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Country Profile

India

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE • Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area Brief • Summary Map

THE SOCIETY • Social structure • Population • Problems of labor • Health • Living conditions • Social problems • Religion • Education • Public Information • Artistic expression

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS • Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The Police • Intelligence and security


THE ECONOMY • Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • Manpower • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS • Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY • Topography and climate • Military geographic regions • Strategic areas • Internal routes • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES • The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

SCIENCE • Level of scientific advancement • Organization, planning, and financing of research • Scientific education, manpower, and facilities • Major research fields



Country Profile:

INDIA

Land of Unique Complexity 1

Undercurrents of National Character • Regionalism and Population • The Economics of Survival • Politics and Democracy, Indian Style • Whither, Mother India?

Chronology 16

Area Brief 17

Summary Map follows 18

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Land of Unique Complexity

"To eradicate poverty we must make a dent in the next three or four years at the very most . . . I must confess the path is not very clear." Indira Gandhi, 25 March 1972

India is many things at once. Over the centuries a unique society has developed which is so complex that India more than most countries frustrates generalization. It is the noise made by teeming masses of people, the sublime solitude of a mystic, the stench and squalor of a Calcutta slum, and the eternal beauty of the Taj Mahal. It is a primitive tribesman hunting with bow and arrow, a scientist at the Trombay nuclear installation, a caste system forever dooming millions to intolerable poverty and servitude, and the world's largest democracy. It is the third largest army on earth, the pacific poetry of Rabindranath Tagore, the heat of Madras, the mountain snows to Kashmir,* poverty beyond a Western observer's imagination in almost 600,000 villages, and opulent wealth in the Malabar Hills above Bombay. It is a woman Prime Minister, and the continuing influence of two men—the saintly Gandhi, who secured independence for his country, and the politically astute Nehru, who guided the new nation in its infancy.

The bitter-sweet Indian society has been compared to a fruit with the combined properties of an orange and an onion. Like an orange, it is divided into segments—religious, regional, linguistic, racial—and like an onion, it has a series of economic and sociological layers, including the rigid caste system. These diverse parts are held together by a legal and administrative system adapted from the British colonial

* For directions on place names see the list of names on the spine of the Summary Map at the end of this chapter and the map itself.

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experience and by a political system which is British in structure but uniquely Indian in process. The pervasive characteristic that makes this society unique is Hinduism. Reinforced by geographic isolation in the millennium before the Muslim invasions, Hinduism has managed to influence the entire society, to provide continuity despite numerous and disparate upheavals, and to evolve a civilization, character, and outlook found nowhere else in the world.

Poverty appears to go almost unnoticed by Indians, probably because it is so profound that it almost totally envelops the country and because the lack of resources and a host of other difficulties preclude its early elimination. Indian leaders recognize where their priorities should be when they point out that more than one-third of India's 570 million people live below the government's own austere concept of a minimum standard of living and that at the current rate of population growth it might take 30 to 50 years to overcome this condition, even under optimum conditions. This problem and so many others are so mammoth as to appear unmanageable, if not insoluble. When the unexpected happens, as it does with frightening regularity, well-intentioned efforts in one area often negate well-intentioned efforts in other areas. For example, because the drought in 1972 has resulted in a decline in agricultural output and a serious depletion of foodgrain reserves, India has had to divert resources originally allocated for overall economic development into crash programs to deal with the more immediate problem of feeding the people.

India is rife with contradictions and maladies and is inhabited by a complex and diverse people who can appear to be philosophical, detached, and serene one moment, and contentious, narrow, parochial, indifferent, or smug the next. Nevertheless, the country seems to possess a searching, compelling grace that attracts many foreigners and almost mystically creates an outlook that counteracts the revulsion they feel when first exposed to the harsh realities of Indian life. To many observers, life pulses and throbs in India more than in any other place in the world. Conquerors

and foreigners have come and gone and kingdoms and dynasties have risen and fallen, but Indian society remains a constant, and somehow—despite crises and disasters—the people continue to survive. Essentially united by the pervasive social aspects of Hinduism, people of different races, religions, and modes of living manage in some subtle way to remain part of and have intense loyalty to the whole, to preserve their traditions of beauty and order, and to present a distinctive character to the outside world.

Undercurrents of National Character



Hands are at chest level to greet equals

Although no generalized description of India's national character can be wholly valid, history and Hinduism have exerted enough influence as to create a common denominator of Indian action and thought. Indeed, many individual characteristics have a significant bearing on national attitudes and actions. Although Western ideas and 20th century institutions have effected some changes in India's overwhelmingly rural populace, significant attitudinal changes cannot easily be induced in 450 million village minds. What counts in 1973 India, however, is what goes on in the minds of a tiny percentage of the population: the educated, largely English-speaking elite who run the government, bureaucracy, and business; the educated non-elite, who are unemployed; the wealthy land-owners, who farm with relative efficiency and who are able to provide the money and support for the political parties; and the party leaders at the village and district level, who control grassroots support. In the final analysis, the differences in character and thought between them and other Indians are more in degree than in substance.

Indian leaders who have a sincere desire to synthesize 20th century ideas and methods with the traditional Indian culture are frustrated when they are unable to overcome the counterforces. Land reform and a ceiling on urban property holdings, for example, have been recognized as imperatives to progress, but forceful action in these matters would alienate

members of the small but powerful segment of the population who provide the essential political support of the regime.

Political subjugation, begun under the Muslims and completed by the British, created a galling sense of national inferiority, which still exists. By looking to the British for guidance, the Indian elite implicitly acknowledged a superior-inferior relationship. Indians are fiercely proud of their culture and cherish independence, but at the same time they take pride in the British system of law, administration, and education, and in the English language, which remains the communications link in business and government. In order to offset the fear that they really may be inferior, however, Indians are often so defensive—touchy and sensitive—that they appear to be offensive, that is assertive, vain, and arrogant. Many Indians also feel that their country is unjustly held in an inferior status and seem to have a need to try to show their superiority over foreigners. National achievements, especially the crushing victory over Pakistan in December 1971 and the apparent ability to create a nuclear weapon, have tended to buoy self-confidence, but euphoria is transient and the feelings of national inferiority are deeply imbedded.

Indians very often appear to act irrationally or contradictorily by accepting things that Westerners regard as incongruous or irreconcilable. A brilliant Indian nuclear scientist, for example, may exhibit Western rationality in the laboratory, but at home he defers every major decision to his father and practices Hindu ritual with no visible trace of discomfort. It has been suggested that the atomistic, highly individualistic Hindu religion, reinforced as it is by the caste system, has tended to develop compartments in the Indian mind. Rather than generating internal consistency, compartmentalization has inhibited the logical flow of implications from one aspect of life to another. In part, this may explain the tremendous gap between ideals and performance in India and why, despite the heavy flow of speeches, programs and policies from New Delhi, many ideas are not translated into action.

Indians seem to have little concern for time. Life seems to glide on imperceptibly, defying measurement in minutes and seconds. The Western notion that time is measurable and irreplaceable is absent. India's history is marked by vagueness over the centuries—the Indus Valley civilization existed "as early as" 2500 B.C.; Indo-Aryans arrived in India from Central Asia and introduced Hinduism "about" 1500-1200 B.C. The reasons for this lack of temporal precision are obscure and open to conjecture, but the consequences

have been more than the apparent inability of Indians either to appear for appointments on time or to undertake bureaucratic business with even the slightest sense of time. While Westerners believe that most problems are soluble, given enough resources, many Indians believe that certain problems are either insoluble or at best, soluble only over an incalculable period of time, or that solutions breed their own problems and contradictions. Indians have ability and ingenuity but not a sense of immediacy. Indians constantly seem to postpone making decisions despite an obvious need, sometimes for no other reason than that the astrologers advise the moment is not auspicious. Accordingly, decision-making often appears mystical rather than rational in the Western sense and seems to be based on feel rather than logic. Immediate confrontation seems to be avoided unless the problem is so pressing that urgent action must be taken. It is not that Indian leaders are unconcerned or unwilling to do the right thing, but their approach appears to be so relaxed that it often frustrates and even infuriates non-Indians. However, it is not at all certain that a Western approach would produce better results in an Indian unaccustomed and unreceptive to it.

