Albania

GENERAL SURVEY

AUGUST 1971

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This General Survey supersedes the one dated June 1967, copies of which should be destroyed.

FIGURES

This General Survey was prepared for the NIS under the general direction of the NIS Committee. The military geography, transportation and telecommunications, and armed forces coverage was prepared under the general supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the introductory material and the sociological, political, and economic coverage were prepared under the general supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. A scientific discussion was not prepared in view of the relatively limited development of science and technology in the country. Research was substantially completed by March 1971.

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GLOSSARY (U/OU)

ABBREVIATION	ALBANIAN	ENGLISH
ATA	*Agjensia Telegrafike Shqipetare*	Albanian Telegraph Agency
BRPSh	*Bashkimi i Rinise se Punes se Shqiperise*	Union of Working Youth of Albania
NLM	*Lavizja Nacional Çlirimtar*	National Liberation Movement
PPSH	*Partia E Punes E Shqiperise*	Albanian Workers Party
...	*Bashkimet Profesionale të Shqiperise*	Central Council of Trade Unions
...	*Sigurimi*	Directorate of State Security
...	*Balli Kombetar*	National Front
...	*Shoqerija per Ndihme të Ushtrise dhe Mbrojtjes*	Society for Aid to the Army and Defense
...	*Komiteti i Planit të Shtetit*	State Planning Committee
...	*Bashkimi i Grave to Shqiperise*	Union of Albanian Women

Chronology (U/OU)

1385-1912	Albania is under Turkish suzerainty.
1444-1468	Skanderbeg leads resistance against Ottoman rule.
1878-1881	Albanian leaders form Albanian League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation (League of Prizren) to promote Albania's interests at the Congress of Berlin. The league strongly influences Albanian political thought and revolutionary activity for the next several decades.
1908	Congress of Monastir (Bitolj) adopts standardized Latin alphabet.
1912	National assembly of notables at Vlorë on 28 November proclaims the independence of Albania from Turkish rule and establishes provisional government.
1913	Treaty of London accords international recognition to unilateral Albanian action. Deliberations conclude on 30 May with the appointment of an international commission to determine Albania's boundaries.
1914-1918	World War I—Albania is occupied by Serbians and Greeks, later by Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops.
1918-1920	New national assembly, elected on still very limited suffrage, has to elicit international support to eject Yugoslavs from the north and Italians from the south, both having reentered Albania after the defeat of the Central Powers. Italians do not leave Vlorë until September 1920.
1920 August	U.S. President Wilson vetoes plan to partition Albania between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy.
1920 December	Albania is admitted to the League of Nations.
1921 November	Conference of Ambassadors redesignates frontiers of 1913—with some slight further concessions to Yugoslavia—as national boundaries of Albania.
1921-1925	Period of unstable governments—certain Western political institutions are introduced, but political life centers on two personalities—Ahmet Zogu and Bishop Fan S. Noli.
1925 January	Ahmet Zogu becomes President of Albanian Republic after staging coup against Fan Noli government.
1928 September	President Zogu proclaims Albania a monarchy with himself as King Zog.
1933-1939	King Zog tries to resist mounting Italian influences while enforcing modernization. Policies lead to several confrontations with Italy, with the Albanians inevitably backing down.
1939 April	Italians land army which after some fighting quickly overruns the whole country. King Zog flees and Albanian Constituent Assembly votes personal union with Italy and King Victor Emmanuel accepts the Albanian crown.

1941	November	Albanian Communist Party is formed under auspices of Yugoslav Communist emissaries.
1944	November	Communist-dominated National Liberation Movement (NLM) installs itself in Tiranë as the government of Albania, with Enver Hoxha as Premier.
1946	March	New constitution, patterned on that of Yugoslavia, establishes People's Republic; collectivization begins.
1948	July	Albania breaks with Yugoslavia and becomes a Soviet satellite.
	November	First Albanian Workers Party Congress is held as Communists rename their party and purge pro-Yugoslav elements.
1949	February	Albania becomes member of Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.
1952	March	Second Congress of the Albanian Workers Party is held.
1954	July	Hoxha resigns as Premier, retaining his position as First Secretary of the party; Moscow-trained Mehmet Shehu becomes Premier.
1955	May	Albania signs Warsaw Pact.
	December	Albania is admitted to the United Nations.
1956	May	Third Congress of the Albanian Workers Party takes place.
1960	June	Hysni Kapo leads Albanian delegation to Romanian Communist Party Congress and conference of Communist bloc leaders. Kapo's speech to congress fails to praise Khrushchev and follows the line taken by Chinese delegate. Albania is only European Communist country not represented by its party leader.
	September	Albania announces purge of leading pro-Soviet party members Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko.
	November	Hoxha denounces Khrushchev at Moscow conference of 81 Communist and Workers Parties. Hoxha and Shehu walk out of conference.
1961	February	Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party—Hoxha discloses attempt to overthrow regime in summer of 1960.
	April	Albania and Communist China sign long-term trade and aid agreement under which China grants Albania US$125 million in credit.
	May	Ten conspirators are tried and found guilty of assisting U.S., Greek, and Yugoslav intelligence services and of planning to overthow Hoxha regime in summer of 1960.
	October	Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress is held in Moscow. Soviet and Eastern European leaders publicly denounce Albania's leaders and policies. Chou En-lai publicly rebukes Khrushchev for bringing the dispute with Albania into the open. Albania is not represented at the congress.
	December	Soviets announce decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Albania.
1963-1964	December-January	Chinese Premier Chou En-lai leads visiting delegation to Albania.
1964	February	Albanians seize Soviet Embassy building in Tiranë.

1966	March	16th Plenum of Central Committee calls for reorganization of party and state apparatus at center and local levels. *Radio Tiranë* broadcasts an Open Letter from the party to the populace containing the plenum's instructions for the elimination of bureaucracy and "bourgeois influences." Political commissars are reintroduced into armed forces. Post of First Deputy Premier is abolished, and the number of ministers is reduced.
	May	Military rank in armed forces is abolished.
	November	Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party convenes.
1967	February	Hoxha launches campaign attacking "bureaucracy," initiates abolition of all religious institutions, and starts campaign for emancipation of women. Campaigns involve controlled use of young people and employment of wall posters.
	November	Decree abolishes statutes on religion and formal religion in effect becomes illegal. Propaganda touts Albania as "world's first atheist state."
1968	September	Having been an inactive member of the Warsaw Pact since 1961, Tiranë formally withdraws from pact following Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
	November	Albania and Communist China sign trade and aid agreement but do not announce amount.
1969	April	Article in party daily *Zeri i Popullit* pledges Albanian support to Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of Soviet aggression, contrasting sharply with previous 20 years of vituperation against neighboring Yugoslavia.
	December	Tiranë State University and Albanian-language University of Priština in Yugoslavia enter cooperation agreement.
1970		Starting to move from self-imposed isolation, between April and November Albania concludes agreements providing for diplomatic recognition with six countries.
	May	Hoxha's landmark speech declares Albania's favoring "constant improvement" of relations with Yugoslavia.
	October	Communist China and Albania sign 1971-75 trade and aid agreement without disclosing amounts.

Albania: Maverick in the Communist World (C)

The most backward and impoverished nation in Europe, Albania has only recently begun to make tentative moves to end a quarter century of isolation. During most of this period the regime of Communist party boss Enver Hoxha has been preoccupied with maintaining Albania's independence against the threat to national existence posed recurringly by more powerful neighbors and the pressures engendered by the open ideological warfare within the Communist camp. The Communist leadership has achieved its limited scope for independent action only by means of radical shifts in alliances which have reflected a timely exploitation of the varied cracks and splits in the Communist world.

Throughout its 2,000-year history, Albania has been overrun by warring armies, the Turks alone occupying the country for more than half a millennium—from 1389 to 1912. Despite the resulting strong streak of xenophobia and fierce nationalism in its inhabitants, the Communist regime has constantly had to seek support from more powerful states to enable the nation of some 2 million people to survive. Immediately after World War II the Hoxha regime had no choice but to accept Yugoslav hegemony, but following Tito's rupture with Moscow in 1948 Hoxha threw his support to the more distant Soviet Union in order to break the now suffocating Yugoslav embrace and to guarantee the economic assistance necessary for survival. The orthodox Stalinist Albanian party leaders, however, shortly thereafter became apprehensive about the implications for themselves of Khrushchev's repudiation of the Stalinist system of rule, as well as over new Soviet efforts at domination. The two countries finally broke relations in 1961 after Khrushchev attempted to organize a coup in Tiranë.

The Albanian regime then decided that its only hope for national survival lay in strengthening ties with Communist China, which itself had caused such consternation in the Communist world by opposing the U.S.S.R. at two major Communist conferences in 1960. From the Albanian point of view this is an ideal arrangement. The Chinese Communists are not a military or political threat to the regime, their rigid ideology is compatible with that of Albania's leaders, and, as long as Chinese economic and military aid is forthcoming, Albania can afford to pay for it in political terms by harassing the U.S.S.R. and its anti-Chinese allies. Since 1969, Albania has also been gradually improving relations with various neighboring states—even longstanding foes like Greece and Yugoslavia, but it apparently is not ready to take steps to seek resumed ties with such major powers as the United States and the United Kingdom, which were more than once involved in attempted coups against the Communist regime.

As the direct threats to Albania's independence have receded in recent years, the regime has turned to the problem of transforming Albania from a backward, rural, patriarchal society into a modern state with the beginnings of an industrial base. The country is run absolutely by a small Communist elite, ostensibly with Stalin's Russia as a model, but in fact drawing on many repressive systems, including that of the Turks, and substantial elements of Mao's zealot philosophy.

Albania's Communist leaders, many of whom received their formal education and Marxist orientation in Western European universities, had to start from scratch to build a viable government. The country they took over was organized around clans that had only limited contact with each other or the government in Tiranë. The Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, and Roman Catholic religions played a somewhat divisive and secondary role in the feudally structured society. Organized transportation and communications were poor and in many areas virtually nonexistent. Education was restricted to a small minority; there was virtually no industry, and agriculture, the major source of income, was at the subsistence level.

During the period of Communist rule, the power of the clans has been broken and the importance of the family in the fabric of society has declined. Women, long denied the most elemental rights in the patriarchal tribes, are now, at least in theory, equal to men. The formal practice of religion has been banned, and instead there is official insistence on a new form of worship: of nationalism, of technological progress, and of the Communist system and its rulers. Universal education has been stressed, and illiteracy reportedly has been wiped out among those under the age of 40. A pool of scientific and skilled workers has been produced, but it is still far from fulfilling requirements. Great strides have been made in improving the state of public health, which as recently as the interwar years ranked the lowest in Europe. The incidence of disease has been greatly reduced, the death rate has declined, and life expectancy has risen markedly. The major source of national income changed from agriculture to industry during the early 1960's, but approximately two-thirds of the people were still living in rural areas and more than half were engaged in agriculture. "Socialization" of the economy was completed in the late 1960's; nearly all of the agricultural land has been collectivized. Albania, however, must still

import food to feed its rapidly growing population. Economic planning and development are rigidly controlled by the regime. Transportation and communications networks have been developed, and the completion of nationwide electrification was celebrated with great pomp in 1970.

Albania's Communist leaders, so solidly entrenched that it would probably require armed intervention to dislodge them, have brought the country a long way into the modern world. They have frequently relied on terror and coercion, which remain instruments of national policy. The Albanian Armed Forces, constituting a threat to no one, are incapable even of maintaining a sustained defense of the country; however, the country's leaders feel assured about Albania's continued national existence and recently have sought more normal relations with their neighbors. Given Albania's present situation and sufficient external support, the regime has a chance—if individual leaders continue to work together—to bring the country fully into the 20th century.

Land and People

A. Background (U/OU)

Albania's proximity to the traditional sea routes of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean has over the centuries invited successive invasions by foreign powers seeking to use it as a base from which to derive military or commercial advantages in adjacent areas. Albania itself has always been poor and largely devoid of natural wealth; its hilly and mountainous hinterland constitutes 80% of the country and was until the mid-20th century the abode of the majority of the population. The steep mountain walls and the deep gorges cut by the numerous westward flowing streams before they emerge onto the coastal plain long impeded communications and cultural integration among the small villages and towns in the intermontane valleys and basins. Geography and history thus fostered a society characterized by the strongly independent and self-sufficient nature of its constituents along with their distrust not only of foreigners but of nonlocal compatriots as well. These factors also account for the fact that Albania's recorded past has been until recent years one of almost uninterrupted turmoil and violence, replete with foreign conquests and exploitation as well as interminable domestic blood feuds and insurrections.

The Albanian people, now numbering just over 2 million, living in an area the size of Vermont, have retained through the centuries a persistence bordering on obstinacy, and their ethnic identity, linguistic base, traditions, and customs have remained virtually unchanged for about 2,000 years. The one important cultural import was the Muslim religion, introduced by the Turks during five centuries of rule beginning in 1385. By making Albania an alien client in Christian Europe during a period in which religious identity was of overriding importance, Islam itself helped to isolate the people from the rest of Europe. At the time of the Communist takeover in 1944 some 70% of the population was Muslim.

The Communist regime has been unable to change significantly the deeply ingrained customs and habits of the majority of the population. The Communists did, however, launch a socioeconomic revolution with the objective of modernizing the country and molding the people according to the concept of a Communist society as determined by the Albanian Workers Party. The regime has reshaped the educational and welfare systems, the public information media, and the labor organizations, and it attempted first to reorganize and then, starting in 1967, to abolish the traditional Muslim (70% of the population), Orthodox (20%), and Roman Catholic (10%) religions. The regime is firmly committed to industrializing the country, but existing industries are for the most part rudimentary and have not yet had a great impact on the essentially rural way of life. It has only been since the completion of large drainage projects in the coastal regions in the 1950's and the subsequent decline of malaria that substantial numbers of Albanians have moved from the interior to the coastal plains and begun to recognize the sea as a potential natural resource. The Communist regime has yet to encourage the development of large-scale fishing or other seafaring activities.

Despite the country's favorable location in the highly commercial Adriatic area of the Mediterranean, it is unlikely that Albania's poorly developed resources will supply products which could find ready markets in the West without politically motivated concessions. The large majority of the population continues to eke out a livelihood on the land, although enforced collectivization is slowly altering traditional ways. Except for the gradual breaking down of the tight family structure in a few urban areas, family life is still closely knit and seems largely centered on assuring self-sufficiency in family needs. The new drive in 1966-69 to root out old and backward habits, in addition to outlawing all public religious worship, featured denunciations of the traditional patriarchy.

The present regime probably has very little popular support. Traditional values based on attachment to the land, respect for private property, strong family and local tribal ties, and the Muslim religious orientation have clashed directly with Communist ideology. Accustomed for centuries to a peasant economy and semiautonomous local government, Albanians resent the highly centralized political authority and tightly controlled socialized economy imposed upon them; the unpopular collectivization of agriculture and infringement of individual freedom have caused widespread distaste for the Communist system. It appears, however, that most Albanians have resigned themselves to the Communist regime, in part, perhaps, because of the effectiveness of the omnipresent secret police.

B. Geography (U/OU)

Albania is a small, predominantly mountainous country situated on the western side of the Balkan Peninsula (Summary Map, Figure 79). It extends from north to south about 215 miles and from west to east

some 50 to 90 miles inland from the Adriatic Sea. The southwestern coastline lies only 45 miles from the heel of the Italian Peninsula, from which it is separated by the Strait of Otranto. Most of Albania's border with Yugoslavia to the north and east, and with Greece to the east and south, lies in the mountainous areas. A coastal lowland, although occupying only about one-fifth of Albania's territory, is the dominant economic and political area of the country. In some places the mountains rise sharply above the plains and hinder movement into the interior. In other places fingers of lowland extend quite far into the interior, especially in the southern half of the country. From the earliest times these lowlands have been used as routes into the interior of the Balkan Peninsula.

In spite of Albania's small size, its climate varies widely. The coastal plain is hot and dry in summer, making irrigation necessary for agriculture. Winters are mild and damp. The interior region has colder temperatures in the winter because of its higher elevation and its exposure to cold continental air masses. Interior elevations receive more summer rainfall from thunderstorms, but winter precipitation is still greater. The Albanian mountains receive some of the heaviest precipitation in Europe, as much as 100 inches annually on the west-facing slopes. The northern interior receives heavy snowfall in winter.

The mountains of Albania are a southern extension of Yugoslavia's Dinaric Alps and lie in northwest to southwest ridges extending into Greece in the south.

Two large highland areas, the North Albanian Alps which rise in the Yugoslav border area and the Çermenikë Highland which divides Albania in half north of the Shkumbin river, interrupt the general trend of the interior ranges. Both highlands are rugged, of difficult assess, and sparsely populated, and they divert major rivers, the Drin and the Shkumbin, from their general northwestward courses to the southwest. The most rugged mountains in Albania, the North Albanian Alps are a thick limestone formation, deeply eroded by streams. Largely unproductive, their lower slopes are heavily forested up to about 6,000 feet and their alpine pastureland above the tree line is devoted to raising sheep and goats; their summits rise above 8,000 feet.

South of the North Albanian Alps, three long parallel mountain chains extend southeastward. Their intermountain valleys generally contain a series of basins, connected by narrow gorges and arranged steplike down the length of the river valley. These basins contain most of the Albanian highland population, which is overwhelmingly agricultural.

The largest of these interior valleys is occupied by the Drin i Zi river, Lake Ohrid, and the Plain of Korçë. Both ends of this valley lie in Albania, but the middle section is in Yugoslavia. Lake Ohrid, in the southeast, occupies a large high basin on the Albania-Yugoslavia border. Still higher, and farther south, is the densely populated basin called the Plain of Korçë, which is about 25 miles long and 6 miles wide.

In the southwest the high mountain ranges, generally referred to as the southern coastal ranges, extend to the Ionian Sea. Their valleys continue into northern Greece. With the exception of the Drin and Delvine river basins, the valleys are narrow.

Low sandstone and limestone hills mark the transition between the interior mountains and the coastal lowland. In some places this zone is narrow, and steep mountains fall sharply to the coastal lowland. In other places, hills that are extensions of the interior mountains continue to the sea. The soils of the hill country are shallow, and their natural vegetative cover consists of the low shrubs characteristic of Mediterranean coasts. Areas of native shrubs are gradually being replaced by olive and citrus groves and vineyards.

The Albanian coastal lowland is not continuous, being interrupted in several places by low hills. At its widest point the lowland extends 30 miles up the Shkumbin river valley to Elbasan. Swift rivers rush down to the lowland from the high mountain valleys, bringing sediment that is deposited along the lower river courses, where deltas are constantly building. The sediment clogs the channels, causing riverbeds to shift and lagoons and marshes to form behind coastal dunes. Stagnant water provides a breeding place for mosquitos and makes much of the coast a malaria zone. The soils adjacent to the river channels are fertile, but severe annual flooding has curtailed agricultural production.

Important mineral deposits are found in intrusive geologic formations of the north. The largest deposits are those of chromium, copper, iron, and nickel. Their full exploitation is, however, handicapped by a poor transportation network. In spite of this limitation, Albania is the largest producer of chromium ore in Eastern Europe. The important chromium deposits near Bulqizë are the most accessible from the coast. They are connected by road with the port of Durrës. An important copper mine and a copper smelter are located at Rubik in the westernmost of the interior ranges. This area is also connected by road with Durrës. An iron-nickel ore mining area has been developed around Pogradec in east-central Albania. This area is located on the main road along the Shkumbin river into the interior from Elbasan.

Fuels have been found in the sedimentary formations of the southern basins. High-quality lignite coal is mined in the Korçë and Vijosë basins and at Krrabe, situated between Tiranë and Elbasan. Oil, gas, and bitumen deposits are exploited in the river basins of the southern lowland area.

The southern interior supports more agriculture and a greater population than the north because the mountains are not so rugged, the valleys are wider and more accessible, and the climate is warmer. Lumbering is more important in the north where the greater rainfall results in richer forest stands. The Plain of Korçë, an important agricultural area producing wheat, sugarbeets, apples, and grapes, is an example of the wide, fertile southern basin as contrasted to more northern downstream basins, which are deeper, narrow, and less fertile. In the valley of the Drin river, corn, tobacco, and dairy products are produced. In the Delvinë basin, on the southwestern coast, and on the mountainsides overlooking the southwestern seacoast, olive and citrus trees are cultivated.

The lowland contains the greatest concentration of population. The people are traditionally and predominantly farmers, but they are becoming more urbanized. Tiranë, the capital and largest city, is located about 17 miles inland on the higher ground of the transitional hill country. Here industry is dominated by textiles and food processing. Other important lowland cities are Durrës and Vlorë, the main ports; Shkodër, a northern agricultural center; Elbasan, an important lumbering center; and Cërrik and Stalin, located southwest of Elbasan, the sites of oil refineries based on the oilfields in that area.

Beyond the coastline, Albania claims a 12-nautical-mile zone of territorial water. Twelve miles are also claimed for fishing. Most of this offshore territory lies at depths shallower than 100 meters, where the coastal plain continues submerged before dropping off into the Adriatic trough. The exception to the shallow marginal sea occurs along the southwestern coast, where the mountains drop sharply to the sea, and depths at 12 nautical miles range from 500 to more than 1,000 meters.

C. Population (U/OU)

1. Size, composition, and distribution

The population of Albania on 2 October 1960, the date of the most recent census, was 1,626,315. By 1 January 1971 the population was estimated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to have reached 2,154,000, reflecting an average annual growth rate of 2.8%—the highest in Europe and one usually associated with the less developed non-European countries.

The population is essentially homogeneous—about 96% ethnic Albanian. The largest minority consists of some 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Greeks (perhaps 3%), with Vlachs, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Gypsies making up the remainder.

With an area of about 11,100 square miles, Albania is estimated to have a population density of 194 persons per square mile. It has one of the smaller populations of Europe (Figure 1), although the population density is about average for the rugged Balkan area. Within Albania, density varies greatly between regions (Summary Map, Population and Administrative Divisions inset, Figure 79). The densely settled west-central coastal districts of Durrës, Krujë, Lushnje, and Fier, together with the most populous district of Tiranë averaged over 365 persons per square mile in 1968. The three northern districts of Tropojë, Puke, and Mirdite and the southern district of Kolonjë, all marked by difficult mountainous terrain and a relatively harsh climate, have the lowest densities, ranging from 60 to 84 persons per square mile.



FIGURE 1. Population and population density, Albania and selected countries, 1970 (U/OU)

Albania is the least urbanized country in Europe. Before World War II about 80% of the population lived in rural areas, a proportion which, even by the optimistic Albanian reporting practices, decreased to only 69% in 1960 (census) and 66.7% in January 1968. Regime claims of an increase of some 13% in the urban population since World War II must be treated with circumspection, because official statistics classify as an urban area a locality with a population of 400 or more. In fact, virtually all communities of less than 1,000 residents are little more than primitive agricultural villages; they offer few, if any, of the amenities normally associated with urban living. Population distribution by district and rural-urban breakdown is shown in Figure 2. Only two districts (Tirane and Durrës) in 1968 officially recorded a majority urban population, and seven districts acknowledged at least a 90% rural population. The major urban center is Tiranë—the capital and largest city; its population increased from 25,000 persons in 1938 to about 170,000 in 1968. By early 1968 only three other cities had a population of more than 50,000 persons (Durres, 80,000; Vlorë, 57,700; Korçë, 53,500).

Internal migration has increased markedly since 1950, stimulated by the "economic rationalization" of the Communist regime. Much of this movement has been from the highlands to the coastal lowlands. Thus, a society which traditionally referred to its domain as the "land of the eagles," and whose history has emphasized a strong mountain psychology, is in the process of a basic transformation. About 60% of the population now lives in the lowland districts which face the Adriatic. Improvements in health and sanitation have made the previously malaria-stricken lowlands more hospitable to agricultural and industrial development. The regime's emphasis on rapid industrialization has encouraged large numbers of peasants to leave the primitive, mountainous rural areas for the new industrial centers along the coastal plain.

2. Vital statistics

Albania's rapid population growth stems entirely from natural increase—a traditionally high birth rate and a declining death rate. Statistical data released by the regime reveal that the birth rate of 35.5 per 1,000 population in 1968 approximates the rate of 34.7 registered in 1938. During the 30-year period, external forces, such as war and deprivation, or official pronatalist policies caused periodic fluctuation—from a probable near low of 27 births per 1,000 in 1946 to about 43.5 births in 1955 and again in 1960. The death rate has

FIGURE 2. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION, JANUARY 1968 (U/OU)

DISTRICT	LAND AREA	POPULATION	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION	URBAN POPULATION	PERCENT	RURAL POPULATION	PERCENT
	Square miles							
Berat	412	104,390	253	*5.31*	37,385	*35.8*	67,005	*64.2*
Dibrë	606	93,812	155	*4.77*	9,145	*9.7*	84,667	*90.3*
Durrës	332	155,780	469	*7.93*	80,066	*51.4*	75,714	*48.6*
Elbasan	581	130,430	224	*6.64*	49,095	*37.6*	81,335	*62.4*
Fier	460	139,175	303	*7.08*	27,056	*19.4*	112,119	*80.6*
Gramsh	270	24,095	89	*1.22*	1,945	*8.1*	22,150	*91.9*
Gjirokastër	439	49,170	112	*2.50*	15,590	*31.7*	33,580	*68.4*
Kolonjë	310	18,685	60	*0.95*	4,385	*23.5*	14,300	*76.5*
Korçë	842	159,115	189	*8.09*	53,563	*33.6*	105,552	*66.4*
Krujë	236	55,325	234	*2.82*	13,395	*24.2*	41,930	*75.8*
Kukës	604	58,880	97	*3.00*	4,795	*8.1*	54,085	*91.9*
Lezhë	182	33,225	182	*1.69*	4,560	*13.7*	28,665	*86.3*
Librazhd	391	42,730	109	*2.17*	3,515	*8.2*	39,215	*91.8*
Lushnje	275	81,595	297	*4.15*	17,545	*21.5*	64,050	*78.5*
Mat	397	45,340	114	*2.31*	4,317	*9.5*	41,023	*90.5*
Mirditë	269	22,465	84	*1.14*	3,598	*16.0*	18,867	*84.0*
Përmet	362	30,340	84	*1.54*	5,565	*18.3*	24,775	*81.7*
Pogradec	280	42,775	153	*2.18*	9,702	*22.7*	33,073	*77.3*
Pukë	374	27,568	74	*1.40*	3,841	*13.9*	23,727	*86.1*
Sarandë	424	58,135	137	*2.96*	14,371	*24.7*	43,764	*75.3*
Skrapar	278	23,035	83	*1.17*	2,178	*9.4*	20,857	*90.6*
Shkodër	978	150,350	154	*7.65*	49,830	*33.1*	100,520	*66.9*
Tepelenë	315	30,350	98	*1.57*	7,745	*25.1*	23,105	*74.9*
Tiranë	458	241,900	528	*12.31*	170,603	*70.5*	71,207	*29.5*
Tropojë	403	25,570	63	*1.30*	2,145	*9.4*	23,155	*90.6*
Vlorë	621	119,995	193	*6.11*	57,745	*48.1*	62,250	*51.9*
Total	11,100	1,964,730	177	*100.0*	653,950	*33.3*	1,310,780	*66.7*

NOTE—Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

dropped steadily from 17.8 per 1,000 in 1938 to 8.0 in 1968. The decline in the death rate stems entirely from improved health and sanitation and a somewhat improved diet, and it has been accompanied by a life expectancy increase of almost 30 years since the pre-World War II period. According to official Albanian estimates, the life expectancy of a child born in 1968 is 66 years, compared with a life expectancy of 38 years in 1938. Nevertheless, the 1968 figure remains the lowest of any European country. The rate of natural increase of 27.5 per 1,000 population in 1968 was more than twice that of any country in continental Europe (Figure 3), even though this represented a decline from the rate of 32.9 registered in 1960, and it is slightly below the average rate of 28.8 reached during 1960-68. A total of 69,261 live births and 16,565 deaths was registered in 1967.

Despite the general increase in life expectancy, the infant mortality rate of 75.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1968 is by far the highest of any East European country (Figure 4). Infant mortality rates are a sensitive indicator of social well-being and provide a valid measure for international comparisons, since they are not affected by differences in age structure. The extent of recent progress in Albania may be gaged by the marked decline in infant mortality from the high rates prevailing in all East European countries in the early 1950's.

In 1967, 77% of the infants who died were under 6 months of age. Of the total population, 66.7% resides in areas officially defined as rural, where about 78% of the infant deaths occurred in 1968. This illustrates the hardships of life and the lack of adequate medical facilities in isolated back-country areas. The urban infant mortality rate was 65.7 deaths per 1,000 in 1968.

3. Composition by age and sex

Compared with other European countries, the median age of the Albanian population has remained low. Although the United States is also considered a young country in the demographic sense, the base of the Albanian pyramid is even broader, highlighting the very large section of the population under 15 years of age. The age-sex distribution of the Albanian population is compared with that of the United States in Figure 5.

Between 1960 and 1969 the proportion of the Albanian population under age 15 decreased from 42.7% to 42.4%. The proportion of the population in the economically productive ages (by Albanian definition 16-59 for men, 16-54 for women), which was 47.6% in the fall of 1960, decreased slightly to 46.8% at the end of 1967. People



FIGURE 3. Vital rates, Albania and selected countries, 1968 (U/OU)

beyond the productive ages decreased by 0.5% (from 9.5% to 9.0%) in the 9 year period. A breakdown of the population by broad age groups in January 1969 is shown in Figure 6.

The sex ratio since 1950 has remained relatively unchanged—105 males to 100 females—and official Albanian estimates for 1967 listed almost 106 males for every 100 females. The 1960 census revealed that there were 835,300 males and 791,000 females, or a ratio of 105.6 males to 100 females. U.S. estimates for 1969 cite an estimated ratio of 106.3 males for each 100 females in Albania. In 1969 males were in a majority in almost all of the age groups under 55, reflecting the universal excess of boys over girls among newborn infants. The officially reported excess of males in Albania, however, is unusually marked, a feature characteristic of the population well before improved medical practices increased male longevity. The phenomenon could stem from greater care given to male infants, or it could be in part a paper disparity caused by the reluctance of peasants to report female births in this still strongly patriarchal society.

Since the early 1950's the marriage rate in Albania has been slightly above the European norm, averaging 8.4 per 1,000 population from 1950-67. There was an unaccountable upsurge in the year 1961, when a rate of 11.3 was reached, and the 1967 rate of 8.6 was the highest since 1961. Between 1960 and 1966 the marriage rate averaged about 7.4 per 1,000. During the 1970's—when the very large segments of the population born in the years 1954-63 begin to reach marriageable age—the marriage rate is likely to increase. Divorce rates have been low because of strict traditions and close family ties. In 1967 only 1,415 divorces were officially reported. In that year there were 16,853 marriages. Trends in the birth, death, and marriage rates, 1938-68, are shown in Figure 7.

4. Population policies and trends

Although the regime has not been able to provide much more than the necessities of life for its population, it promotes population growth by encouraging a high birth rate and prohibiting emigration, which in the past had been considerable because of the poverty of the country. As do other Communist regimes, the Albanian places greater confidence in the future support of the younger generations that have known only communism. Additionally, the rulers apparently believe that the long-range potential of an expanded labor force outweighs the short-term disadvantages. Maternity and child care benefits, designed to encourage a high birth rate, are granted to all female citizens. Benefits include cash stipends of 280 leks (5 leks equal US$1) per live birth (to unwed mothers as well), paid maternity leave of up to 98 days, and early retirement. Working mothers who have given birth to and reared six or more children up to 8 years of age may receive an old-age pension at age 50 (5 years early), after having worked a minimum of 15 rather than 20 years. Kindergartens and crèches have been established for children of working mothers, and work breaks are granted to nursing mothers. Partial pay (up to 10 days during each 3-month period) is also given to mothers to care for sick children under the age of 2 years.

Until 1966 the government encouraged migration of the rural population to industrial centers in the cities. A shortage of urban facilities—including housing and health and sanitation facilities—and a desire to decentralize the government structure probably motivated the regime to stem the movement to urban centers. Recent indications hint at a government policy of establishing production centers outside the major urban areas.

Population growth will probably continue at a high level because of the declining mortality rate and the proportionately large younger age groups moving into the reproductive period. U.S. Bureau of the Census projections indicate that Albania's population may reach about 5 million by July 1990. The population is expected



FIGURE 4. Infant mortality, Albania and Eastern Europe, 1950-68 (U/OU)



FIGURE 5. Age-sex distribution, Albania and the United States, 1969 (U/OU)

to maintain its demographically young profile. The median age in 1990 is projected to be 23.8 years (compared with 18.3 in 1969), and the proportion of the population in the 15-39 age group in 1990 is expected to be greater than that in 1969. In 1990 a substantially smaller proportion of the population is expected to be in the oldest age group.

D. Structure and characteristics of the society

1. Ethnic composition and languages (C)

The precise origin of the Albanians has not been determined with certainty. Present-day Albanians dwell in the West Balkan region, part of which was known in antiquity as Illyria, and they generally desire to be regarded as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians. Historical and anthropological evidence suggests that, of the two Albanian subgroups, the Gegs of the northern highlands are descended more directly from the ancient Illyrian tribes than the Tosks of southern Albania. Largely because of centuries-long isolation in the rugged mountainous interior, the Gegs seem to have preserved much of the Illyrian heritage. The Tosks have a more heterogeneous lineage but are principally a mixture of Illyrian and Thracian, which reflects the traditional Greek and Vlach presence in the coastal lowlands of southern Albania. Some philologists focus on the proto-Romanian phonetics of the Albanian language and the absence therein of signs of any significant Greek influence. These authorities suggest that the Albanians originated in the northeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula and thus may be descended from the Thracians.

The two major ethnic groups—Gegs and Tosks—together make up about 96% of the Albanian population.



FIGURE 6. Population by major age groups, projection for January 1969 (U/OU)

The differences between these two groups are observable in physical appearance, dialect, religion, and social customs, but the differences are not pronounced and permit Albania a degree of homogeneity uncommon elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The remaining 4% of the population is made up of Greeks, Vlachs, Bulgars, Serbs, and Gypsies. The Greek minority is the largest—approximately 40,000 to 50,000 persons in the southwestern coastal area and the border areas south of Gjirokastër. This minority has adopted many Albanian folkways and dress, is bilingual, and has long been a source of friction between Greece and Albania. Albanian authorities continue to discourage Greek culture and traditions in this area and may indeed have moved some ethnic Greeks north, away from the border areas. The other minorities are insignificant both because of their small numbers and the official policy of playing down minority distinctions in an effort to focus popular attention on common economic and political goals. The Vlachs—migratory sheepherders of Romanian origin whose itinerant life-style has been changed by collectivization of their herds—are most numerous in the Pindus mountains and in the Fier, Korçë, and Vlorë areas. Persons of Bulgar origin live mostly in the border areas of Lake Prespa. A few persons of Serb derivation live in the Shkodër area, and Gypsies are scattered throughout the country. Perhaps 1 million ethnic Albanians live in Yugoslavia, of which about 70% live in Kosovo province, contiguous to the northeast section of Albania. This area is held by irredentists to be part of the motherland. The numerous Albanian communities



FIGURE 7. Births, deaths, marriages per 1,000 population, 1938-68 (U/OU)

abroad include perhaps as many as 250,000 ethnic Albanians in Italy and Sicily, 350,000 in Greece, and 80,000 in the United States, with indeterminate numbers also located in Bulgaria, the United Arab Republic, Romania, and Turkey.

Differences among ethnic Albanians—mainly between the Gegs and Tosks— have been noted and measured by qualified observers. Physical anthropologists place the Gegs of the north in the distinctive Dinaric grouping, while the Tosks of the south most prevalently are of the Alpine groupings. Gegs average 5 feet 6 inches in height and tend to be lean and muscular, with a hawklike facial appearance. Tosks are shorter, with rounded features, and have low-bridged noses markedly unlike those of the Gegs. Physically, the Tosks appear to be more closely akin to the Greeks than to the Gegs (Figure 8).

The Albanian language, of Indo-European origin, is the only surviving language of the early Thraco-Illyrian group. Throughout the centuries, Albania has been influenced by Roman, Greek, Slav, and Turkish invaders, merchants, and settlers. The present-day Albanian language in its mechanics is reminiscent of Serbian, modern Greek, and Latin; in its sounds the language

resembles Hungarian and Romanian. A standardized alphabet of 36 letters established in 1908 and given official approval in 1924 continues in use. Prior to this standardization, more than a dozen different alphabets had developed—based variously on Latin, Greek, or Turko-Arabic.

The two main dialects are Geg and Tosk, with minor variations widespread. Since the accession to power of the Communists, most of whose leaders came from southern Albania, the Tosk dialect has become the official language of the country. During the 1920's and 1930's

FIGURE 8. Ethnic types (C) (a.) Geg gendarme from Pukë. (b.) Dinaric Geg from the Klementi tribe of northern Albania. (c.) Dinaric Greek from Gjirokastër. (d.) Tosks in native costume.

the government tried unsuccessfully to establish the dialect of the Elbasan area as the official language. Local dialects still persist but present no communication barriers. Greek is the only significant minority language, and it is confined for the most part to southern Albania, and even there its use is reportedly decreasing. There is relatively little local knowledge of foreign languages. Italian is probably understood in urban areas along the Adriatic coast and reportedly is widely used in the diplomatic circles of Tiranë. The use of French and English, which during the period between the two world wars were known to a small section of the literate elite, has declined since the Communist takeover.

2. Social structure (U/OU)

The structure of Albanian society has been greatly influenced by topography and historical traditions. Apart from the narrow strip of coastal plain along the Adriatic, Albania is divided into numerous restricted highland valleys separated by steep mountain barriers. Among the inhabitants of the highlands, most particularly in the north, a tightly knit tribal structure developed and endured for two millenia of recorded history, while the coastal lowlands permitted domination by powerful overlords and the growth of large estates worked by tenant peasants. Isolation and a meager economic base provided the backdrop for the development of a tough independence and a strong sense of local autonomy among the highlanders. Loyalties belonged first to the family and then to groupings of families—the tribe or clan. Because each family was ruled by the senior male member along strong patriarchal lines, so the clan was headed by the leading patriarch of the group, called under Turkish rule the *bajraktar* (standard bearer). The head of the clan, whose powers were extensive, had authority to arrange marriages, settle disputes between clan members, and decide courses of action in such issues as blood feuds and political alliances.

Because of greater accessibility and cultivability, the coastal lowlands came much more firmly under Turkish control. During the centuries of Ottoman rule the large, independent families were replaced by semifeudal Muslim aristocrats, with their own retinues, fortresses, and estates worked by peasants. These landowning *beys* and *pashas*—whose life-styles contrasted markedly with those of the highland chieftains—predominated in the lowlands until well into the 20th century. Ahmet Zogu—who was later proclaimed King Zog I and effectively ruled Albania from 1925 until the Italian invasion of 1939—controlled the country largely through local leaders. Zogu was from a major *bey* family of Geg background in the central lowlands, and secured the loyalty of the tribal north by investing 240 *bajraktars* with military rank, complete with government stipends.

The accession to power of the Communists led to profound changes in the traditional social and political structure as a result of the exile or liquidation of family heads and tribal leaders, together with the expropriation of the lands and property of the traditional ruling class of *beys* and *bajraktars*. The regime was successful in maintaining its grip on the country, but only by resorting to brutal repression and terrorism in its efforts to intimidate and extirpate dissident elements. The Communists quickly installed a "new class" of bureaucrats and administrators at every level of society and charged them with implementing the decrees of the party. Social dislocation was widespread because of the complete replacement of officials at almost every level. The government's drive to collectivize agriculture and develop industries where none had existed uprooted thousands of persons and led to increased migration from the countryside to the crowded towns and cities.

Concomitantly, for the first time in recent Albanian history, a pervasive vertical social mobility was brought into being and rapidly developed through the educational system. Officially, the Communist regime has claimed that only two classes—workers and laboring

peasants—exist, but in 1965 more than two social groups were delineated. The census of 1960 classified the population as follows:

	Number	Percent
Workers	433,040	26.6
Employees	182,913	11.2
Collective farmers	670,422	41.2
Individual farmers	275,169	16.9
Collective artisans	35,056	2.2
Individual artisans	8,950	0.6
Collective traders	2,328	0.1
Private traders	3,474	0.2
Free professions	889	0.1
Clergy	2,785	0.2
Unemployed and unknown	11,289	0.7
Total	1,626,315	100.0

Between 1967 and 1970 the private peasants, artisans, and traders were substantially reduced or collectivized. In 1967 clergymen were stripped of their ecclesiastical duties and responsibilities and sent to work in economic enterprises.

Any effort to distinguish social groupings is, of necessity, somewhat arbitrary, but three distinct social groups seem to have developed since 1944. At the top is a small party elite enjoying special privileges; next are the professional people, government and industry officials, and artisans. This latter group, which resembles a middle class, is sometimes looked upon with suspicion by the regime. Peasants, who make up the majority of the population, and industrial workers, most of whom are of recent peasant origin, are at the base of the social structure.

With the stabilization of Communist rule, social mobility has diminished. It is relatively difficult to improve one's status without training and education. Contrary to official assertions, educational opportunities are not available equally to all and are especially inadequate in rural areas. Moreover, children of the former upper class continue to be openly discriminated against in such matters as education and employment, while those of the new ruling class enjoy some advantages in both schooling and jobs.

Despite these impediments, vertical mobility continues to exist. There is a growing demand for qualified personnel to staff the administrative bureaucracy of the government as well as the increasing number of industrial enterprises established by the state. The turnover of personnel in responsible managerial positions, attributable in part to incompetence and ideological unreliability, is considerable. Scholarships to capable and politically reliable students from poor families provide opportunities for social as well as economic advancement, and rural-urban migration, even though now much reduced, affords peasants an opportunity to advance economically.

3. Family ties and traditions (U/OU)

For centuries the family has been the basic unit of society. Especially among the Geg highlanders, who seldom dwelled in villages or communities, the extended family was the main political, economic, and social unit. The meager economic base, as well as difficult communications, engendered the growth of a relatively tightly knit extended family, which typically included second and third generation relatives from the male side of the family. A strong sense of hierarchy prevailed in the patriarchal underpinnings of the family. All members of the household—including other males—obeyed the master of the house, who assigned household tasks, arranged marriages, meted out justice, and represented the household in all public dealings. At the evening meal all talk, movement, and action flowed from and was initiated by the head of household. If the master talked, everybody talked; if the master wished to be silent, everybody was silent. The master had only to ask and he was entitled to procure for himself almost any item he desired, frequently a horse or a fancy weapon. The other members of the household did not resent this practice, because his possessions were a source of pride to the entire household and reflected the family's status.

Upon the death of the head of the household (usually the father), the title passed to a previously designated successor. Primogeniture alone did not determine succession, even though respect for elders was an essential part of society. An unexpected death of a household head occasioned the selection of a successor at a meeting of all household males. Ability and talent, as well as age, were factors in the selection.

The women of the household occupied an inferior position, being treated as creatures fit only to supplement their reproductive functions with hard manual work. The mistress of the household ruled over all the women, but her authority usually was limited to assignment of work tasks, with discipline left to the master. Child betrothals were customary, and a girl ceased to be part of her family upon marriage. Betrothals were rarely broken—reneging on contracts often being the pretense for a blood feud—and a recalcitrant young lady could avoid an arranged marriage only by vowing "perpetual virginity." Women did not share in the division of household property, which often occurred as the result of the exodus of a nuclear family from the extended family.

A comprehensive set of tribal laws and customs evolved over the generations and became known as the "unwritten law." This customary law, particularly strong in the mountain areas, regulated many aspects of social life in great detail, but its main feature was the principle of "a life for a life." Custom dictated the taking of a life for a myriad of offenses, ranging from rape and murder to an insult of honor, real or imagined. Frequently families and tribes demanded yet another life in return, thus perpetuating the interminable blood feuds which characterize Albanian history. Honor was considered the most precious commodity—as the oral literature well demonstrates—and a blow to one's honor often was returned with violence. Feuds, once started, often continued for generations and were governed by intricate rules. The taking of blood—a revenge murder—could not be done anywhere or anytime; in most areas a man was

temporarily immune while escorting a woman. Feuds could be postponed or ended only by an agreement of clan chieftains and the taking of a solemn pledge (or *besa*) by heads of the feuding families.

These tribal laws and customs—especially the prevalence of blood feuds—were weakened somewhat in the interwar period. During the dozen years that Ahmet Zogu was in power, first as President and later as a self-proclaimed monarch (Zog I, 1928-39), a principal objective of the government was to modernize and "civilize" the still largely primitive society. Under the Communist regime improvements in communications and transportation, the increasing accessibility of education, enhanced social mobility, and other socioeconomic developments have further contributed to the decline of traditional mores. Many Albanians, however, still cling stubbornly to their old folkways. Press reports indicate that regime campaigns for women's equality, marriage based on love, and an end to patriarchy have not been unqualified successes. The clan mentality has persisted not only in rural areas but also in urban centers, where most of the residents are relatively recent arrivals from the countryside. The enduring strength of family ties and the traditional obligations to relatives and the clan are evident even among the top leadership, of the Communist party: 61 members of the Central Committee are related by blood or marriage. Party boss Enver Hoxha, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, and party secretary Hysni Kapo all have placed their wives in important positions. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Kadri Hasbiu, is the brother-in-law of Shehu, a former Minister of Internal Affairs.

The pervasive influence of patriarchy and clan loyalties has been manifested at all levels of the party. A press article of early 1970 criticized leaders of a local party organization for their "unjustified selectivity" in membership admissions. It seems the local leaders were admitting to the party only those applicants who were from their own clan in order to gain family control of the party organization. Hoxha's complaint in 1968 that local party and government positions often were considered inheritable positions further underscores the vitality of the old ways. Not atypical is the complaint of the man who objected to the proposed candidacy of his sister-in-law as a member of an agricultural collective's council. His objections rested on her failure to obtain his permission (he being head of the family) and, in any case, "the men of the family were not yet dead."

It has been said that Albania is one of the few remaining countries in which what is known as peasant costume is in fact worn by the peasants. City dwellers commonly wear drab, Western-type clothing, but many rural people still wear the white Macedonian tarboosh and the enormous baggy pantaloons of the Muslim highlander. The short full skirt (*fustanella*) commonly worn by men in Greece is also a part of traditional dress in southern Albania (Figure 9).

4. National attitudes (C)

Albanians are nationalistic and independent—characteristics fostered by isolation, rugged mountainous terrain, and hostile neighbors. Communist ideology clashes directly with the ancient Albanian traditions of and belief in individual freedom and orientation to family or tribe rather than to central authority. As a result, many Albanians are still hostile to the Communist regime because of its oppressive nature and the enforced regimentation that has destroyed individual freedom.

Hostility toward the Communists also stems from the identification of communism with the Serbs, traditionally despised by the Albanians. The Communist movement has for the majority of the population a definite Slavic connotation as a result of the influence of the Yugoslav Communist Party in organizing Albanian splinter groups into a unified Communist party in 1941. During the period from 1948 to 1961, when Albania was a loyal satellite of the U.S.S.R. and a recipient of aid from that country, Albanians came to resent the higher level of

Durrës Shkodër Tiranë

FIGURE 9. LINGERING TRADITIONAL DRESS IN THREE PRINCIPAL CITIES (U/OU)

living enjoyed by Soviet technical and military aid personnel and their attitudes of superiority. Since the break with the U.S.S.R., officials have gained a measure of popular support by a continuing propaganda barrage aimed at inflaming the population against the U.S.S.R., appealing to nationalistic tendencies of the Albanians, and blaming the U.S.S.R. for Albania's economic woes. In addition, the very longevity of the regime, along with other factors, such as the slowly improving levels of living and the gradual assumption of power by the younger generation educated under the Communist system, suggests that there may be a growing acceptance of the regime by the population.

Despite the close and cordial relations that exist between Albania and Communist China at the national level, there is little evidence that the majority of Albanians share these positive feelings. Even the replacement of the Soviet Union by Communist China as Albania's principal source of economic aid and political support does not appear to have greatly enhanced the enthusiasm of most Albanians. Prolonging this apathetic acceptance are the unfamiliarity of China and its culture to most Albanians and the aloof behavior of Chinese technicians in Albania.

Albanians have tended to regard their neighbors, Yugoslavia and Greece, as hereditary enemies. These traditional hostilities are kept alive, albeit with diminishing intensity, by propaganda alleging Yugoslav designs on Albanian territory and by Greek claims to portions of southern Albania as rightfully belonging to Epirus.

Although the official attitude toward the United States is one of hostility, many older Albanians, particularly those who have lived in the United States or who have relatives there, regard the country favorably. The much larger and constantly growing proportion of persons who do not have ties to the United States, however, may be susceptible to the official hostile and abusive anti-U.S. propaganda.

E. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor relations

1. Size and characteristics of the labor force (S)

Albania's labor force totaled 911,000 in mid-1969, according to U.S. estimates, and it accounted for about 44% of the total population and almost 84% of the population of working age (15-64). Although the labor force has steadily increased in size, it has not kept pace with the rapid growth of the population. In 1960 it comprised 722,000 persons and represented 45.4% of the population; by July 1966 the labor force had decreased to about 43.9% of the population, a level since maintained, according to official U.S. estimates.

Despite a continuing increase in the nonagricultural work force, Albania remains the only country in Europe in which the bulk of the labor force is still engaged in agriculture. Three-fourths of the labor force was employed in agriculture in 1955, a proportion that declined to 63.7% in 1967 and to 60.4% in 1969 (Figure 10). Conversely, the number of workers and employees in industry (manufacturing and extractive) has increased. According to U.S. estimates, the 12.2% of the labor force employed in industry in 1960 rose to 17.9% in 1969.



FIGURE 10. Distribution of the labor force between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, 1955-69 (U/OU)

For the year 1967 the greatest proportion of the nonagricultural labor force was employed in the manufacturing and extractive industries and the smallest proportion in credit institutions. Between 1960 and 1967 the distribution of nonagricultural workers among the various economic sectors remained fairly stable. The greatest changes were registered in the industrial and construction sectors. During the 7-year period, the proportion of industrial workers increased by 6%, while the construction sector registered a decrease of 5%. The decrease in the proportion of workers employed in the construction sector possibly could be attributed to the high priority given to mechanization. Employment has remained relatively stable in most other sectors of the nonagricultural economy. The 2% increase in personnel engaged in teaching and other educational endeavors seems inadequate for the greatly increased school enrollment; the slight proportionate decline in the number of public health workers, however, raises doubts about the continuing effectiveness of the health campaign. The distribution of the nonagricultural labor force, 1960-67, is shown in Figure 11.

The regime has made some progress in encouraging the use of women in the nonagricultural labor force. Women

FIGURE 11. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY* (U/OU)

ECONOMIC SECTOR	1960			1965			1967		
	Number employed	Percent	Percent of females	Number employed	Percent	Percent of females	Number employed	Percent	Percent of females
Industry	64,421	37.7	37.6	86,803	39.3	37.9	110,858	43.4	44.5
Building	33,588	19.6	4.2	38,738	17.5	4.2	38,157	14.9	4.2
Transportation and communications	8,863	5.2	1.4	11,369	5.1	1.5	12,087	4.7	1.6
Trade and procurement	25,211	14.7	22.2	29,629	13.4	20.3	33,083	12.9	18.6
Communal	3,224	1.9	1.5	4,502	2.0	1.9	4,299	1.7	1.8
Education and culture	13,923	8.2	12.6	23,122	10.4	15.9	26,201	10.3	13.7
Public health	9,881	5.8	15.0	13,258	6.0	13.9	14,370	5.6	10.9
Public administration	8,133	4.8	3.3	8,427	3.8	2.4	8,299	3.2	2.1
Credit institutes	810	0.5	0.8	978	0.4	0.7	976	0.4	0.6
Other	2,484	1.6	1.4	3,968	2.1	1.3	7,194	2.9	2.0
Total	170,538	100.0	100.0	220,794	100.0	100.0	255,524	100.0	100.0

*Excluding military personnel and self-employed individuals.

FIGURE 12. NONAGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE BY SEX, 1967 (U/OU)

ECONOMIC SECTOR	TOTAL	MALE/PERCENT	FEMALE/PERCENT
Industry	110,858	70,105 63.2	40,753 36.8
Building	38,157	34,307 90.0	3,850 10.0
Transportation and communications	12,087	10,601 87.7	1,486 12.3
Trade and procurement	33,083	16,034 48.4	17,049 51.6
Communal	4,299	2,616 60.9	1,683 39.1
Education and culture	26,201	13,640 52.1	12,561 47.9
Public health	14,370	4,434 30.9	9,936 69.1
Public administration	8,299	6,343 76.4	1,956 23.6
Credit institutes	976	447 45.8	529 54.2
Other	7,194	5,430 75.5	1,764 24.5

will comprise about 48% of the agricultural work force, while, according to the secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, they constituted 38% of the nonagricultural labor force in July 1970. The latter proportion represents a rise of 2% over regime estimates in the summer of 1969 and a marked increase from the 26% officially claimed in 1960. Although the female participation rate (Figure 12) is not notably high in comparison with other Communist states, the recent increase of women workers in the nonagricultural sector reflects a continuing departure from Albanian tradition, by which women were expected to confine their activities to the home and the farm.

Proportionately more women than men are employed in the public health, education and culture, and trade sectors of the economy (Figure 11). Relatively few women are employed in the building, transportation, and public administration sectors. The proportionate employment of women in industry has increased slightly faster than the increase in industry's share of the total nonagricultural labor force, a phenomenon largely attributable to the development of such sectors as textiles which traditionally employ women.

Official statistics on unemployment are not published, because theoretically there is no unemployment. The inefficiencies of the economy—as aired in the press—nevertheless point to persistent underemployment. A breakdown of the labor force by population age groups is not available.

The regime keeps close control over movements of the labor force, although it does not publish statistics on labor mobility. Traditional movements of the migratory Vlachs and Gypsies—seasonally mobile as shepherds and artisans, respectively—have been severely curtailed. Article 55 of the labor code states that a worker may quit his job only "for good reason," and worker-initiated transfers are probably "of good reason" only if the movement conforms to state needs or is in response to government campaigns. Most worker transfers are implemented at the direct behest of the local or central government. The labor code contains several articles governing enterprise-initiated transfers and makes no provision for worker agreement. Rather, the code allows a worker to be transferred to a commensurate job in any other enterprise, regardless of location. Transfers within an administrative district are accomplished at the initiative or with the approval of the district people's council executive committee. Movements between districts are handled through the appropriate economic ministry or other central organs.

Prior to early 1966 the regime appeared to encourage the movement of the labor force from the countryside to

the cities as part of its industrialization campaign. The resulting crush on housing and other urban services, however, subsequently required the regime to halt the influx, and in some areas even to order a reversal of this migration. The "rational location" of new regional production centers closer to rural settlements and the renewed recruitment of farm labor needed to increase agricultural production on the largely unmechanized farms have resulted in the resettling of peasant families in their native villages.

