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Government
and Politics

Guatemala

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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GUATEMALA

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Government and Politics



President Carlos Arana Osorio (U/OU)

A. Introduction (S)

Although a democracy in form, Guatemala is completely unprepared for democratic rule. It has been dominated throughout its history, except for brief periods, by an oligarchic upper class devoted to protecting its own economic interests and by the armed forces, which traditionally have been the most important political force in the country. The people have had little opportunity or desire for democratic expression or even for acquiring an elementary understanding of democratic processes. Many of the citizenry are illiterate, poverty stricken, apathetic, and often cynical. Most political groups are without a guiding philosophy or mass base and their leaders are interested more in personal power than in national development. Constitutional guarantees of political, economic, and social "rights" for the people have been largely ignored, and programs to raise the standard of living of the majority have been neglected or found impractical even by their advocates when once in power. The armed forces, harassed by Communist insurgents since about 1963, have responded with a terrorist campaign of their own. This counterterrorist activity was moderately successful in curtailing Communist activities, but the breakdown of law and order resulting from the clash of these two

forces has compounded the problem of endemic violence, although it served to strengthen government stability.

In its backwardness, divided culture, and highly unequal distribution of wealth and influence, Guatemala is representative of many nations which developed from the imposition of Spanish colonial culture on a large Indian population. Following the Central American declaration of independence from Spain in 1821, Guatemala participated in unsuccessful attempts to form a larger regional organization. After the collapse of the short-lived Central American Confederation in 1839, Guatemala functioned independently and finally declared itself a republic in 1847. From then until 1944 the presidency was held by a succession of *caudillos*, (political bosses) most of them somewhat despotic. Elections were held only when the incumbent government could assure its own success, and revolution became the only effective way to change administrations. The last of the *caudillos* was Gen. Jorge Ubico, who remained in power from 1931 until he was forced to resign in the revolution of 1944.

Before the fall of Ubico, Guatemala was bound in a feudalistic economy characterized by large land-

holdings operated by forced labor, mainly Indian. The Indian was officially denigrated, maintained within a caste structure, and excluded from national life. A miniscule middle class was employed almost entirely in services. The concept of broad national interest was undeveloped; the only contact local communities had with the national scene was through authoritarian local administrators appointed by the central power.

The social character of the revolution of 1944 and the emphasis placed upon political democracy inspired political activity. The Constitution of 1945 was one of the most liberal and progressive in the country's history. Government, however, was in the hands of inexperienced idealists unable to meet the problems of a coffee and banana export economy with insufficient local capital and industry. Communists, in an atmosphere of confusion, were able to take advantage of the lack of trained public servants and to use the free processes and institutions to entrench themselves in vital positions and finally to dominate the government. The success of the anti-Communist coup in 1954, led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, was almost universally credited to U.S. support. After Castillo's assassination in July 1957, Guatemala was in political turmoil. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-63), continually threatened by plotting from both the left and the right, played off one group against another and further divided an already broken body politic.

Determined that leftist ex-President Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-51) should not run in the elections scheduled for November 1963 and suspicious of Ydigoras' failure to back them on the issue, the military had for some time considered a preventive coup. When Arevalo returned to the country clandestinely on 19 March, the Defense Minister, Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who until then had remained loyal to President Ydigoras, led the smoothly executed ejection of Ydigoras. Peralta, as ranking military officer, assumed both executive and legislative functions, as Congress was dissolved, the Constitution abrogated, and political activity suspended under stringent state of siege provisions. General public reaction to the coup was one of acceptance and relief, for a tense atmosphere had pervaded political and economic life for months.

The military government, having pledged itself to honest administration, promotion of a climate of effective democracy, and the return of power to a freely elected successor, did in fact give more than lip service to these aims. It attempted, against all the odds of traditional corruption, to provide good government. In March 1964 it lifted the state of siege and for a while became lenient toward legitimate centrist to

rightwing political activity, which it saw as no threat to the regime. It sponsored controlled elections for a Constituent Assembly in May 1964 and announced that general elections would follow the promulgation of a new constitution in March 1965. By early 1965, however, the government had begun to show signs of incipient weakness. Unity of the armed forces, the keystone to viability of the military government, was threatened by the personal ambitions and rivalries of several officers. Political parties were growing increasingly disgruntled, both with the indecisiveness of the regime on dates and candidates for elections and with the apparent intent to exclude civilians as nominees. The left objected strenuously to its almost total exclusion from the Constituent Assembly and to difficulties it allegedly encountered in trying to operate legitimately. Limited, but sometimes spectacular, raids by Castro-influenced guerrillas also added to the general restiveness. Following a wave of terrorism, a state of seige was reimposed in February 1965. The Constituent Assembly failed to meet its March deadline, delaying the completion of the new constitution until September of that year. Elections were held in March 1966, and, with the inauguration of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro on 1 July 1966, the country returned to constitutional government.

To take and hold office, however, Mendez had to grant the armed forces *carte blanche* in military affairs, particularly in the field of counterinsurgency. The army's indiscriminate antiterrorist campaign left hundreds dead and a battered but unbroken insurgency movement. In social and fiscal affairs, Mendez trod lightly, backing off from reforms that upset important vested interests. Nevertheless, his do-nothing government was in one respect unique in Guatemala: after surviving its full 4-year constitutional term, it then handed over authority to the duly elected opposition.

Terrorist attacks escalated in late 1969 and early 1970 in an attempt to disrupt the March 1970 elections, reaching a climax with the kidnaping of the Guatemalan Foreign Minister in February 1970 (he was later released). This increased insurgency effort further enhanced the appeal of presidential candidate Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, a leading figure in the 1967 counterinsurgency campaign, whose candidacy was supported by a coalition of conservative parties, and whose platform strongly emphasized the need to pacify Guatemala and to improve the lot of the "marginal" Guatemalan through socioeconomic development. Arana won the presidency by a plurality and was inaugurated on 1 July 1970. Arana's seeming

sincerity in wanting to turn the country around, to end political violence, and to help all his countrymen won him at least a hearing from the legitimate opposition.

The active insurgents, who had been thrown off balance by Arana's initial reformist rhetoric and insistence on legality in dealing with subversion, reverted to their position that a repressive government best served their purposes and set out to invite repressive action. They resumed terrorist activity, concentrating on murdering easy targets such as minor police officials, forcing Arana's supporters to lobby for a no-holds-barred counterterrorist campaign. Continuing terrorism and the fear that the insurgents would attempt major violence on the 10th anniversary of the creation of their movement led the government on 13 November 1970 to impose a state of siege of unprecedented severity. This move signaled an all-out assault on the subversives. The security forces and allied rightist counterinsurgent terrorist squads probably accounted for most of the estimated 150 political deaths a month in 1971, but many of the violent incidents cannot be ascribed to any particular group.

Since late 1971 the Arana government has been taking a more moderate approach as part of its efforts to reduce political violence. A shift to a more restrained approach occurred when the regime lifted the year-old state of siege in November 1971. The Congress also passed a law granting amnesty to all persons who had committed political offenses, or common crimes which were politically motivated, from 1 July 1970 through November 1971. These steps were taken in response to growing domestic pressure and to a deteriorating international image. The level of violence has decreased since the lifting of the state of siege, and Arana probably hopes that the insurgents will see that its reimposition would be as little in their interest as in the government's.

Even though the major thrust of the government during 1970 and 1971 was on limiting terrorism and violence, a few other government programs took shape. Most notably, Arana adopted a 5-year national development program drafted by the previous Mendez government. The plan is directed primarily toward economic growth with the ultimate goal of improving the level of living of the rural underprivileged. Since the plan does not call for radical and basic social change, it has not yet impinged sufficiently on the interests of the conservative elements who support Arana to trigger their opposition. However, full implementation of the plan will confront Arana with important policy decisions and will require considerable funds. The

sincerity and depth of his commitment to improve the lot of the "marginal" Guatemalan will be severely tested.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

1. Constitution

The present (seventh) Constitution, promulgated in September 1965, incorporates many features of previous charters as well as some provisions found in Decree Law No. 8, the "fundamental charter of government" under which Peralta governed from 1963 to 1966. Guatemalan constitutions since 1945, like those of other Latin American nations during the same period, have attempted to regulate a wide range of political, social, and economic relationships, many of which would be the subject of statutory law in Anglo-Saxon countries. In addition to civil rights provisions ordinarily found in the constitutions of most Western democracies, the present Constitution devotes roughly one-fifth of its content to social and economic guarantees to the family and labor.

The primary method provided for amending the Constitution involves a National Constituent Assembly, convoked by a two-thirds vote of the Congress. The assembly is composed of two members elected in each electoral district; those districts having more than 200,000 inhabitants elect one additional member for each additional 100,000 inhabitants or fraction greater than 50,000. The Congress must indicate the articles that are to be amended; however, none of the articles referring to the principle of nonreelection of the President may be amended in any way. In connection with matters in the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Congress and the Council of State meeting together. This applies to such amendments as would be necessary to bring Guatemala into a full or partial union of Central America, and to such amendments as would be necessary to implement Guatemala's claim—asserted in the Constitution—that British Honduras is a part of the national territory.

2. Executive branch

a. President

The President is elected for a 4-year term by an absolute majority of popular votes. The absolute majority requirement proved to be a problem after the election of March 1970 because none of the three

candidates had received the necessary majority. The constitutional provision that the legislature is to choose between the two top candidates in such a case fails to specify whether the vote should be by the outgoing or the incoming Congress (the latter convenes on 15 June before the presidential inauguration on 1 July). The parties concerned finally agreed on election by the outgoing Congress, which chose the slate of Carlos Arana Osorio (President) and Eduardo Caceres Lehnoff (Vice President), which had received the most votes in the popular election.

The President must be a native Guatemalan, 40 years of age or over, and in complete possession of all rights of citizenship. Persons who have come to power by having been leaders of coups or who have held power following a coup during the time the constitutional order was interrupted may not be elected President until one elected constitutional term has intervened. Others who may not be elected President are those occupying the Office of President when an election is held or who have occupied that office at any time within 6 months prior to the election; relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or the second degree of affinity of persons occupying the Office of President; persons who have been a minister of state or held a high military command during the 6 months prior to the election; and ministers of any religion or sect. Reelection or prolongation of the presidential term is specifically prohibited; a person who at any time has held the presidency by popular election or who has acted as a replacement for an elected President for more than 2 years may not again hold that office for any reason.

The President has the usual executive powers derived from his responsibilities for national defense and public order, foreign relations, domestic planning, and execution of legislation passed by Congress and of decisions of the Supreme Court. He has the broad power to appoint and remove, without congressional concurrence, all diplomatic and consular personnel; departmental governors; ministers and vice ministers of state; officials and employees of the presidential office; directors general; officials of the decentralized, autonomous, and semiautonomous agencies; and any other officials and employees whose appointment is not specifically delegated to another branch of the government. He also confers military ranks up to and including colonel without the necessity for congressional approval and may conclude treaties, which in some instances require no congressional ratification. Through his ministers of state he may participate in the lawmaking process by initiating legislation.

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In the field of public order and defense, the President may initiate five stages of governmental control: a state of prevention (15 day maximum), a state of alarm, a state of public disaster, a state of siege, and a state of war. In all cases except a state of prevention, Congress must ratify, modify, or disapprove the presidential decree within 5 days. Under the 1966 Law of Public Order, states of alarm, of public disaster, and of siege were limited to 30 days, and could be extended only with the approval of Congress. In November 1970 the law was revised, giving the President greater freedom in declaring any of the five states of emergency and, in effect, empowering him to extend the state for an indefinite period without consulting Congress. During a state of siege the right of *habeas corpus* and the requirement for search and arrest warrants may be suspended; public assembly and party political activity may be forbidden; curfews may be imposed; persons may be required to reside only in designated areas; and the press may be forbidden to publish specified material.

The executive branch is to a great extent the center of government. The President, as chief executive, heads an administrative system with powers that extend at least indirectly to the local level (Figure 1). Also, as leader of a party or a coalition of parties supporting the government, he exerts an influence tantamount to control of the legislative and judicial branches. The chief executive's position has been enhanced by the creation of a number of autonomous agencies—whose officials he appoints—through which influence can be brought to bear on the social and economic life of the nation. Cabinet members assist in the exercise of executive functions. Ministers are usually civilians selected chiefly on a basis of personal loyalty to the President.

b. Vice President and the presidential succession

The Vice President is elected on the same ballot with the President and for the same term; he may not be reelected Vice President or elected President for the term immediately following. He must have the same qualifications as the President and is granted the same immunities. The day-to-day duties include presiding over the Council of State, participating in discussions of the Council of Ministers, representing the President in official and protocolary acts when so requested, and performing other duties assigned by the Constitution.

In the case of temporary incapacity of the President, the Vice President occupies the Office of President until the latter is able to resume office. In the case of a permanent incapacity, the Vice President occupies the Office of President until the completion of the term. If

both President and Vice President should be permanently incapacitated, the Congress and the Council of State choose a successor by two-thirds vote of their combined membership. (If such a successor resigns without having served more than 2 years, and more than 6 months before the next election, he is eligible to run for the presidency in the election.)

c. Ministers of state

Each ministry under the executive branch is headed by a minister of state and a vice minister. The Constitution does not specify the number of ministries; in mid-1972 there were 10: Foreign Affairs; Government; Treasury and Public Credit; Economy; Public Health and Social Work; Agriculture; National Defense; Education; Communications and Public Works; and Labor and Social Security.¹

A minister of state must be a Guatemalan, in full enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, and 30 years of age or over. Ministers may not be related to the President, Vice President, or another minister within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity. Others who are not eligible are persons who have been convicted in cases involving accounts whose liabilities have not been settled; contractors on works financed by government funds or persons with claims pending in respect to such matters; persons who are representing or defending the interests of companies or persons operating public services or plants making alcoholic beverages; or ministers of any religion or sect. The Secretary General of the Presidency and the Private Secretary to the President must meet these same qualifications.

