

**EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS  
COMMITTEE  
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE  
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
(HISTORICAL SERIES)**

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**VOLUME XIV**

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**EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS**

**SECOND SESSION**

1962



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## REPORT ON THE U-2 INCIDENT

6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,  
 FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
 Washington, DC.  
 session at 10:45 a.m., in

Senators Sparkman, Hum-  
 ken, and Williams. Senator

of the bill (S. 2768) to pro-  
 States by authorizing the

official transcript.

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[Editor's Note.—On May 5, 1960, the Soviet Union announced that it had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over its territory. American officials at first described it as a weather research plane and denied that it had been involved in espionage. Two days later, however, Soviet Premier Khrushchev revealed that the pilot was still alive and would stand trial for spying. That same day, the State Department admitted that the U-2 had been "endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain." Khrushchev's demand that President Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 flights, and Eisenhower's refusal, led to the collapse of the 4-Power Summit Conference scheduled for later that month in Paris.

The American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was tried before a Soviet military tribunal and sentenced to 10 years in prison. However, on February 10, 1962, Powers was released in exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel. Powers returned to the United States, where he was interrogated by a special board of inquiry which the CIA had formed to investigate his capture.

On February 12, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee formally requested that it receive a full report of Powers' interrogation. At a news conference, the following day, President Kennedy said that Powers was "cooperating voluntarily" with the interrogation, and that the results would be made available to Congress.

On March 6, Powers testified before a public hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Chairman Richard Russell opened the hearing by reading a statement from the CIA board of inquiry that Powers had "lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in connection with his mission as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself."]

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,  
 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
 Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this afternoon to have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. McCone. You have issued a statement concerning Powers? Does everybody have a copy?

Senator SYMINGTON. I had one but I have not got it here.

The CHAIRMAN. I have read it. There is no need of reading it since everybody has read it. We will proceed, if you would like to comment on it, Mr. McCone, and then we can ask questions if any of the committee wishes to ask questions.

(247)

**STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCONE, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL AND MORSE ALLEN, CIA; MAJOR HARRY CORDES, U.S. AIR FORCE, AND ROBERT GOODNOW, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTANT**

Mr. McCONE. Mr. Chairman, there are a few notes I have. I see no reason to read the memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. McCONE. First, I have been asked many questions as to the purpose in securing Powers' release. The purpose was twofold; first, an understandable human desire to secure the release of a young man captured and imprisoned, and when acting under our direction. This has been and will continue to be our policy in other instances if they should occur.

Second, and perhaps of greater importance to the national interest, was to determine beyond a reasonable doubt if the U-2 plane was actually brought down by ground-to-air fire or otherwise from a very high altitude. If this fact was established, then the U-2 has obviously been compromised and cannot be safely used where such defensive installations exist. If, on the other hand, the investigation we conducted would prove that the U-2 descended from its altitude because of engine failure and, hence, finally came down within reach of Soviet fighter planes and was shot down, then the U-2 might make further very important contributions to our national security.

It is, therefore, in our national interest to know all ascertainable facts concerning this incident. For that reason the Powers-Abel exchange, in my opinion, has served the interests of the United States.

**THE INTERROGATION OF POWERS**

Turning to the interrogation of Powers: Powers, on his return, was first carefully examined by doctors who reported that he was in good physical condition, normal mental condition, and showed no signs whatsoever of abnormalities as a result of his imprisonment or any treatment he might have been subjected to during the period of his imprisonment. This examination, which continued throughout the period of his interrogation, was made by competent physicians, by psychiatrists and psychologists who were chosen because of their knowledge of brainwashing, truth serums, and other techniques which might have been applied.

One of these specialists is present now.

On the basis of these reports, the Board of Inquiry and the CIA have concluded that Powers' physical and mental condition and treatment during imprisonment would not distort his story regardless of what it was.

In connection with this interrogation, we selected a team of the most competent interrogators available to us, who questioned Powers intermittently over a period of 5 days concerning the incident and all related matters. These interrogators were chosen on the basis of their experience and, most particularly, because of their objectivity. We wanted men who, to our knowledge, were not

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Y LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON,  
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prejudiced in the case, and also men skilled in interrogation techniques. In this respect I think the executives of CIA were successful.

One of these interrogators is here to answer your questions.

All conversations were recorded and transcribed and were carefully studied by the Board of Inquiry, which I will refer to later, and by a technical evaluation group established by the U.S. Air Force, at my request, to render a judgment as to whether a plane damaged as Powers said his plane was damaged, could behave as he claimed it did behave, with the effects of the pilot which he claims he experienced.

As the paper before you indicates, the interrogators were satisfied that Powers' story was correct, that it was supported by collateral intelligence unknown to him, and that there were no contradictions which raised questions in their minds.

#### CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE

They therefore have reported that the Powers U-2 plane was damaged while flying at 68,000 feet. Actually it was above 68,000 feet, but this information remains classified.

While the exact nature of the cause of the damage cannot be established, circumstances lead to the conclusion that the damage was caused by the explosion of a ground-to-air non-nuclear missile. The explosion occurred some distance behind the plane, but close enough to so impair the stabilizer as to render the plane uncontrollable.

The plane acted as reported in the paper before you, and Powers was exposed to forces of gravity, which explains his difficulty throughout his descent. These have been carefully examined by experts.

The loss of control, the nosing over of the plane, the tearing off of the wings, the inverted spin assumed by the fuselage and the remaining parts of the plane, and the gravity forces on the pilot have all been studied by competent aerodynamicists and aeronautical engineers, who report that all these events would all occur in the manner described by Mr. Powers. In other words, there was no inconsistency between what Mr. Powers said happened and what scientists feel would happen under such circumstances.

A further point that has been examined is the extent of the damage of the remnants of the plane. Some have stated that a plane falling from such height would suffer far greater damage than was evidenced by pictures of the remnants of the Powers' U-2.

Aeronautical engineers who examined photographs of the remnants of four other U-2's which failed at 68,000 feet or above, find no appreciable difference between the condition of the remnants in each of these planes and the pictures of the Powers' U-2. This point was therefore dismissed by the experts.

#### SPECULATION THAT THE PLANE HAD DESCENDED

Conflicting intelligence which led to the speculation that Powers' plane descended gradually to an altitude of 35,000 to 40,000 feet, has also been examined.

250

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, there was considerable speculation in the press that Powers was not shot down at 68,000 feet, but that his engine flamed out and he descended gradually, and finally was shot down when he came within range of Soviet interceptors. [Deleted.]

This information has been examined and reexamined by the Board of Inquiry. This [deleted] caused the Board to question the dependability and reliability of this particular information. Moreover, the fact that the information itself is in certain important details contradictory, contributed to the conclusion that such information cannot be accepted as dependable intelligence upon which Mr. Powers' story could be refuted.

[Deleted.]

#### POWERS' POLYGRAPH TEST

When Mr. Powers was confronted with the conflicting information, he requested, as the paper before you states, a polygraph test. He was under the polygraph for 5 hours, an inordinately long time for a polygraph test. The test was conducted by the most expert polygraph tester in the agency.

The results were positive. There were no reactions which, in the opinion of the experts, could be interpreted as indicating that Mr. Powers was deviating from the truth with respect to any essential aspects of the inquiry, including, of course, his story of the event which damaged his plane and the subsequent events during his descent.

His insistence on subjecting himself to a polygraph and the results of the tests have an important bearing on the conclusions of the Board and the agency.

[Deleted.]

#### THE BOARD OF INQUIRY

As has been reported, I appointed a Board of Inquiry to examine into this matter carefully and to report the findings to me. The Board was composed of three distinguished and knowledgeable citizens: retired Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, who was former Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; General Harold R. Bull, a man of great experience in both military and intelligence matters; and John Bross, a very senior CIA staff officer of long experience, of legal background and no previous direct connection with the U-2 project. This Board spent 10 days studying all available facts and interrogating a great number of witnesses and specialists, including Mr. Powers himself.

They rendered a report to me, and then I met for several hours with the Board to personally review the reasons for their conclusions, and more particularly to examine the conflicts to which I referred earlier. The Board reached the conclusions stated in the final paragraph of the paper before you.

After a long and intense discussion with the Board and the consideration of all other information available to me at this time, I concur with the findings and concur in the findings of the Board. Those findings are to the effect, and I will quote:

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"On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion of the Board of Inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case," and my conclusion as well, after carefully studying the Board report and discussing it with them, "that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself. Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers under the terms of this contract will be paid to him."

That concludes my notes extending the statement that was made public.

#### SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think, Mr. McCone, the Russians did not resort to greater pressure, if not torture on Mr. Powers? How do you account for their apparently rather lenient treatment?

Mr. McCONE. It seems to be rather characteristic of their treatment of men who are imprisoned in this way. It was exactly the way they treated the two fliers on the RB-47 that was shot down a year or two ago, or were released about a year ago, you will recall.

