnest until about 1963. The campaign was stepped up in 1967 after the military coup in Greece and the Arab-Israeli war, and it intensified after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Civil defense comes under the jurisdiction of an Assistant Federal State Secretary for National Defense and the secretariat's Administration for Civil Defense. Each republic also has a secretariat for national defense with responsibilities in civil defense. The basic civil defense organs are at the communal level, where each commune formulates a civil defense plan based on the policies contained in directives from higher levels.

There is a civil defense school in Belgrade offering courses in such subjects as defense against atomic, biological, and chemical warfare; medical and veterinary services; and organization and tactics of civil defense. Graduates are expected to improve civil defense in their localities and to overcome popular apathy. Successful completion of civil defense and paramilitary training courses is mandatory in order to receive a degree at a Yugoslav university. The SAWPY, LCY, army, economic enterprises, and secondary schools all cooperate in civil defense instruction and propaganda.

Every Yugoslav from ages 16 to 65 is liable for civil defense service and is supposed to receive instruction in first aid, fire fighting, and atomic, biological, and chemical warfare protection. Courses include theoretical detail on types and effects of nuclear bombs and on chemical and bacteriological warfare, as well as instruction on how to survive an atomic attack, how to build a radiation-proof bunker, and how to perform personal decontamination. Yugoslav
civil defense doctrine calls for evacuation of cities and towns in case of attack. No large-scale program to construct urban shelters has been undertaken.

The basic Yugoslav defensive strategy within the context of all-people's defense is to use the more heavily armed “operational forces” to defend temporarily the frontiers and to conduct an orderly and fighting retreat into the mountains. Defense strategy is kept as flexible as possible, however, and could allow initial defense well inside the frontiers in some areas. The general aim is to prevent the enemy from achieving a quick victory and hopefully to put his armed forces in a difficult military and psychological position when his technical and numerical superiorities do not yield the expected victory. Theoretically, enough time will be gained to transport necessary government personnel and records into the mountain redoubt and for the activation of partisan units. Although coordination through the supreme command in Belgrade is intended to keep these units from becoming republic armies, i.e., committed only to regional interests—some officers, particularly those who denigrate the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare or who fear excessive decentralization of the Yugoslav system, have opposed the scheme on the ground that it would foster regional separatism.

Yugoslav military leaders have no illusions about their ability to defend successfully all of the country against an invasion by a major power and realize that most of the plains and major industrial areas probably would fall into enemy hands. Once secure in the mountains, however, the retreating operational army and the partisan units would cooperate in operations against the enemy. Under the Yugoslav Constitution, no one, including the chief of state, may sign an act of capitulation to an invader.

E. Threats to government stability (C)

1. Discontent and disidence

The flexibility with which the Tito regime has approached Yugoslavia's multitude of problems has instilled an element of popular trust. The regime has succeeded in creating the image of genuine willingness to listen to domestic criticisms and to meet objections if they appear valid. This process of give-and-take, which has become the Yugoslav modus operandi in the 1960's and early 1970's, has kept popular discontent and disidence at a minimum.

There is popular dissatisfaction over the government's failure to deal with rampant inflation and to meet increasing worker appetites for consumer goods, but at no time has this irritation seriously threatened the regime. In general, there is a recognition of and pride in the strides postwar Yugoslavia has made. Moreover, Tito has kept his finger on the pulse of the nation through popular opinion polls and frequent contacts with special-interest groups. Tito also permits a number of safety valves for inipient popular discontent, including work stoppages, and considerable freedom for the trade unions and writers' organizations to voice the complaints of their constituents.

Tito's intentions are generally respected by the people and his grasp of the situation, despite his advanced age, is good. This does not prevent complaints about his solutions to substantive problems, and Tito is still faced with the problem of gaining widespread popular support for the system he has built.

The regime is aware that there are several important weaknesses in the political, economic, and social fabric of the nation. First and most important are the nationality rivalries with their underlying threat of separatism. The Communists, who led the Partisan resistance in World War II under the banner of “brotherhood and unity,” believed, perhaps naively, that the creation of a federal government of six republics and two provinces at the close of World War II would solve the nationality disputes. More than a generation later, however, the search for a Yugoslav national identity which will permit the country's more than 15 nationalities to live and work together in harmony, is still going on.