In addition to the administration of their respective ministries, ministers of state are empowered to appear before Congress and the Council of State to participate in discussions pertaining to their ministries. They are also required to present to Congress annually an account of the activities of their respective ministries. Ministers must also appear before Congress to answer interpellations, and such questioning may result in presentation of a resolution of lack of confidence if requested by at least eight legislative deputies. If it is passed, the minister (or ministers—not to exceed three at any given time) must submit his resignation. If the President does not accept the resignation, a two-thirds vote of all deputies is necessary to override his rejection.

¹For current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

The President of the Republic and the ministers of state, meeting together, constitute the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is convoked and presided over by the President and may discuss only those matters submitted by him. Ministers are jointly and individually responsible with the President for all measures signed together with him.

d. Autonomous agencies

In addition to the ministries, there are about a dozen autonomous and about a half dozen semiautonomous agencies. The former, whose officials are appointed by the President, are completely self-governing; the latter are under the general guidance of a ministry. Among these agencies are the Bank of Guatemala, the National Agricultural Development Bank, the National Mortgage Bank, the Monetary Board, the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security, the University of San Carlos, the Municipal Development Institute, the National Institute of Housing, the Guatemalan Tourist Center, and the Electoral Council and Electoral Registry.




FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U/OU)

e. Council of State

An advisory body, the Council of State is empowered to render opinions on the negotiation and renegotiation of contracts for public services; on bills and other matters submitted to it by any branch of government, on treaties, conventions, and international agreements that require the approval of Congress; and on disputes that may arise between various government agencies when a solution is not provided by law; and to submit for consideration by the President suggestions for the solution of general problems of the country. The Council of State is a prestigious body, but generally has little effect on government policy.

The council is composed of the Vice President, who presides over its meetings, two members designated by each of the three branches of government, one member designated by the presidents of the professional associations recognized by the San Carlos University, one member chosen by the *municipios* (roughly analogous to U.S. counties or rural townships), one member representing urban workers and one member representing farm workers chosen by the boards of directors of their respective legally registered unions, and one member each representing agriculture, industry, commerce, and private banking designated by their respective associations. Qualifications for membership are generally the same as those for minister of state except that members of the Council of State must be at least 40 years old and of recognized competence in affairs of state. Those prohibited from membership are the same as in the case of ministers of state; additionally, officials or employees of the government or its agencies are ineligible (except for teachers and professionals in the field of social welfare). Members of the Council of State serve for 4 years; they may serve as many as two terms, but these may not be consecutive.

f. Public Ministry

The Public Ministry is headed by the Attorney General and is composed of agents and investigators as specified by law. The Attorney General is appointed by the President from a list of three persons proposed by the Council of State. He may be removed by the President after a hearing in the Council of State; the Constitution does not specify, however, what authority, if any, the Council of State has in overriding the wishes of the President in matters of removal. The Attorney General must be a lawyer with not less than 10 years practice or service in the judicial branch. His functions are basically the same as those

of the U.S. Attorney General—to represent the state in legal matters and defend its rights and interests, to force compliance with the laws, and to take steps necessary to insure the administration of justice.

g. Civil service

Despite efforts during the Peralta regime to make public administration more honest and efficient, buttressed by provisions to this effect in the present Constitution, the law establishing a civil service system was not passed by Congress until May 1968, becoming effective in January 1969. Guatemala has not yet created a viable merit system to regulate the hiring, dismissal, promotion, and discipline of public employees. Patronage and nepotism continue to govern appointment and advancement in public office, although corruption has been reduced considerably since the Ydigoras administration. A major obstacle to efficient government is the high illiteracy rate and the consequent problems of staffing. The lack of competent replacements, therefore, has been a major safeguard of a civil servant's tenure.

3. Legislative branch

Legislative power is vested in a unicameral Congress composed of deputies who are directly elected for a 4-year term. They may not be elected again until after the lapse of one term, and reelection is permitted only once. (Some consideration is being given to eliminating these provisions, because they result in a completely new, inexperienced Congress every 4 years.) There were 55 deputies elected in 1970. The number of deputies is variable; each of the 23 electoral districts elects two deputies unless the population exceeds 200,000, in which case an additional deputy is elected for each additional 100,000 inhabitants or fraction over 50,000. Each district elects only one alternate deputy.

A deputy must be a native Guatemalan, in possession of all rights of citizenship, and at least 30 years of age. Those who may not be deputies are:

- employees and officials of the executive and judicial branches and employees of the legislative branch except teachers and professional welfare workers; contractors for public works or persons with claims pending for such work; relatives of the President and Vice President within the fourth degree of consanguinity or the second degree of affinity; persons convicted in cases involving accounts if their liability has not been settled; military men on active duty; persons representing the interests of companies operating public services; ministers of any religion or sect.

A deputy may, however, represent Guatemala on temporary or special diplomatic missions.

The regular sessions of Congress run from June 15 through October 15, but they may be extended for such time as may be necessary. Since 1966, Congress has met virtually the year round. The most important duties of Congress involve legislation; financial matters, such as the approval of the budget and expenditures, levying of taxes, and authorization of the Executive to negotiate loans; approval of some categories of treaties; and the election for a 4-year term of judicial magistrates and the Chief of the Office of the Comptroller of Accounts. Congress must also approve the conferring of the military general-officer ranks. Most bills of Congress require approval of an absolute majority for passage. Congressional actions which require a vote of two-thirds of all deputies are:

- a declaration that grounds exist for legal proceedings against the President, Vice President, or other high public official; a declaration of the physical or mental incapacity of the President based on a report by five doctors; approval of matters relating to loans of any kind; convocation of a national constituent assembly to amend the Constitution, approval of specific types of treaties, conventions, and international agreements.

Treaties requiring a two-thirds vote are those affecting laws which required a two-thirds vote for passage; those affecting the national domain or establishing a partial or complete union of Central America; those obligating the state financially in excess of 1% of the budget; those agreeing to submit any matter to international judicial or arbitral decision; those permitting the passage of foreign armies through the national territory or the installation of foreign military bases; and those which could affect the security of the state or put an end to a state of war. Congress also has the responsibility of counting the ballots for the President and Vice President; if no slate obtains the required majority of votes, Congress must choose between the two slates having the highest number of votes.

In general, Guatemalan congressmen have been poorly prepared for their legislative duties and at times have appeared to have little understanding of the legislation on which they worked. Traditionally, the President and political party leaders have been able to exert substantial influence on the selection of congressmen. During the administration of Arevalo numerous inexperienced students served in Congress, and shortly thereafter Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54) had his chauffeur elected to Congress. Occasionally conflicting political currents, personal jealousies, shifting loyalties, and lack of leadership have made it difficult for administrations to push through their

legislative programs. More often, however, when the President puts serious pressure on Congress, he can expect to get what he wants, even though there might be some delays and entanglements of bills. Ex-President Ydigoras once referred privately to money as the lubricant of the legislative process.

4. Judicial branch

The judiciary is composed of a Supreme Court of at least seven members (whose president is also president of the entire judicial system) and three subordinate echelons of courts. Immediately below the Supreme Court is the appeals level, which consists of the Court of Appeals, the Contentious-Administrative Courts, the Court of Second Instance of Accounts, and the Court of Conflicts of Jurisdiction. The president of the judiciary, magistrates of the Supreme Court, and magistrates on the appeals level are chosen by Congress for 4-year terms. If they are elected to three successive terms they are entitled to permanent tenure until the age of 70. They may, however, be removed at any time by a two-thirds vote of Congress for conviction of a crime, notorious misconduct, or manifest incapacity. Appeals level magistrates are chosen as a group by Congress and are assigned to the various courts by the Supreme Court. Below the appeals level are the courts of first instance and the courts of accounts. The basic unit of the judicial system is a network of lower courts roughly equivalent to justices of the peace. These and judges on the first instance level are chosen by the Supreme Court.

Judges of the lower courts, courts of first instance, and courts of accounts must be native Guatemalans, in possession of all rights of citizenship, and of recognized integrity. Persons holding office in a political party or labor union or ministers of any religion or sect may not be appointed. In addition to these requirements, magistrates on the appeals level must be at least 35 years of age and have been either a judge of first instance or a practicing lawyer for 5 years. Supreme Court magistrates, in addition to meeting the basic requirements, must be at least 40 years of age and have served one full term as a magistrate on the appeals level, or have practiced law for 10 years.

The lower courts, the courts of first instance, and the Court of Appeals constitute the regular court system. Specialized tribunals, such as the others on the appeals level, have jurisdictions limited to specific situations. The Contentious-Administrative Courts hear cases involving disputes arising from acts or decisions of the public administration, of *municipios*, and of the decentralized, autonomous, or semiautonomous

agencies, in the course of performing their regular duties, and also cases involving contracts and concessions of an administrative nature. The courts of accounts handle matters involving accounting disputes. The Court of Conflicts of Jurisdiction is apparently formed only when there is a specific need and hears disputes between the Contentious-Administrative Courts and courts of ordinary or special jurisdiction, and between the public administration and such courts. There are also two special courts—the Court of Amparo (injunction) and the Court of Constitutionality. The Court of Amparo is composed of the president of the first division of the Court of Appeals and six other magistrates. This court takes cognizance of amparo proceedings entered against the Supreme Court or any of its members, against Congress, or against the Council of State for acts and decisions that are not merely legislative. The Court of Constitutionality is composed of 12 members: the president and four magistrates of the Supreme Court, and seven magistrates chosen from among those serving on the Court of Appeals and the Contentious-Administrative Courts. This court hears appeals entered against laws or governmental orders on the ground that they contain the partial or total defect of being unconstitutional. An affirmative vote of at least eight members of the court is necessary to declare a law unconstitutional, and no appeal of any kind may be entered against a decision of the Court of Constitutionality.

Theoretically an independent and equal branch of the government, the judiciary is the least independent of the three. It is to some extent subordinate to the legislature, since all top-level magistrates are selected by Congress for 4-year terms, and, like the entire government, it is dominated by the Executive. The position of the judiciary is further weakened by the caliber of its personnel and the antiquated laws under which it operates. The Peralta government achieved some success in lessening graft, inefficiency, and dishonesty in the judiciary, and in dismissing some judges and magistrates of leftist persuasion. Nevertheless, these problems still exist, and many of the lower courts are staffed by law school students. The Code of Criminal Procedures and the Penal Code were enacted in 1898 and 1936, respectively. The former was amended in December 1966 to provide more power for police to deal with terrorists and again in March 1967 to accelerate the judicial procedures in cases involving rebellion, sedition, kidnapping, and assassination. In reality, the latter amendment placed time limits on the various phases of the judicial process which judges have found difficult to meet. The Penal

Code was amended in July 1970, increasing the sanctions for crimes connected with subversion.

5. Local government

For administrative purposes Guatemala is divided into 22 departments and those in turn into *municipios*. Guatemala City, the capital of the country and located in the Department of Guatemala, is known as the Central District. Departmental administration is entrusted to a governor, who is appointed by the President of the Republic and who is responsible entirely to him. There are no legislative bodies on the departmental level and no departmental autonomy. The governor functions solely as a representative of the President and serves at his pleasure.

The *municipios*, which numbered 325 in 1970 including the Central District, are each governed by a council presided over by a mayor (*alcalde*). The number of councilmen (*concejales*) and legal advisers (*sindiccs*) varies with the size and importance of the *municipio*. Guatemala City, for instance, elects three *sindiccs* and 11 *concejales*. The length of the term also varies. Guatemala City, the 21 other departmental capitals, and 14 *municipios* with 30,000 or more inhabitants, or otherwise declared "urban areas," elect their officials every 4 years. In the remaining *municipios* the term of office is 2 years. Elections in all 325 *municipios* were held in March 1972; the next elections of officials who serve only 2 years are scheduled for March 1974. All officials are elected directly by the people—mayors and *sindiccs* by a plurality and *concejales* by proportional representation. *Municipio* officials may not be immediately reelected.

Candidates need not be nominated by a recognized political party; a petition to nominate, submitted by a civic committee, is sufficient. The number of signatures required is as follows: Guatemala City, 2,000; departmental capitals and cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, 200; municipalities with over 10,000 inhabitants and in the ports, 100; municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants, 50; and in those with less than 5,000 inhabitants, 25. Because these requirements are easy to fulfill, there is usually an abundance of candidates. In 1970 there were 13 candidates for mayor of Guatemala City. In 1969 the Electoral Council decreed that candidates must obtain the signatures of at least 10% of the registered voters, but this aroused so much opposition that the decree was rescinded.

The degree of autonomy accorded by law to *municipios* differs according to its demographic character, economic capacity, political and ad-

ministrative importance, and cultural development. For the most part, their autonomy is administrative, although some *municipios* levy and collect taxes, and some have police forces directly responsible to the mayor.