This man was not part of any espionage system. He was a flier and employed to pilot a plane and to operate a mechanism in the plane which he didn't know too much about, although he knew the purpose of the—

The CHAIRMAN. It is much more clearly espionage than the RB-47 flyers, though, wasn't it? They were off the coast.

Mr. McCONE. I do not think it more clearly espionage. It was over the country rather than offshore. But the purposes of that flight were very clearly known, which was to establish certain facts with reference to the Soviet defense mechanism.

#### A GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE

The CHAIRMAN. The conclusion is that the Russians developed a more powerful vehicle, rocket, than we had thought they had, I guess?

Mr. McCONE. This is the conclusion that I draw from all of the testimony, although Mr. Powers does not know and cannot say for sure what brought him down. No one saw a ground-to-air missile. But when you take his story and you take all collateral intelligence and examine the results of previous flights, you can only come to the conclusion that it must have been a ground-to-air missile, plus the fact that we knew from other intelligence that he was flying over Soviet air defense sites.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you to say that the plane was flying in excess of 60,000 feet at the time?

Mr. McCONE. It was flying at 70,000 feet, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. 70,000 feet?

Mr. McCONE. Yes. The Soviets said that it was 68,000 feet, and Powers admitted 68,000 feet, although that was below his actual altitude and several feet below the capability of the plane, so we just let it go at that. That was consistent with his instructions, incidentally.

252

Senator SPARKMAN. We do not have any ground-to-air rocket in that range, do we?

Mr. McCONE. I do not know—on the effective range of the Nike and the Nike Hercules—but I would think that it would be up in that altitude, yes. Colonel, could you answer that question?

Senator SPARKMAN. The Nike Zeus.

Major CORDES. To the best of my knowledge the Nike Ajax and the Nike Hercules could reach to this altitude.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you are wrong, but I will check it.

Major CORDES. The Nike Hercules; and the Ajax is open to question, sir.

#### MECHANISM FOR DESTROYING THE PLANE

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice the gentleman sitting by you is holding some kind of an instrument. What is that?

Mr. HOUSTON. There was a lot of talk about whether it was just the activating of a fuse which could have destroyed the plane. This is not just a button you push. You have to go through four actions. There are covers here which are wired down. First you have to break the cover up like that, then set that switch, and then break that cover and set that switch, and then he has 70 seconds in which to get out. So it is not just as easy as pushing a button.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I mean. I believe, according to the statement, he said that there was no way of—first, he could not get to it, and second, when he thought he might maneuver his way to it, he felt he could not get out within the 70 seconds, is that right?

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Mr. HOUSTON. At that time he could get to it. It was within reach, easy reach at that time. But he did not know yet whether he could go out because he could not get into his ejection mechanism, so he thought he would wait until he got clear. When he got clear he was halfway out of the plane and he could not get in, owing to the G forces, and reach it.

#### MODEL OF THE PLANE

Mr. McCONE. I think if Major Cordes could get this plane, he could describe Mr. Powers' story of what happened to him. Quite by coincidence, a U-2 plane came down in Louisiana on the 2nd of January, and the pilot of the plane describes the performance of the plane, and it was just identical with that of Mr. Powers—conformed practically identically with what Mr. Powers had to say.

Major CORDES. My apologies to you, sir. You have it already, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do it so well, I would like to hear it three or four times more.

Major CORDES. This is a model of the U-2 of the type that Mr. Powers was flying.

These are auxiliary fuel tanks. The engine is located in the fuselage, in the area indicated thusly.

These are the air scoops. This is the cockpit. The equipment bay where the camera is located is just behind the pilot in this area.

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l the pilot in this area.

The analysis of the pictures of the wreckage reveals that a fail-  
ure of some type occurred in the tail area. It was most likely a fail-  
ure to one or both of the horizontal stabilizers. That is these eleva-  
tors, horizontal stabilizers, in this area.

Mr. Powers stated that his right wing dropped thusly. He cor-  
rected this. The ailerons responded. He corrected with the controls,  
responded, at which time the nose started dropping, and at this  
time he pulled back on the control column. The controls were inef-  
fective.

At this time he described a series of events that, in reconstruct-  
ing it, is most likely that at some time during this nose-over ma-  
neuver, the tail perhaps came completely clear of the aircraft.

Also at some time in his nose-over maneuver, the structural  
limits of the wings were exceeded. The wings could have failed  
either upward or downward. The direction is not critical, but the  
fact that they did fail is clearly shown in the wreckage. They could  
have failed upward from excessive speeds and loads or downward  
from the effects of the winds.

#### PLANE WENT INTO A SPIN

This then is the portion of the airplane which is the range it  
went over into an inverted position and started into this inverted  
spin, as Mr. Power described it.

From my experience with a spinning aircraft, a spin is a very un-  
comfortable maneuver. I would imagine with only this much of an  
aircraft remaining, inverted spin of this type is quite uncomfort-  
able.

He stated that the nose was up and he could see the sky up in  
the front of the aircraft. This would indicate that possibly the  
engine was still remaining with the fuselage at that time, provid-  
ing this weight back in this area.

He stated that he attempted to get back in his ejection seat. He  
had difficulty assuming the ejection seat.

It is interesting to note that on the 2nd of January this year, a  
U-2 accident occurred in which the pilot landed in, I believe it was,  
Alabama or Mississippi. He spent the night in a tree.

This gentleman, in reconstructing the series of events preceding  
his accident—the events are quite similar to those described by Mr.  
Powers. The sensations that he experienced during this inverted  
spin are quite similar to those experienced by Mr. Powers.

#### AN AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, what was the cause of his in-  
cident or accident?

Major CORDES. The cause of his incident, sir, the most probable  
cause, and these are the words of the accident report, was an auto-  
pilot malfunction that caused the aircraft to exceed the structural  
limitation and failure occurred in one or more control surfaces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you use those interesting words  
that you just used, what do you mean, the engine quit working or  
what?



Major CORDES. No. The automatic pilot is a device designed to fly the aircraft, allowing the pilot to devote more attention to navigation, fixing his position, recording information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Major CORDES. The automatic pilot senses changes in direction. It is gyroscopically stabilized and applies corrections to the control surfaces.

In this instance, the most probable cause of the accident was considered to be an autopilot malfunction that caused a pitching of the aircraft that caused failure of the structures.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is in the Louisiana fall?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir.

PILOT JETTISONED MANUALLY

In the case of Mr. Powers, Mr. Powers stated in his testimony that he was flying the aircraft manually, that the autopilot was not employed. The similarity between the two accidents is in the manner in which the wings failed, the inverted position, the sensations experienced by the pilots, sir.

In this spinning configuration, Mr. Powers stated that finally he was able to manually jettison mechanically. This is done by releasing two handles, one on each side of the cockpit. The canopy separated.

He states that he then released his safety belt, which allowed him to fly out over the forward portion of the aircraft. However, he was momentarily connected by his oxygen equipment.

This subsequently broke loose. He does not know whether it came loose at the ordinary disconnect position or if it were a break in a different position.

He was thrown free of the aircraft. At this time his parachute opened, he stated, almost immediately, and from this it was deduced that his altitude at that time was perhaps 15,000 feet or below, because the parachute is set to open automatically at 15,000 feet or below. He then floated down to Earth.

At the time the pictures were taken in Gorki Park, the engine was shown separate from the fuselage. There are indications that at some time during the descent of this portion of the aircraft, the engine may have been thrown free and landed separate from this other part.

Senator SPARKMAN. The wings and all the parts that show there, were they included in the pictures?

Major CORDES. The wing—

Senator SPARKMAN. The tail assembly.

Major CORDES. No, sir; not in this fine a condition, but damaged.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the wings?

Major CORDES. I believe that there is no positive indication that the left horizontal stabilizer was shown in any picture.

As I recall the picture of this other tail, it was up against the exhibits so that it could not be determined whether this was actually there or not. As I recall, this is more of the configuration that the tail was in, with damage to each of these parts.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you.

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#### OTHER U-2 CRASHES

Mr. McCone, you said that four U-2 flights had fallen at 68,000 feet or above. Did this include the two that he described a minute ago?

Mr. McCONE. There were four besides the Powers flight.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, the Louisiana or Alabama—

Mr. McCONE. And elsewhere.

Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't you have one in California just the day before yesterday?

Mr. McCONE. Yes. That was at about 30,000 feet, I would say.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know yet the trouble with it?

Mr. McCONE. I have not had a report. The initial report was that counterturbulence at the time of refueling occurred. Perhaps you have a report on that?

Major CORDES. No, sir. I have nothing official yet.

Mr. McCONE. That is the unofficial report I have. We lost the pilot.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I noticed that.

#### MISSION OF THE FLIGHT

When we held our hearings back in the summer of 1960—you knew we held hearings on this?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I did.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought we had the hearings here, and we also issued a report. It stated this in one of the paragraphs:

There remains the question of the wisdom of sending the flight at all. The committee was told that the flight was after information of well above average importance, but it was not told what this information was.