Economic problems in recent years have severely complicated matters. Enmities will persist as long as there are economic disparities between the different regions of Yugoslavia. The federal government recognizes this and has been, as a clearing house for redistributing capital from richer to poorer regions in an effort to close the gap between the “haves” and “have nots.” This policy has had only minor success, creating as many problems as it has resolved. Economically advanced republics such as Croatia complain loudly that they are being bled dry of the investment resources and foreign exchange needed to modernize and expand their own industrial plant. Even so, the provinces and the republics that do get the money are dissatisfied.

The differing socioeconomic backgrounds, the disparity in natural resources, and the varying rates of population growth further complicate the nationality question and remain a major source of discontent for the immediate future. There is also a basic contradiction in the national policy intended to close
the income gap between the richer north and poorer south: the political objective of closing the gap conflicts with the economic goal of achieving a more efficient, stable economy. The result is a compromise and not much progress toward either objective.

There are forces at work, however, which augur well for overcoming the nationality problem. Social mobility and, to a lesser extent, internal migration stemming from rapid industrialization are chipping away at regional prejudices. This process of national fusion is slow, but it has been speeded up since the end of World War II and ultimately could save national unity.

Another vital factor that bears upon stability in the country is the length of Tito’s tenure. There is a widespread but natural uncertainty about who and what will follow his passing. Sporadic, but evident popular concern over Tito’s health has inevitably raised the question of whether “Titoism” as a system can survive the man. The whole question of succession and of possible Soviet attempts to use this period to encourage Yugoslavia to return to the Communist bloc has created an undercurrent of uneasiness.

A number of minor irritants arise from time to time. Petty scandals involving embezzlement of enterprise funds, lavish weekend cottages, and privileges due to party position are a fairly frequent occurrence. Moreover, the “new class” of party and government bureaucrats demonstrates arrogant, exclusive social attitudes; government bureaucrats in particular treat their social inferiors in a classically patronizing manner.

Another factor of potential instability is the generation gap in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav youth want a say in the future of their country. They are impatient for the material benefits of the West, but are not well disposed toward capitalism as a system. On the other hand, the almost daily exposure of graft in Yugoslavia, as well as chronic housing shortages and high unemployment, tend to alienate them from the self-managing system. There is considerable official concern about the nation’s youth; the third party conference scheduled for early 1972 was to be devoted to this problem.

Although the Catholic and Orthodox churches have reached a sometimes uneasy modus vivendi with the regime, both are basically opposed to Communist rule. The Serbian church is outraged at the regime’s support for the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which the Serbs regard as schismatic. Although relations between the regime and the Roman Catholic Church have improved greatly, some Catholic priests reportedly still sympathize with subversive emigree organizations. One of the main elements in the Vatican-Yugoslav agreement of 1966 to resume diplomatic relations was the Vatican’s pledge to disavow and curb the subversive activities of emigree priests. The resurgence of religious practice in Croatia is largely a result of the traditional close links between Croatian nationalism and Roman Catholicism.

The growth of liberal tendencies among segments of the intellectual and student communities, particularly at the universities in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, also has alarmed the regime. Although the liberal intellectuals back the regime’s reforms, some of them wish to carry the reforms further than Tito has envisaged, even to the point of calling for the creation of a multiparty system. As long as the more moderate reformists remain dominant within the LCY, the ultraliberals probably will grumble at the pace of the reform, but remain nonsubversive. Should the conservatives regain control of the party machinery, however, the ultraliberals might become more forceful in their methods of dissent. In general, however, the relative freedom in the intellectual community has successfully prevented the rise of academic malcontents. Failure to provide jobs and improved housing for young college graduates, however, has become a source of irritation.

2. Subversion

The Yugoslav Government has had to cope with a great deal of subversive activity instigated both within the country and abroad. The amount of such activity has generally been greater than that encountered in any other Balkan nation. On coming to power in 1945, the regime used police-state methods to quickly eliminate most anti-Communist groups and their leaders. By 1948, following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, it was sufficiently entrenched to withstand Soviet efforts at subversion. The government has effectively continued to combat subversion, and has felt strong enough to allow a great deal of intellectual freedom as well as freedom of movement to its citizens.

National rivalries and traditional antipathies within the ethnically diverse Yugoslav state provide the greatest potential for subversion. Almost from the foundation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the central government has been threatened by the activities of dissident ethnic groups. Fueled by conflicting ethnic claims, national antagonisms have reappeared and grown alarmingly since the early 1960’s. Most divisive is the rivalry between the Western-oriented, Roman Catholic, and more
economically advanced Croats and Slovenes, and the Orthodox, more traditionally Balkan, less advanced Serbs.