C. Political dynamics

1. Political forces

The three major political forces in Guatemala are the military, the upper class, and the political parties. The military is by far the most important; since early in the 20th century its support, or at least its tacit consent, has been essential to every government's continuance in office. The military has become an internal power, exerting influence on national policy far out of proportion to its size and share of the national budget. The wealthy upper class influences government policy through various economic pressure groups and has close ties with the rightist parties in power. It has traditionally been allied with the military and would need military support to overthrow a government. Political parties are largely the election vehicles of ambitious individuals and the strengths of the parties vary with the political fortunes of their leaders. (U/OU)

a. Military (S)

The tenure of Guatemalan chief executives has depended upon their ability to retain support of the armed forces. Traditionally, the military has had an important and frequently determinant position in politics, despite the nonpolitical status of the military establishment under most constitutions. Both the Arbenz regime and the interim administration of Luis Arturo Gonzalez Lopez (1957) fell when the armed forces withdrew their support at a critical point. When the armed forces have considered the political situation intolerable, they have not hesitated to seize the government. Such was the case in March 1963, when Ydigoras was relieved of his executive position by the military, when the military saw the threat of Communist resurgence in the possible presidential candidacy of Arevalo. The military establishment regards itself as the guardian of the constitution and of the country, and it tends to participate directly in politics at times of chaos and national unrest, or when politics appear to be subversive. Since 1954 after their experience with the heavily Communist-infiltrated Arbenz regime, even moderate leftism has been intolerable to the Guatemalan military. Moderately leftist President Mendez, elected in 1966, was

apparently allowed to assume office in exchange for giving the military complete control of the internal security effort. Furthermore, even though elected on a reformist platform, he was unable or unwilling to attempt any significant program on behalf of the poorer class for fear of alienating the wealthy upper class and losing military support.

Although the military regards itself as nonpolitical—even when it has been in control of the government—individual military leaders have often sought positions of national political leadership. At any given time, the military high command includes several presidential aspirants. Sixteen of the 21 presidents from 1871 to the present have come from military ranks. As a career military man, President Arana is highly acceptable to the armed forces and he continues to enjoy their complete support.

b. Upper class (U/OU)

Guatemala's wealthy families exert influence on the government through their economic power. This is often done through personal contacts with government officials and sometimes through membership in commercial, industrial, professional, and agricultural associations. These associations maintain close ties with government parties and the military and association members often hold government positions. The upper class is unable on its own to overthrow a government, but its economic power and its personal relationships with government officials assure it a voice in shaping government policy.

c. Political parties (S)

Political parties are unrepresentative, unstable groupings generally revolving around a personality, and are held together by varying mixtures of personal loyalty to the leader, greed, ambition, and animosity toward figures in opposing political aggregations. Conspicuously absent is a well-defined ideology or consensus on public policy or national objectives. The parties seldom face issues, having no need to address themselves to the wishes of the voters, since the electorate is on the whole illiterate and uninformed. The essentially personal and irresponsible character of the parties has led to their rise and fall in accordance with the personal fortunes of their leaders. Election times have consistently given rise to new ephemeral parties and have exaggerated the tendency of party alignments to shift. Expediency and the scramble for power have dictated last-minute political compromises and realignments (Figure 2).

The 1965 Constitution maintains basically the same ground rule for political activity established by the




FIGURE 2. Presidential elections, 1944-70 (U/OU)

Peralta government in February 1964. It bars the Communist party and other parties of totalitarian ideologies from participation, and establishes a minimum membership of 50,000 registered voters, 20% of whom must be literate, for inscription of a party. Not only are political groups highly disorganized, but many citizens are reluctant to place their names on any political list. On the other hand, other citizens are ready to sign up with whatever group pays the most, often signing with several parties. Four parties have legal status: the National Liberation Movement (MLN), the Democratic Institutional Party (PID), the Revolutionary Party (PR), and the

Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG). In addition, there are two other parties of importance: the Democratic Revolutionary Unity group (URD), a less formal organization which was aligned with the DCG in 1970; and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), the Communist party, which is illegal.

(1) Government coalition parties

(a) NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN)—The MLN was formed as a split from Castillo Armas' old National Democratic Movement (MDN) in 1958 by Mario Sandoval Alarcon, a former director of the MDN and still the secretary general of the MLN. The party was registered in 1960. This wing of the MDN had formed part of the opposition to President Ydigoras and, as the MLN, joined the PR and the DCG in 1962 in demanding his resignation. The MLN collaborated with the Peralta regime in its plans for a return to constitutionalism and participated in the May 1964 elections for the Constituent Assembly. The party orientation is rightwing conservative, violently anti-Communist, and firmly against any party to the left of it in the political spectrum. The MLN polled 24% of the votes in the 1966 presidential elections (Figure 3) and obtained six seats in Congress. Party leaders in addition to Secretary General Sandoval include: First Vice President of Congress Hector Andrade; Minister of Education Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre; Minister of Government Roberto Herrera




FIGURE 3. Facts on the 1966 and 1970 presidential and congressional elections (U/OU)

Ibarguen; and Congressional Deputy Ernesto Zamora Centeno. Some friction apparently exists among party leaders. Sandoval maintains complete control of the party and has been criticized for preventing the development of second-echelon leaders.

(b) DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL PARTY (PID)—In the summer of 1964 the PID was formed as a government-sponsored party to serve as a focal point of a coalition with the MLN and the PR; the intention was for the three parties to unite in backing a single candidate for the presidency. However, the coalition disintegrated before the 1966 elections, and each party supported its own candidate. The PID backed Juan de Dios Aguilar, who polled 32% of the vote, and the party elected 20 deputies to Congress. Its political orientation is extremely rightwing conservative and violently anti-Communist. The PID was considered a very weak party in 1965, and in 1968 it appeared to be dying when 10 of its congressional deputies declared themselves no longer associated with it. Party leaders include Minister of Public Health and Social Work, Jose Trinidad Ucles, Minister of Treasury and Public Credit, Jorge Lamport, Secretary General Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz and Congressional Deputies Ramiro Ramos and Guillermo Valdez Tible.

(c) THE MLN/PID COALITION—In 1969 the MLN and the PID joined forces and the coalition elected President Arana on a strong law and order platform in 1970, receiving 40% of the vote and winning 37 of the 55 congressional seats (Figure 4). The coalition further increased its influence by winning in over 70% of the 289 municipalities in the March 1972 municipal elections. But this victory was less significant than it appeared since traditionally the governing parties




FIGURE 4. Party representation in Congress, 1972 (U/OU)

have won a majority in off-year elections. Moreover, the lackluster effort by the main opposition, the PR, which registered candidates in only about half of the municipalities contested, often left MLN/PID candidates unchallenged.

Although the two parties are enjoying the fruits of power, there are indications of strain between them. PID leaders are preoccupied about the future, and have lingering fear that the party will be absorbed by the MLN. Sandoval has already made inroads, having won or bought the allegiance of several PID congressional deputies. With no strong party pull holding them in the fold, other PID deputies may change their allegiance. Despite their partnership, most MLN leaders speak disparagingly of PID members. They are seen as political opportunists who are members of a party that lacks a political philosophy and a future. Although the two parties will probably continue working together, the MLN is exploring other possibilities. Some reports indicate that the MLN is trying to woo the more conservative faction of the PR into an alliance. PR Secretary General Sagastume and three PR congressional deputies have consistently supported the MLN/PID coalition in Congress, with the deputies even voting against their own party. The PID is reasonably content with its present lot since it does enjoy several important positions in the government.

(2) Opposition parties—The opposition parties, the PR, the DCG, and the URD, have been under greater constraints than the governing MLN/PID because of the state of siege during 1971, which curtailed their political activities. In addition, a series of events, including personal threats, arrests, and the murder of some of their members have intimidated opposition leaders. As a consequence, most leaders have restricted their activities and as a result have lost much support and influence since 1971. Some leaders have withdrawn from politics, or left the country, for reasons of personal security. For example the former PR leader and ex-Minister of Foreign Relations in the Mendez government, Alberto Fuentes Mohr, has taken up residence in Costa Rica.

Some leaders of the democratic left continue to voice criticism of the government security campaign and the extralegal actions condoned by or participated in by the government. Since the lifting of the state of siege, however, the criticism has been less intense and comes mostly from university quarters.

(a) REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PR)—Formed in August 1957, the PR was the principal opposition party during the Ydigoras administration and at times has

been the most active and possibly the most powerful political group in the country. In its early days it included all elements of the left, ranging from the mildly socialist to the militantly Communist, a diversity which created party disunity. Following attempts by the Communists to make the PR a front for the clandestine PGT, the PR in December 1958 expelled extreme leftist members and reorganized to provide a leadership loyal to the more moderate views of the party leader, the late Mario Mendez Montenegro, brother of former President Mendez.

The party program is liberal, reformist, mildly nationalistic, and denunciatory of communism and other brands of extremism. It favors private enterprise over state-directed development schemes. Prior to the 1966 election the PR had achieved the formation of hard-working party units in all of the nation's 23 electoral districts, and in most of the 325 *municipios*. The PR successfully directed its campaign appeal to the average voter—the lower and middle class wage earner, both urban and rural—who, even if he understood little of national problems, wanted a chance to vote against the *status quo* and the policies of the "establishment" designed to "keep him in his place." The PR polled the largest plurality of presidential votes (44%) and elected 29 of the 55 deputies to Congress in 1966. Party statutes call for a national convention every 2 years to elect officers. The PR is financed by members' dues assessed on a sliding scale and by voluntary contributions.

Intraparty discord has characterized the PR since losing the presidential elections in 1970. Two unsuccessful attempts to elect a secretary general in 1970 divided the party between a faction headed by Carlos Sagastume Perez, who seeks accommodation with the governing rightist parties, and a more leftwing faction, which opposes such a move. A party convention was held in February 1972 and Sagastume was unanimously elected party leader. He reportedly received help from MLN leader Mario Sandoval in defeating a dissident Palomas Blancas group headed by Gonzalo Yurrita and may try to form a center-right unity front for the 1974 presidential elections. Sagastume could also opt to form an opposition coalition with the DCG. After Sagastume took over the PR apparatus, a group of younger party activists, including five of the party's deputies announced their resignation from the PR. This group, lead by Deputy Rafael Pantoja and Gonzalo Yurrita and consisting largely of the hard core opposition to Sagastume's election, saw no hope of having a real voice in a Sagastume run PR and joined together to form a new party, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) as a

vehicle for its member's political hopes. While this group has taken a dramatic anti-Sagastume stand, many PR leaders feel that the best and safest posture for the party is one of mild opposition and low profile. They retain a haunting fear that elections might not be held in 1974, and do not want to make any moves that would jeopardize the elections. The party enjoys a reputation of honesty and is generally more acceptable to the armed forces than other opposition parties. The party's relative inaction and lack of leadership continue to be serious liabilities. Although most political observers, including the PR leadership, assume that the party enjoys the support of a large mass of voters, no PR leader, with the exception of Sagastume, is keeping in touch with the grass roots. The party's lack of leadership and disorganization are evidenced by its loss of over 100 municipalities to the MLN/PID governing coalition in the March 1972 municipal elections.

(b) GUATEMALAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY (DCG)—Originally founded in 1955 by a group of wealthy conservative Catholics, the DCG, through the years moved to the left of the political spectrum and is now controlled by young liberals. Of the DCG leaders, the best known are Rene de Leon Schlotter, the party's chosen "precandidate" for the 1974 presidential elections, and Secretary General Danilo Barillas Rodriguez. Although allied with other national and international Christian democratic organizations, the DCG follows a fairly independent political course. Its ideology is consistent with other Christian democratic philosophies in Latin America, favoring radical solutions to socioeconomic problems. Rejecting church influence, the dominant liberals are sometimes embarrassed by the strong identification of their predecessors with the Catholic Church. The party is still attacked by its adversaries as a clerical party—a particularly damaging charge because one segment of the population courted by the DCG, the intellectual community, is outspokenly anticlerical. The DCG shares interest, objectives, philosophy, and close rapport with the Christian democratic labor and student groups, the Central Federation of Guatemalan Workers (FECETRAG) and the Social Christian Student Federation (FESC). In the 1970 presidential elections, the DCG and its URD ally made a strong showing by obtaining 20% of the vote, reflecting a tendency for a large number of Guatemalans to vote as far left as legally possible. Its key stronghold is Guatemala City where URD leader, Manuel Colom Argueta, won the mayoralty (Figure 5). The DCG waged a vigorous campaign and drew many votes which would have normally gone to the PR. The result

was the reverse of the 1966 election when the PR won the left and the center vote to elect President Mendez by a plurality. With the impressive vote in 1970, the DCG was confident of increasing support in the March 1972 municipal elections. However, the party won only 27 municipalities (9%), which is not indicative of the growing support the party claims. DCG activities are now focusing on the 1974 presidential elections. No precise party strategy has been agreed upon, but leaders suggest that an alliance with other opposition groups such as the liberal faction of the PR, will be necessary to make a strong showing.

(c) DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY UNITY GROUP (URD)—Members of the PR who were expelled for being too far left formed the URD in 1958. Except for the PGT, the URD is now considered the most leftist oriented group in Guatemala. It has never been legally inscribed because of failure to acquire the necessary 50,000 signatures for inscription. A number of URD leaders—including Guatemala City Mayor Colom Argueta—in March 1972 announced their intentions to form a new party called the Democratic Revolutionary Unity Front (FURD) to replace the URD. Reports indicated that the FURD would remain aligned with the DCG, but would undertake an all-out campaign to enlist the 50,000 signatures needed for legal inscription. Given the substantial resources available to Mayor Colom, as well as his personal skill and magnetism as a politician, it appeared that he could muster the necessary signatures, if the government were to let him try. Francisco Villagran Kramer, and a number of other members of the URD have not joined in Colom's efforts to form the FURD.