Can you tell us now what the information was?

Mr. McCONE. Yes. Have we got a map here? I can tell you what it was.

The pilot of this flight was to take off from here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was that in Turkey?

Mr. McCONE. In Pakistan.

It was to fly over the Tyura Tam missile range, and then up to Sverdlovsk—and here is where the accident occurred—and then it was to go over here, which is a big base in which we were interested, and then up north.

Moscow is here; Leningrad is over here. It was to go up north in search of missile bases and other installations up north.

We had never had any flights up in that area, although we had a great many penetrations in the Soviet Union. We had never been up in the north or if we had, they had not been satisfactory. For that reason this was considered an unusually important mission.

#### THE TIMING OF THE FLIGHT

Senator SPARKMAN. If you remember, there was one question that was in the minds of a great many people at that time, and that was the timeliness of this flight. I do not know whether it is worth going into now, but this was, you remember, just on the eve of the opening of that conference.

Mr. McCONE. Indeed I do, Senator. I was over there in Paris at the time, so I remember it very well.

Senator SPARKMAN. I guess you know something. It must have caused quite a stir there.

Mr. McCONE. Indeed it did.

I was not part of the decisionmaking process on flights at that time. As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, I was a member of the National Security Council, [deleted].

I am told that there were a great many considerations, not the least of which was the weather; that many of these flights aborted because of bad weather, and there seemed to be a brief period where there was particularly good weather, and therefore there was a desire to take advantage of those conditions particularly up into the north. Another consideration—we saw the rising defense effort of the Soviets and wanted to get as much done as we could before some incident might occur.

In retrospect, it might have been unfortunately timed with reference to the summit meeting. But we had to carry this effort on because this is the most solid intelligence, the hardest intelligence, that we have ever obtained. A great deal that we know of the Soviet military posture and atomic energy developments and all the rest come from this U-2 photography. Hence, had this occurred May 20 rather than May 1, I think it would have caused the same kind of an uproar.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have used my share of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

#### TWO ABORTED FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my recollection that, at the hearings at that time, it was made quite clear that the days of the year when they had the greatest reasonable visibility over the entire proposed course were very few, and are very few in that area. This happened to be one of those days which had not occurred for a long time before, and might not occur for a long time afterwards, and they sent the flight when the conditions came as nearly being ideal as they usually are in that area. At least, to my recollection that was the presentation.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I think that is right. As I recall, and I am speaking from memory now, there were—they aborted two flights, and this was a third one.

#### NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF A FLAME OUT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. If they had not settled on this day, there was no telling how many weeks or months might go by before they could get weather conditions which would answer as many of the problems as they wanted to find out about.

Now, this hollow-sounding explosion, or whatever it was, that Powers mentioned, and the subsequent or coincidental orange colored flash, was that accompanied by a physical shock, did he say?

Mr. McCONE. It was described as a feeling of forward acceleration. He got a push from the stern.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would not be characteristic of a flameout, would it?

Mr. McCONE. I would think not, no. It would be just the opposite, would it not, Major?

Major CORDES. No, sir. That would not be characteristic of a flameout, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you think it was characteristic of an air pressure or being struck by a solid object?

Mr. McCONE. I would think it would be characteristic of an air pressure. I would think if he was struck by a solid object there would be much more of a violent reaction than he described.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

What happens when they have a flameout at that height?

That is at a substantial height, is it not, accompanied by an explosion or something of that kind, or by—well, an explosion describes it—what happens?

Mr. McCONE. Major?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it just stop and there is no more?

#### CABIN PRESSURE

Major CORDES. Sir, I have experienced flameouts at that height, too, to be exact, and the sensation is, it gets quite violent in the airplane. The best way I could describe it is a chug in the engine, not an explosion, not a push, but a chug in the engine, followed by the next thing one would notice, his revolution per minute indicator going down rapidly. The next sensation, sir, would be the pressure suit automatically inflating because the cabin pressure would tend to adjust itself to that of the outside air, the cabin being normally pressurized.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Normally pressurized as the result of the engine operation?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir. A compressor on the engine compresses the air, which pressurizes the cabin in the neighborhood of 29,000 feet at 68,000 to 70,000 feet.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did he notice any immediate increase of that expansion of his pressure suit?

Major CORDES. Sir, he stated that he recalled at some time during this series of maneuvers he experienced that his suit did inflate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Is a flameout accompanied by a flash of light that could normally be seen by the pilot?

Major CORDES. No, sir; it is not.

#### POWERS' COURTROOM DECLARATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take it, Mr. McCone, that you are satisfied with Powers' courtroom declarations.

As I understand the reports, they said that the direct question was asked him: Was he spying or was he a spy? And the reports said that he said he was spying. Then there were some reports that he seemed to agree with their condemnation of American policy and expressed regret, or something of that kind, that this had happened.

Those are apparently newspaper reports of one kind or another. What was the circumstance there?

Mr. McCONE. I think they are right. I think it has been verified. I think that he did that under the advice of the counsel that was provided for him, who emphasized that the seriousness of his situation was great, and advised him to admit the purposes of his mission and express repentance because he was in danger of drawing a death sentence. His action in this regard did not materially conflict with the instructions that he was given as to the course of action he should follow if captured.

#### NO EVIDENCE OF BRAINWASHING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You discovered no evidence that any means such as drug injections or anything of that kind or protracted brainwashing techniques had been used on him?

Mr. McCONE. I would like Dr. Goodnow to answer that question.

Mr. GOODNOW. We made a pretty careful analysis of his testimony, his behavior when he came back and was debriefed and interviewed by us, and through other collateral sources, the source of procedures that the Soviets have used or could use under the circumstances, and there is no evidence of any kind that—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What does he say about it?

Mr. GOODNOW. He says no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is, they used no drugs?

Mr. GOODNOW. No drugs, no hypnosis, no truth serum, no special procedures, no conditioning procedures.

Senator SYMINGTON. They did give him an injection.

Mr. GOODNOW. He did get an injection the first night in prison, probably believed to be a general immunization injection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean against disease of one kind or another?

Mr. GOODNOW. Fairly standard procedure in Russian prisons is to give a new prisoner immunization, because they are concerned with the general physical health of the prisoners.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Was he questioned immediately after that?

Mr. GOODNOW. No, he was not. This was on the first night in the prison. He was not questioned during the next morning, but was questioned sometime after that.

Mr. HOUSTON. Excuse me, Doctor, he was questioned some that next morning.

Mr. GOODNOW. In the morning?

Mr. HOUSTON. In the morning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

#### COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. What was this collateral intelligence that you applied in reaching your judgment, that was unknown to him as you interrogated him?

Mr. McCONE. Well, at the point of his descent, he describes in considerable detail the geography that he observed during his para-

ports of one kind or another.

I think it has been verified. The advice of the counsel that was given to him about the seriousness of his situation and the purposes of his mission was in danger of drawing a conclusion that did not materially conflict with the course of action.

WASHINGTON

There is no evidence that any kind of that kind or protracted was used on him?

How to answer that question. A careful analysis of his testimony and was debriefed and interviewed from other sources, the source of information could use under the circumstances any kind that—say about it?

Used no drugs? No truth serum, no special

an injection. On the first night in prison, a medical injection. Against disease of one kind or

procedure in Russian prisons is to be used because they are concerned about the prisoners.

that? Was on the first night in the cell on the next morning, but was questioned some that

INTELLIGENCE

Collateral intelligence that you had that was unknown to him as

his descent, he describes in detail what he observed during his para-

chute descent, and in this way identified the locality, the community adjacent to the point of his landing.

Now, we determined that individuals who came to him immediately after his landing and testified at his trial, actually lived in this particular community. This was determined and our knowledge of that was not known to him.

Senator LAUSCHE. How were those facts pertinent in concluding that this happened the way it was described by him?

Mr. McCONE. I do not think that it was finally conclusive. I think it was contributory to the whole picture, though.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were any of these other experiences which you described known to him in the giving of this testimony? Was that collateral intelligence which you applied to determine whether he was telling the truth?

Major CORDES. Sir, the experiences that he described in going through this descent in the aircraft were compared with experiences described by other pilots who had experienced a similar type of break-up of the aircraft. There were no inconsistencies noted between what Mr. Powers testified and the testimony of other pilots who had experienced this same type of incident.

Senator LAUSCHE. Had Powers ever gone through an experience of this type before?

Major CORDES. He had not undergone this previously himself, sir. Senator LAUSCHE. So the intelligence which you acquired through other experiences was used in determining whether he was telling the truth, and you found that his description compared with your other intelligence?

Major CORDES. Sir, in our evaluation we were attempting to establish that the experiences that he described were completely consistent with what would happen in this type of incident.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

#### TIME OF DESCENT

Now, then, he was at 70,000 feet and his last observation of altitude showed him to be, I think he testified, at 34,000 feet.

Did you try to calculate what length of time it would have taken him to drop from the 70,000 feet down to the 34,000 feet?