The national aspirations of the Croats were partially fulfilled by the formation of an independent state of Croatia under Axis tutelage during 1941-45. Ante Pavelic, the leader of the Croatian Fascist Ustaš organization, headed the short-lived state. A bloody civil war between Croats and Serbs accompanied the 4-year struggle against the Axis occupiers and revived the tradition of guerrilla fighting. The struggle soon produced a confusing welter of Croatian and Serbian nationalist, Communist, royalist, and quisling units.

A large part of the total population became active in two well-organized resistance movements—the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (popularly known as Chetniks), under Gen. Draza Mihailovic, Minister of War of the royal government-in-exile, and the Communist-led partisans under Josip Broz Tito (Tito was originally his Partisan name). The partisans became the strongest force in the country and established themselves in power. In 1946, Mihailovic was captured and executed, and within a few years the Communist regime had stamped out all organized resistance. A number of hostile persons, including Pavelic, managed to escape to the West, however, at the end of World War II.

Subversive activities against the Tito regime are for the most part apparently planned abroad and executed either abroad or by emigres infiltrated into Yugoslavia. The emigre organizations attempt to play on the anti-Communist and nationalist sentiments of those in the homeland.

These organizations exist throughout Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and North America, particularly in Austria, West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Sweden, Canada, and the United States. Every major Yugoslav nationality is represented. Usually composed of those who fled Communist rule during the early postwar years, the emigre groups have made great efforts to recruit followers among the large number of Yugoslavs temporarily working in Western Europe. Most of those who have infiltrated Yugoslavia to perform terrorist acts have been recruited in the West. Domestically initiated subversive activity generally is limited to isolated individuals and small groups which occasionally distribute propaganda clandestinely or scrawl antiregime slogans on walls.

Although the efforts of many of the emigre organizations are limited to clandestine distribution of antiregime propaganda, some of them engage in terrorism. In 1968, Croatian emigre organizations were responsible for three explosions in the Belgrade railway station and one in a movie theater, resulting in one death and many injuries. Until then, such terrorism had been directed mainly against Yugoslav installations abroad. Sometime in 1968, however, a shift in tactics occurred and Yugoslav officials became targets. In June of that year the chief of the Yugoslav military mission in West Berlin was critically wounded by gunfire. On 10 February 1971 the Yugoslav consulate in Goteborg, Sweden, was occupied by terrorists who unsuccessfully attempted to ransom its occupants for US$100,000 and the release of a fellow terrorist, then on trial in Yugoslavia. The Goteborg incident was followed by the assassination of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Boloviche, in April 1971. In January 1972 a bomb planted on a Yugoslav airliner en route from Stockholm to Belgrade exploded over Czechoslovakia, causing a crash that took 27 lives. In July 1972 a group of 19 emigre terrorists infiltrated into Bosnia and Hercegovina and tried to incite armed rebellion. The attack failed, but the incident shook Yugoslav security forces and has led to a tightening of border security. Although the leaders of this group were Yugoslav emigrants living in Australia and were members of the “Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood,” most others were guest workers who had left Yugoslavia within more recent years to seek employment in Austria and Germany. Late in 1972, three other Croatian terrorists skyjacked a Swedish airliner and obtained the temporary release of the assassins of Ambassador Boloviche, taking them to Spain.

Of the numerous emigre, nationalist, subversive organizations, the Croatian groups are the most vocal and active. One of the most notorious is the Croatian National Committee (HNO) headquartered in West Berlin. The HNO was founded in 1951 by Branko Jelic, following a quarrel with Ustaš leader Ante Pavelic. Frustrated by the marked improvement in Yugoslav ties with the West, Jelic claimed to have sought Soviet support for a free and independent Croatia, a claim that carried with it implication of Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs. Before his ties to the Soviets could be proved or disproved, however, Jelic suddenly died in May 1972, throwing the HNO leadership into disarray. In September 1972, Dr. Ivan Jelic, the brother of Branka and reportedly somewhat more moderate, became the president of the HNO.

A second group is the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP), formed by Ante Pavelic in 1957 following several years of squabbling between Ustaš factions. It is headquartered in Argentina. Following
Pavelic's death in 1959, HOP came under the leadership of Dr. Svetlana Hufner.