Simultaneously the regime has attempted a partial reordering and decentralization of the governmental administrative apparatus. In March 1966 an Open Letter from the party called for a reduction of "surplus functionaries" and "bureaucrats" in the state administration and party apparatus. In the space of about a year, an estimated 8,000 government workers were assigned from Tiranë to regional production centers. During subsequent years, new graduates of health and education schools have "volunteered" to work in the villages for periods of time varying from 1 to 5 years.

Temporary and seasonal labor movements are usually the product of crash economic projects. Such projects as cultivating virgin land, building railroad lines, and digging irrigation ditches are implemented through the mobilization and movement of work brigades selected from all sectors of the population. Students often spend their 2-month summer vacations performing "voluntary" work, often at remote construction sites (Figure 13). Work on the Fier-Rrogozhinë railroad in 1967, according to press reports, involved the labor of 40,000 young people working in 2-month shifts. Similarly, press reports throughout 1967 acclaimed the 20,000 youths who were cultivating virgin lands and the 4,000 young people building roads around Shkodër. During harvest time the regime frequently shifts large numbers of urban workers and youth to the countryside. An economic summary for 1967 points to the movement of 150,000 persons to the countryside and notes that they contributed 850,000 "voluntary" workdays in aiding the harvest. The educational reform of late 1969, by making production work a requirement in the educational curriculum, has placed further emphasis on the mobilization of students for part-time work.

FIGURE 13. Students working on Elbasan-Prenjas railroad (U/OU)

All segments of society, including the armed forces and criminals, are mobilized to work on economic projects. The armed forces are periodically enlisted for work on emergency projects and purportedly played an important role in the drive to fulfill the fourth Five Year Plan (1966-70). In 1966 the army reportedly cultivated all land within some military zones and opened new areas for agricultural production, especially in mountainous regions. Albania is one of the few Communist countries that still resort to the use of prison labor for such state projects as the construction of railroads, highways, and irrigation systems, but the use of such labor brigades may have decreased in the last several years.

Manpower shortages—whether skilled or unskilled—occur periodically, largely because of poor management and the stopgap planning techniques of an overextended economy. In addition to the fairly frequent movements of large numbers of unskilled laborers, the regime must occasionally shift skilled workers from job to job, depending on the priority of various projects. Poor compilation of manpower balances—part of the central system of labor planning indexes—and competing pressures on the limited pool of skilled manpower often lead to disputes between economic enterprises and district executive committees. To hedge against labor shortages, enterprises frequently request more workers than they need, thereby exacerbating the situation. Statistics on skilled manpower needs and shortages are not published. Periodic references to shortages contain some statistics but provide no overall pattern. Press reports in the fall of 1968 revealed manpower shortages in the mining, construction, and lumbering sectors of the economy. Koco Theodhosi, Minister of Industry and Mining, asserted in late 1967 that a shortage of medium-grade engineering workers caused an inadequate distribution of 3.8 workers for every 5.2 jobs. Politburo member Spiro Koleka stated frankly in late 1969 that the industrial construction projects planned for the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) require at least 500 additional highly trained workers, 1,500 "medium trained" workers, and 17,000 skilled workers. He maintained that a solution to the shortages could be found by upgrading workers' skills and by recruiting young qualified and potentially qualified "male and female workers primarily from the city, and then from the village."

Albania has sought to improve the skills and technical qualifications of its labor force, placing increased emphasis on vocational training as one of the most important elements in its educational system. An extensive system of secondary vocational and technical schools—70% of which are located at production enterprises—turns out middle-grade workers, but not in sufficient numbers. A network of lower vocational

schools—existing outside the formal educational network—provides training, specialization, and qualification courses for workers. Lasting from a month to a year, the lower vocational courses train new entrants into the labor force and upgrade workers' qualifications for specific jobs. On-the-job training is provided for students fulfilling production work requirements ("students in the economy") and for lower category workers trying to upgrade their skills.

According to Sotir Kamberi, secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, 7,000 workers were enrolled in lower vocational training in the 1969/70 school year, while 60,000 workers attended part-time schools at various levels. One-third of the workers in the latter category attended secondary vocational schools, and 15,000 workers took higher education courses (mostly technical training) at night or by correspondence.

The improved educational level of the labor force is difficult to document in any extensive fashion. One available example, although perhaps reflecting a generally higher educational level than the norm for the nonagricultural work force, is the educational profile of the employees of the Korçë knitting combine, which in mid-1970 was delineated as follows:

Level of education	Number of workers
Incomplete 8-year school	681
Complete 8-year school	1,100
Incomplete secondary school	190
Complete secondary school	294
Higher education	16

Commentary accompanying these statistics indicat that, although many workers have only 8 years of education, the regime tends to regard completion of secondary school (12 years) as comprising an "average education."

Frequent press complaints point to the workers' apparent lack of enthusiasm for work-related training courses. Campaigns to encourage attendance at the various training schools open to the workers evidently have led to forced enrollments. Consequently, the workers' schools suffer from high dropout and absentee rates. Reliable observers in late 1969 noted propaganda which emphasized the "buddy system" approach to technical training. Parading under the slogan of "two for one," the campaign proposed that each technically qualified worker raise the technical level of two friends.

2. Productivity and working conditions (C)

Shortcomings in labor productivity have been the object of regime criticism in Albania, much as in other Communist countries. An indifferent labor force evidently is a prime cause of low productivity. The press periodically bemoans such indications of worker apathy as high absentee rates, late arrivals, early departures, and slipshod work. Factors contributing to poor performance include generally low, poorly differentiated wage levels, a low level of worker training and education, the pervasiveness of the artisan mentality, and lingering dietary and other health deficiencies. The regime's general response to poor worker performance is to urge greater discipline, to raise worker norms, to dole out labor awards, and to enjoin trade unions, youth groups, and party organizations to "mobilize" the population. The low level of fixed capital also impairs efforts to achieve higher productivity.

Statistical data on output per man-hour are not available. Official statements on productivity are infrequent and limited to generalized statements pointing out, for example, that labor productivity increased 6% from 1965 to 1966 or that in 1969 it was 3.64 times greater than in 1950. Every enterprise has a quarterly planning figure for achieving an increase in productivity, but targets and results seldom are published. No estimate on the relative efficiency of the economic sectors is therefore possible, but the admission by *Zeri i Popullit* in the fall of 1968 that labor productivity is lowest in agriculture probably still holds true. No estimates on gross national product are published.

The legal workweek is comprised of six 8-hour days, with exceptions to this norm set by the Council of Ministers. Minors under 16 cannot work more than 6 hours, and workers performing difficult or dangerous jobs work from 5 to 7 hours. Dangerous occupations include certain mining operations, furnace cleaning, and work around radioactive materials. The workday is periodically split into two segments by a decision of the Council of Ministers. Premiums for night work (10 p.m. until 6 a.m.) are paid either by shortening shifts an hour or by granting the worker an hour of extra pay. The normal workday may be increased for seasonal work, theoretically with appropriate pay increases. Additionally, workers may "volunteer" for overtime, but in no case may a worker perform more than 180 hours of overtime work a year. Payment for overtime work is only one-fourth of the worker's normal wage. Workers have the right to at least 11 hours of rest between two workdays, one weekly rest period of not less than 36 hours, a yearly paid vacation of 12 working days, and unpaid leave up to 12 days. Women are entitled to paid maternity leave, breaks during the day for nursing, and up to 3 months of unpaid leave for child care.

The actual workweek is undoubtedly much longer than the legal workweek, because the regime makes extensive use of the labor force for "voluntary" campaigns. Segments of the population are periodically mobilized to accomplish certain projects. Aside from large-scale projects, such as construction of roads and railroads, the construction of urban housing and "cultural" facilities has frequently occupied the spare time of the Albanian worker.

The state Health Inspectorate is responsible for insuring the implementation of hygiene and safety rules at work centers, including the right to close temporarily an enterprise and levy fines. Persons employed in dangerous work or in sectors where production could facilitate the spread of contagious diseases must undergo

periodic medical checkups and carry a health book issued by the inspectorate. Although the trade unions were relieved of formal responsibility for safety regulations in 1965, the unions are still charged with checking on health and safety conditions at work. Concern with workers' safety seems a periodic phenomenon at best, and reliable observers have reported that such concern very rarely takes priority over the fulfillment of production tasks.

The Council of Ministers sets rates of pay for all occupations. Hourly wages are the exception rather than the rule, and most pay is based on fulfillment of production norms, which most often specify a number of parameters—quantity, quality, or technical characteristics of the work. Production norms often apply to a collective of workers rather than to an individual. Placement of all workers in specific graduated job categories—which probably are rough reflections of skill levels—provides an additional criterion for calculating wages. According to the revised wage scale of 1967, all industrial workers are placed in one of five categories (seven categories for the textile industry).

Information on actual wage differentials—either according to job or geographical area—is practically nonexistent. A narrowing of wage differentials, implemented in the fall of 1967, reduced top wages and selectively increased the wages of those in the lowest categories. The avowed purpose of this reduction was the "withdrawal of material incentives" and the promotion in their stead of the more ideologically pure "moral incentives," but the distribution of the wage increases seemed to favor labor-scarce industries. Economic sectors with supply shortages or quality-control standards (e.g., export items) were excluded from the reduction of material incentives, as were some very senior skilled workers. The regime sought to justify the wage reductions by pointing out that the real income of the workers included such benefits as social security, pensions, free medical care, and educational and cultural benefits. Agricultural earnings are probably much lower than industrial wages, partly because the farmer is the last claimant on the net income of the cooperative and state farms. Additionally, in the past, farmers have had to make social insurance and income tax payments at times when most industrial workers received the social benefits free of charge. Periodic reductions in consumer prices over the last few years and the abolition of the income tax in 1967 have probably increased the purchasing power of both urban and rural wage earners, but the level of living remains the lowest in Eastern Europe.

3. Labor relations and legislation (S)

As in other countries of Eastern Europe, trade unions are merely an arm of the Communist party, and most high-level union officials hold important positions in the party. At the center of the trade union system is the Central Council of Trade Unions. Formed on 11 February 1945 as the Provisional General Council of Workers Syndicates of Albania, the council has met in national congress seven times since 1945. The central council is composed of about 100 members, ostensibly delegates from constituent unions, but actually selected by the party leadership. The council has a small executive body, the presidium, and an extensive administrative apparatus, both of which conduct daily business in the name of the central council. The chairman of the council, presumably designated by the party Politburo, is assisted by a secretary general and several secretaries, who oversee the administrative apparatus. Four main functional divisions of the apparatus (education, culture, and commerce; industry and mining; transportation and construction; and agriculture) regulate the activities of the appropriate local trade union organizations. The central apparatus also has four "substantive" branches (culture, foreign affairs, labor safety, and social security) cutting across functional areas of responsibility.

The branches for labor safety and social security seem to function, even though the trade unions were formally relieved of administering safety regulations and social security in December 1965. The foreign affairs branch is responsible for relations between the Central Council of Trade Unions and foreign trade union organizations. Albania is still a member of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and in 1965 was reported to be at the top of the list of countries delinquent in their dues to this organization. Since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania has boycotted many WFTU sessions and has often used the occasion of WFTU meetings to level scathing press denunciations of the Soviet Union.

Below the central trade union structure are 27 district trade union councils, corresponding to the administrative divisions of the country. The district councils also have an extensive apparatus and are responsible for the activities of all the trade unions within the district boundaries. Every state enterprise and institution has a trade union organization headed by a committee nominally elected by the trade union members. The committee members, notably their chairmen, are the guiding spirits of the organization, and their responsibilities include mobilizing the workers in production competitions, implementing regime campaigns, enforcing safety regulations, monitoring management, and settling workers' grievances.

Only the skimpiest machinery has been established for the regulation of labor-management relations. The revised labor code of 1966—the basic law governing labor and manpower—sets down rules on work hours, wages, working conditions, employment and transfer, and grievance settlements that normally would be considered part of a labor contract. No mention is made of collective bargaining, and the criminal code treats would-be strikers as criminals guilty of economic sabotage. The resolution of worker grievances is relegated to the trade union organization, but appeals may be addressed to the local people's court. A worker's liability for work damage ("intentional or careless") is assessed by the director of the enterprise, but again the regular court system is a forum of appeal. Serious prolonged labor disputes appear

to be unknown in Albania, and they would be regarded as "manifestations of capitalism."

Since all industrial enterprises are the property of the state and about 98% of agricultural land has been socialized, management in the Western sense does not exist. Officials appointed by the state are responsible for the management of enterprises; they lack many powers associated with true management. They do not have the power to hire and fire freely, to set prices, or to make other basic decisions. These prerogatives belong to the government and the party. In many cases management positions are given to persons who are loyal to the regime rather than to those who have demonstrated related professional competence; often the subsequent training afforded new managers is inadequate. Criticisms in the press reveal that in response to the government's unrealistic production goals, management has permitted the manufacture of shoddy merchandise and has not infrequently falsified records.

F. Health and welfare (U/OU)

1. Principal diseases

The Communist regime continues to improve the public health facilities that were totally inadequate prior to World War II. Progress generally has been erratic, however, for officials not only must cope with deeply ingrained primitive health habits among a population basically hostile to government direction, but they must also make their influence felt in many barely accessible mountain communities.

Albania has traditionally suffered severely from tuberculosis, malaria, syphilis, and a variety of dietary and other ailments prevalent in very backward countries. Tuberculosis remains a main public health threat despite the advancements made in the battle against the disease under the Communist regime. A diagnostic screening program, using tuberculin tests and X-rays for the population up to the age of 18, is conducted throughout the country, and in many factories X-ray screening is undertaken periodically. Nevertheless, the official tuberculosis mortality rate of 14.7 per 10,000 population in 1967 was still the highest in Europe, but it represented a marked decline from the 53.1 deaths per 10,000 registered in 1960. Venereal diseases probably continue to be a serious public health problem, even though the regime claims to have virtually eliminated syphilis. The prevalence of the disease for centuries, coupled with the relatively widespread illiteracy and inaccessibility to proper medical care, makes this claim dubious. A public health article of late 1969 claims that the last case of syphilis contracted within the country was detected in 1960.

Malaria—one of the most prevalent diseases before 1950—has been significantly reduced, but the disease probably persists, particularly in the lowlands along the Adriatic. Health officials maintain that no cases of malaria have been recorded since 1967. Albanian sources also claim marked reductions in the incidence of dysentery and of typhoid fever, but the prevailing inadequacy of sewage disposal, the widespread contamination of foods and water, and the abundance of flies require that such claims be treated with caution. Albanian authorities have also made a concentrated effort to combat typhus by immunization, but they have been unable to control either the louse and flea vectors or the rat population.

Epidemics since the advent of the Communist regime include two measles epidemics in 1948-49 and in 1954-55, an Asiatic flu epidemic in 1957, outbreaks of typhoid fever in 1945 and in 1950, and poliomyelitis in 1953 and in 1955-58. The measles epidemic of 1954-55 afflicted almost 14% of the population, and 1,712 children under age 15 died. Children were vaccinated against measles for the first time during 1965 with vaccine donated by Communist China, and the authorities claim that measles has been eliminated. During the height of the polio epidemic of 1955-58 an incidence of 4.3 cases per 100,000 inhabitants was reached. The regime has imported Salk and Sabin vaccine and claims to have vaccinated all children up to 4 years of age. Spokesmen for the Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology claim that the institute produces rabies and typhus vaccines and purified serums against diphtheria, tetanus, and rabies.

2. Medical facilities

The Ministry of Public Health regulates the medical facilities and public health educational programs. Confronted with staggering medical problems in the early postwar years—stemming from virtually nonexistent medical and sanitation facilities in a society over three-fourths illiterate—the regime has made measurable strides in improving the somber picture. The number of physicians has increased from 102 in 1938 to almost 1,400 in 1969, according to official estimates. Thus, in the latter year, there was one physician for every 1,500 inhabitants—a marked improvement over the ratio of one physician per 3,600 inhabitants registered a scant 9 years earlier (1960). This approximate ratio of 6.8 physicians to 10,000 population (1969) still, however, compares poorly with neighboring Yugoslavia (eight physicians per 10,000 population), where facilities are recognized as inadequate, and is well below the rates in such advanced countries as France (13:10,000) or Denmark and the United States (16:10,000). Many physicians are specialists located in urban medical facilities and probably have little contact with the population. An Albanian health official's admission in 1968 that the country has only one physician for every 5,998 peasants (or 1.7 physicians for every 10,000 rural inhabitants) points up the wide disparity between rural and urban medical care. The shortage of doctors has been partially compensated for by the training of auxiliary medical personnel. The number of medical aides, midwives, and nurses has increased dramatically—having almost doubled between 1960 and 1969. Such personnel appear to have only minimum medical knowledge, but they have helped raise the health level of the population from the very low levels prevalent before the Communist takeover. According to official statistics,

the 8,967 medical cadres listed in 1969 were divided into the following categories:

Physicians	1,396
Medical aides	725
Midwives	1,091
Nurses	4,100
Laboratory technicians	737
Other	918

Many of the auxiliary medical personnel have been assigned to rural areas. Between 1962 and 1968 the number of medical aides in rural areas more than doubled, and the number of midwives increased almost sevenfold. Official estimates in 1968 placed 50% of the medical aides and midwives among the 60% of the population classified as rural.

Health care facilities, according to 1968 statistics, include 196 hospitals, 1,108 first-aid stations and polyclinics, and 36 dispensaries and tuberculosis centers. A total of 11,922 beds in all institutions throughout the country in 1968 yields almost 60 beds per 10,000 population. The majority of these beds are reserved for specialized uses, and only 53 hospitals (containing 522 beds) serve rural areas. Health care facilities for the rural areas are comprised largely of traveling first-aid stations and polyclinics. Permanent facilities are often rudimentary first-aid stations or maternity "homes," each of which may function as a maternity consultation center, a first-aid station, or a nursery.

No information is available concerning medical programs for disaster relief or civil defense. Albania has a Red Cross and a civil defense organization called the Society for Aid to the Army and Defense. Fragmentary evidence indicates that the latter is responsible for all aspects of civil defense, including measures against bombing and gas attacks and all forms of first aid.

3. Sanitation

Water supplies are generally inadequate for the needs of the population and are frequently contaminated and unfit for drinking. Wells, springs, lakes, rivers, and streams are the principal sources of water. During the summer dry season their supply is often meager, especially in the lowland regions. Water contamination is common in rural areas. Wells used by most villages are located without any consideration for possible pollution from nearby pit privies and manure piles. By Western standards the water in most urban areas is neither potable without further treatment nor adequate in quantity for basic sanitation requirements. Only Tiranë has a fairly well developed municipal water system, which supplies more than half of the city's buildings with water. Urban homes not connected to municipal water systems and virtually all smaller communities depend on private wells, cisterns, and public fountains (Figure 14).

Efforts to upgrade water supply systems may be documented in the press, but meaningful statistics are rarely presented. It is evident that testing water sources, a responsibility of the Institute of Health and Epidemiology, has become much more prevalent during the 1960's. Similarly, the construction of simple water mains and pumping facilities seems to have been given a high priority. The regime claims to have constructed 187 water mains in 1968-69 alone, as well as to have continued work, during the same period, on a major water-improvement system in the Shkodër area.

FIGURE 14. Children at public water faucet in Berat (U/OU)

Basic sanitary precautions considered normal in most of Western Europe have not yet become widespread. Only Tiranë seems to be provided with an adequate municipal underground sewerage system. Other communities—including such cities as Durrës and Shkodër—probably dump untreated sewage into streams, rivers, lakes, and the Adriatic Sea. In the rural areas most of the villages still use pit-type open privies. Use of night soil as fertilizer is believed to be practiced by much of the peasant population despite a law which forbids it. The regime apparently has not yet taken strong countermeasures in some areas. Only Tiranë is known to have garbage and trash disposal systems, though several other cities probably maintain collection services which operate infrequently. Street cleaning operations are performed regularly in Tiranë; other urban centers do little to keep their streets free of refuse.

Inadequate storage, refrigeration, and transportation facilities have contributed to serious problems in food distribution. Correct food-handling procedures are understood by the authorities, but regulations are not uniformly enforced, and in many sections of the country contamination of food products occurs during their processing, transportation, and sale at local markets (Figure 15). Although the regime has made some progress



FIGURE 15. Market place in Durrës after crowds have dispersed (U/OU)

in constructing new food-processing plants near the growing population centers, quantities of produce still spoil en route to the consumer. Albanian claims of an 18-fold increase in public refrigeration facilities between 1945 and 1969 provide scant evidence as to actual progress achieved. In 1945 very little refrigeration—public or private—existed.

4. Levels of living

a. Diet

The dietary level of the population in both quantity and quality is the lowest in Europe. Although a member of the United Nations since 1955, Albania has not complied with requests by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization for statistics on daily average per capita caloric consumption. Collateral evidence indicates, however, that the daily caloric intake averages about 2,100 calories per capita, well below the Western European and North American norm of more than 3,000 calories and the southern European daily average of 2,800 calories. Frequent shortages of food constitute the main factor contributing to nutritional inadequacies. The diet remains deficient in protein and other essential elements; an estimated 80% or more of food intake is carbohydrates. Basic dishes, high in starch content, are made from corn, wheat, rice, and potatoes. Other fairly common foods, from which most of the minimal protein requirements are derived, are yogurt, cheese, and dried beans. Fruits and green vegetables appear seasonally in limited quantities. Meat of almost all kinds is still a luxury.

b. Housing

One of the most pressing problems is the improvement of housing, which is characterized by overcrowding, poor construction, physical deterioration, and inadequate sanitary facilities. These deficiencies are acutely felt in urban areas, where two or more families occupy a small house or apartment and share toilet and kitchen facilities. Although apartments are relatively inexpensive, their allocation is strictly linked to the type of employment of each worker. Since at least early 1968 the regime has attempted to relieve the urban housing shortage by promoting apartment construction with "voluntary" labor. About 3,200 apartments were built using state funds and voluntary labor during 1968, and about 40 million leks were allocated for further such construction in 1969. A reliable observer in mid-1969 noted, however, that apartments are of generally shoddy construction and poorly maintained.

The quality of housing has improved little in rural areas since World War II. During the third Five Year Plan (1961-65), about 30,000 homes were built, most of them in the villages, but peasant homes generally still are primitive one- or two-room structures of stone. Containing only the barest furnishings, the huts are planned around a central hearth. The traditional thatched roofs and earthen floors, however, are slowly giving way to the use of more durable materials, such as tile and stone. In some rural areas domestic animals are kept inside the dwelling at night, but this practice may be declining as a result of strong efforts to modernize the countryside. Sanitary facilities are primitive in rural areas, where dwellings frequently lack even outhouses. According to official claims, every Albanian village had been supplied with electricity by the fall of 1970. Nonetheless, few private rural dwellings have electricity. The contrast between traditional housing and new urban apartment buildings is shown in Figure 16.

c. Consumer items

Despite improvements in many phases of life since the end of World War II, the level of living of the average family in Albania remains the lowest in all of Europe. In addition to frequent food shortages, all consumer items remain scarce and of poor quality. The daily sight of queues in front of the shops affords visible evidence of the hardships and difficulties of life. The ordinary citizen is estimated to spend 90% of his earnings on food and rent, while the remaining 10% must be parcelled out for other necessities, such as clothing, linen, toilet articles (where used), household furnishings, and transportation. Little, if any, is left for the most meager entertainment, and articles considered necessities elsewhere in Europe are obtained with difficulty. A bicycle, for example, costs from about 800 to 1,300 leks, which at the official exchange rate (a rate that has little real meaning) would be US$160 to $260. Automobiles are owned by such a very small number of people that downtown Tiranë little resembles other European capitals (Figure 17). Figure 18 depicts the availability of specific consumer items in Albania and other European countries.

5. Social welfare programs

Albania has a broadly based social insurance program designed, in part, to further official aims to maximize production, strengthen worker discipline, and reduce absenteeism and labor turnover. Prior to December 1965 the administrative, technical, and financial functions of the social insurance program were handled by the trade unions. As a result of a reorganization, the Office of State Social Security—attached to the Council of Ministers—was charged with running the program through district social insurance offices apparently attached to the district

FIGURE 16. Rural and urban housing, Tiranë District, 1969 (U/OU)

people's councils. Interpretations of the social insurance law often involve the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Health, and the court system.

Social insurance does not cover general medical care, obstetric and pediatric services, or family assistance payments made to households with children. The state appropriates special funds for these various categories of aid. The following tabulation depicts related budget expenditures in millions of leks for 1967.

Social insurance	181.5
Health	189.0
Family assistance	117.0
Education and culture	338.0

Social insurance is financed by the state through appropriations from the state budget and from contributions made by enterprises, institutions, and state and social organizations. Individual contributions are made by members of certain cooperatives but apparently not by the majority of workers and state employees. Any deficits in the insurance fund are covered by state funds. Budgeted social insurance expenditures increased from 100 million leks in 1961 to 120 million in 1965. The 1967 expenditures for social insurance of about 182 million were allocated in millions of leks as follows, although data on pension expenditures are contradictory and outlays in 1967 might include an additional 8.9 million leks:

Pensions	114.6
Temporary work disability	33.9
Maternity compensation	15.0
Childbirth assistance	7.2
Rest homes	7.2
Other compensation	3.6

The state insurance program covers all government employees, workers in state-owned factories and institutions, servicemen, and members of certain cooperatives (i.e., arts and crafts cooperatives and fishermen's cooperatives). Collectivized peasants do not



FIGURE 17. Tiranë's main street, Stalin Avenue, during midafternoon. Automobiles are absent and the avenue is used as a sidewalk. (U/OU)



FIGURE 18. Levels of living in selected countries (U/OU)

participate in the system but receive benefits from a fund created by setting aside a percentage of the total income of the collective farms. Temporary workers often are not entitled to all the benefits accorded permanent workers. The Council of Ministers has the power to extend social insurance coverage to other worker groups.

The state social insurance plan also provides unemployment benefits for permanent or temporary disability, various pensions, maternity leave benefits, and allowances for births and deaths in a family. A major portion of the fund allotted to social insurance is spent on various pension programs. In 1967, according to official statistics, 40,500 workers received pensions, compared with 35,500 in 1966. Expenditures on pensions accounted for some 60% of social insurance expenditures.

Four types of pensions are available under the social insurance law: old age, permanent disability, family, and military retirement. However, no more than one pension may be received at a time. Old-age pensions are set at 70% of a worker's wage but must be between 350 and 900 leks a month. They are paid only upon retirement after a certain number of years on the job. Depending on the job, men can retire as early as age 50 with 20 years of work or as late as age 60 with 25 years on the job; women can retire as early as 45 or as late as 55. Because of the shortage of qualified teachers, the regime "allows" teachers to work until age 65. Partial old-age pensions are granted to workers who have attained retirement age but do not have the required number of work years. Most people work beyond the age of retirement. Because of the chronic labor shortage, part-time or "voluntary" work continues well beyond the legal retirement age.

Payments for disability are highly differentiated according to the degree and cause of disability and years of service. Partially disabled workers can receive a pension while working at another job, but the total income from pension and wages cannot exceed the pay on which the pension is computed. Family pensions are granted to dependents of a deceased head of household. Servicemen are eligible for a retirement pension after 20 years of military service. The amount paid increases after 25 years of service (from 35% to 60% of the basic wage), but the pension is discontinued after a person is eligible for an old-age pension. Special increments are paid to those who participated in the revolutionary movement and in the National Liberation War before 24 May 1944.

According to the revised social insurance law which went into effect on 1 January 1967, a worker with less than 10 years of service who is temporarily incapacitated receives an insurance grant amounting to 70% of his wages, while a worker with more than 10 years receives 85%. Temporarily incapacitated miners with 5 years of service receive 80% of their wages, and those with more than 5 years of service receive 95%. When inability to

work is the result of an accident on the job or is caused by occupational illness, regardless of seniority in work, the insurance pays 95% of a worker's wages and 100% of a miner's wages. The rates are presumably the same for lengthy disabilities, and payment apparently continues until the worker may again be gainfully employed.

Miscellaneous benefits granted under the social insurance law include cash payments of 280 leks for each birth, a death payment of 200 leks to survivors, temporary unemployment compensation for discharged servicemen and students leaving school, and free vacations in rest homes (built and administered by the trade unions with social insurance funds).

Changes in the social insurance law in May 1970 reflect the use of the social insurance law as a tool for molding behavior. Most notably, requirements for student unemployment compensation were stiffened, and the period of compensation was halved in an apparent effort to encourage a swift transition from school to gainful employment. The period of military service required for a retirement pension was increased from 15 to 20 years. Under the new law the state was given further powers to revoke pensions as a means of helping combat an upsurge of petty theft and graft. Other changes include extension of death benefits to families of temporary workers, reduction of pension benefits for the permanently disabled who are able to perform simple tasks, and extension of some pension benefits to relatives of workers in agricultural cooperatives.

6. Social problems

The social and political revolution which occurred following the Communist takeover profoundly affected the lives of a people who for the most part had been agriculturalists and herdsmen. Such factors as the conflict between Communist and traditional values, the enforced collectivization of the land, and the intensive efforts to industrialize led inevitably to tension between the regime and much of the population.

Despite relatively effective isolation from developments elsewhere in Europe, there are indications that Albania is beginning to face some of the social problems that have become common in other European countries. Juvenile delinquency, practically unheard of in Albania prior to World War II, has become a matter of some concern. The antisocial behavior of youth may be attributed to the breakdown of respect for authority, as well as to the social uprooting which occurs when the rural population begins to move to growing urban centers. In addition to the kinds of actions normally termed "delinquent" in Western countries, youth has been charged with failure to produce satisfactory goods, violation of work discipline, and manifestation of "improper attitudes" toward the regime and its objectives. Theft of state property—which stems largely from the traditional Albanian attitude that, although it might be wrong to steal from an individual, there is nothing wrong with stealing from the government—has become a major problem. As the state has gradually assumed control of all production, its vulnerability to peculation has risen proportionately. Another social problem is prostitution, which, although illegal, exists in production centers which employ large numbers of women. The regime attempts to explain away these persisting social problems by maintaining that they are residues of "old ideas" or products of "foreign pressures."

G. Religion (C)

Prior to the Communist takeover the majority of Albanians were followers of Islam, a legacy deriving from some five centuries of Turkish rule. A Christian minority (Orthodox and Roman Catholic) traced its origins to the missionary activity of the apostles in the first century. High priority aims of the regime have been to eliminate as expeditiously as possible both religious traditions and to supplant them with a holy dedication to the state.

Christianity, according to some accounts, came to Albania with Saint Paul, when the apostle visited Durrës in the seventh decade of the Christian era. Albania was the scene of missionary activity from both Rome and Constantinople, even after the division of the Roman Empire in A.D. 395 placed Albania in the eastern part of the empire. The schism of 1054 returned northern Albania to the jurisdiction of the Roman church, and during the subsequent three and one-third centuries Albania became one of the borderlands between the eastern and western branches of Christianity. The fortunes of the competing polities with interests in Albania largely determined the boundaries of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches, but by the time of the Turkish invasion in 1385 Roman Catholicism generally predominated among the tribes in northern Albania, while Orthodoxy was strongest in southern Albania.

During more than 500 years of Turkish rule, about 70% of the population adopted the Muslim religion. Religion—not nationality—provided the basis of the Ottoman Empire, and the opportunity for a fighting career with the famed Janissary Corps or the material advantages of a successful career in the Ottoman bureaucracy led many Albanians to pledge their sons or themselves to accept Islam. A number of Albanians distinguished themselves in the service of the empire and became provincial lords, *pashas*, governors, and even viziers; one of these Albanian administrators founded the Egyptian dynasty, which lasted until the 1950's. As suggested above, many Albanians were forced to adopt Islam upon being drafted into the Ottoman structure through child tribute or manpower levies. Attempted forced conversions of the general population however, were infrequent and not consistently applied because of the rugged terrain, the scattered population, and the power of local lords. The occasional instances of mass coercion coincided with periods of warfare between the Ottomans and the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian city states, or Russia. During the more protracted periods of peace, the established Christian religions were not molested. Thus, the Orthodox Church even enjoyed official protection through most of the period up to the Russo-Turkish wars of the middle 18th century.

According to some authorities, many mountain highlanders adopted the Muslim religion because the Muslim concept of the Holy War (jihad) was compatible with their tightly knit family groups which emphasized the blood feud and retribution. Evidently many conversions were entirely pragmatic, however, because scattered groups of crypto-Christians—persons who publicly avowed Islam and privately practiced Christianity—continued to survive throughout the period of Turkish rule.

It is estimated that just prior to the Communist takeover 70% of the population was of Muslim background, 20% Orthodox, and 10% Roman Catholic. Most of the Muslims belonged either to the majority Sunni sect—a conservative, orthodox group—or to the minority liberal Bektashi sect. During the period between the two world wars Albanians of Orthodox belief belonged to the independent Albanian Orthodox Church—founded in 1909 in Boston by Albanian nationalists to combat longstanding Greek influence. Catholic orders active in Albania prior to World War II included the Franciscans and the Jesuits. Religious harmony has generally prevailed among the three religions, although the protracted existence of crypto-Christianity suggests that there were pressures to conform to the majority faith. Religion was nearly always secondary to the traditional blood feuds as a divisive force; obligations to clan and tribe were regarded as more important than any sense of commitment to a particular religious group.

The Communists first made a concerted effort to reduce the religious communities to [illegible]nt, amenable appendages of the state. The campaign was climaxed in the early 1950's by a series of laws and decrees which legalized the churches as mass organizations financed and directed by the state. Ultimately, in the late 1960's, the regime inaugurated a campaign looking to the final elimination of all public religious practices and in 1967-68 rescinded all legislation recognizing organized religion.

Between 1945 and 1952 clergymen of all three major religious communities were persecuted, and many church institutions were closed or confiscated. The first target of the regime was the Roman Catholic clergy, which suffered ruthless persecution because it was probably the best organized and best educated and enjoyed close ties to the West. During 1945-46 almost all church leaders in the top levels of the hierarchy were imprisoned or executed for "treason," the Vatican's representative in Tiranë was deported, and a substantial portion of the lower clergy was imprisoned, executed, or transferred to remote parishes. Acting under the land reform law of 1945, the regime closed all Catholic schools, orphanages, and relief institutions, as well as most of the monasteries, convents, seminaries, and perhaps one-half of the churches.

Persecution of the Orthodox Church—while not unknown—was very mild, not only because of the proregime sympathies of part of the clergy, but also probably because the Albanian church had been recognized as an independent church by the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople in 1937. Replacement of higher ranking clergy was not effected until 1949, when Archbishop Kristofor Kisi, head of the Albanian Orthodox Church since 1935, was replaced by a proregime cleric chosen from the lower ranks. Although several other leaders of the Orthodox Church were replaced at the same time, no widespread persecution of the clergy seems to have occurred.

The most moderate approach was taken toward the majority Muslim community. Using the classic tactic of divide and rule, the regime in 1945 granted the Bektashi sect full autonomy from the majority Sunni Muslims, a goal sought by the Bektashi during King Zog's reign. Many Bektashi were sympathetic to the Communists, having fought with their partisan forces during World War II, and consequently the regime was able to install acknowledged Communists in the upper levels of the Bektashi hierarchy with little difficulty. However, after the unexplained death of three Bektashi leaders in 1947, including two important proregime clerics, the regime initiated a wide-scale purge of the Bektashi sect. By 1950 the Bektashi clergy at the diocesan level had been completely reshuffled through transfers or arrests. Among the Sunni Muslims, a number of the leaders seem to have been liquidated or imprisoned, but there is little information on the extent of these purges.

The climax of the campaign to first subordinate all the religious communities to the will of the state is symbolized by the 1949 Decree on Religious Communities. The decree—passed as law in 1950—provided for the separation of church and state and added that the religious communities could organize and function only in accordance with statutes approved by the government. Furthermore, all church bylaws, public statements by religious leaders, and nominees for spiritual leadership had to be approved by the government. The law enjoined churches from operating any philanthropic, welfare, or public educational institutions. All contacts with foreign religious communities had to be channeled through the government, and religious communities which had their headquarters outside the country (i.e., Jesuits) could not operate in Albania. The statutes of the four religious communities were formulated on the basis of the 1950 law and were approved by the government in 1950-51. The Catholic Church in its statutes severed its ties with the Vatican and established the Independent Catholic Church of Albania. All the religious communities assumed as their greatest responsibility the inculcation of patriotic feelings and the promotion of loyalty to the People's Republic of Albania.

Although the regime for the next 15 years or so applied strict authoritarian restraints on the churches, it adopted a relatively moderate approach toward personal beliefs, realizing the difficulty of forcibly changing the customs of the people. Party lectures in the schools, collectives, and factories, and appeals calling for continued emphasis against "proreligious prejudices" were designed to restrict religion to the older generation and to raise a new generation whose only loyalty was to the party.

A change in the relatively moderate attitude occurred in early 1967 with the initiation of a spirited antireligious drive. The spark for this campaign was a speech in February 1967 by Hoxha. Urging all mass organizations to struggle against religious beliefs and old customs, Hoxha asserted that henceforward "the only religion for an Albanian is Albanianism." The movement—publicized as an initiative of the people and implemented largely by youth organizations—attacked religious institutions and beliefs. Virtually all churches, mosques, and ancillary buildings were closed or converted to secular use, such as museums, restaurants, or maternity centers. A number of church buildings were partially destroyed. A few churches and mosques reportedly were retained because of their historical value (Figure 19). But the 19th century Et'hem Bey mosque in Tirana was closed, and the Franciscan cloister at Shkodër, where the Albanian national poet Father Gjergj Fishta once lived, reportedly was destroyed. In September 1967 an Albanian newspaper asserted that 2,169 religious buildings had been seized by youth groups during the first 6 months of 1967. Clergymen reportedly were defrocked and then drafted into the army, given jobs on public works, or forcibly retired.

Perhaps the climax of the attack on religious institutions came in late 1967 with the abrogation of all laws governing church-state relations. The November decree annulled the 1950 law and all subsequent decrees recognizing the statutes of the religious communities. Formal religion became an extralegal institution, with no rights, privileges, or obligations—which in a Communist state means that it became essentially illegal. In the fall of 1967, propaganda articles claimed that Albania had become the "first atheist state in the world."

Concurrent with the banning of religious institutions the regime instituted a concerted attack on all manifestations of religious belief. The campaign attacked the observance of religious holidays, fasting, praying, separation of graves in cemeteries on the basis of religious belief, and the celebration of name days. Efforts have been made to substitute national for religious holidays, to draw up a list of approved names for children (excluding foreign and religious names), and to redesignate cities bearing religious names.

The regime has recognized and Hoxha has stated that the destruction of formal religion does not mean the disappearance of religious belief. Evidently, religious beliefs and practices have been forced out of the public square into the relative privacy of the family. But even here there is pressure to abjure the traditional faith. The regime has recently asserted that intrafamily relations have a political-social meaning. Critical press articles indicate that the new generation is not entirely immune to its parents' religious views. In a society with a long tradition of fierce independence and still largely rural and primitive, periodic resistance to official intrusions into religious privacy is likely to continue.

H. Education (C)

1. Summary and background

The Communist regime has made considerable progress in reducing illiteracy, and by its own standards has greatly improved the accessibility, quality, and relevancy of education. A campaign mounted in the 1950's to teach all persons in the 12-40 age group to read and write is reported to have raised the literacy rate from about 20% in 1945 to an estimated 70% or 75% in recent years. A national educational system is in the process of



FIGURE 19. Former houses of worship; today's "historic monuments" (U/OU) (*above*) Bachelor's Mosque, Berat. (*right*) Saint Nicolas Church, Mesopotam, Sarande District.

consolidation through intensive training of school teachers, building schoolhouses, expanding enrollments, and gradually upgrading standards. The regime has inaugurated a system of higher education comprising the country's first university and an expanded network of higher technical and professional institutes. In its approach to developing an educational system to meet what it sees as Albania's needs, the regime has consistently placed high priority on the mass education of a "people's intelligentsia," a term which denotes a politically loyal mass of workers whose technical proficiency and willingness to work are rivaled only by their loyalty to the regime. By Western standards the education system is still rudimentary and unsophisticated, but it has made large strides in providing the country with a pool of trained workers, even though chronic shortages of skilled workmen testify to the system's continuing deficiencies.

Education in pre-Communist Albania was confined largely to foreign-supported schools in urban areas. These schools, nearly all of which were founded during and after World War I, served a very small minority, mainly the sons of local chieftains and beys and later children from the small urban middle class. Because of the prevalence of especially restrictive attitudes toward women throughout the primitive society, few girls attended school. During the last century of Ottoman rule (which ended in 1912) there had been a handful of schools sponsored by the Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic religious institutions; instruction in the Albanian language, however, was prohibited until the mid-19th century. Instead, Turkic, Latin, and Greek, and later French and English, were among the languages of instruction. Any rise in nationalist pressures during the years of waning Turkish rule, such as accompanied the first standardization of the Albanian language in 1909, often led to the closure of the few Albanian-language schools, whatever their religious affiliation.

With the formation of a national government in 1920, the foundation of a national school system was laid. For the next decade or so political instability inhibited efforts to consolidate the system, despite the priority given to building schools in a country still some 90% illiterate. The nationalization of almost all schools in 1933 was in part an initial attempt to incorporate them into one system so as to make education compulsory throughout the country. The measure was, however, at least equally concerned with stopping the spread of foreign-sponsored schools—especially those supported by Italy. Foreign schools proliferated during the interwar years and played an important role through their education of middle class Tosk youths, many of whom participated in the Communist takeover—among them Hoxha and Shehu. By the time of the Italian invasion in April 1939, some slight progress had been made; illiteracy had been reduced to 80% and an increasing number of women were enrolled in various schools. In March of that year there were some 650 primary schools with 38,500 male and 17,000 female pupils, and 18 secondary schools with 5,000 male and 1,500 female pupils. The secondary schools included, in addition to the prestigious *lycée* in Korçë and the technical school in Tiranë, a normal school for boys in Elbasan, a normal school for girls in Tiranë, schools of agriculture at Lushnje and Kavajë, and a commercial institute.

Education in pre-Communist Albania owed much to the foreign-supported school, and developments in the school system under Communist rule have also strongly reflected foreign influence. Shortly after the Communist takeover, the educational system was completely overhauled so as to conform to Soviet educational experience. Yugoslav influence, which at that time was primarily a reflection of Soviet techniques, predominated in the schools from 1945 to 1948 and was followed by direct Soviet hegemony in the education field between 1949 and 1960. Soviet influence was manifested in the daily activity of the school system through textbooks, compulsory Russian-language courses, and training teachers in the U.S.S.R. Soviet educators attached to the Albanian Ministry of Education "advised" their counterparts on pedagogy and curriculums, and the growth of the education system often proceeded from the planning and initiative of these advisers. The 2-year trade schools (*teknikums*) and the higher technical institutes, established in the early 1950's, followed Soviet patterns, as did the State University in Tiranë, which was founded in 1957. Soviet influence has remained strong since the formal Soviet-Albanian break in 1961, despite official efforts to reduce it. Two educational reforms since 1961 appear to reflect in part a desire that Albanian schooling not mirror the Soviet system. The durability of practices instilled under Soviet tutelage is shown by the usage until late 1969 of Soviet nomenclature such as *teknikume* and *politeknikume*. Reports in the fall of 1970 indicated that Russian is still the prevalent foreign language taught in the school system, simply because the number of teachers of that language is greater than for others. Many texts used in higher education apparently are Soviet texts, either translated or in Russian.

Progress in education is documented by only a minimum of statistics, but available data suggest that it has made great gains. The enrollment of students in all educational institutions has grown from about 65,000 in 1938 to 499,000 in the 1967/68 academic year. This almost eightfold growth in the student population occurred during a period in which the total population doubled. Of the 499,000 students in 1967/68, some 443,100 attended day-time classes, while approximately 55,900 persons were enrolled in evening or correspondence courses. During 1967 about 25% of the population was enrolled in educational institutions of all kinds, representing a 6% proportionate increase over enrollment in the 1960/61 academic year. The number of schools in 1967/68 offering full daytime courses, their enrollment, and educational level was as follows:

	Schools	Pupils
Primary schools (grades 1–4)	2,629	260,630
Eight-year schools (grades 1–8)	871	152,025
Twelve-year schools (grades 1–12)	61	11,961
Pedagogical schools	5	1,853
Teknikums	20	8,493
Higher education	6	8,141
Total	3,592	443,103

The pedagogical schools and *teknikums* (which since have been renamed according to their specialties) are secondary technical and vocational schools, and the last 4 years of the 12-year schools prepare the student for admission to institutions of higher education. A majority of students in higher education attend Tiranë State University (5,237 daytime students); the total enrollment figure includes students in the five polytechnical institutes. A trend toward consolidating schools reflected by data for the 1967/68 academic year reveals that the number of schools declined by about 220 compared with 1964/65.

The fundamental need both to train an adequate number of teachers and to provide the facilities for the continually expanding educational system constitutes the most severe challenge facing the educational system. While detailed information is lacking, a fairly accurate overview may be gleaned from public utterances by Albanian leaders and from press accounts. About 18,000 teachers were employed in 1967/68, of whom almost one-half (46%) were women. More than 60% of the women teachers had completed their education in the secondary pedogogical schools and were employed as teachers in both the primary and the 8-year schools. Ultimately the regime hopes to be able to train a corps of teachers adequate in number to permit upgrading *de facto* training requirements. Such upgrading would demand a certificate from the Higher Pedagogical Institute for a permanent teaching post in grades 5 through 8 in the 8-year schools. This certificate or a degree from one of the other higher educational institutions is required at present for teaching at the secondary level. Grades nine through 12 of the 12-year schools and the academic and technical courses in the united and general secondary schools will ultimately be taught by teachers trained in the university faculties, notably the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and the Faculty of Natural Sciences. Such levels of professional training for the teaching staffs have not yet generally been attained. It was stated reliably that in the academic year 1969/70 more than 80% of the students attending the Shkodër Higher Pedagogical Institute were part-time students—teachers already on the job in the 8-year schools or in secondary education but still in the process of finishing the alleged prerequisite pedagogical training. Other reliable evidence indicates that vocational schools employ as teachers experienced workers with practically no pedagogical training, while girls in their early teens who have completed only the 8-year primary course are undergoing "crash training courses" so as to teach in the growing number of preschool centers. Figure 20 depicts the increase in students and teachers at various educational levels since the mid-1950's.

The shortage of classrooms has led to the use of factories and buildings owned by cooperatives as emergency teaching facilities. These shortages have hindered the development of the educational system beyond the required 8 years. In the fall of 1969 the Minister of Education and Culture admitted that secondary education was confined largely to urban areas.



FIGURE 20. Numbers of teachers and students at all educational levels, 1956-68 (U/OU)

His remarks also acknowledged the difficulties of providing adequate schooling in the more inaccessible mountain regions, difficulties compounded by the prejudices of a rural population that still sees little value in education.

Under the terms of the constitution, all citizens enjoy equal rights with respect to education, regardless of ethnic identity, sex, and economic and social standing. In actual practice, however, children whose parents have been labeled "enemies of the people" and students whose political loyalty is in doubt are often denied an education. With the possible exception of preschool training in kindergartens and day nurseries, education is provided free of charge through the university level. All citizens who have completed secondary schooling are theoretically entitled to free higher education, subject only to meeting certain work and academic requirements. Additionally, scholarships are provided for many full-time students at higher educational institutions to help pay for room, board, and other expenses. Workers attending school part time are given paid leave for study sessions and examinations.

As in all Communist countries, education is under complete party and state control, with the entire system administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The ministry approves all plans, programs, and textbooks, controls all schools in the educational system, and directly administers all schools of higher learning. Even the "voluntary classes" set up by workers in factories and cooperatives come fairly promptly under the "sympathetic" purview of the ministry. A hierarchy of administrative and supervisory bodies extends from the

ministry into each school. The education and culture sections of the district people's councils have direct jurisdiction over almost all the schools. The sections report to the executive committees of the district councils and are responsible for inspecting schools, implementing educational plans, improving teachers' skills, collecting teaching materials, and improving school buildings.

Every school director, who is responsible to the district executive committee, is assisted by a deputy director and a pedagogical council. The pedagogical council supervises the implementation of the curriculum and provides a forum for the political and professional evaluation of teachers. The party exercises control through the school's basic party organization or through the local branch of the Union of Working Youth of Albania, one of the party's front organizations. Many teachers in lower schools belong to the party or the youth organization, and a majority of teachers in secondary schools and higher institutes holds membership in the party.

Party controls in education extend directly into the student body through several mass organizations for young people. The pioneer organization (for children ages 7 to 14) and the Union of Working Youth (ages 15 to 26) have branches in every school. These junior party organizations are headed by full-time organizers appointed by the party, and, although not enrolling the entire student population, serve as focal points to enlist all students in a variety of extracurricular activities. Such activities can range from voluntary work on a railroad to closing religious institutions (as in 1967). The youth organizations are also held responsible for such classroom functions as insuring discipline and preventing unnecessary absenteeism or student dropouts.

After a 2-year "mass discussion" on "revolutionizing" the schools, an educational reform was passed in late 1969 and went into effect on 1 January 1970. By the autumn of 1970 it was in the initial stages of implementation. This reform undertakes the second reorganization of the schools in about 10 years and seems intended to build upon and develop the reorganization undertaken in 1963. Emphasizing polytechnical training much like the previous reform, the current law lays down a three-part curriculum of "academic (classroom) study, productive labor, and military and physical training." This new program is held to be applicable for all levels of the educational system, but stress seems to be placed clearly on its immediate implementation in all secondary and higher education courses. Both secondary and higher education graduates must perform 8 to 9 months of production work—the former to qualify for higher education work and the latter to receive their degree. Military training begins in the first year of the secondary school curriculum, continues throughout higher education, and is supplemented by a 3-month course after graduation. Secondary school curriculums are to be standardized by adopting a single 4-year course, which purportedly will balance general and vocational training, but the traditional emphasis on vocational/technical course work will probably continue—encouraged by the more stringent production work requirements. Other specifics include lowering the school entrance age from 7 to 6 years of age and establishing a unified 8-year school which incorporates the still-separate primary and intermediate schools.

Factors behind the reform include an apparent desire to reduce a lingering pervasive Soviet influence (the Soviet system of naming secondary schools was finally dropped) and an attempt to inject more polytechnical and military training into the "academic" atmosphere of general secondary and university courses. The increased polytechnical training is intended to better serve the needs of an economy short of skilled labor, while more military training may reflect continued concern over Soviet intentions, particularly in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. Educational system

The educational system, as outlined in the law of 1 January 1970, is divided essentially into four stages: preschool, general 8-year, secondary, and higher education. A program of adult education for workers, which has been steadily expanding in recent years, is also incorporated within the system (Figure 21). Preschool education is provided in kindergartens and in day nurseries (crèches) for children in the 3-5 age group. Although the regime claims that all education is free, a revised 1967 fee rate for child care in nurseries and kindergartens has never been repealed. Charges for preschool care range from 70 to 200 leks a month, depending on family income. Despite the burden of such fees, 26,021 children (at least a third of the preschool age children) attended 417 kindergartens in 1967/68. Nearly all these facilities were located in cities and towns. A recent drive to expand kindergartens in rural areas increased attendance in 1970/71 to 40,257 children in 928 separate facilities. An obligatory 8 years of general education for children (ages 6-13) is to be conducted in a unified 8-year school. The 8-year schools provide the pupils with the basic elements of academic, ideological, moral, physical, and military education. Until the transition period is completed, separate primary schools (grades 1-4) continue to exist, especially in the more remote rural areas, but the regime is giving high priority to making compulsory 8-year primary schooling available throughout the country as rapidly as possible. After completing the compulsory 8 years of basic education, normally at age 13, a student may continue at the secondary level for 4 more years.

Officials maintain that all secondary schools provide equivalent levels of general education. Such statements have the essentially propagandistic intent of reinforcing the concept of a classless society. In practice certain disciplines and programs are more demanding—and ultimately more rewarding—than others, and there are clear differences in the emphasis accorded vocational as opposed to general education. All secondary schools have the same general structure: 6 ½ months' classroom study,



FIGURE 21. Educational system, January 1970 (U/OU)

2½ months' production work, 1 month's military training, and 2 months' vacation. The united secondary schools provide both general and vocational/technical training, as do the general secondary schools. The final 4 years of the 12-year school, however, probably offer more work in the theoretical sciences in preparation for matriculation into one of the university faculties. All three types of secondary schools prepare the student for continued study in an institution of higher education. The vocational secondary schools specialize in specific vocations, such as construction, mining, trade, paramedical work, or pedagogy. The graduates of such schools are classified as middle-grade cadres and work as low-level accountants, agronomists, teachers, assistant physicians, technicians, and veterinary specialists. Often—but not always—the phrase "middle-grade" is prefixed to these titles to distinguish them from people with more education. Multibranched secondary schools provide under one roof several vocational, technical, and lower professional courses. These latter categories of vocational secondary schools are all, in one form or another, the apparent successors of the Soviet *teknikums*.

Higher education courses are from 3 to 5 years' duration, and, like the secondary schools, entail the triad of classroom study, production work, and physical and military education. All secondary school graduates must complete 8 or 9 months of production work to be eligible for higher education, and workers who complete secondary school through attending part-time classes must take a 1-year preparatory course in general education before admission to higher educational institutions. Graduates of higher education must undergo an 8- or 9-month probationary period in production work and a 3-month military training course.

Higher education in Albania is relatively new. There were no facilities for higher education before World War II, and young people who wanted to continue their studies had to go abroad. Tiranë State University, the only university in Albania, was organized in 1957 by consolidating four institutes established in the postwar period. The State University functions under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Culture and has seven faculties and two institutes. Higher education is also provided at the State Higher Agricultural Institute—

with its three faculties of agronomy, forestry, and veterinary medicine—and the Higher Institute of Physical Culture, the Higher Institute of the Arts, and the 2 year Higher Pedagogical Institutes in Tiranë and Shkodër. The Higher Institute of the Arts comprises three former institutes (figurative arts, dramatic arts, and the conservatory). According to official Albanian statistics, 7,300 students attended Tiranë State University in 1970/71. Over 80% of the students at institutions of higher education reportedly receive financial grants covering their room and board. In certain branches of study, such as mathematics, physics, and the life sciences, all students hold state scholarships. They are also covered by the state social security systems, and they receive free hospital treatment. Enrollment in higher education in 1967/68 is shown in Figure 22.

Albanian is the official language of the school system, but in Greek-speaking villages Greek is used in the first four grades and Albanian is taught in 1-hour daily sessions. Beyond the fourth grade, Albanian becomes the only language of instruction throughout the country, and one foreign language—Russian, French, or English—is offered students in the fifth through 12th grades. One secondary school specializing in languages has courses in German and Italian, and university courses (mainly in the philology faculty) include other languages. Russian is the most widely taught second language, in part because of the large number of Russian-speaking teachers. Italian, however, is still widely spoken and is the chief means of communication for diplomats in Tiranë.

