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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



CASE STUDY

OPERATION LEMON AID

FBI review completed

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FBI/DOJ

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This paper details a variety of counter-intelligence resources, methodologies, techniques and/or procedures considered sufficiently sensitive to warrant "Secret" classifications; however, the majority were declassified for evidentiary purposes in legal proceedings against the subjects of this case and therefore are presented herein as unclassified. Sensitive counter-intelligence sources and methods not previously declassified and addressed herein are classified "Confidential" as is the overall classification of this paper.

Date of issue: October 25, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

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OPERATION LEMON AID

The May 20, 1978, arrest of two employees of the United Nations Secretariat, both Soviet nationals, in Woodbridge, New Jersey, and their subsequent conviction on charges of violating the espionage statutes of the United States have been the topics of extensive news media reportings. Even the Soviet press, usually silent when it comes to any allegations of wrongdoing by its citizens abroad, was compelled to present its view of this obviously embarrassing situation to its readers. The November 15, 1978, issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta, in a lengthy article on "FBI 'Anti-Soviet Provocations' Aimed at Harming Relations," asserted that Comrades Enger and Chernyayev were the victims of an FBI act of provocation, code named "Operation Lemonade (sic)." Under the by-line of the publication's New York correspondent, I. Andronov, and subtitled "Crooks Under the FBI's Coat of Arms," the article declared that the staging of this case was "an act of flagrant tyranny incompatible with universally recognized international norms and normal relations between states," and built upon fabricated evidence and perjury from witnesses. Predictably, the Soviet news article failed to document its charges. (U)

Background

Operation Lemon Aid, an induced double agent operation, was conceived, controlled and concluded as a cooperative counterintelligence effort by the FBI and the U. S. Naval Investigative Service (NIS). Conceptually, the operation was designed to assess the potential agent "spotting" capability of crew members serving on Soviet cruise liners calling at the Port of New York; to determine whether a potential agent recruit, once spotted, would be developed and operated by intelligence personnel serving aboard Soviet ships or by those based in a legal Residency; and, upon resolution of the spotting, developing and operating issues, to effect optimal countermeasures. (C)

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A consensus was reached amongst operational planners that a U. S. military "volunteer," sufficiently backstopped as to motivation and informational access, would be the most attractive bait to offer in furtherance of the predetermined objectives. In addition, and because a Soviet cruise vessel had been selected as the initial target environment, the operational planners agreed that a U. S. Navy officer playing the role of a "volunteer" could best relate to the ship's crew members in offering his services to Soviet intelligence. The NIS thereupon identified a U. S. Navy Lieutenant Commander, who possessed a "Top Secret" clearance in connection with his military contract review duties, as a likely candidate to meet these operational requirements and his candidacy held up during subsequent screening processes. Thus, the U. S. Navy officer, who later became known to his Soviet principals simply as "Ed" (and for purposes of this paper will be so identified), was selected and readied for a stint as an "agent provocateur" in this induced counterintelligence operation. (U)


CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Staging

Pursuant to his controllers' instructions, Ed purchased a cruise ticket on July 7, 1977, from the March Shipping Passenger Services, Inc., New York, for the sailing of the Soviet liner, "Kazakhstan," on August 13, 1977, from New York to Bermuda, returning on August 20, 1977. He was then provided a "cover story" for his family and co-workers, i.e., during the period August 13-20, 1977, he would be in Detroit, Michigan, to negotiate a Navy contract with a private industrial firm; and an emergency point of contact (an NIS representative) in Bermuda. About mid-afternoon on August 13th, Ed boarded the "Kazakhstan" and the operational stage was set. (U)



Kazakhstan (U)

On coming aboard, Ed and the other passengers were directed to stand under an arch bearing the ship's name and photographed by the ship's photographer. He was then assigned to stateroom 2026, where he found a brief

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

biographic questionnaire to be completed by him and returned to the Purser's office. Since the ship's cruise director immediately began imploring the passengers to promptly return the completed questionnaires, and such appeals continued over the loudspeaker right up to departure time, Ed provided his true name, date and place of birth, and residence; but falsely noted that he was self-employed. (U)

Immediately following the ship's departure from New York, Ed attended a "get acquainted mixer" in the lounge and was sought out by a couple who appeared to be Americans and who began asking questions about his background and employment. Ed was quite evasive in responding to their queries and, when the male conversationalist bluntly asserted "You look military," tactfully excused himself from their presence without making a reply. He made a point of avoiding the couple for the remainder of the cruise, but did observe the male individual engaging other passengers in similar conversations and speaking with ship's officers.

The cruise was otherwise uneventful, since the Soviet nationals aboard generally were segregated from other passengers, and the ship's officers and crew did not mix or socialize with foreign passengers. Ed did not participate in the Soviet-organized tours in Bermuda; instead, he made some independent sightseeing trips there. (U)

The "Kazakhstan" arrived in New York from Bermuda at 8:30 a.m. on August 20, 1977. After clearing Customs and Immigration, and immediately prior to debarking, Ed went to the Purser's office where he observed two of the ship's officers engaged in conversation. He approached them and handed a note, written the previous evening on the ship's stationery, to the officer who appeared to be the most senior. Upon taking the note, sealed in an envelope and addressed to the "Soviet Ambassador" on the face thereof, the recipient officer asked, "What is this for?" Ed gave no reply and immediately departed the ship. The note read as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL

"I am a career American Naval Officer, stationed in the New York City area, and will retire in six years. I am interested in making additional money prior to my retirement and can provide you with information which may be of interest to you. If you are interested, telephone me at (201) 922-9724 at 11:45 a.m., August 30, 1977. Ask for Ed." (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The Target Nibbles at the Bait

The telephone number indicated in the note passed to the ship's officer was assigned to a public telephone booth located in the parking lot of the Castle Diner at the intersection of State Route #33 and West Jumping Brook Road, near Exit #100 of the Garden State Parkway (a major North-South highway) in New Jersey. On August 30, 1977, Ed, in military uniform, stood by this telephone booth at the designated time and, sure enough, the phone rang. (U)



First Contact Site (U)

When Ed picked up the receiver, a heavily accented male voice said, "Hello Ed, we have received your letter and were pleased to get it. To make sure we're talking to the right person, what was your cabin number on the ship?" Upon Ed's immediate and correct response, the caller, who identified himself simply as "Jim," stated, "We'd like to meet with you tomorrow night at Queens Boulevard and 56th Street in New York City." Ed, expressing

CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

CONFIDENTIAL

reluctance to travel that far and to be away from his job and home for any length of time, requested the contact occur closer to his place of employment in New Jersey. The caller then suggested they meet at the New York City location, but on Saturday --- a nonworkday. Ed again indicated his unwillingness to meet in New York City, to which Jim thereupon advised he would check with his superiors; attempt to arrange a meeting closer to Ed's place of employment; and call him back on Wednesday, September 7, 1977, at the same time and telephone number. Before terminating the conversation, Jim asked for, and received, a description of Ed's automobile. (U)

*N.B.: Since this first telephone contact was not monitored and/or recorded, the identity of the caller remained unknown for the time being. However, Ed's responses were deemed to be in keeping with the role he was attempting to play, i.e., a "volunteer" quite concerned about his personal security; and sufficiently enticing for the Soviets to initiate a follow-up contact. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The Target's Interests Begin to Surface

At the appointed time and place, on September 7, 1977, Ed received a telephone call from Jim; however, it was a terse, one-way conversation with the latter instructing Ed to immediately proceed to another public telephone booth located in front of a Sears Roebuck Store in Asbury Park, New Jersey, where he would be called again in exactly 30 minutes. Ed hurriedly complied with the instructions and, true to Jim's word, received a second, albeit equally brief telephone call in which Jim told him to retrieve a magnetic "hide-a-key" container attached to the underside of the phone booth's shelf; to read the message contained therein; and to await a return call in 15 minutes. The message is reproduced as follows: (U)

Hello, Ed

#I. As you understand we are ready to accept your proposal. Right now the first thing for us to do is to have a personal meeting where we can discuss all conditions of our future cooperation. But here we have some difficulties: according to our previous conversation you can't meet with us in New York. On the other side we are restricted by the 25 mile zone and can't go far than that without notification of the State Dept. Besides, New Jersey and especially the place where you live and work is not the place for our personal meeting and further operations from the security point of view. In this situation we urge you to give a thorough consideration to our proposal to use your vacations for going to Finland, Guyana, Columbia or Jamaica where we can discuss with you all the questions under the utmost security measures. Of course, all the expenses will be paid (even if you go with your family.). Up to our next contact (conditions below) be very cautious and accumulate information.

#II. We have already used your phone twice and because of security we can't use it any longer. That's why for our next contacts use public phones at MONMOUTH SERVICE AREA located at the GARDEN STATE PKWY between exits 98 & 100. There are 5 public phones there. We'll use #681-9743 & 681-9744. Wait there for our call every last Saturday of every month from 2 p.m. till 2.15 p.m.. As usual we ask for Ed. Alternate time: the same day, 8 p.m. - 8.15 p.m..

#III. Right now we can't discuss our matter over the phone openly. That's why we prepared a list of questions.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

I have a copy of these questions (below) so we don't need to read them over the phone. Just give me your short answers ("Yes" or "No") then I name the number of question. As you understand it's done for the sake of time and security.

QUESTIONS

1. Are you an officer on active duty?
2. Do you serve at a navy base?
3. Do you work at a research institute?
4. Do you work at a civic center?
5. Do you have clearance?
6. Do you have access to classified materials?
7. Do you have military information?
8. Do you have scientific information?
9. Do you have military intelligence information?
10. Do you have access to any information connected with strategic system "TRIDENT"?
11. Do you have any information about submarine warfare?
12. Do you have any information connected with the construction of surface ships?
13. Do you have information about fire control system of navy ships?
14. Do you have contacts with the NAVY INTELLIGENCE?
15. Do you have secret information prepared for passing to us in the nearest future?
16. Is it up-to-date information?
17. Is it original material?
18. Is it films from secret documents?
19. Do you familiar with photo?
20. Do you have camera?
21. Can you take home classified materials from your office?
22. Can you film or copy secret documents?
23. Can you do it at home?
24. Can you do it at your office?
25. Do you have access to AD-A ...AD-B microfiches?
26. Can you accumulate documents (films or copies from them) for passing to us at a convenient place and time?
27. Do you agree to pass your information to us through caches (hiding places)?
28. Do you agree to get money for it through caches?
29. Do you want to make all deals with us at personal meetings?
30. Will you have your vacations this year?
31. Can you go to Europe (Finland or Austria) during next (this) year vacations? (All expenses will be paid by us.)
32. Can you go to Latin America (Columbia or Jamaica) during your vacations?

Thank You.

P.S. Make necessary notes & destroy the letter.

Best wishes.

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

As indicated, Ed received a third phone call 15 minutes later and during which he provided yes and no answers to the 32 questions listed in the message. In addition, Jim asked if any specific country was preferable and/or unacceptable for personal meetings, to which Ed replied that he had reservations about Guyana. Jim then confirmed that the Monmouth Service Area met with Ed's satisfaction for the next telephonic contact; repeated his instructions for continuing contacts there on the last Saturday of each month; and extended "best wishes" to Ed before hanging up. (U)

*N.B.: This first written message to the asset, while primarily intended to test and measure his bona fides and informational access, nevertheless provided some interesting insights to the target's interests and intentions. First and foremost, the security precautions taken by the Soviet principal(s) portended the difficulties to be encountered in any attempts to effect his/their identification(s). Secondly, the specified Latin American third-country sites for personal meetings were indicators of the Soviets' current perception of the most secure operational environments in the Western Hemisphere. Lastly, the query as to the asset's access to AD-A/AD-B microfiches (question #25) confirmed the target's familiarity with the "Technical Abstract Bulletin," a quarterly publication of the Defense Documentation Center, U. S. Department of Defense, which lists technical reports that have been reduced to microfilm. (C)


CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

A KGB Principal is Identified

Ed appeared at the bank of public telephone booths located in the Monmouth Service Area of the Garden State Parkway on September 24, 1977, and received a call from Jim on schedule. The call simply instructed him to drive south on the Parkway to the Herbertsville Picnic Area, where he should retrieve a crushed Marlboro cigarette package placed at the foot of a "Do Not Drive on Shoulder" road sign; read the message contained therein; and continue south to the town of Toms River, New Jersey, where he should await a follow-up call, at 3:00 p.m., at the public telephone booth located directly in front of a "Two Guys Store." (U)




Herbertsville Picnic Area at southbound mile marker #94.6 on the Garden State Parkway, New Jersey (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

CONFIDENTIAL



September 24, 1977, dead drop site (U)

As instructed, Ed proceeded to the dead drop site and retrieved the apparently discarded cigarette package. A lengthy message secreted therein addressed long-range objectives and modus operandi; the expectation of large cash payments with cautionary advice as to how such monies should be handled; a "shopping list" of coveted informational topics; specific instructions for the next scheduled dead drop activity; and the wherewithal to maintain "constant conditions of connection" in the United States and abroad should current contact channels be interrupted. After reviewing the message, Ed immediately drove on to Toms River to receive Jim's follow-up call, the purpose of which turned out to be simple verification that the drop had been cleared and conditions for the next scheduled activity were acceptable to Ed. (U)