The Croatian National Resistance is a quasi-military organization having branches throughout the Western World. The Australian branch has emerged as the dominant wing of this organization under the leadership of Srebro Rovic. A second Australian-based organization is the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB). This organization's main goal is to infiltrate terrorist groups into Yugoslavia and to carry out attacks on Yugoslav diplomatic posts. HRB's existence was not known until 1968. Before that time it carried out terrorist strikes against Yugoslavia from secret bases in West Germany.

The only subversive Slovene organization which may be active is the Organization of Slovene Anti-Communists. In December 1962, three members of this group were tried and sentenced in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, for subversive activities, which may have included planning an assassination attempt against Aleksandar Rankovic. According to the Yugoslav Government, the three defendants previously had belonged to the pro-Fascist Home Guard Organization. They were also alleged to have received supplies and orders from Slovene emigres in West Germany. Three more alleged members of the Organization of Slovene Anti-Communists were tried and sentenced in Ljubljana in March 1964. One of the defendants was caught while attempting to enter the country from Austria, and the other two were apparently already in Yugoslavia. Subversive activities in Slovenia and Ljubljana since 1964 generally have been confined to the dissemination of propaganda and have been carried out by the students at the University of Ljubljana.

There are a great number of Serbian emigre groups, particularly in the United States and France. One such organization was responsible for the bombing in January 1967 of the Yugoslav consulates in San Francisco and Chicago, and the embassy in Washington. Most Serbian emigre organizations have close ties to the emigre Serbian Orthodox Church, which in many cases does not recognize the authority of the patriarch in Belgrade. In the United States, some of the emigres have given allegiance to Archbishop Dionisije of Libertyville, Illinois. Several Serbian emigre groups, such as the Serbian National Defense Council, led by Slobodan Draskovic, have their headquarters in Chicago.

Because of the clandestine character of the subversive groups and organizations, it is impossible to gage their strength. Several have demonstrated that they have (at least outside Yugoslavia) a functioning organization which is capable of committing acts of terrorism both within and outside their homeland. Some organizations publish newspapers and propagandize other emigres by radio. Money is plentiful, with contributions coming from outside Yugoslavia. Rich emigre businessmen apparently are willing to donate large amounts.

Yugoslav authorities have been effective in combating subversion. Although the effectiveness of the secret police has been somewhat undermined by the purges and reorganizations since July 1966, it is able to cope with emigre activities. The regime is sensitive to the efforts of the emigres, and both the military and civilian intelligence services are targeted toward them. Most of the would-be terrorists are caught shortly after entering Yugoslavia and before they can do serious harm.

Other factors undermining the emigres' efforts at subversion include the grudging respect Tito has earned since 1948, the support given his regime by the U.S. and U.K. Governments since 1949, and the regime's success in raising the standard of living of the Yugoslav people.

There appears to be high correlation between economic hardships and the incidence of domestic subversion. There was a rash of expensive industrial fires in Slovenia and Croatia in 1967, one of the leanest years during the economic reform. More recently, the Croatian emigres took advantage of the relaxed political climate in Yugoslavia in 1970 and 1971 to flood Croatia with separatist propaganda.

Although subversive threats from foreign governments have subsided in recent years, Belgrade is still wary of the potential for meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs by Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the first Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement in 1957-58, Albania, which had been forced by the Soviets to moderate its policies toward the hated and feared Yugoslavs, quickly returned to a sharply anti-Yugoslav stance. Albania's siding with Communist China as the Sino-Soviet split deepened further insured that Tirane would remain hostile to the Yugoslavs. This animosity continued through most of the 1960's, but moderated somewhat after the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia, which was opposed by Yugoslavia, China, and Albania.

Albania's ability to trouble Yugoslavia stems not from any affinity among the Albanians in Yugoslavia with the rigorous regime of Enver Hoxha, but rather from their nationalist aspirations. Despite Tirane's expressions of satisfaction over the conditions of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, Belgrade is concerned over Hoxha's failure to renounce his role as champion of
Albanian nationalism. Concentrated in Kosovo, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were repressed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav secret police, under Rankovic’s command, with considerable brutality. The improvement in the status of Albanians after Rankovic’s fall however, has not fully met their demands. Moreover, the Albanians’ demands have stirred resentment among many Serbs, who retain a romantic attachment to Kosovo as the center of the medieval Serbian empire.