FIGURE 22. STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL COURSES, 1967/68 (U/OU)

	DAY TIME	PART-TIME CORRESPONDENCE	TOTAL ENROLLMENT
Tiranë State University:			
Economics	437	838	1,275
Geology	255	0	255
History and philology	984	960	1,944
Engineering	1,102	157	1,259
Political science and jurisprudence	163	341	504
Medicine	1,034	0	1,034
Natural sciences	1,262	421	1,683
Total	5,237	2,717	7,954
Higher Agricultural Institute:			
Agronomy	839	395	1,234
Forestry	150	24	174
Veterinary	324	0	324
Total	1,313	419	1,732
Higher Institute of the Arts	232	7	239
Higher Institute of Physical Culture	169	22	191
Tiranë Higher Pedagogical Institute (2 years)	331	782	1,113
Shkodër Higher Pedagogical Institute (2 years)	859	347	1,206
Grand total	8,141	4,294	12,435

An extensive network of part-time schools for workers and peasants has been established in an effort to upgrade the educational level of the work force. Any level of schooling from a primary education to university course work is, in principle, available. The employed worker has the theoretical advantage of acquiring a general education while improving his job-related skills, but in practice the emphasis is almost exclusively on the latter. Working students can complete the 8-year school in 6 years and secondary school in the normal 4 years but must study at schools of higher learning a year longer than normal. Workers' secondary schools, both vocational and general, have been set up in enterprises, farms, or as adjuncts to regular schools. Evidently, the curriculum is more limited in these secondary schools than in regular secondary schools, and is determined largely by the specialty of the sponsoring economic enterprises. Graduates of these secondary schools must take a 1-year preparatory course in "general education" prior to entering a higher educational institution. Branches of the higher educational institutions have been set up around the country, and workers theoretically may complete their studies while still on the job. By early 1970 the regime claimed to have established 22 branches of Tiranë State University and seven branches of the Shkodër Higher Pedagogical Institute in various parts of the country. Each branch evidently offers advanced training in a single subject area (i.e., mathematics-physics, agronomy, hydrotechnological construction) rather than a general education.

Economic enterprises have often been expected to expand the network of workers' schools. The state has looked to economic enterprises as a source of "reserves" in order to overcome temporarily the nationwide shortage of qualified teachers, adequate facilities, and suitable teaching materials. Teachers in these schools are usually the better educated production workers, and spare rooms in factories and other enterprises can be used as classrooms. Not surprisingly, the enterprises often have not implemented the workers' school program satisfactorily. The schools suffer because of poorly trained teachers and the high absentee and drop-out rates of undermotivated students dragooned into the classroom by overzealous organizers anxious only to meet quotas. Enrollment remains substantial, however; officials assert that 60,000 full-time workers were enrolled in schools during the 1969/70 academic year.

There is no reliable information on the number of Albanians studying abroad. Just prior to the break with Moscow in 1961 Tiranë claimed that about 1,200 Albanians were enrolled in Soviet institutions. Prior to September 1966, when Peking announced that all foreign students were to be sent home, a number of Albanians were known to be studying in Communist China. Albanian press reports in the fall of 1970 alluding to Albanian "trainees" in China suggest that Peking is again training some Albanians.

I. Artistic and cultural expression (U/OU)

The evolution of a native Albanian culture was long impeded by geography and foreign domination. Settling

in the hilly interior rather than along the unhealthful coastal lowlands throughout most of their history, Albanians exhibit the inbred culture typical of mountain folk. But until the 20th century they could not experience an integrated cultural growth. Numerous small villages in the valleys and clusters of dwellings on the lower slopes were isolated, one from the other, by deep gorges and chasms and steep mountain walls. Thus, notwithstanding the small area occupied by ethnic Albanians, local tribal customs and cultural expression were slow to meld into a national culture. Such melding was probably further obstructed by long-established blood feuds (vendettas), the vigor of which rivaled any in the Mediterranean area. Even the Albanian language, reflecting this cultural divergence, evolved over the centuries in two distinct idioms, each encompassing several dialects. Geg was spoken in the north and Tosk in the south, areas separated roughly by the Shkumbin river. Only since 1908 has there been a conscious effort to reconcile these idioms and dialects into a national Albanian language.

Four centuries of Ottoman domination, terminating in the early 20th century, isolated Albania from the intellectual and artistic currents of Europe. Permanent cultural legacies derived from the Ottoman occupiers seem to have been largely confined to the Muslim religion, which in a modified form was adopted by nearly 70% of the population. Numerous Albanians, in turn, made distinctive contributions to the administrative and military leadership of the vast Ottoman Empire. The cultural tradition which continued to develop in the "eagle's mountain fastness" remained essentially indigenous and largely parochial, if not tribal. It consisted primarily of a fund of lyric and heroic songs, proverbs, and other folklore. This material was complemented by a few books from the wilder Geg area produced in the 16th and 17th centuries—reflecting almost exclusively Roman Catholic missionary activities, some 18th century Tosk poetry produced by exiles in Italy, and 19th century nationalist writings originating in both the exile communities across the Adriatic and in neighboring Serbia and in the Albanian homeland.

The oral folklore was first collected and transcribed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Since Geg and Tosk are for the most part mutually intelligible, there was a ready interchange, depending on who was transcribing. Much of the recording, however, was accomplished in the Tosk-speaking Albanian enclaves in Italy; nearly all of the material has subsequently been set down in modern Albanian Latin orthography, itself based (since World War II) on the Tosk idiom.

The strong European nationalist movements of the 19th century, notably the *Risorgimento* in Italy, stirred a national awareness among Albanians. With their homeland still firmly under Turkish control, such awareness was first manifested in the writings of expatriate Albanians in Italy, and then in neighboring Serbia. A conclave of Albanian patriots in the Serbian town of Prizren, who protested the shelving by the Congress of Berlin (1878) of the Albanian petition for autonomy, gave a marked impetus to Albanian letters through the nurturing of two of Albania's greatest writers: Naim Frasheri (1846-1900) and George Fishta (1871-1940).

Standing above all the writers of this period is Father George Fishta, whose epic, *The Lute of the Mountains*, details the Albanian struggle for national freedom over the past several centuries. Largely ignored by the Communist regime, Fishta used the Geg idiom of the northern highlanders and the meter from traditional Albanian heroic poetry in composing the more than 13,000 verses of the *The Lute*. Frasheri—a romantic poet influenced by Persian mysticism and Bektashi Muslim beliefs—was a staunch proponent of Albanian nationalism and is often regarded as the national poet of Albania. Although his collection of short poems, *Spring Flowers*, is considered to have more literary merit, the Communist regime recognizes only his works which stress great patriotism, as the *History of Skanderbeg*, an epic poem which details the battles between Albanians and Turks during the era of that greatest Albanian national hero (15th century).

Following Albania's declaration of independence in 1912, a number of Albanian writers were able to return to their native land to work. Among the writers of this period must be numbered P. Vincenc Prennushi (1885-1954), a lyric poet who remained in Albania after the Communist takeover; another lyric poet, Lasgusk Poradeci (1899-) who moved from the traditional heroic subject matter to write of sunsets, birds, and love; Ernest Koliqi (1900-), a poet who attempted to combine traditional Albanian themes and exposition with the newer Western trends and later turned to fascism. Western, and especially Italian influences were great before World War II, but with the imposition of the Communist regime Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese influences have, in turn, been paramount.

Before 1945 there were no professional theaters and only occasional amateur performances in Albania. Two Albanian playwrights who attained some local prominence were Sami Frasheri and Kristo Eloqi. The Communist regime recognized the utility of the theater as an instrument for indoctrination and under Yugoslav tutelage established a professional theater group in 1945. Since then several professional and amateur groups have been established throughout the country. In 1964 some 22 professional drama and variety theaters were identified. Cinematography likewise was unknown in Albania (except for a joint Italian-Albanian documentary team in Tiranë during World War II) and was developed only with Soviet aid in 1949-50. A few full-length, artistic films are produced from time to time; the majority of the films are short—usually documentaries of a di actic nature.

Albania has a rich tradition of heroic and lyric folk songs. Accompanied by the lute, the bagpipe (*roja*), or the tamberine (*tupan*), these songs have been handed down from generation to generation. Small field orchestras (*saze*) often provide music for weddings and

other special occasions. Western music was first spread throughout the country in the 1920's by an Albanian brass band trained in the United States. Kristro Kono, the only composer of significance in pre-Communist Albania, remains active under the Communist regime and is a friend of Enver Hoxha. State-supported musical academies and local musical groups have been started throughout the country, and the National Opera and Ballet Theater and the National Song and Dance Ensemble have been established in Tiranë.

Painting and sculpture were poorly developed in pre-Communist Albania. An art school, rudimentary by contemporary Western standards, opened in Tiranë only in the 1930's, and it was necessary for students to go abroad for advanced study, usually in Italy. Androniqi Zengo, an Athens-trained painter, and Odhise Paskal, a sculptor trained in Florence, achieved fame before the Communist takeover and continued to be productive under the new regime.

Artistic and cultural expression under the Communists has been tightly channeled to promote the goals of the regime. Few works produced since 1944 in Albania have any literary value. Rather, the cultural front has been characterized by attacks on the principle of "art for art's sake," efforts to mobilize the arts as a didactic tool of the regime, and appropriation of great Albanian writers of the past to support current campaigns. All books, music, plays, paintings, or sculptures are judged for acceptability according to the precepts of "socialist realism." In practice, these precepts may range from the personal predilections of the party leadership to themes supporting economic or social goals. The arts are regarded as a political weapon and envisaged as being on the front lines of the "class struggle." They constitute part of the media for education and indoctrination and must be topical and reflect the themes of current experience. Consistently stressed themes have been the heroic struggle for socialist construction, the emancipation of women, the struggle against old customs, and the virtue of patriotism.

Cultural policy seeks to awaken an awareness of past Albanian cultural and military achievements as a method of inculcating patriotism. Naim Frasheri has been extolled by the regime as a great national poet, principally because of his idealization of Skanderbeg. His near contemporary, George Fishta, tends to be ignored, notwithstanding the greater literary merit of his work. In the eyes of the regime *The Lute* lacks material that lends itself to interpretation as "socialist realism." The regime has selectively extracted from Albanian history persons and events to support current campaigns. One of the salient features of the "cultural revolution" begun in 1966 was a depiction of the close parallels between past heroic deeds and the heroism of socialist construction in present-day Albania.

Mass organizations, such as the Union of Working Youth of Albania, the Union of Albanian Women, and the Albanian-Chinese Friendship Society, envelop virtually all the population and encourage and organize amateur cultural activities among different groups. The



FIGURE 23. Palace of Culture, Berat (U/OU)

designation of Palaces of Culture (Figure 23) has accompanied the effort to "organize" culture. As in all other Communist states, writers and artists are organized into a professional control organization. The Union of Writers and Artists of Albania, formed in 1956 as a successor to two separate organizations for writers and artists, has held only two congresses (1957 and 1969) since its inception, with the last congress attended by some 400 members. The union publishes two cultural journals, *Drita* and *Nendori*, which print literary works and criticism. All longer written works must be published through the state publishing house.

Artists and writers are able to produce works only at the sufferance of the regime. Periodic repressions of writers and artists are probably more an exercise than a reaction against genuine protest, which has not been much in evidence. A particularly scathing and wide-ranging attack took place in mid-1966 in an apparent modified imitation of the cultural revolution in Communist China. Singled out for special attention were deviant writers. Previous criticism was mild compared with the attack on the novel *The Tunnel* published in 1966. Its author, Dhimiter Xhuvani, revealed the hardships of life in Albania and the heavy price which the people have been forced to pay in order to achieve some progress in their country. Xhuvani was censured for distorting the reality of life, lowering the morale of the working people, and slandering their hero image. Xhuvani quickly admitted his "grave ideological errors" and publicly confessed that he had fallen prey to foreign bourgeois influences. This episode was accompanied by a campaign obliging intellectuals to live and work for a while among the people. In early 1966 and 1967, brigades of writers and artists were dispatched to the countryside to work and to learn from the broad popular masses. By early 1969, with the convocation of the much-postponed Second Congress of the Union of Writers and Artists of Albania, the pressure on the cultural intelligentsia seems to have abated. Criticism of leading personalities of the union did not end in their removal from leadership positions. A new law in late 1969 reversed the party position of 1966. Whereas the campaign of 1966-67 sought to place artists

among the people and put them in production work, the 1969 law made it possible for writers and artists—with the approval of the Ministry of Education and Culture—to become professionals, quit production work, and live entirely on a government subsidy.

J. Public information (C)

All public information media, the press, radio, and films, are tightly controlled by the state and used primarily to indoctrinate the population with the regime's goals, achievements, and outlook. Only secondarily do they attempt to raise the cultural level of the people or provide entertainment and relaxation. The ability of the public media to imbue the population with official aims is hampered, however, by the newsprint shortage, poor transportation and distribution, and the poorly organized and inadequate radiobroadcasting system.

In spite of these problems, circulation of printed matter has increased. In 1955 there were nine newspapers with a total annual circulation of more than 19.5 million copies, whereas in 1961 there were 13 newspapers with an annual circulation of almost 33 million copies. By 1967 these figures had increased markedly, with 19 newspapers accounting for a circulation of 45.5 million. The number of periodicals increased from 23 in 1955 to 37 in 1964, but subsequently decreased to 34 in 1967, with a total circulation of 1.5 million. Probably the most widely read newspaper is the party's official organ *Zeri i Popullit*, which has an estimated daily circulation (1967) of 85,000 copies, and serves as a model for all the other news media. A recent development in journalism has been the appearance of local newspapers sponsored by regional party committees. Since 1967, five regional papers, reported to be published twice weekly, have appeared: *Jeta e Re* (New Life), published in Shkodër; *Perpara* (Forward), published in Korçë; *Pararoja* (Vanguard), published in Gjirokastër; *Adriatic*, published in Durrës, and *New Kukes*, published in Kukës. At enterprises, schools, and state institutions information sheets are posted as wall newspapers—or flash bulletins—by local party agitators or youth organizations. Like all the public media, these wall newspapers are polemical in style and generally aim at propagandizing current campaign slogans. Principal newspapers and periodicals are listed in Figure 24.

The official Albanian Telegraph Agency (ATA) is the only press agency in Albania and handles both domestic and foreign news. Its regional representatives are the channels by which local propaganda media receive handouts from governmental and party organizations. It also transmits domestic news abroad, distributes the releases of other news agencies, and monitors foreign broadcasts. Since Albania's break with the Soviet Union in 1961, Communist China's New China News Agency (NCNA) has replaced the Soviet TASS service as the main supplier of foreign news to Albania.

Radiobroadcasting serves primarily as an instrument of the party for furthering its social, economic, and political policies. *Radio Tiranë* is the heart of the entire system of radio stations in Albania and originates both the Albanian International Service and the Albanian Home Service. The domestic radio stations (located in Gjirokastër, Korçë, Kukës, Shkodër, the city of Stalin, and possibly in Durrës) have low-power transmitters and probably serve as relay points from *Radio Tiranë* to a network of wired loudspeakers and private receivers. Radio programs from Italy and Greece are reportedly popular in southern and southeastern Albania. The government's policy of not jamming foreign broadcasts on a regular basis appears to stem from the expense involved in establishing and maintaining appropriate installations rather than from a relaxation of ideological vigilance.

Although the Albanians have had an experimental TV station operating in Tiranë since 1960, there are few if any relay stations in the mountainous country, and telecasting still appears to be limited to some 3 hours a week in the vicinity of the capital city. The regime may now be moving to expand this coverage. In late 1969 it reportedly requested French aid for the early installation of a national TV network. Television sets are estimated to number 2,100, all located in the capital area. Both Yugoslav and Italian TV transmissions are received in the Tiranë area, but the regime evinces strong hostility only to the Yugoslav programs. Private ownership of TV sets appears to be restricted almost entirely to the ruling elite and is discouraged by very high import duties. Albanian TV receivers use the standard European 625-line definition.

Both radio receivers and wired loudspeakers are fairly numerous in Tiranë and other large cities. Some rural areas probably have neither, but the campaign to electrify every village (a goal whose success was acclaimed in November 1970) undoubtedly will bring wired loudspeakers to most parts of the country. Official Albanian statistics indicate that there were about 150,000 radio receivers in the country in 1968—a twofold increase over 1964. Nevertheless, the high cost of radios continues to place them out of the reach of many rural dwellers. Reliable statistics are not available, but it was estimated that there were about 161,000 radio receivers and 30,000 to 35,000 wired loudspeakers in 1970.

Other public information media, such as films, public libraries, and museums, also are utilized to serve the interests of the state. Albanian studios produce very few full-length, feature films, restricting most of their production to short documentary and propaganda films which are intended to reinforce loyalty to the regime and its policies. A small number of feature films are imported from Italy, along with documentaries from friendly Communist countries. In 1967 Albania had 95 permanent motion-picture houses in operation and an unknown number of mobile units for the less accessible areas of the country. In the same year there were 24 museums open to the public, along with 29 libraries, having a total collection of about 1.4 million volumes. The two largest libraries—the National Library and the University Library, both in Tiranë—hold over half of the available volumes.



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Government and Politics

A. Summary and background (C)

Albania emerged as a nation-state in 1912 when a group of Albanian leaders declared the country's independence from a hard-pressed Ottoman Empire during the First Balkan War. Five centuries of Turkish hegemony could not be replaced overnight, however, and the country's birth was a protracted event (1912-21) presided over by the Great Powers and complicated by the territorial claims of Albania's neighbors. The Treaty of London (1913), which provided a general settlement of the First Balkan War, rejected *de facto* Serbian occupation of much of the country and affirmed Albania's unilaterally declared independence. It was not until after World War I and the peace settlements of 1919-20, however, that Albania was able to achieve its goal of independence.

As elsewhere in the troubled Balkans, self-determination in the area inhabited by ethnic Albanians was not all-pervasive. The fairly extensive northeast Kosovo region, originally awarded to Serbia just prior to the outbreak of World War I, was confirmed under Yugoslav control. In fact, the boundaries of Albania as determined in 1913-14 remained virtually unchanged, engendering reciprocal Yugoslav and Greek irredentist claims that have endured to the present. Further claims on Albanian sovereignty were made at the outset by Italy, which only after acrimonious debate at Versailles was pressured into pulling out of Vlorë, which Italian troops had reoccupied following the defeat of the Central Powers.

Because of the backwardness, bellicose parochialism, and impoverishment of the people, uncommon even in the underdeveloped Balkan area, effective central government eluded the new state for the next few years. A "period of parliamentarianism" (1921-24) brought the trappings of Western political life without the traditions necessary to make it work. A chamber of deputies and Albania's first political parties appeared in 1921, but political life was characterized by personal rivalries, regional differences, and tribal loyalties which rendered central government almost superfluous. The main political combatants of this period were the radical Orthodox Bishop Fan S. Noli (whose short-lived government in 1924 recognized the Soviet Union) and the authoritarian Ahmet Zogu. The latter personality, with Yugoslav backing in 1924, staged the last of a series of coups and countercoups, and in early 1925 Zog had Albania proclaimed a republic with himself as President. The republic was short-lived, being transformed into a monarchy in 1928 under "Zog I, King of the Albanians," who ruled until the Italian invasion in 1939.

Zog's rule, both as President and King, was a curious mixture of authoritarian control and Western reforms. Such anarchical traditions as the blood feud were curbed, some fundamental education and health measures were implemented, and various new codes (including a penal code, civil laws, and a commercial code) were drawn up after Western models. During Zog's reign, the central government gained power at the expense of the local leaders. Much as the Ottomans had done, Zog controlled the country through local *beys* who had sworn allegiance to the ruler and manipulated the government by appointing deputies to parliament. While Tiranë increased its control over national affairs, Albania's sovereignty was impaired by the King's many concessions to Italy.

A salient feature of Zog's rule was the gradual growth of Italian influence through a number of economic, military, and political agreements, seriously challenged only once by a short-lived attempt to reassert national sovereignty in the early 1930's. The period of rising Italian influence culminated in Fascist Italy's invasion and occupation of the country in 1939 and subsequent efforts by Rome to absorb Albania. An objective of Italian rule was to win over Albanian public opinion by supporting Albanian irredentists in their demands for annexing the Kosovo (that part of Yugoslavia populated largely by ethnic Albanians) and a portion of Greece. The Italians did not succeed in winning over Albanian public opinion by these tactics, and opposition to the occupation continued to grow; in 1941-42 two major resistance groups were founded: the National Liberation Movement (*Levizja Nacional Çlirimtar*), created and dominated by the Albanian Communist Party, and the anti-Communist *Balli Kombetar* (The National Front).

Aided by the Yugoslavs, the Communists emerged as the most effective element in the resistance and were able to lay the groundwork for their eventual takeover of the country in 1944. This was greatly facilitated by the promises of economic and political reform made by the National Liberation Movement during World War II. The front's program for political independence from foreign rule and for improvement of social and economic conditions had a dynamic appeal. Disillusionment with the new regime and hostility toward it followed soon after 1944, however, because the Yugoslav-backed Communists not only failed to fulfill their promises of unfettered national independence but also imposed a harsher, more regimented system than that experienced during the Italian and German occupations.

Yugoslavia, which had played the major role in organizing the Communist party in Albania in 1941, dominated the country from 1944 to 1948. When Tito's refusal to accept Soviet dictates caused a break with the Soviet Union in 1948, Albania abandoned Yugoslav protection in favor of orthodox Soviet-style "Stalinism." Khrushchev's attempts in the immediate post-Stalin years to improve relations with Tito's Yugoslavia occasioned the first doubts in Tiranë of the efficacy of its close alliance with Moscow. In 1961, after 13 years as a Soviet satellite, Albania openly repudiated Soviet Premier Khrushchev's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and publicly embraced Mao Tse-tung's more dogmatic version, and it has since continued to echo and often exceed the anti-Soviet polemics of its current ally, Communist China.

The fall of Khrushchev in 1964, indicative to Albanians of continued dissension within the Soviet hierarchy, strengthened the internal position of the Albanian leadership and weakened further the insignificant elements in the country that had opposed its policies. Albanian official reaction to international developments has tended to be most predictable and almost always reflects a further advance in doctrinaire intransigence. The coincidence of interests which, at the time of the crisis with Moscow, led to the unique alliance between Albania and Communist China are still relevant, and Mao Tse-tung's China remains the main source of international support of the Albanian regime. Since 1966 and early 1967 the Albanian Communist party hierarchy has stressed a self-reliant nationalism as a key to gaining popular acquiescence and participation in the rapid economic development of Albania. Progress in this area is still heavily dependent on Chinese assistance, and as the two countries have expanded their international contacts in 1970 their alliance has shifted to a more flexible but still firm footing.

The impact of a quarter of a century of Communist rule on the domestic institutions and traditional way of life has been sharp and painful to many Albanians. Communist ideology itself is foreign to the ancient traditions of Albania and to the Albanian orientation to family and tribe rather than to central authority. Life in the small, isolated communities characteristic of Albania has produced a highly individualistic people who are hostile to the strict, centrally controlled system imposed by the Communists. In addition, the popular view of communism as a foreign influence has further alienated many people. These negative factors are offset to some degree by the undeniable economic and social progress that has been achieved under the Communists. The sheer length of Communist rule and the dim prospect for its deposition have probably led to growing popular acceptance of the regime. Open resistance to the Communist regime is sporadic, isolated, and generally without organized leadership. The country remains a police state in the Stalinist tradition, with security forces which have proven effective against internal resistance and foreign subversion.

Ruling in the name of the Communist party in Albania, party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and Premier Mehmet Shehu head a regime which is still the most oppressive in Europe, wielding almost absolute power over the political, economic, and social life of the country. The regime has attempted to gain popular support by erecting a facade of democracy and most recently by stressing Albanian national traditions. Intensive propaganda campaigns extol the constitutional guarantees of the rights of the individual. The constitution, however, is used only to give a semblance of legality to the regime; in practice the people have few civil or religious rights. The People's Assembly and the "elections," routinely rigged in standard Communist fashion, serve merely to give unanimous approval to party decisions and to implement policies already made by the party hierarchy. In theory the party is separate from the government, but in fact the governmental apparatus is merely the administrative and executive arm of the party.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (S)

1. Constitution

The Albanian constitution of 1950 defines the political institutions and ostensibly regulates the government of the Albanian people. Patterned essentially after the basic laws of Albania's contemporary Soviet mentors, the document seeks to give an appearance of legitimacy to the governmental, economic, and social institutions created by the Communists. Although it clearly guarantees essential liberties, assuring each citizen his basic civil and religious prerogatives and his equality before the law, the constitution remains essentially a propaganda instrument, while the most elementary of human rights are consistently and flagrantly abused.

Most of the Albanian people are apathetic in matters concerning governmental processes and have demonstrated little interest in the various constitutions which have been adopted during Albania's existence as an independent state. Such apathy stems from their very limited historic experience under a written basic law that was actually functional, and, more importantly, from their recognition that the provisions of the new Communist constitution, however explicit, in reality offer no protection to the individual. Furthermore, many Albanians probably consider the constitution, based as it is on Soviet models, a foreign import; it reflects standard Communist ideology, while it disregards Albanian traditions and customs. In the event unforeseen exigencies force a reorientation of Albanian tutelage back to Europe and European models, with some loosening of Communist dictatorial authority, a means for expression of the popular will does exist in the *de jure* political institutions defined in the national constitution.

The first of Albania's five different constitutions was drawn up in 1914 by an International Control Commission established by the Great Powers of Europe

following the country's declaration of independence in 1912. This constitution, which was almost immediately shelved because of the outbreak of World War I and remained in abeyance for the duration of that conflict, was revised in 1925. While the constitution of 1925 provided for parliamentary government and reflected an awareness of the concept of "checks and balances," the excessive authority it granted to the President of the Republic in fact nullified the latter principle. It, in turn, was replaced in December 1928 by the constitution which established a monarchy under King Zog I (Ahmet Zogu). In practice, basic political guarantees continued either to be ignored by the willful King or at best interpreted cavalierly. The monarchy remained in power until 1939 when the Italians introduced a Fascist government into Albania, and a new Fascist constitution on the Italian model was subsequently approved by the Albanian Constituent Assembly in June 1939.

The first Communist constitution of Albania was drafted during the anti-Axis resistance early in World War II, but it was not formally adopted until March 1946. It was almost a direct copy of the Yugoslav constitution. As Yugoslavia could not be accepted as a model following Stalin's break with Belgrade in 1948, a new constitution was adopted in 1950. This last document was intended not only to establish a closer conformity with the Soviet constitution but also to reflect the social, economic, and political changes necessitated by Albania's switch from a Yugoslav- to a Soviet-oriented state.

The 1946 constitution transferred local administrative functions from agencies of the central government to people's councils and made provisions for the introduction of a unified economic plan. Although retaining, at least theoretically, a blueprint for local initiative, the 1950 constitution recognized and provided for the perpetuation of the dominant role of the Communist party (Article 21). The 1950 constitution also established the party's legal status by defining it as "the organized vanguard of the working class and of all the laboring masses in their struggle to construct the bases of socialism." Provisions for the socialization of agriculture, protection of socialized property, and state control of domestic trade were incorporated into the constitution for the first time.

The 1950 constitution consists of 97 articles grouped into three sections. The first part contains such fundamental principles as the definition of the "People's Republic," the nature of its social and economic structure, and descriptions of the alleged rights and duties of citizens. The second part outlines the political structure of the state, the most important bodies of which are the unicameral People's Assembly and its Presidium, the Council of Ministers, and the judiciary. It also defines the role of "people's councils" in local administration and discusses the military establishment. The third part describes the seal and flag and names Tiranë the capital city. Changes or additions to the constitution may be adopted by an absolute majority vote of the People's Assembly.

The Albanian constitution stresses social and economic ideology, as do the constitutions of other Communist countries. The concentration of all means of production in the hands of the state, undertaken in Albania immediately after World War II, is legalized in Articles 7 and 8. Although Article 11 guarantees the rights of private property and private enterprise, this provision is rendered meaningless by the addition of the qualifications that "no one has the right to use private property against the public interest" and "private property can be limited and expropriated if such action is demanded by the public interest." Article 11 has been used by the state to confiscate or nationalize virtually all private property in Albania.

Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, the press, assembly, and petition, and the right to form public organizations and hold political meetings and demonstrations (Articles 18 and 20) are subsequently so qualified and delimited that in practice these rights scarcely exist. Any opposition to the regime is considered treason; freedom is interpreted to mean obedience to the party, and the citizen has in fact no protection against the state. The constitutional document itself not only implicitly tolerates repression in its numerous qualifying clauses, but in "wrap-up" Article 38 it states explicitly:

> Citizens cannot use the rights given them by this constitution to change the constitutional regime of the People's Republic of Albania for antidemocratic purposes.

Women are guaranteed equal rights with men in nearly all spheres of private, political, and social life under Article 17. In practice, however, these constitutional provisions do not appear to have materially affected the position of Albanian women who traditionally have been assigned a subservient role in society. All citizens who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and to stand for election to all the organs of state power. The constitution establishes work as the basis of the Albanian social system, and a duty and an honor for all able-bodied citizens. As stated in Article 13, society will be administered according to the principle of "who works not, eats not."

In theory, the inviolability of the person is guaranteed by Article 22 which states that no one can be detained for more than 3 days without a decision by a public prosecutor or a court. Search warrants are required—or the consent of the owner of the house—and all searches must be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Guarantees of the secrecy of personal correspondence are excepted only for criminal investigations or during a state of war. In practice, however, these guarantees have proven to be largely meaningless. A person considered dangerous to the state may be held for an indefinite period; homes may be searched and citizens may be evicted from their homes without due process of law; and mail censorship is widespread, although it is somewhat more relaxed than in the earlier years of the regime.

A number of articles outline some of the state's responsibilities to the citizenry. Included among these responsibilities are provisions for a state health service, a

state school system, and state support for science and the arts. Additionally, the state guarantees citizens the right to work, to rest (annual paid vacations), and to receive old-age and disability pensions. Article 39 enshrines the national minorities' rights of cultural development and the use of their native language.

Duties of the citizens to the state, as set forth in the constitution, are headed by the obligation to protect public property, which is called "the sacred and inviolable basis of people's democracy, the source of strength of the homeland, and the welfare and cultural life of the working people" (Article 35). Other duties include military service, defense of the country, and payment of taxes.

The constitution establishes separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. Article 41 conforms to European constitutional practice in providing that the legislative branch, the People's Assembly, is "the highest organ of state power." Article 61 designates the Council of Ministers as "the highest executive organ." This theoretical division of power, with explicit legislative supremacy, is noted in other Communist constitutions and reflects the West European constitutional experience. In Albania, however—as elsewhere in the Communist world—the theory is not the practice. The concept of the unitary state in which all organs of government function under the direction of the Communist party in the interests of one class is the fact of political life. The Marxist-Leninist political formula that the state represents the interests of the worker class exclusively has constituted the *de facto* underpinning for an Albanian workers' state and has in practice nullified the theoretical "separation" of powers and the implied principle of some checks and balances. Aside from the instruments of central government, the constitution also provides for a hierarchy of people's councils—local organs of the central power—at the different territorial-administrative levels in the country.

2. Structure of the government

Despite the powers and responsibilities assigned the executive, legislative, and judicial branches by the constitution, all important decisions are made by the party leadership and passed on to the appropriate government agencies for implementation (Figure 25). Because the party leaders themselves are the top-ranking government officials—the orthodox Communist principle of the interlocking directorate—the government agencies serve merely as executive and administrative bodies of the party, and the judiciary acts as an instrument for the enforcement of party decisions. The government has three levels of administration below the national level, but functionally it is essentially unitary. Regional and local governments as generally understood in most Western countries are nonexistent, and administration at lower levels is merely an adjunct of the central regime in Tiranë. Figure 30 depicts the interlocking directorate, a concept discussed more fully below under Political Dynamics.

The major legal entities of the national government, in order of importance, are the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), the Presidium of the People's Assembly, the People's Assembly, and the judiciary. Even within the context of party control, the regime does not permit the legislative supremacy called for in the constitution but directs the government first through the more manageable executive branch. The three branches are closely coordinated by party discipline, however, in controlling every facet of public life and most facets of private life as well.

In March 1966 the Presidium of the People's Assembly approved sweeping measures for reorganizing the governmental structure and redistributing responsibilities within the state apparatus, including the diffusion of some additional administrative powers to lower governmental levels. The number of ministries was reduced from 19 to 14 (and later to 13) and the number of departments within these organs was decreased from 400 to 110. According to a speech by Premier Shehu before the People's Assembly in March 1966, district governments were to be entrusted with additional unspecified duties which previously had been the exclusive prerogative of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of lower organs has also been broadened in the fields of the budget, labor, finance, and inventories. The purpose of these reforms appears to have been to satisfy a genuine need to streamline the bureaucracy and make local government more responsive to local needs.

a. Council of Ministers

Nominally appointed and subject to recall by the People's Assembly, the Council of Ministers is the most important executive and administrative agency in the government. Although it is theoretically accountable to the People's Assembly or its Presidium when the assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers is actually chosen by the central party apparatus, and its main function is to insure that all party decisions are carried out by the central and lower governmental units. Council decrees, which cover all political, economic, social, cultural, and military activities in the country, are binding on all government agencies. Theoretically, the Council of Ministers acts in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and expresses the will of the People's Assembly. In practice, important decrees and decisions are issued jointly in the name of the party's Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers presents the country's annual budget to the People's Assembly, and it issues and implements most decrees and regulations in *pro forma* compliance with the laws in force. Its other stated constitutional duties include the direction of the monetary system and the armed forces and the enforcement of all necessary measures to guarantee observance of the constitution. The Council of Ministers is also charged with maintaining relations with foreign countries and with carrying out the provisions of treaties and international obligations.



FIGURE 25. Party control of governmental structure (U/OU)

In the March 1966 government reorganization that reduced the number of portfolios to 13, all three First Deputy Premier posts were abolished; the staff of the Central State Administration was cut in half; and in September the Ministry of Justice was eliminated. These changes were part of a campaign to reduce the overinflated bureaucracy and were in line with other intensive efforts to simplify administration in order to make government more efficient. The only change in the Council of Ministers since the 1966 reorganization has been the addition of a secretarial body—the Secretary General of the Council—presumably to streamline the inner workings of the council.

The Council of Ministers in December 1970[1] consisted of Premier Mehmet Shehu, four Deputy Premiers, and 14 other ministers and officials of ministerial rank, whose areas of responsibility were as follows:

Agriculture	Industry and Mining
Commerce	Internal Affairs
Communications	People's Defense
Construction	Public Health
Education and Culture	State Planning Committee
Finance	Minister without Portfolio
Foreign Affairs	Secretary General of the Council

Nine members of the Council of Ministers were members or candidate members of the powerful party Politburo, and all but five were members of the party Central Committee.

Mehmet Shehu (Figure 26) has been Premier since 1954 and a member of the Politburo since 1948. He is outranked in the regime only by party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and is considered the ruthless strongman of the regime. Prior to becoming Premier, as Minister of Internal Affairs he controlled the state security organization, the *Sigurimi*. In this capacity he built the *Sigurimi* into an effective secret police organization and became the most feared and hated man in the country because of his skill and ruthlessness in eliminating resistance to the regime. Although much has been written of possible Shehu-Hoxha friction, there is no firm evidence of basic disagreements between the two.

Because the government is virtually the sole owner of industry and almost all agriculture is under state or collective farms, the ministries represent government monopolies and are responsible for all matters in their field of competence, including the training of cadres, planning, technical developments, and investment.

b. Presidium of the People's Assembly

The Presidium of the People's Assembly, composed of a president and 14 members, including three vice presidents and a secretary, is elected by the assembly to exercise the assembly's authority between its semiannual sessions. The assembly may dismiss the Presidium or any of its members before the end of their 4-year terms and elect new ones.

The President of the Presidium, Haxhi Lleshi (Figure 27), is the Chief of State, but he is only a figurehead and wields little power or influence. His principal duties are limited to ceremonial functions such as accepting credentials of foreign representatives and greeting visiting dignitaries.

Because the full assembly meets only twice a year for a short period of time, the party uses the Presidium as the primary instrument for the enactment of legislation. Among its nominal functions are interpreting and making decisions concerning the constitutionality of laws; issuing decrees and promulgating laws passed by the assembly; ratifying and denouncing international agreements; upon cabinet recommendation, appointing ministers (ad interim), heads of commissions, and representatives abroad; determining the enterprises and institutions to be operated by the government; and declaring (ad interim) general mobilization and imposing martial law. The Presidium also proclaims elections and convenes the People's Assembly, grants pardons and

[1]For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

FIGURE 26. Mehmet Shehu, Chairman, Council of Ministers (C)

FIGURE 27. Haxhi Lleshi, President of the Presidium of the National Assembly (U/OU)

awards, and appoints the commander of the armed forces. This impressive list of nominal powers stands in contrast to its actual complete subservience to the party.

c. People's Assembly

The People's Assembly is a unicameral body popularly elected every 4 years on the basis of one deputy for every 8,000 citizens. All candidates for the assembly are picked by the party and run on the slate of the Democratic Front, the party's mass political organization. Elections in 1970 provided an assembly of 264 members. Although the constitution stipulates that the assembly is the only executor of legislative power, it performs little actual legislative work and usually meets only twice a year for 2- or 3-day sessions to approve decrees and laws proposed by its Presidium or the Council of Ministers. Other *pro forma* responsibilities of the assembly include approval of the state budget, creation or abolition of ministries, and amendment of the constitution.

Theoretically, elections of assembly delegates are direct and by secret ballot. In practice, however, voting is for a party-prepared single slate of candidates who are chosen by the Democratic Front, a mass political organization, and "unanimously endorsed" by sponsoring social, trade union, and political organizations. To vote against the regime, the voter must cross out the name of the official candidate and write in another. Assembly deputies theoretically have parliamentary immunity, but legal action can be taken against individual deputies if the assembly or its Presidium authorizes such action.

d. Judiciary

The main function of the judicial system is the preservation of the Communist regime. In adjudicating criminal and civil disputes, many of the latter involving pension and social insurance claims, the courts have proved relatively freewheeling. Constitutional guarantees are meaningless when they conflict with party policy, and the court system consistently upholds the state's rights rather than those of the individual. Interpretation of the constitutionality of laws is theoretically the responsibility of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, not the court system. The Presidium, however, through the interlocking directorate, directly expresses the wishes of the party Politburo. The President of the Supreme Court, Aranit Cela—writing in mid-1969—revealed the extent to which the entire court system is inhibited from interpreting and applying the law freely. Cela enjoined the courts to judge on what is "right" and not to engage in "formal applications of the provisions of the law." Stressing that the courts must be guided by "proletarian policy," Cela proceeded to decry the "intellectualism, narrow judicial light, and professionalism" of some legal workers. Attempts to standardize punishments were exhibited as manifestations of a "technocratic" attitude.

The court system consists of a Supreme Court, district courts, and village, city, and city district courts. The Supreme Court—the highest judicial organ in the country—organizes and controls the Albanian court system. It consists of a chairman, several deputy chairmen, and an unspecified number of judges and assistant judges—all elected by the People's Assembly for 4-year terms. The Supreme Court meets as one body (a plenum) or in several different compositions (a penal or a civil or military collegium) with the chairman of the Supreme Court or one of his deputies presiding at each convocation. The number of justices necessary for the convocation of a collegium seemingly varies, but when functioning as a court of the second instance (appellate) a collegium of three judges sits in session.

There are no firm criteria specifying which category or categories of cases must be adjudicated by the Supreme Court as a court of the first instance. Any "important" case can be removed from the district court's jurisdiction by the chairman of the Supreme Court. The court is a court of second instance in hearing appeals against the decisions of district courts. The highest appellate judicial body is the plenum of the Supreme Court. The plenum, in addition to establishing norms of legal practice and studying judicial problems, examines appeals "for legal protection" arising from penal and civil decisions of the Supreme Court's collegiums.

District courts—the mainstays of the legal system—are courts of the first instance for most penal and civil cases aired in the country. They also serve as courts of second instance in appeals against the decisions of lower courts. The activities of the district courts are closely monitored by the Supreme Court, which, aside from the control it exercises as an appellate court, sends inspectors with undefined powers and responsibilities to sit in on sessions of the district courts. Additionally, the functions of a district court can be assumed by a Supreme Court judge upon the decision of the chairman of the Supreme Court. Judges of the district courts are popularly elected for a period of 3 years. Assistant judges, much less experienced and of lower educational background than judges, participate in various ways in the work of the district courts.

The lowest courts—at village, city, and city district level—judge minor criminal and civil cases. Essentially, these pseudojudicial organs, often called people's courts, are controlled by the district courts. They are composed of an assistant judge from the district court and local social "activists" popularly elected for 1-year terms.

Since the judicial reorganization of 1968, military courts have ceased to exist as a separate court hierarchy. In their stead are military collegiums of the Supreme Court and district courts. For the most part, military judges are selected in the same manner as their civilian colleagues, except that assistant military judges are selected by the military instead of the People's Assembly or the general public.

The implementation of the law is the prerogative of the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the People's Assembly. He in turn appoints the district prosecutor, whose office is the main investigative office for most court cases in the country. People's prosecutors are popularly elected at the district and lower administrative levels and are directly responsible to their respective

district prosecutors. They, in part, serve to popularize and implement the law, but have a very limited legal background. Defense attorneys probably still exist in Albania, although they are organized and employed by the state. A 1967 decree increased the regime's control over attorneys by abolishing the Lawyers' Collective and establishing an Office of Legal Assistance under the Supreme Court.

e. Legal codes and judicial procedures

Albania's penal code and code of criminal procedure, adopted in 1952 and 1953, respectively, are patterned after Soviet law. The main objective of the codes is "protection of the socialist state...and its legal order." The penal code has two sections. The first contains general provisions which define crime as any action that is "socially dangerous." It adds, in Article 3, that an "act is socially dangerous if it is directed against the people's authority and state resources." The second section has 12 articles dealing respectively with crimes against or involving: 1) the state; 2) socialist property; 3) the socialist system of economy, particularly industry, foreign and domestic trade, finances, taxes and tariffs, transport, agriculture, forestry, handicrafts, or fishing; 4) individuals; 5) marriage and the family; 6) property of citizens; 7) work and labor discipline; 8) the performance of official duties; 9) denial of the right to vote; 10) denial of justice; 11) administrative order; or 12) military matters and discipline.

The general provisions of the first section of the code appear to be harsher than their Soviet counterparts, and in many instances the penalties are much more severe. The major penalties provided by the code are death, imprisonment, and internment in "corrective" labor camps. The death penalty is for crimes against the state, and there have been instances of capital punishment for certain economic offenses, "social endangerment," and murder. Although life imprisonment is not provided for by law and allegedly does not exist, defectors claim that there are a number of criminals serving life sentences. Harsh penalties are also provided for persons who give or offer shelter to enemies of the state. In contrast, individuals who break laws in defense of the state and of "socialist wealth" are exempted by the code from criminal prosecution.

The code of criminal procedure describes the processes to be followed from the discovery of a criminal act to the final disposition of the case. Criminal proceedings are initiated by the prosecutor and investigative agencies either on their own initiative or in response to accusations by citizens, enterprises, social organizations, officials, or self-denunciation by the defendant.

The results of pretrial proceedings are of major importance because they may be used at the trial if the defendant's testimony before the court conflicts with that which he has given to the investigators or if the defendant refuses to testify before the court. Thus, a "confession" may be the main evidence of a defendant's guilt. Albanian criminal procedure in theory adheres to the principle of presumption of innocence until guilt is proven. However, the procedures provide no legal guarantees for enforcing this presumption, and in practice it is ignored.

Constitutionally, all Albanian citizens are guaranteed the right of defense counsel. The code of criminal procedure, however, does not provide for participation of a defense lawyer in the all-important pretrial examination or investigation. Moreover, a defendant under arrest does not have the right to communicate with a lawyer or with anyone else to request assistance in gathering evidence pertinent to his plea or in organizing his defense. The net result of this procedure is that guilt is usually determined before the trial, and the defense lawyer merely enters a plea for mercy.

Based on Soviet civil law, the Albanian civil code consists of provisions on inheritance and a so-called general section (introduced in 1955), which deals with property law and nonproperty personal relationships.

The first article of the general section regulates property relationships among social organizations, among social organizations and citizens, and among citizens themselves. The second article clarifies the character of the country's civil legislation, which aims at assisting the building of the "new life." Nothing which interferes with developing and strengthening "socialized existence" is countenanced. In addition, juridical persons consist solely of those individuals and state and social organizations and institutions which are endowed with socioeconomic functions in the building of socialism. No partnership or other combination of private persons for economic purposes is recognized as a juridical person.

f. Local government

Local government is based on a hierarchy of people's councils which exercise governmental authority over areas corresponding to administrative territorial divisions. People's councils exist in districts (*rreth*), localities (*lokalitet*), cities, city wards, united villages, and villages. Albania is divided into 27 districts, including a district for the city of Tiranë (Population and Administrative Divisions inset, Summary Map, Figure 79).

Although theoretically autonomous, the people's councils are essentially local agencies of the central government under the control of local party organs. Article 2 of the law on people's councils states that the party defines the general line of their activity and controls systematically the execution of that line in practice. Additionally, the district people's councils have the right to define the concrete duties of the lower people's councils in the economic, social, and cultural fields.

Responsibilities of the people's councils, as set forth in the law on people's councils of 31 December 1967, are so diverse and open ended that the councils in theory are responsible for practically everything that occurs in their district. Some of their specific responsibilities include execution of the economic plan; collection of fees and taxes; guidance of all institutions, enterprises, and economic organizations in their territory; and the direct supervision of certain institutions and organizations

directly attached to the people's councils. Additionally, the people's councils are responsible for organizing health services, directing education, maintaining roads and parks, controlling the collection of agricultural products, expanding the commercial network, and developing agriculture and industry in general. The actions of the people's councils in so many diverse fields are, of course, subject to the real political power exercised by the local party organization and the constraints and regulations laid down by the central government's bureaucracy.

Members of the people's councils at all levels are elected for 3 years by the citizens from lists of candidates prepared by the party and issued in the name of the Democratic Front. In the May 1964 elections 22,780 administrators were elected to people's councils. Subsequent elections in June 1967 and in September 1970 have not revealed how many elected administrators are working in the people's councils.

People's councils meet regularly, with the minimum number of sessions as regulated by law ranging from 4 to 12 times a year, depending on the administrative level. The lowest level (village) meets most frequently. Each people's council elects a "presidency," chooses permanent or temporary commissions, and elects an executive committee. The executive committee is the real repository of administrative and executive authority. The executive committee prepares the local draft economic plan and draft budget, executes decisions of the party and higher government organs, and directs activities of all institutes and organizations on the territory of the people's councils. Meeting at least once a month, the executive committee performs its work on a day-to-day basis through various sections and offices, whose heads have considerable authority and need not be members of the executive committee of the people's council. The executive committee is composed of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and a specified number of members (depending on the administrative level). The presidency of the people's council—consisting of a chairman, several deputy chairmen, and a secretary—prepares and presides at meetings of the people's council and oversees the work of the council's commissions. The presidency is a relatively powerless position. Commissions of the people's councils are appointed as necessary by the people's councils and sometimes serve to involve the citizenry in special council efforts.

C. Political dynamics (S)

1. Party history

The long isolation of Turkish-dominated Albania from European currents and the very late emergence of the nation as an independent entity are reflected in the belated introduction of Marxist socialism. The first feeble cells—inspired by the Soviet October Revolution (1917) and the third International (1919)—did not appear until the 1920's and were for a long time confined to the cities, notably Tiranë and Korçë. The impact of developments in the Soviet Union was strengthened by the fact that it was the Bolsheviks who had revealed to the world in December 1917 the contents of the secret Treaty of London (April 1915) which provided for the partition of Albania among the Great Powers of Europe.

In the wake of Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the resultant Comintern policy of forming anti-Fascist organizations in Europe, several small Marxist groups expanded their influence in Albania, and future Communist leaders, including Enver Hoxha, who had been active in the Communist movement in Western Europe, returned to the country. The Italian invasion of Albania (April 1939) enabled these early Marxists to identify their anti-Fascist role with national liberation and thereby greatly to increase their following. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, all Albanian Marxists joined with other nationalist groups and, partly through demonstrated leadership qualities, enhanced their influence in the coordinated resistance to the Italian and subsequent German occupations. The consolidation of Communist control over the resistance movement was essentially brought about from the outside; Albanian resistance fighters were systematically aided and directed by the well-organized Communist partisans in neighboring Yugoslavia.

The Albanian Communist Party was founded clandestinely in Tiranë on 8 November 1941 by two emissaries of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Dusan Mugosa and Miladin Popovic, both of whom directed the Albanian party until the end of the war. The Albanian Communist Party was in reality a branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party until 1948 when Belgrade was expelled from the Cominform. The Albanian Communist Party did not become completely independent until it held its first congress in November 1948 and changed its name to the Albanian Workers Party.

The Communist-dominated Albanian National Liberation Movement took control of the country when the Germans withdrew in 1944, and on 29 November Premier Enver Hoxha inaugurated the government of the "Albanian Democratic Republic." Prominent during World War II as a party and resistance organizer, Hoxha emerged in the postwar period as the undisputed leader of the government and party. Hoxha had received his education at the French *Lycée* in Korçë and later studied at Montpellier University in France. After only a year at the university he went to Paris, where he came under the influence of radical French Communists. Returning to Albania in 1936, Hoxha taught at the French *Lycée* before joining the resistance against the Italians in 1939. As Premier from 1944 to 1954 and First Secretary of the party since 1941 (the position was known as Secretary General from 1941 to 1954), Hoxha (Figure 28) has remained top man in the Communist regime.

The Albanian Workers Party (*Partia E Punes E Shqiperise*—PPSH) has been subjected to a number of purges which have affected Politburo members as well as the lowest party rank and file. Of the 11 leading members at the time the predecessor Albanian Communist Party was founded in 1941, only Hoxha remains. Although some purges were carried out between 1944 and 1948, the

FIGURE 28. Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Communist party (C)

first major purge occurred in the latter year, after Albania sided with the U.S.S.R. against Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1952, out of a total PPSH membership of some 29,000 in November 1948, about 6,000 party members were purged for alleged pro-Yugoslav sympathies. Koci Xoxe, Politburo member and chief of the security force, who had become one of the most powerful figures in Albania because of Yugoslav backing, was stripped of his position, tried, and executed in 1949. Only in July 1954, following the post-Stalin Soviet lead, did Hoxha reluctantly apply the "principle of collective leadership" and relinquish the premiership to Mehmet Shehu. Hoxha retained the position of party First Secretary, however.

The next period of factionalism and purging began as soon as 1955, when the U.S.S.R., to the dismay of the Hoxha regime, sought a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Two former Politburo members and government ministers, Bedri Spahiu and Tuk Jakova, were ousted and imprisoned for promoting a liberalization in domestic policies. Further purges erupted in 1956, when Liri Gega, who had been a top party leader during World War II, was executed on charges of being "linked with the espionage organization of a foreign country" (presumably Yugoslavia). His dereliction was more likely continued support for contemporary Soviet liberalization policies.

The most recent purge of party and government leaders occurred in 1960, when Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko were dismissed from high party offices because of their pro-Soviet leanings at a time when the regime had begun to side with Communist China in the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Since 1960 the party leadership has stabilized and has consistently reaffirmed Sino-Albanian solidarity while stressing the independent character of its own revolutionary movement.

2. Party organization

Under the principle of "democratic centralism," officials of party organs are "elected" and in theory the minority submits to the majority. In practice, the higher party officials select the candidates and the members approve them automatically. The party is organized in accordance with the country's territorial subdivisions, with a central apparatus in Tiranë and subordinate organizations in districts and cities. The lowest level, usually at the individual rural village, factory, school, or collective farm, is the basic party organization. Each level is similar in organization, with a "representative" body for the entire level which theoretically is the highest organ and comprises the leadership. The "representative" bodies are the congress at the national level, the conference at the district and city levels, and the general meeting at the basic party level. Between sessions of these representative bodies, the everyday work of the party is carried on by executive bodies, which are the real leadership organs of the party (Figure 29).



FIGURE 29. Structure of the Albanian Workers Party, March 1971 (U/OU)

a. National level

According to the party statutes the highest organ of the party is the congress. Delegates to a congress are nominally elected by district and city conferences, but the election, which has always been nearly unanimous, is only *pro forma* because the delegates are handpicked in advance by the central apparatus in cooperation with the district and city conferences. The party statutes state that a congress must be called at least once every 4 years, but in actual practice more time usually elapses between sessions. Over 5 years elapsed between the Fourth Congress (February 1961) and the Fifth Congress (November 1966), and in early 1971 the Sixth Congress was scheduled for November of that year. Theoretically, extraordinary congresses may be called by the Central Committee at its initiative or at the request of no less than one-third the number of all party members who were represented at the previous congress. This prerogative has never been exercised.

The functions of the congress include ratification of reports submitted by the Central Committee and other central bodies, review and amendment of party tactics, and election of members of the Central Committee and the Central Control and Auditing Commission. Much of this activity, however, is *pro forma;* the party congress usually rubber stamps the policies and decisions of the leadership.

The Central Committee, composed of 61 members and 36 candidate members, is nominally assigned the functions of representing the party in its relations with Communist parties and mass organizations in other countries, directing the activities of party organizations, electing members of the central party organs and supervising their activity, authorizing publication of the party newspaper and journal, and administering party funds.

The real locus of power is in the Politburo, the policy-formulating body of the Central Committee, composed in early 1971 of 10 members and five candidate members. It exercises control over the party and, through the placement of its members in top governmental and mass organization positions (the interlocking directorate, Figure 30), it formulates all policies concerning economic, defense, internal security, and social and political affairs of the country.

Although the Politburo is formally elected by the Central Committee, in reality it determines its own composition and has been stable since the purges of the mid-1950's. With the exception of Liri Belishova, who was purged in September 1960, and Rrapo Dervishi, who was not reelected to candidate membership, all the incumbent members and candidates elected at the Third Party Congress (1956) were reelected at the Fourth and Fifth Congresses, in 1961 and 1966, respectively. The



FIGURE 30. Members of the Politburo and Secretariat and their positions in government and mass organizations (U/OU)

consistent reelection of the top party body lends support to the regime's assertion that the party is "monolithic." The party hierarchy, many of whom are related by blood or marriage, is now a tightly knit group which has given Albania a degree of stability under First Secretary Hoxha. Like many Communist dictatorships, however, Albania does not appear to have any provision for succession within the leadership, and unforeseen events, such as the death of Hoxha, could seriously disrupt the equilibrium of the party elite.