Ed's personal value to this counterintelligence operation, already established by his department in playing the "volunteer" role, was further enhanced by his reported observations as he passed through the Herbertsville Picnic Area. During an operational debriefing, Ed recalled seeing a blue Plymouth automobile parked in the rest stop and a

CONFIDENTIAL

-12-

CONFIDENTIAL

portion of its New York State license plate number. Based on this reporting, the vehicle's registration was traced to Rudolf P. Chernyayev, employed as a Personnel Officer at the United Nations Secretariat, and known to the FBI as an officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). (C)



UNCODE

Enclosure to KGB's message of September 24, 1977, establishing "constant conditions of connection" abroad. The succeeding two pages depict the text of the message. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-13-

CONFIDENTIAL

Eslo, Ed

In this letter we would like to draw your attention to some points which are of great importance for our future cooperation. As we have no opportunity to meet you personally in the nearest future we think it necessary to point out the following.


1. As you understand, you'll have additional amounts of money to your salary as a result of our cooperation. These amounts might be as great as thousands dollars a month, dozens of thousands dollars a year and so on. Your information will be paid in cash by 20 dollar bills for your convenience. But you are to be ready to give an appropriate explanation as to the source of your additional income, in case such a question arise. And even your wife might put these question.

2. You must be extremely careful while accumulating materials and preparing to pass them over to us. See to it that nothing uncommon should be noticed in your behaviour, in a way you are handling documents. Please, find the place where you could safely keep the materials untill passing it to us. This place might be in your house as well as out, but "Beware of children".

3. We agree to have a long-term cooperation and we are planning to use short-term caches for receiving your information and passing over the money. It is absolutely safe and you have already used it - our letters were given to you through short-term caches. The description of these caches whereabouts will be given to you in due time. The materials which you will prepare for passing over to us should be camouflaged as some trash object. As far as this is concerned you will be given respective recommendations in each particular case separately. The time of loading&unloading of caches will be picked up so that it is convenient to you.

4. The payment for your information will be made after its evaluation, i.e. after a certain period of time. If afterwards it is proved to be of more value we will make an additional payment indicating what will be this payment for. We are interested in secret up-to-date information, research projects so, please, save your time and prepare only valuable information.

5. For our next contact we'll use public phones of CHEESEQUAKE SERVICE AREA, located at the GARDEN STATE RKWY before exit 125 (while driving northbound). We'll use ##721-9839 & 721-9840. (See the drawing.) Please, wait for our call on October 15 from 2 p.m. till 2.15 p.m.. Alternate time: the same day, 8 p.m. - 8.15 p.m.. We ask for Ed.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. By October 15, please, prepare the following:

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.

- a. Underwater acoustics, passive and active underwater acoustic devices (sonar, buoys, ship-bottom-mounted hydrophones).
- b. Submarine acoustic detection systems and their platforms.
 - aircrafts (P-3C, S-2E, S-3A)
 - helicopters ("LAMPS" - light airborne multi-purpose system)
 - surface ships ("SES" - surface effect ship, DD-963 destroyer)
 - hunter-killer submarines
 - large fixed and towed arrays ("SASS" - suspended array surveillance system, "TACTAS" - tactical towed array sensors, "SOSUS" - sound surveillance system, "RDSS" - rapid deployment surveillance system)
 - ordnance, fire control systems.

Together with the above mentioned secret information give us your biography, description of your research institute and your position there, where you copy or film documents, your exact address and phone.

7. On October 15 put all prepared materials in an empty package from "ORANGE JUICE", crash it, so that it looked like trash and take the package with you to "CHEESEQUAKE SERVICE AREA". Please, wait there for our call and further instruction.

8. On this day you must have 2 - 3 spare hours.

9. On October 15 we'll agree upon the time of handing money over to you.

10. It is preferable that you pass your material to us in undeveloped films. If you have no experience of filming documents, please, notify us. We'll prepare necessary instructions.

11. As you understand, due to unforeseen circumstances our communication with you can be lost. In this case:

a. Use MONMOUTH SERVICE AREA. Wait for our call there every last Saturday of every month from 2 p.m. till 2.15 p.m..

Alternate time: the same day, 8 p.m. - 8.15

b. Use permanent conditions of meeting in Finland. (Enclosed)

Thank You,

P.S. Please, make necessary notes & destroy the letter.

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Initial Perception of the KGB's Operational Pattern

The outline of a KGB operational pattern began to emerge from a review of the sequence of events that transpired in the September 24th contact and the instructions to Ed regarding subsequent dead drop activities. In essence, we could expect that Ed, on any scheduled date of activity, would receive at least three telephone calls from Jim: the first serving to inform him when and where the second call should be received; the second to direct him to the location of a secreted message in or near the booth; and the third to confirm his retrieval of the message and compliance with instructions contained therein. Furthermore, the telephone calls would be timed so precisely that little or no lead time would be afforded Ed (and obviously any cooperative surveillants) in his travels from one phone booth to another. It was also clear that the second in the series of calls would key any dead drop servicing by Ed, i.e., pertinent information as to when, where, and how he should load/unload the drops. During some contacts, the drops to be filled and cleared were, in fact, located in two separate areas; however, as the operation progressed, the Soviets instructed Ed to simultaneously clear and fill the same site. (U)

The early projection of this pattern not only proved correct, as it was repeated throughout the next eight months of the operation with only minor variations, but also served as the catalyst for planning and implementing a variety of surveillance techniques to identify all KGB principals. While Chernyayev had been identified during the September 24th contact, it was apparent that his presence in the vicinity of the dead drop most likely placed him in the role of countersurveillance. It was therefore speculated that at least one other principal was clearing and filling the drops and, of course, assuming the role of Jim, i.e., Ed's phone contact. In regard to the latter, Ed noted the last call on September 24th ran slightly longer than usual because he requested the next contact a week later than scheduled by Jim; and twice during the conversation Jim excused himself to deposit additional coins into the telephone. Thus, we further speculated that Jim was calling some distance removed from the operational sites and could not be the same individual servicing the drops. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