Major CORDES. Yes, sir. We have had some estimates of this kind.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the estimate of the time, based upon his description of what occurred?

Major CORDES. Sir, the estimate went below 34,000, down to 15,000. There is evidence in his testimony that his parachute opened. This would be the altitude at which he left the aircraft, so our investigation concerned itself from the time of 70,000 feet down to 15,000 feet.

The time estimates, sir, varied from a minimum of approximately 1 minute and 50 seconds up to several minutes. There could be quite a significant variation, sir, dependent upon how much wing surface remained with the fuselage, whether or not the engine was thrown clear, and at what time it was thrown clear.

I am sorry, sir, that I cannot give you a more definite answer than that at this time.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that.

260

When you say several minutes, what do you mean by several minutes?

Major CORDES. I mean, sir, it could have been in excess of 5 minutes.

Senator LAUSCHE. 70 seconds to 5 minutes?

Major CORDES. Yes.

#### WHY PILOT DID NOT DESTROY THE PLANE

Senator LAUSCHE. There has been no description given in your demonstration of how this plane tumbled and revolved about the time when he tried to reach this lever or mechanism that would destroy the ship. When did he try to reach it and why couldn't he reach it?

Mr. McCONE. Have you got your photographs of that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't the issue why he did not destroy this ship? That is the principal issue.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I think, yes. This has always been a question, and there is an explanation for it that seemed plausible.

However, I would like to explain to the committee, if I might, Mr. Chairman, that the charge that was placed in the ship was a 2½-pound charge for the purpose of destroying the camera as an operational camera. It was not a large enough charge to destroy the camera or the film, to say nothing of the ship.

However, it was in a place where it was quite dangerous to the pilot because it was immediately under him.

Major CORDES. Yes, sir.

Sir, this is a picture of the cockpit. This is the control wheel. The pilot would be sitting facing the control wheel. The position of the destruct is on his right, indicated thusly by my finger.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Major CORDES. In the configuration that he described during his descent from this aircraft or what remained of this aircraft, this remaining portion of the aircraft was going through some wild gyrations, if I may use that expression. He was, by his description, thrown out against his safety belt, and his arms were thrown upward in this direction, sir.

He released himself by managing somehow to get his arms down and releasing his safety belt. By his statement, he was thrown out over the front of the aircraft—this would be out over in this direction; that is, upside down, spinning this way. Centrifugal force threw him out this way.

#### FOUR SEPARATE OPERATIONS

At this time he stated that he could not reach back inside and reach the switches. The switches, sir, if I may have that—this is not a mere one single operation. There are four separate operations involved to assure that this mechanism will destruct.

There is an arm switch in any such destruct mechanism, and one must build certain safety features into it. The arm switch guard must be raised; the arm switch must be activated thusly.

Next the destruct switch cover must be raised and the destruct switch activated thusly.

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be raised and the destruct

This is a spring-loaded switch; a momentary switch to the de-  
 struct position is all that is necessary.

On activating this destruct switch, the pilot has 70 seconds re-  
 maining to get clear of the aircraft.

From his description of the manipulations that this aircraft was  
 going through and the difficulty that he was having in attempting  
 to get at his seat and get his safety belt unfastened, in my estima-  
 tion, sir, it would have been difficult to actuate the switches.

Does that answer your question?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, it does.

That is, you really have to use this 70-second period in determin-  
 ing whether under the circumstances he was able to liberate him-  
 self and also set into motion this explosive device.

Major CORDES. He must arm the device, then actuate the switch.  
 From the time he actuates this switch he then has 70 seconds to  
 get clear of the aircraft.

Senator LAUSCHE. What prevented him from getting clear of the  
 aircraft?

Major CORDES. At this particular time, sir, at the time he unfas-  
 tened his seat belt stating he was thrown out forward and hanging  
 over the front of the cockpit, windshield, he stated that his oxygen  
 equipment, that equipment which connects the pressure suit to the  
 aircraft oxygen supply, was tangled up and it finally broke loose,  
 again his expression.

Senator LAUSCHE. Could he have reached this thing while he was  
 outside the plane?

Major CORDES. It would have been extremely difficult, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask Mr. McCone a question?

#### OTHER FLIGHTS IN THAT AREA

Generally how many flights were made in that area with  
 the U-2?

Mr. McCONE. I do not have the exact number, Senator. If you  
 would take that down, there [deleted].

[Deleted.]

Mr. McCONE. Not from the standpoint of interception or of  
 engine failure.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

The only difficulty that we had was on this flight of May 1?

Mr. McCONE. That is the only difficulty we had over the Soviet  
 Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. Over the Soviet Union.

Mr. McCONE. Yes. We had difficulty elsewhere with U-2's.

Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted.]

Mr. McCONE. Complaint?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, by the public or anybody else.

Mr. McCONE. None whatsoever.

Senator LAUSCHE. The only complaint is that this flight should  
 not have been made.

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. What if this one had proved successful?

Mr. McCONE. If this one had proved successful?



Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. There would have been no complaint I suppose?

Mr. McCONE. Eventually you were going to have trouble with one of these flights, either mechanical failure and the plane would come down or it would get shot down. But you are gaining the most useful, solid intelligence that we have had on the Soviet Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, you find no fault with the decision that was made on that day of May 1, to make this flight?

Mr. McCONE. No, I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

#### POWERS' SALARY

Senator AIKEN. Mr. McCone, it is probably unfortunate that Mr. Powers returned to a somewhat skeptical nation, and evidently that skepticism was not all being allayed by recent developments.

We folks get questions that we cannot answer. Some of them we probably should not answer even if we knew the answers.

As I understand it, Mr. Powers received his \$2,600 a month pay as a test pilot rather than an espionage agent.

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Is that the usual pay for a test pilot?

Mr. McCONE. It is the pay, standard of pay, that we pay for the pilots of the U-2 planes on these dangerous missions.

Senator AIKEN. Now, the question we are asked is how does the pay for Mr. Powers compare with the pay which the seven astronauts received, and was his job more hazardous than theirs?

Mr. McCONE. I have not heard there were any special allowances made to the astronauts. I am not familiar with that.

Senator AIKEN. That is a question that we are asked. Why should he be paid so much more than they are?

Mr. McCONE. I might say, however, that on the question of pay, it pays less than an American Airlines pilot.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. He doesn't have a union. [Laughter.]

Mr. McCONE. No, there is no U-2 union.

Senator AIKEN. Which might account for it.

#### PROVIDING PILOT WITH DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES

Also you say that under general instructions that pilots—"If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors."

If that is so, why would they be furnished with a needle and any other destructive devices?

Mr. McCONE. Of course, this does not assure that their captors are going to have a cooperative attitude toward them.

The taking of the needle was a voluntary act and on his own initiative. It was not mandatory that he take it. It is a fact that this is the only flight of the 20-odd missions that he flew, it is the only flight that he did take the needle.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many flights did he make?

Mr. McCONE. He made 118 total U-2 flights of which, I think, 27 were missions over either the Soviet Union or other denied territories.

Senator LAUSCHE. Pardon me, George.

#### SITUATION OF DOWNEY AND FECTEAU

Senator AIKEN. Now, we hear comparisons drawn between Mr. Powers and Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau who apparently were tortured severely and are still in prison and refuse to talk. Did they have a different type of training?

Mr. McCONE. I am not familiar with the instructions that Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau had. They are in the hands of the Chinese Communists. I am quite positive that the Chinese Communists did not adhere to the same standards as the Soviets in these matters.

Are you familiar with their instructions at all?

Mr. HOUSTON. They were given different instructions and they were engaged in very different operations. The operation was classified and a much more effective cover story existed to conceal the operation which was given them than was given to the public, so that there was more expectation that they would try to conceal the exact nature of their operation, whereas in the U-2 operation the very presence of the plane in itself revealed the operation.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know of any recent efforts which have been made to effect their release?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I do. There was a meeting in Warsaw last week at which this matter was again discussed, inconclusively and disappointingly from our standpoint.

There is another meeting scheduled on the 5th of April.

I had a long talk with Mrs. Downey on Saturday morning. It is a very sad case.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. McCONE. And we intend to use every effort that we can, directly or with friendly nations, to try to persuade the Chinese Communists that, on the basis of this very Power-Abel exchange, many of their arguments against exchanges or consideration of the Downey case can logically be dismissed.

Now, whether we are going to get very far with that or not, I do not know. I am going to keep working at it.

Senator AIKEN. We would be warranted, perhaps, in going to rather unusual extremes to do something in order to get the release of Downey and Fecteau?

Mr. McCONE. I believe so.

#### PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE PLANE

Senator AIKEN. You say, "In the fifth place, a study of the photograph of the debris of the plane and other information concerning the plane revealed, in the opinion of experts making the study, no condition which suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of what had transpired."

Is that a photograph which was furnished you by the Russians or ones you were able to get?

Mr. McCONE. They were photographs from two sources. They were photographs that were released by the Russians and also photographs, I believe, that we took, did we not?