Like Albania, Bulgaria in 1957 began again to disseminate propaganda with irredentist overtones—in this case pressing its claims to Macedonia. This propaganda increased to such a point that in October 1957 Belgrade officially protested Bulgaria’s “open and rude interference” in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs and “hostile actions against the integrity of Yugoslavia and the unity of its peoples.” Bulgaria practically ended its propaganda campaign in 1961, but friction over Macedonia continued from time to time until Tito’s visit to Sofia in 1965 put Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations on a more friendly basis.

Polemics over Macedonia broke out again in early 1968, when the Bulgarians celebrated the 90th anniversary of the short-lived Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which had awarded most of Macedonia to Bulgaria. Mutual recriminations over Macedonia heightened as Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations plummeted to rock bottom following the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Only in early 1972 were there again signs of improvement between Sofia and Belgrade. Plainly, however, as long as Bulgaria regards Macedonians as Bulgarians and attempts to speak for them, the Yugoslavs will consider Sofia as bent on sowing dissunity in Yugoslavia.

There is little concrete evidence that the U.S.S.R. is conducting subversive activities against Yugoslavia. After the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, the Tito regime became apprehensive about such a possibility. Many Yugoslavs believe that the Soviets are behind the Bulgarian irredentist press campaign. Protests in the Yugoslav press in January 1969 about antiregime, nationalist propaganda from abroad directed at the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina revealed the Yugoslav concern that the U.S.S.R. might play on the nationality problem to bring pressure on Tito to moderate his domestic reforms and end opposition to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. In December 1971 there were unconfirmed reports of Soviet meddling in the Croatian crisis.

F. Maintenance of internal security

The responsibility for intelligence and security in Yugoslavia rests with the federal and republic secretariats for internal affairs as well as the Federal State Secretariats for National Defense and Foreign Affairs (Figure 6). The supervisory leadership of the intelligence and security services interlocks with both the leadership of the Federal Executive Council and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The mission of the Yugoslav intelligence and security services is to protect and perpetrate the regime and to engage in those intelligence activities abroad deemed essential to the protection of Yugoslav interests and the security of the Yugoslav state. Although the security and intelligence services are well able to fulfill their mission, they have still not fully recovered from the purges they underwent following the ouster in 1966 of Aleksandar Rankovic, then Vice President of Yugoslavia and Secretary of the LCY Central Committee. Some of the Rankovic men who were retired in 1966-67 have been returning to the internal security service. The external services, however, are
basic components: municipal police and rural gendarmerie. Under the Communists police duties have been performed largely by the Public Security Service (People’s Militia), now called simply, the militia. Since 1950, the militia has undergone a number of structural changes, the latest stemming from the Basic Law on Internal Affairs of December 1966.

The basic police element is the commune and its police station. In cases of large communes, substations are added. Each commune has its own department for internal affairs, which supervises the local police. Most militia funds come from communal budgets. The militia deals with suppressing criminal acts, enforcing traffic regulations, and maintaining public order. Militiamen usually carry sidearms and, in case of riots, use truncheons, rifles, submachine guns, tear gas equipment, and steel helmets.

There is no information on the strength of the militia, although it probably is below that necessary to fully handle crime in large urban areas. The last available figures (January 1967) indicated that of the 2,365 Belgrade militiamen, 1,000 had low educational qualifications. In addition, it was revealed at that time that the health of many militiamen was substandard; only 406 of the Belgrade force were adjudged in good health. Many militiamen were formerly peasants and workers who participated in the revolution during World War II, and most of the officers are party members. In January 1967, all insignia of rank were abolished, and militiamen only wear devices indicating their function—traffic police, marine police, or penitentiary guards.

A new training curriculum for the police academy was introduced in 1969. In addition to traditional law enforcement skills, police cadets receive intensive training in etiquette, proper social behavior, and correct dress. Acutely conscious of its image among Western tourists, Yugoslavia also has decided to incorporate foreign language, photography, and some medical training into the young cadets’ studies.

Low pay, inadequate housing, and low social status make recruiting for the militia difficult. An ambitious plan reportedly is under consideration to recruit only high school graduates for the militia and to require university degrees for the higher ranks. Despite its handicaps, the militia apparently is successful in preventing large-scale violent crimes. Most crime in Yugoslavia is economic in nature, i.e., theft, bribery, and embezzlement.

3. Penal system (S)

The federal and republic secretariats for internal affairs control Yugoslavia’s prison system, except for special military prisons. Most prisons and jails are supposed to be financed by communal assemblies. As a result, most prisons receive barely adequate financing.