(d) COMMUNIST PARTY—The Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), illegal since 1954, is the Communist party in Guatemala. Founded in 1952, it declined from a high of 4,000 members under the Arbenz administration to approximately 700 in late 1972. Most of its founding members were young intellectuals, and the bulk of its present membership is of middle class origin. The PGT continues to appeal to labor, students, and intellectuals, the sectors most highly receptive to its denunciations of social and economic inequities in Guatemalan society. It backs popular causes in its printed materials, which include *Verdad*, a clandestine newspaper, which is published irregularly and distributed throughout the nation. The basic organizational principle is stated to be democratic centralism, which is defined as the "widest possible democracy under centralized direction." The highest governing body is the national congress, which

is supposed to be convened every 3 years. However, 8 years passed between the second and third congresses, and another 8 years passed before convocation of the fourth congress in December 1969. The congress elects a 21-member central committee—16 permanent members and five alternates—which is the highest authority between congresses.

The central committee has the responsibility for choosing the members of the political commission (the number varying from five to seven), which directs the party's activities between meetings of the central committee. Also on the national level are various other commissions such as propaganda, intelligence, organization, education, and logistics. Since 1966 the PGT has been organized into seven regions. These are not fixed geographic demarcations, but general areas of operation and importance.

The PGT has no significant front organizations. The Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala (FASGUA), a labor federation dominated by the Communists, claimed a total membership of 2,600 in 1970. Many of its affiliates (19 trade unions and 32 peasant leagues), however, have frequently been described as paper organizations, and the total membership is not believed to be nearly as large as claimed. The federation has been ineffective and is practically defunct.

The main source of financial assistance to the PGT has been the U.S.S.R.; smaller amounts are believed to have come from China, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. Funds are also received locally from kidnappings and robberies. In the past the funds were sufficient to finance salaries, living expenses, and allowances for top PGT leaders and some of the lesser leaders. The amount being received by the PGT is not known, but the Soviets may have pledged \$100,000 per year.

The PGT is committed to undermining the government and has numerous penetrations at various levels of society. Its broad strategy still calls for the long-term preparation of the masses for a full-scale effort against the entrenched, feudalistic system. The party, moreover, has a plan—although a vague one—for governing; it has wielded power once, and may have some capacity for governing. Communists are highly influential at San Carlos University, which is generally considered to be a leftist oriented institution. Rector Rafael Cuevas del Cid, although not a member of the PGT, cooperates with the party, and both the secretary and the treasurer of the university are party members. Of a total of 436 professors and administrators in the university's three main schools—law, economics, and humanities—49 were believed to be PGT members in January 1972. The PGT also

sponsors a number of students annually to study in the Soviet Union. This is a continuing program and over the last decade the party has sent about 150 students to the U.S.S.R.

The PGT received one of its severest setbacks in September 1972 when a number of party leaders, including the Secretary General, disappeared. Although the Arana government continues to deny any responsibility, the press has widely reported that security forces broke into a secret meeting and arrested the Communists. The press has also repeated persistent "rumors" that the men have been killed. Government pronouncements have not been particularly convincing and are unlikely to divert suspicion from the regime.

The PGT may feel compelled to retaliate in order to maintain credibility as a significant national force. The lack of action thus far seems to indicate continued doubt whether the men are alive or dead. Fears that the men have been interrogated will force the Communists to take time-consuming protective measures. As time passes without word of the whereabouts of the Communists leaders, it will be assumed that they are dead, and terrorist strikes to avenge the killings will be a likely possibility.

The PGT action arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR), was formed in 1967 after the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) severed its ties with the PGT. The PGT/FAR is relatively inactive, however, occasionally participating in operations such as robberies, kidnappings and extortions to gain funds for the party. The two FAR groups are discussed below under threats to government stability.

(3) *Campaign maneuvering in 1972*—Since the lifting of the state of siege in November 1971, all political parties have renewed "normal" activities to varying degrees. Both legal opposition parties, the PR and the DCC, held party conventions in February 1972 and elected party leaders. The DCC also nominated Rene de Leon Schlotter as its prepresidential candidate for the 1974 elections. The selection of Carlos Sagastume as secretary general of the PR has at least temporarily divided the party between "old liners" and "young guards" with the latter faction backing Gonzalo Yurrita. This faction evidently is wary of Sagastume's reported friendship with Mario Sandoval, President of Congress and leader of the ruling National Liberation Movement (MLN). Sagastume's party candidacy was avidly acclaimed by Sandoval in an apparent attempt to split the MLN's opposition, and the PR is in a state of disarray (Figure 5).

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All parties are planning for the 1974 elections. The MLN may support the candidacy of Mario Sandoval but his nomination is not assured because of the military's and President Arana's reservations about his acceptability as President. Many feel that Sandoval is too rightist and *status quo* oriented, which would probably prohibit his bringing together the necessary political forces into a government dedicated to tackling Guatemala's many socioeconomic problems.

2. Special interest groups (U/OU)

There are no significant special interest groups in Guatemala organized specifically to influence government policy, but voluntary organizations of various size, significance, and purpose do exist. For the most part these groups are limited to the middle and upper class. Many are short lived and others are only tenuously held together by a common cause. Among the most important are those established for the furtherance of business and commercial interests. Professional societies and women's organizations are other potential centers of joint activity. These groups make their interests known through petitions to officials, manifestos or statements of positions, mass demonstrations, parades, and meetings, all of which are employed with varying frequency.

Groups set up to further the economic interests of their members operate somewhat like their counterparts in developed countries. The majority of these associations arose during the Arbenz administration in answer to what many businessmen felt was a growing threat to the private enterprise system from organized labor. The resulting network of organizations includes groups which count among their membership Guatemala's wealthiest businessmen and agriculturalists, such as the Coordinating Committee of Associations of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry, and Finance (CACIF), the Association of Friends of the Country, and the Guatemalan Association of Agriculturalists (AGA).

To some extent, foreign business enterprises operating in Guatemala constitute a political pressure group. Prior to 1944, these companies, chiefly U.S. owned, exerted effective pressure on the executive and on members of Congress, but their influence rapidly declined with the growth of nationalistic and anti-U.S. sentiment during the succeeding revolutionary administrations and following the disclosure of a U.S. role in the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in 1954. The economic importance once exerted by such entities as the United Fruit Co. constituted a form of indirect foreign pressure on the government. However, the company's predominance in the economy has



Manuel Colom Argueta—Mayor of Guatemala City and leader of Democratic Revolutionary Unity



Rene de Leon Schlotter—A leader of the Guatemalan Christian Democracy party and its chosen prepresidential candidate for the 1974 elections

largely disappeared, and most U.S. investment is now in small manufacturing enterprises.

In addition to the business and commercial associations, certain groupings exist to promote the interests of particular professions. Among these is the Guatemalan Bar Association, which functions in a manner similar to that of its counterpart in the United States. With a membership of over 500 lawyers, it is a highly respected professional organization of long standing. Two organizations in the media field, the Association of Journalists of Guatemala (APJ) and the Association of Communications Media of Guatemala are active in denouncing both government censorship and terrorist attacks on news outlets. The former publicizes government detentions of newsmen without due process of law. The latter, combining major press, radio, and television organizations, brings the influence of the media to bear on public opinion.

Associations of women abound, but with few exceptions they are small and ineffective. In 1952, the Civic Alliance of Women's Associations was created as an umbrella organization for 45 of these groups. Two of the more important constituent members are the Guatemalan Association of University Women and the Association of Business and Professional Women. The restricted role of women in Guatemalan society effectively hampers any large-scale public activity on their part, although a feminist movement has existed in the country since 1944.

The Guatemala labor movement did not begin to recover from severe setbacks suffered after the overthrow of the Arbenz regime until the late 1960's; today it represents more a potential than an actual force for group action and social change. Unions are specifically prohibited in the Constitution from engaging in politics and are subject to dissolution if



Carlos Sagastume—Secretary General of the opposition Revolutionary Party



Mario Sandoval Alarcon—leader of the National Liberation Movement and President of Congress

FIGURE 5. Leading political figures (U/OU)

they do so. Except for the FASGUA, whose executive board includes members of the clandestine Communist PGT, no union is directly affiliated with any of the political parties, and the latter do not have labor sectors as such. Nevertheless, under the Mendez regime both the PR and the DCG provided moral support for the organizational efforts of various labor groups. The labor movement does have some voice in national affairs, although to a much lesser extent than in the early 1950's. Labor is also represented on the National Minimum Wage Commission, the Board of Directors of the Workers' Bank, and the Board of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS). Attempts by labor leaders to play a more significant role in economic planning have generally been rebuffed, as shown by the fact that labor is not represented on the National Economic Planning Council or on such agencies as the agrarian reform and housing institutes.

Since the political attitude of university students is widely respected by the largely illiterate population, students have exercised an important influence in national politics disproportionate to their numbers. In 1944 students played a significant role in bringing about the overthrow of President Jorge Ubico and participated in the fall of his successor, Gen. Federico Ponce. University students were for the most part very much opposed to Castillo Armas; in 1956 they demonstrated so threateningly against the government that marchers were dispersed only after police had killed or wounded a number of them. The student clement was opposed to the Peralta government but feared to agitate against it. During the Mendez administration, and thus far in Arana's regime, students have continued to be relatively quiet.

The hard core of University of San Carlos activists operates through several student associations in the 10 schools comprising the university and vies for the support of the uncommitted majority of students, many of whom attend classes only in the evening. The principal student associations are the University Revolutionary Front (FRU), the Social-Christian Student Front (FESC) and the PR-sponsored Revolutionary Youth. The Marxist FRU, together with several other far-left groups, has traditionally dominated the Association of University Students, which functions as the student governing body. However, the FESC has made increasing gains since 1965 and seems to be growing at a faster rate than its rivals. Student associations at three new private universities established during the 1960's are required to refrain from any activity of a political character.

3. Electoral procedures and the electorate (U/OU)

During most of Guatemala's history, suffrage and electoral procedures have meant little. From the earliest days of the republic until 1879 the right of suffrage was restricted to a small portion of the adult male population. The constitution adopted in 1879, which at first increased suffrage only slightly, was subsequently amended to include in the electorate a majority of adult males. Under dictatorial regimes, however, qualified voters either lacked interest in politics or feared to oppose the government, or elections were simply rigged, so that voting served only to confirm a choice already made by the executive. At times attempts were made to use suffrage as an outward facade suggesting democratic procedures; for example, dictators have had numbers of Indians, and sometimes women, transported to the polls, although neither group was allowed to vote at that time. Legislation since 1944 has considerably broadened the electorate; Indians and women are now permitted both to vote and to hold office. Under the 1956 Constitution the right to vote was extended to all male citizens at least 18 years old, and to literate women of that age. Voting was by secret ballot and was obligatory for literates. The 1965 Constitution extends suffrage to all persons 18 years of age and over and maintains the provision for compulsory voting for literates and for the secrecy of the ballot. The broadened franchise has not been very meaningful, however, since the major extension was to illiterate campesinos, who tend to vote as they are told by some person or political group in a position to pressure them. Moreover, despite safeguards designed to insure honest elections, the incumbent governments and dominant political parties have traditionally conspired to control and direct the electoral process. Electoral malpractices have been flagrant.

There is a generally low level of active participation in political affairs. The illiteracy and general backwardness of the population are such that many decades may pass before the bulk of the Guatemalan electorate becomes politically conscious, even to the extent found in some other Central American countries. In 1970, 2,339,625 persons were eligible to vote. Of this number only 1,134,075 (48.5%) registered, and only 546,288 (48.2% of the registered) actually voted—the absence attributed largely to apathy.

General elections are held on the first Sunday in March. Candidates for the Presidency, Vice Presidency, Congress, and municipal mayoralties in

the Central District (Guatemala City), department capitals, and municipalities with over 30,000 inhabitants are elected every 4 years. All other municipalities elect their mayors every 2 years.

Supervision of all electoral activity is the responsibility of the Electoral Register and the Electoral Council. The Electoral Register is a permanent organization headed by a director appointed by the President for a term of 4 years. It registers all voters and political parties, establishes municipal electoral boards, and investigates and resolves violations of the electoral law. The Electoral Council, which functions only temporarily during the quadrennial elections, is composed of the director of the Electoral Register, who is also the Chairman of the Electoral Council; one member designated by each registered political party that obtained at least 15% of the votes in the last general election; one member appointed by Congress; and one member appointed by the Council of State. The Electoral Council is convoked at least 15 days before the election and is dissolved after it. The council organizes and supervises the election; prepares and publicizes the general rules and procedures to be observed; counts the votes and certifies the results, except for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, which are certified by Congress; investigates and resolves questions relating to the election; and imposes penalties over matters in which it has jurisdiction or takes the offense to a court of justice. The only recourse against decisions of either the Electoral Register or Electoral Council is a request for restraint (*amparo*) before the Court of Appeals, except for nullification of votes in nonpresidential elections, which may be appealed to the Supreme Court. Only Congress can nullify a presidential election.