-16-

CONFIDENTIAL

In preparing for the October 22nd contact, and in an effort to penetrate the security measures effected by the Soviet principal(s), it was decided to place an FBI Special Agent inside a public men's restroom located in the immediate vicinity of the telephone booths at the Cheesequake service area and to locate stationary or picket surveillance teams at various points along the Garden State Parkway. Ed was instructed to write down the directions given to him by Jim in the initial call; and immediately thereafter pass them on to the Special Agent waiting in the men's restroom. It was hoped that this information, if quickly and securely fed into the established communication system, might enable the surveillance teams to spot the other principal(s) passing through the picket line. Finally, the NIS identified, secured and made available certain national defense documents, appropriately cleared for passage to the Soviets, as "feed material" responsive to the Soviet collection taskings; and the "feed material" was photocopied and discreetly marked for later identification prior to being secreted in a crushed half-gallon orange juice container to be used in the next dead drop. (C)




Cheesequake Service Area

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The stationary surveillance measures put into effect for the October 22nd activity did confirm Chernyayev's involvement and the presence of a second, albeit still unidentified principal at the drop site. Chernyayev was observed by a surveillance team member at 1:50 p.m. in the Cheesequake Service Area, and his automobile was seen leaving the rest stop approximately five minutes later by Ed and the surveillant. Ed received the scheduled call from Jim at 2:00 p.m. and was simply told to proceed northbound on the parkway to a telephone booth at the Raritan Toll Plaza and await a second call there in 15 minutes, which he did after dutifully advising the Special Agent standing by in the nearby men's restroom. (U)




Telephone booths (white arrow) at the Raritan Toll Plaza

CONFIDENTIAL

-18-

CONFIDENTIAL

The second call directed Ed to retrieve another magnetic "hide-a-key" box attached beneath the telephone and containing additional instructions. Enclosed he found a copy of a map with handwritten notations, a photograph of the Metropark Railroad Station in Iselin, New Jersey, and a typewritten note. The note instructed him to travel north and fill his drop at the Metropark Station (just off Exit 131-A of the Garden State Parkway); and continue north on the parkway approximately two miles to a Texaco Service Station, where he would receive a follow-up call at a public telephone booth. (U)



Note secreted in "hide-a-key" container, October 22, 1977. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 19 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Map secreted in "hide-a-key" container, October 22, 1977. On the left hand margin of the map, the letters A, B and C mark the locations of the Raritan Toll Booths (A), the Metropark Station (B), and the Texaco Service Station (C) with mileage between sites A and B shown as 5.7 miles, and between B and C as 2 miles. The hand-drawn insert depicts the Texaco Service Station area. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Following these instructions, Ed arrived at the Metropark Station at approximately 2:30 p.m. and shortly thereafter dropped his half-gallon orange juice container (with the "feed material" secreted therein) at the specified base of a support post under the stairs leading to the station's platform. After filling his drop, Ed immediately returned to his car and exited the Metropark Station parking lot; however, he made a wrong turn and was unable to enter the northbound lane of the Garden State Parkway. Upon doubling back to the parking lot and finding the correct exit (which took about three minutes), he noticed Chernyayev's car, containing two males, directly ahead of his own. It was obvious to Ed (and subsequent debriefing personnel) that the two males in Chernyayev's car had cleared the dead drop filled by Ed just minutes earlier. (U)

Ed then proceeded to the Texaco Station where, at 2:57 p.m., he received a call from Jim instructing him to walk to a broken fence directly in front of his parked car; retrieve a discarded milk carton containing additional material; and await another call. Upon opening the milk carton, Ed found \$2000 in U. S. currency (twenty-dollar denominations); a note with instructions for the next scheduled contact (November 26, 1977); and a copy of specifications for the Konica Autoreflex-T3 camera, the reverse side of which contained hand-printed instructions for filming documents. After reading the pertinent instructions, he returned to the telephone booth and received another call from Jim. Both confirmed that their respective drops had been cleared and they mutually agreed on December 3rd for the next contact instead of November 26th --- Thanksgiving Day. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-21-

CONFIDENTIAL

Good afternoon, Ed

1. As you understand our caches were loaded just before the operation with you & of course I do not have your materials in front of me right now. In this connection I'd like once again to stress that in case it is proved to be of more value we'll make additional payment for it.

2. Your questions & proposals which you possibly passed over to us together with the material will be answered during next operation on November 26.

3. For our next contact we'll use public phones inside of GROVER CLEVELAND SERVICE AREA which is located at New Jersey Tpke before exit I2 (while driving northbound). We'll use ## 634-9806 & 634-9707. Please wait for our call on November 26 from 2 p.m. till 2.10 p.m.. Alternate date: December 3, 2 p.m. - 2.10 p.m.. We ask for Ed.

4. Proceed with accumulating secret information on submarine acoustic detection systems & their platforms:

- aircrafts (P-3C, S-2E, S-3A)
- helicopters ("LAMPS" - light airborne multi-purpose system)
- surface ships ("SES" - surface effect ship, DD-963 destroyer)
- hunter-killer submarines
- large fixed and towed arrays ("SASS" - suspended array surveillance system, "TACTAS" - tactical towed array sensors, "SOSUS" - sound surveillance system, "RDSS" - rapid deployment surveillance system)
- ordnance, fire control systems.

5. On November 26 take all prepared material camouflaged into a package from milk with you. We'll have the same kind of operation as to-day.

6. Passing of material in undeveloped films is a matter of security & allows the usage of small containers for your materials. So next time, please, film at least part of your materials & hand it over to us together with the ^(test strip) of it. (Instruction is enclosed.)

7. Enclosed, please, find \$2000 for information you possibly delivered to-day & for buying a camera.

Best wishes,
Jim

P.S. Excuse my printing mistakes - I am not a typist.

Note secreted in discarded milk carton, October, 22, 1977. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-22-

CONFIDENTIAL

The Two Remaining KGB Principals Are Identified

The planning of FBI surveillance tactics for the December 3rd operational activities centered upon identifying Chernyayev's accomplices. In support of that objective, an extensive survey was conducted at and around the next designated contact site --- the Grover Cleveland Service Area on the northbound portion of the New Jersey Turnpike (also a major North-South highway that connects with the Garden State Parkway). The survey determined this initial contact point to be located in close proximity to the Garden State Parkway interchange; and directly opposite the southbound Thomas Edison Service Area of the New Jersey Turnpike. Recognizing the potential utility of the latter rest stop, i.e., as an observation post for KGB countersurveillance of the Grover Cleveland Service Area, it was decided to place stationary and mobile surveillance personnel in both areas and at strategic locations to the north and south of each along the turnpike. (C)

Our surveillance preparations further took cognizance of the necessity for timely awareness of all telephonic contact instructions to Ed; specifically, the direction in which he should proceed and his next destination. However, we did not wish to draw any undue suspicion to Ed's actions by overdoing the routine of restroom visits, so we stole a chapter from the KGB's modus operandi. In brief, Ed was provided several "hide-a-key" containers of his own and sheets of two-part, pressure-sensitive carbon paper; instructed to jot down Jim's initial and following instructions as received; pass the first set to a waiting Special Agent in a nearby restroom as before; and leave the succeeding sets in "hide-a-key" containers attached beneath the telephone booth shelves for retrieval and relay by other surveillance personnel. (C)