According to an official Yugoslav study, 230 prisons in the country held 53,242 inmates in 1967. (The number of prisoners probably is inflated by an unknown number of local jails.) In addition to being ill-repair, many older prisons often are overcrowded, and inefficient administration results in newer prisons being underutilized. There is a shortage of prison guards, who often are recruited from the ranks of those rejected by the militia. The most progressive and least onerous prison system is in Slovenia. Perhaps the harshest prison in Yugoslavia is that on Otok Goli of the Dalmatian coast in Croatia.

The prison system is supposed to engage in an extensive rehabilitation effort, but lack of funds has prevented its full implementation. A professional counselor, supposedly trained in penology, assisted by aides and guards, supervises the prisoners. The counselor is a key man in the life of a prisoner, works closely with the inmate until his release, and keeps the prison director informed of the prisoner’s progress. One of his specific duties is to read the prisoner’s mail. Each Yugoslav commune is required by law to form a committee to help prisoners find work and to adjust to life after their release. Nevertheless, the last published rate of recidivism was about 31% in 1963.

Many inmates work at various jobs while in prison. They are allowed to subscribe to newspapers, buy food and clothing, and have individual beds and linens. Some are permitted to work outside the prisons and receive wages at a reduced scale.

No general differentiation of inmates on the basis of nationality appears to exist. For the most part, political and nonpolitical prisoners are accommodated in the same institutions, although some prisons maintain separate wards for various categories of political prisoners. Men and women are housed in the same institutions but are required by law to be separated. Alcoholics are placed in special wards, as are recidivists.

4. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities (C)

The Yugoslav militia has proven itself capable of handling emigree-sponsored attempts at armed insurgency. In early July 1972, for example, the local security forces in the republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina quickly quelled an emigree-sponsored attempt to incite rebellion. Using Australian, Swedish, and West German passports, and hiding automatic weapons and sabotage gear in their luggage, 19
terrorists organized by the "Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood" crossed the Austrian border, seized a truck, and drove to the town of Mostar. In a subsequent skirmish, 13 local security officers and most of the terrorists were killed.

This incident was the first since the immediate postwar years. Those emigres who attempted to foment rebellion include the remnants of the Fascist Ustaši, who recruit disenchanted young Croats who have sought work in the West. The terrorists also have wealthy sympathizers among the established emigre community.

There have been unsubstantiated reports that Moscow clandestinely backs some of the emigre groups. Soviet support, however, mainly consists of granting asylum to emigres who fled Yugoslavia at the time of the Tito-Stalin break in 1948.

There is no evidence, for example, to support the claim by the late Branko Jelie, leader of the Croatian National Committee, that in 1971 the U.S.S.R. endorsed the creation of an independent socialist Croatian state.

Belgrade has charged the Yugoslav security services with neutralizing the emigre threat, apparently including preventive operations mounted against emigre centers in the West. In late 1968 and early 1969, for example, a number of emigres who died under mysterious circumstances in West Germany apparently were the victims of Yugoslav countermeasures. The Yugoslavs have publicly stated that foreign governments on whose territory terrorists train and organize will be held responsible for any terrorist attacks in Yugoslavia. Should Tito or his successors need them, however, the internal security forces have proven themselves trustworthy and capable of meeting the challenge.

G. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

The best and most detailed examination of Yugoslav foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the third world, is Alvin Rubenstein’s Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton University Press, 1970). For an account of the 1948 Tito-Stalin break, the standard work is The Battle Lost by Vladimir Dedijer (the Viking Press, 1970). For a more recent and well written look at problems in Yugoslav-Soviet relations—stemming from the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia—read the chapters on Yugoslavia in Anatole Shub’s An Empire Loses Hope (W. W. Norton and Company, 1970).

There are two fairly good biographies of Tito. The first is Phyllis Auty’s Tito: A Biography (Longman Group Limited, London, 1969) and the second, giving an insider’s view, is Vladimir Dedijer’s Tito (Simon and Schuster, 1953).

Milorad Dijas is the best known Yugoslav political theorist. His work, The New Class (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957) brought him international recognition. Since then, his other works have included Anatomy of A Moral (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959); Land Without Justice (Harcourt, Brace, 1958); Conversations With Stalin (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962); and The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969).