Mr. HOUSTON. Life Magazine.

Mr. McCONE. Of the exhibit, and also Life Magazine.

Senator AIKEN. We took the one afterwards?

Mr. McCONE. Afterwards.

Senator AIKEN. Was it similar enough to the one used by the Russians so that it appeared to be the same?

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

Mr. HOUSTON. Except for those very first photographs which were their own plane.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

#### POWERS' CAPTURE

One other question: Mr. Powers, in describing his accident and his fall and his final parachuting to Earth, has he said anything, did he observe whether he was being pursued on the way downward or whether he was shot at or how was he captured?

Mr. McCONE. He was captured—he landed in a field, and there were people there who observed him coming down, and were there even in time to help spill the air out of his parachute and help him get out of his rig. So they were there almost coincidentally with his hitting the ground.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, they did not know he was American?

Mr. McCONE. They did not know he was American. They, by fingers, seemed to be questioning him whether there were one or two people in the plane, and he signaled one, and then they pointed up, and he says he observed what appears to be another parachute coming down.

Now, this is unexplained. We have a certain conjecture and an opinion that they actually shot down one of their own planes in the excitement. But that is just a conjecture. We have no solid information on it.

Senator AIKEN. How long after he was captured did the Russian military or police appear?

Mr. McCONE. Mr. Allen, I think you might answer that.

Mr. ALLEN. Relatively few minutes, at least as far as he could tell.

Senator AIKEN. Relatively few minutes?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOUSTON. He does say in answer to that question today that no one was in uniform until he got to the second village where he was taken very quickly, and then apparently there was someone in police uniform. The people who met him were not in uniform.

Senator AIKEN. And he went willingly with the local people to the village?

Mr. HOUSTON. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. But he has no recollection of being pursued on the way down?

Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Or being shot at on the way down?

Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.  
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

POWERS' OTHER MISSIONS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. McCone, how many of those missions were flown by Powers?

Mr. McCONE. I cannot tell you exactly, Senator. He flew several, but of the 27 missions I cannot tell you how many of them were penetrating Soviet territory.

Do you know?

Mr. HOUSTON. [Deleted.]

Senator WILLIAMS. As a result of your examination of Mr. Powers, do you feel that he did everything that would be required of a man in his position?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I do, and therefore I agree with the findings of the Board and with the findings of our interrogators.

LEFT WITH A CLOUD OVER HIM

Senator WILLIAMS. With that feeling, don't you think he is being left with just a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is supposed to do, why leave it hanging?

Mr. McCONE. I do not think, Senator, we did. We tried to be objective, and the report which was released today explained, to the extent we could explain it publicly, the process we went through in verifying his story and came to the conclusion that his story was correct, and reached the conclusion that he had conducted himself in accordance with the contract and instructions, and comported himself as an American should, and for that reason we were paying him the money that he would be entitled to by law under that finding.

Senator WILLIAMS. I read your findings there, and they seem to give him a clean bill of health. But the earlier press reports were that, first, he had been subjected to intensive questioning, and later there was a lie detector test. Those things indicate a doubt in the man in the minds of somebody, and I do not think we can quite get away from that. If a man is responsible for negligence, it should be so stated; but if he did not act negligently, I am wondering if you have not pretty much left him hanging.

Mr. McCONE. Senator, the facts are that the doubt was there. The doubt was there from the very day that he came down; there was doubt in a great many of us. I thought the way to dispel that doubt was to go into the whole situation with sufficient thoroughness so that when we did report on it, it would be a considered judgment resulting from a careful investigation, and the facts then stood up, the man would be cleared.

It is true that during the period of the last 3 weeks, while this interrogation has been going on and this high level Board has been giving consideration to the whole matter and interrogating Powers himself, there probably has been some doubt. But I would hope that the very thoroughness that was exercised here would clarify the matter, whereas I think if we just gave it a very light treatment, the doubt might have continued.

## NO INCIDENTS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION

Senator AIKEN. Is it true, Mr. McCone, that one or two other pilots have destroyed themselves, their planes? We hear reports that two have destroyed themselves when there appeared to be danger of getting caught.

Mr. McCONE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. AIKEN. Do you know about this?

Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.

Mr. McCONE. Not to my knowledge.

The fact is that this is the only incident where a U-2 pilot has been downed on denied territory.

Senator AIKEN. But is this one the other day—you said you lost five.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, but they had not been on denied territory.

Senator AIKEN. This has been accidental reasons.

Mr. McCONE. It has been accidental and been over either friendly territory—

Senator AIKEN. There was no reason for self-destruction.

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCone, I would like to return to Mr. Sparkman's first questions.

## THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FLIGHT

I did not quite get the significance of the answer with regard to this question that was raised on the report before, as Senator Sparkman read from one point on page 22.

There is another place, on page 7 of that report, which says as follows:

In any event it appears that there was something very special about the May 1st flight, although the committee has been unable to determine exactly what.

This is not the weather. We discussed the weather at length. There was the feeling that there was some special event that justified going on this day. Can you throw any light on that?

Mr. McCONE. No, I cannot. I do not know what is referred to there, Mr. Chairman. The special importance of the flight was reconnaissance in the north which would provide information that we needed.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be true for any flight.

Mr. McCONE. But I do not know of any—

The CHAIRMAN. Your predecessor at least left the impression, and that is reflected in these two statements, that there was some event that made some very special reason why it should take place at this time, other than the weather. We know about the weather being always a consideration I thought maybe it might clarify that.

Mr. McCONE. It has never been disclosed to me.

Let me ask Mr. Houston, our general counsel. Do you know?

Mr. HOUSTON. No sir; I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. What we suspected, and it was purely a guess, was that there was some event which you anticipated or you

7-DESTRUCTION

McCone, that one or two other  
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counsel. Do you know?

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thought there was reason that might be taking place that you  
wanted to be sure of.

Mr. HOUSTON. I know of none, sir. I only know of the importance  
put on the area to be covered.

COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CIA

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder, Mr. McCone, if we could ask a few  
other questions that are not directly related to this, although this  
particular incident brought out an aspect of this operation which  
has concerned a number of people.

Senator [Mike] Mansfield some years ago, and more recently Sen-  
ator [Eugene] McCarthy, have introduced a resolution regarding a  
joint committee for the overseeing, I suppose you would say, the  
CIA.

You had long experience or considerable experience with the  
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you think that committee  
functions properly and effectively?

Mr. McCONE. I had very satisfactorily experience with the Joint  
Committee on Atomic Energy, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see any reason why a similar committee  
for supervision of CIA should not be set up?

Mr. McCONE. I do not see the necessity for it in view of the  
manner in which the subcommittee of the Armed Services Commit-  
tee and the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee  
function.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those committees given this function by law  
or is that an informal arrangement? What is the basis for the su-  
pervision of the subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees?

Mr. McCONE. Well I do not know, Mr. Chairman, what the back-  
ground is. I do know that, and I have been told that, the legislation  
which established the Central Intelligence Agency, which was the  
National Defense Act of 1947, was processed through the Armed  
Services Committee. I imagine that was the beginning of their ju-  
risdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that legislation give them jurisdiction over  
the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. I would be very much surprised if it did.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Houston?

Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir. The legislation does not mention it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any legislation give any jurisdiction?

Mr. HOUSTON. Over in the House.

Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.

Mr. HOUSTON. In the constitution of the subcommittee.

Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.

Mr. HOUSTON. Not legislation, but official action of the House.

Mr. WARNER. The House Parliamentarian has ruled that the  
House Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction, but there is no  
legislation that confers jurisdiction that I know of.

[Deleted.]

CIA BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of the budget of the CIA?

Mr. McCONE. I would like this off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. McCONE. This figure is always kept very confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. The regular budget of the State Department is about \$260 million.

Mr. McCONE. I have not seen it for some years, but I remember it is in that order.

[Deleted.]

[Deleted.] Although this is a question on which I can see there are arguments on both sides of it, at the moment the Armed Services Committee considers themselves as the parent committee of CIA, and always has. Whether that is logical or not I think is a matter for determination here rather than for determination by us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to do, to develop a little information with regard to this question. We have before us a resolution now, S.J. Res. 77, introduced by Senator McCarthy for himself and a number of others, there must be 15 or 20 Senators—on this question of creating a joint committee modeled after the Atomic Energy Joint Committee. As I say, this is not new.

As I recall it, the first resolution of a similar nature was introduced by the present majority leader, although he was not majority leader at the time. We have had on various occasions—I am just informed that the resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield as long ago as 1956 was sponsored by 35 Senators, which raises this question of whether there is a conflict.

#### ARMED SERVICES' INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Let me go back a little with regard to the Armed Services. Each of the Armed Services has its own intelligence; it has its own G-2, does it not? Don't they all, the Air Force, the Army?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, each one has its own intelligence organization. The CHAIRMAN. Organization.

Mr. McCONE. There is the G-2 and the A-2 and the ONI.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all quite substantial organizations?