All citizens must register with the Electoral Register within 6 months after reaching the age of 18 and, in order to vote, must have registered at least 20 days before the date of the election. Voting is compulsory for literates and optional for illiterates. Members of the police and the armed forces and the mentally disabled are not permitted to vote. Fines or imprisonment may be levied for failure to register or vote. In addition, public officials may be suspended from work for 30 days or fined and imprisoned for their failure to exercise suffrage. Information is not available as to enforcement of these laws.

Two weeks before election day names of eligible voters are listed alphabetically, literate voters separately from the nonliterate. The Electoral Register then prints 3% more ballots than the total number of eligible voters. Although all ballots are of equal form,

color, and size, separate ones are used for each elective office. Candidates are listed under their party or sponsor's name and symbol in the chronological order in which they registered to run for office. A photograph is also included for candidates in the presidential election.

Voters do not vote for individual candidates; rather, they vote for a party or group list. Polls are usually open from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., but those in line at 6 p.m. will be permitted to cast their vote. After casting his ballot, the voter's citizenship card is marked, and his right index finger is dipped in indelible ink to preclude plural voting. Ballots are counted at the polling place in the presence of electoral officials and representatives of the political parties, and the results and ballots must be sent within 3 days to the Electoral Register delegate for that electoral district. The delegate then has 24 hours to forward the results and ballots to the Electoral Council, where the votes are recounted and winners certified, except for the President and Vice President. Ballots for the presidential election are sent to Congress for review.

Candidates for President, Vice President, or Congress must be nominated by a registered political party and register with the Electoral Register at least 20 days before the election. Candidates for local office in the townships do not have to be nominated by a political party. Civic committees may nominate them by submitting the required number of signatures on a petition. The required number varies from 5,000 in the capital to a minimum of 25 in the smallest township. Nominations by civic committees are common. In the 1966 mayoralty contest in Guatemala City, all five candidates were supported by civic committees, and none nominated by a political party.

D. National policies

1. Domestic policies

Since the liberal revolution of 1944, Guatemalan policies have changed significantly and have assumed a generally reformist character. Although the revolutionary idealism has generally been corrupted or lost, many of the forces set in motion in 1944 remain. Since the Liberation of 1954 (the overthrow of Arbenz), however, Guatemalan presidents have had to tailor their policies to meet the exigencies of an unstable political situation, with a resultant marked slowdown in the reform program. (U/OU)

A wide gap exists between policy and achievement. Government leaders, whether idealistic or opportunistic, have generally been inexperienced. Confronted

with frequent plots, and possible revolts, governments have been preoccupied with staying in power rather than with broad national interests. Policies have often been expedient or aimed at rapid, pretentious returns. (U/OU)

The 3-year military government under Peralta concentrated on the maintenance of public order, a return to constitutional government in such a way as to exclude pro-Communist elements, and establishment of fiscal and administrative responsibility. In these areas the Peralta government achieved at least moderate success. Conscious of its role as a transitory government, however, the administration engaged in almost no basic socioeconomic reform. (U/OU)

The return to constitutional government was accomplished with elections in March 1966 and the subsequent inauguration of Mendez in July. Although elected on a reform platform, Mendez appeared to believe that his most important objective was to finish his term, and there is evidence that other considerations were subordinated to this goal. The result was that the "third government of the revolution," which Mendez promised during his campaign, initiated action on few basic reforms. The upper class and the military, preoccupied with maintaining their own privileged positions, sharply limited initiation of reforms. (U/OU)

When President Arana took office in July 1970, with a reputation as a vigorous guerrilla fighter, he proclaimed pacification of the country a principal objective. At the same time he surprised many who regarded him as essentially a conservative by making a strong commitment to economic and social development, arguing that backwardness and violence were twin problems necessitating quick action to reduce the underlying causes of discontent. A few months later he adopted with enthusiasm a comprehensive national development plan that had been drafted by the previous government. The plan is directed primarily toward economic growth; it also envisions a major effort to improve the level of living of the rural population; but, because it does not call for radical, basic social change, it has not yet impinged sufficiently on the interests of the conservative elements who support Arana to trigger their opposition. However, full implementation of the plan will require considerable funds, and as time passes this may confront Arana with important policy choices. Reforms in tax administration are already underway. However, the question arises as to whether they will generate sufficient additional revenue for the development program. If not, the Arana government would be tested as to its political will to adopt new

sources of tax revenue, as well as to its sincerity and depth of commitment to improve the lot of the lower classes, especially in rural areas. (U/OU)

a. Pacification (S)

President Arana's administration is pledged to the pacification of Guatemala through the elimination of Communist guerrillas and their collaborators and reducing common crime. Arana's background as the army zone commander who during 1966-68 cleared the guerrilla-terrorists from their long-time safe haven in the eastern hills earned him the sobriquet of "Lion of Zacapa" among his admirers and "Jackal of Zacapa" among his detractors. Aware of his position as a minority President regarded by many as ruthless, Arana upon assuming office promised to exercise restraint in the security field. This policy, however, was gradually abandoned and replaced by an unrestrained counterterrorist campaign.

The state of siege imposed in 1970 in answer to the continuing wave of insurgent terrorism initiated an assault of unprecedented severity against subversives. Arana placed major responsibility for the counterinsurgency program in the hands of the military, although former Minister of Government (now Minister of Foreign Affairs) Arenales and President of Congress Sandoval were involved in picking targets. There was often a blurred distinction between the democratic left and Communists. Furthermore, the program was conducted clandestinely and largely outside the regular judicial system, which the government regards as weak and ineffective; the intended victims thus had no appeal mechanism through which to try to establish their innocence. Some of the victims were selected on the basis of their political opposition to groups in power or because of their association with the revolutionary governments during 1944-54. A few had been very prominent in public life and were representative of the most articulate elements in society. They included a congressional deputy, a labor leader, and several university professors, radio commentators, and journalists. Dozens of students and others of the intellectual community have been missing and presumed dead at the hands of army assassination squads. The killing in January 1971 of Adolfo Mijangos Lopez, which followed the December 1970 slaying of MLN leader Otten Predo by the FAR, a respected law professor and the leader of an opposition bloc in Congress who was also considered an intellectual advisor to the FAR, was generally blamed on ultraconservative paramilitary groups widely believed to be part of a progovernment apparatus. In

response to public outcry against this manifestation of rightist violence, the government promised to investigate the case thoroughly, but there have been no arrests.

Violence reached unprecedented heights during 1971. By mid September of the preceding year bombings, kidnappings and murders had increased dramatically and in November Arana was coming under very heavy criticism for the drift and lack of direction in his handling of the internal security situation. He finally took up the gauntlet and unleashed the security forces. One principal factor contributing to the sharp increase in violence was Arana's policy of making use, in his counterinsurgency campaign, of the extreme rightist sector, which has consistently viewed pacification as a crusade against the Communists and as revenge for the deaths and persecution of its own adherents at the hands of far leftists. Another factor was the granting of a high degree of autonomy to zone commanders in the hinterland; as a result, in some areas, innocent persons as well as true subversives have been killed. In addition, the government allowed some large plantation owners to arm their trusted employees; other owners recruited recently discharged soldiers to serve as armed security personnel.

Although the level of violence declined only slightly toward the end of 1971, the government on 23 November lifted the state of siege, claiming progress in its pacification campaign. Indeed, both the FAR and the PGT/FAR had suffered serious losses, and their capacity for terrorist activity did appear to have been significantly reduced—at least temporarily. However, Arana's action was widely viewed as evidence that the government was worried about foreign and domestic criticism, because imposition of the state of siege had been roundly criticized in U.S. and European newspapers as well as in Guatemala.

b. Economic and social development (U/OU)

Although qualified observers believe that the national development plan (1971-75) is not likely to be implemented fully, they regard it as by far the most carefully elaborated and realistic plan ever produced in Guatemala. Ambitious in scope, the plan provides a blueprint for the achievement of an annual GDP growth rate of 7.8% and calls for public investment of more than \$450 million, with major emphasis on agricultural development. It also includes a number of administrative reforms.

Analysis of 1963-69 economic performance indicated to the planners that the primary stimulant of growth in Guatemala is exports and the secondary,

government expenditures. Their principal policy statement, therefore, calls for a stress on public support of directly productive activities. Specific measures are outlined to restrict imports and expand exports, to promote private investment, and to enlarge public sector activities.

Without the plan Guatemala's imports would tend to grow 7.4% annually, threatening an exchange crisis in 1972-73. Therefore, measures—one of them a tax program to discourage consumption—are provided to reduce import growth to 4.3%. Exports are to be increased by some 30%, with emphasis on agricultural exports, nickel, and tourism. Further balance of payments support is to come from a revised foreign debt policy. Government measures to encourage increased involvement of the private sector in the total national development effort include the provision of training to improve managerial and technical capabilities in the agricultural, industrial, and business sectors, and the establishment of a loan guaranty program for small businesses.

In planning for the enlargement of public sector activities, far less emphasis has been placed on capital investment than in previous plans. To be sure, some new construction—of roads, schools, and potable water and sewerage systems—is projected over the long range, but in the earlier stages the main effort is to be directed toward making more efficient use of existing facilities. The one area that does receive hitherto denied emphasis is telecommunications, with some \$30.5 million to be devoted to making the system more nearly adequate.

A major economic role is accorded to a project for the exploitation of nickel resources. If fully implemented, the contract between Guatemala and the International Nickel Co., a U.S. firm, would more than double investment in Guatemala.

The largest single element of the plan calls for the expenditure of \$143 million for rural development, in a comprehensive effort to introduce a substantial part of the hitherto marginal rural population to modern agricultural techniques, to make credit available, and to raise the effectiveness of the rural family through health and educational programs. The plan does not mention redistribution of land, but rather puts emphasis on modernizing and diversifying agriculture.

The plan puts the government on record for the first time as seriously concerned with the problems of rapid population growth, stressing the burdens placed on the public services and the need to create 45,000 more jobs each year. Although it does not directly recommend birth control, by calling for a "population policy" it does so by implication. Actually, the government

began quietly encouraging family planning activities in the 1960's, and since 1969 such services have been available in health centers throughout the country. However, the 40,000 persons who accepted a contraceptive method during the first 10 months of 1971 represented only 5% of the target population.

c. Implementation of development policies (U/OU)

During its first 18 months the Arana administration evidenced far more interest in economic and social development than had been anticipated by many. It established the framework for a number of new initiatives, with emphasis on agriculture and on health, education, and social services in the rural area. In the opinion of qualified observers these modest beginnings justify mild optimism that real progress will be made. The government, however, suffers from a shortage of capable personnel. It also remains to be seen whether improved tax collection will make it possible to fund programs at planned levels or, if not, whether Arana will risk offending powerful economic interests by levying new taxes.

Although Guatemala continues to enjoy a period of economic prosperity that dates back to the final years of the Mendez government, the GDP has increased at an average annual rate of 6%, still short of the 7.8% called for in the development plan.

A number of the fiscal and administrative changes prescribed by the plan have already been effected and a higher percentage of budgeted appropriations was expended in 1971 than in 1970. The national budget for 1972 included a greatly increased sum for investment expenditures, while current appropriations and debt servicing rose only slightly. In addition, much of the country's external public debt has been shifted from a short-term to a long-term basis. Legislation reorganizing and modernizing the Ministry of Treasury and Public Credit also calls for the unification into one agency of all direct tax offices. Two public sector banking institutions were combined to form a National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA); small and medium farmers, who lacked collateral to borrow from private banks, will receive loans from BANDESA to enable them to increase and diversify their production. The Ministry of Agriculture has also been reorganized and the Minister made ex officio president of the boards of directors of all agencies in the public agricultural sector, thus for the first time bringing under one leadership the disparate elements of credit, marketing and price stabilization, crop research, agrarian reform, and manpower development.

Several other measures are also designed to benefit the rural sector. In November 1971 President Arana and the American Ambassador journeyed to a mountain village, typical of hundreds of communities which lack all health facilities, to sign a \$2.5 million AID loan agreement—the first stage in setting up a comprehensive rural health care system. The government is also vigorously supporting one of the largest and most effective Food for Peace programs in Central America, and the Congress has passed a compulsory school feeding law encompassing all schools, both public and private. After many years of limited rural power development, Guatemala in 1971 embarked on an ambitious \$28 million program to provide electric service to five regional rural areas. The first stage is already underway in three areas, financed by an AID loan of \$7 million and government input of \$4.6 million.

Land redistribution is not a part of the national development plan, but it continues on a modest scale under the 1962 agrarian reform law. Among its other provisions the law calls for a progressive tax on underutilized properties of more than 247 acres, expropriation of such properties if not brought into production within 5 years, and legalization of deeds to certain lands occupied as a result of earlier legislation. The National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INTA) settled 26,500 families on 412,000 acres of land by 1970. INTA proposes to carry out a colonization project in the northern part of the country, which calls for resettling 12,000 families in northern Huehuetenango and the sparsely populated Departments of Alta Verapaz and Izabal.

President Arana, during visits in 1971 to 225 municipalities in 18 departments, repeatedly emphasized that his government would help those communities that demonstrate willingness to help themselves. Under a new director the National Community Development Program (PNDC) was thoroughly reorganized and by early 1972 had established more than 22 local centers in ten departments and had completed an impressive number of projects including 42 primary schools, 67 potable water systems, 45 access roads, and 15 bridges.

For the first time in recent history the government has taken an active interest in the improvement of local government, committing \$2 million to the revitalization of the Municipal Development Institute (INFOM) and instituting a 5-year municipal training and administrative reform program.