Additional, though somewhat specialized reading, includes a critical analysis of Yugoslavia’s political-managerial system in Yugoslavia, The New Class in Crisis by Nevan Popovic (Syracuse University Press, 1968), while the impact on the international scene of the unique U.S.-Yugoslav relationship is examined in Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics, by John C. Campell (Harper, 1967).
Chronology (u/ou)

1102
Croatia accepts a Hungarian king, losing its independence.

1331-35
Tsar Stephen Dusan rules over a Serbian empire—the golden age of medieval Serbia.

1399
Turks defeat the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo to begin nearly 500 years of Turkish domination.

1527
Croatia passes under Habsburg sovereignty.

1718
The Turks withdraw from Croatia.

1804-13
Karanjordje leads the first Serbian rebellion against the Turks.

1815
Second Serbian rebellion, led by Milos Obrenovic, gains concessions from the Turks.

1830
Serbia is granted autonomy by Turkey.

1867
Last Turkish soldiers leave Serbia.

1878
Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia independent.

1882
Serbia is proclaimed a kingdom.

1885
Serbia is defeated in war against Bulgaria.

1912
The First Balkan War—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro defeat the Turks and expel them from Macedonia and Albania.

1913
The Second Balkan War—Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey defeat Bulgaria.

1914
Archduke Francis Ferdinand is assassinated at Sarajevo, resulting in Austrian declaration of war on Serbia and the start of World War I.

1918
Yugoslavia is created as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

1941
April
German and Italian forces overrun Yugoslavia.

1943
November
Second session of Anti-Fascist Council of National Lib-eration declares itself the "supreme legislative and executive body of Yugoslavia."

1946
January
New constitution creates the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

1948
June
Cominform publ! -resolution condemning and expelling the Yugoslav communist Party.

1949
September
U.S.S.R. denounces 1945 treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation with Yugoslavia.

1951
November
United States and Yugoslavia agree on military assistance within framework of Mutual Defense Assistance Pact.

1953
March
Regime abandons efforts to collectivize agriculture.

1954
January
Third (Extraordinary) plenum of Party Central Com-mitee removes Milovan Djilas from the Central Com-mitee.

October
Dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy over Free Territor-y of Trieste ends with signing of Memorandum of Understanding by Yugoslavia, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

1955
May
Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade and seek reconciliation with Tito.
1956

June

Tito visits the U.S.S.R.; party ties are reestablished.

September-October

Khrushchev and Tito confer on Yugoslav-Soviet frictions.

November

Tito attacks Stalinist elements and Soviet role in Hungarian revolt.

1957

August

Tito and Khrushchev meet secretly in Bucharest.

October

Yugoslavia recognizes East German regime; West Germany breaks diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia.

November

Yugoslav representatives refuse to sign 12-party Moscow declaration.

1958

April

Seventh Party Congress meets and adopts new party program conflicting with Soviet doctrine.

May

Pravda editorial asserts that the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is revisionist and contrary to Marxism-Leninism.

1960

February

Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, outspoken foe of Tito’s Communist regime, dies and way is paved for improved relations between the regime and the Roman Catholic Church.

1961

September

First conference of nonaligned states in Belgrade.

1962

December

Tito pays unofficial visit to the U.S.S.R.; hears Khrushchev declare that Yugoslavia is a socialist country.

1963

April

Yugoslavia adopts new constitution.

October

Tito visits the United States.

1964

September

Tito meets on separate occasions with Communist leaders of Romania, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

October

Tito attends second nonaligned conference in Cairo.

December

Eighth Party Congress meets and reaffirms Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policies.

1965

April

Tito visits Algeria and the U.A.R.

June

Tito visits Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union.

September

Tito visits Bulgaria.

1966

June

Diplomatic relations are restored with the Vatican.

July

Tito ousts Vice President and Party Secretary Rankovic from his party and government posts, accusing him of engaging in a “struggle for power.”

October

Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee starts the reform of the party by reorganizing its leading bodies. Rankovic is expelled from the LCY.

December

New Basic Law on Internal Affairs curtails the power of the secret police.

1967

April

National elections are held; constitutional amendments alter the structure of the Federal Assembly and the executive, giving the republics more authority.

June

Tito attends Soviet bloc meeting in Moscow in the wake of the Israeli defeat of the Arabs.

July

Federal Assembly adopts legislation allowing foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

August

Tito visits the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq to sound out possibilities for a Middle East settlement.