The foregoing surveillance tactics paid dividends even before the December 3rd operational activities commenced. At 1:23 p.m. on that date Valdik Aleksandrovich Enger, an employee of the United Nations Secretariat, and Vladimir Petrovich Zinyakin, an employee of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, both of whom previously had been known as KGB officers, were observed by FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

-23-

CONFIDENTIAL

surveillance personnel entering the Thomas Edison Service Area in Enger's automobile; and several minutes later Chernyayev was observed by surveillance teams directly across the turnpike as he arrived at the Grover Cleveland Service Area. (U)

Ed arrived at the Grover Cleveland Service Area at 1:45 p.m. and received the initial call from Jim promptly at 2:00 p.m. The latter, upon ascertaining that Ed had material to pass, directed him to a public telephone in the vicinity of the next northbound exit of the turnpike. Concurrently, Enger was observed at a bank of telephone booths in the restaurant across the turnpike at the Thomas Edison Service Area; and Chernyayev was observed in the vicinity of the specified telephone booth at Exit 12 (the next northbound exit of the turnpike). The second call to Ed, received at approximately 2:17 p.m., directed him to retrieve a crushed Marlboro Cigarette pack lying on the ground behind the telephone booth. The discarded cigarette package contained a photocopy of a map of the New Jersey Turnpike and Garden State Parkway in the vicinity of Woodbridge, New Jersey; a hand-drawn inset of the Arco and Exxon Service Stations on the Garden State Parkway in the vicinity of Iselin, New Jersey; and a note that instructed Ed to reverse his turnpike direction via Exit 12 and proceed southbound to the Thomas Edison Service Area. The note further depicted a precise spot in which Ed should park his car and a bank of telephone booths whereat he should await a follow-up call. Jim's third call directed Ed to fill his drop under an evergreen tree in front of his parked car, and then proceed to the designated parking space and telephone booth at the Arco and Exxon Service Stations on the Garden State Parkway. (U)

Immediately following each of these three calls, Ed securely passed on the pertinent instructions to our surveillance teams via the prescribed means, i.e., messages written on sheets of two-part, pressure-sensitive carbon paper. At this point, and even before the fourth stage of the operational activity had been completed, several aspects of the KGB's modus operandi were open to immediate speculation as a consequence of observations by the various surveillance teams.

CONFIDENTIAL

-24-

CONFIDENTIAL

Chernyayev obviously had verified Ed's arrival at the Grover Cleveland Service Area and probably relayed same to the waiting Enger and Zinyakin across the turnpike via telephone or walkie-talkie. While Enger, playing the role of Jim, made the first call to Ed, Chernyayev almost simultaneously had placed the crushed Marlboro Cigarette pack behind the telephone booth at the second site. In turn, Enger and Zinyakin probably used the former's car to occupy (and reserve) Ed's designated parking space at the Thomas Edison Service Area, and removed it just prior to his contemplated arrival. Chernyayev, keeping one step ahead of Ed in the sequence of activities, and Zinyakin apparently provided counter-surveillance at the Thomas Edison Service Area while Ed received his third call from Enger; and they proceeded on to load, and provide countersurveillance of, the KGB drop at the Garden State Parkway site while Enger cleared Ed's drop at the Thomas Edison Service Area and placed the fourth telephone call. (U)

Shortly after his arrival at the Arco and Exxon Service Stations on the Garden State Parkway, Ed received a call from Jim and was asked if he parked in the correct spot. When Ed replied in the affirmative, he was directed to retrieve an orange juice container lying directly in front of his car near a pile of cement blocks; read the note secreted therein; and await a follow-up call in five minutes. Jim's subsequent call merely confirmed that Ed had cleared the drop and did not foresee any problems posed by the contents of the note, which read as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

-25-

CONFIDENTIAL

Hello once again, Ed

1. This letter is very long but as we've just agreed I'll call you in 5 minutes. So, within this time, please, be ready to give your answer about the date of our next operation. We are planning it on January 7, 1978, usual time. For our contact we'll use public phones ## 686-9738, 686-9745, 686-9756 which are inside VANX MALL SERVICE AREA located at the exit #142 of GARDEN STATE PKWY (while driving northbound) before Union Toll Plaza. Wait for my call here on January 7 from 2p.m. till 2.10p.m.. Alternate date: January 21, the same time. Will that be all right for you?

Other questions will not be discussed with you over the phone for the sake of security. Besides, now we have the opportunity to receive your answers in written form together with your material through caches (we call them DLB - dead letter box) and it's need to air our conversations. Hope, you'll agree with it. Other points, please, read after receiving my call.

2. In your letter you have raised the question of payment of your expences made while getting in contact with us. We agree with it. In October we passed over to you 2 thousand bucks. You spent some money from them for buying a camera. Let's consider the rest as payment of your expences. O.K.? So, this question is closed.

3. Now about materials received from you. We thoroughly examined the documents and compared them with those that we have. The manuals gave us the opportunity to get more knowledge about the place of your work & they will be helpfull. Due to them we know more definitely what kind of information you have access to. The report turned out just of some interest to us. It is true but it's not your fault. The thing is that as you know president Carter has cut off serial production of "B-I" which had been taken into consideration when the estimates were compiled. This turned the estimates of the report incorrect and reduced its value. That is why we evaluate the material for 2 thousand dollars. Enclosed, please, find 3 thousand bucks: 2 - for information & plus 1 thousand as our Christmas gift to you.

4. With regard to the documents received from you we'd like to raise the question of security. As far as we can understand you'd gotten the report from your library and copied it. In order to give you proper recommendation for the future we'd like to know how frequently you used this library, have you ever taken this kind of documents before, was it not a surprise to the librarian, where is the xerox machine (you used to make a copy) placed, its type and trade mark.

Some more about your library. We definitely know that there are more than 9000 microfiches filed in this library. Our practice has shown that some microfiches are kept in libraries in several copies and can be taken without anybody's notice. Please, give this a thorough consideration and carefully study the procedure of receiving microfiches in your library bearing in mind the possibility to pass them over to us through DLB's. Usage of the microfiches is preferable because it will be possible to put them in small containers. (If necessary we could return them to you in due time. For example: if you take microfiches from your library on friday and hand them over to us on saturday we may return them to you through DLB on sunday.) In connection with this, please, write in your letter whether you have ever taken microfiches from your library, can you do it how long can you keep them.