Every man is probably more of an island in India than anywhere else. It may seem strange that there is such insularity in a country where people are so crowded together and a lack of privacy characterizes virtually all aspects of life. The Hindu religion and the caste system, while providing cultural continuity and solidarity, have reinforced societal atomization and introspection. The joint family has provided a strong but strictly limited sense of social responsibility. Large numbers of people are required to live under the same roof, or even in the same room, and to get along with each other. They work, eat, sleep, and relieve themselves together. Even today, a man who comes from a rural village to the city for employment will often send most of his earnings back to his family in his village, return there for important ceremonial occasions—a custom that causes an unacceptably high rate of absenteeism in many fields of endeavor—and years later retire to his native village. People outside the family, however, are regarded as distant islands—mere shadows for whom someone else, or God, is responsible. More practical reasons also exist for this insularity and insensitivity of man to man, especially in urban areas.

There are so many people in the cities and such an acute housing shortage that even Indians whose income should enable them to live above the subsistence level nevertheless live in slums; 30% to 40% of the pop-

ulation of any of India's major cities live under such conditions. The government has created complicated definitions by structural variation (tin, cardboard, wood) of what constitutes slums but, in short, it considers them to be primarily residential areas which are overcrowded with dwellings unfit for human occupation. According to the government, however, unfitness is relative to the social and economic progress of a community at any given period, and so the standards of tolerable living conditions vary accordingly. The slum inhabitants are fortunate, however, compared to the thousands of permanent pavement dwellers in the large cities. With almost half of the Indian population barely subsisting and unemployment and underemployment so widespread, most Indians find it virtually impossible to assume any sense of obligation to or involvement with their fellow man. The comparatively few wealthy Indians who could afford to be concerned tend to take a ritualistic approach to charity, which to the Western mind does not attack the fundamental problems.



Sadhus—Indian holy men

Hinduism is a way of life in India, where it is practiced by more than 80% of the population. Grand and not so grand temples, countless statues, sacred cows, venerated rocks and trees, yogis, and itinerant *sadhus* (holymen) provide daily visible evidence of the religion and spirituality. Indeed, *sadhus*, having chosen the ascetic life, are respected and fully accepted by the people. It is only by such abandonment of the physical world that Hindus believe true spirituality can be achieved. Thus, a Hindu's ultimate goal is to put an end to the endless cycle of his reincarnation by attaining perfection—unity of all things with Brahma (God)—but this is so difficult to achieve that Hindus usually seek only to improve the conditions for their next existence. Each man, accordingly, calls upon the Hindu deities to achieve worldly ends for him and aid him in achieving a better station in his next incarnation. His ultimate goals can be furthered best by performing the functions of his caste and avoiding the functions of other castes, even if he might do them better.

Hinduism is an individual, personal and non-institutionalized religion. Although orthodox Hinduism provides all embracing rules for the conduct of life from birth to death, it has no single, clear-cut system of practices, beliefs, or dogma, and no revealed authority. A variety of ancient books—the *Vedas*, the *Mahabharata*, and the *Ramayana*—are universally accepted in Hinduism, but they merely provide moral guides. Recognizing that all people cannot have the same goals or beliefs, or attain the same spiritual heights, the great Hindu umbrella accepts atheistic preachers, pantheism, polytheistic practitioners of magic and witchcraft, sophisticated and not so sophisticated monotheists, and monists. Indeed, Hinduism has absorbed and incorporated many extrinsic beliefs, ideas, deities, and cults. There can be and is no heresy in Hinduism. At the village level, anthropomorphism, superstition, and belief in both local and major gods are prevalent, although the more enlightened and educated tend to reject these beliefs in favor of prayer and meditation.

Despite Hinduism's flexibility, tolerance, and creed of nonviolence (*ahimsa*), India is a violent land where religious discrimination and prejudice based on real or imagined racial differences are found both within and outside of Hinduism. Untouchables are regarded by caste Hindus, especially at the village level, as a source of ritual pollution. The Indian constitution has abolished untouchability and the discrimination based on it, but this type of discrimination is still widespread. Discrimination against Muslims is not as pronounced,

but it is practiced, notably in employment opportunities. Bloody communal violence, especially between Hindus and Muslims, can easily erupt over minor incidents that arouse religious sensitivities. In such cases, violence may stem more from the need of two economically competitive groups to vent their frustrations over miserable conditions than from actual religious differences. When the conditions of life become more difficult, such as during times of famine or worsening unemployment, there is often an accompanying increase in the frustration level and local tensions. India's socioeconomic balance is so delicate that even wholly unrelated problems can lead to violent outbursts against religious groups.

Skin color often is identified as evidence of racial difference, but such prejudice rarely leads to violence without the presence of other factors such as caste. This color prejudice, however, is more subtle, widespread, and intense than religious discrimination. Except for tribals, who do not seem to care, Indians revere light skin and disdain dark. This feeling may be rooted in real, or mythical, ethnic and racial differences in the past, and may have been reinforced by the caste system. Rich and poor, learned and illiterate, dark and light skinned, Hindu, Muslim, and other religions all exhibit strong color feelings, which coexist with but overlie caste prejudices. Because of his higher caste status, a dark-skinned Tamil Brahman may look down on a lighter skinned Rajasthani Kshatriya, but the latter's wife will pity the former's wife because of her dark children. Their apparently inescapable preoccupation with color leads most Indians to assume that Westerners look down on and victimize Asians because of their swarthy color.

Caste, the social structure of Hinduism, is still very important in India but not necessarily in the traditional sense. Historically, membership in one of the broad social groups (*varna*)—Brahman (priests, highest status), Kshatriya (warriors, rulers), Vaisya (cultivators, middle class), and Sudra (artisans, lower class)—or nonmembership therein (the untouchables) made identification of social status and occupation relatively easy. In the Brahmanical Hindu view, *varna* indicated the general class of castes to which a person belonged, and within each, a ranked series of positions further defined status. People of *varna* status performed all the social, economic, religious, and military tasks for society, while the untouchables did the dirty work. Although the *varna* system was probably never more than a Vedic ideal, the system and vagueness of position within it have survived, giving some groups

grounds for loosely determining their position in society.


The essential caste compartmentalization today involves more than 3,000 subcastes (*jatis*), which are ranked in the Brahmanical system by status within the four stratified *varnas*. The subcastes generally follow rules which have evolved from antiquity. These rules pervade all aspects of a Hindu's life. They define personal relationships and obligations, and are especially important in village India, where 80% of the population lives. Despite some uncertainty over their own position within any *varna*, all Hindus recognize that the lowest position on the social scale is occupied by those outside of the *varna*—the loosely defined "Backward Classes," including the "Scheduled Castes" (untouchables, or as Gandhi called them, *harijans*), the "Scheduled Tribes," and "Other Backward Classes." These groups, which account for about 30% of the population, are legally accorded special recognition and privileges, because "backwardness" in India is a status determined by birth and not the result of economic or educational deprivation. Thus, some *harijans* have become rich, well-educated men, while a poor Brahman may seek to pose as a *harijan* in order to gain preferential consideration for appointment to a specially reserved government job or admission to a university. Caste also seems to pervade the social structure of all non-Hindu Indians, except the tribals, whose social structure also is stratified and strongly resembles that of the Hindus. Every Indian and every caste, no matter how low on the social scale, can usually identify another considered lower.

Modernization is making the extremely complex social system of caste even more complex. Twentieth century society, technology, industry, and ideas are causing very gradual changes in caste relationships, especially in cities where the urban environment complicates the more simple structure found in the villages. Concepts of democracy, egalitarianism, social responsibility and welfare, pragmatism, the opportunities for more self-development, and the eradication of poverty have complicated traditional thought patterns and have had an important impact on many Indians at all levels of society. Although social and occupational distinctions have been blurred or relaxed somewhat, with a corresponding alteration of values and attitudes, caste nevertheless still deeply affects all Indians. The habit of caste is apparently so ingrained that it is inescapable, despite new groupings which are beginning to emerge apart from caste. These groups include political parties, labor organizations, and eco-

conomic alliances of both urbanites and villagers based on regional as well as on caste considerations. More often than not, these social groups, as well as the more ideologically oriented political parties, present a veil which, when pierced, reveals a particular caste or group of castes, or a tiered structure controlled by people from higher castes.