The Secretariat, composed of First Secretary Hoxha and three secretaries, is the administrative and executive body of the Central Committee. It manages the various directorates of the Central Committee and is also responsible for other select party functions, including ideology and relations with foreign Communist parties. The division of responsibility between the three party secretaries is not clear, but Hysni Kapo appears to be in charge of organizational matters and party cadres, Xhafer Spahiu is apparently in charge of industry and other economic affairs, and Ramiz Alia remains the party ideologist.

The Central Committee directorates—the core of the central apparatus—are directly controlled by the Secretariat. At the behest of the secretaries, the directorates often collect information and devise options for policy decisions, and also implement policy guidelines adopted by the Politburo. The directorates have direct connections with all implementing bodies. For instance, the Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda (*agitprop*) not only issues directives to the agitation and propaganda sections of the district party committees but also to all propaganda outlets in the government, mass organizations, and the armed and security forces. Directorates exist for different sectors of the economy as well as for internal party matters and all governmental functions. The most important directorates are those of Cadres and Organizations, responsible for appointments to all major positions in the country; of Agitation and Propaganda; and of State Administrative Organs.

The separate Control and Auditing Commissions were combined into the Central Control and Auditing Commission at the Fifth Congress in November 1966. Its duties consist of assuring that party directives reach local party organs and of checking on the application of party discipline. It also regulates the treasury and investigates the fiscal activities of the Central Committee.

The Ministry of People's Defense has its own Political Directorate which is on the same level as other directorates or departments within the Central Committee. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also has "appropriate" political organs which are responsible for the political orientation of the ministry's forces. In March 1966 the Politburo decreed that effective immediately political commissars would be reintroduced in all army units, a move undoubtedly intended to strengthen party control over the armed forces.

b. Local levels

Below the national level, the pattern of party organization parallels the governmental structure. Twenty-seven district party organizations, including one for the city of Tiranë, are responsible to the central apparatus. Below the district and city levels, the more than 2,800 basic party organizations form the base of the party pyramid. The district party organization not only "guides" the activities of all the party organizations within the district, but also "guides and regulates" the activities of the local government bodies and mass organizations, partly through interlocking directorates at the local level. The basic organizations are established in factories and plants, agricultural enterprises, machine tractor stations, villages, basic units of the armed and security forces, state administration, schools, and other work centers where there are no less than three party members. Where there are less than three party members, "groups" of party candidates or joint groups of party and "working youth" members are created and directed by a party member selected usually by the district party committee. The basic organizations are assigned a multitude of duties ranging from checking and controlling enterprises to admitting and indoctrinating new party members. The hierarchy of party organizations in the armed forces extends from the basic organizations through a series of chiefs of political branches in units and installations up to the Political Directorate of the Ministry of People's Defense. The latter is directly subordinate to the party central organs. Additionally, all political organs in military units are obliged to maintain close relations with local (civilian) party organizations.

The annual party conference is the highest organ of each district and city party organization. Between the conference meetings the affairs of the organization are conducted by a committee whose members are elected by the conference. The election of delegates to the conferences by party members at the next lower level gives the appearance of democratic control, but in practice control is always exercised from above. No party committee or conference may refuse to obey or even question orders issued by higher authorities, nor may it refuse to elect a candidate nominated from above.

c. Membership

Membership in the party is open to any Albanian citizen 18 years old or over who is a "worker," accepts and upholds the program and statutes of the party, executes all party decisions, pays his membership dues, and does not "exploit" the work of others. All prospective members are carefully screened and the character, background, and work of applicants are thoroughly considered. They must undergo a probationary period of candidate membership, which lasts from 2 to 3 years. Additionally, all applicants must be sponsored by three full-fledged party members who have known him for at least 3 years. Children of formerly wealthy farmers, pre-Communist governmental officials, and wealthy tradesmen may be accepted in the party only under special circumstances.

Total party membership in January 1970 was officially announced as 75,673. This figure represents about 3.5% of the country's total population and an increase in membership of 9,346 since November 1966 when total party membership was 66,327. Workers accounted for about 35% of the total party membership, peasants almost 29%, and white-collar workers about 36%. Since 1966, the percentage of party members classed as workers has slowly increased. Of the new party members selected during the period 1966-69, 35% were workers, 45% collective farmers, and only 16% white-collar employees. Efforts are continually made to increase the number of women party members, who in 1966 amounted to 12.5% of the total membership. The regime is also concerned about the unequal geographic distribution of the party membership. Although the rural population is twice as large as the urban population, 68% of party members live in urban areas. Despite the great number of peasants joining the party in 1966-69, the percentage of peasants in the total party membership in 1970 was only 0.02% higher than in 1966, indicating, in part, changes in job status.

Most party members lack professional qualifications as administrators or are insufficiently grounded in the principles and practices of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or both. The lack of administrative skill is attributable largely to regime policies of placing first priority upon faithfulness to the party. The still relatively widespread illiteracy and functional illiteracy makes it difficult to indoctrinate ideology, dependent as some of it must be on minimum reading skills. Some capable men have been purged because they have shown tendencies to deviate from the party line in the interest of economic or bureaucratic efficiency.

3. Mass organizations

The party has created a number of mass organizations whose chief functions are to further the political, economic, ideological, and cultural aims of the regime. Completely under the control of the party, they are used as propaganda instruments to maintain political control; all citizens are under political and economic pressure to join them.

The Democratic Front of Albania, an outgrowth of the National Liberation Movement, is the most important mass organization because it has the primary function of mobilizing the country to execute the program and policies of the party and of choosing candidates for national and local elections. The organization is headed by party chief Enver Hoxha. Membership in theory is voluntary and open to all citizens 18 years of age or over, regardless of national origin, religion, or social class, who accept the front's statutes and actively promote its principles. In practice, however, participation is forced by regime pressure, because it is very difficult to obtain a job or make purchases in state stores without a membership card. Only those considered hostile to the regime are refused admission. Even under these conditions, only about half the population, or 700,000, belonged to the organization in 1961. More recent membership totals are not available.

The Union of Working Youth of Albania is a junior branch of the party and constitutes the core of future party membership. Youths under 20 years of age are only eligible for party membership if they belong to the union. This organization recommends members from its ranks for party membership, takes an active part in promoting party directives, and educates members in Marxist-Leninist principles. Membership is open to all between the ages of 15 and 26 who accept the union's statute. In 1967 the union was officially reported to have 210,000 members—a rather insignificant increase over the 1961 membership of about 135,000, in view of the rapidly expanding population. Although the provisions of the statute imply that membership is voluntary, youths who fail to join run the risk of being barred from higher education, being denied a desirable job, or being branded an "enemy of the people." Nevertheless, the union seemingly has failed to induce a majority of the youth to join.

In addition to its main task of instructing future members of the party, the union controls the pioneer organizations (which group children from 7 to 14 together), makes certain that party directives are implemented by the youths, and organizes young people into "voluntary" work brigades. The party periodically gives the union special missions, most prominently during Albania's recent cultural revolution. In February 1967 Enver Hoxha tasked the organization with closing down all religious institutions in the country. The union purportedly accomplished its mission within a few months.

The Central Council of Trade Unions, created in 1945, implements party policies in the economic and labor fields; it does not represent worker interests. The organization enforces work production quotas, helps administer the regime's program of social insurance, and is responsible for raising the cultural and ideological level of its members. Membership is open to all workers, members of the professions, and managers. Many workers join primarily to avoid discrimination in jobs and to gain privileges and benefits. Their lack of genuine motivation is reflected in frequent regime complaints against persistent inefficiency, lack of enthusiasm for work, abuse of state property, and failure to meet planned goals in agriculture and industry. The number of members is not known and may be as low as 150,000 or as high as 400,000.

Other less important mass organizations include the Union of Albanian Women, which indoctrinates Albanian women in Communist ideology, controls and supervises their political and social activities, and strives to improve their status in the patriarchal society; and the Society for Aid to the Army and Defense, a military and civil defense corps whose main task is to provide premilitary training and to conduct special civil defense courses for Albania's youth. Another is the Committee of

Albanian War Veterans, which is largely composed of survivors of World War II partisan detachments.

4. Electoral procedures

Elections in Albania provide the regime with an opportunity for a vigorous campaign to bolster its domestic policies by obtaining apparent popular endorsement and participation. Electoral procedures are so designed that the voters have no choice of candidates, and even the right to abstain from voting is in effect denied by regime intimidation and pressure.

Preparations for electoral campaigns begin months in advance, and agitation and propaganda teams attempt to persuade voters "that elections are free and democratic, that everyone is free to express his views, and that only those candidates desired by the voters should be elected." All information and propaganda media extol the achievements of the regime and make optimistic promises for the future. Electoral meetings throughout the country are addressed by high party officials who urge the voters to cast their ballots for the Democratic Front candidates.

Since 1956, citizens have voted by dropping into a box a single ballot which contains only the names of the regime's candidates. To vote against the regime the voter must cross out the name of the candidate and write in another name. Since the booth provided at the voting place may or may not be used, at the voter's discretion, anyone who does enter it to cast his ballot is automatically suspected of doing so to write in another candidate's name, and thus of being in opposition.

Voting day, always Sunday, is a national holiday and a festive occasion. Great efforts are made to bring out every voter; voting places are decorated with flags and flowers, and the youth organizations are mobilized to keep order. Theoretically, voting is optional; in practice, however, local party officials insure that every registered person votes either at the polls or at home if he is sick or an invalid. A voter who abstains runs the risk of being accused of opposing the people's candidates or being an "enemy of the people."

Voting procedures result in automatic approval of the regime's candidates by over 99% of the voters. The regime propaganda media always give much attention to the elections as signal endorsements of its programs. During the national election of July 1966, official announcements assert, only four of the eligible voters neglected to vote, and, of those who did vote, only three reportedly failed to cast their ballots for the single list of Democratic Front candidates. In the September 1970 elections for deputies to the People's Assembly, also according to official announcements, 100% of the voters cast 100% of their ballots for the Democratic Front slate.

D. National policies (S)

1. Summary and background

Three major influences underlying Albania's domestic and foreign policy are its restricted size, its underdeveloped economy, and its deep isolation from the outside world. These factors have encouraged a defensive posture manifested in the rigid totalitarian attitudes of Albania's rulers and their protective alliance with Communist China. Until recently, foreign policy under the Communist regime had been largely confined to maintaining close relations with the patron power of the moment—successively Yugoslavia (1944-48), the U.S.S.R. (1948-60), and Communist China (since 1961)—and vigorously advancing its causes in international forums. Since 1969, however, Albania has begun to establish more normal relations with its immediate neighbors, among other states of the Mediterranean basin, and with the smaller countries of Western Europe. Albania's internal policy has stressed rapid economic development in a context of revolutionary fervor, the "class struggle," and the inspiring of a genuine national motivation to replace tribal and regional particularism. The Albanian strain of "self-reliant" nationalism has necessitated, *inter alia*, the maintenance of relatively large internal security and defense forces, and has been verbalized in such typically Marxist mass-oriented slogans as "a pick in one hand, a rifle in the other." Every important policy decision is linked ideologically to the need for combating the internal and external menaces of "revisionism" and capitalism, or to the importance of maintaining the dictatorship of the Communist party. If ideological Marxist "purity" has long been the rationale for a self-imposed isolation, its expression has, on occasion, meshed with the needs of a labor-scarce, undercapitalized economy. The imperative of bypassing the "exploitive period of capitalist expansion"—of catapulting economic production into the modern age—has been met by programs designed to involve the greatest possible number of people, regardless of status, in the attainment of national economic goals. Some of the benchmarks of this process were the equalization of wages (1967), mobilization of "voluntary" labor, requirements of "production work" for students and intellectuals, and the drive to sharply increase participation of women in the industrial labor force. This welcome confluence of socioeconomic policy and ideological "rightness" was especially characteristic of the Albanian "cultural revolution" when the very "young" population (median age in 1970 was 19 years of age) was mobilized in economic and social action groups—in structure but not in purpose vaguely reminiscent of the Red Guards in the Chinese cultural revolution—so as to exploit youthful energies as a wedge to move the largely apathetic population toward a positive commitment vis-a-vis regime policies.

2. Domestic

Since the mid-1960's the leadership's domestic priorities have shifted from consolidation of power to a concentration of effort to bring Albania into the 20th century. Basically, however, the regime's domestic objectives of consolidated central political control, rapid economic development through a tightly regulated

economy, and the "modernization" of a backward society have remained unchanged since the Communists gained control of the country following World War II. The party has consolidated its power by means of purges, intrigues, and family friendship ties. The ruling elite, at least outwardly, has been a very stable grouping, and periods of purging have been closely linked, on the whole, with changes of foreign sponsorship. In 1960-61 party leader Hoxha was strong enough to throw party and state support to the Chinese Communists and against the U.S.S.R. after dismissing only two pro-Soviet members of the leadership. Economic development, which has proceeded largely with foreign assistance, has meant in the Albanian context the initiation of such basic programs as working to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, bringing electricity to every village, and developing export markets for raw and semifinished industrial and agricultural products. The regime has taken the first steps toward "modernization" of the society by initiating extensive literacy and education programs, health and sanitation measures, and strong attacks on "old customs," the targets of the latter ranging from the sale of brides to religious beliefs.

In an effort to break down family ties and to substitute the state for the tribal patriarch, the Albanian leadership has shown great concern for organizing and controlling every facet of society, as well as the life of each individual citizen. Because of this policy, distinguishing between the public life and the private life of an individual is meaningless, and there is little that one can do to escape participation in regime programs. A strict system of security precautions throughout the general population further strengthens centralized political control. A police-state atmosphere pervades all aspects of life in Albania. The large number of paid and unpaid informers among all strata of society has given rise to the popular belief that perhaps one-sixth of the population is in the pay of the security forces. Albanians are forbidden any unregulated contacts with foreigners. Mail censorship, while less pervasive than in earlier years, is still a common practice, and travel restrictions are stringent. Personal identity cards are required for travel within the country and checkpoints are numerous.

Available evidence at the end of 1970 suggests that by 1966 the party leadership may have taken stock and felt sufficiently confident of its position to initiate a series of socioeconomic and political changes that were intended to transform Albania into a modern state. With Chinese Communist help the regime had survived the break with the Soviets and isolation from its hostile neighbors, and had capitalized on the siege mentality developed during this period to initiate the awakening of a national consciousness, a phenomenon largely dormant in the country's modern history.

The decision to break with the past involved a basic psychological reorientation of Albania's leaders. This meant a turn from a negatively oriented, defensive outlook seeking mainly self-perpetuation, and the almost incidental provision for the basic necessities of the people, to a positive commitment offering viable programs for building a better life for all, which consequently would require the active support of the party and government bureaucracy. Perpetuation of the regime's monopoly of power is still a *sine qua non* of its policy aims, but in contrast to the earlier period the leadership now seeks popular acquiescence and participation in this goal. One of the keys to the successful implementation of these changes is to secure the participation of youth, with its idealism and vigor. Educated exclusively under the Communist system, young people could most readily be harnessed to the new programs which seek to transform Albanian life under the banner of the so-called cultural revolution. This symbolic rallying slogan confused foreign observers, who were inclined to equate Albanian developments with Chairman Mao's revolution in Communist China. These observers erroneously concluded that Albania had been reduced to the status of a mere puppet in its relationship with China and that the regime was aping Peking's policies without a discernible reason.

Unlike events in China, the Albanian revolution never pitted social organizations against each other, and the dominance of the party was never questioned or threatened. Events in Albania did include the use of force to weaken or eliminate old traditions considered impediments to national growth. Even the beliefs and practices of the Muslim and Orthodox religions came under attack, albeit in a more thoroughgoing, devastating manner. The new religion and the source of morality is "Albanianism," the turning of necessity into virtue, with respect to "self-reliance," and of apathy into fierce national pride, based on the country's heritage and undeniable accomplishments in the years since World War II. Little is known about the changes in popular outlook accompanying this controlled revolution, but it is clear that Albania is on the threshold of a new distinctive phase in its history. The fact that in 1970 the leadership was grappling with the problem of whether or not it could afford to decentralize some state functions without losing its control is indicative of how far the process has already gone.

In 1966, the first order of business was to replace terrorism as the major instrument of national policy with a constructive, popular program of nation building. Indispensable to such a program was the rapid development of a streamlined party and government which would be more efficient and responsive and eventually gain a larger measure of popular acceptance. This entailed a risky dismemberment and rebuilding of the military and the state apparatus, which, knowing no other tradition, had established an influential "new class" of privileged bureaucrats with a vested interest in keeping themselves in power. Therefore, in March 1966 the party leadership published an unprecedented open letter to the people, admitting the situation as it existed and attacking the bureaucracy in terms reminiscent of its savage polemics with the Soviet Union. The leadership disclaimed responsibility for the "bureaucratic

distortions" that had occurred and placed the blame on unnamed party members who had allegedly lost touch with the people. The immediate purpose of the attack was to break the bureaucracy's grip on the machinery of state and to serve notice to local officials not to undercut or oppose the party's new program. A far reaching reorganization of the party and state apparatus at the national and local levels followed the open letter and allowed for limited decentralization of power, but party control remained firmly in the hands of Albania's leaders. During 1966-67 large numbers of bureaucrats were transferred from their central offices to the outlying areas, especially to regional production centers. Little is known about the new bureaucracy that has been established in Tiranë, but to be consistent with the program it would necessarily have to be loyal, nationalistic, relatively young, deeply committed to modernization of the country, and probably better educated than its predecessor group. One of its key assigned missions is to be the source of ideas and action for "progress," rather than for perpetuation of the *status quo*.

Since 1966 the regime has relied heavily on appeals to Albanian nationalism to inspire the masses and to rally popular support for projected social and economic programs. The violent antireligious campaign begun in 1967 was based on a dictum by party boss Hoxha that "the only religion for an Albanian is Albanianism." In literature, the theater, and the folk arts the Albanian leaders have aggressively promoted the use of such traditional themes as heroism, self-sacrifice, and love of freedom and independence from foreign domination. Prominent Albanian national and literary figures of the past, most of them non-Communists, have been restored to places of honor. During the 1968-70 period, for example, the regime celebrated with considerable fanfare the anniversaries of four important (but decidedly non-Communist) events in Albanian national history: the 90th anniversary of the League of Prizren (established in 1878), which sparked the Albanian national movement; the 60th anniversary of the Congress of Monastir (1908), which first attempted to standardize the Albanian language; the 50th anniversary of the Congress of Lushnje (1920), the birth of the modern Albanian nation state; and the 500th anniversary of the death of Skanderbeg, Albania's greatest national hero. During the latter festivities the leadership attempted to draw parallels between the struggle against the Turks in the 15th century and Albania's current struggle for survival against the "imperialists and revisionists." Given the lineup of world powers in 1970, this type of phraseology was directed equally at the West and the U.S.S.R.

The development of the economy has been spotty and uneven because of Albania's heavy dependence on foreign aid from the Communist countries and the periodic disruptions in the flow of this aid resulting from the differences which have arisen in the Communist world. Prior to 1948 Albania was largely dependent on Yugoslavia for development aid; from 1948 to 1961, on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and since the latter date, on Communist China. Nevertheless, over the years, solid progress has been achieved. The first economic plan, the One Year Plan of 1948, was scrapped in mid-course because of the Cominform-Yugoslav break. Subsequently, Albania promulgated a Two Year Plan (1949-50) and a series of 5-year plans culminating in the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75). Sino-Albanian economic agreements negotiated in late 1968 and again in October 1970 have allotted substantial but unpublicized amounts of aid for Albania's economic development in 1969-75. Judging by numerous reports, a substantial portion of this aid is allotted for 30 large-scale industrial projects, ranging from a hydroelectric plant to a metallurgical combine.

Agriculture is still the predominant sector of the economy and its development has been slow. The regime's agricultural policies from the beginning were aimed at complete collectivization, but a policy of gradualism was pursued for a number of years, probably because of the imperative need to sustain food production. Immediately upon taking power the new regime expropriated land from large landowners, giving it to the peasants. This action was followed shortly by rigid controls over production and marketing which forced the peasants to turn most of their produce over to the government. First begun in 1946 against strong peasant resistance, the collectivization drive did not get fully underway until 1955. With the consolidation of remote highland farmsteads in 1968, the regime had in large part achieved its goal of a collectivized agriculture. As collectivization proceeded, the amount of land and livestock allowed to the peasant for his private use has varied. Following the change of national policy in 1966, however, a determined effort was made to reduce the peasant's independence and to increase his reliance on the state for survival; regulations in 1967 reduced the size of private plots and subsequent steps have strictly limited private livestock holdings. Although more than 95%—and perhaps as much as 99%—of the arable land has been socialized, party boss Hoxha assured the peasants in late 1970 that they would be permitted to retain their private plots for the foreseeable future. Despite the appearance that this is a concession to the peasants, it probably more accurately reflects Hoxha's satisfaction with the *status quo*, as well as recognition of the economic importance of the private plots.

Agricultural output has been totally insufficient for domestic needs and the country probably will remain a net importer of foodstuffs. The regime has attempted to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency by promoting the expansion of arable land through large-scale programs of land reclamation, soil improvement, and irrigation. Much of this land melioration has been accomplished by mobilizing large numbers of people, both civilian and military, to work on massive projects. Since 1967, land reclamation has been intensified in the mountainous areas, and during the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) these regions are envisaged as providing still further tracts of reclaimed land. The construction of two fertilizer plants

in recent years has helped to increase agricultural yields somewhat. Despite the continuing shortage of basic agricultural products for domestic consumption, the regime has also attempted to expand agricultural exports. The increased planting and cultivation of grapes, olives, and other fruit and vegetable crops has been directed toward the sale of such products on foreign markets.

Industry in Albania is still rudimentary, but it has developed considerably since World War II, largely because of foreign economic and technical assistance. Despite the limited resources of the country, industrial projects continue to receive the government's special care and attention in the hope that they will soon provide a base for future Albanian heavy industry. Presently, industry is unable to meet the country's goals for industrial development and is still heavily oriented toward exports of raw and semifinished goods. Much of the investment capital channeled into domestic use has gone for producer goods and infrastructure needs (e.g., electrification of the country). The most important industrial sectors are agricultural processing, manufacture of textiles and clothing, timber, and the extractive industries.

Highly centralized control of the economy has enabled the regime to concentrate capital and labor on the very intensive development of certain economic sectors. The entire population has been regimented in support of economic programs. Controls over the workers have been implemented through the trade unions and other mass organizations, as well as by regulating production quotas, absenteeism, and wages. Penal or forced labor is still a factor in the economy; "volunteer" youth brigades and military units are also used on many projects.

As in other Communist states, the advantages of centralized control have been offset by the generally inefficient utilization of economic resources. A large bureaucracy and the highly centralized decisionmaking apparatus have stifled local initiative. Since 1966 the regime's increased willingness to discuss publicly economic problems has led to such proposals as a partial decentralization of the industrial structure (but bearing little resemblance to the Yugoslav experience). For example, Haki Toska, one of the first appointees to a deputy chairmanship on the Council of Ministers under the program of national mobilization inaugurated in 1966, asserted in July 1970 that some centrally directed enterprises should be placed instead under the guidance of the district people's councils; he added, however, that there are "differing ideas concerning the solution of these problems." Little evidence has become available to explain the differing positions, although a job swap between Toska and party secretary Xhafer Spahiu at the end of 1970 might have been related to the discussions.

The Communist regime during its years of power has implemented a series of programs—unique in Albanian history—that have directly benefited the general population. For the first time, extensive social insurance and health care programs have provided workers and families with such benefits as retirement pensions, free health care, disability and maternity payments, and day-care centers for children. The incidence of disease and illness has also been greatly reduced. Despite the marked progress that has been made, much still remains to be done to educate the population in basic sanitary measures and to increase the availability of medical facilities and personnel.

It is probably in the field of education that the Communists have achieved their most impressive gains since taking over the government a quarter of a century ago. The state assumes the responsibility for providing an education, free to all, from the kindergarten to the university level, but in practice the schooling of those considered unreliable or antiregime tends to be limited to the basic levels. The literacy rate of perhaps 75% (1970) contrasts sharply with conditions prevailing in pre-Communist Albania, when the literacy rate was only 20% (1939). The educational system is largely technical-vocational in nature and is hampered by a shortage of facilities, materials, and trained instructors, but it has gone far in meeting the country's dire need for a literate, semiskilled labor force. Indoctrination in Communist ideology and the inculcation of loyalty to the state and its policies are pervasive features of the education system; periodic press reports remind educators that scholarly pursuits must not be emphasized at the expense of indoctrination and training in Marxist ideology. All forms of intellectual expression—literature, theater, music, and art—are controlled by the party and are regarded as a means by which to develop a "socialist" outlook among the people.

3. Foreign

Because of its bitter past and very brief history as an independent nation, Albania's prime foreign policy objectives are the protection of its territorial integrity and maintenance of its independence. Because it is small, economically weak, and susceptible to outside pressures, its need to rely on more powerful foreign sponsors has made difficult all attempts to establish a purely Albanian foreign policy, even though Tiranë has always been careful to assert its independence from the donor countries. Under Yugoslav and during at least the early years of Soviet tutelage, Albania had virtually no foreign policy. In the latter years of their alliance with the Soviet Union, the Albanians were clearly espousing their own foreign policy, even to the point of publicly contradicting the Soviet line. Since its alliance with Communist China, following the break with the Soviet Union in 1961, Albania has consistently promoted Peking's international objectives but has had a measurable amount of freedom to conduct its own foreign policy.

From 1961 to 1966 Albania's foreign policy was almost indistinguishable from Communist China's, principally because Tiranë needed Chairman Mao's protection against what it considered to be a continuing threat from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Also impeding the development of an independent foreign policy was the fact of the traumatic split with the

U.S.S.R. The regime required a period of consolidation and reorientation because its longtime sponsor and the font of the ruling Albanian party's ideological beliefs and ideals was now classified as potentially a dangerous enemy. The first years after the break with Moscow were spent in purging or neutralizing those elements in the party who balked at making the transition from a pro-Soviet to a pro-Chinese policy. Once having embarked on a course of independence from the U.S.S.R., the regime had to face up to the precariousness of Albania's position and its future prospects. From Albania's point of view perhaps one of the most important factors was Communist China's great distance from Albania and its consequent limited ability to be of direct assistance to Tiranë should the Soviets launch a campaign of subversion or an outright invasion. Despite these uncertainties, ideological sympathies compelled Hoxha to look to Communist China for support and guidance. Available information indicates that the regime has sought Communist China's views on a number of issues, apparently in order to determine the degree of freedom Peking would grant Tiranë in the area of foreign relations. It appears that the Chinese have given the Albanians a freer hand in these matters than did either the U.S.S.R. or Yugoslavia during their periods of tutelage.

Thus, coincident with the domestic campaign to bring Albanian society into the 20th century, Tiranë began to make a gradual but discernible break with its policy of isolation from the non-Communist world. Since 1966 a series of events has moved the Albanian regime, slowly at first but with increased momentum by 1970, to increase its ties with foreign countries. It seems likely that at first the Albanians were motivated by worry over whether or not they would have a viable ally because of the ferocity of China's internal upheavals in 1966-67. This worry began to subside in 1968, but the lesson remained. The dangers inherent in the regime's policy of isolation were brought home hard by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the subsequent pact threats to Romania, Yugoslavia, and ultimately Albania itself. The reemergence of China in international diplomatic circles after years of self-imposed isolation, apparently reassured Albanian leaders that they were on the correct path, and subsequent Chinese support in terms of large-scale economic aid confirmed this. The creation of an industrialized economy has been a major pillar of the regime's policies, and perforce such a policy requires contact with foreigners. Indeed, the desire for expanded economic ties has been foremost in Tiranë's mind, but in trying to establish these ties the regime has been hampered by Albania's lack of readily marketable export items and the dearth generally of even the most rudimentary contacts with the non-Communist world.

The regime still officially reveres Stalin—a concomitant of its domestic and contemporary pro-Chinese policies—and in many respects still maintains rigid control over all facets of national life. After World War II, Albanian Communist leaders willingly sacrificed their national integrity on the altar of "proletarian internationalism." As events unfolded, this meant in practice acquiescence to Yugoslav control over the largely Albanian population in the Kosovo region and overall subjugation to Yugoslavia, because Stalin considered Tito a more important ally than Hoxha. By 1948 the Albanian party leadership was prepared to deemphasize the idealism of earlier years and to assert more vigorously Albania's own national interests. When Tito broke with Stalin, the Albanians took the opportunity to end their dependence on Yugoslavia. The new, more intimate association with the U.S.S.R. paid dividends in economic terms, and Albania's economy today is based on the foundation laid by the Soviets. But the Soviets were interested in Albania primarily as their only base in the Mediterranean, and they wished it to be secure. Moscow's assistance was accompanied by a style of colonialism not unlike that endured by the Albanians during the period of Turkish domination. Growing disillusionment with "proletarian internationalism" as practiced by the Soviets increased the desire for true independence and an opportunity to regain national integrity.

The major development in Albania's foreign policy during the post-Stalin period has been its break with the U.S.S.R., which was formalized with the suspension of diplomatic relations in December 1961. This break also entailed the immediate severance of ties between the two ruling Communist parties, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Albania, the recall of Albanian military and civilian students from the U.S.S.R., the withdrawal of Soviet submarines from the base near the head of Gji i Vlorës, and the suspension of Albanian participation in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Albania's official withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact did not occur until September 1968, when Tiranë's concern over the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia led it to formally renounce the Warsaw Pact agreements.

The ouster in 1964 of Khrushchev, Hoxha's archenemy, strengthened the position of the Albanian regime and increased the domestic prestige of its leaders. But Khrushchev's successors in the Kremlin have treated Albania with the same hostility as did Khrushchev, while the Albanians have reciprocated by accusing the Soviet leadership of ideological deviation. The two parties have become implacably hostile, and Albania's leaders have summarily rejected any proposals to reestablish contacts with the Soviet leadership. An invitation to the 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1966 was refused by Tiranë "with contempt," and the appended explanation added that Albania could not have relations of any kind with "traitors to communism and renegades of Marxism-Leninism." Events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 markedly increased Albanian apprehensions over Soviet policy aims in Eastern Europe, and, among other things, led Tiranë to become even more abusive in condemning Soviet policies. The invasion also moved Albania to find common cause against the Soviets with the other two

maverick states of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and Romania. Reports in late 1969 of a Soviet initiative to improve relations with Albania were answered by a scathing attack on the Kremlin leadership by Albanian party boss Hoxha at the celebrations marking the 25th Anniversary of Albania's liberation. In early 1971, an improvement in relations between Moscow and Tiranë appeared highly improbable, at least during the tenure of the current leaders.

The break in party ties with Moscow extended to the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, at the time of the suspension of Albanian-Soviet diplomatic relations, none of these countries completely severed ties with Albania. Indeed, Bucharest has consistently maintained relations on an ambassadorial level with Tiranë. The other Communist countries censured Tiranë's intransigence but chose to maintain diplomatic contact at the chargé level or lower. Poland appointed an ambassador in February 1966, but almost immediately relations reverted to the chargé level. Between July 1968 and October 1970 Albania was represented in Sofia only by a trade representative, the Bulgarians having expelled the Albanian diplomatic mission for "unseemly" proselytizing. Romania's relations with Albania have been moderately warm, and since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which the Romanians refused to participate, the two countries have drawn even closer. While the Stalinist overtones of the Albanian regime are undoubtedly an embarrassing reminder to the other countries of their not-too-distant past, they have avoided an all-out condemnation of Albania. Instead, they have patiently cultivated economic ties with Albania in the expectation that "reason" may ultimately prevail in Tiranë. All Eastern European bloc countries, except Yugoslavia, had long-term agreements with Albania extending at least into 1970, and throughout the long period of hostility dating back to 1948 even Yugoslavia has negotiated trade protocols on a year-to-year basis. In May 1971 the two countries concluded their first bilateral 5-year trade agreement (amounting to a total of US$110 million).

Albanian relations with Peking developed slowly for the first decade after the Communist takeover of mainland China in 1949. With the realization of common ideological interests, however, closer relations developed quickly after 1959, and since 1962 China has been the Hoxha regime's main source of economic and political support. There have been numerous exchanges of political, military, economic, and cultural delegations. Some of Albania's propaganda attacks on the Soviet Union have been coordinated with Communist China and, in addition, Peking frequently broadcasts vituperative Albanian commentary about the Soviet Union.

Albania has relied heavily on Chinese assistance to compensate for the cancellation of Soviet aid, which left the country on the verge of economic ruin. China provided a long-term trade and aid agreement (1961-65) and at least US$125 million in credits to finance the third Five Year Plan, helped finance the fourth Five Year Plan (1966-70) with unspecified amounts of credit, and in 1968 concluded an extensive, long-term (1969-75) trade and aid agreement. A further agreement negotiated in the fall of 1970 appears to implement the 1968 protocol. Albania's shortages of grain have been relieved on a number of occasions by grain from China, which initially had been purchased for hard currency from Western countries. The Chinese have provided economic and technical assistance in support of Albania's industrialization program. On various occasions as many as 1,000 Chinese technicians have been reported in Albania at one time, working in a variety of fields and specialties.

During 1966-67, when the struggle for power within China perhaps was at a peak, Tiranë grew increasingly apprehensive that Peking's support—an item of critical importance to the Albanian leadership—would falter or possibly end outright. An exchange of high-level delegations in 1967 helped strengthen the Peking-Tiranë alliance, but a certain aloofness in relations was noticed by diplomatic observers into early 1968, suggesting that the Chinese leaders were preoccupied with domestic problems. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the two countries closed ranks to contend with the hardening of Soviet attitudes toward the "socialist community," and since then there has been no evidence of strains within the alliance. The rapprochement between the two allies in this anomalous political partnership has continued into 1971, although both Peking and Tiranë have slowly begun to reestablish and strengthen their ties with the international community. Albania helps earn its support from Peking by waging an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at placing the sole responsibility for "splitting" the international Communist movement on the Soviet Union. Albania also acts as spokesman for Communist China in the United Nations, affords China its only foothold in Europe, provides a convenient place where pro-Chinese Communist elements from European Communist parties can meet, harbors exiled splinter groups from the Eastern European parties, and operates one of the most powerful radio propaganda operations in the world against the U.S.S.R. and its allies.

Soviet policy toward Albania's traditionally hostile neighbor Yugoslavia was perhaps the major reason underlying the Hoxha regime's decision to switch allegiance to Communist China. Hoxha was forced for lack of an alternative to accept Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito in 1955, although he viewed it as contrary to Albania's national interests. Subsequently, Albania's propaganda against Yugoslavia was frequently out of line with Soviet policy. China's challenge to the increasing "revisionism" it saw in the Soviet-led European Communist movement, as exemplified in the Soviet-led rapprochement with Tito's "renegade" national communism, finally provided Hoxha with an alternative.

Although Hoxha chose to justify his opposition to Yugoslavia by portraying it as a struggle of orthodoxy against revisionism in the Communist movement, it is

perhaps more a manifestation of long-held fears of Yugoslav expansionism and the xenophobia which characterizes the popular attitudes of Albanians toward their Slavic neighbors. It is widely believed in Albania that Yugoslavia was preparing to annex Albania before the 1948 break. Relations between Albania and Yugoslavia are also aggravated by the large number of ethnic Albanians who live in Yugoslavia. About 915,000 ethnic Albanians (equaling roughly 42% of the population of Albania proper), live in the contiguous areas of Yugoslavia known as Kosovo province (Figure 31). Their level of living, while lagging behind that of other areas of Yugoslavia, is higher than in Albania. Diplomatic protests have frequently been exchanged over alleged mistreatment of these ethnic Albanians as well as over border violations and other "provocations." On occasion both countries have expelled one another's diplomatic representatives, but neither has taken the extreme step of breaking relations.

Albania's hostile propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia continued unabated until the fall of 1968, when the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia thoroughly alarmed both countries, and Tiranë suspended its polemics against Belgrade. Since late 1968 polemics between the two countries have only occasionally been revived, and never on the former scale. As areas of common concern and cooperation have slowly expanded, so have the economic ties between the two countries. Commercial exchanges were expanded in 1970, and border crossing procedures have been simplified. Tourism to Albania has once again been opened up, and during 1970 cooperation between Tiranë State University and the new ethnic-Albanian University of Priština in Yugoslavia was formalized in a series of agreements. Of major importance in the improved relations has been the public expression of good will toward Yugoslavia by Albanian party boss Hoxha in May 1970. At that time Hoxha turned his back on the previous 20 years of hostility toward Yugoslavia and expressed a desire to improve Tiranë's ties with Belgrade, reserving only the right publicly to air the "deep ideological differences" which separate the countries. In February 1971 this sign of Albanian good will was translated into an elevation of diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level, a move reportedly proposed by Belgrade as early as the spring of 1970.



FIGURE 31. Albania's population and border problems with Yugoslavia and Greece (C)

In mid-1971 Albania resumed formal diplomatic relations with its other neighbor, Greece, thereby ending some 30 years of nonrepresentation between the two countries. For years, normalization of relations had foundered on Greek claims that a state of war existed between the two countries because Albania was an autonomous entity, rather than a puppet of Italy, when it attacked Greece in 1939. Another obstacle to the resumption of normal relations had been the area of approximately 2,000 square miles called northern Epirus by Greece. It is still a potential irritant. The Greek minority of perhaps 40,000 who reside in this area have Greek-language schools but have not been granted autonomy.

Albanian-Turkish relations have moved forward since December 1965, when Albania supported Turkey in the United Nations over the Cyprus issue. Subsequently the two countries raised their diplomatic missions to the ambassadorial level and have taken a number of steps to improve relations in the political, economic, and cultural fields. The two countries exchanged parliamentary delegations in 1968 and 1969, and the visit of an Albanian delegation in 1969—headed by Behar Shtylla, who previously had been foreign minister—was notable because it was the first trip of a high-level Albanian official to any state other than Communist China since the Soviet-Albanian break in 1961. A Turkish view of Albanian-Turkish relations, expressed at the time of Shtylla's visit, stressed the identity of interests between the two countries in their efforts to resist Greek irredentism. Albania's traditional ties to the Ottoman Empire also provide some common ground for association between the two populations, but since Albania is of only limited economic interest to Turkey, it is doubtful that Ankara will vigorously pursue the development of bilateral relations.

Until 1970 Albania maintained diplomatic relations with only three members of NATO—Turkey, Italy, and

France. Albanian approaches in late 1969 to a number of Western European countries for diplomatic relations slowly bore fruit throughout 1970. Within 11 months, Tiranë received favorable responses for the establishment of relations from four European states—Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Close ties with Western countries are complicated, however, by Tiranë's militant anti-Western propaganda.

Between 1960 and 1967 Albania established relations with only nine Afro-Asian countries. Since December 1968, Tiranë additionally has agreed to established relations with Syria, Kuwait, and Southern Yemen, and in 1970 reached an accord for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with two African countries, Libya and the Central African Republic.

Relations with the United States, broken off in 1939 after the Italian occupation, have not been reestablished. An informal U.S. mission to Albania was withdrawn in 1946 when the Hoxha regime refused to recognize the validity of bilateral treaties in effect between Albania and the United States in 1939 and placed the mission under increasing harassment. Occasional Albanian hints of a desire to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States have not been pursued by either side. These isolated, abortive overtures were always followed by a sharp step-up in vituperative anti-U.S. propaganda, a tactic that has led some observers to conclude that Tiranë was not genuinely interested. Albania's attitude toward both the United States and the United Kingdom has long been colored by its belief that the governments of both states were responsible for attempts to subvert or overthrow the Communist regime on various occasions since 1945, the latest being in 1952.

After World War II, the British encountered undisguised hostility from the Hoxha regime and withdrew their military mission in 1946. Later that year, in October, prospects for normal relations were further reduced when two U.K. warships struck mines in the internationalized Corfu Channel. The International Court of Arbitration subsequently ordered Albania to compensate the United Kingdom in the amount of US$2.3 million, a judgment which Albania has ignored. London maintains that Albania must pay at least a portion of this indemnity and guarantee normal operating conditions for a diplomatic mission before the United Kingdom would be willing to resume diplomatic relations. Albania has shown no willingness to comply.

Albania joined the United Nations in 1955 as a part of the so-called package deal that also brought into the international organization several of the other Eastern European Communist countries. Although it is a member of seven of the United Nations' specialized agencies, it has not made a major contribution to their work. Albania annually introduces before the General Assembly the so-called Albanian resolution which calls for the United Nations to seat Communist China in place of Nationalist China.

4. Defense

During the relatively short period of time that Albania has been independent it has been forced to look to more powerful states to guarantee its territorial integrity. As a consequence, when the Communists seized power in 1944, they turned to Yugoslavia as their guarantor; following Hoxha's break with Tito in 1948, the regime shifted its allegiance to Moscow. Since Albania's break with the U.S.S.R. and its *de facto* withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in 1961, Albania's integrity has rested more on the stabilized situation in the Balkans than on the political-psychological support of Communist China. Yugoslavia is loathe to begin a Balkan war for fear of Soviet or Western intervention; Greece and Italy are tied down in the NATO alliance. Albania's foreign policy since 1966 suggests that these facts are more appreciated by the leadership.

Latest available information (1966) credits the Albanian armed forces with 35,000 men on active duty. There is ample manpower for military needs, for there were an estimated 505,000 males listed in the 15 to 49 age group in 1970. A reserve and mobilization system, which appears to be countrywide, includes some 160,000 trained ground forces reservists. A majority of the population will receive some form of basic military training if a 1970 law providing for compulsory military training for all students is fully implemented.

A series of measures promulgated since 1966 evidently have been intended to give the Albanian military establishment a revolutionary image modeled on the experience of Communist China. Military rank has been abolished, and a new uniform styled along the lines of Chinese military dress has been introduced. Great stress has also been placed on the economic self-reliance of all military units, which often clear land, grow their own food, and construct their own housing.

Announced budgetary outlays for military expenditures since 1966 have fluctuated from a high of 9.1% of total expenditures in 1969 to a 1970 low of 5.9%. The 1970 national budget allocated 304 million leks (1 lek=US$0.20) for defense, a decline of 27.6% from the previous year. The high military expenditures in 1969, however, may have reflected the anxieties and the response of the Albanians to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Increased outlays, in part, have gone for modern equipment and armaments—including planes, patrol boats, and various antiaircraft and coastal defense weapons—which have been supplied by the Chinese.

Albania has denounced all international discussions of disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear-free zones. China's emergence as a nuclear power has served to reinforce Albania's demands for granting Peking a voice in world nuclear policy decisions. Tiranë characterizes U.N.-sponsored disarmament efforts and especially the two-power strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) begun in 1969 as a "plot between the U.S.S.R. and the United States to dominate the world."

Albania's civil defense programs are directed by the Society for Aid to the Army and Defense, established in

1949. This organization is a military and civil defense corps charged with training the population in paramilitary operations and civil defense procedures. Its known activities range from excursions to historic places to grueling "partisan marches." It also offers instruction in "morale building," radio communications, first aid, and precautionary measures against bombardment and gas attack. Fragmentary information indicates that a few underground shelters may have been built in some of the large cities. There has been very little information on the society since its first and only congress in November 1963. At that time it reported a membership of 173,590 in 3,250 local organizations.

E. Propaganda programs (U/OU)

1. Organization, purpose, and control

As do other Communist governments, the Albanian regime relies heavily on official propaganda for disseminating its views and implementing its policies. The propaganda mechanism is therefore highly developed and pervades every aspect of Albanian life. While the methods employed and the content occasionally reflect a sophisticated understanding of the people and culture, the propaganda dispensed by the regime tends to be naive and even more heavyhanded than that of the other Communist countries.

The Albanian Workers Party has a monopoly of control not only over those agencies concerned solely with propaganda but also over the activities of all mass and specialized organizations in the country. This monopoly is guaranteed in the 1950 constitution in which the party is appointed leader, teacher, and guide of "all organizations"—both public and state (Article 21). Dissenting views are not permitted a forum, and attempts to disseminate material critical of the regime are regarded as a threat to the "people's authority" and are punishable by from 3 to 10 years' imprisonment.

Control of the dissemination of propaganda themes to the mass and specialized organizations is directed by the party Central Committee's Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda (*Agitprop*). The gist, or often the precise content, of propaganda is then communicated to government ministries such as the Ministry of Education and Culture, to editorial boards of newspapers and radio stations, to film studios, and to groups such as the Central Council of Trade Unions, the Democratic Front of Albania, the Union of Working Youth of Albania, and the Albanian-Chinese Friendship Society.

2. Domestic propaganda

The primary aim of domestic propaganda is to bring about the suppression of the tenacious customs and habits which inhibit "socialist growth" and to transform the Albanian people into a Communist society. Such propaganda concomitantly aims at preventing the growth and dissemination of views hostile to the regime which could lead to active resistance, and therefore it maintains a persistent campaign against "reestablishers of capitalism." A secondary purpose of domestic propaganda is to secure popular support for specific regime programs, through criticism or praise. Words are considered to be almost as important as wages in boosting economic output and productivity. The regime develops extensive publicity campaigns around events such as factory competitions, voluntary labor projects, and individual production achievements. Local *Agitprop* workers post wall-newspapers acclaiming successes and rebuking laggards, dole out labor awards, and periodically hold workers' meetings to give peptalks on the importance of overfulfilling work norms. Albania's so-called cultural revolution (1966-69)—which featured, *inter alia*, the dragooning of urban workers and intellectuals to cultivate the new lands, some apparent decentralization of administration, the use of "voluntary" labor on numerous local building projects, and the closing of all churches—was accompanied by a barrage of words and propaganda actions. All these campaigns were orchestrated under the general heading of a "struggle against bureaucracy and the capitalist mentality, the struggle for the full emancipation of woman, and the struggle against backward customs and religious beliefs."

The effectiveness of domestic propaganda has been limited by the small number of radio receivers and wired loudspeakers and other technical factors. In addition, the constant exposure of the populace to the exaggerated claims and misrepresentations in Albanian propaganda has probably developed an apathetic attitude on the part of the average Albanian toward claims and pronouncements of the regime.

The major media for disseminating domestic propaganda are the press, radio, films, and public lectures. All have been used since 1960-61 to condition the Albanian people to the break with the U.S.S.R. and the alliance with Communist China. While the propaganda in the Central Committee's daily paper *Zeri i Popullit*—partly designed for foreign consumption—is couched in terms of universal Marxist ideology, there is firm evidence pointing to a stress on nationalistic themes in purely domestic propaganda. The principal medium for this line is reportedly the party-sponsored lecture in cities and villages. The tremendous publicity accorded in early 1968 to the 500th anniversary of the death of Skanderbeg (Albania's only national hero) attests to the regime's emphasis on bolstering nationalism.

Motion pictures are one of the more popular means of disseminating propaganda. The primary task of the film industry is to bring about a Marxist-Socialist orientation of the people—to rally them to a struggle for the "new life," to accept new customs, and to engage in "self-sacrificing labor." Few feature films are produced locally, and approved imports either have the Albanian language dubbed in or they use subtitles. Because the government and the party are the only distributors of films, censorship poses no problem; films from other countries are shown only after careful selection. The Albanian film studio *Shqiperia e Re* (New Albania) does produce documentary films which tout the accomplishments under communism.

3. Foreign propaganda

The basic purpose of Albania's propaganda directed abroad is to present the country's foreign policy in a favorable light. Ancillary aims are to advance the regime's views on intrabloc problems while demonstrating its support of Chinese Communist ideological viewpoints, to portray a peaceful Albania, and to win support of Albanian emigree communities abroad. The most important dissemination channels are the press, *Radio Tiranë*, the Albanian Telegraph Agency (ATA), diplomatic and trade missions, foreign pro-Albanian Communist organizations, and books and periodicals.

The other East European Communist countries have tried to stem the dissemination within their borders of Albanian-originated materials—once permitted under cultural exchange agreements. Persistence in this activity, however, has led to sporadic official diplomatic protests. Albanian diplomats in key centers in the non-Communist world still distribute a considerable volume of printed material. Pamphlets containing reprints of press articles and anti-Soviet speeches of First Secretary Hoxha have appeared in Italian, French, German, and Spanish in Europe and even in South America. Albanian diplomats also actively support pro-Chinese party factions which are active in a number of non-Communist countries.

Several changes were made in Albania's international broadcasting schedule and its methods of transmission as a result of the break with the U.S.S.R. In 1961 *Radio Tiranë* began broadcasting to the U.S.S.R. in Russian for the first time. At the same time, Tiranë began broadcasting in Bulgarian; a program in Hungarian commenced in early 1964, and transmissions in Czech and Polish were initiated in September 1966. The Polish-language programs of *Radio Tiranë* are frequently used to disseminate messages containing attacks on the Polish leadership by the so-called Polish Communist Party, a minuscule pro-Peking splinter group with which Stalinist escapee Kozimierz Mihal is believed to be linked.

Albania embarked in 1966 on a rapid expansion of its foreign broadcasting facilities. A new radio transmitter, built with Communist China's assistance, was inaugurated in November 1966 and reached full operation during 1967. By the end of 1967, Albania's foreign broadcasting output had swelled to a record 381 hours per week (from 199 hours a week at the end of 1966). Consequently, Albania that year jumped to fourth place among Communist countries in international broadcasting volume and, by the end of 1969, was tied with North Korea for third place. Between 1966 and the end of 1969 Albania added more than 300 hours of propaganda broadcasts, inaugurating broadcasts in Indonesian (1967), Portuguese (1969), and Romanian (1969). Tiranë also broadcasts in Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Serbo-Croat, and Spanish. Figure 32 presents Albania's weekly foreign broadcast schedule.

4. Propaganda directed from abroad

The medium of radiobroadcasting is one of the few ways of penetrating Albania's rigid barriers to



FIGURE 32. Albanian weekly foreign broadcast schedule (U/OU)

communications. The Albanian leadership is cognizant of the potential of this channel and has on more than one occasion warned against this "poisonous" source. The two chief protagonists of the "modest revisionist" camp which are very active in the field of Albanian-language broadcasting are *Radio Moscow*, which transmits 28 hours weekly, and *Radio Priština* in Yugoslavia, which maintains a full daily program in the Albanian language, ostensibly only for the large Albanian ethnic group located in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia but also clearly directed to Albanian citizens on the other side of the border.

After the break with the U.S.S.R., *Radio Moscow* began broadcasts to Albania which were critical of the Hoxha regime. When this proved to be fruitless, the tenor of the broadcasts changed to one of extolling the unity of other Communist parties with the Soviet party and reminding Albanian listeners of Soviet aid in former years which had proved indispensable to the socioeconomic development of Albania.

The transmissions of four Western broadcasting services can be received in Albania: Voice of America (VOA), *Radio Vatican*, *Radio Audizione Italiana-Televisione*, and *Trans World Radio* (a privately operated religious station in Monte Carlo). These four services broadcast a total of 7 hours weekly to Albania in 1970, a marked decline from previous years. As recently as 1967, when the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was still transmitting to Albania, major Western radio stations allotted a total of 25 hours of programing to

Albania each week. By early 1970 *Radio Audizione Italiana-Televisione* broadcast slightly over 2 hours each week, VOA 3½ hours, *Radio Vatican* 1 hour, and *Trans World Radio* 15 minutes. In addition, the Yugoslavs transmitted 10 hours of Albanian-language programs weekly (down from 13½ hours in 1967) and the Greek radio allocated 1 hour weekly to a Greek-language program directed to the ethnic Greek minority in Albania. Greece had suspended its broadcasts in Albanian in 1962.

The effectiveness of foreign broadcasting to Albania is limited by the comparatively small number of radio receivers in the country. Reception in some valleys also suffers because of the surrounding high mountains. Furthermore, most of the existing sets are owned by loyal party members, which also limits the effectiveness of foreign propaganda. Although there is no known law against listening to Western broadcasts, the regime uses pressure tactics and intimidation to prevent this activity. It has not, however, systematically jammed transmissions from abroad.

F. Subversion (S)

The Communist regime encounters occasional resistance, both active and passive, on a small scale within the country, and some subversive activity directed from abroad. The continuing stability of the regime in this uncongenial environment depends on a pervasive and powerful police system which intimidates the populace, eliminates dissident elements, and prevents discontent from crystallizing into action.

Subversion directed from abroad poses a more serious threat to the regime than purely internal dissidence. Albania's support of the Chinese Communist position in the Sino-Soviet dispute led to a Soviet effort in 1960 to unseat the Hoxha regime. The U.S.S.R.'s capabilities for intervention, however, were sharply curtailed after 1961 when its diplomatic, military, and aid personnel were withdrawn. Both Greece and Yugoslavia have traditionally engaged in clandestine activity against Albania but have been restrained from undertaking coordinated or extensive overt action by the mutual suspicions governing much of the intercourse among the three powers and by international political considerations. Most recently, the desire by all three countries to improve relations with one another has probably caused a decline in subversive activity among the three countries. The Albanian security forces probably have been unable to prevent some clandestine Yugoslav and Greek groups from crossing the border for sabotage and intelligence missions.

1. Internal subversion

Although there does not appear to have been any organized indigenous resistance in Albania for many years, unorganized resistance, particularly of a passive nature, continues among all classes of society. Aside from an abortive attempt at a coup in the summer of 1960, which was abetted by the Soviets, the break with the U.S.S.R. has led to only a few instances of active indigenous opposition. Poor living conditions, for example, exacerbated in the early 1960's by the drying up of Soviet aid, appear to have helped provoke sporadic riots. One such riot is known to have occurred in the Shkodër region of northern Albania in March 1963.

Discontent and sharp aversion to regime practices among wide segments of the Albanian population have been reported as recently as 1967. The general feeling of the man in the street, according to a 1967 appraisal by the Italian ambassador in Tiranë, was that "things are going to get still more difficult." The "cultural revolution" most certainly exacerbated the hard feelings of portions of the population; but, at the same time, it served to mobilize many segments and provide them with a cause that allowed little time for grumbling. Because of the effectiveness of the security apparatus, there is no apparent leadership behind which any malcontents might rally, and the great majority of the people have grudgingly acquiesced in the *status quo*. The regime's surprisingly effective ban on all arms and ammunition among a heretofore well-armed mountain people virtually rules out armed resistance on the part of the populace without the defection of some army troops.

Passive resistance appears to be widespread, and the government has not been able to eradicate it. The regime has probably had the least success in dealing with resistance among the peasants. A series of harsh agricultural decrees during the early postwar period and an intensive period of collectivization in 1956-60 spurred peasant discontent. The reaction of the peasants was to resist as long as possible, even by resorting to acts of terrorism in some sections of the country. When coerced—which was not infrequent—they were reluctant to bring property into the collective and in some instances sold it or, in the case of animals, slaughtered them. Once in the collective, the peasants have registered opposition chiefly through work slowdowns, wastage, negligence, and attention to their private plots. Collectivization of the mountainous agricultural areas in 1966-67 (amid regime claims of complete agricultural collectivization) may have been accompanied by sporadic violence and unrest.