1968

January

Diplomatic relations are restored with West Germany.

January-February

Tito visits Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, India, Southern Yemen, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R.; calls for a Third World nonaligned conference.

April

Tito visits Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and the U.S.S.R.

June

Students riot in Belgrade.
1968
July
The Yugoslav economy is further decentralized.

August
Tito visits Czechoslovakia and endorses the Dubcek regime; later denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia and orders partial mobilization of the Yugoslav army.

December
Constitution is amended to give more power to the republics and reorganize the Federal Assembly. Legislation is introduced in the Federal Assembly calling for the creation of the “all-people’s defense” system.

1969
March
Ninth LCY Congress adopts new, liberal statutes and reorganizes party.

April-May
Elections are held under new electoral law, which provides for elections every 4 years involving all assembly seats.

September
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Yugoslavia in an effort to patch up relations which have been poor since the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

1970
April
Ranking party leader Bukarić leads Yugoslav delegation to the Lenin centennial in Moscow.

August
Yugoslavia and the Vatican raise diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level.

September
Tito leads Yugoslav delegation to third nonaligned summit in Lusaka, Zambia.
Tito announces his intention to create a collective presidency and revive the position of vice president.

September-October
President Nixon visits Yugoslavia.

1971
February
Tito pays his first visit to Nasir’s successor, Egyptian President Sadat.

April
The Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden is murdered by Ustaši terrorists.

May
Second Congress of Self-Managers meets in Sarajevo.

July
New government is formed in Yugoslavia; Krste Crvenkovski, a Macedonian, is chosen to rotating post of Vice President.

September
Soviet party boss Brezhnev visits Yugoslavia.

December
Tito purges nationalists from Croatian party ranks.

1972
January
Ustaši terrorists bomb a Stockholm-to-Belgrade Yugoslav airliner.

March
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visits Yugoslavia.

June
Tito visits the Soviet Union.

July
19 Ustaši terrorists lead unsuccessful armed attack in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

August
Rato Dugonjić, a Serb from Bosnia and Hercegovina, replaces Crvenkovski as Vice President.

October
Tito purges Serbian party leadership.
Glossary (u/ou)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>SERBO-CROATIAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTUY.........</td>
<td>Sanez sindikata Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC...........</td>
<td>Saznacno izvrsno osce</td>
<td>Federal Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAT...........</td>
<td>Jugoaooverski Aerotransport</td>
<td>Yugoslav Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA...........</td>
<td>Jugoaooverska narodna armija</td>
<td>Yugoslav People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOJ..........</td>
<td>Korpus narodne odbrane</td>
<td>Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOS...........</td>
<td>Kroatobasestajna služba</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCY...........</td>
<td>Sanez komunist-a Jugoslavije</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZNA...........</td>
<td>Odredjevolentnosti naroda</td>
<td>Department for the Protection of the Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAWPY........</td>
<td>Socijalistički sabor radnog narada Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDB...........</td>
<td>Sluzba druzne bezbednosti</td>
<td>State Security Service</td>
</tr>
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<td>SOJ...........</td>
<td>Sanez omladine Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSJ...........</td>
<td>Sanez studenta Jugoslavije</td>
<td>Federation of Students of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDB (UDBa)...</td>
<td>Uprava druzne bezbednosti</td>
<td>Administration for State Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U/OU)

| COORDINATES |
|------------|-------------|
| * N. * E. |
| Adriatic Sea (sea) | 43 00 16 00 |
| Belgrade | 44 50 20 30 |
| Bosnia (region) | 44 00 18 00 |
| Dalmatia (region) | 43 00 17 00 |
| Dubrovnik | 42 39 18 07 |
| Herzegovina (region) | 43 00 17 50 |
| Istria (peninsula) | 45 00 14 00 |
| Kakanj | 44 08 18 05 |
| Kovacic | 45 06 20 38 |
| Ljubljana | 46 03 14 31 |
| Maribor | 46 33 15 39 |
| Nis | 43 19 21 54 |
| Novi Sad | 45 15 19 59 |
| Osijek | 45 33 18 42 |
| Priština | 42 40 21 10 |
| Rijeka | 45 21 14 24 |
| Sarajevo | 43 50 18 25 |
| Skopje | 42 00 21 29 |
| Split | 41 13 16 26 |
| Thessaloniki, Greece | 40 38 22 56 |
| Zadar | 44 07 15 15 |
| Zagreb | 45 48 16 00 |