Indians apparently need a pecking order. They must know where they stand in relation to the next person, whether Indian or foreigner. New occupations, for example, have sometimes created new "castes," especially in the cities where social identity can be concealed. A new occupational grouping, or even an existing caste, can over a period of time rise to a higher position in the social structure merely by adopting the ritual of a higher caste. No organized Hindu authority exists to dispute such action. It is the group, then, which can raise an individual's standing; personal accomplishment, while important, is not enough. Even in government—both central and state—where caste considerations should be irrelevant, they often consciously or unconsciously influence appointments, promotions, working relations, and friendships. Prime Minister Gandhi, for example, is a Kashmiri Brahman; everything else being equal, she has tended to surround herself with Kashmiri Brahmans because she feels more comfortable with them. She as well as other astute political leaders seem to have been unable to escape caste considerations; they have adapted to caste rather than attempting to override it.

Regionalism and Population



6

Regionalism, based primarily on linguistic considerations, and a swelling population are crucial problems confronting Indian leaders. Since independence, India has several times redrawn its state political boundaries along essentially ethnolinguistic lines in response to continuous pressures for such action. The results—21 states and 9 lesser administrative regions—have been a mixed blessing. While 14 regional languages are recognized as national languages, English—spoken by only 2% to 3% of the population—continues to be an official language and remains the language of administration. The average Indian, accordingly, is isolated either within the language of his state or by his local dialect.

Although territorial reorganizations have improved India's administrative structure and reduced the regional pressures, Indian leaders are concerned over the dangers inherent in further subdivision and tend to react negatively to issues which reinforce regionalism. Accordingly, when even purely language issues arise—such as the resentment of Assamese Bengali speakers over attempts in 1972 to make Assamese the sole medium of instruction in schools and universities in Assam—New Delhi has been more concerned about the long-range effects of yielding to regional demands than about quelling the violence that almost always occurs. Dissatisfaction with local rules for employment in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh emerged in 1972—and continues in 1973. The resulting agitation, for example, was sufficient grounds for New Delhi to intervene directly and attempt to settle the dispute. There is continuing concern in New Delhi that the central government must deal firmly with regional pressures lest dormant regional and separatist passions, particularly in southern India, be revived and spread throughout the country.

One child is born almost every second in India. This raises the prospect of there being a billion Indians by the turn of the century. The dimensions of such a human avalanche are so enormous that they have frustrated traditional attempts to deal with the attendant social and economic problems. Despite one of the world's most intensive family planning programs, which includes monetary incentives, multicolored condoms, rhythm method beads, a large promotional campaign to publicize birth control techniques, vasectomy camps, and legalizing abortion in 1972, it is not at all certain whether population growth can be reduced to tolerable levels. Lack of strong backing from Prime Minister Gandhi, shortages of trained personnel, the reluctance of those who are trained to go to the



countryside, where most people live, and even more important, suspicion, indifference, and fear, especially among the villagers, have been serious handicaps.

With survival or bare subsistence being even more basic goals than economic progress, concern must be directed toward reducing population growth. The government, therefore, hopes that the family planning program will lead to the prevention of 18 million births

by 1974, an estimated 7.4 million had been prevented by 1971. Such a goal may appear modest since there were more than 570 million Indians by mid-1973. Nevertheless, a beginning has been made. Population control is perhaps the most important problem facing India; the failure to resolve it not only jeopardizes all efforts to improve the lot of the people but also threatens India's survival as a politically stable nation.



The Economics of Survival

Although India sometimes appears to be only one step ahead of economic chaos, it has achieved some economic gains that did encourage guarded optimism about its economic potential. The modest economic growth since the mid-1960's was due primarily to the technological advances in agriculture associated with the Green Revolution. Despite technological improvements, India's preponderantly agricultural economy still remains vulnerable to the rhythm and vicissitudes of the monsoon rains. With only about 20% of the cultivated land currently under irrigation, estimates claim that only 35% to 50% will be irrigated by the end of the century. It is crucial that enough rain arrive at the right time, although rapid popula-

tion increases have continued to vitiate economic gains and frustrate efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in foodgrains. Aggregate growth in national income by 1973 was roughly abreast of population growth, and agricultural production, especially foodgrains, was reaching new heights. There was widespread optimism in New Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi's policy of emphasizing allocation of more resources to agriculture, in contrast to the greater emphasis on heavy industry in earlier development plans, had not only increased agricultural production but also was enabling India to build foodgrain reserves that hopefully would be sufficient to ensure survival without relying on foreign food imports during future periods of drought.

In 1971 economic conditions apparently were such that Mrs. Gandhi's successful election pledge of *garibi hatao* (abolish poverty) appeared to Indian leaders to be a realizable if yet a remote goal. India was euphoric over its victory in the December 1971 war with Pakistan and was encouraged by record stocks of foodgrain reserves, which obviated the need for P.L. 480 food assistance—foodgrains from the United States. Mrs. Gandhi's government was then able to concentrate its attention on such problems as land reform, income inequities, and unemployment. The need for land reform had long been recognized, but action had been postponed because emphasis had to be placed on the allocation of resources to deal with the more basic problems of survival. Indian voters, apparently convinced that Mrs. Gandhi could and would finally begin to deal with pressing social and economic issues, gave her party sweeping victories in the 1972 state elections, thereby extending Mrs. Gandhi's direct influence and control beyond the central government to almost all of the state governments. Encouraged by the possibility that a truly national effort based on center-state cooperation could now be launched, Indian economic planners were able to conceive of the country's Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) as the one under which India might finally achieve self-sufficiency and make some real progress in fulfilling urgent social and economic goals. The disappointing monsoon of 1972, however, had turned optimism to pessimism and brought many Indian leaders back to the harsh realities of economic life in India.

There is a fundamental conflict between India's political and purely economic goals. This conflict is complicated by the obvious desire of Indian leaders to bypass several centuries of evolutionary economic development without permitting either the economic freedom of Western-style capitalism or adopting the repressive state controls of communism. The social problems stemming from poverty, overpopulation, unemployment, and underemployment are so complex, so deeply entrenched in the economy, and so fraught with inhibiting political and social overtones that they tend to overwhelm the efforts to achieve such economic goals as improved technology and rapid expansion of industrial and agricultural production. Additionally, India lacks the financial and many of the natural resources for extensive development and growth. Its languid, tradition-bound agricultural economy thus far has been unable to solve the basic food problem or generate sufficient surplus capital to adequately promote industrial development and modernization. Moreover, because of an ideological antipathy toward big business harbored by the current leadership of the Congress Party, the government has enacted legislation which discourages private investment either by Indian capitalists or foreign investors. Finally, New Delhi's policies have failed to increase Indian exports sufficiently to pay for needed imports. Accordingly, pragmatic Indian leaders feel that India will probably have to continue relying on foreign aid, at least for the foreseeable future.



Bathing cattle in water also used for drinking


Through March 1972, India had received almost \$20 billion in foreign economic aid, of which about 50% was from the United States and about 10% from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Soviet aid has been earmarked largely for heavy industrial projects. U.S. and other Western aid, on the other hand, has been almost entirely in the form of food and raw materials and equipment for industry and agriculture. This dependence on foreign aid has been anathema to Mrs. Gandhi, who has often stated that eliminating the need for it is one of her primary goals. It is uncertain whether her views have been motivated by a nationalistic desire for self-sufficiency, a shrewd assessment that aid-weary bilateral donor nations seem to be favoring multilateral aid, or simply the realization that during her tenure of office India's net foreign aid receipts have been declining because of sharply rising debt repayments and a decrease in gross aid receipts. Despite her desire to end foreign assistance, Mrs. Gandhi in 1973 appeared aware that it is still needed. Acceptance of this fact has been a bitter but not impossible pill for her to swallow, especially since India in effect will continue to need U.S. aid, even if it is supplied through multilateral organizations. Indians appear to view aid through an organization such as the World Bank as more acceptable than direct U.S. assistance, even if the United States supplies most of the funds.