In industry, worker disaffection has often been expressed through abuse of state property, pilfering, and deliberate failure to fulfill work quotas. Most of the industrial worker force is not even one generation removed from the land, and although lacking organization and cohesion in their new environment many workers may still exhibit some of the fierce independence long associated with the Albanian mountain peasantry. Such an independent spirit is apparently being worn down, but it is bound to be antipathetic to the regimentation of life in the factories and industrial dwelling areas.

The Albanian press has repeatedly complained about shortcomings on the part of some Albanian youth; it has charged them with indifference, carelessness, and with failure to fulfill tasks assigned to them. Manifestations of

apathy periodically aired in the press stem more from the opposition of youth to attempts by the regime to organize and direct all activity toward regime-sponsored goals than from a general sense of disaffection. Young people have been accused of clinging to traditional concepts and habits regarding family life and agricultural methods. Nevertheless, it is to the youth, educated under the Communist system and exposed to incessant regime propaganda, that the Tiranë leadership must look for its basic support.

Dissatisfaction with the regime has periodically surfaced among the younger intellectuals. The demands on spare time imposed by the Communists and the pragmatism which is supposed to be the motivating factor in all forms of intellectual activity are particular irritants. Although members of the intellectual class by and large reject religion and family unity as discredited relics of the past, they resent Albania's enforced isolation from the outside world. The regime's program in 1967 of sending artists and writers to engage in production work in the countryside undoubtedly was also a major irritant to this social stratum.

The nagging disaffection which appears to have always existed in varying degrees in the armed forces was exacerbated in 1966 when all rank reportedly was abolished and political commissars were reintroduced into all military units. The discontent caused by these decrees and other regime measures to eliminate bureaucracy have reportedly led to isolated arrests of a few high-ranking military officers. There does not appear, however, to be any organized antiregime resistance within the military.

The bulk of the enlisted personnel, conscripted from the ranks of the peasantry, often bring their resentments and antagonisms with them into the service. Isolated groups or individuals within the still extant officer corps, which is assumed to be loyal to the regime, have on occasion proven more loyal to communism as practiced elsewhere. Thus, purges of the military have often involved those alleged to have pro-Yugoslav or pro-Soviet feelings. It was to the military, and especially the navy, that the U.S.S.R. turned in 1960 to seek a group willing to overthrow Hoxha; this led to the arrest of some officers, particularly among the group that had most recently studied in the U.S.S.R. The regime places its greatest trust in the secret police (*Sigurimi*) as an organ of internal control, as was evidenced in the 1962 riot in Fier when ammunition was withheld from the army and turned over the *Sigurimi*. Unconfirmed reports in early 1970 asserted that several army officers had been dismissed and subsequently executed for dissenting activities.

Lower level office workers and civil servants have also shown signs of disaffection. Although their hostility seems somewhat muted, at least when compared with that still evidenced among peasants, they have been subjected to many of the same restrictions and obligations. The launching of a Chinese-style campaign in 1966 to transfer white-collar workers to "voluntary" production work, especially in provincial centers, undoubtedly provided administrative workers with a new source of dissatisfaction. There have been no indications, however, that this reshuffle, which reportedly involved thousands of workers, was actively resisted.

2. Subversion from abroad

In the Communist era the threat of foreign subversion has come mainly from two historic sources, Greece and Yugoslavia, and, since 1960, from the U.S.S.R.

a. Greece

The Greek claim to southern Albania, known in Greece as northern Epirus, is based on occupation of the area by Greek forces during the Balkan War of 1912 and again for brief periods during World Wars I and II. Greek claims also derive from the fact that the population of southern Albania was under the protection and cultural influence of the Greek church for centuries; consequently, the Greeks have always considered this population to be Greek. Hostility between the two countries has been intensified by Greek assertions that Albania discriminates against the Greek minority in Albania.

The Greek Government has refrained from taking overt, official action to realize its claims to northern Epirus. Reports of Greek subversive actions against Albania are now relatively infrequent when compared with the widespread disorders attributed to Greek clandestine activities in 1961-62. In October 1962 the Greek Foreign Ministry admitted privately that a secret organization led by Bishop Serafim was engaged in acts of sabotage along the border between Greece and Albania. Units of this organization reportedly were responsible for the destruction of a flour mill, the blowing up of portions of a highway, distribution of anti-Hoxha leaflets, and explosions at some ammunition dumps during 1962. The status of the Greek minority in northern Epirus is still a political issue of some importance, and propaganda barrages periodically issue from Athens. An improvement in official relations beginning in early 1970 reportedly extended to a reciprocal return of escapees, notwithstanding the possible international reaction to repatriation under these circumstances. Greek territorial claims to parts of southern Albania remain an emotional issue capable of resuscitation at any time, even though the two countries agreed in May 1971 to resume formal diplomatic ties.

b. Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia directed subversive activities against the Albanian leadership for some time after losing control of the country to the Soviets in 1948. Since the latter 1960's Belgrade's policy has apparently been one of trying to overcome the traditional Albanian hatred of Yugoslavia rather than one of underwriting a maximum effort to subvert the Hoxha regime. Infiltration of Yugoslav agents and small-scale acts of sabotage may still continue, but in all probability at a much reduced level compared with the 1950's. Broadcasts and other more conventional methods of psychological warfare attributing the harsh life in Albania to the dogmatic, Stalinist policies of the

Hoxha leadership have largely replaced terrorist and espionage activity.

Yugoslav subversive efforts were initially directed through the League of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia (Prizren Committee), which was established in 1951 at Prizren, a city near the Albanian border. The objective of the league's Yugoslav backers was to give their country an organized group of Albanian refugees who could be returned to Albania should the opportunity to overthrow Hoxha's regime arise. Although the organization had some success in recruiting and infiltrating espionage agents into Albania, it failed in its efforts to gain the support of the Albanian people and to weaken the Hoxha regime. Because of these failures, it was disbanded after being active for only 3 or 4 years.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's usually reliable sources reported that another subversive group had been organized in Yugoslavia. It was led by Dusan Mugosa, Yugoslavia's foremost authority on Albanian affairs and one of the two Yugoslavs who helped found the Albanian Communist Party. Mugosa, who was a Secretary of the Communist Party in the autonomous region of Kosovo, where a large Albanian minority resides, was active in gathering intelligence information from Albanian refugees. The activity of this group dwindled sharply in the aftermath of Mugosa's transfer to a Belgrade post in May 1965.

After Albania survived the break with the U.S.S.R. in 1961, Yugoslavia officially adopted a policy of nonintervention in Albanian affairs, not because the desire to replace Hoxha and Shehu with leaders amenable to Belgrade had lessened, but because overt intervention would have damaged Yugoslavia's international position of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence and would risk a great power confrontation in the Balkans. Yugoslav secret police officers in late 1962 and early 1963 reportedly were in contact with Albanian refugee groups in Belgium and France. Apparently as early as 1967 the Yugoslavs began to scale down their subversive and propaganda activities against the Albanian regime, a process markedly stimulated by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Frontier incidents have been minimal, and the Yugoslavs have persisted in returning escapees from Albania. The commonly felt threat of the Soviet Union to both Albania and Yugoslavia is encouraging further moves toward détente on the state level. The potential for subversion still exists, however, and may only await a lessening of Yugoslav-Soviet tensions.

c. U.S.S.R.

Following the Soviet moves in 1956 toward improved relations with Yugoslavia, Moscow allegedly exerted strong pressures on Albanian leaders Hoxha and Shehu to follow suit. According to a speech by Hoxha in late 1961, the Soviet leadership had tried in 1956 to persuade the Albanian Workers Party "to rehabilitate the traitor Koci Xoxe." Hoxha noted that this attempt had coincided with the convening of the Tiranë municipal party conference in April 1956, at which time opportunist elements had "endeavored to carry out a plot" with the direct encouragement of Yugoslav revisionists. The Albanian leaders, probably correctly, regarded these maneuvers as aimed primarily at their own overthrow and replacement by persons more acceptable to Tito.

The Hungarian revolt in late 1956 and the subsequent renewed deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations relieved Soviet pressure on Hoxha and Shehu. At the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in November 1960 Hoxha revealed that the U.S.S.R. had been involved in the internal coup attempt against the regime which had been uncovered in August 1960. Hoxha declared that the Soviet ambassador in Tiranë and his staff were engaging in "attacks" on the Albanian leadership and using "corrupt" elements to sow trouble within the party. To make it clear that he meant deposed party members Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko, Hoxha stated that Belishova had "capitulated to the dishonest threats of the Soviet Union."

Having failed to overthrow the Albanian leadership by an internal coup, the Soviets began applying economic pressure. This pressure, which later included complete cessation of Soviet economic aid and withdrawal of all Soviet technical, military, and economic specialists, apparently placed the Albanian leaders in a very difficult economic situation and put the regime's stability to a severe test. Chinese Communist economic and political support in 1960-61, coupled with support Hoxha and Shehu gained from the countryside by appeals to nationalist sentiment, however, enabled the two leaders to maintain control of the party and government.

Since the diplomatic break with the U.S.S.R in 1961, the Albanian leaders appear to have successfully thwarted Soviet plans to overthrow the regime. Albania's geographic isolation from the Soviet bloc which was once a decided handicap, has now worked to Tiranë's advantage by discouraging direct intervention. The professed effort to maintain Albanian independence and territorial integrity against alleged designs of neighboring countries is probably one of the most popular features of the present regime.

G. Police and intelligence services (S)

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for maintaining public order and safety and for suppressing all internal opposition to the Communist regime. It also assumes ultimate control over Albania's limited foreign intelligence collection effort. To accomplish these missions, the ministry has three separate police and security organizations: the Directorate of Frontier and Pursuit, the Directorate of People's Police, and the Directorate of State Security. Kadri Hasbiu has been head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1954, and is related to the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Mehmet Shehu, who became Premier. Prior to his appointment, Hasbiu was head of the Directorate of State Security (more commonly known as the *Sigurimi*). Hasbiu, 51 years old in 1970, has since 1961 been a candidate member of the Politburo, the policymaking body of the Communist party.

The combined personnel of the police and security forces were estimated in 1967 to number 17,500, which included 7,500 frontier troops, 5,000 state security forces (also referred to as interior troops), and 5,000 people's police. Many Albanians are forced to become informers; the populace is said to believe that every sixth person in the country is directly or indirectly employed by the security apparatus. There is no firm evidence to confirm or refute so high an estimate.

The decree of May 1966 which abolished traditional military rank and insignia in the armed forces also applies to Albania's security forces. This measure was reportedly intended in part to ease interservice rivalries between the Ministry of People's Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There have also been unconfirmed reports indicating that the *Sigurimi* was inflating its ranks to counter the power of the armed forces. Despite such rumored rivalries and tensions, the Albanian military and security forces appear to have remained stable and dependable.

1. Police system

The people's police are responsible primarily for maintaining public order and safety. In addition to the normal police and public assistance tasks, they have unpublicized functions, such as collaborating with the *Sigurimi* in the apprehension of anti-Communist elements. They also control the movements of civilians, issuing identity cards which must be carried by all citizens 17 years of age or older.

The people's police are organized into five branches: general police, police for guarding economic projects and installations, firefighting police, communications police, and police for the protection of isolated areas (i.e., penal institutions). There are various sections and subsections of the people's police in districts, localities, and villages. They are assisted by local civilian "voluntary groups," including civilian firefighters and the "guardsmen" of the executive committees of district and local governments.

The Directorate of Frontier and Pursuit is responsible for border controls and the prevention of escapes by defectors and foreign agents, as well as the elimination of subversive infiltration. This office came into being in April 1957, when the Directorate of Border Defense and the Pursuit Battalions were merged. Prior to this merger, the highly mobile Pursuit Battalions, semi-independent units subordinate to the Directorate of State Security, were charged with tracking down and suppressing anti-Communist resistance bands and guerrillas. The responsibilities of this directorate became more significant after Tiranë broke with Moscow in 1961 and Albania, more clearly on its own, had to provide its own protection against potentially hostile neighbors.

Decree No. 4650 of 9 March 1970 provides general regulations on boundary demarcation and control procedures. This decree supersedes two decrees (1952 and 1961) on border areas and redefines and redesignates restricted frontier zones. Contiguous to all land boundaries, according to the new decree, are border zones and border belts, both areas being designated and controlled by regulations from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Albania's territorial waters as defined by the decree extend 12 nautical miles west from a series of lines connecting the mouth of the Buenë river in the north with the middle of the Corfu Channel narrows in the south, and determined by Kep i Rodonit, Kep i Palit and Kep i Durrësit, Kep i Lagit, Kep i Seman, and the west coast of Ishulli i Sazanit (Summary Map, Figure 79).

The frontier units have not yet been able to seal the border or to prevent completely the flight of dissident Albanians to Greece and Yugoslavia. However, the number of escapees, particularly those crossing to Greece, has been steadily decreasing. The reduced number of escapees reflects the continuous improvement in the border control apparatus, which includes the use of specially trained dogs, a system of fortifications, trenches, barbed-wire barriers, and a number of mechanical devices to thwart illegal border crossers. Extra rations as well as cash awards have served as effective incentives to improved performance by frontier unit personnel. A strong deterrent to political defectors may well be an awareness of the unpredictable nature of their reception in the prospective host country. Both Yugoslavia and Greece, in the interest of improving relations with Albania, have since 1967 selectively returned escapees.

2. Security and foreign intelligence

The Directorate of State Security (*Sigurimi*) has the primary responsibility for both internal security and the collection of foreign intelligence. The *Sigurimi* delegates part of its responsibility for maintaining internal security to the other two directorates, but it retains overall control. Similarly, while the other two directorates cooperate with the *Sigurimi* in carrying out its foreign intelligence operations, the *Sigurimi* retains final authority within the Ministry of Internal Affairs for all foreign intelligence activities (Figure 33).

The internal missions of the *Sigurimi* specifically include detecting and suppressing agitation and propaganda activities of dissident political elements; uncovering and eliminating antiregime infiltration into the country's economic projects and preventing interference with national production; detecting and neutralizing the efforts of foreign agents and "diversionists"; monitoring the activities of foreigners in Albania; providing personal protection to government and party leaders; and preventing infiltration of dissidents into government agencies, including the armed forces.

In its foreign intelligence operations the *Sigurimi* is primarily concerned with thwarting the activities of anti-Communist Albanian emigrees. These same refugee groups, however, have, in the past, provided the *Sigurimi* with its primary source of agents for intelligence operations abroad. The *Sigurimi* also recruits agents from the Albanian populace, allowing them to "escape" and emigrate into selected European countries. The *Sigurimi*



FIGURE 33. Organization of intelligence and security services (S)

also directs intelligence operations from Albanian diplomatic installations abroad, its main responsibility in this connection being the collection of military, economic, and political information.

Sigurimi's foreign intelligence operations have been moderately successful, and in several instances the service has proved itself to be well organized and surprisingly efficient. Although Greece and Yugoslavia are probably the main foreign intelligence collection targets, the Sino-Soviet dispute has made the *Sigurimi* increasingly active in propaganda efforts to influence other Communist parties, especially in Western Europe. The rift with the U.S.S.R., however, has impaired relations between the *Sigurimi* and the intelligence services of the Eastern European Communist countries. For example, in the past the *Sigurimi* had used Bulgarian diplomatic installations and trade missions in some non-Communist countries to provide cover for *Sigurimi* officers, but this arrangement is no longer permitted. Similar cooperation once extended by the Yugoslavs came to an abrupt halt when Tito broke with the Cominform.

Many *Sigurimi* officers, about 10% of whom are stationed at the Tiranë headquarters, were trained in Moscow. Some evidence suggests cooperation more recently between the Albanian and Chinese intelligence services, and the Chinese Communists are known to be training *Sigurimi* personnel, particularly in the fields of espionage and counterespionage.

The Ministry of People's Defense also has some responsibility for intelligence and security matters, but its authority in these fields is secondary to that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The intelligence section of the Ministry of People's Defense is called the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and it constitutes an integral part of the armed forces general staff. Its activities are confined to military matters and are probably conducted only within Albania, the two bordering countries of Greece and Yugoslavia, and Italy. Information is not available on its size, organization, specific functions, or effectiveness.

3. Penal system

The Ministry of Internal Affairs administers the penal institutions. The people's police guard all prisons and forced labor camps, and the wardens or directors of these institutions are *Sigurimi* officers. Most of these prisons and camps contain both ordinary convicts and political prisoners. Specific information on the organization of the penal system, location of prisons and camps, and the number of prisoners is not available.

With the exception of those found physically unfit, work is obligatory for all prisoners, whether in prisons or forced labor camps. An 8-hour day is the supposed work norm, but excessive hard work is more likely the reality of prison life. Those who fail to complete their production norms are deprived of their daily food ration; heavier punishment is meted out for repetition of an offense. Prisoners ordinarily receive 15% of the daily wage of a free worker. Overcrowding and undernourishment have resulted in the prevalence of disease, particularly tuberculosis, and in a very high death rate among prisoners.

According to the 1959 amendments to the criminal code and to the code of criminal procedure, a prisoner may be paroled after having served more than half of his term. Paroles are granted by the courts on the recommendations of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

H. Suggestions for further reading (C)

Stavro Skendi's *Albania* brings together much material on Albania's historical development. Although Robert Wolff's authoritative *The Balkans in Our Time* has no section devoted solely to Albania, its lucid history of the Balkans places Albania's history within the general context of southern Europe's development. Joseph Swire's *Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom* is an excessively detailed account of the country's first years as a nation-state; the book contains an excellent chronology and an extensive bibliography. A volume of special interest is Julian Amery's *Sons of the Eagle*, a personal account of the author's experiences with Albanian resistance groups during World War II. The one chapter on Albania in Paul Lendvai's recent volume on nationalism and communism in the Balkans, *Eagles in Cobwebs*, is a boldly sketched interpretative essay which outlines the country's recent past. Nicholas Pano's *The People's Republic of Albania* examines the role of Albania in the world Communist system; it is also a somewhat useful introduction to the politics of Communist Albania.

The Economy

A. Summary and background

1. Introduction (U/OU)

Albania has a traditional peasant economy and a rapidly growing population. Like other countries in the same position, even its present low level of living can be maintained only with outside help. This help has come from Communist China since Albania's break with the U.S.S.R. in 1961. With Chinese help averaging about US$20 per capita a year, the economy has grown since 1961 at a rate of about 7% a year, according to official claims, which may be exaggerated. In any case, the rate of economic growth has exceeded the annual growth of population, estimated at 2.6%. The level of output and per capita consumption, however, remains much lower than in any other European country.

Albania is a predominantly agricultural country with a substantial but declining deficit in bread grains (wheat, rye, and corn), amounting to a known 62,000 metric tons in 1968. Even though imports of grain declined during 1966-69 compared with 1961-65, apparent per capita consumption of grain rose somewhat. Because of the small amount of land suited for cultivation, the backwardness of agricultural practices, and the rapidly growing population, there is little chance that Albania will become self-sufficient in grain in the near future.

By European standards, agricultural land accounts for a small share—about 43%—of the total area of the country. Much of the agricultural land lies in mountainous areas and is suitable only for pasture, so that only about 20% of the total area is arable. Arable land per capita is thus only 0.27 hectare, the lowest in any agricultural country in Europe. Forests cover about 43% of the total area and are an important source of fuel and of wood for construction.

Apart from the land, the natural resources consist largely of low-grade petroleum and brown coal, chromium, iron-nickel, and copper ores, and construction materials. The hydroelectric potential is relatively large but mostly unexploited. Albania is just beginning to develop metallurgy beyond the stage of simple refining of its own ores. The recently completed electrolytic and copper wire plant has enabled the country to begin producing finished copper products. The fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) calls for the construction of a metallurgical combine, which will process Albanian iron-nickel ore and will produce semifinished and finished steel. Most of the output of chrome and nickel is now exported.

Albanian resources of petroleum, natural gas, salt, pyrites, chromium, copper, limestone, and phosphorites could be used to expand greatly the small chemical industry. The Albanians have just begun to exploit some of these resources in the recently completed superphosphate, nitrogen fertilizer, and caustic soda plants; and plans call for further development of the chemical industry.

In spite of its break with the U.S.S.R. in late 1961, Albania has retained Stalinist institutions and has followed Stalinist policies in its efforts to modernize and industrialize the economy. Industry has received much greater material support than agriculture. Agricultural progress has been further impeded by the socialization campaign. The collectivization in 1967 of most farms in mountainous areas brought more than 99% of the arable land under the control of cooperative and state farms.

Industrial production has grown much more rapidly than agricultural production. Even so, the industrialization of the country is barely underway, and agriculture still accounts for about three-fifths of total estimated employment, with industry accounting for about 18%. Most of the growth of industrial production reflects substantial additions to employment and the commissioning of new plants, some of which represent large increases in industrial capacity.

The level of economic development in Albania is lower than in the other Balkan countries but is somewhat higher than that in Turkey and considerably higher than that in Communist China (Figure 34). In 1969 the gross national product (GNP) of Albania amounted to an estimated US$800 million (1968 prices), or about $400 per capita.[2]

Albania depends on imports for nearly all its supply of machinery and equipment and finished steel and for an important part of its supply of foodstuffs (Figure 35). Moreover, the economy has long been dependent on foreign help. The country received large amounts of economic aid from Italy (1925-45), Yugoslavia (1945-48), the U.S.S.R. (1948-60), and the Eastern European Communist countries[3] (1949-60). Since 1961, economic aid has been furnished by Communist China. Chinese

[2]The GNP of Albania is estimated by means of a comparison with Turkey and Bulgaria, using selected indicators of production and consumption, plus demographic data. The method used is that proposed by Charles K. Wilber for studying less developed areas (*Soviet Studies*, April 1966, p. 408ff.). The results indicate that GNP per capita in Albania is somewhat higher than that of Turkey and only one-third that of Bulgaria.

[3]Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

FIGURE 34. COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR ALBANIA AND SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES, 1969* (C)

(Production per capita)

	UNIT	ALBANIA	TURKEY	COMMUNIST CHINA	BULGARIA	YUGOSLAVIA
Primary energy**...	Kg.....	952	366	294	1,226	1,093
Electric power.....	Kw.-hr.....	443	224	61	2,048	1,125
Crude oil.....	Kg.....	557	104	17	39	131
Cement.....	....*do*.....	154	168	14	423	194
Grain***.....	....*do*.....	279	430	237–243	721	706
Ginned cotton†.....	....*do*.....	4	12	2	2	*Insig*
Cotton textiles.....	Linear meters....	21	22	*na*	40	*na*

na Data not available.

*Many of the data are estimated or provisional.

**Estimate in terms of standard fuel of 7,000 kilocalories per kilogram, including coal, crude oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power, but excluding fuelwood, peat, and shale.

***Data include potatoes on a grain equivalent basis of 4 metric tons of potatoes to 1 metric ton of grain.

†Data are for 1967.

FIGURE 35. STRATEGIC SUPPLY POSITION, 1967 (U/OU)

(Thousands of metric tons, unless otherwise noted)

	PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	APPARENT CONSUMPTION	PRODUCTION AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION
Electric power (million kw.-hrs.).....	590	0	0	590	*100*
Crude oil.....	980	0	166	814	*120*
Brown coal.....	434	0	0	434	*100*
Coke.....	0	26	0	26	*0*
Tractors (units).....	0	388	0	388	*0*
Planters and cultivators (units).....	0	211	0	211	*0*
Trucks (units).....	0	627	0	627	*0*
Rolled steel.....	0	*77	0	77	*0*
Cement.....	22	17	0	238	*93*
Chemical fertilizers.....	*15	67	0	82	*18*
Corn.....	286	*na*	0	286	*100*
Wheat.....	148	*89	0	237	*62*
Sugar.....	18	*0	0	18	*100*
Cotton textiles (million linear meters).....	37	1	3	35	*106*

na Data not available.

*Estimated.

credits—which in reality are gifts because of Albania's inability to repay—have been the principal basis for the country's recent industrial development and have helped in maintaining the food supply.

2. Growth and structure of the economy (C)

Economic growth has been steady since 1950[4] in spite of the great fluctuations in agricultural production caused by variable weather (Figure 36). The growth of industrial production, which was rapid during the 1950's, slowed sharply during 1961-65, partly as a result of the cessation of trade with the U.S.S.R. in the latter part of 1961. During the period 1961-65, gross industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 6.8%, compared with a rate of 16.7% during 1956-60. Largely because of Chinese Communist assistance in the completion of a number of industrial projects, gross industrial production reportedly increased at an estimated average annual rate of 13% during 1966-70. According to official data, gross agricultural production on the average was 25% greater during 1956-60 than during 1951-55, about 32% greater during 1961-65 than during 1956-60, and about 32% greater during 1966-70 than during 1961-65.[5]

[4]In this section, official Albanian data are used for growth of national income, industrial production, and agricultural production. The latest available Albanian statistical yearbook is for 1967. In large part, the yearbook data for 1965-67 are given in terms of indexes rather than absolute numbers. Because of this, data used herein for later years are mainly based on percentage increases given in plan fulfillment reports; some are estimates based on other considerations.

[5]These data are believed to overstate economic growth consistently, though probably not grossly. Aside from the inflation of production indexes for industry and possibly for other economic sectors, official data for national income exaggerate overall economic growth because they exclude depreciation and "unproductive" services—which typically grow less rapidly than production of goods—and because distortions in the price system greatly overstate the share of industry in the national income.



FIGURE 36. Economic growth (U/OU)

The relatively rapid growth of agricultural production during 1961-70 and of industrial production during 1966-70 resulted in an average annual increase in national income of about 6% during 1961-65 and about 8% during 1966-70. Because of the rapid growth of Albania's population, national income per capita increased much less rapidly than total national income during 1961-70: an average annual rate of 4% compared with 7%, according to official statistics.

a. Industry

Albanian industry produces mainly foods, textiles, timber, minerals and metals, petroleum, and construction materials. In its successive 5-year plans, begun in 1951, the Hoxha regime has stressed the development of mining and petroleum extraction together with the production of electric power and construction materials. Since the mid-1960's the regime has also stressed the development of the chemical and machine building industries.

According to official statistics, gross industrial production was about 15 times as large in 1970 as in 1950. A large part of this increase came from increased employment. Estimates indicate that the industrial labor force increased at an average annual rate of 11% during 1951-60, 5% during 1961-65, and 10% during 1966-69. Labor productivity rose by an estimated average annual rate of 8% during 1951-60, and by 3% during 1961-69. However, increases in labor productivity probably are exaggerated, especially for the 1951-60 period, because of exaggerations in the official index of gross industrial production.

b. Agriculture

Agricultural production has risen significantly despite the higher priority given to industrial development. Production of grain, which comprises about four-fifths of the average Albanian diet, increased only 8% on an annual average output basis during 1956-60 compared with 1951-55 and then declined slightly during 1961-65. Increased acreage and greatly expanded use of chemical fertilizers enabled the Albanians to increase average annual output of grain during 1966-69 an estimated 61% over the 1961-65 average. Albania still produces less food than it consumes and will continue to do so for years.

Gains in the value of gross agricultural production reflect in part increases in the cultivated area and, since 1966, increases in crop yields which, however, remain low by European standards. These gains also reflect in part a shift to high-valued products such as industrial crops and fruits. By giving priority to reclamation projects and promoting the cultivation of marginal land, the regime doubled the arable area between 1938 and 1969. The ratio of arable land to population, however, remains about the same as in 1938. Opportunities for increasing the cultivated area are diminishing, and more chemical fertilizer and pesticides, higher quality seed and livestock, and greatly improved farming practices are required if agricultural production is to be raised substantially.

The variety of climate permits production not only of the usual grain and root crops, but also of such products as tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, grapes, and olives. Tobacco and tobacco products are among the leading exports. Because grain production has not kept up with the growth of the population, imports of wheat have been essential. In recent years Albania also has imported about two-fifths of its sugar supply. A large share of meat and the bulk of other livestock products are derived from sheep and goats. The increase in hog numbers has been substantial but probably has been held down by the old Muslim traditions against eating pork. Much of the pasture land is not suitable for the grazing of cattle. Although per capita production of livestock products has increased since 1955, it remains less than before World War II.

c. Foreign trade

Albania is dependent on imports for nearly all the machinery and equipment used in investment and for certain industrial materials and foodstuffs, especially wheat. Although the country continues to rely heavily on credits to finance these imports, it probably has made few if any repayments. In 1961, Communist China replaced the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist countries as Albania's source of economic assistance. Albania accumulated a trade deficit of about US$340 million—nearly all with Communist China—during 1961-69.

Following a period of stagnation, trade turnover grew rapidly during 1956-60. As a result of worsening relations and the final break with the U.S.S.R., Albanian trade declined sharply in 1961-62. As the Chinese Communists became more active in the Albanian investment program, trade began to grow again and by 1969 was an estimated 72% greater than in 1960. Communist China accounts for about one-half of Albanian trade, compared with less than one-tenth in 1960. Trade with the U.S.S.R., which accounted for about one-half of Albanian trade during 1956-60, ended in 1962. Trade with the Eastern European Communist countries—which accounts for about two-fifths of Albanian trade—rose in 1961 but fell somewhat in 1962. This trade increased sharply in 1964 and by 1969 was about 80% over the 1960 level.

Albania's most important imports are machinery and equipment, wheat, and rolled steel. Chromium and iron-nickel ores, crude oil and refined asphalt, and tobacco and cigarettes constitute Albania's major exports.

Albania ceased to be active in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) after 1961.

B. Sectors of the economy

1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (U/OU)

a. Agricultural production

Albania is a predominantly agricultural country that cannot adequately feed its rapidly growing population without food imports. Even in the record year 1969, production of breadgrains (wheat, rye, and corn), the principal basis of the diet, provided only about nine-tenths of domestic requirements. Natural conditions are unfavorable, and agricultural practices are still primitive by Western standards (Figure 37). In these crucial respects, Albania is only slightly better off than some of the less developed countries of Asia.

Of the total land area of 11,100 square miles (2,875,000 hectares); some 43% is devoted to agriculture (Figure 38) compared with 57% in Yugoslavia and 69% in Turkey. Moreover, the largely mountainous terrain and the prevalence of swampy conditions in the lowlands limit arable land to only 20% of the total area. In 1969

FIGURE 37. Harvesting grain on a cooperative farm (U/OU)



FIGURE 38. Land use, 1967 (U/OU)

Albania had only 0.27 hectare of arable land per capita as compared with 0.40 hectare per capita in Yugoslavia, which has many of the same natural disadvantages.

The climate of Albania permits the growing of all major crops characteristic of U.S. and European agriculture, but under the usual hazards in the Mediterranean area (Land utilization inset, Summary Map, Figure 79). Droughts are frequent in summer, and heavy seasonal rains in the fall result in serious erosion and occasional floods. Grains are the dominant crops. In 1967 approximately 65% of the land in field crops was in grain (primarily corn and wheat), 14% in industrial crops, 8% in potatoes and other vegetables, and 9% in fodder crops. The main industrial crops are cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, and oilseeds. Albania also produces fruit, olives, and nuts. Tobacco is one of the country's most important exports. Figure 39 shows production and yields of major crops.

During 1951-65 the output of grain grew considerably more slowly than the population. Since 1965, sharply increased yields, together with an increase in acreage, have resulted in a large increase in grain output. During 1966-69, the total average yearly output of grain rose 61% over the 1961-65 average. Estimates—based on official statements—indicate that production of grain reached a record high of 555,000 metric tons in 1969. Because of the sharp increase in grain production the Albanians have been able to reduce considerably their dependence on imports. Thus, known imports of grain (primarily wheat) dropped to about 13% of the total supply during 1966-69, compared with 31% during 1961-65. The Albanian consumer has benefited from the increased grain production in spite of the cutback in imports. Apparent per capita availability of grain rose to an average of about 280 kilograms (kg.) a year during 1966-69 as compared with about 255 kg. a year during the previous 5 years. Communist China, by financing

FIGURE 39. PRODUCTION AND YIELDS OF PRINCIPAL CROPS (U/OU)

	1934–38 AVERAGE	1956–60 AVERAGE	1961–65 AVERAGE*	1965*	1966*	1967*	1968*	1969*
Production (thousand metric tons):								
Total grains	*193.0	312.0	310.2	342.3	437.4	490.1	515.0	554.6
Of which:								
Corn	133.3	173.3	160.9	166.0	277.2	286.3	254.7	189.2
Wheat	39.5	95.1	107.9	119.2	101.1	147.6	196.0	269.7
Cotton (unginned)	**0.1	15.9	21.6	24.6	24.6	21.9	*na*	*na*
Tobacco	**2.0	8.7	11.5	13.3	13.6	13.1	14.9	17.1
Sugar beets	0	90.0	96.3	90.2	132.9	138.5	*na*	*na*
Potatoes	**3.6	22.1	25.6	21.2	108.0	115.9	158.4	121.7
Yields (quintals per hectare):								
Total grains	12.8	10.3	10.5	11.6	14.1	15.6	15.1	*na*
Of which:								
Corn	14.3	11.3	11.8	11.6	14.8	18.0	17.2	17.8
Wheat	10.4	9.8	9.2	11.3	13.0	13.3	14.1	19.1
Cotton (unginned)	**5.0	7.0	9.5	10.8	11.0	10.0	*na*	*na*
Tobacco	**7.5	6.1	5.0	5.9	6.1	6.3	*na*	*na*
Sugar beets	0	160.8	168.9	156.2	221.5	230.8	*na*	*na*
Potatoes	**90.0	74.6	70.0	57.4	73.0	60.2	60.7	56.1

na Data not available.
*Estimated.
**1938.

Albanian imports of grain from non-Communist countries, has taken over the U.S.S.R.'s former role as the major supplier of grain.

In 1966 the Albanians began to expand rapidly the production of potatoes. The Chinese supplied a large share of the seed potatoes used. By 1969, the area devoted to potatoes was seven times that in 1965 and production was more than five and a half times the 1965 level. Even so, the Albanians apparently did not achieve their goal for 1970, which was to increase the area to 12 times and production to 22 times the 1965 level. Yields so far have amounted to only about three-fifths of those planned. Production of industrial crops, which in the past had contributed the most to increases in gross production of field crops, appears to have stagnated in 1967-69. The Albanians themselves have admitted shortfalls in the output of cotton and have not published production data on either cotton or sugar beets for these years. Production of tobacco has grown, however, and in 1966-69 was 28% higher on the average than in 1961-65.

Because of the priority given to raising the level of technology in food crop production, growth of the livestock sector lagged during the 1960's. Little or nothing has been done to expand output of concentrated or roughage feeds, and recently introduced programs to upgrade breeding stock have yet to show results. Consequently, livestock numbers and productivity have failed to grow faster than the population. The per capita production of meat in 1967 (the most recent data available) was less than in 1960, and that of eggs and milk no better in 1969 than 1960.

The number of cattle, horses, asses, and mules increased very little between 1950 and 1966 (Figure 40). The number of goats, which in 1950 was considerably below the 1938 level, rose 44% between 1950 and 1966, but the number of sheep declined slightly. The number of hogs, with an increase of 204%, showed the fastest growth, followed by an increase of 164% in poultry numbers. Official Albanian data for the gross value of livestock production—which accounts for about one-third of total gross agricultural production—show that in 1961-67 output was substantially higher on the average than in the previous 10 years. Official statistics also indicate, however, that during 1960-67 meat production

FIGURE 40. NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK (U/OU)
(Thousands, end of year)

	1938	1950	1956–60*	1961–65*	1965**	1966**
Sheep	1,573.9	1,707.0	1,612.9	1,613.2	1,637.0	1,670.0
Goats	932.3	830.2	1,071.6	1,150.3	1,175.0	1,200.0
Cattle and buffalo	412.7	434.3	424.6	425.0	429.0	432.0
Hogs	15.3	46.7	106.2	127.0	141.0	142.0
Horses, asses, and mules	109.2	117.3	119.0	124.0	124.0	125.0
Poultry	1,037.2	660.1	1,385.7	1,682.5	1,722.0	1,746.0

*Annual average.
**Estimated.

declined and wool output was unchanged. Production of milk and eggs went up during 1960-69 by only 26% and 33%, respectively, or by no more than the increase in population.

The average daily per capita availability of food—an estimated 2,500 calories—is among the lowest in Europe. This compares with average availabilities of roughly 2,900 calories in Greece and Yugoslavia. Caloric intake in Albania is not much higher now than before the war, and the quality of the diet has shown little improvement. Most foods are still rationed.

Grain products are the chief food staple, accounting for an estimated 80% of the caloric intake. The major change in the diet has been an increase in the consumption of wheat and potatoes at the expense of corn during the 1960-69 period. The share of livestock products in the average diet is no better than the early 1960's, about 5% of caloric intake. The regime has admitted the need to import livestock products but lacks the foreign exchange to do so. Similarly, the increased output of fruit and vegetables is not reflected in diets; the increase has been absorbed in exports.

Exports of agricultural and forestry products accounted for an estimated two-fifths of total exports in 1967. Tobacco and cigarettes alone accounted for an estimated 30% of total exports. Nearly all exports of tobacco and cigarettes went to other Communist countries.

b. Agricultural problems and policies

A low level of technology, insufficient industrial inputs, and Chinese Communist influence on agricultural policies go far to explain the very low yields of most crops in Albania. Much of the increase in the gross value of agricultural production can be attributed to expansion of the cultivated area, to emphasis on higher valued industrial crops, and to chemical fertilizer. Average yields of wheat and corn, however, have recently improved and in 1966-69 were 62% and 44%, respectively, higher than in 1961-65. The main reasons for the improved yields of these two crops are increased use of fertilizer and improved varieties of seed. Average yields of most other crops have not increased over the average for 1951-55, which in turn was no higher and, in some cases, was lower than the average for 1934-38. Cotton and sugar beets are the main exceptions. Average yearly yields of cotton and sugar beets rose 96% and 90%, respectively, between 1951-55 and 1961-67 but appear to have declined in 1968-69.

The use of chemical fertilizers, improved plant varieties, and pesticides is still small, but has increased rapidly since 1966. Supplies of chemical fertilizers to agriculture by the state fluctuated between 15,151 metric tons (presumably in gross terms) and 32,404 tons during 1957-66. Unusually large imports, together with the beginning of production in Albania's first two chemical fertilizer plants, raised the supply to 81,646 tons in 1967 and to about 184,932 tons in 1969. Application of chemical fertilizers per hectare of agricultural land in 1969 amounted to 50 kg. (estimated in terms of active nutrients), compared with the application in the crop year 1968/69 of 35 kg. per hectare in Greece, 42 kg. in Yugoslavia, 91 kg. in Hungary, and 57 kg. in Italy.

In October 1966 the superphosphate plant in Laç started operation on a small scale. The nitrogen fertilizer plant in Fier reportedly began operation in February 1967. The Albanians are still, however, importing some nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers and will continue to rely on imports for potassium fertilizers.

Nearly all arable land is held by collective and state farms. Collectivization was slow from 1946 through 1955. Only 13% of the arable land had been collectivized by the end of 1955, and only 8% was under the state sector. The pace was greatly accelerated during 1956-60, and, by the end of 1964, 73% of the arable land was in collective farms, 17% was under the state sector, and only 10%, largely in the mountains, was held by private farmers. With the collectivization of most farms in mountainous areas in early 1967, private farms now account for less than 1% of the arable land. In 1967 there were 33 state agricultural establishments, modeled after Soviet state farms, receiving preferential treatment, and there were 1,208 cooperative farms. Besides state farms, the state sector of agriculture includes other nationalized areas managed as experimental stations, agricultural subsidiaries of other state enterprises, and state grazing land.

Despite considerable improvement in recent years, Albanian agriculture is one of the least mechanized in Europe. By the end of 1969 Albania had in use about 10,500 tractors in terms of 15-horsepower (hp.) units. The average amount of agricultural land to be handled by one 15-hp. tractor unit was about 55 hectares, compared with 103 hectares in 1960 and 67 hectares in 1965. However, lack of complementary equipment for tractors and poor maintenance have limited their effectiveness in farming operations.

Most of the heavy machinery used in collective farms is under the control of the machine-tractor stations (MTS's), which also provide other forms of technical assistance and are an important instrument of political control over agriculture. In 1967, there were an estimated 30 of these stations. The MTS's operate at a low level of efficiency because of the lack of skilled manpower, poor work discipline, shortages of spare parts and fuel, and poor planning and organization.

In a series of decisions in 1966 concerning agriculture, the Albanian Government increased the state's control over agriculture. Besides collectivizing private farms in the mountainous areas, the government decided to reduce by 50% to 66% the size of the private household plots of collective members and to reduce by about 50% the number of livestock that can be held by collective members. By 1967 the average size of household plots had been reduced 37% below the 1966 level.

Other measures already taken include the transfer of party and state officials into the country; the movement of unemployed workers from towns to the farm and greater control over the flow from farms to cities and towns; the establishment of work norms through the example of superior brigades; and the abolition of personal plots of state farm workers. Also, party and state employees, professional people, and members of the military are expected to work one month a year in production, primarily on farms. In addition, members of the army are to continue to grow their own food and to participate in agricultural projects, such as opening new land for growing potatoes.

As in earlier periods, the Albanians are trying during the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) to achieve self-sufficiency in grain. The regime hopes to about double the output of breadgrains—primarily by increasing yields. The achievement of this goal is highly unlikely, given the country's past performance and poor potential. Some increase in production is nevertheless likely if average weather conditions prevail. The Albanians also hope to increase considerably the production of industrial crops and livestock products. The Chinese Communists are to aid in the expansion of the superphosphate plant in Laç and in the construction of another nitrogen fertilizer plant in Fier. Because of the sharp increase planned for credits to agricultural cooperatives, the Albanians established an Agricultural Bank in January 1970. It is not known whether the increase in credits is to supplant in part or to supplement investments by the state in agriculture.

c. Forestry, timber processing, fishing

Albania's forests are an important natural resource, providing fuel and construction materials for the economy and some exports. The forested area amounted to 1,242,100 hectares in 1967, or 43% of the total land area. In 1964 the total stock of timber was 80,900,000 cubic meters, of which slightly over one-half was suitable for commercial timber. Because of the decline in the use of firewood, log removal dropped from 1,894,000 cubic meters in 1965 to 1,471,000 cubic meters in 1967, when two-thirds was used as firewood. Although firewood accounted for only 14% of total energy consumption in 1969 compared with 25% in 1964, it remains the main fuel used in the heating of residences.

The timber and timber processing industry accounted for 8% of gross industrial production in 1967. Products of the processing industry include plywood, veneer, pit props, telegraph poles, furniture, and matches. The Albanians plan to double the output of furniture during 1971-80. This industry is located primarily in Elbasan, Durrës, Pukës, and Shkodër *rreths* (districts). During 1961-69, the Albanians put into operation at least three small timber processing plants, two of which were built with Chinese Communist assistance. Some processed wood products, such as plywood and veneer, and forest byproducts, are exported. Output of timber products is shown in the following tabulation, in thousands of cubic meters:

	Sawn timber	Plywood
1950	51	0
1955	107	3
1960	170	6
1965 *est*	148	8
1966 *est*	162	9
1967 *est*	144	9
1968 *est*	120	*na*

na Data not available.

Fishing is poorly developed, despite the country's long coastline and numerous lakes. This deficiency is mainly the result of inadequate equipment, opportunities for earning higher incomes from farming in the coastal plain, and poor transportation facilities. Except in the coastal towns, fish is not an important part of the Albanian diet.

2. Fuels and power (C)

Crude oil is by far the most important source of primary energy in Albania. In 1969 the estimated consumption of energy available from primary sources was as follows, in percent of total:

Crude oil	*58*
Brown coal and imported coke	*14*
Hydroelectric power	*14*
Fuelwood	*14*
Total	*100*

According to official claims, the petroleum industry accounted for 7% of gross industrial production in 1969. In 1969, crude oil production reached almost 1.2 million metric tons (Figure 41), nearly nine times the 1950 level and 61% over that of 1960. Proved oil reserves are adequate for 12 to 15 years at the current level of production. The Albanians claim to have discovered several new deposits in recent years and assert that reserves are greater than Soviet experts had led them to believe. Total refining capacity has doubled since 1966 and now amounts to about 1.1 million tons a year. Nearly all of this increase came from the 500,000-ton refinery in Fier, which began operation in the latter part of 1968. The Chinese Communists provided the equipment for this plant. Albania exports only small amounts of crude oil, once an important earner of foreign exchange. These exports accounted for 45% of industrial output and an estimated 10% of total exports in 1960, but for only 7% of output and an estimated 4% of exports in 1967. Because of its low quality, most Albanian crude oil is not suitable for production of high-grade light petroleum products. Small quantities of aviation gasoline and other light products as well as lubricating oils are imported. Albania exports a large part of its output of refined products, primarily asphalt, which, with small exports of natural asphalt, accounted for an estimated 19% of total exports in 1967. Most of the exports of asphalt went to Communist countries, with the remainder going

FIGURE 41. PRODUCTION OF FUELS (U/OU)
(Thousands of metric tons, except where noted)

	1950	1955	1960	1965*	1966*	1967*	1968*	1969*
Crude oil	132	208	728	820	890	980	1,040	1,170
Diesel fuel	4	6	68	78	96	105	788	*na*
Gasoline	5	4	54	45	44	45		*na*
Refined asphalt and other residuals	47	68	245	385	450	542		*na*
Brown coal	41	195	291	331	393	434	500	600
Fuelwood (million cubic meters)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Electric power (million kilowatt-hours)	21	85	194	341	433	590	710	930

na Data not available.
*Data are, for the most part, estimated or based on percentage increases.

primarily to Italy. A plant for the production of coke from natural asphalt was completed in Stalin in 1965.

During 1971-75 the Albanians plan to expand greatly the output and assortment of petroleum products and to begin production of petrochemicals. The Chinese have agreed to assist in the construction of another refinery, which is to have a capacity of 1 million tons of crude oil a year, i.e., about as much as the country's present total refining capacity.

The Albanian pipeline system is used for carrying crude oil from the Patos and Devoll oilfields to the refineries at Fier, Stalin, and Cërrik, and to Uj të Ftohtë south of Vlorë. The system consists of an estimated 80 miles of major trunk lines and 30 miles of gathering lines in the oilfields. A short gas pipeline from the Devoll oilfield is believed to supply the nearby city of Stalin with natural gas. Details of selected pipelines are given in Figure 42.

Albania is self-sufficient in solid fuels except for small imports of coke. Coal deposits are small, scattered, and limited to brown coal. As of 1958, total reserves of brown coal were estimated at 19 million metric tons, but subsequent prospecting and the discovery of additional deposits have probably added substantially to the estimate. Production of brown coal in 1969 was approximately 600,000 tons, or about 15 times that in 1950 and twice that in 1960.

In 1968 the Albanians, with Chinese Communist assistance, began the construction of a coal preparation plant at the Memaliaj coal mine in Tepelenë district. This plant, with a planned processing capacity of 700 tons per day, was scheduled for completion in 1970. Another preparation plant and a new coal mine at Valias, both located in Tiranë district, are also to be constructed with Chinese Communist assistance. The Valias mine is to have a yearly production capacity of 210,000 tons. A small preparation plant at the Mborja coal mine near Korçë is currently being enlarged.

The electric power industry has made significant increases in production and installed capacity since 1965. Production reached an estimated 930 million kilowatt-hours (kw.-hr.) in 1969 with an installed capacity of 240,000 kilowatts (kw.), compared with about 290 million kw.-hr. and 117,000 kw. in 1964. Per capita production was 443 kw.-hr. in 1969, a considerable increase over the 228 kw.-hr. in 1966. Although the rate of growth is high, total capacity and production are insignificant.

The production of electric power is about equally divided between thermal and hydroelectric powerplants. The generating base of 240,000 kw. consists of 140,000 kw. in thermal plants and 100,000 kw. in hydroelectric plants. The four largest plants contain 73% of the total generating capacity. These four plants are the 99,000-kw. Fier thermal powerplant, the 25,000-kw. Ulzë Karl Marx hydroelectric powerplant, the 24,000-kw. Shkopet hydroelectric powerplant, and the 28,000-kw. Delvinë

FIGURE 42. SELECTED PIPELINES (C)

TERMINALS					THROUGH-PUT	
From	To	LENGTH	DIAMETER	PRODUCT TRANSPORTED	CAPACITY	REMARKS
		Miles	*Inches*		*Bbl./day*	
Devoll (oilfield)	Uj të Ftohtë	50	12.75	Crude	*na*	Constructed 1935; completely overhauled 1947–48. Pumping stations at oilfield, Fier, and Skrofotinë. Reversible flow believed possible from Fier to Stalin.
Patos (oilfield)	Fier	6	12	*do*	*na*	Connects with Devoll Uj të Ftohtë pipeline at Fier pumping station. Pumping station at oilfield.
Stalin	Cërrik	22	12	*do*	*na*	Connected in Stalin with Fier–Stalin section of Devoll–Uj të Ftohtë pipeline. Pumping station at Stalin.

na Data not available.

Bistricës I and II hydroelectric powerplants. Other powerplants are less than 8,000 kw. in size, and many are less than 100 kw.

Consumption of electric energy, mostly in the form of motive power, is largely in support of industry, which accounts for about 65% of total usage. Powerplant uses and transmission and distribution system losses account for 12% of the consumption. The other principal consumers are municipal and governmental services, agriculture, and households. Household consumption, satisfying minimal lighting requirements, is increasing rapidly. The Albanians claim to have completed on 25 October 1970—a year ahead of schedule—an electrification program to provide for the extension of electricity to all villages.

The country has a well-developed transmission system for its small power base. Transmission of electric power is accomplished by a 110-kilovolt (kv.) network which extends to principal areas of the country. Lower voltage lines extend to less important areas. In many remote or isolated areas, where extension of transmission lines is not feasible, electric power is supplied by small powerplants.

Development of the electric power industry is oriented toward the hydroelectric potential, which is relatively large and mostly unexploited. Under construction is the 250,000-kw. Va i Dejës hydroelectric powerplant on the Drin river, scheduled for completion in 1972. Also on the Drin river is the planned 400,000-kw. Fierzë hydroelectric powerplant. Construction of this project is to begin in the early 1970's. Other new construction is planned in the 5,000- to 15,000-kw. range, both in thermal and hydroelectric installations. Higher voltage lines of 220 kv. also are planned during the early 1970's. Growth of the industry will depend on timely imports of generating equipment, none of which is domestically produced.

3. Minerals and metals (U/OU)

Albania now has no iron and steel industry, except for a small rolling mill, but it is an important producer of chromium ore and since 1959 has produced iron-nickel ore on a relatively large scale. Chromium is one of the principal exports; together with iron-nickel ore, it represented roughly one-fifth of the total value of Albanian exports in 1967. Largely because of the development of the copper industry, output of the chromium, copper, and iron-nickel industries accounted for an estimated 8% of gross industrial production in 1969 compared with 3% in 1965. Continued stress will be placed on developing the extractive industries during the fifth Five Year Plan.

Albania is the world's sixth largest producer of chromium ore and has reserves between 4 million and 6 million metric tons. Production—which was developed with Czechoslovak financial and technical aid—increased from 52,191 tons in 1950 to an estimated 420,000 tons in 1969 (Figure 43). The ore is exported principally to other Communist countries. In 1967 exports of chromium ore accounted for an estimated 15% of total exports. With an average chromite content of about 45%, the Albanian ore is inferior to the grades that can be readily obtained in non-Communist countries and from the U.S.S.R. and thus is difficult to sell in non-Communist markets. A plant for upgrading low-grade chrome ore to over 50% chromium content is now being constructed with Chinese assistance at Bulqizë. The Albanians plan to export the ore from this plant. During 1971-75 the Albanians plan to construct facilities for the production of ferrochrome.

FIGURE 43. PRODUCTION OF METALS (U/OU)
(Thousands of metric tons)

YEAR	CHROMIUM ORE	IRON-NICKEL ORE	COPPER ORE	BLISTER COPPER
1950	52	0	14	1
1955	122	0	24	1
1960	289	255	81	1
1965*	310	395	220	4
1966*	302	395	228	5
1967*	327	405	267	5
1968*	365	405	285	5
1969*	420	*na*	*na*	6

na Data not available.
*Data are, for the most part, estimated or based on percentage increases.

Exploitation of Albania's reserves of iron-nickel ore, which amount to an estimated 20 million tons, began in 1958 with Czechoslovak aid. Nearly all of the ore is exported—primarily to the Sered Nickel Plant in Czechoslovakia, which began operation in August 1963. Before the opening of this plant, the ore was stockpiled at Sered. The nickel content of the ore is only 1%, but Czechoslovakia has developed a process for obtaining electrolytically refined nickel from the ore. In 1968, Albanian production of the ore amounted to an estimated 405,000 tons, 59% over the 1960 level. The fifth Five Year Plan schedules a considerable expansion in the exploitation of iron-nickel ore reserves.

All pig iron and most rolled steel is imported. In October 1966 a small rolling mill built with Chinese Communist assistance was put into operation at Elbasan. Albania produces no crude steel and thus must rely on imports of semifinished steel to operate the rolling mill. The only other iron or steel facility in Albania is the iron foundry at the Enver Hoxha General Machine Works in Tiranë, which produces about 5,000 tons of iron castings annually, using domestic scrap and imported pig iron and coke.

The Albanians have ambitious, and perhaps somewhat ridiculous, plans for the steel industry. In line with their policy of becoming economically self-sufficient, they plan to build, with Chinese assistance, their first integrated steel plant at Elbasan. This plant, which is planned to incorporate the present rolling mill, is to process Albanian iron-nickel ore for both iron and nickel. The Albanians plan to replace their exports of iron-nickel ore with exports of rolled steel products from this plant.

The plant is to produce annually 250,000 tons of rolled steel, including sheet products, watermain materials, and oil and gas pipe. Other products of the plant are to be ferronickel and cast iron for foundries. In order to meet the smelting capacity of the combine, the Albanians plan to put into operation mines with a capacity of 500,000 to 700,000 tons of iron-nickel ore a year. They will have to import much or all of the metallurgical coke required for the plant. The need to import coke together with the difficulty of extracting iron from iron-nickel ore as well as the small consumption of iron and steel domestically make the construction of an integrated iron and steel plant in Albania a questionable undertaking. Although the iron-nickel ore has a high iron content, the presence of chromium, nickel, and other minerals reduces its suitability for the production of all but "naturally alloyed" pig iron, which has limited uses. Also, it is likely that the Albanians will have a much harder time finding markets for their iron and steel products than for the iron-nickel ore, especially since the latter has an assured market in Czechoslovakia.

Output of copper ore increased from 14,207 tons in 1950 to 81,477 tons in 1960 and to about 285,000 tons in 1968. Output of blister copper, the unrefined smelter product, changed little during 1956-60 but by 1969 reached an estimated 6,400 tons, or 6.1 times the 1960 output. These increases were largely the result of economic and technical assistance from Communist China. Four new mines were opened, and concentrating and smelting facilities were constructed at Kukës, Rubik, and Reç. Other new construction included a small refinery at Rubik and a copper wire factory in Shkodër. With the opening of these latter two facilities, exports of blister copper dropped from about 3,700 tons in 1965 to about 1,900 tons in 1967, and Albania began to export refined copper and copper wire. In 1966 the Albanians began to export cathode copper.