5. In our previous letter we have already drawn your attention to the necessity of filming documents and passing them to us in undeveloped films. We urge you to do so. During the first period, please, give the films together with documents so that after developing them we could see if everything is all right and give you proper recommendations if necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

-26-

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. Right now we have permanent contact with you, know the place where you work and your position. Yet, it's not enough for our fruitful cooperation. In our letters we indicated not once what kind of information we are interested in and for what documents proper money will be paid. But up to now we don't know if you can get these materials and get them safely. To overcome this difficulty, please, pass over to us in January a list of documents you work with daily, a list documents (their brief contents, classification) you are planning to hand over to us, a list of documents you have access to due to your clearance. We'll thoroughly examine these lists and in February inform you what will be of interest to us i.e. be worth of money. It will save your time and enable you not to do a useless job. Taking this opportunity we want to stress once again that we are interested in a classified up-to-date information.

7. We scrutinized the manuals about the place of your work (we received them from you together with the report). On their bases we compiled the following list on information, some of which we hope you'll manage to deliver to us in January:

- technical documentation connected with navy shipboard aviation: description and technical characteristics of shipboard equipment - shipboard-type catapults, arresting systems, shipboard take off & landing systems, sequence of work during take off & landing, extreme parameters (for example, for high sea).
- technical characteristics, documentation or any other materials on fire control system "AWG-9".
- if possible, technical documentation connected with fighter "F-14" (performance, engine characteristics, instruction for pilot.)

8. We have already agreed upon the date of our next operation in January. In order to avoid the discussion of these questions in future we've prepared the following schedule for other operations:

month	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY
date	18 (25)	11 (18)	8 (15)	13 (20)	17 (24)	15 (22)

(In brackets the alternate dates of operations are given.)

Time of operations will remain unchanged - 2 p.m..

In your letter, please, give us your opinion about the proposed dates and if they are not convenient to you - give your dates, please.

9. Summing it up, for operation in January, please prepare:

- a. materials mentioned in #7.
- b. your personal letter (it will be better if you write it not type for the sake of time & security) about the library xerox, microfiches (#4), lists of documents (#6), schedule of operations (8). Try to film your letter too.
- c. If unclassified news bulletins on international & domestic events are issued at your base, please, put some of them together with the above mentioned materials & letter.

As a container for your materials use crashed ORANGE JUICE packages.

MERRY CHRISTMAS & HAPPY NEW YEAR TO YOU.

Jim.

sl-417

Please, make necessary notes and by all means destroy the letter before returning home.

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 27 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Efforts to Build a Prosecutive Case Begin

Upon completion of the December 3rd operational activities, an analytical review and assessment of this case to date led to a decision that future counterintelligence efforts be directed toward building a prosecutive case. Several factors entered into the decision, e.g., the only counterintelligence objective not met was the implementation of optimal countermeasures; two of the KGB principals (Chernyayev and Enger) did not enjoy diplomatic immunity; progressive difficulties would be encountered in sustaining the quality of "feed material" as well as the asset's credibility in a prolonged operation; the asset would be a credible prosecution witness; the potential for compromise of our surveillance coverages was increasing with each monthly operational activity; and the Soviets were pushing for a personal meeting in Helsinki, Finland, which would remove the asset from our control. In discussions with U. S. Department of Justice officials, it was pointed out that a key element in the development of a prosecutable case would be documentary evidence of a Soviet physically present at a dead drop site retrieving classified material deposited by the asset. (C)

Looking toward the goal of arrest and prosecution, surveillance planning for the January 7, 1978 schedule of operational activities revolved around preliminary photographic evidence of the roles played by each KGB principal. In spite of the inherent security risks involved, it was decided to expand the capabilities of ground surveillance units, both stationary and mobile, covering the designated and potential contact sites; to effect an aerial surveillance of the Soviets' movements by means of fixed-winged aircraft; and to establish a communications command post to coordinate the timely positioning of personnel for photographic efforts. (C)

On January 7th, Chernyayev was observed and photographed at the initial contact site, i.e., the Vaux Hall Service Area on the Garden State Parkway, between 1:31 and 1:48 p.m., and at the second contact site at 2:00 p.m. Unfortunately, neither Enger nor Zinyakin were observed at any of the pertinent activity sites on that day. The aerial surveillance was prematurely

CONFIDENTIAL

-28-

CONFIDENTIAL

discontinued due to poor visibility and icing conditions, and the mobile ground units were unable to arrive at the designated drop sites in sufficient time to observe and photograph loading and unloading activities. (U)

Ed received the initial call from Jim at 2:02 p.m. in the Vaux Hall Service Area, and was promptly directed to another telephone booth immediately north of the Union Toll Plaza on the parkway, where he retrieved a magnetic "hide-a-key" container. Enclosed were a map and letter directing him to a location where he was to fill a drop, and still another spot where he was to clear a drop and await a telephone call. (U)

Hallo, Ed

Please, read this letter very attentively, examine the map & pictures and then begin to act checking each your step with the instructions and strictly following them.

1. Right now you are at the place, which marked at the map as "A".
2. After reading the instructions proceed to point "B". Your route will be: GARDEN STATE PKWY (northbound) - EXIT #150 - S-OVER ave. - SHELTER.
3. Place the container with your material the way it is shown at pictures. (Behind two trees just opposite the right south corner of the wire fence.) See to it that nobody noticed you doing it.
4. Immediately leave this place and proceed to point "C". Your route: GARDEN STATE PKWY (southbound) - EXIT # 141 - VAUXHALL RD. Park your car behind Lincoln technical Institute.
5. Go to the place shown at pictures and pick up our container. The container is a rubber tube of the car, which connects the radiator with the cooling system of the engine.
6. Return to your car and come to the phones which are located at the "EXXON" gas station. (See the pictures.) Their # 688-8818 688-9713. Wait for my call. I'll call at 3 p.m. In case you are late I'll repeat the call at 3.30, then 4 p.m., 4.30, 5 p.m..
7. You will not be able to open our container immediately and to read our letter. So, please, be ready to confirm the date of our next operation.
8. As it was given in our schedule we plan it on February 18. Alternate date - February 25. In case its all right just say: "Everything is O.K. with point 8."

I'll end this letter with a very good news for you - in our containers you'll find a very large sum of money. But we urge you to be careful & attentive.

Thank you.