In early 1973, agricultural shortfalls resulting from the 1972 drought were leading to a new threat of famine, and India faced serious economic difficulties. A record breaking 9 million tons of foodgrain reserves were almost exhausted and India needed to purchase 2 to 3 million tons of foodgrain abroad. To finance these imports without seeking new foreign aid, India has had to dip into its carefully hoarded but limited foreign exchange holdings. The Fifth Five Year Plan has been reoriented from its original social welfare goals to emphasize more rapid economic growth, greater self-reliance, and even tighter central control of the economy. The whole process, however, represents a shift of words and resources rather than a shift to dramatic new approaches. The resources, or lack

thereof, remain the same as before, and so does the planning mechanism.

After more than two decades of "socialism" and expanding, tightly controlled, and planned economic development, India essentially still relies on *ad hoc* economic decisions made by the Prime Minister's office. Politics plays such a key role in the formulation of economic policy that Mrs. Gandhi's desire to make progress in the field of social welfare frequently conflicts with the policies needed to achieve economic growth. Because flexibility in economic policy is limited by political constraints, Mrs. Gandhi's policies have appeared to be inconsistent, contradictory, and lacking in depth. A sharp increase in economic growth is a prerequisite for achieving social welfare reforms. Mrs. Gandhi, however, feels obliged by political necessities to commit the government to measures which she feels are popular, such as encouraging small-scale industry to create employment. But small-scale industry, however, is often economically inefficient and does not necessarily contribute to significant economic growth. Indeed, more often than not, her domestic actions have been no more than symbolic gestures for public consumption that seemingly signify real progress but which, in fact, are ineffective, not enforced, or are altered later. Mrs. Gandhi has surrounded herself with highly competent economic advisers, but her instincts, training, and temperament are political, not economic. Thus, there has been a gap between precept and practice on crucial issues such as land reform because Mrs. Gandhi is dependent on rich farmers and landlords for political support and, therefore, is disinclined to pursue economic policies that would alienate them.

Mrs. Gandhi's political instincts have probably already warned her that her political future will ultimately hinge on her government's ability to fulfill her social welfare promises while, concurrently, maintaining stable economic growth. Although vacillation and compromise have marked her policies in the past, Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian leaders presumably realize that the time is rapidly approaching for some hard economic decisions. National elections must be held no later than the spring of 1976.



Campaigning in Rajasthan

Politics and Democracy, Indian Style

The Indian political system is basically an Indian translation of British democratic parliamentarism and American federalism infused with a generous helping of Marxist socialist rhetoric. As in the best of translations, some of the essential meaning has been lost. Nevertheless, despite the modifications of Western principles and practices resulting from India's history and very different socioeconomic conditions and needs, Indians have remained remarkably faithful and dedicated to preserving the democratic ideals of political and individual freedom. Many educated Indians will assert with great pride that India is the world's largest democracy and ignore the fact that democracies still prevail in India despite the enormous social, economic, and political problems. The assertion warrants the respect of most observers (not the older democracies). Many Indian voters are illiterate, unsophisticated, and lack broad information on national issues, but they do take their franchise quite seriously. They turn out in large numbers—about 54% of those eligible actually voted in the 1971 national election compared to about 53% in the 1972 U.S. presidential election—and are paid great heed by politicians at the local, state, and even national levels. There is a fairly high turnover of elected officials—about one third in

each session for the *Lok Sabha* (lower house of Parliament). Voting irregularities—ballot tampering, vote buying, and intimidation—do occur and are almost part of the political folklore of certain traditionally tempestuous areas such as West Bengal. For the most part, however, the results of elections, particularly national, appear to be a good index of popular sentiment and a continuing example of Indian democracy in action.

The parliamentary process, at the heart of Indian democracy, Parliament at the center and assemblies at the state levels, are among the freest legislative bodies in the world. In theory, Parliament was created to control, question, debate, and approve or reject government actions. Indeed, parliamentarians are at their rhetorical best in the *Lok Sabha* during the daily question hour at 11 o'clock and the zero hour at noon when they question government spokesmen on topical issues.

A multiplicity of political parties undermines the effectiveness and stability of the national political system and would decrease the potential efficiency of both Parliament and government should the Congress Party's traditional hegemony weaken. Despite the Congress Party's preeminence in political affairs, the

central government reflects essentially a coalition system, which has given it stability when guided by strong and authoritative leadership. Indeed, the coalition nature of Indian politics is also illustrated by the wide range of political beliefs that exist under the Congress Party umbrella. In addition to several major parties, there are a great number of special interest and splinter parties as well as independents both at the center and in many states. Chronic fluidity characterizes party politics in many states because, as the political tides change, loyalties often wane and defections occur. This renders even the most stable state coalition governments fragile and susceptible to collapse at any time, encourages minority government, with all its difficulties, and is an invitation to irresponsible demagoguery.


The nature of Indian parliamentary politics and politicians also mitigates against efficiency. Indian parliamentary politics is a rough and tumble business that gives full vent to impassioned politicians of all ideological stripes. Many legislators deliver rambling and vague speeches and are often interrupted by haranguing colleagues. Emotions flare regularly, sometimes even leading to fist fights when the issues are politically sensitive. The simultaneous translation from the regional language of the speaker of English adds further confusion. Indeed, talk frequently seems preferred to action. Many parliamentarians practice the art of gamesmanship—wheeling and dealing—with such zest that politics appears to be their major national sport. Corruption is a fact of life both among politicians and public servants. Corruption is so pervasive, however, that it seems to have been almost accepted by the people as an inherent evil connected with political and governmental jobs. On the other hand, more politicians probably are diligent and honest than not, and few survive in office without being responsive to their electorate. Despite its cumbersome nature and capacity for delay, the system works. It works because of the acknowledged determination of most of the nation's leaders to make it work in order, hopefully, to achieve a better existence for the people through democratic means.

Despite crushing problems which, in the short run, might be more efficiently handled by authoritarian means, the national leaders' deep-seated commitment to the forms of democracy has allowed diverse and plural interests to find appropriate expression within the Indian union. In addition, the federal character of the Indian Union has compartmentalized some of the conflicting national pressures by providing local outlets for regional grievances. Despite the "high com-

mand" concept of central decisionmaking by New Delhi, Indian leaders, particularly Mrs. Gandhi, have traditionally considered center-state relations very important. Recognizing that individual treatment and attention is necessary in dealing with different areas, they have encouraged diverse and sometimes surprising solutions to the many problems. New Delhi approved greater regional autonomy for the tribal areas of northeast India, for example, even though it was contrary to the trend toward increasing central control. Indian federalism has worked well, in general, and although regional partisans have often disagreed with New Delhi over interpretation of how deeply the center should exercise its constitutional responsibility in state affairs, their discontent, with very few exceptions, has been expressed by demands for greater autonomy, not for secession. Similarly, although discontent and frustration over the miserable conditions in India are expressed daily, the thrust is generally for change, not destruction of the existing system.

Since independence, national leaders have used "President's Rule"—the constitutional authority enabling the central government to assume direct control of a state—to dominate and orchestrate Indian affairs. One-party domination and the use of President's Rule have evolved as special Indian tools for bringing and holding together a diverse nation and providing it with direction and vitality. Democracy in the Indian context occasionally has also resulted in near anarchy, e.g., West Bengal during 1969-71. Such conditions have produced a wily style of governing that sometimes smacks of autocracy but one that has sought to provide a relatively stable framework within which India might make significant strides in trying to solve its staggering problems.

Since independence, Congress Party-led governments have shouted, wheedled, and compromised their way through India's democratic parliamentary system at the national and local level and, on balance, have probably made progress to the degree that the Indian milieu has permitted. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's keen understanding of her people and the Indian political process has been enviable and possibly unparalleled, even by her famous father.