The Chinese Communists will provide assistance in future plans for the Albanian copper industry. They are to help in the doubling of the capacity of the concentrator in Reç and in the construction of a new concentrator at an unspecified location as well as in the construction of a smelter and refinery at Laç. The latter will produce sulfuric acid and copper sulfate as well as refined copper. Also, the Albanians plan to install at the copper wire plant in Shkodër a new line for the production of plastic insulated cable.

4. Construction materials (U/OU)

With the aid of the Chinese Communists, Albania is becoming self-sufficient in major construction materials. Output of this industry accounted for an estimated 7% of gross industrial production in 1969 as compared with 5% in 1965. During the 1960's, the expansion of the Lenin Cement plant in Vlorë and the construction of cement plants in Tiranë, Elbasan, and Fushë-Krujë permitted the Albanians to increase cement output more than four-fold, as shown in the following tabulation, estimated in thousands of metric tons:

1960 (actual)	73
1965	135
1966	138
1967	220
1968	303
1969	330

The plants in Elbasan and Fushë-Krujë—each with a capacity of 100,000 tons—were built with Chinese assistance. The completion of these plants also made it possible for Albania to begin exports of cement in 1969. In earlier years the country depended heavily on imports of cement, but by 1967 these imports accounted for only 7% of apparent consumption as compared with 35% in 1960 and 28% in 1965. Since 1967, imports have probably declined further as a share of supply. The Chinese are to assist in tripling the capacity of the Fushë-Krujë plant during 1971-75; much of the additional output will doubtless be exported.

Reported production of brick and tile increased rapidly during 1951-60 but declined during 1961-66, as shown in the following tabulation, in millions of units:

	Bricks	Tile
1950	14	4
1955	58	18
1960	130	35
1965	112	28
1966	106	23
1967	139	24
1968	255	33
1969	269	50

Much of the increase recorded through 1960 probably reflects an expansion of statistical reporting to include small local yards. The beginning of operations in three plants resulted in a sharp increase in production during 1968-69 when output of bricks rose about 90% and production of tile increased about 110%. The silicate brick and tile plant in Tiranë and the plant for the manufacture of sandstone pipe and tile in Vlorë were built with Chinese assistance. The Albanians had planned to complete construction of at least one additional brick factory by 1970.

The Albanians plan to produce reinforced concrete and other profiles for construction at the metallurgical combine to be constructed in Elbasan. They hope, thereby, to eliminate the need to import these items.

5. Manufactured goods

Manufacturing consists predominantly of food processing and light industry. Machine building and the production of chemicals have barely begun. Factory production has expanded rapidly during the post-World War II period, although official statistics for some products probably reflect an extension of statistical reporting to include at least a part of local handicrafts. (U/OU)

a. Agricultural processing (U/OU)

Although factory processing of agricultural products has gained some significance, some types of food

processing, such as baking, continue to be performed mainly by hand in small shops and are not fully recorded in official statistics. Output of the food processing industry has grown much more slowly than total industrial production. As a result, the share of the food industry in gross industrial production dropped from 58% in 1950 to 39% in 1965 and to about 28% in 1969.

Tobacco processing is the single most important agricultural processing activity. Of lesser significance are the processing of sugar, fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy products, and fish, and the production of beer and liquors. Cigarettes and tobacco leaf are important exports, but Albania imports about two-fifths (1968) of its supply of sugar, mostly from Cuba. Albania exports small quantities of vegetables, fruits, olives, nuts, preserves, canned fish, brandy, and wine. Output of selected products of the agricultural processing industries is shown in Figure 44.

b. Light industry (U/OU)

Albanian light industry, which accounts for about one-fourth of gross industrial production, fills most of the simple needs of the domestic market and provides some few exports. The more complex manufactured articles are mainly imported. The textiles and clothing industry, the most important of the light industries, produces cotton and woolen fabrics, cotton, yarn, socks, and knitted goods. According to official statistics, the gross value of light industry output increased more than 120% during 1961-69.[6]

Primarily because of the completion of the Mao Tse-tung textile plant in Berat, industrial output of cotton fabrics about doubled between 1961 and 1969, and in the latter year amounted to about 44 million linear meters. Output per capita of cotton fabrics came to about 21 meters, compared with 15 meters during 1961-65. During 1966-67, known net exports of all types of textiles amounted to only 2% of industrial production.

[6]Data on the growth of light industry are for the textile and clothing, footwear and leather, and rubber industries. References to light industry elsewhere in this section include, in addition, such industries as paper, printing, ceramics for household use, and household consumer goods.

The Stalin Textile Combine in Ysberisht, near Tiranë, accounted for an estimated one-half of total textile output in 1969. The Mao Tse-tung Textile Combine, built with Chinese Communist assistance, went into partial operation in October 1966 and was completed in November 1969. In 1969 the Albanians began construction of a new textile plant in Gjirokastër. The Chinese are assisting in the construction of a woolen textile plant in Tiranë.

Albania's only significant rubber goods plant, located in Durrës, produces rubber footwear, conveyor belts, tubes, and tires for carts and bicycles and is equipped to retread motor vehicle tires and to reclaim rubber. All the rubber used in the industry, as well as a number of rubber products, chiefly motor vehicle tires, is imported.

Three paper plants constructed with Chinese assistance have added substantially to Albania's small output of paper and paper products. A plant for the production of cement bags began operation in Shkodër in 1965. The following year, a plant for the production of cardboard and wrapping paper in Lushnje and a plant for the production of writing and printing paper in Kavajë came into operation. These plants permitted a substantial reduction in imports of paper and paper products, which in 1967 amounted to 1,302 tons as compared with 6,956 tons in 1965. The Chinese are to assist in the construction of a new paper plant with an annual capacity of 7,500 tons.

Albania also produces small amounts of porcelain, glass, rope, hemp, and brooms. The Enver Hoxha General Machine Works in Tiranë produces such consumer goods as tableware, pots and pans, irons, and household tools. In 1965 a plant to produce metal utensils started operation in Gjirokastër. The equipment for this plant came from Communist China. The Chinese are assisting in the construction in Durrës of a plastic products plant, which is to produce consumer as well as producer goods and is to use imported material until completion of a polyvinylchloride plant, which is to be built during 1971-75.

FIGURE 44. AGRICULTURAL PROCESSING AND LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (U/OU)

	Unit	1950	1955	1960	1965*	1966*	1967*	1968*	1969*
Sugar (refined)	Thousand metric tons	1	7	13	15	14	18	*na*	*na*
Bread	do	51	79	138	184	191	194	*na*	*na*
Macaroni	do	3	8	8	10	12	13	*na*	*na*
Cheese	do	1	1	2	4	4	5	*na*	*na*
Industrial oils	do	1	1	2	2	3	2	*na*	*na*
Canned vegetables	do	*Insig*	*Insig*	*Insig*	1	2	2	2	*na*
Fresh fish	do	1	3	3	3	4	4	4	*na*
Beer	Thousand hectoliters	21	38	69	105	112	111	122	*na*
Cigarettes	Billion units	1	1	3	4	3	4	*na*	*na*
Cotton textiles	Million linear meters	1	19	25	30	34	37	41	44
Woolen textiles and blankets	do	0	1	1					3
Knitted goods	Million pieces	*Insig*	*Insig*	1	2	2	3	*na*	4
Socks	Million pairs	*Insig*	*Insig*	1	3	3	3	*na*	3

na Data not available.
*Data are based on percentage increases or are estimated.

c. Machinery and equipment (U/OU)

Albania relies on imports for nearly all of its machinery and equipment. Machinery output is limited almost entirely to spare parts and simple machinery. The expansion of existing facilities and the construction of several small plants and machine shops enabled the country to increase the gross output of the machine building and metal processing industry about 480% between 1960 and 1969 and to raise its share in gross industrial production from 4% to an estimated 10%. In 1967, production of spare parts was more than 3½ times the 1960 level. The Albanians claim that they produced over one-half of domestic requirements for spare parts in 1965, and estimates indicate that this share increased to about two-thirds in 1967. Shortages of spare parts still severely hamper the operation of industrial, agricultural, and transport equipment.

Facilities consist of a number of machine shops engaged in maintenance and repair work and in the manufacture of spare parts, agricultural machinery, construction equipment, simple industrial equipment, and radios. Plants in Tiranë account for about two-fifths of the industry's gross output. Among the major machine building facilities are the Enver Hoxha General Machine Works, the Dynamo Engineering Works, the Partizani Plant, and the tractor spare parts plant—all in Tiranë; the precision instruments plant in Korçë; and the agricultural machinery plant in Durrës. The Chinese assisted in the construction of the tractor spare parts plant and the precision instruments plant, which began operation in 1966 and 1969, respectively. Albania has no facilities for producing modern military equipment.

d. Chemicals (C)

Albania is just beginning to make significant use of its indigenous chemical raw materials, which include salt, limestone, petroleum, natural gas, lignite, pyrites, arsenic, and phosphorites. The construction of two fertilizer plants and a caustic soda plant was largely responsible for the recent large increase in gross output of the industry. By 1969, the output of the chemical industry—nearly seven times the 1965 level—accounted for an estimated 4% of gross industrial production, compared with 1% in 1965. The range of products is still small. Besides soda ash, caustic soda, superphosphates, nitrogen fertilizers, and sulfuric acid, the Albanians produce small amounts of such products as calcium carbide, sulfur gas (probably sulfur dioxide), pharmaceuticals, lampblack, oxygen, ethyl alcohol, tanning extract, and glycerin. Albania still relies on imports for most chemicals, including synthetic rubber and potassium fertilizers, and for some chemical raw materials, such as phosphate rock. Albania has long exported tanning extract and claims to have begun recently to export nitrogen fertilizers and soda ash.

Imports of chemical fertilizer averaged 18,000 tons (presumably gross tons) a year during 1961-65, jumped to 30,000 tons in 1966, and to 67,000 tons in 1967. The completion of fertilizer plants at Laç and Fier probably has permitted Albania to sharply reduce or eliminate all but imports of potassium fertilizers. These two plants were built with Chinese credits and technical assistance. The plant at Laç, which went into partial operation in late 1966 and into full operation in 1967, produces superphosphates, sulfuric acid, and pesticides. It uses phosphate rock imported from Morocco and domestic pyrites. The nitrogen fertilizer plant in Fier, which began operation in early 1967 and apparently was completed in early 1968, was to have a capacity of 110,000 tons in gross terms (37,000 tons in terms of pure nutrient) a year. China purchased the equipment for the plant from Italy, and Italian specialists assisted in assembling the machinery at Fier. Albania's first soda ash and caustic soda plant in Vlorë, also constructed with Chinese assistance, began operation in 1967. The Chinese assisted in the construction of a plastics products plant in Durrës, which was completed in 1970.

The Chinese Communists have agreed to assist the Albanians in their ambitious plans for the chemical industry during 1971-75. A new nitrogen fertilizer plant with about the same capacity as the present plant is to be built in Fier. The phosphate plant at Laç is to be expanded. A polyvinylchloride (PVC) plant with an annual capacity of 6,000 tons of PVC and 7,500 tons of caustic soda is to be constructed. The Albanians plan to exploit their own phosphorites instead of relying on imports of phosphate rock and intend to build a factory for concentrating phosphate rock.

6. Construction (U/OU)

According to official claims, the volume of construction in the socialized sector rose at an average annual rate of 15% during 1951-60, at a rate of 9% during 1961-65, and at a rate of about 8% during 1966-69. During 1964-67, 42% of construction funds in the socialized sector were allocated to industry (as compared with 26% during the previous 4 years), 12% to agriculture for drainage and canals, 10% to residential housing, and 36% to transportation and other sectors. Nearly 54% of total investment funds were expended on construction during 1961-67. Judging from the ambitious projects planned for 1971-75, the growth of the volume of construction is to be rapid.

C. Economic institutions and policies

1. Economic institutions (U/OU)

Economic activity in Albania is closely controlled by the government, which implements the policies of the Communist party. The bulk of economic activity is under state control. The socialized sector (made up of the state and cooperative components) includ over 99% of the arable land, nearly all of industrial production, over 92% of retail sales, and all foreign trade, wholesale trade, banking, transportation, and communications.

Albania retains intact the highly centralized Soviet economic system adopted in 1945. National economic plans are drawn up for various periods of time—chiefly 1- and 5-year periods—to attempt to coordinate domestic

economic activity and all foreign economic relations. Goals are defined for national income and its distribution between investment and consumption, total production in the various economic sectors, production of major commodities, employment, productivity, costs, transportation, wages, real income, and the volume of foreign and domestic trade. The prices of most commodities also are prescribed. Money in circulation is taken into account in the plan, which sets forth estimates of the amounts of the population's income that will be absorbed by the purchases of goods and services and by bank savings.

The Council of Ministers, the highest executive body of the government, establishes the national economic plan on the basis of the general economic policy laid down by the party. The State Planning Committee, a permanent agency of the Council of Ministers, drafts the plan on the basis of proposals presented by ministries, state and cooperative organizations, executive committees of the district people's councils, and individual enterprises. The draft plan is presented to the Council of Ministers and to the party leadership for approval. The approved plan is submitted to the People's Assembly for ratification, which is routine. The State Planning Committee coordinates and supervises the implementation of the plan, but other agencies also take part in the supervision.

The basic unit of management is the enterprise, which may consist of one or several plants producing related products, a state or collective farm, or a financial institution, construction company, or trading company. Enterprises are normally expected to cover their current costs from their receipts from sales, although much of their investment is financed from the state budget. State enterprises in mining, metallurgy, and manufacturing are subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Mining. Other economic ministries control agriculture, finance, domestic and foreign trade, construction, and transportation and communications. Local governments are responsible for directing many small-scale state enterprises producing consumer goods, construction materials, and spare parts, and for overseeing cooperative and private enterprises, as well as organizations providing municipal services. The Central Union of Handicraft Cooperatives, which since March 1966 has been subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Mining, is responsible for the numerous artisans' cooperatives.

Concerned over economic difficulties, especially in agriculture, the government decided in 1966 to reduce the size of the central bureaucracy—in the hope of increasing efficiency—and to try to mobilize more popular support among the apathetic workers and peasants by shifting some responsibility for economic decisions to lower levels. The number of ministries—which had been increased in 1965—and intraministerial organizations was reduced. The number of personnel in central and district administrations was cut. Primary responsibility for decisions on about three-fourths of plan indicators and prices was to pass from the Council of Ministers to the individual ministries and district executive committees. Numerous party and professional people were sent from the capital to production units in outlying areas, especially agricultural cooperatives. The regime also stressed the importance of implementing and expanding the already existing apparatus for participation by the people in the management of the economy. Such participation consists primarily of permitting workers and members of cooperatives to make proposals for establishing and implementing production goals. In 1968 the Albanians established workers' control committees to supervise the daily operations of the enterprises. These moves appear to have been influenced in part by the Chinese Communist example.

The announced purpose of the reorganization was to give the people a greater voice in management, but in actuality it has permitted closer supervision of the populace. Among major features of the program were the collectivization of farms in mountainous areas, the sharp reduction in the size of personal plots and the number of livestock held by members of cooperative farms, the reduction of wages of higher paid personnel, and the reduction of bonus payments. Party and state employees, professional people, and members of the military were to work in production—mainly on farms—1 month each year. White-collar workers in industrial and agricultural enterprises were to devote one-third of their time to participation in production.

The Albanians apparently intend to continue the process of streamlining and strengthening the central apparatus while at the same time encouraging greater participation by the people. Thus, in November 1970 the Albanian leaders announced:

> We are in the process of taking measures for the ultimate perfection of the methodology of planning. Generally and basically speaking, the present methodology of planning our people's economy is on the right road, but perfection knows no limits. The measures . . . are aimed at an even more complete application of the mass line in planning the people's economy and in ultimately developing the movement of initiatives by the masses and cadres as spheres of productive creation. . . . The economic and cultural progress of the country will always be attained on the basis of the single state plan. . . . We shall take measures ultimately to perfect also the method and style of our work of state direction of the economy. . . . (Mehmet Shehu, 21 November 1970.)

The Albanians hope that these measures will help to overcome the high degree of inefficiency and waste that now exists in the running of the economy.

2. Economic policy and plans

a. Planning and administration (C)

The major goals of economic policy have been rapid industrialization with emphasis on the extractive industries, self-sufficiency in grain, increasing state control over the economy, and freedom from foreign interference in internal economic affairs. Starting from a low base, the Albanians achieved rapid industrial growth during 1951-60. In an economy such as theirs the

construction of just a few plants can add substantially to the productive capacity. In spite of the break with the U.S.S.R. in 1961 and the consequent delay in construction of projects planned for the third Five Year Plan, a moderate—though greatly reduced—rate of industrial growth was achieved during 1961-65. With the completion of a number of projects, the Albanians were able to achieve a substantial increase in industrial production during 1966-69.

The extractive and electric power industries and, more recently, the chemical industry, have received primary emphasis, but light industry has also been developed rapidly. The Albanians are now trying to develop their chemical raw materials and toward this end have put into operation two chemical fertilizer plants and a caustic soda plant. The pattern of industrial development accords reasonably well with the country's needs. Because of the lack of the necessary resources and know-how to create more than a rudimentary machine building industry, Albania must rely almost completely on imports for capital equipment.

Only slight progress has been made toward the goal of self-sufficiency in grain. In spite of many years of stressing the importance of agriculture, the Albanians have largely neglected increased use of chemical fertilizer, mechanization, irrigation, land reclamation, and advanced techniques. The Albanian leaders have spent much time and effort on exhorting the peasants to greater efforts but appear to have done little to spread the knowledge of modern farming—at best a slow job.

In establishing their 5-year plans, Albanian officials have tended to set unrealistically high goals, especially for agricultural production. The first Five Year Plan (1951-55) was revised downward in 1953, when the regime realized that the original plan targets were overly ambitious and that the investment programs were causing excessive strain. Increases in production were rapid in 1951-55, although they were below the original goals. According to official data, gross industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 22%, compared with a planned rate of 27.7%. Gross agricultural production, originally planned to increase at an average annual rate of 11.3%, actually increased at a rate of only 6.7%. Gross fixed investment in the socialized sector during this period was 181% greater than in 1946-50. During 1951-55 the Albanians accumulated a trade deficit of US$124 million, of which about $110 million was split evenly between the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist countries. In April 1957 the U.S.S.R. canceled the outstanding Albanian debt, in effect making gifts of much of the industrial plant constructed during the first Five Year Plan.

The second Five Year Plan (1956-60) reflected more cautious policies, except for the provision for rapid collectivization of agriculture. Production successes in 1956-57 and additional Soviet economic assistance led to an upward revision of the plan in February 1958. Most of the original targets were fulfilled—the notable exception being that for agricultural production—but the revised targets were, in general, not met. According to official statistics, gross industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 16.7% and gross agricultural production at a rate of only 0.9%. The goal of attaining self-sufficiency in grain and in livestock products was not achieved.

Gross fixed investment during this period was 67% higher than in 1951-55. The original goal of eliminating the foreign trade deficit by 1960 was not realized. The cumulative trade deficit during 1956-60 came to US$177 million, of which $111 million was with the U.S.S.R., $49 million with the Eastern European Communist countries, and $11 million with Communist China.

Cancellation of credits by the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European Communist countries delayed most projects outlined in the third Five Year Plan (1961-65). Nevertheless, the extension of assistance by Communist China together with the use of the industrial capacity completed during 1956-60 allowed the Albanians to achieve moderate rates of growth in industry during 1961-65. Gross industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 6.8%, as compared with the planned rate of 8.7%. Investment dropped sharply in 1962, but began to rise again in 1963 as work on a number of projects was begun with Chinese financial and technical assistance. Thus, the Albanians were able to increase gross fixed investment in the socialized sector 43% during 1961-65 relative to 1956-60, compared with a planned increase of 51%. The failure to fulfill the investment plan resulted from substantial underfulfillment in investment in industry, which increased only an estimated 55% over 1956-60, compared with a planned increase of 85%. Among the projects completed during 1961-65 were a copper smelter, a metal utensils plant, a cement plant, a plant for the production of cement bags, three shoe factories, and several food processing plants. Czechoslovakia provided equipment and technical services for the Friedrick Engels (in Shkopet) and Bistricës I hydroelectric powerplants, which also were completed during the period. Several important projects were not completed by the end of 1965 and had to be carried over to the fourth Five Year Plan.

The plan for agriculture fell far short. The goal of an average annual increase of 11.5% was highly unrealistic, especially as Albania continued to pay too little attention to improving agricultural practices, fertilizer supplies, and worker incentives. Gross agricultural production grew at an average annual rate of 6.4% between 1960—a poor agricultural year—and 1965.

The plans for both imports and exports also fell far short, primarily because Communist China did not furnish enough help to compensate entirely for the withdrawal of credits by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist countries. Both imports and exports increased at average annual rates of 5%. The cumulative deficit on trade—an approximate indication of drawings on credits—amounted to an estimated US$150 million—mostly with Communist China—compared with the planned deficit of $195 million to $220 million.

The fourth Five Year Plan (1966-70) called for a moderate rate of growth in industrial production and for greatly increased attention to the needs of agriculture. Self-sufficiency in grains was again the goal. Unlike most other Communist countries, Albania achieved a considerably more rapid rate of growth during 1966-69 than during 1961-65. The large amount of industrial capacity put into operation permitted the Albanians to achieve a higher growth for industry than planned. According to official Albanian reporting, the 1966-70 goal for industrial production was achieved by 1968. During 1966-70, gross industrial production increased about 83%, as compared with the 50% to 54% increase originally planned. Among the fastest growing branches were the electric power, copper, iron-nickel, chemical, construction materials, and machine building industries.

The goal of self-sufficiency in grains was not achieved, although substantial increases in production were realized. Gross agricultural production in 1966-70 was about 33% greater than during 1961-65. Thus, output fell far short of the 41% to 46% increase called for in the fourth Five Year Plan.

The Albanians overfulfilled their investment plan. In 1966-70 the volumes of investment and construction were about 54% and 42% higher, respectively, than in 1961-65. Among the projects completed during the period were the oil refinery and the thermal powerplant in Fier; the rolling mill in Elbasan; the copper refining plant in Rubik; the copper wire factory in Shkodër; the nitrate fertilizer plant in Fier; the superphosphate plant in Laç; the caustic soda plant in Vlorë; the Mao Tse-tung Textile Combine in Berat; and two cement plants—one in Elbasan and one in Fushë-Krujë. The Chinese assisted in the construction of these and a number of other plants.

Foreign trade grew more rapidly than called for in the fourth Five Year Plan, which stipulated an increase of only 31% in 1966-70 over the level of 1961-65. During 1966-69 alone, average yearly turnover was an estimated 42% higher than in 1961-65. Imports rose about 36% between 1965 and 1969, whereas exports increased about 27%. The Albanians hoped to achieve a 17% increase in exports in 1970. The estimated cumulative deficit of US$190 million incurred during 1966-69 was financed by the Chinese Communists.

The fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) apparently is to be a very ambitious one. The Albanians intended to present it at the Sixth Albanian Workers Party Congress to be held late in 1971. Emphasis is to be placed on working toward self-sufficiency in many branches of industry as well as in agriculture. Albania will still need imports and credits, however, as pointed out by Mehmet Shehu in a speech in September 1970:

> To build socialism by relying on one's own forces does not at all mean to refuse the need for outside aid from real friends. The Chinese People's Republic—our great and faithful ally—the great 800 million Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung have assisted and continue to assist us with great courtesy and with a great internationalist spirit.

Industry will still receive primary attention. The many industrial projects planned indicate that investment will be large and will, as in the past, be heavily concentrated in industry. Special emphasis is to be placed on the domestic processing of Albania's mineral and fuel resources. Albania hopes not only to cut down on many of its needs for imports—such as for finished steel—but also to replace many of its exports of raw materials with exports of semifinished goods.

In 1968, the Chinese granted the Albanians a new credit to be used during 1969-75 in the construction of 30 important industrial projects. Among these are a hydroelectric powerplant on the Drin river; a plant to refine iron-nickel ore and to produce steel and steel manufactures; a copper-enrichment factory; a copper smelter; an oil refinery; a PVC plant; a plant for the manufacture of plastic products; a nitrogen fertilizer plant; and expansion of the phosphate fertilizer plant in Laç, the chrome ore enriching plant being built in Bulqizë, the cement plant in Fushë-Krujë, and the tractor spare parts plant. The Chinese also are to assist in the exploration for and mining of iron-nickel and chrome ores, phosphorite, and coal. In October 1970 the Albanians and Chinese signed trade and payments agreements covering the period 1971-75.

The goals for agriculture also are ambitious and probably highly unrealistic. The Albanians hope through increased yields to double the output of breadgrains and corn and to increase considerably the production of industrial crops and livestock products. Among the measures to be taken are increased use of chemical fertilizer and of high-yield seeds, expansion of the irrigated area, more drainage of swampy land, and increased mechanization. The Chinese have agreed to assist in developing agricultural mechanization.

b. Finance (U/OU)

The financial system is designed to insure state control over the economy. Financial plans are an integral part of the state economic plan. The Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for the financial management of the country, drafts the state budget and controls its execution after adoption. In addition, it has the following powers: jurisdiction over budgets of the local people's councils and of state institutions; financial control over state economic enterprises and institutions; direction and supervision of the activities of the State and Agricultural Banks; and responsibility for the organization of savings and insurance.

The Bank of the Albanian State reviews and checks the execution of the financial plans and exerts broad control over the economy. The bank regulates the financial operations of state and cooperative enterprises by extending credits to nonagricultural enterprises, auditing accounts, and controlling transactions. All financial transactions between enterprises are cleared through the bank. Through the monopoly of note issue, it regulates the volume of currency in circulation in accordance with the cash plan, with the aim of balancing financial flows and maintaining monetary stability. The main elements

in the cash plan are wage and bonus payments by enterprises, payments to farmers, pensions and social insurance payments, and retail sales. In addition, the bank serves as the fiscal agent of the government, provides a repository for state funds, and makes foreign settlements. In 1966, control of the wage fund and of investment expenditures was transferred from the bank, presumably to the State Planning Committee.

In January 1970 the Albanians established an Agricultural Bank with the hope of increasing the role of credit in the development of cooperative agriculture. During 1966-69, the average annual amount of short- and long-term credits granted to cooperative farms was nearly twice as large as during 1961-65.

The Directorate of Savings and State Insurance of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the collection of personal savings for use by the state in financing the economy, for the administration of payments on state loans, and for the handling of insurance other than social insurance. Subordinate to the directorate are the savings agencies, located throughout the country, which handle interest-bearing savings deposits and a number of minor transactions. The value of savings deposits increased at an average annual rate of 11% during 1961-66 but fell 4% in 1967. The state insurance system covers individuals, personal and private property, collective farms, supply and sales cooperatives, and artisan production cooperatives.

The state budget is designed to carry out the government's financial and fiscal policies and reflects in monetary terms the broad goals set forth in the country's economic plan. The budget finances the operations of the government establishment, including defense, welfare, and administrative activities. It is an essential tool in controlling inflationary pressures. As in many non-Communist nations, the budget is designed to redistribute the national income in politically desirable ways through both taxes and expenditures. The budget also provides indirect but effective control of enterprises—for example, through the pattern of taxes, subsidies, and authorization for investment in the various sectors of the economy.

The state obtains the bulk of its income by setting the prices of most goods at levels much higher than costs of production. The revenues that result, which are classified under the heading "revenues from the socialized sector," account for nearly nine-tenths of total budget receipts. A large part of the differences between prices and costs are accounted for by the turnover tax—a differentiated sales tax—which, according to provisional results, provided 43% of total receipts in the state budget in 1967 and came to 50% of the value of retail sales through socialized outlets. The remainder of the difference consists of state enterprise profits, which accounted for about one-fourth of state budget receipts. Other receipts from the socialized sector accounted for about one-fifth of total state budget receipts in 1967. Most of these receipts come from the following sources: profits from imports; profits resulting from discriminatory pricing by trading enterprises between private and state buyers; profits of the cooperative sector; and taxes on cooperatives.

Taxes and fees from the population declined more than one-fourth between 1955 and 1960 and then stagnated through 1966. They dropped by about one-half in 1967—when they accounted for only 1% of total budget receipts—and finally were abolished in November 1969. Social insurance receipts accounted for 4% of total budget receipts in 1967.

About three-fifths of total budget expenditures are allocated to the development of the national economy—mainly the financing of investments and working capital and the covering of financial losses of enterprises. These funds are allocated to industry, socialized agriculture, transportation and communications, trade, and public services. Between 80% and 85% of total investment is channeled through the budget.

Expenditures for social-cultural purposes represent the second largest outlay of the budget, accounting for about one-fourth of total expenditures during 1961-70. Of expenditures under this category in 1967, 40% was spent on education and culture, 23% on health, 17% on social assistance, and 20% on social insurance.

Announced expenditures on defense increased about 124% between 1960 and the 1970 plan, and their share in total budget expenditures averaged about 9% during 1961-70. Expenditures on state administration averaged 2% a year during 1961-70.

3. Factors in economic development (U/OU)

There are many obstacles to economic development in Albania: a very low level of per capita income allowing very small savings; rapid population growth; a small amount of arable land per capita; a market too small to support many industries on an efficient scale; lack of capital, labor skills, and managerial ability; and the prevalence of traditional patterns of peasant life. By restricting the growth of consumption and promoting education and training, the regime has improved the conditions for economic development, but by reducing the death rate—thereby accelerating population growth—it has also complicated the problem.

Assets for economic development include a large reservoir of excess labor in agriculture, climatic conditions permitting the production of a wide variety of crops, good mineral resources, and a large hydroelectric potential. To develop these assets, large foreign investments are required. A large part of the capital, skill, and managerial ability for the industrialization program has come from Soviet bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, and, since 1961, from Communist China. Most of the factories and other facilities have been built by foreign engineers and skilled workers. Since the Soviet withdrawal, China has assumed much of the burden for the Albanian investment program; however, the equipment and technology supplied directly from China tend to be inferior to that available in the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist countries.

Agricultural employment accounts for 60%—as compared with 82% in 1950—of the total estimated

employment of about 911,000. Industry accounts for only about 18% of the total, or about 45% of nonagricultural employment. Nonagricultural employment has more than tripled since 1950, while agricultural employment has increased only about 12%, as is shown by the following data, in thousands of persons as of 1 July:

Year	Total	Agricultural	Nonagricultural sectors
1950	600	492	108
1955	677	507	170
1960	730	513	217
1965	821	545	276
1966	842	553	289
1967	865	548	317
1968	887	549	338
1969	911	551	360

The faster growth of socialized nonagricultural employment (230% between 1950 and 1967) than of total nonagricultural employment (194%) reflects the socialization of handicrafts and other private establishments.

Because of a rapidly growing population, a large reservoir of surplus labor in agriculture, and the small relative size of the nonagricultural sectors, there is an ample supply of unskilled labor to support rapid industrialization. In past years the agricultural labor force has continued to grow, despite a substantial migration of farm labor to urban areas. As mechanization progresses, labor requirements in agriculture should level off or decline, freeing additional labor for industry and related occupations. The growth of nonagricultural employment, however, is limited by the ability of the nonagricultural sectors to absorb new labor, by the cost of training this labor, and by the difficulty of procuring food for an expanding urban population. The measures taken since 1966 to move part of the urban population onto the farms may be primarily designed to relieve the pressure on urban areas.

Rapid industrialization and the installation of more sophisticated machinery are rendering increasingly serious the severe shortage of skilled labor and managerial personnel. For example, although the number of engineers in Albania nearly tripled during 1961-67, the total in 1967 was only 2,770. The Albanian regime is concerned about this and is stressing on-the-job training and more vocational and technical courses.

Gross fixed investment in Albania, although it has fluctuated widely because of the great fluctuations in imports of machinery and equipment, has shown a general upward trend (Figure 45). By 1967, investment was 5½ times that in 1950. Albania must rely heavily on imports for its investment in machinery and equipment. Estimates indicate that these imports constituted between one-fifth and one-fourth of total gross fixed investment in the early 1960's.

Albania's industrial growth has been made possible by a rapid expansion of production facilities. In recent years nearly one-half of the investment has been devoted to industrial development (Figure 46). In the 1960's the



FIGURE 45. Growth and structure of gross fixed investment in the socialized sector (U/OU)

country concentrated its investment efforts on the petroleum, electric power, minerals and metals, chemicals, construction materials, and light industries.

The share of investment in socialized agriculture dropped slightly between 1956-60 and 1961-67. Although investments in agricultural machinery and buildings have had little if any effect on output, gains have been realized through the increased agricultural land made available through reclamation.

Average yearly investments in transportation and communications were 53% higher in 1966-67 than in 1961-65. The transportation system appears to be adequate for the country's present stage of economic development. Albania has about 127 route miles of railroad and relies primarily on trucks—all of which must be imported—for mechanized transportation.

Industrialization has increased requirements for urban housing and for municipal, educational, and health facilities, but despite substantial growth these facilities are still far from adequate. In 1966-67, average yearly investment for social-cultural purposes and housing was 25% greater than in 1961-65.



FIGURE 46. Distribution of gross fixed investment by the state by economic sector (U/OU)

D. Trade

1. Domestic (U/OU)

Domestic trade is relatively less important and less developed in Albania than in the other Eastern European Communist countries, reflecting the fact that the country has the most primitive economy and the lowest level of living in all of Europe. The population is made up primarily of peasants whose consumption consists mainly of goods produced on their own farms or obtained by barter and which therefore do not enter the commercial market. Natural conditions also inhibit the development of trade—terrain is unusually difficult in the mountainous sections, and there are no navigable rivers. The road and railroad network is poorly developed, and there is a shortage of warehouses and other commercial facilities. In 1967 about 13% of the socialized nonagricultural labor force was employed in retail, wholesale, and foreign trade.

Domestic trade is planned and controlled by the state, except in the small free market—where products are sold to the population at uncontrolled prices by farmers, private store owners, and private craftsmen and enterprises. Farmers' markets, where private farmers and members of collective farms sell produce, account for the bulk of sales on the free market. Consumer goods are distributed through the socialized wholesale and retail networks operated by the Ministry of Commerce and by the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives, the latter having been made subordinate to the Ministry of Commerce in March 1966. State stores operate primarily in urban areas, whereas the consumer cooperative network is responsible primarily for trade in rural areas.

The State Procurement Committee, under the supervision of the Council of Ministers, and the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives are responsible for supplying agricultural products for urban consumption and for industrial and export requirements. Quotas are set by the State Procurement Committee. Compulsory delivery quotas apply to collective farms and to private farmers. State farms automatically deliver all of their output to the State Procurement Committee. Each agricultural collective is supposed to sell to the state certain designated quantities of its produce as "surplus" (at prices higher than those established for the basic quotas), in addition to meeting its compulsory delivery quotas. In practice, however, the collectives tend to sell to the state as little as possible of this surplus, preferring to divide it among the members. The peasants still prefer to sell in the small free market, where prices are higher.

At the end of 1969, there were 7,469 retail outlets (including eating and drinking places) under the Ministry of Commerce. Most of the shops are small. In urban areas the majority of the shops are specialized so that customers still have to go to several stores to make their purchases. In rural areas, on the other hand, the majority of the retail outlets are mixed and general stores. Since 1965, private retail outlets have accounted for 20% of total outlets, but for only 7% of sales. The private sector probably has declined considerably since 1965.

Retail sales (in constant prices) in the socialized sector increased at an average annual rate of 8% during 1966-69 as compared with an estimated 5% to 6% during 1956-60. Of total socialized trade in 1964, sales of food accounted for 47%, sales of manufactured consumer goods for 37%, and sales by public eating places for 16%. Sales by peasants accounted for nearly two-thirds of total private trade in 1964, but only 10% of total sales of food (excluding public eating places). This share probably has dropped considerably following the recent measures to collectivize farms in the mountains and to reduce the personal holdings of cooperative members. Because of the decline in the private sector, total retail sales have increased more slowly than sales in socialized trade. During 1961-65, total retail sales (in current prices) increased 18%. Sales in the socialized sector rose 23%, but sales in the private sector declined 19%.

Estimates indicate that during 1956-58 retail prices in the socialized sector rose sharply, primarily as a result of the abolition of rationing for nonfoods in January 1956 and foods in November 1957. Since then the Albanians have reestablished rationing for many food items. Retail prices, especially those of nonfoods, declined slightly during 1959-62 and remained stable during 1963-64 and appear to have declined during 1965-69.

2. Foreign

a. Development of foreign trade (C)

The Albanian economy is heavily dependent on imports both for sustenance and for economic development. During 1966-69, the country relied on imports for about one-seventh of its supply of grain.

Imported machinery and equipment accounted for an estimated one-fifth to one-fourth of investment in the socialized sector in 1964 (the last year for which detailed data are available). Albania also must import most or all of its pig iron, rubber, finished steel, and coke, and much of its chemical fertilizer and sugar.

Albania has imported a good deal more than it can pay for; during 1961-69, exports averaged only three-fifths of imports. That is, the country relies heavily on credits, most of which have not been repaid. As a result of the Soviet-Albanian dispute, Communist China has replaced the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European Communist countries as Albania's source of credits. During 1961-69, Albania incurred an estimated deficit on commodity trade of about US$340 million—about $150 million during 1961-65 and $190 million during 1966-69.

Substantially increased receipts of goods under long-term credits and the growing ability to export resulted in a rapid expansion of trade turnover from 1955 to 1960 after a period that showed little upward trend (Figure 47). Total trade dropped 7% in 1961, however, because the growth in trade with Communist China only partly offset the decline in trade with the U.S.S.R. The prompt Chinese support, however, kept the total drop in imports at only 11% although deliveries from the U.S.S.R. declined by 51%. Trade with Communist China increased again in 1962, but this increase did not compensate for the near cessation of trade with the U.S.S.R. As a result, both imports and exports declined.



NOTE: Data for 1965—69 are estimated.

FIGURE 47. Growth of foreign trade (U/OU)

As the Chinese became more active in the Albanian investment program, trade began to grow again and by 1964 had surpassed the 1960 level. Total trade increased 29% during 1961-65—largely owing to a doubling of trade with Communist China—and 33% during 1966-69—primarily as a result of increases in trade with both China and the Eastern European Communist countries.

The Albanians plan to increase exports about 50% during 1971-75. They hope to raise the level of processing of their major exports—chrome and iron-nickel ores—and to replace a part of imports—steel, spare parts, simple machinery, and phosphate rock—with domestic production. The most ambitious goal involves the construction of a plant to produce finished steel from iron-nickel ore. Thus, the Albanians hope to replace exports of iron-nickel ore with those of rolled steel and nickel. The Albanians no doubt will continue to incur a substantial deficit on trade, especially because of the large requirements for machinery and equipment. In 1968 the Chinese extended a long-term interest-free credit of unknown value, which is to be used primarily to help finance construction of 30 large industrial projects. This credit was incorporated in new economic agreements for unrevealed amounts in October 1970.

b. Organization and control of foreign trade (U/OU)

Foreign trade is controlled by the state through the Ministry of Commerce and its subordinate trade enterprises and organs. There is no direct connection between foreign trade and domestic prices, and the differences are cleared through the state budget, as in the classical Stalinist system. Because of this dual set of prices, the foreign exchange value of the currency unit, the lek, is unrelated to its actual purchasing power within Albania. In commodity trade transactions, US$1 is worth 5 leks. Before the currency exchange of 1965, $1 was worth 50 leks. The internal value of the lek is generally much lower than the foreign exchange value and varies widely among different types of goods and services. The noncommercial exchange rate for the lek is 12.5 leks to $1.

c. Geographic distribution of foreign trade (C)

The U.S.S.R. was Albania's principal trade partner during most of the post-World War II period, generally accounting for one-half or more of its turnover (Figure 48). In 1961, however, the Albanian dispute with the U.S.S.R. brought a drastic shift of trade to Communist China. As recently as 1960, Albanian trade with China did not exceed 7% of total trade. This share increased to 18% in 1961 and averaged an estimated 52% during 1962-69. The value of foreign trade by geographic area is shown in Figure 49.

Although trade with the U.S.S.R. apparently has ceased, exchanges are continuing with the Eastern European Communist countries, which have accounted for a large part of Albanian trade since 1949. After a 12% decrease during 1962-63, Albanian trade with these countries rose 90% during 1964-69. Albania's most



FIGURE 48. Geographic distribution of foreign trade (C)

important Eastern European trade partner is Czechoslovakia, followed by Poland and East Germany.

By 1969, trade with Yugoslavia was six times the 1960 level, and its share in total Albanian trade was nearly 3% as compared with less than 1% in 1960. Both the Albanians and the Yugoslavs are seeking to expand this trade even more.

Albania has been attempting to step up its relations with non-Communist countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Excluding imports financed by Communist China,[7] trade with non-Communist countries in 1969 was more then 3½ times the 1960 level and accounted for about 8% of total Albanian trade. Italy accounted for over two-fifths of Albania's trade with non-Communist countries in 1969. Italy supplied—through the Chinese Communists—the design and equipment for the nitrogen fertilizer plant in Fier, and Italian technicians went to Albania to assist with the construction and installation of the equipment. The United States, which has not had diplomatic relations with Albania since the break in 1939 following the Italian occupation of Albania, accounted for only 1% of Albanian trade with non-Communist countries in 1969.

Although Albanian trade with the non-Communist countries may increase considerably over the next several years, Communist China no doubt will remain Albania's patron and major trading partner. Because of the poor quality of most of its export products, Albania is in no position to finance sizable imports from the developed non-Communist countries. With the completion of some of the plants planned to be built during 1971-75—e.g., the chromium ore enrichment plant and the plant to process iron-nickel ore into rolled steel and nickel—Albania may be able to increase the marketability of its products in the West. However, any substantial increase in imports from non-Communist countries will have to be financed by credits, probably from China.

d. COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN TRADE

(1) *Imports* (*C*)—Albania's most important imports are machinery and equipment, wheat, rolled steel, and chemical fertilizers. Albania depends almost entirely on imports for the machinery, equipment, and structural steel needed in its investment program.

Imports of machinery and equipment have fluctuated greatly, resulting in wide fluctuations in investment. In 1964, the last year for which such data is available, these imports totaled US$49 million and represented 50% of total imports. The worsening of relations and the final break with the U.S.S.R. resulted in a sharp decline in imports of machinery and equipment in 1961-62 (Figure 50). These imports picked up again after 1962 as deliveries from Communist China increasingly replaced those which were to have been supplied by the U.S.S.R. As shown in Figure 45, investment in machinery and equipment—which gives an approximation of the trends in imports of machinery and equipment, allowing for some lag period—declined 52% during 1962-63, rose 315% during 1964-66, and declined 19% in 1967, by which year it was about 70% above the 1960 level. Data on total investment indicate that investment in machinery and equipment increased during 1968-69. Imports of spare parts, which comprised 15% of total imports of machinery and equipment in 1964, rose 40% during 1961-65 and declined 14% during 1966-67.

Imports of fuels, metals, and construction materials accounted for 16% of total imports in 1964. Imports of rolled steel—which in 1967 accounted for an estimated 13% of total imports—increased 10% during 1961-63, dropped 33% in 1964, stagnated in 1965-66, and increased 76% in 1967. Other imports of industrial and construction materials include small quantities of coke, pig iron, and glass.

Imports of foodstuffs, which made up 16% of total imports in 1964, consist primarily of wheat, edible oils and fats, and sugar. Good years of record grain harvests in 1967-69 permitted the Albanians to reduce known annual average imports of wheat to 68,000 metric tons as compared with 124,000 tons during 1961-66.

[7] In this section, Albanian imports from non-Communist countries on Chinese Communist account are considered as imports from China. In 1969 the value of such imports (consisting mainly of machinery and equipment and wheat) amounted to about US$21 million, whereas imports from non-Communist countries, excluding imports financed by China, came to an estimated $13 million.

FIGURE 49. VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA* (C)
(*Millions of U.S. dollars*)

	1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965**	1966**	1967**	1968**	1969**
Turnover	28	56	130	[illegible]	106	119	158	168	173	176	191	223
Communist China***	0	1	9	2	54	65	86	95	93	83	91	115
U.S.S.R.	12	21	70	41	*Insig*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern European Communist countries†	16	32	40	48	42	42	56	55	61	74	74	80
Other Communist countries††	0	*Insig*	1	1	4	4	6	8	8	7	9	10
Non-Communist countries	0	2	5	6	6	8	10	10	11	12	17	18
Imports	22	43	81	72	65	71	98	105	107	109	116	143
Communist China***	0	1	7	20	42	42	62	69	71	63	68	88
U.S.S.R.	8	16	46	22	*Insig*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern European Communist countries	14	25	24	25	17	23	27	26	26	36	36	40
Other Communist countries	0	*Insig*	*Insig*	1	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	5
Non-Communist countries	0	1	4	5	3	5	6	6	6	6	8	10
Exports	6	13	49	49	41	48	60	63	66	67	75	80
Communist China	0	0	2	3	12	23	24	26	22	20	23	27
U.S.S.R.	4	5	24	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern European Communist countries	2	7	21	23	25	20	28	29	35	38	38	40
Other Communist countries	0	*Insig*	1	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	5	5
Non-Communist countries	0	*Insig*	1	1	3	3	4	4	5	5	9	8
Trade balance†††	−16	−30	−33	−24	−24	−23	−38	−42	−41	−43	−41	−63
Communist China	0	−1	−5	−17	−30	−18	−38	−43	−49	−43	−45	−61
U.S.S.R.	−4	−10	−22	−1	*Insig*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern European Communist countries	−11	−17	−3	−2	+8	−3	+1	+3	+9	+2	+2	0
Other Communist countries	0	*Insig*	*Insig*	*Insig*	0	*Insig*	0	0	0	−1	+1	0
Non-Communist countries	0	−1	−4	−4	*Insig*	−1	−2	−2	−1	0	+1	−2

*Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
**Estimated.
***Including imports from non-Communist countries which were financed by Communist China.
†Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
††Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.
†††A minus sign indicates net imports; a plus sign indicates net exports.

Albania must import all of its supply of rubber and part of its supply of chemical fertilizers. The completion of two plants to produce nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers probably resulted in a substantial reduction of imports. Albania still relies, however, on imports of potassium fertilizers and phosphate rock.

Large shares of nearly all products formerly imported from the U.S.S.R. are now coming from Communist China. The Eastern European Communist countries continue to be important suppliers of such items as machinery and equipment, rolled steel, chemicals, and consumer goods. Imports from non-Communist countries consist primarily of machinery and equipment, manufactured goods, and wheat. All of the imports of wheat and a large portion of the imports of machinery and manufactured goods are believed to be financed by Communist China.

(2) *Exports (U/OU)*—Albania's most important exports are chromium and iron-nickel ores, crude oil and refined asphalt, and tobacco and cigarettes. Chromium and iron-nickel ores are produced almost solely for export, and a large part of the domestic production of petroleum, tobacco, and copper is exported in either processed or unprocessed form.

Exports of petroleum, minerals, and metals represented more than one-half of total Albanian exports in 1964. The estimated structure of these exports in 1964 and 1967 is shown in the following tabulation (in percent of total):

	1964	1967
Fuels, minerals, and metals	54	*na
Of which:		
Crude oil	7	4
Refined and natural bitumen	17	19
Chromium ore	20	15
Iron-nickel ore	7	3
Blister copper	3	4

*Since 1964 Albania has exported cathode copper and copper wire. The value of these exports cannot be estimated.

Exports of tobacco, which in 1967 comprised an estimated 12% of total exports, have fluctuated widely with output but have displayed an upward trend since 1950 (Figure 51). In 1967, exports of tobacco were more than 30 times the 1950 level but only 8% over the 1960 level. Other exports of inedible raw materials of animal and vegetable origin include herbs, skins, cotton, wool, and plywood.

Foodstuffs were a major export in 1938 but accounted for only 3% to 5% of total exports during 1950 and 1955-

FIGURE 50. IMPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES

		1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Machinery and equipment	Million U.S. dollars	7.0	18.0	38.0	27.0	18.0	23.0	49.0	*na*	*na*	*na*
Of which:											
Spare parts	....do	1.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	5.0	6.0
Electric motors	Units	33.0	288.0	631.0	[illegible]	[illegible]	356.0	835.0	836.0	665.0	742.0
Tractors	....do	15.0	454.0	505.0	197.0	264	443.0	510.0	664.0	551.0	388.0
Planters and cultivators	....do	0.0	469.0	111.0	151.0	101.0	151.0	172.0	318.0	337.0	211.0
Trucks	....do	243.0	444.0	435.0	434.0	92.0	115.0	328.0	222.0	512.0	627.0
Coke	Thousand metric tons	2.2	4.7	8.3	6.0	18.0	5.5	10.4	17.5	24.1	25.7
Pig iron	....do	0.2	1.2	1.9	2.2	5.0	3.0	2.7	1.8	4.4	4.3
Rolled steel	....do	8.4	16.9	31.3	36.6	52.9	64.9	43.7	43.6	43.7	*77.0
Chemical fertilizers	....do	0.0	11.0	21.0	20.0	26.0	9.0	17.0	18.0	30.0	67.0
Paper and cardboard	....do	2.0	3.4	5.3	6.1	7.0	7.0	6.5	7.0	4.5	1.3
Motor vehicle tires	Thousand units	12.0	15.0	28.0	38.0	33.0	38.0	31.0	28.0	46.0	49.0
Cement	Thousand metric tons	4.0	14.0	40.0	17.0	28.0	42.0	40.0	53.0	22.0	17.0
Wheat	....do	8.0	27.0	177.0	182.0	89.0	110.0	111.0	*145.0	*105.0	*89.0
Corn	....do	0.0	11.0	0.0	28.0	0.0	20.0	22.0	*na*	*na*	*na*
Sugar	....do	3.0	1.0	5.0	10.0	22.0	7.0	11.0	*15.0	*14.0	*0.0
Cotton textiles	Million linear meters	8.2	0.7	1.3	0.3	0.6	*Insig*	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1

na Data not available.
*Estimated.

57. Following the rapid development of the cigarette and food processing industries, exports of foodstuffs (including tobacco products) rose to 14% of total exports in 1958 and to 25% in 1961-64. Cigarettes comprised an estimated 83% of exports in this category in 1964. Other exports include wine, brandy, vegetables, nuts, and jams. Exports of manufactured goods—which include cotton textiles, blankets, and carpets—nearly doubled between 1960 and 1964, when they accounted for 5% of total exports. Exports of cotton textiles, however, declined between 1963 and 1967.

Communist China provides a market for many Albanian goods formerly sent to the U.S.S.R. The major products exported to China are crude oil, asphalt, chromium ore, tobacco, and cigarettes. The Eastern European Communist countries also continue to purchase substantial quantities of these products from Albania. In addition, nearly all Albanian exports of iron-nickel ore go to Czechoslovakia for processing at the Sered Nickel Plant. Exports to non-Communist countries consist primarily of small amounts of fruit and vegetables, cotton, and crude oil.

e. Balance of trade (C)

Albania has had large deficits in its foreign trade for many years. The deficits between 1948 and 1960 were financed almost entirely by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European Communist countries, and since 1960 by Communist China. During 1961-69 exports covered on the average only three-fifths of imports. During 1945-69 the cumulative deficit in Albanian commodity trade totaled about US$700 million, of which some $120 million was canceled by the U.S.S.R. and East Germany in 1957. A deficit of $177 million was incurred during 1956-60 and one of about $340 million during 1961-69.

With the exception of earnings formerly accruing from the lease of Albanian property to Soviet—and perhaps now Chinese—military installations, the import surplus has been balanced almost exclusively by receipts of loans and grants. Albania has only a small merchant fleet, little gold to sell, and little tourism. In fact, the regime—in line with its isolationist policy—has not permitted a significant development of tourism. Remittances from emigrants are believed to be small.

Albania probably records its imports on an f.o.b. basis and thus may have incurred sizable deficits on freight in addition to its deficits on trade. If this is the case, data for indebtedness with individual countries given below represent a minimum.

In April 1957, the Soviet Government canceled debts amounting to US$105.5 million, leaving outstanding Albanian indebtedness on commodity trade with the U.S.S.R. at the time of the Soviet-Albanian break in 1961 at an estimated $65 million. In addition, at the end of 1961 Albania owed an estimated $40 million to Czechoslovakia, $24 million to Poland, $22 million to Romania, $19 million to Hungary, $14 million to Bulgaria, and $12 million to East Germany. In 1957 East Germany had canceled $15 million of the amount owed by Albania through 1955. After 1961 Albania received little or no credit from the Eastern European Communist countries. As a result, during 1962-69, an export surplus of about $20 million was incurred with these countries, thus reducing Albanian's indebtedness to the Eastern European Communist countries from about $130 million to about $110 million.

During 1955-60 Albania incurred a deficit of US$11 million in its trade with Communist China. In support of the third Five Year Plan, China extended at least $125 million in credits and may have extended an additional $100 million. In 1965, China extended a credit—reportedly larger than that extended for the 1961-65 plan—in support of the 1966-70 economic plan. During 1961-69 Albania incurred a deficit on commodity trade of about $340 million with China and probably incurred, in addition, a sizable deficit on invisibles, especially on transportation and on payments for the services of the many Chinese technicians at various plant sites. In 1961 the Chinese and Albanians formed a joint shipping company, but the terms of payment set by the Chinese are not known.

FIGURE 51. EXPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES (U/OU)

		1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Crude petroleum	Thousand metric tons	67.0	124.0	329.0	290.0	273.0	310.0	294.0	284.0	253.0	166.0
Natural and refined bitumen	*do*	65.0	55.0	236.0	197.0	148.0	207.0	252.0	279.0	271.0	360.0
Chromium ore	*do*	21.0	117.0	248.0	234.0	269.0	248.0	311.0	297.0	309.0	323.0
Iron-nickel ore	*do*	0.0	0.0	246.0	417.0	417.0	80.0	462.0	505.0	373.0	392.0
Blister copper	*do*	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.3	3.7	2.2	2.0
Cathode copper	*do*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.8
Plywood	Thousand cubic meters	0.0	1.7	0.9	*Insig*	0.6	2.0	2.3	4.4	3.1	3.1
Sheep and goat wool	Metric tons	701.0	130.0	242.0	250.0	240.0	557.0	307.0	417.0	474.0	253.0
Tobacco leaf	*do*	248.0	1,343.0	6,925.0	2,226.0	0.0	3,905.0	8,035.0	5,341.0	7,325.0	7,513.0
Cigarettes	*do*	47.0	0.0	2,488.0	2,707.0	2,132.0	2,914.0	2,763.0	3,411.0	2,370.0	2,136.0
Fresh fruit and vegetables*	Thousand metric tons	0.3	0.5	2.2	5.4	8.4	4.5	6.5	12.2	17.4	19.9
Cotton textiles	Million linear meters	0.0	0.0	1.5	4.5	1.9	4.9	3.1	1.1	2.1	2.6

*Including grapes and melons.