Mr. McCONE. They are very substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you, for the record, indicate if you know how large they are?

Mr. McCONE. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But they are very substantial?

Mr. McCONE. They are very substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Employing several thousand people?

Mr. McCONE. And they are parts of the budgets of the respective services?

The CHAIRMAN. Yours then, the CIA, is not exclusively a military operation, is it?

Mr. McCONE. No, it is not exclusively a military operation. In fact, its basic purpose as established by law is to serve as a central facility for collecting, assembling intelligence for all agencies, correlating it and evaluating it, and then disseminating it.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only from all agencies, but you do it directly on your own, too, don't you?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, we do a great deal of that on our own. Then there are certain areas of activity which are assigned to us by the National Security Council.

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. We have had from time to time in the committee, reports of differences of views between the CIA and the representatives of the State Department in such countries, as an example, as Laos. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All of this is, of course, before you were in charge, but you have heard of that?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; indeed I have. I have heard of the differences that have existed. I heard them debated many times in the National Security Council when I was there sitting there as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not this is justified, it has been my impression that in many cases the views of the CIA prevailed, is that not so? It did in Laos, didn't it?

Mr. McCONE. No, I do not think that it did. I think the view of the State Department prevailed in Laos; at least it prevails today.

## SITUATION IN LAOS

The CHAIRMAN. To be specific about it, go back, I think it was 2 or 3 years ago, to the time of the ouster of Souvanna Phouma and the bringing in of Phoumi and Boun Oum. There is certainly information in the hearings here that there was a difference of opinion as to the wisdom of that move, and that the military arm and the CIA were in favor of what did take place, whereas the representative of the State Department was not in favor of it. Is that correct? Have you ever heard of such position?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I have heard that debated many times, Mr. Chairman, in the cloistered halls of the National Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been debated in this cloistered hall.

Mr. McCONE. I heard the spokesman for the military take a very strong position in favor of Phoumi, and spokesmen for the State Department strongly support Souvanna, and I left with the impression that the spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency leaned strongly toward the military position.

The CHAIRMAN. Which prevailed in that case.

Mr. McCONE. I was not so close to the situation that I knew that any action was resulting from that difference.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact was that they did succeed in ousting Souvanna Phouma, and they did go to Phnom Penh, and Phoumi was installed with Boun Oum, was he not?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, he was.

The CHAIRMAN. I only use this as an illustration and, of course, as I say, you were in no way responsible.

## TWO STATE DEPARTMENTS

I am trying to resolve in my own mind just what we do have here, whether we have two State Departments each going their own way. I realize that the traditional response to this is that the CIA is not a policy-making agency but, as a matter of fact, I am quite unable to see the distinction when in a case like this the



views of the CIA prevail over that of the State Department which does make policy.

Mr. McCONE. I think in the discussions I heard of this situation it seemed to me it was the view of the Defense Department that prevailed, because in the discussions I heard they took a very strong position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs took a very strong position, and was supported by the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree that the military and the CIA both took that position. That is what our information was, but it was not nearly authentic as yours in the NSC, because I was not in the NSC. This came out in discussions here with representatives of the Department of State.

I think this presents a very difficult position, at least for this committee and for what we say is our Department of State, in the formulation of policy. Do you have any suggestions to make about this?

This is one of the reasons why, I think, there is a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that some committee such as a joint committee suggested, should have supervision over the activity, perhaps coordination, if you like. If we do not, then the military not only are running our military establishment but also are making our political policy.

#### MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY JURISDICTION

Mr. McCONE. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are discussing two different things here. One is the logic of the jurisdiction of the CIA resting with the Armed Services Committee as contrasted with the Foreign Relations Committee. That is one problem.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one problem.

Mr. McCONE. The other is the establishment of a joint committee which would remove the jurisdiction of the CIA from either Armed Services or Foreign Relations and place it under the cognizance of a third committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. McCONE. Then it seems to me you would have this situation where since CIA has its influence on both military matters and foreign policy, and, granted, whether it makes policy or not, there is no dispute over the fact that it influences policy—you would have three committees involved, so it would be further complicated, I would think.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be presumed, I would think, that if a joint committee were set up similar to the one on Atomic Energy, it would have rather exclusive jurisdiction. I think this committee—at least, I want to speak only for myself and not the whole committee although, as I say, a number of the members who sponsored or co-sponsored the resolution were on this committee—would feel that the normal supervision of the representatives in the Congress would be respected, that this would not be essentially a military operation.

It leaves me with the feeling, the way it is now set up, that the military not only directs the defense of the country but also are becoming the dominant influence in the political policy of the Government. Maybe it is a good thing, I do not know. I do not think it

271

is quite traditional, nor do I think the American people quite understand that this is so.

You remember the famous statement, I think it was that of Churchill, that war is much too important to be left to the generals, or something to that effect.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I remember it very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not want to be held to the exact quotation.

Mr. McCONE. I can see the problem from the standpoint of this committee. I do think that the problem would be compounded by the establishment of a joint committee. I say this with some reluctance because I had a very satisfactory experience with the Joint Committee, but I would like to point out that the Joint Committee is established and operates under very special legislation with which you are thoroughly familiar.

#### INJECTING A THIRD DIMENSION

It has been my observation that both their authority and their success stem from the legislation that is basic to the committee. This situation would not prevail in the case of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? This is where I get lost. I do not see why it could not.

Mr. McCONE. You might better accomplish what you are talking about by arranging between the Armed Services Committee and this committee, some joint subcommittee that could meet regularly and discuss Agency matters. Then you would not be injecting a third dimension into this problem, because I can just envisage a joint committee sitting off some place with maybe no membership from this committee or maybe one.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be logical that you would have some. On Atomic Energy we have two of your very important members, at least two, maybe more, important members on the Atomic Energy Committee on this committee.

Mr. McCONE. Well, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they serve a great purpose.

Mr. McCONE. But, as you know so well, Senator, these committee assignments go by seniority, and so on and so forth, and chairmanship becomes of special consideration. Just picture—this concerns me very much because I can see your dilemma, but I think it would be compounded if the Joint Committee were sitting concerning itself with an agency that you feel is affecting both defense matters and, more particularly in your interest, in your special interest, foreign affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what, it is the latter part of that, concerns me. I mentioned only Laos. I could also mention, at least rumors, with regard to Algeria. Guatemala, I think, is beyond a rumor.

Mr. McCONE. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Guatemala was beyond a rumor. I do not think anyone would deny it.

Mr. McCONE. Yes, we can go through a great many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. There are a great many of them, and they essentially involve very important policy matters.

Mr. McCONE. There is no question about that, and I think this is absolutely true. For that reason there is probably a great deal of logic that there should be a more intimate relationship between this committee, or a subcommittee of your committee, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

#### A VERY SPECIAL ACTIVITY

But I cannot see how you answer your problem, which I recognize as a problem, by the creating of a joint committee unless that joint committee is, by agreement, made up of a group from the Armed Services Committee and a group from this committee. If that is what you are talking about, then it is—

The CHAIRMAN. The bill simply leaves it to the leadership to appoint it. I do not believe in the appointment to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee that they followed the usual rules in the appointment, if I am not mistaken about that, John. You probably remember this. This is what you would call a very special activity.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it followed the same traditions that we have followed in the other committees, and I think one of the reasons why this procedure has appealed to them is simply because of the success of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

Mr. McCONE. Yes; but I want to point out to you that my observation from working with the joint committee is that their success is due to, in the first place, a very special area of their responsibility and the fact that it is controlled by special legislation; that it gives them great authority in this particular area.

Now, I think that the very things that concern you here that you have been talking about, and the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency apparently in their activity materially affects matters of your concern, of this committee's concern, is a reason why the joint committee is not the answer that you want, unless the joint committee is very carefully designed as really a subordinate element on both this committee and the Armed Services Committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. If the Chairman will permit?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

#### COMPARISON TO JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not quite follow you, because I see no reason why there could not be the same kind of legislation setting up this joint committee and giving them the same type of jurisdiction that was done in the case of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

Now, in the case of the Joint Energy Committee you have a joint committee but, at the same time, that part of the joint committee which is in the Senate becomes a Senate legislative committee on atomic energy legislation, and the same thing is true in the House. Why couldn't the same thing be done with your Agency?

I was here when the Joint Atomic Energy Act was passed. I remember it quite clearly. In fact, it was handled by a committee of which I was a member in the House at the time, on the House side.

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of the Atomic Energy Services Committee.  
Will it permit?

## COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

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Services Committee you have a joint  
committee as part of the joint committee  
on Atomic Energy, a separate legislative committee on  
Atomic Energy. The one thing is true in the House.  
Will it permit with your Agency?

The Energy Act was passed. I re-  
member it was handled by a committee of  
the time, on the House side.

I remember the very hard fight and difficult time we had handling  
it and, by the way, it was not a case of filling it up with senior  
members. For instance, Senator [Clinton] Anderson and Senator  
Gore both became members almost immediately upon coming to  
the Senate, or within a year or so.