Whither, Mother India?

Even though the Congress Party controls the Indian Government, it is the government and its leader who make the decisions. As leader of both party and government, Mrs. Gandhi has achieved almost complete omnipotence in Indian politics. At the center, her handpicked candidates sit in the Congress Party-dominated Lok Sabha, and she selects both the cabinet and sub-cabinet-level ministers. At the state level, she personally has chosen many chief ministers and most of the Congress Party's organizational leaders. Indeed, following the elections of 1971 and

1972, except for Tamil Nadu, in those few states where Congress failed to come into power, the failure was because Mrs. Gandhi either had let her party step aside in deference to a friendly local party or she had allowed the Congress Party to coalesce with local politicians.

Mrs. Gandhi has shown no reluctance to utilize provisions in Indian law allowing temporary suspension of normal constitutional rights and procedures. She has not hesitated to impose President's Rule to establish control over a state where circumstances were in her

opinion, warranted central control. She has fostered constitutional amendments to broaden her government's power to initiate reforms. These amendments empower Parliament and, by extrapolation, Mrs. Gandhi to abridge those fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution that conflict with certain formerly unenforceable socioeconomic policy guidelines called "directive principles of state policy." She has stated that the thrust of these amendments is to place national social justice objectives ahead of fundamental individual rights, but she has also promised that none of these basic rights, except the right to own property, will be affected.

Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1973 wields unprecedented power and is the single most important person in the country the future for her, her Congress Party, and India may be now. Since coming to power in 1966, but especially since the late 1960's, Mrs. Gandhi's actions have resembled those of a skirmisher clearing the ground for the big battle. She routed the old guard in a gladiatorial Congress Party struggle in 1969. Subsequently, she reoriented the party so as to make it a more left-of-center, youth oriented, and reform-minded organization, and she has begun to fill key advisory, government, and party positions largely with congenial supporters who lack political bases of their own. Mrs. Gandhi swept the political board first in the March 1971 national elections and then in the state elections in the spring of 1972. Pausing of necessity in 1971 to deal with the East Pakistan crisis, she eventually achieved a crushing victory over Pakistan in the December war. With opposition at the national and local level decimated and postwar nationalistic euphoria at a height, Mrs. Gandhi finally appeared to have all the necessary power to overcome deep-seated center-state differences and to begin a nationwide attack on poverty and other socioeconomic ills with a real chance of success.

Until the poor monsoon of 1972, agricultural progress leading to record-breaking foodstock reserves as well as modest growth in other segments of the economy were additional grounds for guarded optimism that an assault on social welfare problems could finally begin in earnest. Although the government maintained that it was forced by India's vulnerability and the fear of possible joint Sino-Pakistani military action to maintain and equip the world's third largest army, for the first time since independence Pakistan no longer posed a significant military threat. Even China seemed increasingly an unlikely aggressor, and no other external power threatened India. Indeed, when the United States

suspended economic aid in late 1971, New Delhi felt confident enough to proclaim that India was on the threshold of attaining its long-desired goal of economic self-reliance.

Although the drought in 1972 has precipitated something of an economic crisis, it may prove to contain some political blessings in disguise for Mrs. Gandhi. Rising expectations and self-confidence had begun to wane in the wake of disillusionment over rising prices, continued unemployment, and little, if any, improvement in standards of living. The recent abolition of princely purses and privileges and the nationalization of banks and insurance companies were well-publicized accomplishments for Mrs. Gandhi, but ones which increasingly appeared to be mere gestures. The political opposition, while still weak, has become more vocal and is focusing attention on India's unsolved socioeconomic problem, but as long as national attention remains diverted to solving the more immediate problems associated with the monsoon failure, the Prime Minister may continue to enjoy a respite from accounting for her poor performance in social welfare matters.

Even though the common man is scarcely better off than he was a few years ago, he has blamed the deficient "system" rather than the Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi is only expected to "do something," i.e., to provide leadership for change, not to accomplish miracles. Nevertheless, her transparently *ad hoc* solutions to problems and her uncertainty or unwillingness to act—probably because of her unfamiliarity with the economic field and felt political restraints—are beginning to become evident to the people. Indeed, critics have already begun to excoriate her for failing to reveal an explicit blueprint for change. Political opponents may succeed in making mismanagement an issue, but they probably will have to proceed by focusing attention on specific shortcomings, such as the lack of food, rather than by criticizing her basic approach.

India's problems are so numerous and complex and the agricultural economy is so deeply dependent on the vagaries of nature that Mrs. Gandhi may have chosen purposely to avoid precision in policymaking as the only prudent way an Indian leader can operate. She may not know precisely how to solve India's problems, but in India's case, precision may not be necessary. Mrs. Gandhi is viewed by many in 1973 as the symbolic leader of India—*Bharat Mata* (Mother India). If she continues to play the role of a symbolic leader who maintains domestic tranquillity and simultaneously takes rational, albeit *ad hoc*, measures

that result in at least some progress, she may be proceeding along the best path possible for India. Mrs. Gandhi is an astute, shrewd, pragmatic politician who has shown skill for taking deft action at the proper time in order to retain and expand her power.

Nonalignment is still the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, but the concept has been subtly redefined to remove the notions of neutrality associated with it some 20 years ago and to accommodate India's enunciated policy of bilateralism—an admittedly opportunistic principle for guiding its foreign political and commercial relations. Mrs. Gandhi and the other Indian leaders presumably realize that India did not achieve the significant balancing voice it had sought as self-proclaimed "leader" of the nonaligned or third world, even during the "bipolar" years. Such a goal may be inappropriate or impossible to attain today in a changing world dominated politically not only by the United States and the Soviet Union but also, to a lesser degree, by China, Western Europe, and Japan. A strong emotional attachment to the old concept still lingers in New Delhi, however. Mrs. Gandhi and Indian leaders still regard India as the major spokesman for at least the developing nations and believe that, because of its size, location, and potential, India has a rightful role to play in both regional and world affairs. They are quite sensitive about gaining international acceptance of this position. They rationalize that as the paramount power on the subcontinent, India should at least be able to extend its influence in Asia. The remarkably successful war against Pakistan in 1971 altered the power balance in South Asia so dramatically that many of India's smaller neighbors now regard New Delhi with increased suspicion and fear. Furthermore, to its detriment on the international scene, India in the postwar period finds itself somewhat at the mercy

of its client state Bangladesh—particularly in the matter of release of Pakistani prisoners of war. And finally, two giants—economically powerful Japan and China with its 850 million people and nuclear weapons—will continue to vie with India should New Delhi press its desire for a greater role in Asian affairs.

Even before the moves for rapprochement among the great powers in the early 1970's, India had sought to maintain balanced relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, to establish more normal relations with China in order to strengthen India's security, and to enhance its international position generally. Despite treaty relations with the Soviet Union, continuing serious strains over fundamental issues with the United States, and the apparent indifference of China, Mrs. Gandhi evidently seeks to balance India's foreign policy and maintains a credible commitment to nonalignment.

Indira Gandhi probably will determine India's course for the indefinite future. She realizes that India eventually may have to go it alone in its struggle for development, and she is seeking to evolve realistic Indian solutions to uniquely Indian problems. In foreign affairs, her apparent desire to continue her father's policy of extending India's influence abroad to achieve regional status, or even international, is given renewed life by India's practical need for access to foreign resources, e.g., Middle East oil, and by India's security requirements. The Indian Government will have to continue balancing the domestic demands on resources with the continuing requirements for foreign investment in framing its foreign policy initiatives. Whether Mrs. Gandhi can achieve an international role commensurate with Indian aspirations, begin to alleviate social ills, and, at the same time, maintain a growing, self-reliant economy will determine her future and the future of India.

Chronology

1947

August

On 15 August India becomes an independent dominion in the British Commonwealth with Jawaharlal Nehru as its first Prime Minister.

October

Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, faced with rebellion by his Muslim subjects, accedes to India and requests Indian troops to repel tribal invaders from Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani war continues in Kashmir throughout 1948.

1948

January

Mahatma Gandhi is assassinated on 30 January.