President Arana is giving strong support to a program—part of the national development plan—to improve the quality of primary, especially rural,

education. For the first time in Guatemala's history, emphasis is being placed on curriculum improvement and teacher preparation to meet rural development needs, rather than merely on construction. Teacher training institutes and regional rural schools to be built during 1972-75 will introduce the new practical, action centered curriculum and teaching methods developed since 1969 in AID-funded schools. At the same time the government has strongly supported preschool language training and preparation of the Indian population to enter the public school system. The government has also been notably receptive to innovative educational methods. A pilot program in 1972 is to explore the applicability of new technology, including film strips, radio, television, and cassettes.

The government, through the National Institute of Housing (INVI) seeks to provide housing—costing from \$1,000 to \$5,000—for low and middle income families. The deficit in this price range is about 150,000 units. INVI in early 1972 proposed a 4-year construction program of 22,000 units and applied to AID and the Inter-American Development Bank for large loans.

d. Propaganda programs (U/OU)

Government propaganda for domestic consumption is concerned mostly with publicizing public welfare and service programs, both to inform the people and enlist or maintain their support, and to secure their cooperation in such projects as census taking and public health measures. President Arana, a believer in "taking the government to the people," has publicized his rural and community development programs by touring the countryside and meeting with Indian councils and small peasant groups; he has visited virtually all of Guatemala's municipalities, many of them in areas where a chief executive had never been seen.

The only public information medium owned by the government is a daily newspaper, *Diario de Centroamerica*. In a negative sense, the government has made use of states of siege and alarm to control dissemination of news about violence within the country in order not to alarm the people. For this reason there has been considerable sensitivity on the part of the government to newspaper and magazine articles in the foreign press which have been critical of the internal security situation.

One of the most consistent and deliberate propaganda efforts of the government, directed at both the domestic and foreign consumer, concerns British Honduras. Many public documents and postal stamps show a map of Guatemala including Belize—

as British Honduras is called in Guatemala—and bearing statements to the effect that one-fifth of the national territory is in the hands of a foreign power (the United Kingdom). Guatemalan embassies in Central America often have such propaganda to distribute.

It is nearly impossible to assess the effectiveness of any propaganda beyond the fact that radio is a more effective medium than the press because of the low literacy rate. Some portions of the population, however, cannot be reached effectively even by radio, since Spanish is not universally spoken in Guatemala. There are no known propaganda efforts in any of the Indian languages.

2. Foreign policies

Guatemala's principal foreign relations are with its Central American neighbors and with the United States. Since the late 1960's Guatemala has been concerned mainly with problems stemming from the deterioration in the Central American Common Market (CACM) and from the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras. The issue of British Honduras—which Guatemala has long claimed as part of its national territory—has also been troublesome. (U/OU)

a. Relations with Central American republics (S)

Since the achievement of independence in 1821, many attempts have been made to form a political federation of two or more of the five Central American republics, but none of these has been successful for long. Nevertheless, the ideal of unity has persisted, and Guatemala has traditionally been in the forefront of the movement for economic and political integration, taking the lead in the formation of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) in 1951 and in its restructuring in 1962. ODECA includes a Supreme Council of heads of member states; a Council of Foreign Ministers; a Permanent Executive Council; a Legislative Council, composed of three members from each legislature, whose function is to standardize similar legislation; an Economic Council for the CACM; a Cultural and Educational Council; a Central American Court of Justice; and a Central American Defense Council.

ODECA's most important accomplishment has been the formation, in 1960, of the CACM; until about the middle of the decade it was widely regarded as probably the most successful experiment in economic integration outside of Europe. By 1968, however, changing economic conditions and various

technical difficulties had led to a growing sense of frustration and disillusionment, particularly in Nicaragua and Honduras, which—being less developed—had benefited less than the other members. It was realized then that the CACM must be restructured. Unfortunately, in July 1969 hostilities erupted between El Salvador and Honduras as a result of friction over an undefined border and alleged mistreatment of each other's nationals. Ever since this brief but bitter war the two countries have had no mutual trade and no diplomatic relations—a state of affairs which has further complicated the problem of restructuring the CACM. Guatemala—which has been perhaps the chief beneficiary of the CACM—continues to do all it can to encourage restoration of relations between El Salvador and Honduras and to explore ways of reviving the market.

Relations with other Central American republics have not always been cordial. During the 19th century and the first four decades of the 20th century disputes occurred—mostly over boundary problems—between Guatemala and both El Salvador and Honduras, leading on several occasions to actual hostilities. By 1938, however, these boundaries had been settled, and relations have since been relatively friendly. In early 1972 Guatemala and El Salvador began joint military border operations against leftist Guatemalan guerrillas.

Since 1970 differences in outlook between the strongly anti-Communist Arana government and the government of President Figueres in Costa Rica, which in early 1972 welcomed a Soviet ambassador, have caused some friction. In late 1971 and early 1972 President of Congress Sandoval was reportedly giving some encouragement and some material assistance to rightist Costa Rican elements plotting a coup against Figueres. After Figueres complained publicly, the Guatemalan government gave formal assurances that no attack against Costa Rica was being organized in Guatemala, while Figueres pledged that Costa Rica's commercial and diplomatic relations with Moscow would not affect its close ties with the Western world.

b. The British Honduras problem (5)

British Honduras (known to its inhabitants as Belize and to Guatemalans as Belice) was first settled by shipwrecked British sailors in 1638 but during much of the 17th and 18th centuries it was recognized as Spanish territory. It has been effectively controlled by the British since about 1814. The population of 126,000—51% Negro, 22% mestizo, 19% Amerindian, 8% other—has a different political, legal, and social heritage from that of the rest of Central America; and

the colony, with few resources, is an underdeveloped backwater. Guatemala's claim to it, therefore, is apparently motivated mainly by nationalistic pride and by some genuine concern that an independent Belize would be used as a stepping stone for Communist and particularly Cuban penetration of Central America.

After achieving independence, Guatemala contended that it had inherited Spanish rights to the area, but in an 1859 treaty it recognized British sovereignty. A dispute soon arose, however, over alleged British failure to honor a promise to help establish road and/or river communication from the Atlantic coast to Guatemala City, and in 1939 Guatemala, declaring that the treaty had lapsed, claimed British Honduras as part of its national territory. In 1963 Guatemala broke relations with the United Kingdom because of a new constitution which gave the colony a greater degree of self-government.

Mediation by the United States during 1965-68 proved fruitless when the British Hondurans and Guatemalans both angrily rejected a proposed treaty on the grounds that it would make British Honduras merely a colony of Guatemala. They insist on full and unfettered independence. Guatemala, however, insists that it will not accept independence for British Honduras unless its economy, foreign policy, and defense are linked to Guatemala or to a Central American federation.

The situation caused concern in early 1972 when President Arana, fearing that British troop arrivals for maneuvers in the area were actually designed to support an independence move, placed his armed forces on alert and broke off the heretofore secret talks which were being carried on with the British. Tension eased in April when the Guatemalan Foreign Minister reported to his government's "Executive Commission" on Belice, that the British Government had given assurance that it would not consider granting British Honduras independence for the next 2 or 3 years. With only one dissenting vote the commission recommended to President Arana that there be no military confrontation over British Honduras and that conversations with the British be continued. The recommendation was probably based upon the assumption that, if independence were to be delayed 2 or 3 years, the Arana administration, which will be out of office in 1974, probably would not have to grapple with the issue again. In an address to the nation on 8 May the President backed away publicly from an aggressive stance on Belice by accusing leftist elements of "disseminating the false report that we would invade Belice so as to bring us into conflict with an

extracontinental power in order to distract our army while they provoked an internal uprising." By denouncing the reported plan as false, leftist inspired, and risky in terms of internal security, Arana was also giving an unmistakable signal to the "hawks" in his own administration to slack off. Although the official Guatemalan position is that talks will not be resumed until the British Garrison is reduced to pre-January levels, there appears to be some flexibility in this position.

c. Relations with Mexico (U/OU)

Relations with neighboring Mexico have occasionally been strained but are now generally friendly. Mexico claims the northern half of British Honduras, but the claim remains in abeyance unless Guatemala should actually annex the territory, and during the dispute between Guatemala and the United Kingdom in early 1972 Mexico gave diplomatic support to Guatemala. The Guatemalan and Mexican armies are cooperating in flushing out the Guatemalan leftist guerrillas operating along the Peten border.

d. Relations with the United States (U/OU)

Guatemala's relationship with the United States—its principal trading partner and the strongest supporter of its efforts to achieve political, economic, and social development—has always been of paramount importance. Traditionally, the two countries have been on generally friendly terms, except during the administration of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-51) and, even more so, during that of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1951-54). Arbenz, whose government was heavily infiltrated by Communists and who demagogically exploited popular resentment against U.S. investments in Guatemala, was overthrown by Carlos Castillo Armas, with the encouragement and support of the United States. The United States has given massive development assistance to Guatemala; during fiscal years 1946-70 the U.S. Agency for International Development and its predecessor agencies alone provided more than US\$166 million in loans and grants, and further U.S. funds reached Guatemala indirectly through such agencies as the Export-Import Bank and the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank. U.S. military assistance consists of advisory and training services and of limited amounts of grant materiel. The United States on many occasions has been requested to act as mediator or to use its good offices in Guatemala's disputes with other countries—most recently (1965-68) in connection with British

Honduras. Guatemala generally supports positions taken by the United States on most issues in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States.

e. Relations with non-Communist countries (U/OU)

Relations with countries outside the Western Hemisphere are limited. An exception is West Germany, which is an important buyer of Guatemalan coffee and which has given technical and financial assistance on a small scale. The kidnapping and murder of the West German Ambassador to Guatemala in April 1970 by leftist terrorists after the Guatemalan Government refused to negotiate with them only temporarily strained relations between the two governments.

Relations with both Japan and Israel have been increasing.

f. Relations with Communist countries (U/OU)

Guatemala has no diplomatic relations with Communist countries. However, in 1969 an edict which has prohibited contact with Communist countries was repealed, and in late 1971 the visit of a Czechoslovak commercial mission resulted in a joint declaration calling for increased trade. Several other Eastern European missions have also visited Guatemala, but none has expended so much time and money on efforts to promote trade as have the Czechoslovaks.

E. Threats to government stability

1. Discontent and dissidence (S)

Guatemala is beginning to lay an institutional base for orderly and legal governmental succession, and this breakaway from the tradition of politics by conspiracy and force may prove over time to be very important for the country's eventual political maturation. As of the early 1970's, however, the experiment with democratic processes appeared tentative at best and ineffective in alleviating the psychological attitude among substantial elements that there are fundamental grievances and injustices and that violence can be successfully used to change the situation.

Political discontent and dissidence in Guatemala stem in large part from the extremes the nation has experienced since the 1944 revolution; on one side are the "Revolutionaries" who glorify the overthrow of the Ubico dictatorship and the beginnings of the modernization of society under President Juan Jose

Arevalo, while on the other side, the "Liberationists" view the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz by Col. Castillo Armas as the salvation of the country from communism. The abrupt swings of the political pendulum after 1944 have kept the politically aware portion of the Guatemalan public in varying stages of polarization, as those in power have wreaked varying degrees of vengeance upon their political opponents. Outstanding instances of intense polarization and a near civil war atmosphere occurred during 1967-68 under President Mendez and in 1970-71 under President Arana when these administrations gave free rein to their fanatic anti-Communist constituents in response to terrorist brutality against the public forces and against rightist political figures and important foreign diplomatic officials in Guatemala. The cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism during 1971 resulted in hundreds of politically motivated assassinations and lesser acts of violence. The political violence began to taper off in late 1971 and continued to diminish in 1972, but a lingering malignant effect on the society was visible in the continuance in banditry and other forms of common crime.

The increase in violence over the past decade—the result of guerrilla-terrorist operations and the government's response to them—has built up new political rivalries, grievances, and interparty distrust so that political compromise and accommodation remain difficult to come by in Guatemala. The enmity between the left and the right thus has continued to be on a level of hardened stereotypes, with the conservatives making little distinction between political outlaws (the insurgents) and their so-called "intellectual authors," i.e., the legitimate left, the media, organized labor, the university, and other groups commonly regarded as "pro-Communist." Perceiving this, leftist opposition groups often have despaired of being able to come to power by peaceful means, and their conspiracies have fed the vicious circle.

Added to the primitive nature of Guatemalan politics, traditional social inequality and widespread poverty further complicate efforts to develop the country. Most Guatemalans are illiterate subsistence farmers mired in miserable conditions and at the mercy of education, health, and welfare services that rank among the poorest in Latin America. At the core of the poverty problem are the Indians, who make up almost half the total population and whose traditions lead them to avoid social integration and modernization. Rural poverty reflects a failure to develop peasant agriculture. A rapidly growing population and a lack of credits, agricultural education, extension

services and incentives to small farmers have contributed to holding agricultural output below the nutritional needs of the people. Growth in agricultural production has been concentrated in a few export crops that are raised on a few large modern farms. Political realities and the entrenched power of the economic elite in Guatemala have inhibited an all out attack on the problem of poverty.

Thus, in long term considerations, Guatemala's backwardness offers fertile ground for revolutionary efforts. Only a small portion of the population (wealthy businessmen, some professionals, owners of large farms, and top government officials) owns most of the wealth and lives lavishly. A small, emerging middle class, still less than 20% of the population, can afford most necessities but few luxuries. The huge bulk of the population, probably at least 80%, cannot afford what in the United States would be considered the barest necessities. These poor are inadequately housed and clothed, malnourished, and often without medical or educational facilities. Moreover, the cultural division between the Indian and Westernized Guatemalan places the Indian in an inferior social position. This isolation is emphasized by widespread illiteracy and limited transportation facilities.