Transportation and Telecommunications

A. Summary (S)

The simplicity of Albania's transportation and telecommunication (telecom) systems clearly reflects the country's standing as the smallest among Communist nations and least developed among the Balkan states. Moreover, the systems are barely sufficient to meet the limited requirements of a largely agricultural economy.

Most of the important surface transport facilities, over half the operational airfields, the two major ports, and the majority of significant telecom centers are located in the lowlands west of Elbasan and, from north to south, between the Tiranë–Durrës and Vlorë areas. The development, maintenance, and distribution of surface routes elsewhere is conditioned and handicapped by harsh topography inland, where most towns and cities are accessible only by mountain roads of stone, gravel, or earth.

The rail system, which handles most of the freight traffic in the area it serves, occupies a minor position in the national pattern. The road network, although backward by U.S. standards and poorly developed in comparison with other European systems, is the primary means of Albanian transportation. The 1969 freight performance by road and rail was 33.8 million short tons and 592.4 million short-ton-miles, the highways accounting for 91% and 80% of the respective totals. Negligible inland waterway activity is confined primarily to the major lakes bordering Yugoslavia and Greece. The short crude oil pipeline system links the producing fields to three small refineries and to a marine terminal on the coast south of Vlorë.

Nearly all international commerce passes through the major ports (Durrës and Vlorë) because of the inadequacy of overland routes and the political factors restricting their use. The small merchant marine has increased 56% in deadweight tonnage since early 1967, but foreign-flag ships continue to carry most of the country's seaborne foreign trade.

Albania has no civil air flag carrier, but military transports are available for internal airlift use. Since the mid-1960's the additions and improvements to the airfield system have centered on the development of fighter dispersal facilities—largely those in proximity to the Yugoslav and Greek frontiers. Public use of the predominantly open-wire telecom network is subordinate to the needs of government.

Little information is available on detailed plans to improve Albania's transport or telecom facilities. Most improvements and new construction achieved during the fourth Five Year Plan (1966–70) were modest and probably fell short of the goals established. However short, they do represent a betterment of the progress made under earlier plans. Whatever development and expansion is realized under the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75) will be largely the result of continued assistance from Communist China.

B. Railroads (S)

The railroad system, totaling about 127 route miles of standard-gage (4′8½″) track, consists of four short lines; two run inland from the coast, and the other two parallel the coast about 10 miles inland. The two main lines connect the port of Durrës with Tiranë (24 route miles east) and with Elbasan (44 route miles southeast). The third line leaves the Durrës-Tiranë line at Vorë and terminates 18 miles northward at the superphosphate plant in Laç. The fourth line, which opened in October 1968, leaves the Durrës-Elbasan line at Rrogozhinë and ends 34 miles to the south at the petroleum refinery and nitrate fertilizer plant in Fier. Long-range plans call for extending this line south to Vlorë, thus completing a Durrës-Vlorë rail link. Each of the two main lines has a short branch line: a 4.6-mile branch extends from Kashar on the Durrës-Tiranë line to the textile combine at Yzberisht, and a 2.8-mile branch off the Durrës-Elbasan line at Kulej-Papër serves the petroleum refinery at Cërrik. All lines are single track; none are electrified, and there are no international connections. These lines make up the government-owned Albanian State Railways, operated under the Directorate of Railroads. A 19-mile single-track 2′0″ narrow-gage industrial line from the asphalt pits of the Selenicë area to the port of Vlorë has been dismantled.

The Durrës-Tiranë line has a 720-foot tunnel; information indicates that the line has at least eight bridges that are 50 feet or more in length. The two longest are 260 and 180 feet in length. The Durrës-Elbasan line has 31 bridges that are over 50 feet in length; the five tunnels on the line total 7,465 feet. The longest structures are a 460-foot bridge and a 4,200-foot tunnel. The longest of five bridges on the Vorë-Laç line is 400 feet in length. Length information is available on three bridges on the Rrogozhinë-Fier line; they total 1,712 feet, and the longest is 869 feet long.

The Albanian rail lines are primitive by U.S. standards. Maintenance is given secondary consideration in favor of plans for new construction. Problems inherent in construction and maintenance in mountainous terrain

FIGURE 52. Volunteers building a rail line. This 34-mile line from Rrogozhinë to Fier has been completed. (U/OU)

are compounded by shortages of material, equipment, and trained personnel. The Rrogozhinë-Fier line was constructed with the assistance of 65,000 volunteer youth (Figure 52). Maintenance requirements are further aggravated by the inferior quality of the original construction. The two main lines are lightly constructed of secondhand 72- or 78-pound-per-yard rail imported chiefly from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. Crossties of oak and beech are imported from Yugoslavia and are painted but not impregnated with a preservative. The newer lines are believed to have indigenous wooden ties and 87-pound rail imported from Czechoslovakia. Limestone, granite, and gravel ballast is obtained locally. The roadbeds are probably in fair condition. The highest permitted axleload is believed to be 21 short tons.

As the terrain progressively increases in ruggedness farther inland, the extension of the Durrës-Elbasan line eastward to the Pishkash-Prenjas area will encounter more difficult construction requirements. Construction of the Elbasan-Prenjas line, begun in April 1969 by volunteer youth brigades, will include 14 tunnels and five major bridges even though the alignment will follow the river terrain between mountains and along the Shumbin river. This new line will link the nickel-iron mines near Prenjas and Pishkash with a metallurgical complex under construction at Elbasan.

All switches are hand operated, and traffic is regulated by telephone. The Durrës-Tiranë line was reportedly converted to automatic block control late in 1969. Locally available coal and oil are used as fuels, but the coal is lignite of poor grade and the oil has a high sulfur content.

In 1969, 3.0 million short tons of freight moved by rail, and 116.4 million short-ton-miles were produced. Freight traffic is mainly nickel and chrome ore, asphalt, coal, and cement.

Because Albania has no railroad equipment industry, all equipment comes from abroad. The first traction equipment consisted of a group of 2-8-2 steam locomotives from Poland, and about 15 are probably still in operation.

In 1958, dieselization of switching operations was begun with the purchase of two CKD (a Czechoslovak locomotive works) 150-horsepower diesel-mechanical locomotives. In 1959, CKD supplied two more of these units and two 750-horsepower diesel electrics. By the end of 1962 five more 750-horsepower units had been acquired. Between 1965 and 1967, CKD delivered four new slightly heavier 750-horsepower diesel electrics (Figure 53), and the Ganz-Mavag plant in Hungary supplied a 600-horsepower diesel electric. A German diesel-hydraulic locomotive of about 400 horsepower was imported sometime prior to 1967. At least four 1,350-horsepower mainline diesel-electric locomotives were imported from CKD in 1969.

Many of the system's passenger coaches (about 70 cars in January 1970) and freight cars (estimated at 250 units in January 1970) are secondhand units purchased from

FIGURE 53. Diesel-electric locomotive. One of four Czechoslovak-built 750-h.p. units imported between 1965 and 1967. (C)

various East European railroads. In recent years, however, some modern four-axle passenger and freight cars have been imported from Communist China.

The only rolling stock imports from Europe since 1960 seem to be the 13 four-axle ore-carrying hopper cars ordered from Czechoslovakia in 1963 and the 26 freight cars delivered by Yugoslavia in December 1969. The Yugoslav delivery was a partial shipment of a July 1969 order for 39 freight cars; the majority of the order was for hopper cars, and the balance was for two-axle boxcars. In September 1970 an order was placed with Yugoslavia for 20 tank cars to be used for hauling asphalt. The tank cars were expected to be delivered sometime during 1971.

New repair shops for locomotives and rolling stock were opened at Durrës in October 1966. The railroad formerly depended on Soviet advisers for technical aid on operations and construction; however, to remove this dependency, training courses for native personnel have been conducted by various Albanian transportation authorities since 1955.

C. Highways (S)

Although it is inadequate, Albania's most important mode of surface transportation is its highway system, which consists of about 3,100 miles of roads. The system has about 300 miles of bituminous-surfaced roads, 1,200 miles of gravel- or crushed stone-surfaced roads, and 1,600 miles of earth-formed roads, some of which have received some type of improvement.

Development of the network is hindered by the topography, which is extremely mountainous and has many torrential streams and numerous valleys; these conditions govern the pattern and restrict the distribution of the roads. The network has two main north-south routes, one paralleling the Adriatic coast and the second paralleling the eastern border. These two routes are connected by east-west routes that traverse the mountainous regions. The important cities and towns are served by the network, as are the mines, factories, mills, and other industries. The greatest concentration of roads is in western-central Albania. Several roads provide international connections with Greece and Yugoslavia.

The two-lane roads (Figure 54) have surface widths ranging from 18 to 26 feet; those with only one lane have a surface width ranging from 9 to 17 feet. Highway base courses generally are of crushed stone, gravel, or a combination of the two materials. Shoulders, when present, have widths ranging from 2.5 to 6 feet and are of gravel, sand, or earth. The radius of curvature on the main roads through flat or undulating regions is rarely less than 150 feet, but in hilly or mountainous regions, the radius may be 80 to 40 feet. On minor mountain roads the radius may be as little as 23 feet. Some main roads have grades up to 13%, and minor mountain roads occasionally have grades up to 20%.

Most of the principal bridges are of reinforced concrete or stonemasonry, but there are many steel, timber, and concrete structures. Existing timber and war-damaged bridges are slowly being replaced with reinforced-concrete deck-arch or deck-girder structures. The older bridges are stonemasonry arch structures. The gross load capacities of the bridges are estimated to range from 15 to 26 short tons. The minimum vertical clearance of the through-type structures is generally about 14 feet, and road widths range from 10 to 21 feet. The only tunnel on the network is unlined and is 600 feet long, 16 feet wide, and has a 15-foot vertical clearance. The network does not have ferries, snowsheds, or galleries. Fords are uncommon, and those that do exist are probably unpaved.

Construction and maintenance of highways and bridges is the responsibility of the Directorate of Highways and Bridges under the Ministry of Communications. Under the jurisdiction of the directorate are a number of government construction companies, which are located in the principal cities. Much of the labor force is composed of voluntary brigades of students and other citizens (Figure 55).

Weather damage to road surfaces and bridges necessitates constant maintenance. Work is seriously impeded by the rugged terrain, the lack of mechanical equipment and skilled personnel, and a critical shortage of processed materials, especially cement. Under the fourth Five Year Plan (1966-70) 140 miles of new highways were to have been opened. Recent information indicates that a number of new forest roads have been completed as part of a reforestation program.



FIGURE 54. Gravel-surfaced two-lane road. This mountain road is typical of much of the highway network. (U/OU)

Restrictions to highway traffic include narrow and low-capacity bridges, sharp turns at approaches to bridges, and numerous steep grades and sharp curves. Adverse weather conditions render many roads impassable or extremely difficult to use for varying periods of time. Heavy snows and rains, landslides, rockfalls, fog, and spring floods are common traffic interruption factors. Offroad movement is virtually impossible along many of the highways because of the terrain, heavy vegetation, or unstable soils. In rural areas traffic is frequently impeded by farm animals or slow-moving animal-drawn carts.

Albania has no private transport firms or facilities. All motor pools, parks, garages, and repair facilities are nationalized. Bus and truck services operate under the direction of the State Motor Vehicle Transportation Enterprise and are organized into motor pools. Transport operations are implemented from motor vehicle parks, which are located in the main cities and towns. Each

FIGURE 55. Road-building brigade. Student volunteer workers compensate for shortages in highway construction equipment. (U/OU)

motor pool has a designated zone in which it operates. Regulations specify routes, areas to be served, speed limits, and vehicle maintenance programs. Nationalized industries maintain their own truck fleet and transport facilities.

Truck transport of freight should increase considerably during the fifth Five Year Plan (1971-75); an increase is also expected in passenger transport. Under regional economic development programs it is planned to connect many of the small towns and villages not served by highways. In 1969, highway transport carried 30.8 million short tons of freight and produced 476 million short-ton-miles. Chrome and iron-nickel ores, crude oil and petroleum products, tobacco and tobacco products are the major commodities carried. The roads bearing the most traffic are along the coastal plain and in the main valleys leading from it. There is little vehicular traffic in the southern part of the country.

Motor vehicles of all types must be imported. The Eastern European Communist countries, North Korea, and China have replaced the U.S.S.R. as principal suppliers. As of January 1969 an estimated 12,000 motor vehicles were registered in Albania (3,000 passenger cars, 7,000 trucks, and 2,000 buses). No information is available on registered motorcycles. Animals and animal-drawn carts are widely used, especially in rural areas.

D. Inland waterways (C)

The navigable inland waterways of Albania consist of the Buenë river and Lakes Scutari, Ohrid, and Prespa. The four waterways—all forming parts of the Albanian border—are of local importance only and have little or no significance to the national surface transportation system. Traffic statistics are not available, but the waterways are known to be used primarily for short-haul passenger movements. Cargo shipping is negligible. Craft operating on the waterways are generally 50- to 150-ton vessels having drafts of 5 feet or less.

The Buenë, in the extreme northwest, is the natural outlet of Lake Scutari to the sea. The river flows 27 miles from the lake to the Adriatic Sea, forming the Albania-Yugoslavia border over the lower 13.5 miles. The Buenë can accommodate 350-ton vessels for 19 miles upriver to Obot and 50-ton craft beyond.

Lakes Scutari, Ohrid, and Prespa—all deepwater bodies subject to significant seasonal variations—provide a combined surface area of about 390 square miles, of which an estimated 120 are Albanian waters. Most of the small vessels plying the lakes are fishing craft and passenger launches drawing 4 to 6 feet. Most scheduled cargo and passenger services are performed between lake ports on the Yugoslavia portions, but international services exist—including a passenger connection on Lake Ohrid between Pogradec, Albania, and Ohrid, Yugoslavia.

A highway bridge spanning the upper Buenë near its outfall from Lake Scutari is the only structure on the waterways. Crude landing facilities exist at Obot and various lake sites, but none are developed as mechanized ports.

Information is not available as to the extent of governmental control over waterway operations. The waterways are not maintained, and it is unlikely that there are plans for future development.

E. Ports (S)

Albania's two major ports (Durrës and Vlorë), two minor ports (Sarandë and Shëngjin), and several insignificant minor landings are fairly well distributed along the Adriatic coastline. The northern two-thirds of the coast is generally low and bordered by a narrow beach, interrupted at intervals by deltas, cliffs, or hills. The southern third is straight, rugged, precipitous, and for the most part fronted by deep water. All the ports are fairly well protected, either artificially or naturally.

Durrës (Figure 56), the leading commercial port, is also becoming more and more significant as an industrial center. Most Albanian foreign trade moves through this port. Vlorë, situated in the finest and largest natural harbor in Albania, is primarily of naval importance, having two naval bases along with its small commercial



FIGURE 56. Port of Durrës. View is northeastward across artificial harbor. (U/OU)

port. Both major ports are adequate for normal shipping needs but have only a limited amount of alongside berthing space for ocean-type vessels.

Cargo is occasionally lightered from oceangoing ships to Shëngjin and Sarandë, which can accommodate only small coastal craft. The ports serve surrounding agricultural districts.

Port affairs are handled by harbormasters who are officials of the Office of Harbors, a branch of the Ministry of Communications. Naval installations are under the jurisdiction of the Naval Directorate of the Ministry of People's Defense.

Selected details of the major ports are given in Figure 57.

F. Merchant marine (C)

The Albanian merchant marine has eight dry cargo and three bulk cargo ships of 1,000 gross register tons (g.r.t.) and over; they total 53,806 g.r.t. and 72,753 deadweight tons (d.w.t.). The oldest ship was built in West Germany in 1951; the newest, in Poland in 1970. Five of the ships were built in Poland, three in Italy, and one each in Bulgaria, East Germany, and West Germany. Speeds range from 10 to 18 knots; six are diesel powered and five are oil-burning steamships. Two ships have heavy-lift capability. The *Internacional* has a 50-ton boom; the *Tirana*, a 60-ton boom.

The merchant marine also has five coastal dry cargo ships under 1,000 g.r.t. each; they total 2,778 g.r.t. and 3,956 d.w.t. All are diesel powered; four have speeds of 9.5 knots, and one has a speed of 11 knots. Two were built in East Germany in 1956, two in Italy in 1957, and the fifth in Italy in 1960.

In addition to the 16 major units, some 25 motorized wooden sailing schooners, aggregating about 3,000 d.w.t., also ply the coastal waters.

The state-owned merchant fleet is headquartered at Durrës and operates under the general direction of the Ministry of Communications. Six of the ships under Albanian registry—the *Durresi* (4,957 d.w.t.), *Internacional* (11,769 d.w.t.), *Skenderbeg* (3,025 d.w.t.), *Vampo* (12,304 d.w.t.), *Vlora* (12,446 d.w.t.), and *Tirana* (12,259 d.w.t.)—are operated by the Chinese-Albanian Joint-Stock Shipping Co. (CHALSHIP), which was established in December 1961.

About 450 officers and ratings, including some citizens of Communist China, are employed as crew members aboard oceangoing ships of the merchant fleet. All crew members of the *Internacional* and *Vampo* are Chinese.

The Albanian economy relies heavily on sea transport, and most seaborne foreign trade is transported in foreign-flag ships. Until the break of relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1961, most seaborne trade was carried in Soviet ships. Since then, most has been transported in ships of Yugoslav, Greek, Somalian, Liberian, Panamanian, and Italian registry. In 1969, Albania negotiated 62 voyage charters—33 to Communist and 29 to non-Communist ports.

No information is available on the volume of goods transported by the Albanian merchant fleet in recent years. However, in 1969 the fleet provided nonscheduled service on 14 routes, making 182 calls at 29 ports on the Adriatic, Mediterranean, Black, and Baltic Seas, and to Communist China and North Vietnam.

Despite the rigid alignment with Communist China, it appears that Albania is attempting to broaden its trade

FIGURE 57. MAJOR PORTS (S)

NAME; LOCATION; ESTIMATED MILITARY PORT CAPACITY*	ACTIVITIES	HARBOR	BERTHS
Durrës..... 41°19'N., 19°26'E. 4,650	Port for Tiranë. Seat of administrative district; a major commercial center. Significant military center; site of small naval base for patrol craft and minesweepers. Terminus of rail lines to interior; good road connections. Receipts—heavy machinery, manufactured articles, coal, grain, refined petroleum. Shipments—agricultural products, asphalt, and iron-nickel, chromium, and copper ores. Further deepening of harbor and entrance planned.	Combination of roadstead and artificially protected harbor. Roadstead area, in middle and N. parts of bay, has general depths of 15 to 36 ft. Artificial harbor is $^2/_3$ mile long, $^1/_3$ mile wide; water area, about 185 acres; general depths range from 6 to 26 ft.	Alongside—For 5 standard and 3 small ocean-type cargo vessels, 2 standard and 1 small coaster-type cargo vessels, 3 lighters, 1 standard coaster-type tanker. Anchorage—Partially protected for large numbers of ocean-type and coaster-type cargo vessels in roadstead.
Vlorë..... 40°27'N., 19°30'E. 2,250	Principal naval port with bases for submarines and surface craft. Limited commercial facilities for handling petroleum and other cargo. Seat of administrative district, industrial center, military center. Receipts—manufactured goods, construction equipment. Shipments—asphalt and crude and partly refined petroleum products. No major development projects underway or planned; minor improvements being made to naval port areas. Naval ships up through medium submarines can be repaired; largest drydocking facility is floating dock 295 ft. long; marine railway and repair yard for small naval and commercial craft.	Natural, consisting of well-protected bay with small artificial breakwater-protected harbor on E. side of Ishulli i Sazanit island just NW. of bay entrance. Bay extends 9 miles SSE., averages about 5 miles in width, has general depths of 70 to 170 ft. 13-acre breakwater-protected harbor on Ishulli i Sazanit has depths of 6 to 17 ft. Approach to bay entrance is deep.	Alongside—For 2 small ocean-type cargo vessels, 2 small coaster-type cargo vessels, 4 submarines, 6 minesweepers, 10 motor torpedo boats. Offshore pipelines—1 large and 1 small ocean-type tanker. Fixed-mooring—2 berths customarily used by small naval craft. Anchorage—Fairly well sheltered for all-sized vessels in bay.

*The estimated military port capacity is the maximum amount of general cargo—expressed in long tons—that can be unloaded onto the wharves and cleared from the wharf aprons during a period of one 24-hour day (20 effective cargo-working hours). The estimate is based on the static cargo-transfer facilities of the port existing at the time the estimate is prepared and is designed for comparison rather than for operational purposes; it cannot be projected beyond a single day by straight multiplication.

links with the European countries. This development might provide the stimulus for limited expansion of the merchant marine

G. Civil air (S)

Albania has no civil air carrier. Domestic air transportation activity is limited to the operation of an estimated three CRATE (Il-14) aircraft, which are subordinate to the military and utilized for VIP flights and other official government or military purposes. There has been speculation that internal civilian air services linking Tiranë to Shkodër, Dibrë, Vlorë, and Korçë might be established, possibly using single-engine aircraft supplied by Communist China. However, these services have never materialized, and there is no indication that they are presently under construction. It is unlikely that a national air carrier will be established in the near future, because of Albania's small size and low economic potential.

Internationally, Albania has entered into aviation agreements with several Communist and two non-Communist countries. Among Communist countries, Albania has arrangements with the U.S.S.R., Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Information as to the terms of these arrangements is not available, but they evidently provide for the operation of air services into Albania. The extent of the services has been governed largely by the political climate of the time. After Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union in 1948, those services that overflew Yugoslavia to Albania were sharply restricted. As tensions relaxed, the services resumed, only to be drastically curtailed again in 1961 when Albanian-U.S.S.R. relations were severed. At that time Soviet air services into Tiranë were discontinued, and the flights of other Communist air carriers were substantially reduced. Fearing complete air isolation, Albania entered into an agreement with Italy which provided for the establishment of regularly scheduled services between Rome and Tiranë by the Italian carrier Alitalia. Service was instituted in April 1962. The only other non-Communist carrier serving Albania is Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), which began services in April 1970. An agreement with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines was reported in May 1962, but regular services

were never initiated. It is believed that Albania also has air agreements of some type with France and Austria, but, again, services by the flag carriers of those countries have never developed. Negotiations with Bulgaria in 1964 were broken off by Albania because the parties were unable to agree on satisfactory financial arrangements.

International air services into Albania include a weekly East German Interflug flight, East Berlin-Budapest-Tiranë and return, and a weekly round-trip flight by the Hungarian carrier MALEV over the Budapest-Belgrade-Tiranë route. Both MALEV and Interflug use Coot (Il-18) aircraft on these routes. Alitalia's weekly flight from Rome via Bari to Tiranë and return is made by a Fokker F-27. PIA uses a Boeing 707 on its weekly Dacca-Karachi-Cairo-Tiranë-Paris-London flight. The return trip begins 4 days later and uses a Boeing 720B out of London. Connections are easily made from Dacca to PIA flights serving Shanghai and Canton. This first regularly scheduled air link between Communist China and Albania is being subsidized by Peking. It is possible that, as its fleet of long-range jetliners continues to grow, the Communist Chinese carrier CAAC eventually will establish a direct Peking-Tiranë route.

The national carriers of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia once provided scheduled services from their capitals to Tiranë, but these routes have been discontinued. Present commercial flights into Albania carry very few passengers, and, occasionally, no passengers. Since little or no material advantage may be expected from most of the services now in operation, it seems likely that political and other considerations are determining factors in their existence.

H. Airfields[8] (S)

The Albanian air facilities system consists of 10 operational airfields; runway lengths range from 4,000 to 11,000 feet. Nine of the airfields are military; the other is jointly military and civil. Four airfields have concrete runways, and at six the runways are of improved graded earth. One airfield is capable of supporting jet medium bombers on a sustained basis, another can accommodate jet light bombers, and each of the 10 airfields can support regular jet fighter operations, assuming the use of mobile support equipment in some instances.

Both the military and joint use airfields are controlled by the Albanian Air Force. Various foreign airline companies share with the air force the use of Tirane/Rinas, which serves as the international airport. The limited domestic airlift requirements are met by light military transports from Tirane.

The airfield network is keyed to the two permanent jet fighter bases, Tirane/Rinas and Berat/Stalin, both located near the center of the country. The bulk of the remaining air facilities serve as jet fighter dispersal airfields and are as well distributed throughout the country as terrain will permit. Most are adjacent to the Greek and Yugoslav frontiers or fronting the Adriatic Sea. The two fighter bases are fairly well maintained, as are Tirane and Vlore. The dispersal airfields are less well maintained and in some cases are almost totally dependent on mobile support equipment for aircraft maintenance, navigational and landing aids, and ancillary services.

Since 1965 significant improvements have been made to the Albanian air facilities system. The concrete runway at Berat/Stalin was extended to 8,200 feet, making the base suitable for aircraft more advanced than the Fresco presently assigned there; maintenance and support facilities also were expanded. Two new dispersal airfields, Elbasan/Cerrik and Korce Northwest, were constructed with graded earth runways of 9,700 and 10,700 feet, respectively; and the graded earth runways at Kukes and Shkoder/Shtoj I Ri were lengthened from 3,900 to 6,600 feet and from 5,400 to 7,600 feet, respectively.

In 1969 and 1970 active and passive defenses at Berat/Stalin and Tirane/Rinas have been greatly improved. Many new, improved aircraft revetments have been erected at each base, antiaircraft artillery coverage has been expanded, and new taxiways leading to dispersed hardened hangarettes have been constructed.

Little change in the airfield network is anticipated over the next few years. It is possible that some aircraft revetments may be constructed at selected dispersal facilities, as may some improved support buildings and fixed navigational aids. The disperal airfields, however, probably will remain dependent on mobile landing aids for the near future.

Details of the 10 operational airfields are summarized in Figure 58.

I. Telecommunications (S)

Telecommunications in Albania (Figure 59) are the least developed of any Eastern European Communist country. All facilities are owned by the government and operated by the Director of Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone, a department of the Ministry of Communications. The modest government requirements are satisfactorily met for the most part, but service available to the general public is limited. The greatest concentration of domestic and international facilities is at the capital city of Tiranë. Secondary centers are at Berat, Durrës, Elbasan, Gjirokastër, Korçë, Kukës, Shkodër, and Vlorë.

Most domestic and international telephone and telegraph traffic is carried over open-wire lines, which are supplemented by high-frequency radiocommunication stations. Albania has a few automatic telephone exchanges, but most exchanges are manually operated. Semiautomatic dial service is available between Tiranë and Korçë. Most telegraph equipment also is manually operated; teleprinters serve Tiranë, Durrës, Korçë, and Shkodër. It is estimated that Albania has 13,000

[8]Detailed information on individual Albanian airfields is contained in Volume 15, *Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

FIGURE 58. SELECTED AIRFIELDS (S)

NAME AND LOCATION	LONGEST RUNWAY: SURFACE; DIMENSIONS; ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL	LARGEST AIRCRAFT NORMALLY SUPPORTED	REMARKS
	Feet		
Berat/Stalin 40°46′N., 19°54′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 220 120	MiG–17 (FRESCO)	Air force. Major day-fighter base. Could support jet light bombers.
Elbasan/Cerrik 41°03′N., 20°00′E.	Graded earth 9,700 x 340 350	*do*	Air force. Probable fighter dispersal airfield for Berat/Stalin.
Gjirokaster 40°05′N., 20°09′E.	Graded earth 4,600 x 170 665	*do*	*Do.*
Korce Northwest 40°39′N., 20°45′E.	Graded earth 10,700 x 310 2,800	*do*	*Do.*
Kukes 42°02′N., 20°25′E.	Graded earth 6,600 x 150 1,150	MiG–19 (FARMER)	Air force. Probable fighter dispersal airfield for Tirane/Rinas.
Mifol 40°37′N., 19°26′E.	Graded earth 11,000 x 300 35	FRESCO	Air force. Probable fighter dispersal airfield for Berat/Stalin.
Shkoder/Shtoj I Ri 42°07′N., 19°32′E.	Graded earth 7,600 x 300 100	FARMER	Air force. Probable fighter dispersal airfield for Tirane/Rinas.
Tirane 41°20′N., 19°48′E.	Concrete 4,000 x 270 300	Il–14 (CRATE)	Air force. Small military light transport unit; CRATE, Li–2 (CAB). Serves domestic civil airlift needs.
Tirane/Rinas 41°25′N., 19°43′E.	Concrete 9,200 x 200 100	Il–18 (COOT)	Air force, civil. Major all-weather fighter base; FARMER, FRESCO. International airport. Could support jet medium bombers.
Vlore 40°29′N., 19°29′E.	Concrete 4,200 x 220 10	FRESCO	Air force. Fighter training base; Yak–18 (MAX), UMiG–15 (MIDGET), FRESCO.

NOTE—Data on equivalent single-wheel loading; the capacity of an airfield runway to sustain the weight of any multiple-wheel landing-gear aircraft in terms of the single-wheel equivalent, is not available.

telephones, the majority of which are used by government offices. Public telephone booths are located in most post office buildings, and telephone services gradually are being extended to remote highland villages. A submarine cable extends from the mainland near Vlorë to nearby Ishulli i Sazanit.

A small network of low- and medium-frequency AM radiobroadcast stations carries the programs originating in the Tiranë studio. Network coverage reaches about 50% of the country and is further extended by a well-distributed wired broadcast network. Programs transmitted by *Radio Tiranë* are rebroadcast via 75 distribution centers throughout the country. Wired broadcast is a primary propaganda facility of the government, and an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 wired loudspeakers are installed in homes, factories, and public places. In 1970 there were about 161,000 radio receivers in the country. Television is still operated on an experimental basis from a station in Tiranë. The construction of a new TV center was expected to be completed by the end of 1970; however, it is not known whether this was accomplished. Of the 2,100 TV receivers in the capital area, most were owned by government and party officials.

The international radiocommunication station at Tiranë provides direct radiotelephone or radiotelegraph circuits to about 10 foreign countries. Low-capacity landlines extending into Yugoslavia provide telephone connections with other capitals.

The Army General Headquarters in Tiranë communicates with subordinate installations in Durrës, Elbasan, Gjirokastër, Shkodër, and Vlorë via a military landline net and radiocommunication circuits. Coastal or maritime radiocommunication stations are located at Durrës, Himarë, Shëngjin, and Shkodër, and a small aeronautical radiocommunication net connects Tiranë with Berat, Durrës, Gjirokastër, and Shëngjin.

The Albanian telecommunication industry consists only of three small plants in the Tiranë area and one at Durrës—all have extremely limited capabilities to assemble simple types of radio and telephone equipment. Most of the equipment in use, including that held by the army, is of Soviet origin; more recent additions have come from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Communist China.



FIGURE 59. Principal telecom facilities (S)

Military Factors

A. Military geography

1. Location and description (U/OU)

Albania is a small country extending predominantly north-south along the southeast shores of the Adriatic Sea (Summary Map, Figure 79). The topography ranges from flat to rolling plains in the western coastal region to diverse mountain ranges in the remainder of the country. Deciduous scrub and broadleaf deciduous forests are widespread. Cultivated vegetation, intermingled with pasturelands, is found mainly on the coastal plains and in scattered intermontane basins. Numerous rivers rise in the highlands and drain generally westward. From Albania direct land access is possible into Greece, a NATO nation, and into Communist Yugoslavia. The few airfields of Albania are within 1,500 nautical miles of most of the industrial complexes of Europe and most of the important oil-producing centers of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, and are within 1,000 nautical miles of the Suez Canal and important cities of northern Africa.

Albania has an area of about 11,100 square miles and is similar in size and shape to Vermont. Maximum dimensions are about 210 miles[9] north-south and 90 miles east-west. The perimeter of Albania is about 700 miles, of which about 445 miles are land boundaries (Figure 69). The total population is about 2.15 million.

a. Topography

Albania is predominantly a country of hills and mountains; the plains areas, which cover less than 20% of the country, are near the coast in the west. The hill and mountain region includes scattered intermontane basins and comprises more than 80% of the country. The pattern of settlement consists mainly of small villages and towns in valleys and basins. Natural vegetation is mostly scrub or deciduous forest. The terrain is highly dissected, and elevations, which vary widely, are mostly between 500 and 7,000 feet above sea level. The maximum elevation of 9,068 is in the northeast. Numerous streams flow generally westward from the highlands and, although subject to great seasonal variation, most streams are perennial.

The plains areas are mostly cultivated and flat to rolling. Hills with elevations generally less than 500 feet above sea level are scattered on the plains. Most of the population, the large cities, and the sparse network of roads and railroads are located on the plains.

[9]Distances are in statute miles unless nautical miles are specifically indicated.

b. Climate

Albania has a Mediterranean-type climate with warm to hot, fairly clear, rather dry summers (June, July, August) and cool to cold, cloudy, wet winters (December, January, February). Most of the cloudy, rainy weather is a result of frequent frontal passages. These migratory frontal systems are rare in summer, quite prevalent during autumn and spring, and at a maximum in winter. Spring and autumn are transitional periods.

Below approximately the 3,000-foot level, mean daily temperatures in summer often rise to the 70's, 80's, and sometimes into the low 90's (°F.) during the day and fall to the 50's and 60's at night (Figure 60). In winter the mean daily temperatures are in the 40's and 50's during the warmest part of the day and fall to the 20's and 30's at night. Temperatures are generally cooler all year at higher elevations. On the average, relative humidity is lowest, 30% to 60%, on July and August afternoons and highest, 75% to 95%, in early mornings during late autumn and winter. Near-drought conditions prevail in summer when rainfall usually averages less than 2 inches per month and occurs mostly as brief showers. Precipitation is generally plentiful in autumn through spring when frontal passages are most frequent. However, mean amounts vary from a few inches per month at many locations to over 15 inches per month on some exposed mountain slopes. Snow has occurred throughout Albania, but it is most frequent in the mountains. As a rule, skies are clear or only partly cloudy in summer, when cumulus clouds predominate. Cloudiness is fairly extensive during the remainder of the year, when stratiform clouds predominate. Maximum cloudiness of about 50% to 80% occurs in November through May, when frontal systems are most active. Thunderstorms may occur in any month, but the frequency is low. Visibility is usually good but may be occasionally restricted to less than 6 miles by dust in summer and by rain, snow, or fog in winter. Surface winds near the coast are mainly from the east and southeast in winter and from the northwest in summer; wind directions are highly variable over the rugged terrain of the interior. Wind speeds are seldom stronger than 16 knots. The strongest winds occur along the coast, in high passes, and on exposed mountain ridges and peaks.

2. Military geographic regions (C)

Differences in terrain are the basis for dividing the country into two military geographic regions—the Western Lowland and the Albanian Highlands (Figure 61). The combination of environmental conditions



FIGURE 60. Precipitation, humidity, thunderstorms, cloudiness, temperatures (U/OU)



FIGURE 61. Military geographic regions and terrain (C)

FIGURE 62. Coastal plain and hills in the Tiranë-Durrës strategic area. The topography is moderately suited for large-scale military operations. (U/OU)

within each region would have a relatively uniform effect on military operations, but there would be marked differences between the two regions.

a. Western Lowland

This region, moderately populated, is predominantly a cultivated, low-lying coastal area drained by several rivers and containing small groupings of hills (Figure 62). Slopes are under 2% in nearly half of the plains area, and differences in elevation between interstream areas and valley bottoms are less than 50 feet. Where the plains are dissected near the hills and mountains, interstream areas are generally 50 to 500 feet above adjacent valley bottoms and slopes are mostly 2% to 10%. The scattered, dissected hills in the coastal areas have slopes from 10% to more than 30%, and differences in elevation between the rounded crests and adjacent valley bottoms are generally 500 to 1,000 feet. The largest rivers, the Buenë, Drin, Mat, Shkumbin, Seman, and Vijosë, are mostly more than 250 feet wide and more than 3.5 feet deep year-round. The high-water period for all of Albania is from late October to early June; the low-water period is from early July to early October.

In most of the country there is a sparse pattern of culture features, and there is no area where the pattern is dense. Areas with a moderate distribution of culture features are located in parts of the coastal plains and in intermontane basins around Korçë and Gjirokastër. Included within these scattered areas are the largest cities and most of the small towns in the country, many of the surfaced highways, nearly all of the railroads, most of the cultivated areas, and numerous small rural settlements. Typical of both the cities and towns are large, open central squares, closely built-up sections with narrow, crooked streets, and new sections with streets two or more lanes wide paved with asphalt or stone blocks. Most buildings are one or two stories high and are constructed of masonry or stone and brick; stucco facing and tile roofs are common. Public and industrial buildings and apartment houses are usually four or five stories high. Tiranë has 183,000 inhabitants, and five towns have populations between 44,000 and 59,000. These urban centers are linked by bituminous- or gravel-surfaced roads, but only three towns, Tiranë, Durrës, and Elbasan, are connected by railroads. The highway network does not permit bypassing of urban areas.

Conditions are moderately suited for large-scale conventional ground operations. Cross-country movement would be fair from early June to mid-October, but during the remainder of the year conditions are mostly unfavorable because of miry soils or flooded streams. Improved roads afford access to the larger towns, although extensive maintenance would be required to sustain prolonged use by military traffic. Conditions are generally good for offroad dispersal. In areas of rolling plain and scattered hill groups, surface irregularities provide some concealment from ground observation and some cover from flat-trajectory fire. In the nearly flat plains, however, conditions for concealment and cover are poor. In cities and villages, concealment and cover, as well as billeting and storage, could be obtained in the better constructed buildings. In constructing new roads, little grading and clearing would be required, but alignments would be restricted in places by scattered, dissected hills. Natural foundations are commonly poor, and soils are miry from mid-October to early June. Flooding is sometimes extensive but of short duration. Construction materials, including sand, gravel, rock, and water, are available throughout the region, and only short hauls would be needed to transport these materials to potential construction sites. Bunker-type installations could be easily constructed in many parts of the region, but tunnel-type installations would be limited to a few scattered sites in hills.

The Western Lowland is moderately suited for airmobile and airborne operations. There are numerous sites suitable for parachute drops and landing of helicopters; however, potential sites for the landing of assault-type aircraft are limited. Air approaches to potential sites are clear from the west, but they would be restricted by high hills and mountains from all other

directions. The construction of large airfields would be fairly easy in much of the region, although drainage problems would be encountered in places.

The coast of Albania is generally unsuited for large-scale amphibious landings because of restricted and encumbered sea approaches, rocky shores, numerous obstructions to cross-country movement, and a sparse network of roads. The most suitable area for landing operations is along the central part of the coastal plain between Kep i Palit and Kep i Lagit. The offshore approaches are generally clear but flanked by a shoal. The nearshore approaches are partly obstructed by wrecks and shoals. The nearshore bottom slope is nearly flat, gradient 1 in 120. Bottom materials are mud and sand. The tidal range is 1 foot or less, and surf 4 feet or higher is infrequent. There are two beaches in the area, 1½ and 4½ miles in length. Each beach is composed of fine sand, which is firm when wet and soft when dry. Exits from the beaches are by tracks and trails to nearby surfaced roads and a railroad.

Operations by irregular forces would be severely restricted by the open, nearly level terrain and moderately dense population. Movement would be easy except during the wet period from mid-October to early June when the ground is soft and miry. Concealment from air and ground observation and cover from small-arms fire are poor. Food and water are available in the cultivated areas. Shelter is available primarily in the populated areas. Supply by air would be relatively easy in the nearly flat to rolling terrain. Supply by sea could be accomplished only at selected beaches.

b. Albanian Highlands

This sparsely populated region consists of north-south trending mountain ranges separated by many narrow, deep, steep-sided valleys (Figure 63), discontinuous but large areas of hills, and some scattered intermontane basins. Elevations in the mountains are generally over 3,000 feet, and many crests are from 5,000 to 7,000 feet. The maximum elevation is 9,068 feet, near the border in the northeast. Differences in elevation between valley bottoms and adjacent ridges are generally 2,000 to 4,000 feet, and slopes range from 30% to more than 45%. In hilly areas, differences in elevation between the valley bottoms and adjacent ridges are mostly 500 to 1,200 feet, and most slopes are from 20% to 30%. The hills and mountains are drained by numerous streams which flow mostly through deep, steep-sided valleys. The streams are generally less than 250 feet wide at mean high water and less than 3.5 feet deep at mean low water. Freezing is uncommon. The hills and mountains are mostly scrub- or forest-covered (Figure 64), and the large valleys or basins are cultivated. Karst areas, characterized by rough surfaces, are widely scattered.

Conditions are generally unfavorable for large-scale operations by conventional military ground forces. Cross-country movement would be confined to foot troops for the most part and would be precluded in many places. The few roads are mainly of earth, have sinuous alignments and steep grades, and would be very difficult

FIGURE 63. Steep, rugged mountains in southern Albania. This type of terrain is unfavorable for conventional ground operations by military forces. (C)

FIGURE 64. The Mat river valley in northern Albania. Cross-country movement in many parts of Albania is restricted to valley bottoms because of steep slopes. (U/OU)

for large military vehicles to negotiate. There are few places suitable for offroad dispersal. Troops operating in the region would be provided moderate cover from flat-trajectory fire and concealment from ground observation by numerous surface irregularities. Scattered forests and brush would also provide concealment. Excellent concealment from air observation would be provided by

deciduous forests, most common in the northern and central parts of the region, when in leaf from mid-April through September. The construction of new roads would be very difficult and would require extensive blasting, filling, cutting, and bridging. There are numerous sites suitable for constructing tunnel-type installations, although access could be difficult. Conditions are not generally suited for bunkers, but there are small areas with many good sites south of Lake Ohrid and Lake Prespa.

The ruggedness of the terrain makes the region unfavorable for airmobile and airborne operations. Although there are several large basins suitable for airdrops and for landing assault-type aircraft on unprepared terrain, approaches would be difficult because of the surrounding high terrain. The topography is generally unsuited for airfield construction; scattered alluvial plains could be used for constructing some small airfields, and a small area near Korçë would be suitable for large airfields. The Albanian Highlands region generally is not suited for amphibious operations. The small length of coast within this military geographic region is mostly rocky and backed by hills and mountains a short distance inland. Conditions are generally favorable for operations by irregular forces. The rugged surfaces and forests provide concealment from air observation and cover from flat-trajectory fire. The sparse population is concentrated mainly in villages and towns in the basins and valleys. Food is available mostly in the cultivated basins and hills. Potable water is available only from swift-flowing mountain streams; elsewhere it is contaminated and must be treated before use. Supplies would be available only at storage depots in populated areas. Supply by air would be limited to isolated basins, with restricted approaches.

3. Strategic areas (C)

The selected strategic areas, Tiranë-Durrës and Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit (Figure 65), contain the most important governmental, military, commercial, and industrial establishments in Albania. Loss of these areas would severely restrict the already small military potential of the country. Korçë and Shkodër, though not of sufficient importance to be strategic areas, would have some military significance as staging areas for movement into Greece and Yugoslavia, respectively.

a. Tiranë-Durrës

This strategic area (Figure 66) contains Tiranë, the national capital, and Durrës, the most important Albanian port. Tiranë is also the largest city (population 183,000 in 1970), the chief commercial center, the most important industrial center (accounting for about 50% of the total industrial output), the most significant military installations, and the country's principal telecommunication facilities. Durrës is the second largest city (population 59,000 in 1970). Although this strategic area contains the leading industrial centers of Albania, the plants are small and produce goods mainly for local consumption. Durrës has the only railroad repair facilities in the country, and Tiranë has the only pharmaceutical plant. The best transportation facilities in Albania consist of a single-track standard-gage (4'8 ½") railroad and two bituminous-surfaced roads between Durrës and Tiranë. Two important airfields are in this area; the one 6 miles northwest of Tiranë is the largest and most important in the country.

b. Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit

This strategic area (Figure 67) includes the coastal area around Gji i Vlorës and Ishulli i Sazanit. Ishulli i Sazanit is a base for Albanian patrol craft and an excellent location from which to patrol the Strait of Otranto, the gateway to the Adriatic Sea. A submarine base is located at the head of Gji i Vlorës. Vlorë (estimated population 56,000 in 1970) is the second most significant port in Albania and an important road junction. Its most important function is the export of asphalt and petroleum; crude and refined petroleum storage facilities are available for more than 250,000 barrels. Uj të Ftohtë is the terminus of a crude petroleum pipeline which originates near Stalin, about 35 miles northeast, and is joined at Fier by a secondary line from the Patos oilfield. A cement plant at Vlorë is the largest in the country, but most industrial installations in this strategic area are of minor significance and produce goods mainly for local consumption. There is a military airfield northwest of Vlorë.

c. Other significant urban areas

Although of less significance than the two strategic areas, the following urban areas are important as industrial, transportation, or military centers:

Name	Importance
Shkodër..... 42°05'N., 19°30'E.	Fourth largest city (population 53,000 in 1970), chief commercial and agricultural center of northern Albania, important road junction and significant military site. Barracks provide billeting facilities for 6,000 to 7,000 troops. A cold storage plant, unlocated, is reported to have a capacity of between 1,000 and 2,000 tons. Ammunition depots of unknown capacity are associated with military installations in the Shkodër area.
Korçë..... 40°37'N., 20°46'E.	Fifth largest city (population 49,000 in 1970). Center of fertile agricultural region and important highway junction in southeastern Albania. Site of the country's largest leather tannery. A main brown-coal mining area a few miles south of town. Light industrial storage facilities.
Elbasan..... 41°06'N., 20°05'E.	Sixth largest city (population 44,000 in 1970). Largest producer of lumber products. Cërrik, about 8 miles southwest, is the site of the largest Albanian oil refinery, with an annual crude throughput capacity of about 2,250,000 barrels. Major crude and refined petroleum storage facilities. Barracks available for about 3,900 men. Linked by road and railroad to Durrës, the major port, and to Tiranë, the capital.



FIGURE 65. Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches (C)



FIGURE 66. Tiranë-Durrës strategic area (C)



FIGURE 67. Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit strategic area (C)

4. Internal routes (C)

The selected internal routes shown on Figure 65 are the easiest avenues of movement between the land approaches and the strategic areas, between amphibious landing areas and the strategic areas, and between strategic areas. Detailed information on the selected routes is shown in Figure 68.

5. Approaches

The perimeter of Albania consists of 255 miles of coastline and 445 miles of land boundaries (Figure 69). Albania claims jurisdiction for 12 nautical miles seaward. (U/OU)

a. LAND (C)

Conditions for movement across the borders range from fair to unsuited. Roads are one or two lanes wide, gravel-surfaced, or two-lane, bituminous. There are no railroad approach routes. Offroad dispersal and cross-country movement are generally restricted because of rugged terrain and are unsuited in winter because of miry soils. Detailed information is contained in the table, Figure 71.

b. SEA (C)

The sea approaches to Albania are via the Ionian Sea, the Strait of Otranto, and the Adriatic Sea. The Strait of Otranto, connecting the Ionian and Adriatic Seas, is about 40 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point. Offshore approaches are clear except for Ishulli i Sazanit, which partly obstructs the approaches to Gji i Vlorës, and a number of islands, islets, shoals, and rocks along the southern part of the coast. The nearshore approaches to the coastal plain of northern and central Albania are encumbered in most places by shoals, shifting bars, and scattered rocks and wrecks. The approaches to Ishulli i Sazanit are clear except for boulders along the eastern coast. Tidal ranges are 1 foot or less along the coast and are considered negligible.

The coastal plain of northern and central Albania extends as much as 35 miles inland and is divided into two nearly equal parts by a range of hills which terminates near the coast south of Durrës. Shores of sand, silt, and some gravel border the plain. The coastal plain is crisscrossed by numerous canals and ditches and is largely under cultivation. Many rivers traverse the plain, ending at the coast in a series of deltas. Marshes, lagoons, lakes, and ponds are common along this stretch of coast. Southward of the plain to the Albania-Greece border, the coast is dominated by mountains and foothills enclosing scattered, isolated lowlands. Ishulli i Sazanit has the same rugged terrain as the mainland south of the plain. The shores along this mountainous stretch are predominantly rocky, with cliffs up to 400 feet high; however, there are short stretches of low-lying shore, consisting mostly of sand and gravel, many of which are in scattered coves and bays.

The amphibious landing areas shown on Figure 65 provide access to the strategic areas. The stretch of coast best suited for large-scale amphibious landings extends along the central part of the coastal plain on the northeastern side of Gji i Durrësit. The second best stretch of coast for large-scale landings is in the southern part along the east side and head of Gji i Vlorës. These two stretches contain four major beaches with a total usable length of 13¾ miles. The beach materials are fine sand, sand, and sand and gravel, which are firm to soft when wet and mostly soft when dry. Beach widths range from 0 to 60 yards at high water to 5 to 80 yards at low water. The northernmost beach, along Gji i Durrësit, is 4½ miles long (Figure 72). Offshore approaches are generally clear but flanked by a shoal. The nearshore approach is partly obstructed by a shoal and by wrecks and is flanked to the northwest by breakwaters. Nearshore bottom slopes are mild, and bottom material is mud grading to fine sand near shore. The beaches along the Gji i Vlorës are 4 miles, 1 mile, and 4¼ miles long. The offshore approaches are

FIGURE 68. INTERNAL ROUTES (C)

ROUTE AND TERRAIN	ROAD	RAILROAD	OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT (CCM)
From Yugoslavia border near Titograd, Yugoslavia, to Tiranë-Durrës strategic area. Predominantly cultivated, flat to rolling plains with scattered hills. Streams commonly deeply entrenched and steep-banked; scattered marshes and swamps. Drainage and irrigation ditches common.	Two-lane, gravel-surfaced to Shkodër, remainder of route bituminous-surfaced; both surfaces in good condition. Restrictions include short sections of steep grades, sharp curves, and a narrow (10-foot) bridge.	Single track, 4′8½″ gage railroad from Laç to strategic area. Bridge 400 feet long over the Ishm river between Laç and Vorë.	Movement restricted because of steep-banked streams, irrigation ditches, and wet areas; unsuited mid-October to early June because of miry soils and swollen streams.
From Yugoslavia border near Bar, Yugoslavia, to route connecting Albania border near Titograd, Yugoslavia, and Tiranë-Durrës strategic area. Cultivated, flat to rolling plains with scattered hills. Streams commonly deeply entrenched and steep-banked; scattered marshes and swamps. Drainage and irrigation ditches common.	One-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition. Restrictions include short sections of steep grades, sharp curves, and a narrow (11-foot) bridge.	No railroad.....	Movement restricted because of steep-banked streams, irrigation ditches, and wet areas; unsuited mid-October to early June because of miry soils and swollen streams.
From Yugoslavia border near Prizren, Yugoslavia, to route connecting Albania border near Titograd, Yugoslavia, and Tiranë-Durrës strategic area. Route from border to Kukës across cultivated, flat to rolling plains. Remainder of route crosses forested mountains and steep hills, narrow valleys and basins.	Two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition. Restrictions include steep grades and sharp, dangerous curves in the mountains; narrow (11-foot) bridge.	....*do*.....	Movement restricted from border to Kukës because of ravines, gullies, and steep-banked streams; unsuited mid-October to early June because of miry soils and swollen streams. Unsuited in the mountains and hills because of steep slopes and narrow valleys.
From Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit strategic area to Tiranë-Durrës strategic area. Predominantly cultivated, flat to rolling plains with scattered hills. Streams commonly deeply entrenched and steep-banked; scattered marshes and swamps. Drainage and irrigation ditches common.	Two-lane, bituminous-surfaced, in good condition. Restrictions consist of narrow bridges 10 to 15 feet wide.	Single track, 4′8½″ gage railroad from Fier to Durrës. Bridge 870 feet long over the Shkumbin river southwest of Rrogozhinë.	Movement restricted because of steep-banked streams, irrigation ditches, and wet areas; unsuited mid-October to early June because of miry soils and swollen streams.
From Yugoslavia border near Struga, Yugoslavia, to route connecting Volorë-Ishulli i Sazanit and Tiranë-Durrës strategic areas. Forested mountains and steep hills with narrow valleys and karst areas; cultivated, flat to rolling plains with scattered hills near Rrogozhinë.	One-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition from border to junction with main road west of Lin; remainder of route westward to Rrogozhinë two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in good condition. Restrictions include mountain pass Qaf' e Thanës which is reported to be closed in winter, several sharp curves, and narrow (11-foot) bridges.	Single-track, 4′8½″ gage railroad from Elbasan to Rrogozhinë. Twenty-three bridges and three tunnels on this route. The longest rail bridge is less than 500 feet long and 18 of the bridges are less than 100 feet in length. Destruction of the rail tunnels would not disrupt traffic for long periods of time. An extension of the rail line is underway from Elbasan eastward to Prenjas; completion date is not known.	Movement unsuited east of Elbasan because of steep slopes and narrow valleys; movement restricted on plains to the west because of ravines, gullies, steep-banked streams, and seasonally wet areas.
From Greece border near Kótas, Greece, to route connecting Yugoslavia border near Struga, Yugoslavia, and the route between the Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit and Tiranë-Durrës strategic areas.	One-lane, gravel-surfaced, in good condition to Korçë. Two-lane, bituminous-surfaced, in good condition to Maliq. Two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition for remainder of route. Restrictions include short sections of steep grades, sharp curves, roadway sections as narrow as 10 feet, six reverse curves, and narrow (10-foot) bridges.	No railroad.....	Movement restricted in the plains because of ravines, gullies, steep-banked streams, and seasonally wet areas. Unsuited in the mountains and hills because of steep slopes and narrow valleys.

FIGURE 68. INTERNAL ROUTES (C) (*Continued*)

ROUTE AND TERRAIN	ROAD	RAILROAD	OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT (CCM)
From Greece border near Kalpáki, Greece, to Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit strategic area. Mostly cultivated plains and hills dissected by ravines and gullies; steep-banked streams. Mountainous area south of Tepelenë.	Two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in good condition to Gjirokastër. Two-lane, bituminous-surfaced, in good condition from Gjirokastër to Tepelenë. From Tepelenë, one-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition to Vlorë-Ishulli i Sazanit strategic area. Restrictions include steep grades, hairpin turns, and narrow (10-foot) bridges.	No railroad.....	Movement severely restricted in the plains and hills by numerous steep slopes and seasonally wet areas. Movement unsuited in the mountains because of steep slopes and narrow valleys.