1949

January

United Nations arranges cease-fire in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and calls for plebiscite to determine its future.

1950

January

India becomes an independent republic on 26 January under a new national constitution.

1951

June

First major U.S. assistance agreement with India is signed; provides for loan-gift of 2 million tons of wheat.

October

First general elections begin, lasting through March 1952.

1952

December

First Five Year Plan (FY1951/52-1955/56) is formally presented to Parliament, somewhat behind schedule.

1954

April

Sino-Indian treaty recognizes Chinese suzerainty in Tibet.

1955

February

First major Soviet aid project, a steel mill, is provided to India.

1956

November

State boundaries are reorganized along linguistic lines in response to regional pressures.

1957

Chinese build road in Ladakh district of Kashmir in first Chinese seizure of Indian territory.

1960

September

Agreement on division and use of Indus River waters is signed with Pakistan.

1961

December

Indian troops seize control of Portuguese India on 18 December.

1962

September

Serious skirmishing with Chinese troops breaks out along the Indo-Tibetan border, followed in October by large-scale Chinese attacks in Ladakh and the then North East Frontier Agency of Assam State.

1964

May

Prime Minister Nehru dies on 24 May.

June

Lal Bahadur Shastri becomes Prime Minister on 2 June.

1965

August

Armed Pakistanis infiltrating into Kashmir spark widespread fighting, which leads to full-scale war in the Punjab, 6-23 September.

1966

January

Prime Minister Shastri dies on 11 January in Tashkent, U.S.S.R., only hours after signing an accord with Pakistani President Ayub aimed at restoring normalcy to Indo-Pakistani relations. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, is named Prime Minister on 19 January.

1967

February

Fourth general elections result in a substantial decline in Congress Party legislative strength at both national and state levels.

1969

April

Fourth Five Year Plan begins after delay of 3 years, since 1965 and 1966 droughts and deteriorating economic conditions had necessitated emergency planning.

August

V. V. Giri, with Prime Minister Gandhi's backing, defeats regular Congress Party candidate for Indian presidency.

November

Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party rivals form a separate organization in Parliament.

1971**March**

Fifth general elections result in a smashing victory for both Prime Minister Gandhi and her ruling Congress Party and halt trend toward coalition government at the national level. Pakistan Government "crackdown" to reestablish its authority in East Pakistan on 25 March begins flow of 10 million refugees to India and precipitates the Indo-Pakistani crisis.

August

India and the Soviet Union sign the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August in New Delhi.

December

Following months of increasing border violations and Indian support of Bengali independence fighters, a full-scale war erupts, 3-17 December; India defeats Pakistan.

1972**March**

State election victories restore Congress Party hegemony at the state level.

July

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi meets with Pakistan President Bhutto at Simla, India; progress on a number of bilateral problems results.

Area Brief**LAND:**

Size: 1,211,000 sq. mi. (includes Indian portion of Jammu and Kashmir; Sikkim, Goa, Daman, and Diu) 60% agricultural, 19% forested, 21% inland water, urban, waste, and other
Land boundaries: 7,880 miles

WATER:

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. (fishing, 12 n. mi.; additional 100 mi. is fisheries conservation zone, December 1968)
Coastline: 4,378 mi. (including offshore islands)

PEOPLE:

Population: 578,034,000 (1 July 1973; excludes Sikkim but includes Indian portion of disputed Jammu and Kashmir, and Goa, Daman, and Diu); average annual growth rate is 2.5% (est.)

Ethnic divisions: 72% Indo-Aryan, 25% Dravidian, 3% Mongoloid and other

Religion: 83.5% Hindu, 10.7% Muslim, 1.8% Sikh, 2.6% Christian, .7% Buddhist, .7% other

Language: 15 languages recognized by the constitution; additional 35 languages spoken by more than 100,000 persons; numerous other languages and dialects that are for the most part mutually unintelligible; Hindi is the national language and the primary tongue of 30% of the people; English enjoys "associate" status but is the most important language for national, political, and commercial communication; Hindustani, a popular variety of Hindi-Urdu, is spoken widely throughout northern India

Literacy: Males 39%, females 18%; both sexes 29% (1971 census)

Labor force: About 184 million; 70% agriculture, more than 10% unemployed and underemployed; shortage of skilled labor is significant and unemployment is rising

Organized labor: About 2.5% of labor force

GOVERNMENT:

Legal name: Republic of India

Type: Federal republic

Capital: New Delhi

Political subdivisions: 21 states, 9 union territories, 1 protectorate (Sikkim)

Legal system: Based on English common law; constitution adopted 1950; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations

Branches: Parliamentary government, national and state; independent judiciary

Government leader: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

Suffrage: Universal over age 21

Elections: National and state elections ordinarily held every 5 years; may be postponed in emergency and may be held more frequently if government loses confidence vote; next general election to be held by March 1976; 16 states and two union territories held state elections in March 1972; remaining states to be polled over next several years

Political parties and leaders: Indian National Congress split into two factions in 1969, largest faction (the Ruling Congress) loyal to Prime Minister Gandhi led by S.D. Sharma, and smaller faction (the Organization Congress) led by Sadiq Ali; Communist Party of India (CPI), S.A. Dange, chairman; Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPI/M), P. Sundararaya, general secretary; Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist (CPI/ML), chairman unknown; Swatantra, P. Mody, chairman; *Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, L.K. Advani, president; The Socialist Party, Kappori Thakur, chairman; *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (DMK), N. Karunanidhi, president
Voting strength (1971 election): 43.7% Ruling Congress, 10.5% Organization Congress, 7.4% *Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, 3.1% Swatantra, 4.8% CPI, 5.2% CPI/M, 3.5% Socialist Parties, 3.7% DMK, 18.1% other

Communists: 80,000 to 100,000 members of CPI (est.); 80,000 to 100,000 members of CPI/M (est.); Communist sympathizers, 13 million

Other political or pressure groups: *Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (ADMK), M.G. Ramachandran, president, opposing DMK in Tamil Nadu; splintered Akali Dal representing Sikh religious community in the Punjab; various separatist groups seeking reorganization of states, particularly in Andhra Pradesh; numerous "senas" or militant chauvinistic organizations, including Shiv Sena in Bombay

ECONOMY:

GNP: \$56 billion (est.) for FY1972/73, less than \$100 per capita; real growth (FY1972/73) 3% est.

Agriculture: Main crops—rice, other cereals, pulses, oilseeds, cotton, jute, sugarcane, tobacco, tea, and coffee; must import foodgrains; caloric intake is low, and diet is deficient in protein

Fishing catch: 1.9 million tons (FY1971/72); exports \$55 million (FY1971/72), imports \$100,000

Major industries: Textiles, food processing

Steel: 6.4 million metric tons of ingot steel and 4.8 million metric tons of finished steel (FY1971/72)

Electric power: 17.8 million kw. capacity (1972); 66 billion kw.-hr. produced (1972), 120 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: \$2.4 billion (f.o.b., FY1972/73); tea, jute manufactures, iron ore, cotton textiles, leather and leather products, iron and steel

Imports: \$2.8 billion (c.i.f., FY1972/73); machinery and transport equipment, petroleum, iron and steel, grains and flour

Major trade partners: U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Japan

Economic aid: U.S. (FY46-71) \$9.3 billion; U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries (1954-March 1973) \$2 billion

Monetary conversion rate: 7.5 rupees = US\$1

Fiscal year: 1 April-31 March

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 37,281 miles: 18,299 miles 5'6" gage; 13,072 miles 3'3/4" (meter) gage; and 2,781 miles 2'6" and 2'0" gage, government owned; 129 miles 2'6" and 2'0" gage privately owned; 6,933 miles (6,645 miles 5'6" gage and 288 miles 3'3/4") double or multiple tracked and 2,303 miles electrified

Highways: 643,028 miles. 106,854 miles concrete and bituminous surfaced (mostly bituminous-surface treated); 95,054 miles gravel, crushed stone, or laterite surfaced; 184,631 miles improved earth; 356,489 unimproved earth