The CHAIRMAN. They were junior Members of the Senate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator [John] Pastore, a brand new Senator  
at the time, was put on it, and it has followed that course through-  
out the years. So I do not see why it could not be done here.

You are apparently thinking of just a watchdog committee. I see  
no reason why it could not be branched out and made the same  
type of committee operation with the same type of jurisdiction that  
prevails in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

## OTHER MEMBERS LEFT IN IGNORANCE

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask you, if such a committee is created  
would I, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, if I were  
not put on the joint committee, find myself in the same ignorance  
about what is going on in the Atomic Energy Commission, find  
myself in the same ignorance on what is going on in a matter of  
business that I have a right to know? I know nothing of what is  
going on.

Senator SPARKMAN. You probably would, but you would probably  
have the satisfaction of knowing that there was a committee with  
full jurisdiction over that to know what was going on.

Senator LAUSCHE. Frankly, I am barred from learning anything  
about the Atomic Energy Commission. I went over to a hearing one  
day and I entered that room in the House as if I were a person  
from—well, without any authority at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have not been in their new office yet.  
You ought to visit it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do think if you create that committee in  
matters that I ought to know about as a member of the For-  
eign Relations Committee, I will be in the identical position  
that I am now in trying to learn what is going on in the  
Atomic Energy Commission.

## TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES

Senator SPARKMAN. I will tell you, if you will yield further, a  
thing that rather disturbs me about this whole thing. I just have  
been sitting here looking at that map.

We are nominally at peace with Russia. I do not see that that  
had anything to do with our defense; I mean the normal function-  
ing of our defenses. It had a lot to do with our relations with that  
country.

The Chairman mentioned Guatemala. It seems to me the same  
thing is true down there. I am referring to the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Or Cuba, either one.

Senator SPARKMAN. The training in Guatemala and the prepara-  
tion that was carried on by the CIA and our military was not a  
part of it, not a part of the invasion. It was something that vitally  
affects the foreign affairs of this country. That is the thing that dis-  
turbs me about this.

Mr. McCONE. There is no question about that, Senator Sparkman. Foreign affairs are of concern to the committee.

#### CREATING THE SAME SITUATION

How do you answer that problem by creating another committee? Don't you create exactly the same situation? Aren't you in danger of creating the same kind of a situation that Senator Lausche just was concerned with?

Senator SPARKMAN. My answer to that would be that I gave to him: at least he would have the satisfaction of knowing that there was a committee set up that did have jurisdiction over that. It might be that they would be taking away the powers of this committee when you did set up a new committee. It does take away powers from another committee when you do that.

Mr. McCONE. My very sincere advice would be for you as members of this committee to find a different solution than the creation of an independent committee, because I think that if you do so you will find that you have a situation developing in this area that is exactly the circumstance that Senator Lausche criticizes in connection with Atomic Energy.

Please understand me, I am not resisting the concept of committee jurisdiction, because I worked closely with committees and without difficulty. That does not worry me in the slightest.

But the very matter you discussed, your concern about this flight—without debating the point, because I think I have a little difference of opinion in what you said in that regard—but I could see a Joint Committee on Intelligence which, because of their mission to gather intelligence, would be running these flights all over. You would not know anything about it, and it would be seriously affecting the mission of this committee. But you would not be privy to it, any more than being privy to what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does for the reasons that Senator Lausche states.

Senator LAUSCHE. I was trying to find a word here before. I would say that I was accepted over there as a pariah. [Laughter.] Go ahead; pardon me.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good word anyway.

#### INTERFERENCE IN POLITICAL DECISIONS

You have to admit—I am just groping here for some answer—this is the only executive function I can think of in which it is not subject to some kind of legal supervision by a regular standing committee. I agree that the covert operations are rather distinct.

This sort of thing which Senator Sparkman used in this example is not really what is bothering me so much. It is what I believe to be interference in political decisions.

I think the Cuban example is a much better one than this, because here a project was developed by the CIA, so far as I can understand, almost exclusively. If the military had anything to do with it, at least the military tried to disassociate itself very much in the end. Whether or not that was sound—I remember when they came before this committee, they professed a very remote interest in that affair. That may have been hindsight, but we were given to understand this was a CIA operation.

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to the committee.

#### THE SITUATION

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#### POLITICAL DECISIONS

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Mr. McCONE. If I might say—  
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And with very grave political impli-  
cations.

Mr. McCONE. If I might inject a thought there, Senator, in re-  
viewing that matter coming in after the fact, there was enough  
blame for everybody in that failure.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish now to argue the merits of any of  
these things, even of Laos, the demerits, but I was really trying to  
get at—and I am not trying to blame you particularly, because you  
were not even in the organization and you had no responsibility  
whatever for it—but there are a number of decisions and activities,  
I think, of essentially a political nature that have taken place in  
any number of countries. We have mentioned only some of them.

#### REAL POLICY DETERMINED BY CIA

The activities in the Middle East, in Iran, Iraq, and so on—at the  
time they occurred, we were very greatly interested in them. We  
were in those activities immediately preceding and during the Suez  
crisis, which had great ramifications in the political field, and yet  
this committee had no influence on it. We did not even have an  
opportunity to know they were underway.

Really, the first notice I ever had of the Cuban thing was a story  
that came from a New York Times reporter who had wandered  
into that camp down there. We had nothing other than just pure  
rumor, and these were very great political implications. It makes  
me feel as if this committee goes through the motions, but the real  
policy is being determined by the CIA.

I am convinced that in some of these places they were the domi-  
nant influence. [Deleted.]

But these are just incidental things that have happened now  
over the course of a number of years. [Deleted.]

If this is the way it is going to be run, I do not know really what  
this committee has to do. We are just going through some motions  
here, and we are pretending we are directing or influencing our  
foreign policy, while we are not.

#### A QUESTION OF SUPERVISION

You would not, of course, deny it, and I do not wish to try to  
deny it.

Mr. McCONE. I would not deny it in the least.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That you do not have this influence.  
I believe you do. It is a question of how we coordinate it and how it  
is supervised.

Mr. McCONE. I do not think the CIA is quite as influential as  
Andrew Tully said in his book, "Inside CIA."

The CHAIRMAN. You do not agree with all that he says?

Mr. McCONE [continuing]. But I am not here to deny that they  
are pretty active. [Deleted.]

Now, I just do not—I see your problem very clearly, but I do not  
agree, I do not think I agree, that the solution is a joint committee.  
I think the solution—

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the solution is?

276

Mr. McCONE. I would like to think about it, but if I have to say now, I think you and the Armed Forces Committee should set up a subordinate subcommittee with representation from both of you, and that committee should meet as frequently as necessary and on a basis on which you would be fully informed on our affairs. That is what I think.

Senator SPARKMAN. A consultative committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, are you intending to pursue this line of inquiry? I had not finished my questions on the subject that was on the agenda for today's meeting on Powers, and I would like to ask about two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly; I thought you had finished.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not cut you off. I thought you had all the opportunity.

## COVER-STORY REVEALED

Senator LAUSCHE. I only want to ask if Powers was questioned as to whether or not the Soviet interrogators told him that back home in Washington it was disclosed that he was not accidentally over the Russian ground but was there on an information-seeking mission?

Mr. McCONE. Mr. Allen, will you answer that?

Mr. ALLEN. He was told that by the Soviet interrogators.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, they said, "Back home they admitted you were here seeking information?"

Mr. ALLEN. After it came out, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was he asked whether that influenced him at all in his revelations to the interrogators?

Mr. ALLEN. I do not think they put it that way, sir, no.

Senator LAUSCHE. But the moment it came out that he was there on an information-seeking mission, they told him that?

Mr. ALLEN. They told him that.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would have just rendered him defenseless in trying to conceal what he was there on.

Mr. ALLEN. Actually, sir, he did very well in his defenses, we think.

Senator LAUSCHE. To me it would seem that he became helpless when they said, "Well, they have said in Washington that you are here on an information-seeking mission."

Mr. ALLEN. On the overall, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that covers it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator LAUSCHE. I am going to leave, I do not—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you to leave. You go right ahead.

## COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to to leave this thought with the Chairman: I am inclined to the belief that this committee ought to do more than merely listen to this report. If Powers did act as an American should have acted in this flight, we ought to give some

think about it, but if I have to say  
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#### COMMITTEE APPROVAL

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thought of the entire committee saying that we approve of what  
 has been done, and I am going to raise that question.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me say that I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would want to think about it. I do not interpret  
 the report or the hearings we had as ever raising much question  
 about Powers. It was an entirely different question. It was the  
 timeliness of it. It had nothing whatever to do with Powers as a  
 man and as a citizen and so on.

However, I do not object to what you are saying. But I did not  
 want to leave this with the impression that I am going to approve  
 of everything that was done, including the decision to make the  
 flight at that time under the circumstances then prevailing.