Jim

(U)

Ed's drop, which he loaded with filmed documents and a handwritten note (requested of him during the previous contact), was situated at the base of two trees near a chain link fence at the Bloomfield (New Jersey) Animal Shelter. The Animal Shelter was located in the vicinity of Exit 150, Garden State Parkway, on a one-block long, dead end street with three garden type apartment buildings, a small parking lot, and a cemetery comprising the neighboring properties. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




Photocopy of map (turn sideways) with detailed depictions of the dead drop sites on January 7, 1978. The likeness of the drawing of Ed's drop to the actual site (as shown in close-up photograph on next page) obviously is the product of exacting preparations for this operational activity by the KGB. (U)


CONFIDENTIAL

- 30 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Aerial view of the Bloomfield Animal Shelter drop site (see arrow). (U)




Close-up view of the Bloomfield Animal Shelter drop site (see arrow). (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The KGB's drop was located in a remote area off Exit 141 of the parkway, near a chain link fence that ran along the Lackawana Railroad tracks behind the parking lot of the Lincoln Technical Institute in Union, New Jersey. The drop material consisted of two pieces of automobile radiator hose filled with \$5,000 in ten and twenty dollar bills and a two page note (pictured below). After clearing the drop, Ed received the now-standard confirmatory call from Jim at a public telephone booth in an Exxon Service Station directly across the street from the Lincoln Technical Institute. The note included in this drop package cautioned Ed about spending large amounts of money; requested a personal meeting in Finland, Guyana, Columbia, or Jamaica; provided a list of desired documents; gave additional document photography instructions; and confirmed the next contact date as February 18th, at the public telephone booths in the southbound rest stop just before Exit 151 of the Garden State Parkway. (U)



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CONFIDENTIAL

- 32 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The Elements Play an Unforeseen Role

The KGB's instructions for the February 18th contact called for Ed to be available for his first telephone call at 2:00 p.m. at the Brookdale Service Area (near Exit 151), Garden State Parkway. A continuing analytical review of the Soviets' operational pattern determined the second contact site could now be accurately predicted, i.e., it would be the very next set of public telephone booths along the parkway in the same direction in which Ed was instructed to travel to the already selected first site. Thus, we were able to pinpoint beforehand a telephone booth located immediately south of the Garden State Parkway's Essex Toll Plaza as the logical second site, wherein further instructions would probably be secreted in a magnetic "hide-a-key" container. (C)

In preparation for the February 18th activities, it was decided to effect consensual monitoring (and recording) of the initial telephone call, and extensive photographic surveillance coverage of the second contact site. Toward the latter end, a construction trailer equipped with still photographic and video taping cameras was set up at the Essex Toll Plaza. Also recognizing that speed would be of the essence in establishing a photographic surveillance capability at the third (and possibly fourth) sites, it was decided to have a standby surveillance team member retrieve the contents of the "hide-a-key" container immediately following placement thereof by the KGB principal; securely communicate the pertinent instructions to mobile ground and aerial units for their quick reaction; and replace the container for Ed to pick up on schedule. (C)

Unfortunately, the weather did not fully cooperate with all our elaborate surveillance plans. Between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on February 18, 1978, a heavy snow storm engulfed the area and visibility was reduced to less than one-half mile, which grounded the surveillance aircraft and substantially hampered the ground mobility and communications. The cold and snowy weather was not without benefits, however, as it also forced the KGB principals to alter their plans. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 33 -

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL


At 6:08 a.m. on February 18th, Chernyayev was observed departing his residence in the Bronx, New York, and walking to his parked automobile. Unable to start his car after trying for over one-half hour, he was subsequently observed running to the nearby Soviet residential complex and, shortly thereafter, departing alone in Enger's vehicle. While he was not observed for the rest of the morning, it can be speculated that Chernyayev spent the next several hours "dry cleaning" himself. At approximately 1:00 p.m., Chernyayev, Enger and a third individual (probably) Zinyakin, were observed in Enger's car at the Vaux Hall Service Area on the Garden State Parkway. (U)

At 2:00 p.m., Ed entered the public telephone booth at a restaurant in the Brookdale Service Area and received the initial call from Jim. Simultaneously, Enger was observed entering the phone booth just south of the Essex Toll Plaza and placing a call. Jim directed Ed to retrieve a magnetic "hide-a-key" container at the very same phone booth in which Enger was then making his call (and also the same one predetermined to be the logical second contact site). This telephone conversation was successfully monitored, and recorded, and at this point the snow storm worked to the advantage of surveillance personnel as all three Soviet principals, apparently using just the one car (Enger's) to minimize the chances of an accident, were present at the Essex Toll Plaza public telephone site. They were all photographed, albeit indistinguishably, in the car and Enger was captured on video tape entering the phone booth and carrying on a conversation. The audio recording of the call received by Ed, when later matched and synchronized with the video tape of Enger's concurrent outgoing call, clearly showed that Enger was, in fact, identical to Jim. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 34 -

CONFIDENTIAL



This sequence of photos, seen from left to right and top to bottom, shows Enger, in his role as "Jim", at the Essex Toll Plaza telephone booths on a snowy February 1, 1978, as he made his 2:00 p.m. contact with "Ed". (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 35 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Immediately after the three Soviets drove away from the phone booth, and prior to Ed's arrival there, the contents of the "hide-a-key" container were retrieved, read and replaced by an FBI Special Agent. The pertinent instructions as to the next dead drop site were thereupon quickly relayed to strategically situated mobile surveillance personnel along the parkway, who in turn raced to the next location in hopes of arriving in time to photograph a KGB principal loading the drop. The "hide-a-key" container, retrieved by Ed barely moments after its replacement, contained a map with inserted, hand-drawn pictures, and an accompanying message which read as follows:

Hello, Ed

Please, read this letter, thoroughly examine the map & pictures. While acting - check all your steps with the instruction.

1. Right now you are at the place marked at the map as "A".
2. After reading the instruction proceed to point "B" - place of DLB. Your route there will be: GARDEN STATE PKWY (south) - exit # 147 - N. ORATON pkwy (south) - left turn to FREEWAY dr. E.
3. Park your car at FREEWAY dr. behind "EXXON" gas sta.
4. Go to the place of DLB. It is in between the stone wall & the staircase. (See the pictures.)
5. Pick up our container & at the same place leave your containers. Our container - crashed can from peanuts - "Superior's CASHEW PEANUT CRUNCH". Color - metallic blue.
6. Immediately return to your car & proceed to point "C". Your route there will be: GARDEN STATE PKWY (south) - service sta. (gas, phones) before exit #131. Wait for my call near the phones located just opposite "ARCO" gas station. (See the picture.)
I'll call at 2.50 p.m.. In case you are late I'll repeat the call at 3.00 p.m., then 3.05, 3.10, 3.15, 3.20, 3.40p.m..
7. You will not be able to open our container immediately & read our letter. So, please, be ready to confirm the date of our next operation.
8. As it was given in our schedule we plan it on MARCH II. Alternate date - MARCH 18. Usual time. In case its all right just say: "Everything is O.K.".
9. Our next operations will be much closer to your home.