Inland waterways: About 8,750 miles with seasonal depths of 3 ft. or more

Ports: 7 major (Bombay, Calcutta, Cochin, Kandla, Madra, Marmagao, Vishakhapatnam), 75 minor

Merchant marine: 257 ships 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 2,718,000 g.r.t. or 2,176,200 d.w.t. (1973)

Civil air: About 116 major transport aircraft; 2 major airlines
Airfields: 619 total, 359 usable; 187 have permanent-surface runways; 2 have runways over 12,000 ft., 49 have runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 130 have runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 4 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Adequate international service; fair domestic telephone service in and between major cities; many small towns and villages without telephone service; telephone distribution is about 0.25 per 100 population; telegraph facilities widespread; AM radiobroadcast adequate; TV limited to Delhi-New Delhi and Bombay areas; 1,350,000 telephones (late 1972); 13 million licensed radio and about 40,000 TV sets (late 1972); about 270 AM broadcast stations in about 75 locations; 3 TV stations; 1 earth satellite station; submarine cables extend to Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Aden

DEFENSE FORCES:

Military manpower (1 July 1973); males 15-49, 138,212,000; about 57% physically fit for military service


Places and Features referred to in this General Survey


	COORDINATES			COORDINATES		
	° 'N.	° 'E.		° 'N.	° 'E.	
Āgra	27 11	78 01	Haryana (state)	29 00	76 00	Nicobar Islands (isls)
Āgra (dist)	27 05	77 58	Himachal Pradesh (union territory)	31 00	78 00	Orissa (state)
Ahmadābād	23 02	72 37	Himalayas (mts)	28 00	84 00	Ootacamund
Ahmednagar	19 05	74 44	Hindan (strm)	28 27	77 28	Pachmarhi
Aljal	23 44	92 43	Hindu Kush (mts)	35 00	71 00	Pandu
Ajanta	20 32	75 43	Hooghly River (strm)	21 55	88 05	Parādip
Ajmer	26 27	74 38	Hyderābād	17 23	78 28	Parādip Garh (port)
Aksai Chin (region)	35 05	79 30	Hyderābād (state)	18 00	78 00	Pathānkot
Alibāg	18 39	72 54	Impāl	24 49	93 57	Patna
Aligarh	27 53	78 05	Indo-Gangetic Plain (plain)	27 00	80 00	Patna
Allāhābād	25 27	81 51	Indraprast	28 29	77 18	Pechi
Ambāla	30 21	76 50	Indus River (strm)	24 20	67 47	Perambur (rr sta)
Amndivi Islands (isls)	11 23	72 23	Indus Valley (valley)	29 00	71 00	Pondicherry (union territory)
Amritsar	31 35	74 53	Islāmābād, Pakistan	33 42	73 10	Port Blair
Andaman Islands (isls)	12 30	92 45	Izatnagar	28 23	79 25	Powāi
Andhra Pradesh (state)	16 00	79 00	Jabalpur	23 10	76 57	Punākha, Bhutan
Ankleshwar	21 36	73 00	Jaduguda (ore mill)	22 39	85 20	Pune (Poona)
Arunachal Pradesh (union territory)	28 00	94 30	Jaipur	26 55	75 49	Punjab (state)
Arvi	18 22	73 49	Jaisalmer	26 55	70 54	Puri
Asansol	23 41	86 59	Jalahalli	13 02	77 33	Quilon
Assam (state)	26 00	93 00	Jamālpur	25 18	86 30	Rājasthān (state)
Āvadi	13 07	80 07	Jammu	32 44	74 52	Rājkot
Badagara	11 36	75 35	Jammu and Kashmir (state)	33 00	77 00	Rājmahāl Hills (hills)
Bāghdogra	26 42	88 19	Jāmnagar	22 28	70 04	Rana Pratap Sagar Dam (dam)
Bāndel (rr sta)	22 56	88 22	Jāmsheḍpur	22 48	86 11	Rana Pratap Sagar (powerplant)
Bangalore	12 59	77 35	Jessore, Bangladesh	23 10	89 13	Rānchi
Baradabar	23 32	81 15	Jodhpur	26 17	73 02	Rangāpuram
Barauni	25 41	78 23	Jogighopa	26 14	90 35	Rānippettai
Barilly	28 21	79 25	Jorhāt	26 45	94 13	Rann of Kutch (marsh)
Barhi	24 18	85 25	Jullundur	31 19	75 34	Raurkela
Bārūni	25 29	85 59	Kābul, Afghanistan	34 31	69 12	Rāwalpindi, Pakistan
Batāla	31 48	75 12	Kākināda	16 56	82 13	Rihand (strm)
Bay of Bengal (bay)	15 00	90 00	Kālol	23 15	72 29	Roorkee
Begampet (rr sta)	17 28	78 28	Kālpākkam	12 34	30 10	Sabarigiri (hydro pur site)
Benares	25 20	83 00	Kandla	23 02	70 13	Sābarmati (rr sta)
Bhāgirathi River (strm)	23 25	88 23	Kandla Creek (strm)	22 58	70 15	Sāgar
Bhākra Dam (hydro pur site)	31 25	76 28	Kānpur	20 25	85 10	Sāha
Bharat	24 20	72 14	Kānpur	26 28	80 21	Sāmbre
Bhilai	21 13	81 26	Karāchi, Pakistan	24 52	67 03	Sānchi, Bhutan
Bhopāl	23 16	77 24	Karāikkudi	10 04	78 47	Sankosh (strm)
Bhubaneswar	20 14	85 50	Karakoram Range (mts)	34 00	78 00	Secunderābād
Bhusāval	21 03	75 46	Kārikāl	10 55	79 50	Sharavati (strm)
Bidar	17 54	77 33	Karnataka (region)	16 00	75 00	Shillong
Bihār	25 11	85 31	Kasauli	30 55	76 57	Shipki La (pass)
Bihār (state)	25 00	86 00	Katarbaga	21 38	84 07	Shirālā
Bhusāval	21 03	75 46	Kāthiāwār (peninsula)	21 58	70 30	Sholapur
Bhutan, Kingdom of	27 30	90 30	Kāthmāndu, Nepal	27 43	85 19	Shwebo, Burma
Bokāro Coalfield (coalfield)	23 49	86 00	Kerala (state)	10 00	76 15	Sikkim (protectorate)
Bokāro Nadi (strm)	23 46	85 55	Khadki	18 34	73 52	Silchar
Bombay	18 58	72 50	Khambhāt (Cambay)	22 18	72 37	Siliguri
Brahmaputra (strm)	24 02	90 59	Kharagpur	22 20	87 20	Simla
Buckingham Canal	15 39	80 13	Kharakvasla	18 26	73 46	Sindi
Budge Budge	22 27	88 10	Khāsi Hills (mts)	25 35	91 38	Singarsi Peak (peak)
Cāchār (dist)	25 05	92 55	Khulna, Bangladesh	22 48	89 33	Sriharikota Island (isl)
Calcutta	22 32	88 22	Kirkee (see Khadki)	18 34	73 52	Srinagar
Cape Comorin (cape)	8 04	77 34	Kodaikānal	10 14	77 29	Sylhet, Bangladesh
Car Nicobar (isl)	9 10	92 47	Kohima	25 40	94 07	Tālcher
Chābua (rr sta)	27 29	95 11	Koraput	18 49	82 43	Tambaram
Cha-hsi-kang, China	32 32	79 41	Korba	22 21	82 41	Tamil Nādu (state) (formerly M
Chālna, Bangladesh	22 36	89 31	Kota	25 11	75 50	Tārāpur
Chandausi	28 27	78 46	Kottagidēm	18 04	80 28	Tawang
Chandigarh (rr sta)	30 44	76 55	Kottayam	9 35	76 31	Telengana (area)
Chandigarh (union territory)	30 45	76 48	Koyali	22 22	73 07	Thar Desert, Pakistan (desert)
Chandrapura (rr sta)	23 46	86 07	Koyna (strm)	17 18	74 10	Thumba (rocket launching statio
Cherrapunji	25 18	91 42	Kozhikode (Calicut)	11 15	75 76	Tinsukia
Chhāngā Māngā, Pakistan	31 05	73 58	Krishna (strm)	15 57	80 59	Tripura (state)
Chittagong, Bangladesh	22 20	91 50	Laccadive Islands (isls)	11 00	72 00	Trivandrum
Chittaranjan	23 52	86 52	Ladākh (dist)	34 20	77 25	Trombay
Ch'u-mu-pi Shan-ku, China (valley)	27 39	87 03	Lahore, Pakistan	31 35	74 18	Tuticorin
Chushul	33 36	78 39	Leh	34 10	77 35	Udhampur
Chutupālu	23 34	85 32	Lhasa, China	29 39	91 06	United Khasi-Jaintia Hills (dis
Cochin	9 58	76 14	Lonāvāle	18 45	73 25	Utrān (rr sta)
Cochin (former native state)	10 25	76 30	Longju	28 38	93 33	Uttar Pradesh (state)
Coimbatore	11 00	76 58	Lucknow	26 51	80 55	Vadodara (Baroda)
				30 54	75 51	Vishākhapatnam