Pervasive social and political injustice in Guatemala has already caused one major upheaval within the memory of many Guatemalans. The revolutionary years of 1944-54 began to wrench the traditionally underprivileged out of their customary apathy and fatalistic acceptance of their lot. The mobilization of the urban and rural working classes and the establishment of lines of communication between the government and the population provided the start of a political renaissance. However, the rapidity with which the old ways were resumed after Castillo Armas' liberation in 1954 underscores the profundity of the conservatism and inurement to suffering that characterize the Guatemalan people.

a. Military

Traditionally and currently, the armed forces generally support and defend the *status quo*, although they do so largely in the usual manner of a security service supporting the government. Occasional reports allude to a small clique of reformists within the armed forces politically akin to the leftist military regime in Peru. The chances for such a group to sway the bulk of the officer corps to a leftwing cause, however, seem remote. The military in Guatemala has been the bulwark of the established order. There have been exceptions among individual officers, however, as the

originators of the insurgent movement were junior army officers.

The appearance of the insurgency problem during the 1960's dramatically reinforced the role of the armed forces as the defenders against those who threaten the established order by illegal means. More important, the counterinsurgent task accelerated the trend toward the expansion of the police powers of the armed forces. The use of *comisionados militares*, locally based civilian agents of the armed forces, grew rapidly and now practically every community has this military representative, who serves as a conscriptor and as an intelligence agent. Military authority also reaches out-of-the-way regions by way of the Mobile Military Police, charged with the responsibility for dealing with rural guerrilla violence. The increased presence of the military throughout the country and the quasi-political control the military authorities frequently exercise in their areas of responsibility seem likely to have an effect on the political processes over time. While military representatives have often tended to use their authority arbitrarily, there are indications that the armed forces, with their broad network of informants, are becoming increasingly sensitive to the needs of the poor majority and will exert their influence in a constructive manner. There is a growing feeling especially among the younger officers that the military should encourage, or at least not stand in the way of, attempts to achieve greater social justice.

b. Minority and ethnic groups

There is no official discrimination against minority groups. With an overwhelming majority of the people Roman Catholic, the overzealous occasionally mistreat Protestant missionaries, but this is uncommon. German nationals experienced difficulty during World War II when the government confiscated their properties, but some properties were returned later to their owners. The German community remains of some economic importance but has not recovered its prewar significance. A large number of successful nonagricultural enterprises have been established in recent years by foreigners or first-generation Guatemalans, including Chinese and persons of Middle Eastern origin. Although government decrees from 1936 prohibit the establishment of commercial or industrial enterprises by certain nationality groups, mainly those from Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, these are not enforced. Ethnic minorities are too small to carry political weight in the country.

The bicultural nature of Guatemalan society provides a potentially explosive division, yet conflict

between the Indians and the Westernized element has been minimal. Class antagonism within the Westernized group is evident, however, and was pronounced during the revolutionary decade. After 1944, the revolutionary governments introduced political and social innovations which initiated a breakdown of the traditional social control by the elite. Labor codes, agrarian reform, social security, and other social legislation were drafted with the intention of security rights for the lower class and particularly the Indians. The traditional upper class viewed attention to its traditional inferiors as a threat to its own power and privilege. Actually, all the legislation favoring the Indians and all the attention given them by aspiring political groups failed to impress upon them their importance as a potential political force. Most of the Indians remained detached and wedded to their own culture and their traditional village life.

c. Intellectual community

Antigovernment sentiment is most pronounced among students, professors, and various professionals such as lawyers, those in the public media, and doctors. This group is largely synonymous with "the left" in Guatemala, and while some intellectuals belong to the extreme left, the majority are part of a democratic left. While this element of society is commonly oppositionist in Western and other societies, in Guatemala, where the tendency toward polarization among the small vocal elements is strong, the relationship between the government and the intellectuals comes close to being paranoid. The rightwing political groups, and particularly leaders of the ruling National Liberation Movement, who have lived in fear of insurgent attack for over a decade, assume that the intellectuals on the left have abetted the insurgents. They further fear that in the 1974 elections the left will receive the support of middle of the road elements which tends to flipflop from one side to another. For its part, the democratic left views the rightists in equally simplistic terms as killers who have already eliminated some of their number and threaten others. Students, leftist professors, and "intellectuals" were targets for the extreme rightwing counterterrorist groups during the year long state of siege that began in November 1970. While an easier political climate seemed to be developing in 1972, these stereotypes remain integral to the Guatemalan political scene.

The leftist intellectuals, initially favorably impressed with President Arana's call for pacification and his commitment to help the "marginal"

Guatemalan, began to feel threatened when early into the state of siege in 1970, professor Julio Camey Herrera was slain and leading economist Alfonso Bauer Paiz was wounded by government forces. When insurgents murdered a progovernment labor leader and a rightwing congressman, harsher security measures were anticipated. The government's assassinations of leftist congressman Adolfo Mijangos and peasant leader Oliva y Oliva, and the search of the University of San Carlos—followed by the open attack on university autonomy by rightist leader Mario Sandoval—persuaded the intellectual community that the government planned to eliminate the left of center political opposition. International attention on the violence in Guatemala caused the security forces to become noticeably more circumspect. Since that time, with the lessening of the insurgent threat, and the slowdown in insurgent and counterinsurgent activity, the polarization has diminished, but the antipathy between the groups remains a grave political division.

The intellectual community is small and somewhat cohesive, but is a sector that is feared by the conservative groups, who know that it is to some degree an adjunct of the Communist insurgent movement. Although it has generally been a minor element in Guatemalan politics, it probably has considerable political potential, as suggested by the 1944 revolution.

d. Rural and urban workers

The laboring class both in the city and in the hinterland suffers from a low level of living, has little expectation for improved conditions, and little hope of doing anything about it. What labor legislation exists is honored mainly in its breach, and very little protection regarding wage levels and conditions of work is actually operative. As recently as June 1971, President Arana discovered on one of his orientation visits to rural areas that some campesinos were being paid 35 cents a day for agricultural labor.

Guatemala's subsistence farmers are barely on the fringes of the money economy; most of the wage and salary earners are concentrated in the urban centers and on the commercial farms. There are wide variations in the average per capita annual wage. The Arana government has promised a minimum wage for agricultural workers, but this is complicated by the fact that payment in kind traditionally constitutes a large portion of many workers' remuneration. According to the Constitution, workers must be paid in legal tender except in rural areas, where they may be paid a portion in food and other benefits. Because

their land does not produce enough to support a family, most small farmers add to their income through home crafts or part-time wage labor. A hand to mouth existence is the general rule for people in the rural areas.

The precarious situation of urban laborers, whose overall situation is little better than that of the farmers, is further threatened by the large numbers of unskilled laborers migrating from the countryside seeking employment. The consequent overtaxing of educational facilities and environmental sanitation means that urban conditions for all are degenerating.

Organized labor has never recovered from the severe setbacks that followed the overthrow of the revolutionary government in 1954. The labor movement in Guatemala dates only from the 1944 revolution, but rapid organization during the Arvalo-Arbenz period gave labor a place of prime political significance. When the Castillo Armas regime took power in 1954, labor's favored position was abolished and the movement has never been able to reorganize effectively. Labor leaders had expected the Mendez Montenegro government (1966-70) to signal a revival of labor's importance on the political scene, but in fact labor did less well under that administration than they had done under some less labor-oriented governments. Mendez generally yielded to pressure from the wealthy class and favored management in the few disputes that arose.

The overall climate for prolabor lobbying and organizing is at best inhospitable. Rightist political groups regard all trade union activity as Communist inspired and have harassed trade union organizers and members. Labor has tended to be a victim of the crossfire during periods of heavy terrorist and counterterrorist activity. During 1971, two major labor leaders were assassinated, one by the insurgents and one by the government. Organized labor is a very downtrodden and frustrated segment of the population and this frustration accounts for much of the violence in the countryside directed against plantation administrators, military agents, and other symbols of oppressive authority. Thus, while the worker is not presently a significant political force since he is for the most part disorganized, isolated from the political process, and without spokesmen on the national level, his general discontent makes the laboring class fertile ground for subversive activity.

2. Subversion (S)

With the right, led by President Arana, in power, the major threat to security comes from the extreme

left, particularly the Cuban-oriented Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Soviet-oriented Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). Although both organizations are committed to overthrowing the government, their tactical approach to the problem has been quite different.

The PGT's hard core of about 700 and probably twice that many sympathizers, accept guerrilla warfare and terrorism as important tools in the struggle for power. They agree too that there is tactical utility in kidnapping for ransom and occasionally assassinating government officials, and the party, through its action arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR), does engage in these activities. The party, however, rejects the view that this alone is sufficient to overthrow the government. On the contrary, primary attention is placed on organization of worker-peasant-student fronts in order to prepare a mass political framework for guerrilla activity. Having tasted political power during the Arevalo government (1945-51), and especially under the following Arbenz administration (1951-54), the Communist leaders also emphasize the need to infiltrate and work through the legal political parties.

Although this balanced approach seems theoretically sound, in practice it has yielded very limited results and, indeed, has created a number of problems for the party. In the first place the party's political action program has not won it any significant popular support. The PGT labor front, FASGUA, has declined in strength and influence and FASGUA officials complain that the organization's effectiveness has been reduced because the PGT periodically strips it of its most talented activists for use in the PGT/FAR. The party's activities through its student front, the Patriotic Labor Youth, and through the Association of University Students at San Carlos University have been only slightly more successful.

The party also carries out armed actions on a selective basis to raise funds, keep its activists happy, and maintain its organizational viability and credibility as a serious force on the left. However, the Communists have had considerable difficulty in maintaining a balance between political action and terror. A decision to cease or reduce terrorism usually causes a morale problem among the younger members who are hungry for armed action. This has led to splits in the PGT/FAR as the more radical members, resisting party discipline and restraint, have sought to continue a more activist posture. After another defection in January 1972, the PGT/FAR had less than 50 members.

The FAR on the other hand, has largely ignored, indeed, scorned this type of political activity and espouses a more simplistic approach, which has had considerable appeal for its younger and rather less sophisticated membership (approximately 300 hardcore members and several hundred collaborators). The FAR does not agree that it is necessary to wait until it has a strong popular base. Instead it has held as an article of faith that full-scale guerrilla warfare is the best and quickest road to power. As a first step it has stressed the use of terror to cripple the government, hinder its security forces, and gain publicity. The general public, it believes, would be forced to become involved as government counterterror more and more affected the lives of the people.

3. Insurgency (S)

The Arana government is up against a determined, disciplined, experienced and well-funded guerrilla-terrorist movement which has existed for over a decade and has taxed the energies and resources of three previous administrations. Despite vigorous government efforts to stamp out the insurgency, the viability and organizational integrity of the movement remain largely intact and the result of a decade of struggle can best be described as a standoff in the government's favor. The government has been unable to destroy the terrorists, but the terrorists have not even come close to overthrowing the government.

The insurgency movement had its roots in an abortive uprising by a group of young army officers against President Ydigoras on 13 November 1960. Those who refused to surrender, led by Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, formed the 13th of November Movement (MR-13) and continued their efforts to overthrow the government. By 1962, a singular lack of success led the group to turn to the PGT for assistance and thus was formed the first FAR, which incorporated the MR-13 as one of its separate elements.

As a result of personal rivalries and disagreements about strategy the extreme left was unable to remain unified for very long. In 1965, the refusal of MR-13 chief Yon Sosa to accept PGT control and direction led to the dissolution of the FAR. The MR-13, however, was itself subject to serious internal strains and a faction of the MR-13 led by Luis Augusto Turcios Lima joined with the PGT to form a new FAR organization.

Turcios and, on his death, Cesar Montes, had the requisite drive and organizational ability to build this second FAR into a capable guerrilla organization with a growing professional reputation in the insurgency

field. Nevertheless, dissension between a pro-Cuban faction, which stressed guerrilla warfare, and a pro-Soviet faction, which saw guerrilla warfare as an adjunct to mass political action by Communist-organized peasants and workers, led to yet another split in late 1967, with the pro-Cuban faction under Cesar Montes uniting with the MR-13 under Yon Sosa. This combined group retained the name—the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)—while the Communist party, also seeking to capitalize on the notorious initials, named its own action arm the Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR), and thereby developed the two major insurgency groupings which currently exist.

Despite its limited membership, the FAR is set up as a countrywide organization, dividing its forces into a number of regional zone commands. The regional commanders meet as a group, styled the National Directorate, to decide policy and coordinate activity. Personal rivalries have hampered the operation of the group, and the FAR has experienced difficulty at various times in reaching a consensus about the degree of Cuban direction and involvement that could be tolerated, the relative emphasis to be given urban and rural operations, and the desirability of closer ties with the PGT.

The FAR has received extensive training, material support, and some funds from Cuba—much of the funds and assistance being funnelled through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. The PGT and PGT/FAR have looked to the Soviet Union, which reportedly provides \$100,000 per year. The PGT has an "annex" in Mexico, where many Guatemalan Communist exiles reside. The "annex" acts as liaison for the PGT, securing and transmitting arms and money to the party.