Senator SPARKMAN. He does not mean that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not mean that.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean as an individual?

Senator LAUSCHE. You see, when the hearings were concluded in  
 1960, was it?

Senator SPARKMAN. 1960.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. We were left with this informa-  
 tion that Powers was completely investigated. He was trusted.  
 There was not a scintilla of proof to show that he was unworthy of  
 trust, that he was guarded against contact by possible infiltrators,  
 and that there was no proof of any character whatsoever that he  
 had defected.

You men conclude that he acted as an American should. He had  
 been condemned by some, and I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to  
 talk it out, as to whether or not this committee ought not to ap-  
 prove what has been done by the Chief of the Central Intelligence  
 Agency and by that Board.

The CHAIRMAN. We will think about it.

#### MATTERS WHICH MAY LEAD TO WAR

I do not want to prolong this too long. I think you get the point  
 that several times in the course of our hearings in the past, I men-  
 tioned particularly Laos because we had Ambassador [Winthrop]  
 Brown here, and he most reluctantly, I think—my interpretation of  
 his testimony was that there was a great difference of opinion  
 there, and that, in effect, he was overridden. He would not put it  
 quite as bluntly as I say it, but I cannot read anything else  
 out of his answers.

Just one example: the Cuban thing, I do not mean to imply that  
 this committee has all the wisdom, but I do think the responsibility  
 that the committee has is such that it ought to be at least advised  
 in advance as to such undertakings as the Cuban thing, for exam-  
 ple, because that is not strictly a military matter.

We are not expected to infringe upon the strategy in case of war,  
 but in those matters which may lead to war and which affect it, it  
 seems to me this committee, if it is to have any function at all,  
 ought to be advised. In the activities of your people in many of the  
 critical spots—and they always are in critical spots, that is part of  
 their business to be there—I do not see why this committee should  
 not be informed and play a part.



278

We would welcome a suggestion from you as the new head, and we hope in the new era here, to see if we cannot get a more satisfactory relationship.

I am not the only one, as I say. There are a great many. There were 35 sponsors to Senator Mansfield's resolution. I do not think there are quite that many to the McCarthy resolution, but it would appear to be in the neighborhood of 15 or 20. With this big operation, you can see that it is going to continue to be troublesome, I think.

#### A REGULAR RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA

Mr. McCONE. I would like to think this thing over. I think this has been a very useful discussion, and I welcome an opportunity to talk it over further with you.

I feel that the concept of the joint committee, for reasons I have expressed, would compound rather than tend to straighten out the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be.

Mr. McCONE. On the other hand, I do not think it beyond the realm of possibility to develop an arrangement which would meet your problem, which I can see is a real one, and one that cannot be left unnoticed.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that the—go ahead.

Mr. McCONE. So far as I am concerned as Director of Central Intelligence, which has to do with the entire intelligence community, and giving it guidance as well as the direction of the Agency itself, I have a great responsibility to this committee. I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It has not been easy for this committee to get, I would say, any regular relationship with the CIA. Your predecessor took the view that he had no responsibility to this committee, and it is my understanding he never would appear without clearance of the Subcommittee of Armed Services, which, under the law, has no particular jurisdiction.

As I understand it, under the law you report only to NSC. You are a creature of the NSC under the law, are you not?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This other business is purely informal, casual, if you like, as far as speaking legally, is that not correct?

Mr. WARNER. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If things go wrong we have the responsibility in the eyes of the public, whether we have anything to do with it or not, as we have very recently experienced in that connection.

The kind of information which you are equipped to develop, of course, is extremely important to any judgment of any of these policies that we have, the kind of judgment which is presently under consideration in Southeast Asia, which is very important. They are going to ask us to pass upon authorizations, and so on, and we can do it only by doing it completely in the dark or very much in the dark, if we do not have any—

#### BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Mr. McCONE. I think information in the Agency, both from our own sources and then from the responsibility of gathering together

suggestion from you as the new head, and here, to see if we cannot get a more satis-

as I say. There are a great many. There is Senator Mansfield's resolution. I do not think it is to the McCarthy resolution, but it would be in the neighborhood of 15 or 20. With this big an operation, it is going to continue to be troublesome.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA

I like to think this thing over. I think the discussion, and I welcome an opportunity to discuss it with you.

of the joint committee, for reasons I have mentioned, and rather than tend to straighten out the situation.

On the other hand, I do not think it beyond the scope of an arrangement which would be developed to see is a real one, and one that cannot be avoided.

Let us go to me that the—go ahead.

I am concerned as Director of Central Intelligence with the entire intelligence community, as well as the direction of the Agency, and my responsibility to this committee. I think it has not been easy for this committee to have a relationship with the CIA. Your predecessor has no responsibility to this committee, and he never would appear without clear authority from the Services, which, under the law, he is required to do.

Under the law you report only to the President under the law, are you not? Yes, Mr. Chairman. Whether business is purely informal, or whether it is legally, is that not correct? Yes, Mr. Chairman. If things go wrong we have the responsibility. Whether we have anything to do with it is another matter. I have recently experienced in that connection a situation in which you are equipped to make a judgment on which you are equipped to make a judgment of any kind of judgment which is required in Southeast Asia, which is very important to pass upon authorizations, and to do it completely in the day-to-day operation. I do not have any—

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OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

information in the Agency, but I do not know the responsibility of gathering and evaluating intelligence from the entire community, and finally in the preparation of estimates is done by the Board of National Estimates, and that is all very vital to your committee.

and evaluating intelligence from the entire community, and finally in the preparation of estimates is done by the Board of National Estimates, and that is all very vital to your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board of National Estimates, that is made up of what?

Mr. McCONE. That is made up of 12 very senior people.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is your shop?

Mr. McCONE. That is part of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is really a facility of mine as Director of Central Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research have independent existence now under the planning functions or is it part of your shop?

Mr. McCONE. No, it is independent, as it always has been.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it amount to much?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, it does. It has a very capable fellow running it, Roger Hillsman, a very able fellow.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know him.

Mr. McCONE. He sits on the U.S. Intelligence Board. They receive and evaluate intelligence that comes through their sources, through their embassy sources and so forth, and feed their evaluations into our Office of Current Intelligence and our Board of National Estimates.

PARTICIPATION BY THE CIVILIAN ARM

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me only common sense that if only the military committees—and all committees, I suppose, human nature being what it is—become oriented to their particular responsibilities, what you really have is primarily a military policy-making agency here, which ought not to be. It ought to be at least partially participated in by, we will call it, the civilian arm of the Government.

Mr. McCONE. I cannot disagree with that at all. I can readily see the problem. But the very thing you said, the committees get oriented to their particular mission, is the reason why I think a joint committee oriented to the intelligence function would make your life more complicated than it is now, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I surely do not want to get it any more complicated than it is now.

Mr. McCONE. I think there is a better solution.

The CHAIRMAN. I think then what we ought to do is you pray over it and see if you can come up with a good solution.

Mr. McCONE. Fine.

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW BOARD

The CHAIRMAN. Did this new Board that was set up to review the CIA, by the President—under General Maxwell Taylor, I believe—have anything to say about this? I have never seen a report on that. They were set up last year, weren't they?

Senator SPARKMAN. Last fall.

The CHAIRMAN. Last fall, and they were supposed to review the whole operation and make a report to the President.

Mr. McCONE. They really devoted themselves more to the Cuban operation.

280

The CHAIRMAN. Just to the Cuban operation?

Mr. McCONE. That Board was made up of Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Allen Dulles. They rendered a report that I have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not consider this sort of problem at all.

Mr. McCONE. No; they had some recommendations of corrections that should be made within the Agency, which I have taken under consideration, but they did not deal with this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will give it some thought and give your colleagues and the others, I would like to pursue it at a later date, after you have had a chance to think about it.

Mr. McCONE. I would like to very much.

#### MCCARTHY'S RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Every now and then Senator McCarthy asks "when are you are going to have hearings on my resolution?" I have never have had any, but maybe with some solution better than that which could be found, we might have. It seems, I confess, that your own Joint Atomic Energy Committee was the reason, because of its success, why I thought that was the proper way. If there is a better way, as I say, I do not want to complicate my life any more than it is, if you think that it would—

Mr. McCONE. I think you have to examine whether the conditions are exactly parallel, because the Atomic Energy Commission in its activities in its own field has little to do with any other field and by the wording of the law, the military control the military applications, and it is all pretty clearly worked out. Nothing that they do, or nothing that the Commission does, affects what you do or what the Armed Services Committee does.

All the time that I was the Chairman of the Commission, I never appeared before this committee, nor did I appear before the Armed Services Committee. But here in the Agency it is quite different. It affects the affairs of your committee and of the Armed Services Committee, and therefore I question whether you are answering the problem that you propound by contemplating the creation of a third committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you could be right. I do not know whether that is the answer or not. It certainly does affect this committee, I mean its policies.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean that you would be subject to the State Department?

Mr. McCONE. That is right, that is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. McCONE. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]