FIGURE 69. BOUNDARIES (C)

BOUNDARY	LENGTH	STATUS	TERRAIN
	Miles		
Yugoslavia	290	Demarcated, undisputed. Light fortifications.	Plains and hills, and Lake Scutari in the northwest; cultivated or marsh vegetation. Mostly high hills and mountains in the north and east, Lake Ohrid (Figure 70) and Lake Prespa in the southeast. Vegetation mostly deciduous forest and scrub.
Greece	155	Demarcated but in dispute; antitank obstacles, pillboxes, and mined areas common.	Mostly high hills and mountains, some lakes in the north. Vegetation mostly deciduous scrub; some deciduous forest and evergreen forest and scrub. Cultivated crops in some river valleys.
Adriatic Coastline (including Ishulli i Sazanit).	255	Claimed territorial limit 12 nautical miles; coastal defenses along the coast.	Narrow beaches backed by sand dunes, small lakes and marshes, and partly cultivated plains; som tretches of rocky cliffs in south.



FIGURE 70. View southeast across Lake Ohrid to Yugoslavia (C)

partly obstructed by Ishulli i Sazanit and are restricted to the bay, which is reportedly mined. The nearshore approaches are clear for the beach at the northern end of the bay, but the two southern beaches are flanked by rocky coasts, naval facilities, and scattered rocks. Nearshore bottom slopes are mild to steep, and bottom materials are mud grading to sand near shore or sand.

For all four beaches, the tidal range is 1 foot or less. Surf 4 feet or higher is expected a maximum of 5% of the time from January through March and less frequently in other months. Beaches are immediately backed by narrow zones of discontinuous low dunes or level, partly cultivated terrain. These narrow strips are in turn backed by rugged hills and by partly cultivated plains flanked and backed by steep, wooded hills and mountains. Behind the northern beach, tracks and trails lead to a bituminous-surfaced coastal road which extends to Durrës and Kavajë. Two bituminous-surfaced roads lead inland through mountain passes to Tiranë, and railroads extend inland and along the coast. Behind the southern beaches, tracks, trails, and natural-, gravel-, and bituminous-surfaced coastal roads lead to the road network extending inland and along the coast.

c. AIR (U/OU)

There are four air approaches[10]: northern, eastern, southern, and western. The northern approach is entirely over land, mainly across mountainous terrain. In southern Yugoslavia, a maximum elevation of 8,274 feet is about 40 nautical miles from the Albania border. In southeastern Yugoslavia, an elevation of 8,865 feet is about 10 nautical miles from the border. In Romania, an elevation of 8,280 feet is about 200 nautical miles from Albania. The eastern approach is mostly across mountainous terrain and partly over the Aegean Sea. In Bulgaria, an elevation of 9,594 feet is about 130 nautical miles from Albania. The southern approach is mostly across mountainous terrain and partly over the Mediterranean and Ionian Seas. The maximum elevation in Greece is 9,550 feet, about 70 nautical miles from the border. The western approach is mostly over the Adriatic Sea, the Strait of Otranto, and the Ionian Sea, but partly over mountainous terrain in Italy. The maximum elevation in southern Italy is 7,438 feet, about 140 nautical miles from Albania.

Weather conditions over all air approaches are generally most favorable for air operations from early June through September, and least favorable in November through February. Cloudiness is at a minimum from June through September, when clear skies are fairly common. Most cloudiness during this period is cumulus, averaging 50% or less with the cloudiest conditions occurring over the land areas. During November through February widespread stratiform cloudiness is common and generally averages 50% to

[10]Discussion zones for air approaches extend approximately 200 nautical miles beyond the borders of Albania.

FIGURE 71. LAND APPROACHES (C)

APPROACHES AND TERRAIN	ROAD	OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT (CCM)
From Bar, Yugoslavia, to Albania border. Scrub-covered mountains and hills, karst areas; moderately dissected plains near the border.	Two-lane, mainly bituminous-surfaced, in good condition, changing to one-lane, gravel-surfaced, within about 5 miles of border. Winding road with many sharp curves.	Movement generally unsuited because of steep slopes, narrow valleys, and rough karst topography. Restricted near the border because of steep-banked streams and wet areas; unsuited during wet period, mid-October to early June, because of miry soils and swollen streams.
From Titograd, Yugoslavia, to Albania border. Nearly flat to rolling plains, mostly cultivated; one small area of hills near the border.	One- to two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair to good condition. Bridge 310 feet long over stream 4 miles southeast of Titograd.	Movement generally unrestricted; unsuited during wet period, mid-October to early June, because of miry soils and swollen streams. Unsuited near border because of rough terrain.
From Prizren, Yugoslavia, to Albania border. Moderately dissected plains and low hills, mostly cultivated.	One-lane winding road, gravel-surfaced, in poor to fair condition.	Movement restricted by gullies, ravines, steep-banked streams, and seasonally wet areas.
From Struga, Yugoslavia, to Albania border. Mostly scrub-covered, flat to rolling plains near Struga, and dissected mountains and hills near the border.	Two-lane, gravel-surfaced, in fair condition; sharp curves and steep grades.	Movement generally unrestricted near Struga; unsuited during wet periods, early December to mid-April, because of miry or flooded grounds. Unsuited near the border because of steep slopes, narrow valleys, and deeply entrenched streams.
From Kótas, Greece, to Albania border. Scrub-covered, dissected hills and mountains with steep slopes and narrow valleys.	Narrow, two-lane (16- to 24-foot), crushed-stone surface, in poor condition. One short stretch with 13-foot surfacing.	Movement unsuited because of steep slopes and narrow valleys in rugged highlands.
From Kalpáki, Greece, to Albania border. Mostly forested mountains and hills.	One- to two-lane (14- to 20-foot) gravel or crushed-stone surface, in poor condition. Portions of road destroyed and blocked by tank traps near border. Other restrictions include sharp curves and steep grades.	Movement generally severely restricted or unsuited because of steep slopes and steep-banked streams.

FIGURE 72. Amphibious landing area southeast of Durrës. This stretch of coast is the most suitable part of the Albanian coastal zone for amphibious landing operations. (C)

80%. Migratory lows and associated frontal systems occur an average of four to seven times per month in winter, decreasing to about one per month in summer. Thunderstorms occur throughout the year over all approaches, but the frequency is generally low. The northern approach experiences a maximum in thunderstorm activity during May through August, when thunderstorms occur on 8 days or less per month. The southern approach experiences thunderstorms on 3 days or less per month during the entire year. Over all approaches, turbulence may be encountered in towering cumulus clouds, frontal zones, and at low levels over rugged terrain. Clear-air turbulence, mostly between 30,000 and 45,000 feet, can occur over any approach but is most frequent over the southern approach. The mean height of the freezing level varies from the surface in the north to near 7,000 feet in the south in winter, and from about 12,000 feet in the north to near 15,000 feet in the south in summer. Although icing can occur any time of the year in towering cumulus clouds, conditions are most favorable for icing during November through February in frontal zones. Winds aloft are variable at lower levels and

are predominantly westerly above 10,000 feet. Mean windspeeds generally increase with height to a maximum of 50 to 60 knots between 30,000 and 40,000 feet over the southern approach. Winds are usually strongest in winter at all levels.

B. Strategic mobility (S)

The government owned and operated transportation and telecom systems cannot sustain large-scale or significant military operations. The two major ports could be adapted to military use but have only a limited amount of alongside berthing space for ocean-type vessels. The 11-ship merchant fleet could provide only very limited logistic or troop-lift support to any military operation, being able to transport about 61,000 tons of cargo. An additional 3,300 tons could be transported by the five coastal cargo ships under 1,000 g.r.t. Two of the merchant ships have heavy-lift capabilities. Albania has no civil air carrier, and domestic service is provided by military aircraft. The air facilities system, which is adequate for military requirements, consists of 10 operational airfields, nine military and one joint military-civil.

C. Armed forces

1. Defense establishment (S)

The Albanian military establishment is an integrated force of ground, naval, and air and air defense elements. The total personnel strength is about 35,000 men, making it the smallest military force in the Eastern European Communist states. Moreover, by comparison it is poorly trained and equipped.

The ground forces have about 30,000 men, organized into seven brigades plus support units, to accomplish the mission of territorial defense. These are predominantly infantry forces with relatively little artillery and armor. They are incapable of launching a successful attack against neighboring countries or of withstanding any significant sustained attack. They have a high potential for guerrilla fighting, however, and are capable of waging determined resistance on a small-unit basis from mountain strongholds.

The navy is a small, compact force consisting of 3,000 men and having four submarines, eight minesweepers, 60 coastal patrol ships, nine river-roadstead patrol type, a few auxiliaries, and a number of service craft. Naval forces are primarily defensive; their mission is to provide for the military security of coastal waters, to prevent smuggling, and to intercept unauthorized entries and exits. The navy is currently equal to its mission of providing for the defense and security of the Albanian coastline under ordinary circumstances. Because of Albania's geographic position, however, the navy could be expected to survive for only a brief period during any conflict involving the coastal area.

The missions of the air and air defense forces are to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy attack by aircraft or cruise missiles after they are airborne, and to provide close air support to the ground forces and probably for the naval forces as well. Personnel strength comprises 2,000 men in the air force and 4,500 in the surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and air control and warning radar units (the 4,500 men are included in the 30,000 ground forces total). Unit strength is two fighter regiments, one SA-2 GUIDELINE regiment of three firing battalions (total 18 launchers), two antiaircraft artillery regiments plus two battalions, and 13 air control and warning radar units. The ability of the air and air defense forces to perform their missions is limited by inadequate amounts of equipment and low standards of training.

In addition to the armed forces there are two militarized security forces—the frontier troops and the interior troops—with strengths of 7,500 and 5,000, respectively. Under control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, these forces are organized, trained, and equipped along military lines. Recruited and supplied by the Ministry of People's Defense, they would be readily available for support of the military forces in time of war. They would be particularly effective in rear area security, traffic control, protection of lines of communication, and other specialized duties.

In March 1966 the Albanian People's Assembly adopted a resolution for immediate reintroduction of the political commissars in all units of the armed forces and the paramilitary forces and issued a decree abolishing the rank system, effective 1 May 1966. These measures are probably a result of Chinese Communist influence. Their effect upon the military establishment and the paramilitary forces is not yet evident.

Prior to the 1961 rift in Albanian-Soviet relations, Albania was an ally of value to the U.S.S.R. for strategic as well as for propaganda reasons. Strategic considerations included Albania's position as the only Warsaw Pact country with ports on the Adriatic and free access to the Mediterranean Sea, its close proximity to the NATO countries of Greece and Italy and to Communist Yugoslavia, and its potential as an advanced site for submarine, air, and missile bases. These factors largely retain their validity; however, the availability of Albanian facilities for future use by Soviet and Eastern European Communist forces is an unknown factor, probably dependent upon the political situation at the time of need.

a. HISTORICAL

Albania, the smallest of the Balkan states, has been subjected to successive wars, invasions, and occupations throughout its history. During nearly four and a half centuries of Turkish rule the Albanians proved adept at both passive and active resistance, harassing the occupiers from mountain strongholds and tribal areas. However, despite this long experience in fighting, the country was not able to develop an effective conventional military force after it gained its independence in 1912.

Under the guidance and tutelage of British and Italian officers, a regular army was established and compulsory military training initiated in 1925. From then until early

1939 the army was under increasing Italian influence. No effective capability had been developed by April 1939, when the Italians intervened directly in Albanian affairs. Virtually no organized resistance could be mustered against the invading Italian Army, and the country was quickly overcome. However, during World War II, in spite of Italian and later German occupation, large parts of the country remained under the control of diverse independent guerrilla groups, who fought among themselves as well as against the Italians and Germans. Of these, the Communist-dominated National Liberation Movement under the leadership of Enver Hoxha was the most aggressive and eventually supplanted the more conservative groups. In July 1943 the movement established its military arm as the Army of National Liberation of Albania. In May 1944 a provisional government was formed with Hoxha as Premier, Minister of National Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Army of National Liberation of Albania.

In the immediate postwar period Yugoslav influence was predominant. Yugoslav materiel aid and military advisers were used to develop the military forces. After Tito's break from the Cominform in 1948, the Soviet Union intensified its influence on the country, and until 1960 Albania was firmly under Soviet domination. The armed forces were organized, trained, and equipped in accordance with Soviet concepts. Initially, Soviet efforts emphasized the development of political reliability, improvement of the general level of education and of military training, and replacement of obsolete and heterogeneous equipment with improved types of Soviet materiel. All military plans and policies were dictated by the Soviet Union and were coordinated with overall bloc plans. After 1955 this procedure apparently was continued through the unified command of the Warsaw Pact, of which Albania was an original member. The head of the Soviet Military Mission dealt directly with the Minister of People's Defense, and members of the mission initially were placed at every staff and command level throughout the armed forces. Even with this Soviet assistance, the armed forces remained the least effective in the Eastern European Communist countries. Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact on 13 September 1968. Since that time the dominant foreign influence has been that of the Chinese Communists. The military effectiveness of the armed forces, however, has not changed materially.

Development of the naval forces began early in 1946, based on the few ex-Italian naval craft left in Albanian ports at the end of World War II. Yugoslavia transferred a number of ex-Italian minesweepers and motor torpedo boats in 1947 and provided training and logistic assistance until the Yugoslav-Cominform rift. Soviet support through 1955 consisted primarily of assistance in the organization and training of a new naval cadre. From 1956 onward, a steady flow of ships was provided by the Soviets, these transfers reaching their peak in 1960 with the arrival of a number of surface ships. Initial steps toward the development of a submarine force were taken with the integration of Albanian crews on Soviet submarines; two units were transferred to Albanian control during the latter part of 1960. In that same year, however, there was marked intensification of the ideological rift with the U.S.S.R. In 1961 the U.S.S.R. terminated assistance to the Albanian Navy and withdrew eight of 10 Soviet submarines based in Albania. Two submarines were seized by the Albanians at that time. Currently, Albania is associated militarily only with Communist China. Chinese Communist aid to the Albanian Navy originally took the form of technical and logistical support and replacement of spare parts for ships already in operation. However, in 1965 the Asian ally began providing new ships when six P-4 class motor torpedo boats were delivered to Albania. Since 1968 the Albanian Navy also has acquired at least 30 *Hu Chwan* class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats from Communist China.

The air force is a post-World War II development. Yugoslavia, with Soviet assistance, set up the nucleus of an Albanian air force in 1947. About 40 FANG (Yak-3) piston fighter aircraft and Yugoslav flying and support personnel were provided. After Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform, Soviet support replaced Yugoslav and included the training of aviation personnel in the U.S.S.R. The air force was virtually dissolved in 1949, however, with the disbandment of tactical units and a sharp reduction in personnel strength, which reached a low of 100 men. However, with the rebuilding of all Eastern European Communist air forces under Soviet auspices in 1950, a buildup of the Albanian air elements was again undertaken. A small group of officers was sent to the U.S.S.R. for pilot training, and the first operational squadron was activated at Tirane Airfield in February 1951. It was equipped with FRANK (Yak-9) aircraft and manned by Soviet air instructors and the U.S.S.R.-trained Albanian pilots. The FAGOT (MiG-15) was introduced in 1955, and the operational force was raised to one full fighter regiment. By 1957 the air force had a combat strength of two understrength regiments. The FRESCO (MiG-17) was identified in fighter units by 1960, probably replacing the FAGOT, which was gradually relegated to training units. The FARMER (MiG-19) was first observed late in 1962, by which time the two fighter regiments had reached a combined strength of 70 combat aircraft. There is no evidence, however, that any aircraft have been delivered from the U.S.S.R. since Albania's break with the Soviet bloc, but it does appear that Communist China is providing the air force with aircraft, including the FARMER, FISHBED, and the HOUND helicopter. Flight training by the fighter units has been maintained at a fairly constant level.

b. DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The military organization (Figure 73) is based on that of the Soviet Armed Forces. Under guidance and control by the Albanian Communist Party Central Committee, military policy is established by the Council of Ministers and by the Higher Military Council. The Higher Military Council is composed essentially of those



FIGURE 73. Armed forces high command (S)

ministers having responsibilities related directly to national security.

The Minister of People's Defense has primary responsibility for execution of defense policies and has operational and administrative control over the military establishment. He is assisted by seven deputy ministers, one of whom is a first deputy and also Chief of the General Staff. Three of the deputies are the Chief of the Directorate of the Rear, the Commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces, and the Deputy for Naval Affairs who is also chief of the naval directorate. The three remaining deputies have not been identified as holding additional positions. Other members of the high command include all chiefs of directorates, that is, the chiefs of the five ground forces branches (armor, artillery, chemical, engineer, and signal).

The General Staff serves all the armed forces. It is the principal military planning, coordinating, and executive body, with sections for communications, intelligence, military training, personnel, operations, organization and mobilization, and topography. The Chief of the General Staff has no command authority except when it is delegated to him by the Minister of People's Defense.

The chiefs of the armor, artillery, chemical, engineer, signal, naval, and aviation directorates serve in a staff-administrative rather than an operational capacity. They advise the Minister of People's Defense, the General Staff, and other high command agencies on matters pertaining to their specialized functions and requirements. They maintain administrative and technical control over all troops in their respective branches, but do not command tactical units.

The Directorate of the Rear is composed of several specialized agencies—finance, fuels and lubricants, medical, military construction, transportation, veterinary, and others. It also supports the military establishment and coordinates the specialized supply functions of the various component directorates.

The Directorate of Political Affairs, with agencies for education, political guidance, propaganda and agitation, youth organizations, among others, is concerned primarily with informing military personnel of party doctrine. It has a direct channel to the party's Central Committee, although the directorate remains nominally under military control. In March 1966, political commissars were reintroduced into the armed forces. In addition, on 1 May 1966 ranks were abolished, and authority for making decisions was transferred from the unit commander to party committees in each unit. These revisions have provided the party direct influence in all military activities and have given considerable significance to the position of political commissar.

Operational command of all combat forces is exercised by the Minister of People's Defense. He controls most of the ground forces units directly or through the corps headquarters that exist primarily for territorial, administrative, and logistic purposes. His command is also exercised through two joint headquarters—the Coastal Defense Forces and the Air and Air Defense Forces. The Coastal Defense Forces are composed of all naval units and those ground forces units assigned a coastal defense mission. The Air and Air Defense Forces control all air units and the ground forces surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and air control and warning radar units assigned the mission of home air defense.

c. Military Manpower and Morale

(1) *Manpower*—There were approximately 505,000 males of ages 15 to 49 inclusive as of 1 January

1971. Of these, an estimated 420,000 are considered fit for military service. The average size of the group that will reach conscription age (year of 19th birthday) annually during the period 1971-75 is estimated at 22,000. Most of these are expected to be inducted into the military forces about as follows: 12,000 into the ground forces, 300 into the naval forces, and 400 to 500 into the air force.

The following tabulation gives a breakdown, by 5-year age groups, of available military manpower:

Age	Total number of males	Maximum number fit for military service
15-19	111,000	105,000
20-24	88,000	75,000
25-29	79,000	70,000
30-34	74,000	60,000
35-39	61,000	50,000
40-44	54,000	35,000
45-49	38,000	25,000
Total	505,000	420,000

All citizens are liable for military service, but women rarely are conscripted. All physically fit males between the ages of 19 and 55 are eligible for military service; induction usually occurs during the year of the 19th brithday or subsequently up to age 27. Induction of most conscripts takes place during late November and early December.

The basic term of conscript service varies with service and branch. It is 2 years for artillery, chemical, engineer, infantry, rear service, and signal troops; and 3 years for armored troops, noncommissioned officers, and any specialist personnel who have completed training at a military school. The term of service for naval personnel is 3 years. The term of service for the air force and other air defense personnel is 3 years, but some specialists may have their terms extended as much as an additional year.

Conscripts are generally sturdy men with good physical endurance. As a group they are fairly homogeneous, though differences exist between the mountaineers and the plainsmen, and vestiges of clan or tribal associations still survive. Although educational standards are low in both groups, the plainsmen are somewhat better educated and have more aptitude for mechanical and technical training. On the other hand, the mountaineers generally are hardier and are considered the better fighters.

(2) *Morale*—Armed forces morale is believed to be only fair. Factors bearing on this include the poor conditions of service life, the constant political pressure imposed by the regime, and the strongly individualistic and unregimented character of the typical Albanian. Naval and air forces personnel probably have somewhat higher morale than ground forces personnel because of generally better living conditions, higher pay, and greater opportunities for technical training.

d. Reserve and mobilization

A reserve officers' school was established in August 1964. Attendance is mandatory for all male university graduates who are physically fit and are not entering the regular armed forces. After completion of the 5-month course, graduates are commissioned as reserve officers and are assigned to operational units for an additional month's training in their specialty.

The ground forces reserves consist of organized reserve units more closely associated with the active army than are those in some of the other Eastern European Communist countries. Reserve units of company and battalion size are formed at mobilization centers that have been established throughout the country. Each center holds an adequate amount of materiel to equip its reserve unit. A regular army officer is the unit commander and is also in charge of the center. Many of the reserve units are under existing regular unit headquarters, and in some cases the mobilization center is located within the installation of a regular army unit. Reserves are on active duty about 5 days per month. Approximately 2 of the 5 days are spent working on construction projects and the remainder of the time is used for tactical training. Reserve units participate in battalion and brigade tactical exercises and maneuvers either with regular army elements or alone. Trained ground forces and militarized security forces reserves are estimated to number some 160,000 men, of whom approximately 76,000 have been separated from active service during the past 5 years.

The navy has about 4,100 in reserve; the bulk of these are honorably discharged enlisted personnel. The air force may have as many as 800 officers and enlisted men in a reserve capacity.

Although Albania is capable of rapidly expanding its armed forces upon mobilization, it is believed that the effectiveness of those forces for conventional warfare would be limited unless outside support were received.

e. Strength trends

From 1923 until World War II Albania maintained ground forces numbering between 10,000 and 13,000 men. During World War II the Italians incorporated Albanian units into their forces, but many of these troops deserted when Italy invaded Greece in 1940. The Albanians formed resistance groups but fought each other as well as the Germans and Italians. It is estimated that the combined strength of all guerrilla fighters reached a maximum of about 25,000 early in 1945. When the Communists took over, they used the Communist-led wartime bands as a nucleus and raised an army of perhaps 40,000 men to defeat the anti-Communist elements still fighting from their tribal areas in the mountains. The strength of the ground forces was cut to about 35,000 in 1948 and to 30,000 in the early 1950's. It was stabilized at 25,000 in the mid-1950's with no appreciable change until it was again restored to 30,000 after the rift with the U.S.S.R.

Development of the naval forces began in 1946 with a force of 200 men. Naval strength grew slowly but steadily until 1961 when it reached 3,000, a level at which it has since remained.

The air force has varied considerably. It was first organized in 1947 with about 400 men. The force had been increased to 2,000 by 1949, but late in that year the tactical units were disbanded and strength was cut to 600. Strength had dwindled to 100 men by 1952. Starting in 1955, with the rebuilding of all Eastern European Communist air forces, strength was again increased, ultimately reaching in 1961 a peak of 2,500, which it held through 1962. In 1963 it dropped back to 2,000, the level at which it still stands.

No significant change is anticipated in the size of the armed forces during the next several years. Albania has only a limited capability to support larger armed forces from local resources.

The estimated strengths of the armed forces for selected years are shown in Figure 74.

f. Training

Training has not provided a high level of proficiency, despite the fact that some personnel have been schooled by the Soviets and Chinese Communists. In the past, even with Soviet support, training suffered from the general lack of facilities and instructors and the low educational level of conscripts. The Soviet Military Mission was withdrawn during 1961 and was replaced by a considerably less effective one from Communist China. Significant Chinese Communist influence on doctrine and training is not yet apparent. Field exercises probably are not held above brigade level, and joint maneuvers probably are of the most rudimentary sort.

The Skenderbeg Military School in Tiranë is both a military preparatory school for boys 10 to 16 years old and a secondary school for officer and noncommissioned cadets of all service branches. It offers a general education curriculum as well as courses on military subjects, and advanced students are selected for officer and noncommissioned officer training. Graduates probably continue training for commissions in a 3-year course at the Enver Hoxha Officers School, also in Tiranë. This school probably gives refresher training to regular and reserve officers. Some indication of the size of enrollment of the Enver Hoxha school is given by the fact that 540 officer candidates marched in the November Independence Day Parade in Tiranë in 1964.

The Mehmet Shehu Military Academy in Tiranë is the highest military educational institution in Albania. It was established in 1961 and formally recognized by the party Politburo in January 1963. The academy trains officers for all branches of the armed forces, offering a 3-year course for company-grade officers and a 2-year advanced course for field-grade officers who are training for staff and command functions. The academy had a representation of 720 company-grade officers in the November 1964 Independence Day Parade in Tiranë.

g. Economic support and military budget

(1) *Economic support*—Although predominantly agricultural, the country is not self-sufficient, even in food production. Albania produces only part of its requirement for petroleum products. Military production is limited to unknown amounts of small arms and ammunition plus some quartermaster items. Prior to the Albania-U.S.S.R. split, most army materiel was imported from the Soviet Union. Since then, Communist China has been the source of moderate amounts of ammunition, heavy mortars, infantry weapons, and medium tanks. The small fleet of submarines and minewarfare and patrol ships received from the U.S.S.R. during 1948-61 was augmented later by Communist China which also has delivered fighters, helicopters, and small transport aircraft. This Chinese materiel assistance was probably made possible through long-term credits or barter agreements.

(2) *Military budget*—Annual defense budgets are prepared by the Ministry of People's Defense and approved by the Albanian parliament. During the period 1965-69, the annual defense allocation has averaged about 8.1% of the total national budget. Announced defense budgets for 1965-69 are shown in Figure 75.

h. Logistics

Prior to the break in relations with the U.S.S.R., military procurement was limited to imports from Soviet bloc countries, especially the U.S.S.R. Current military procurement is from Communist China.

FIGURE 74. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (S)

	ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES				MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES	
YEAR	Ground forces	Naval forces	Air forces	Total	Frontier troops	Interior troops
1945	*25,000	...	...	*25,000	...	...
1950	35,000	600	600	36,200	6,000	4,000
1955	25,000	800	200	26,000	6,000	4,000
1960	25,000	2,000	1,500	28,500	6,000	4,000
1961	25,000	3,000	2,500	30,500	6,000	4,000
1962	30,000	3,000	2,500	35,500	7,500	5,000
1963-69	30,000	3,000	2,000	35,000	7,500	5,000
1970	30,000	3,000	2,000	35,000	**7,500	5,000

*World War II peak, largely composed of guerrilla organizations.
**Includes 300 Frontier Troops afloat.

FIGURE 75. MILITARY BUDGETS, 1965–69 (C)
(*Millions of leks*)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Military budget	288	272	272	304	420
Military budget as percent of national budget	8.6	7.7	7.6	7.6	9.1
Military budget as percent of GNP	5.0	4.6	5.5	5.0	6.0

The distribution of supplies within the military establishment is controlled by the Directorate of the Rear. The Durrës-Kavajë-Tiranë complex and the Vlorë area are the main bases of supply. Some materiel is stored within each tactical unit area and at mobilization centers throughout the country.

Movement of units and transportation of supplies in the ground forces are controlled by the transportation element of the Directorate of the Rear. Motor transport is generally inadequate, and it is doubtful that a sufficient number of civilian vehicles exists for requisitioning to meet extensive mobilization needs. Air, rail, and sea transportation contribute little to the general capability. In wartime, animal-drawn equipment would be used to supplement motorized vehicles, particularly in the rugged mountainous areas.

The Chief of the Directorate of the Rear supervises the rear services activities of the various subordinate commands. Supplies, as finally authorized by this directorate, flow down to the commands through rear service elements.

Generally, maintenance is limited by a shortage of technically skilled personnel and a lack of facilities and spare parts. Equipment requiring extensive repair is often removed from service and cannibalized.

2. Ground forces

The ground forces are basically infantry units inadequately supported by a few armored, artillery, and service elements. The degree of mechanization is below standard for a modern fighting force. The ground forces do not constitute an effective conventional combat force, especially for offensive operations. However, Albanians have always fought stubbornly in defense of their local communities. Pushed back by superior forces, they probably would conduct a fighting withdrawal into the more rugged parts of the country. Units would revert to guerrilla forces, operating out of remote mountain areas. How long such operations could be sustained and how effective they would be would depend on the degree of outside assistance. (C)

a. Organization (S)

The ground forces high command coincides with that of the armed forces. The Minister of People's Defense controls most of the ground forces units through four corps headquarters. Ground forces units assigned to the coastal and air defense missions are controlled through the Commander, Coastal Defense Forces, and the Commander, Air and Air Defense Forces.

The corps headquarters are in the line of command but are not strictly tactical headquarters. They perform territorial administrative and logistic functions similar to those of the military district headquarters in some of the other Eastern European Communist countries. In time of war, staff personnel from the corps could be called upon to form a tactical field headquarters. The corps commander has general responsibility for insuring combat readiness of the units in his area and supervises all tactical training programs. He is also responsible for registration and conscription, reserve training, and wartime mobilization in his area.

The basic tactical unit and highest level of tactical command is the infantry brigade. Its organization is based largely on concepts used in the past by the Soviets. Each of the six existing infantry brigades is believed to consist of three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, and an antiaircraft artillery battalion, as well as reconnaissance, antitank, signal, and engineer companies and other support and service elements. Each infantry brigade normally has a training unit that assists in the training of recruits, noncommissioned officers, and possibly reservists. The authorized wartime strength of a brigade is about 5,000 men, but the actual strength probably averages about 3,000. The reduced strength is managed by maintaining all organic units below authorized strength, rather than by inactivating any of them. Full organizational equipment is believed to be kept available in unit stocks, which allows rapid expansion to full strength by the callup of trained reserves. The brigade structure easily lends itself to expansion of the unit to division size.

A tank brigade is believed to include a tank and an infantry unit (both probably small battalions), an artillery unit (probably a two-battery battalion of mortars and 76-mm guns), and an armored car unit (probably a reconnaissance company). This brigade has 80 to 100 trucks as organic transportation and is completely mobile.

b. Strength, composition, and disposition[11] (S)

The strength of the ground forces is 30,000 officers and enlisted men. Of these, about 5,000 officers and noncommissioned officers make up the regular cadre. The remaining personnel are chiefly conscripts, most of whom serve for 2 years.

Unit strength includes six infantry brigades, one tank brigade, two coastal defense bases (approximately brigade size), and one artillery regiment.

The tactical units of the ground forces are dispersed throughout the country. Two infantry brigades are deployed in the northern area. Two are deployed along or near the southern border facing Greece. One infantry brigade is in the southwestern part of the country. One infantry brigade and one tank brigade are in the central area. The ground forces units of the Coastal Defense

[11]For detailed current information see *Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces* and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Forces occupy areas along or near the entire coastline. The ground forces units of the Air and Air Defense Forces are concentrated mostly in the Tiranë and Vlorë areas. Most of the separate combat and support units are in the Tiranë area.

c. Training (C)

Training has been relatively effective for brigade and smaller units. The training cycle is divided into winter and summer periods. Winter training begins during early December, shortly after the induction of the new conscript class, and lasts for 4 or 5 months. It generally consists of three phases with individual training being emphasized in the first, weapons crew drill and small unit training in the second, and small unit exercises in the third. Practically all training during the winter period is conducted in or near barracks areas.

Summer training usually is carried on from early May through October. Troops move to the field to practice application of the theory learned during the winter period. Again, there are three phases of training. In the initial phase, usually May and June, company- and battalion-level field exercises predominate. In the second, late July and August, exercises may reach regimental level, and in the third, September and October, tactical exercises and maneuvers at brigade level usually conclude the training year.

d. Logistics (C)

Major storage areas for ground forces supplies are in the Durrës-Kavajë-Tiranë area, and lesser quantities are held in the Vlorë area. Combat materiel and supplies are stored in the areas of each brigade, as is equipment for mobilization needs.

The ground forces are equipped with standard weapons and equipment of Soviet types. For a few years preceding the Albania-U.S.S.R. rift, the Soviet Union furnished Albania with modern small arms and larger weapons of World War II types. Most of these probably are still operational, since the Chinese have supplied spare parts. In addition to the parts, Communist China has also supplied small arms and some mortars, armored personnel carriers, and tanks, all of Soviet design. Generally, the Soviet types of equipment are of the older varieties, e.g., T-34 tanks and UAZ-669 trucks. Older equipment of a wide variety of national origins is probably held in storage. The 107-mm launchers (Figure 76) and the personnel carriers (Figure 77) are a recent addition to the ground forces' inventory.

3. Naval forces (S)

The naval forces are organized to fulfill a defensive mission within territorial waters. Because of their small size and Albania's geographic position, the naval forces would be unable to defend against the superior naval forces of any of the neighboring countries for any protracted period. Four submarines offer the only significant offensive threat, but the training level of these units is low. As a result, the Submarine Division is probably the least proficient segment of the navy. To provide for adequate peacetime coastal surveillance, most surface ship units are divided between Durrës in the north and the Gji i Vlorës area in the south. However, seven *Hu Chwan* class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats (Figure 78) now operate from Shëngjin and six from Sarandë. The capability of the naval forces to fulfill their limited mission is fair. Over the long run, however, the inability of the local economy to support the service adequately and the problem of obtaining outside assistance can be expected to restrict operating capabilities.

a. Organization

The senior naval officer serves as both Deputy Minister of Defense for Naval Affairs and Deputy Commander of Coastal Defense Forces. In addition he reportedly carries the title of Commander of Naval Forces. As Deputy Minister of Defense for Naval Affairs, he represents the naval forces at the highest levels of national defense planning. In the latter capacity he is assisted by a small group of naval personnel who represent and coordinate naval interests in overall personnel, logistic, and support branches of the armed forces high command. As Deputy Commander of Coastal Defense Forces, the senior naval officer is responsible for coordinating naval operations with those of other service forces stationed along the coast. As Commander of Naval Forces, he supervises and coordinates day-to-day activities of the naval operating forces.

The naval operating forces are organized into three commands—the Submarine Division, the Vlorë Sea Defense Brigade, and the Durrës Sea Defense Brigade. All combatant ships are assigned to one of these three commands. Surface ships are divided almost equally between the sea defense brigades. Naval base commands are in the Vlorë port complex and at Durrës. Naval stations are located at Sarandë and Shëngjin.

b. Strength, composition, and disposition[12]

Personnel strength of the naval forces is 3,000, of whom 300 are officers and 2,700 are enlisted men. Of the total, 1,500 are assigned to sea duty, 900 are in ashore support billets, 300 are in coastal warning, and 300 are in training. Of the total number of afloat personnel about 300 serve aboard craft of the Maritime Frontier Guard.

The Submarine Division, based at Pasha Liman, has four Soviet W Class submarines and one auxiliary repair dock.

The main facilities of the Vlorë Sea Defense Brigade are on Ishulli i Sazanit. A headquarters element is located in the Vlorë area. With the exception of six *Hu Chwan* class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats based at Sarandë, most ships of this brigade operate from Ishulli i Sazanit. The ships of the Sea Defense Division (all of Soviet origin) include: one T-43 class fleet minesweeper, three T-301 class medium minesweepers, and two Kronshtadt class large submarine chasers. Six Soviet-supplied P-4

[12]For detailed current information, see *Automated Naval Order of Battle (Ships)*, Volume II; *Naval Forces Intelligence Studies (Albania)*; and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.



FIGURE 76. Chinese-built 107-mm rocket launcher on BJ 212 vehicle (U/OU)

FIGURE 77. Chinese-built tracked armored personnel carrier (U/OU)

class motor torpedo boats come under the Cutter Division, which also operates nine hydrofoil motor torpedo boats based at Ishulli i Sazanit, as well as the six based at Sarandë. Within the division, organization may be in groups by type. A few units of the Auxiliary Group may be based at Skele e Vlorës. Craft of the Auxiliary Group include two small oilers, one covered lighter, two launches, one medium harbor tug, one floating workship, and two miscellaneous service craft.

The headquarters and main base of the Durrës Sea Defense Brigade are at Durrës. The Sea Defense Division and the Cutter Division are identical in composition to the comparable divisions of the Vlorë Sea Defense Brigade. However, the six P-4 class motor torpedo boats of the Cutter Division are of Chinese Communist origin. Eight hydrofoil motor torpedo boats are regularly based at Durrës, and seven others operate from Shëngjin. As do the similar units at Ishulli i Sazanit and Sarandë, these may form type groups under the division commander. Craft of the Auxiliary Group include one degaussing ship, one miscellaneous service craft, one floating crane, one diving tender, one covered lighter, two launches, one torpedo retriever, two fuel oil lighters, one fuel oil barge, and three medium harbor tugs.



FIGURE 78. Chinese hydrofoil motor torpedo boat under construction. At least 30 units of this type have been exported to Albania. (S)

Fourteen patrol boats and nine river/roadstead patrol boats are operated by the Maritime Frontier Guard, the afloat element of the Frontier Troops, in close cooperation with the navy. Four PO-2 class patrol boats are based at Shëngjin; three operate from Sarandë; two each operate from Durrës and Ishulli i Sazanit. A POLUCHAT-1 class patrol boat and two single ship patrol boats also operate from Durrës. Three river/roadstead patrol boats operate from Ishulli i Sazanit. Six come under the Maritime Frontier Guard element at Lake Scutari. Composition of the afloat forces on Lakes Ohrid and Prespa is unknown.

Assisting the Maritime Frontier Guard in carrying out its coastal security function is a network of naval coastal observation and radar stations. Observation posts, about 10 in all, are located at fairly regular intervals along the coastline from Shëngjin in the north to Stilo in the south. Supporting radar stations are located at Durrës, Ishulli i Sazanit, and Port' e Palermos. Under normal conditions, coastal observation posts, radar stations, and Maritime Frontier Guard ships cooperate to provide continuous surveillance of the Albanian coastline.

c. TRAINING

Most training for naval enlisted personnel is conducted at the naval training center at Pasha Liman. New recruits are given approximately 3 months of basic training followed by 6 to 9 months of specialist training. Instructors are regular navy officers assisted by enlisted personnel who also teach. The quality of instruction is fair to good. There are no separate noncommissioned officers' schools. In the past, a number of naval officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Now naval line officers are trained at the Vlorë Naval Academy, which offers a 3-year course. Naval technical officers graduate from the technical schools of the Tiranë State University after 5 years of study. Periodic cruises provide at least a minimum of operational training for both officers and enlisted personnel.

d. LOGISTICS

The economy is incapable of adequately supporting the naval forces. Most ships are of Soviet origin and of postwar construction. Their material condition is adequate to good, although maintenance levels probably will deteriorate gradually in the absence of Soviet support. Lack of adequate ship repair facilities will necessitate continued dependence on foreign, probably non-Communist, facilities for complex repairs.

Ordnance and equipment also are largely of Soviet origin, a factor which will have serious consequences when spare parts and replacements become necessary. Although Chinese Communist assistance has increased significantly since early 1965, the distances involved make effective support difficult. Principal storage depots are at Durrës and in the Gji i Vlorës area.

4. Air and air defense forces (S)

The air and air defense forces consist of aircraft, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and air control and warning radar units. The two fighter regiments which comprise the air force are an integral part of the air and air defense forces. The air force is the smallest in the Eastern European Communist countries, both in manpower and number of aircraft. Aircraft have a fair capability for interception and destruction of intruders under clear air mass conditions. This capability is improving with the introduction of FISHBED aircraft. These aircraft were delivered late in 1970 or early in 1971, and are believed to be of Chinese Communist manufacture. All-weather intercept capability is believed to be limited because of obsolescent equipment and the low caliber of training. The capability for air support of ground operations is believed to be negligible. Static

defense is fair in a few localities, but area defense is poor because of the inadequacy of the surface-to-air missile deployment. Air control and warning radar effectiveness is limited by the low level of training and by inadequate amounts of radar equipment.

Although Albania did not formally withdraw from the Warsaw Pact until September 1968, there is no evidence of its active participation after 1961. Soviet advisers, instructors, and technicians formerly assigned to Albania reportedly were superseded by Chinese personnel. Since the early 1960's the air force has probably obtained all of its new aircraft from Communist China. Since 1968 the air force has received a number of FARMER (MiG-19) and FISHBED (MiG-21) fighters and HOUND (Mi-4) helicopters from the Chinese Communists. China now provides items such as POL and spare parts as well as aircraft, all previously supplied by the U.S.S.R.

a. ORGANIZATION

The Air and Air Defense Forces Commander is directly subordinate to the Minister of People's Defense. Though the rank system was abolished in the spring of 1966, the commander and his deputy are the equivalents of one-star generals. The relation between the air and air defense forces and the Aviation Directorate is not known, but the Commander of Air and Air Defense Forces may possibly also be Chief of the Aviation Directorate.

The territory of Albania constitutes a single air defense district and, in size, compares with an air defense sector in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European Communist countries. Command and control are exercised through headquarters in Tiranë, to which the air, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft, and radar units report.

b. STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND DISPOSITION[13]

Personnel strength of the air and air defense forces is 6,500. Of this number, 2,000 are in the air force, 3,700 man the surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery units, and 800 man the air control and warning radar system. There are some 1,600 men in operations, servicing, and support of fighter aircraft; 300 in preoperational training; 50 in airlift or transportation; and 50 in the national headquarters at Tiranë. Pilots number about 100.

The air force consists of two fighter regiments and a small transport unit. The fighter regiments are stationed at Berat/Stalin and Tirane/Rinas airfields, and the transport unit operates from Tirane Airfield. Aircraft currently assigned are: 12 FISHBED C,E (MiG-21), 30 FRESCO A,B,C (MiG-17), 10 FRESCO D, 32 FARMER A,B,E (MiG-19), three CAB (Li-2), one CRATE (Il-14), and 21 HOUND (Mi-4). Some FAGOT (MiG-15) aircraft may still be in the inventory. In addition, one BEAGLE (Il-28) is used by the fighter regiments for tow-target purposes.

Three SA-2 surface-to-air missile battalions and one surface-to-air missile support facility are in the vicinity of Tiranë. One SA-2 site is about 9 miles southwest, another is 5 miles south, and the third is 15 miles northwest of Tiranë. One unoccupied SA-2 site is in the area of Vlorë with another surface-to-air missile site 15 miles northeast. The configuration of these sites is standard—six revetted launch positions with a connecting network of service roads, a central guidance area, and three missile-hold areas to each site. The support facility, located a few miles west of Tiranë, performs final missile assembly, checkout, storage, and maintenance of missiles and guidance components.

There are two antiaircraft artillery regiments plus two antiaircraft artillery battalions. One of these regiments is stationed at Tiranë, and the other is at Vlorë; the two additional battalions are at Durrës and on Ishulli i Sazanit.

The surface-to-air missile and the antiaircraft artillery units together have a total of 31 radar sets.

c. TRAINING

Primary through advanced jet flight training is provided at flying schools at Berat/Stalin and Tirane airfields. After completion of advanced flight training, fighter pilots probably go to operational regiments at Berat/Kucove and Tirane/Rinas airfields for training in FRESCO and FARMER aircraft. Air transport training and helicopter training are given at Tirane Airfield. Personnel in the other elements of air defense receive their training in the ground forces.

Premilitary training, once the responsibility of the Society for Aid to the Army and Defense, is now directed by the Union of Working Youth of Albania (BRPSh), the party's youth auxiliary. Most premilitary training for air force personnel consists of political indoctrination and courses in small arms, automatic weapons, radio, wire communications, civil and antiaircraft defense, first aid, and driving and motor maintenance. It is believed that the Society for Aid to the Army and Defense still plays a minor role in premilitary training, and it may provide flight training in propeller-driven aircraft.

A number of military schools known as academies may be officer candidate schools. One such academy is reported to be collocated with the Air Defense Headquarters Regiment at Tiranë. An air force academy with a 6-year program of instruction is also reported to be at Tiranë.

Within the capabilities of assigned aircraft (FRESCO and FARMER) the air force is believed to carry out a limited amount of operational combat training, including airborne aid to intercept, ground-controlled intercept, air-to-air gunnery, mock combat, and air-ground exercises. However, for the most part, flight activity consists of navigational and takeoff and landing exercises. It is probable that coastal reconnaissance and practice deployment to auxiliary airfields are also part of the training program.

The amount of time logged by fighter pilots is not known but is estimated to be within the averages of the other Eastern European Communist air forces, which reportedly range from 8 to 12 hours per month.

[13]For detailed current information, see *European Communist Aircraft Order of Battle* and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Until about 1961, flight training in Albania was adapted from the Soviet system. Very likely, Chinese advisers and instructors have since introduced their version of training methodology.

d. Logistics

Like the other Eastern European Communist countries, Albania employs basically the Soviet Air Forces logistic system, which was adopted when the Soviet Union was supplying most aviation materiel. The system is characterized by highly centralized control of planning, organizing, and logistic operations.

The net effect of the dispute with the U.S.S.R. on air logistics is not fully known. The U.S.S.R. apparently no longer supplies Albania directly with replacement aircraft, spare parts, or aviation materiel and supplies such as aviation fuel which are essential for continued flying activity by the air force. However, although Albania cannot produce these items domestically, it trades with other Communist countries, particularly Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, which can, and probably do, provide replacement parts and aviation fuels. It is difficult to estimate the extent and adequacy of the imports of aviation supplies; however, war reserve stocks are probably maintained at a low level because of the difficulties inherent in obtaining them and the financial problems involved.

Maintenance personnel were trained and assisted by Soviet engineers and technicians prior to the Soviet withdrawal. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Chinese Communists have provided Albania with replacement parts. Without outside assistance, the Albanians can make minor repairs on their combat aircraft, perform periodic inspection checks, and correct minor faults in equipment. However, they cannot perform depot-level maintenance (major repairs and complete overhauls of aircraft and equipment) because the country has neither the necessary repair facilities nor the skilled personnel. When depot-level maintenance is required, the equipment probably is sent for repair or exchange to one of the other Communist countries or is scrapped.

There have been several unconfirmed reports of Chinese surface-to-air missile support. The SA-2 missiles originally supplied by the U.S.S.R. have probably exceeded their normal shelf life, and replacements or spare parts could be supplied by the Chinese.

5. Militarized security forces (S)

The Albanian militarized security forces are composed of frontier troops and interior troops. Both components are under the operational control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but recruitment and logistic support are handled by the Ministry of People's Defense. The militarized security forces are reliable, well trained, and efficient. They are organized and trained along military lines and are equipped with light infantry weapons. They even wear standard army uniforms with no distinguishing insignia. These troops would be readily available for use in support of the armed forces in time of war.

a. Frontier troops

The frontier troops are under the Directorate of Frontier and Pursuit in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their 7,500 officers and enlisted men are organized into four brigades that are positioned in small detachments along the 445-mile land border. These troops are responsible for controlling legal and preventing illegal traffic across the Albanian border and coast.

b. Interior troops

The interior troops are under the Directorate of State Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Numbering about 5,000, they are organized into five battalions and are stationed throughout Albania. Their function is the maintenance of internal security, principally the elimination of resistance to the regime.

AREA BRIEF

LAND (U/OU)

11,100 square miles; 20% arable, 23% other agriculture, 43% forest, 14% other

PEOPLE (U/OU)

Population: 2,154,000 (1 January 1971); density 194 persons per square mile; males 15-49, about 505,000; 420,000 are fit for military service; about 22,000 reach military age (19) annually

Ethnic divisions: 96% Albanian; 4% Greeks, Vlachs, Gypsies, Bulgarians, and Serbs

Religion: 70% Muslim, 20% Albanian Orthodox, 10% Roman Catholic

Languages: Albanian, Greek

Literacy: Estimated 70% to 75%

Labor force: 911,000 (mid-1969); about 60% engaged in agriculture

GOVERNMENT (U/OU)

Type: Communist dictatorship; ruled by Albanian Workers Party

Political subdivisions: 27 rrethet (districts), including city of Tiranë

Government leaders: Chief of State (a ceremonial position) and President of Presidium of People's Assembly, Haxhi Lleshi; Premier and Chairman of the Council of Minister, Mehmet Shehu

Suffrage: Universal age 18 and over

Elections: National elections theoretically held every 4 years; last elections September 1970

Political parties and leaders: Albanian Workers Party only; First Secretary, Enver Hoxha

Communists: 75,673 (January 1970)

Member of: United Nations (IAEA, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO), CEMA (has not participated in SEMA since rift with U.S.S.R. in 1961); formally withdrew from Warsaw Pact in 1968

ECONOMY (U/OU)

GNP: Estimated at $800 million in 1969 (1968 prices); or $400 per capita

Food: Food-deficit area; imports a large share of grain requirements

Agricultural production: Main crops are corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets, cotton

Major resources: Petroleum and brown coal; chromium, iron-nickel, and copper ores; construction materials

Main industries: Agricultural processing, textiles and clothing, extractive industries

Electric power: 240,000 kilowatts (kw.), estimated capacity (1969); an estimated 930 million kilowatt-hours (kw.-hr.) produced in 1969

Exports: Tobacco and cigarettes, chromium and iron-nickel ores, crude oil and refined asphalt

Imports: Machinery and equipment, wheat, rolled steel, chemical fertilizers

Monetary conversion rate: 5 leks=US$1 (commercial); 12.5 leks=US$1 (noncommercial)

Fiscal year: Same as calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS (S)

Railroads: About 127 miles standard gage (4'8½"); none electrified; all single track

Highways: About 3,100 miles; 300 miles bituminous, 1,200 miles crushed stone and/or gravel, 1,600 miles earth

Inland waterways: 27 miles plus Albanian sections of Lakes Scutari, Ohrid, and Prespa

Pipeline: Estimated 110 miles crude

Ports: 2 major (Durrës, Vlorë), 2 minor

Merchant marine: 11 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling 53,806 g.r.t. and 72,753 d.w.t.; 3 bulk cargo, 8 dry cargo

Civil air: No major transport aircraft

Airfields: 11 total; 4 have permanent-surface runways; 5 have runways 8,000-11,999 feet, 5 have runways 4,000-7,999 feet

Telecommunications: Serves basic needs of government; limited service to public; limited coverage by radio and wired broadcasts; 1 TV station (Tiranë); estimated 13,000 telephones, 160,000 radio receivers, 2,100 TV receivers

DEFENSE FORCES (S)

Personnel: Armed forces: ground 30,000, naval 3,000, air 2,000; militarized security forces 12,500

Ground forces units: 6 infantry brigades, 1 tank brigade, 2 coastal defense brigades, 3 regiments (1 artillery, 2 antiaircraft artillery), 2 antiaircraft artillery battalions

Ships: 4 submarines, 8 minesweepers, 60 coastal patrol types, 9 river/roadstead patrol types, 3 auxiliaries, 21 service craft

Aircraft: 109 in operational units (84 jet fighters, 4 transports, 21 helicopters)

Missiles: 3 SA-2 battalions

Supply: All military materiel obtained from abroad, formerly from the U.S.S.R. Some now procured from Communist China, but little information on present procurement available





PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U/OU)

	COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.
Adriatic Sea (*sea*)	43 00	16 00
Aegean Sea (*sea*)	39 00	25 00
Bar, Yugoslavia	42 05	19 06
Berat	40 42	19 57
Buenë (*strm*)	41 52	19 22
Bulqizë	41 32	20 16
Cërrik	41 02	19 57
Corfu Channel (*marine channel*)	39 35	20 05
Devoll (*oilfield*)	40 48	19 54
Dibrë	41 41	20 26
Drenovë	40 35	20 48
Drin (*strm*)	40 17	20 02
Drin (*strm*)	41 45	19 34
Durrës	41 19	19 26
Durrësit, Gji i (*bay*)	41 16	19 28
Durrësit, Kep i (*cape*)	41 18	19 26
Elbasan	41 06	20 05
Epirus (*region*)	39 45	20 45
Fier	40 43	19 34
Fierzë	42 15	20 01
Fushë-Krujë	41 29	19 43
Gjirokastër	40 05	20 10
Himarë	40 07	19 44
Ionian Sea (*sea*)	39 00	19 00
Ishm (*strm*)	41 37	19 35
Kalpáki, Greece	39 53	29 38
Kashar	41 21	19 43
Kavajë	41 11	19 33
Korçë	40 37	20 46
Kótas, Greece	40 42	21 10
Kukës	42 05	20 24
Kulej-Papër	41 03	19 57
Laç	41 38	19 43
Lagit, Kep i (*cape*)	41 08	19 26
Lezhë	41 47	19 39
Lín	41 04	20 39
Lushnjë	40 56	19 42
Maliq	40 43	20 41
Mat (*strm*)	41 39	19 34
Mborje (*sec. of Rasonik*)	40 36	20 48
Memaliaj	40 20	19 58
Mesopotam	39 54	20 03
Mifol	40 36	19 29
Obot	41 59	19 25
Ohrid, Lake (*lake*)	41 00	20 45
Ohrid, Yugoslavia	41 07	20 48
Otranto, Strait of (*strait*)	40 00	19 00
Palermos, Port' e (*bay*)	40 03	19 47
Palit, Kep i (*cape*)	41 24	19 24
Pasha Liman (*anchorage*)	40 19	19 25
Patos (*oilfield*)	40 38	19 39
Pishkash	41 06	20 30
Pogradec	40 54	20 39
Prenjas	41 04	20 32
Prespa, Lake (*lake*)	40 55	21 00
Prizren, Yugoslavia	42 13	20 45
Pukë	42 03	19 54
Rinas	41 29	19 43
Rodonit, Kep i (*cape*)	41 35	19 27
Rrogozhinë	41 05	19 40
Rubik	41 46	19 45
Sarandë	39 52	20 00
Sazanit, Ishulli i (*isl*)	40 30	19 16
Scutari, Lake (*lake*)	42 10	19 20
Selenicë	40 32	19 38
Seman (*strm*)	40 56	19 24
Seman, Kep i (*cape*)	40 47	19 21
Shëngjin	41 49	19 35
Shkodër	42 05	19 30
Shkopet	41 42	19 49
Shkumbin (*strm*)	41 01	19 26
Shtoj i Ri (*sec. of Grudë e Re*)	42 06	19 33
Skrofotinë	40 35	19 28
Stalin	40 48	19 54
Stilo (*cape*)	39 41	19 59
Struga, Yugoslavia	41 11	20 41
Tepelenë	40 18	20 01
Thanës, Qaf' e (*pass*)	41 04	20 36
Tiranë	41 20	19 50
Titograd, Yugoslavia	42 26	19 16
Uj të Ftohtë	40 25	19 30
Ulëz	41 41	19 54
Va i Dejës	42 01	19 37
Valias	41 24	19 44
Vijosë (*strm*)	40 37	19 20
Vlorë	40 27	19 30
Vlorës, Gji i (*bay*)	40 23	19 25
Vlorës, Skele e (*port*)	40 27	19 29
Vorë	41 23	19 40
Yzberisht (*sec. of Mëzez*)	41 19	19 46
Zall-Reç	41 52	20 19

SELECTED AIRFIELDS

Berat/Stalin	40 46	19 54
Elbasan/Cerrik	41 03	20 00
Gjirokaster	40 05	20 09
Korce Northwest	40 39	20 45
Kukes	42 02	20 25
Mifol	40 37	19 26
Shkoder/Shtoj I Ri	42 07	19 32
Tirane	41 20	19 48
Tirane/Rinas	41 25	19 43
Vlore	40 29	19 29







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Summary Map Figure 79

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