Since 1967 the Communist party has sought to reunite the insurgency movement, but with little success. Indeed, both the PGT/FAR and the FAR have continued to suffer from factionalism. In late 1968, for example, Yon Sosa was ousted from the FAR with some of his men. He was killed in Mexico in 1970, but an inactive and debilitated remnant of his MR-13 lingers on with a reported membership of less than 30. Cesar Montes, in turn, has left the FAR and has a small group of his own.

The guerrillas provided the most serious threat to stability during the 3-year military dictatorship of Colonel Peralta (1963-66) and again in the early days of the Mendez regime. However, from late 1966 through mid-1967 the military launched a ferocious antiguerrilla offensive, which decimated the insurgents and made them turn their attention from the rural to the urban areas.

Insurgency activity remained at a relatively low level from mid-1968 to mid-1970 as the FAR and the PGT/FAR devoted themselves primarily to reorganization, resupply, and recruitment. Nevertheless, even during the time when the insurgency movement was most heavily damaged, the guerrillas maintained their capability for hit-and-run terrorist action and in fact managed to carry off some of their most spectacular operations. The FAR, which gained worldwide attention as a result of the 1968 assassinations of the U.S. Ambassador and two U.S. military officials and the 1970 assassination of the West German Ambassador and kidnapping of the U.S. Labor Attache, has been effective in weakening public confidence in the government's ability to maintain order, in damaging stability, and in generally disturbing and polarizing the political scene. It is incapable, however, of a direct assault on governmental power.

The FAR's assassination targets are either retaliatory—security officials are frequent victims—or prominent persons whose death will win publicity for the terrorist organization, and raise political tensions. The FAR has also engaged in sabotage—fires, bombings, cutting telecommunication lines or damaging electric power sources. In rural areas unpopular local officials are assassinated to gain the trust and the acceptance of the passive, apathetic, culturally isolated Indian peasantry, but the guerrillas have found rural operations to be suicidal without the support of the local populace. Because of the ineffectiveness of rural violence as a revolutionary tactic, the FAR has at times concentrated on urban terrorism, particularly when under heavy pressure in the countryside from government forces. Such activity has seemed a greater payoff for the FAR for the energy expended and certainly the political and psychological impact has been much greater on the more informed, aware, and articulate city dwellers, whose mood has a real effect on the government.

Terrorist activity briefly flared up at the height of the 1970 presidential campaign as the insurgents attempted to embarrass the government and force cancellation of the election. During this period the FAR and PGT/FAR terrorists operated with virtual impunity, attacking and killing over a dozen security officials, a candidate for mayor of Guatemala City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's largest newspaper. They caused damage estimated in the millions of dollars with a series of firebombings in downtown Guatemala City. On the eve of the elections they secured the release of a guerrilla by kidnapping the Foreign Minister and a week later

obtained the release of two others in exchange for the abducted U.S. Labor Attache.

After the Arana victory in March 1970 and the killing of the abducted West German Ambassador von Sprei in April 1970, a relative quiet ensued as the extreme left girded itself in anticipation of the struggle against Arana. The reduced level of activity persisted through the first 2 months of Arana's term but by mid-September 1970 bombings, kidnappings, and murders had increased dramatically as the insurgents attempted to goad the administration into the kind of inept and excessive reaction which would arouse sufficient discontent and social consciousness to give the insurgents a degree of popular support that had thus far eluded them.

By early November Arana took up the gauntlet, imposed a state of siege, and unleashed the security forces. The PGT/FAR and later the FAR suffered important defeats, losing several key leaders, safe house facilities, supply centers, and arms caches. The security forces were not overly preoccupied with the niceties of law and did not discriminate too finely between leftists. As had occurred in the past, their scatterfire tactics resulted in some unjustified killings. Moreover, with the resurgence of rightist counter-guerrilla terrorist groups, the level of physical force used by the security forces and counterterrorists climbed far above the benchmark which had precipitated the state of siege in the first place.

Nevertheless, Arana was not as insensitive to public opinion as the insurgents had hoped. When, after a year, support of the government crackdown began to evaporate and he felt he had squeezed all possible political mileage out of his "get tough" campaign he lifted the state of siege and discouraged the extralegal activities of the right. The tactical losses suffered by the guerrillas had far exceeded any strategic gains they might have hoped to make. Arana emerged with his popularity intact; he had seriously weakened the subversive movement, and no irreparable cracks in the body politic had resulted in the process. The FAR, in particular has emerged with little to show for their effort because their indiscriminate acts made them look more like common criminals than professional revolutionaries.

Although weakened, the insurgency movement has not been destroyed and, indeed, has not fundamentally changed. As in the past the guerrillas have shifted away from the area of the most intense government pressure. In a reversal of the situation which evolved after the government crackdown in 1966-71, the FAR have now begun to turn some of their attention away from Guatemala City to the rural areas, particularly Peten, the northernmost department.

The latest reversals, however, may have made the FAR more willing to rethink its basic strategy. It is unlikely that the FAR will admit the bankruptcy of its guerrilla warfare policy or forswear violence, but it may take greater care that its activities do not become identified in the public mind as ordinary criminality; it may consider a more sophisticated political approach designed to broaden its base of support, and it may once again opt for closer ties with the Communist party.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

Responsibility for internal security is shared by the Guatemalan Armed Forces and the National Police (Figure 6). The National Police force is subordinate to the Minister of Government, except during a state of seige when it is under the Ministry of National Defense. The army, incorporating naval and air elements as well as ground forces, is under the Minister of National Defense.

I. Police

The police services were reorganized in 1970 with the merging of the Judicial Police (now known as the Corps of Detectives) into the national police structure.






FIGURE 6. Organization of security forces (U/OU)

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began a strong counterterrorist campaign. The instruments for the clandestine government-sponsored campaign included "commando units" of the Guatemalan Army and police and groups of armed civilians. Their counterterrorist activities were attributed to phantom organizations such as the Movement of Organized National Action (MANO), the New Anti-Communist Organization, and the Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala. None of these organizations except MANO actually existed; they were front names for army and police directed counterinsurgency programs, which by late 1967 had succeeded in substantially weakening the Communist guerrilla forces. In March 1968 changes in the top military personnel temporarily halted this type of rural counterinsurgency.

Following the murder of the West German Ambassador at the hands of FAR terrorists in April 1970, rightist counterinsurgent groups began to reappear in Guatemala. These reportedly were under the direction of Oliverio Castaneda Paiz, who until his assassination in June 1972 was congressional deputy who had worked closely with the then Colonel Arana during the 1967 counterinsurgency campaign. The new counterinsurgency activities appear to have had at least the tacit approval of President-elect Arana. The victims were supposed to be guerrillas or suspected guerrillas, but in fact, often included individuals opposed to the traditional power blocs, the military, the oligarchy. Some key Arana supporters have repeatedly argued that the best method to eliminate guerrillas would be to indiscriminately strike out at a large number of leftists. Several leftists reportedly have been murdered by rightist assassins under the guise of an organization called *Ojo por Ojo* (Eye for an Eye). Clandestine reports have indicated the association between the government and *Ojo por Ojo* in 1970-71. The government reportedly printed

and distributed *Ojo por Ojo* notices threatening retaliation in the event of killings or kidnappings by the Communists. By mid-1971, *Ojo por Ojo* has given up all pretenses of being separate from the government and even uses the CTR building as its headquarters.

Since the lifting of the state of siege in November 1971, both Communist terrorism and government-sponsored counteractions have declined. In early 1972, the government proclaimed its counterinsurgency effort a success and now appears to be turning its attention to the control of common crime.

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Chronology (U/OU)

- 1524**
Pedro de Alvarado conquers the territory of Guatemala.
- 1542**
Audiencia of Guatemala is established and, during the colonial period, becomes a captainery general, including all of Central America.
- 1821**
Guatemala declares independence from Spain and joins the Mexican empire.
- 1823**
Guatemala breaks from Mexico and becomes part of the Central American Federation.
- 1939**
Guatemala becomes an independent state, officially declaring itself a republic in 1847.
- 1839-1944**
Guatemala is ruled by dictatorships, principally by Rafael Carrera (1839-65), Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-85), Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920), and Gen. Jorge Ubico (1931-44).
- 1944**
June
Dictator Ubico is overthrown.
- 1945**
March
Juan Jose Arevalo is inaugurated as Guatemala's first freely elected President. New constitution is promulgated.
- 1950**
December
Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman is elected President.
- 1951**
March
Col. Arbenz is inaugurated President.
- October**
Organization of Central American States (ODECA) is formed with Guatemalan participation.
- 1952**
December
Communist Party of Guatemala changes name to Guatemalan Labor Party (PCT) and registers officially as a party.
- 1954**
June
Anti-Communist group of about 200 men, led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, invades Guatemala and ousts Arbenz.
- November**
President Castillo Armas is inaugurated.
- 1957**
July
President Castillo Armas is assassinated; Luis Arturo Gonzalez Lopez succeeds to presidency.
- October**
Mob action forces Gonzalez' resignation; military junta takes over; mobs force junta out; Congress names second presidential designate, Guillermo Flores Avendano, Interim President and annuls October elections.
- 1958**
January
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes is elected President.
- 1959**
December
Guatemala accuses Cuba before OAS of helping the Communists to prepare an invasion of Guatemala.
- 1960**
April
Guatemala severs diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- 1963**
March
Government declares state of seige following a wave of terrorism; return of Juan Jose Arevalo precipitates a military coup; Ydigoras is ousted; Col. Enrique Peralta heads provisional military government.
- July**
Peralta government breaks relations with the United Kingdom over British Honduras issue.

1964

February

Decree law provides for formation and functioning of new political parties.

March

State of siege is lifted.

May

Constituent Assembly is elected and charged with writing a new constitution and preparing complementary laws.

July

Constituent Assembly approves abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and legalizes military government.

1965

February

State of siege is reimposed following terrorist attacks.

May

Terrorists assassinate Deputy Minister of National Defense, a key Peralta aide.

June

Schedule for return to constitutional government is announced.

July

State of siege is ended.

October

PR presidential candidate, Mario Mendez Montenegro, commits suicide; brother Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro takes his place as the Revolutionary Party (PR) candidate.

1966

March

PR wins large number of congressional seats in election; no presidential candidate receives absolute majority.

May

Congress elected in March chooses Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro for President.

New constitution (promulgated in September 1965) becomes effective.

July

Mendez is inaugurated President for 4-year term.

October

Guerrilla leader Luis Turcio Lima is killed in auto accident.

1967

December

Two Maryknoll priests and one nun, all U.S. citizens, are expelled from Guatemala for aiding guerrillas.

1968

January

Two U.S. military officers are assassinated by the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala City.

March

Archbishop Casariego is kidnapped by rightwing terrorists; Mendez resignation is unsuccessfully demanded in return for his release. Vice President Marroquin is censured by Congress for his alleged involvement.

Mendez dismisses three top ranking military officers and sends them into diplomatic exile.

May

Congress passes law establishing civil service system.

August

U.S. Ambassador John ~~Winton~~ Mien is assassinated by FAR terrorists on ~~27~~ August.

1970

March

Col. Caylon Arana Osorio is elected President by a plurality.

April

West German Ambassador ~~von~~ Sprei is assassinated by FAR.

July

President Arana is inaugurated; only the second peaceful transfer of power to a duly constitutionally elected opposition in Guatemalan history.

November

Government reimposes state of siege to counter increasing terrorist activities.

1971

November

Government lifts state of siege.

1972

March

Government coalition wins landslide victory in municipal elections.

September

Top leaders of PGT reportedly seized by government.

SECRET

Glossary (U/OU)

ABBREVIATION	SPANISH	ENGLISH
AEU	Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios	Association of University Students
AGA	Asociacion Guatemalteca de Agricultores	Guatemalan Association of Agriculturalists
BANDESA	Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agricola	National Agricultural Development Bank
CACIF	Comite Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras	Coordinating Committee of Associations of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry, and Finance
DCG	Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca	Guatemalan Christian Democracy
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes	Rebel Armed Forces
FASGUA	Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca	Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala
FECETRAG	Federacion Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala	Central Federation of Guatemalan Workers
FESC	Federacion Estudiantil Social Cristiana	Social Christian Student Federation
FPL	Frente Popular Libertador	Popular Liberation Front
FRU	Frente Revolucionaria Universidad	University Revolutionary Front
FUPA	Frente Unido de Partidos Arevelistas	United Front of Arvalist Parties
FURD	Frente Unido Revolucionaria Democratica	Democratic Revolutionary Unity Front
IGSS	Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social	Guatemalan Institute of Social Security
INFOP	Instituto de Fomento de la Produccion	Institute for the Development of Production
INTA	Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria	National Institute for Agrarian Reform
INVI	Instituto Nacional de Vivienda	National Institute of Housing
MDN	Movimiento Democratico Nacional	National Democratic Movement
MLN	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional	National Liberation Movement
PAR	Partido Accion Revolucionaria	Party of Revolutionary Action
PGT	Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo	Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist Party)
PGT/FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias	Revolutionary Armed Forces
PID	Partido Institucional Democratico	Democratic Institutional Party
PNR	Partido Nacional Revolucionario	National Revolutionary Party
PR	Partido Revolucionario	Revolutionary Party
PRG	Partido de la Revolucion Guatemalteca	Party of the Guatemalan Revolution
PUA	Partido Unificacion Anticomunista	Party of Anti-Communist Unification
RN	Renovacion Nacional	National Renovation
URD	Unido Revolucionaria Democratica	Democratic Revolutionary Unity group

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