20 14	08 30	Karakoram Range (mt)	51 09	75 00	Unadmirable	17 27	78 30
21 03	75 30	Kashmir	59 25	79 30	Sharavati (river)	14 18	74 24
22 04	77 33	Karnataka (region)	18 00	78 00	Shillong	05 31	91 30
23 11	83 31	Kashmir	20 25	78 47	Shillong (pass)	31 49	78 45
24 00	84 00	Kashmir	21 28	81 07	Shillong	18 04	74 08
25 03	73 46	Kashmir (gen/river)	21 40	70 30	Shillong	17 41	75 35
26 30	80 30	Kathmandu, Nepal	27 43	83 18	Shwaha, Burma	22 30	85 47
27 48	86 00	Kerala (state)	18 05	78 15	Sikkim (province)	27 45	88 30
28 48	85 55	Khasi	18 21	78 22	Sikhar (province)	24 48	82 45
29 48	85 55	Khasi (Cachar) (river)	27 18	72 27	Siliguri	31 42	83 26
30 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 20	87 20	Simala	23 08	77 17
31 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	18 20	73 46	Simala	30 48	78 53
32 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	25 25	91 34	Simala	21 34	87 23
33 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 46	89 23	Simala	13 45	80 13
34 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	15 31	74 37	Simala	31 03	74 40
35 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	10 14	77 29	Simala	21 41	81 53
36 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	25 40	91 07	Simala	20 57	85 13
37 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	15 18	82 43	Simala	12 55	80 07
38 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 21	83 11	Simala	12 00	78 03
39 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	25 11	73 06	Simala	19 51	72 47
40 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	18 01	70 21	Simala	27 35	81 37
41 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	9 24	74 31	Simala	12 00	79 30
42 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 22	73 07	Simala	27 00	71 00
43 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	17 18	74 10	Simala	5 32	76 31
44 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	11 13	73 74	Simala	27 30	85 27
45 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	15 37	80 54	Simala	31 08	92 00
46 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	11 00	73 00	Simala	8 29	76 55
47 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	31 20	71 24	Simala	18 04	72 36
48 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	21 33	74 13	Simala	8 47	78 05
49 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	31 10	77 34	Simala	31 46	73 04
50 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	29 29	91 06	Simala	25 30	92 00
51 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	18 14	73 23	Simala	21 14	72 52
52 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	24 31	83 21	Simala	28 00	85 00
53 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	26 31	80 43	Simala	22 14	73 13
54 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	29 51	74 51	Simala	17 42	83 19
55 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 43	81 45	Simala	17 42	83 20
56 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 00	78 00	Simala	11 22	74 44
57 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	17 09	80 17	Simala	24 00	89 00
58 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	9 54	78 07	Simala	10 30	74 00
59 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	20 18	86 43	Simala	14 00	73 00
60 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	19 30	73 00	Simala	19 01	73 48
61 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	11 42	73 32	Simala	23 30	81 43
62 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	11 15	76 00	Simala	16 41	83 13
63 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	21 02	78 00	Simala	13 06	77 30
64 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	12 37	74 53			
65 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	13 07	73 39			
66 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	24 00	84 00			
67 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	13 23	73 48			
68 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	27 30	77 41			
69 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	24 30	81 20			
70 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	26 39	77 47			
71 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	11 44	73 48			
72 07	89 20	Khasi (river)	22 33	74 48			
73 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
74 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
75 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
76 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
77 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
78 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
79 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
80 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
81 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
82 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
83 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
84 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
85 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
86 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
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89 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
90 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
91 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
92 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
93 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
94 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
95 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
96 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
97 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
98 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
99 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					
100 07	89 20	Khasi (river)					

ANFIELD

Adampur	31 06	73 48
Agri	27 09	77 38
Ahmadabad	22 01	77 37
Allahabad	23 28	81 41
Amalala	30 22	72 49
Anantapur	33 53	74 59
Bangalore	12 47	77 40
Bombay	18 04	72 57
Calcutta	21 39	85 27
Chandigarh	30 10	78 47
Cochin N&S	9 37	76 16
Dahli	29 34	77 07
Dandigal	17 34	75 24
Gachhi	24 06	81 31
Goa	15 23	73 50
Gondal	26 41	83 27
Haldwari	17 32	76 31
Hindan	24 42	73 23
Hjdrabad	17 27	74 29
Jammu	22 41	74 36
Jodhpur	29 41	84 11
Kalakkunda	23 20	87 13
Lahore	34 06	77 33
Madras	13 00	80 11
Nagpur	24 03	79 03
Patna	37 15	73 33
Poona	18 33	72 53
Rangoon	13 48	74 47
Rajahmundry	11 01	77 10
Telapur	26 43	92 44
Trivandrum	5 29	78 53





India

with Sikkim and Bhutan

International boundary		Broad-gage railroad (5' 6")
International boundary, in dispute		Narrow-gage railroad
Union territory boundary		Road
Capital		Track or trail
Union territory capital		Airfield
Major port		Major port

Populated places

New Delhi/Delhi	3,800,000	• Under 100,000
500,000	○ 100,000 to 500,000	

Spot elevations in feet

Scale 1:6,530,000

100 200 300

Statute Miles

0 100 200 300

Kilometers



Languages and Minority Religions

- LANGUAGE**
- Indo-Aryan
 - Dravidian
 - Tibeto-Burman
 - GARO Language or dialect

- MINORITY RELIGION***
- 4% Estimated percent of state or union territory population professing Islam
 - C Christianity
 - B Buddhism
 - S Sikhism
 - J Jainism

*Hinduism, found throughout India as the majority religion (over 80% of the population), is not shown

— State or union territory boundary



Languages and Minority Religions

LANGUAGE

- Indo-Aryan
- Dravidian
- Tibeto-Burman
- GAO Language or dialect



MINORITY RELIGION*


4% Estimated percent of state or union territory population professing Islam


- C Christianity
- B Buddhism
- S Sikhism
- J Jainism



*Hinduism, found throughout India as the majority religion (over 80% of the population), is not shown

— State or union territory boundary









Manufacturing, Minerals, and Power

- | MANUFACTURING | | MINERALS | |
|---------------|---|----------|------------------|
| ○ | Textiles (jute, cotton, wool, man-made) | Al | Bauxite |
| ◐ | Chemicals, fertilizers, or plastics | Cu | Copper |
| ▨ | Petroleum refining | Fe | Iron |
| ⚙ | Engineering | Mi | Mica |
| ⚙ | Iron and steel | Mn | Manganese |
| 🚂 | Railroad equipment and repair | Pb, Zn | Lead, zinc |
| 🚗 | Motor vehicles or tractors | Ti | Ilmenite |
| ✈ | Aircraft | ⚙ | Processing plant |
| 🚢 | Shipbuilding | ⚙ | Gasfield |
| 🏭 | Cement | ⚙ | Oilfield |
| | | ⚙ | Coalfield |

- ELECTRIC POWER***
- ⚡ Hydro
 - 🔥 Thermal