Best of luck to You

Jim.

LEGEND

- x - place of DLB
- - your route to DLB by car
- - on foot
- - route to phones

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

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A mobile surveillance team, preceding Ed to the drop area in a vehicle uniquely equipped with concealed closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, encountered Chernyayev and Enger in the latter's car circling the designated Exxon Service Station. The third principal, however, was not further observed in this area, it being noted the dead drop was physically located between a stone wall and the base of a staircase behind the service station in an area not accessible to any vehicle. The complete inaccessibility of the drop site negated any attempts to effect physical and/or photographic surveillance coverage of its loading and unloading, and the third Soviet participant (presumably Zinyakin) undoubtedly serviced the drop on foot. Following the drop activity and in accordance with the Soviets' instructions, Ed proceeded to the public telephone booth opposite an Arco Service Station near Exit 131 of the parkway, where he received a call from Jim at 3:00 p.m. and during which they mutually acknowledged receipt of material and confirmed the next contact date as March 11, 1978. The KGB drop contained \$3000 and the following note: (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 37 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, Ed

I'll begin my letter by answering your questions.

1. We agree that at present our operations are being carried on rather far from your home. But it is caused by security precautions. More over, the farther you are away from home the less are the chances of your meeting anyone of your acquaintances at the place of operation, who might from pure curiosity wonder why you were there. However we understand your feelings and we'll look into the matter in order to enable you to spend less time to get to the place of operations.
2. In this connection we also suggest to carry on our operations not each month but every other month, i.e. 6 times a year. This plan has some advantages. It will enable you to have more time for filming, for picking up more valuable documents. Besides, you will be away from home only 6 times a year, which will not be so conspicuous for your close relatives and friends. As far as the payment is concerned you will not lose anything, because having more time you will be able to prepare more materials to hand over to us for which we'll naturally pay more money. If you agree to carry on the operations once every two months - let us know in your next letter. Be sure also to indicate in it what time you are planning your vacation in order to enable us to keep this in mind while planning a new schedule of our operations.
3. You make good films from the documents, they are quite readable and this is O.K. with us. Therefore there is no need to turn back to xerox copies.
4. As you have never taken microfiches - there is nothing to be done. Just forget about it.
5. Now, about the documents which we received last time. The first document is complete and we evaluate it for approximately 3 thousands. (Enclosed, please, find \$3000.) As for the second document, we got only half of it and it is very difficult to evaluate it without the second part. Therefore we are not sure right now how much we should pay for it. We hope to get the second half right now - during this operation. If not - pass it over to us in March. In any case be sure that you'll get payment for the second document but as you understand the complete document worth more than incomplete one.
6. If you have passed the second half of this document right now for the operation in March, please, try to film some of those 3 documents mentioned in our letter in January. In case you have no access to them - film any secret documents dealing with the subjects pointed out in our letters in October & December.
7. Practically all the documents we have received from you up till now were dated 1973 or 1974. Do you have access to the 1977 - 1978 documents? Can you film them? As a rule up-to-date materials are worth more than the aged ones even though they still maintain their actual value. The same thing with the classification.
8. Still one more request. Please, acknowledge in your next letters the date of our next operation so that there will be no need to discuss this matter over the phone.
9. As a container for your materials next time, please, use an empty package from milk. To make it look like real trash just scrape the package put some glue on it and then powder with some sand, soil or dust.
10. For our next operation we'll use public phones inside the CHEESEQUAKE SERVICE AREA, located at the GARDEN STATE PKWY before exit# 125 (while driving northbound). We'll use ##72I-9839, 72I-9840, 72I-9841. Please, wait for our call there on MARCH 11 from 2 p.m. till 2.10 p.m.. Alternate date: MARCH 18, same time.

Thank You

Jim

(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

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A Prosecutive Opinion is Rendered

The results of surveillance coverages of the February 18th operational activities, as well as all other facts developed from the inception of this case, were presented to, and discussed with, officials of the U. S. Department of Justice relative to possible violations of Federal statutes: e.g., Conspiracy to Acquire or Transmit National Defense Information; Espionage (Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 793 or 794); and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 951). The presentation of the facts was made at this time to determine if sufficient probable cause existed to effect an arrest of the KGB principals and an opinion as to the potential for successful prosecution. (U)

The Departmental representatives opined that the case held prosecutive merit, but to date insufficient evidence had been collected to support the filing of necessary complaints with a reasonable expectation of successful prosecution. They had no reservations about the particular Soviets being involved in intelligence activities directed against the U. S., but noted that a prosecutive interpretation of such activities required a higher level of supportive evidence than a purely counterintelligence interpretation. More specifically, the following prosecutive deficiencies were pointed out in the investigation to date: (U)

The second note received by Ed, wherein a request for classified information was made, showed an illegal objective in support of a conspiracy; however, the originator of the note had not been determined. (U)

While Chernyayev had been observed during each instance of operational activity in the pertinent areas and at the critical times, these observations constituted circumstantial evidence only and would not suffice for the filing of a complaint naming him as either a co-conspirator or co-defendant. The circumstantial evidence of Chernyayev's involvement, thus far limited to countersurveillance, could be used in a court of law provided that he could also be identified performing an overt act to commit, or conspire to commit, espionage. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Zinyakin, who possessed diplomatic immunity, had been observed on two occasions in the general area of operational activities; however those sightings were insufficient to cause the naming of him as an unindicted co-conspirator. (U)

The evidence of Enger's participation in significant activity would support a complaint for conspiracy if supporting evidence had been developed regarding the person or persons with whom he conspired. However, the fact that insufficient evidence existed to name either Chernyayev or Enger in a complaint negated any current prosecutive effort against Enger. (U)

In sum and substance, discussions with Departmental representatives resulted in a conclusion that, for the purpose of sustaining a successful prosecution, an expanded effort would have to be made to detect and record one or all Soviet principals engaged in overt acts of espionage or violating related statutes. This conclusion gave direction to the surveillance tactics devised for the March 11th round of activities. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 40 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Evidentiary Needs Are Fulfilled

In order to gather the necessary evidence to sustain a successful prosecution, the FBI's New York and Newark Field Offices committed extensive physical and technical surveillance resources to the March 11th activities. Electronic surveillance coverages of the pertinent telephone booths were instituted, and aerial and ground units were outfitted with special photographic equipment. (C)

At 5:40 a.m. on the appointed day, Enger was observed departing the Soviet residential complex, Bronx, New York, in his 1974 black/gray Dodge Dart Sedan bearing New York State license tags 155 QXR. This vehicle was next observed at approximately 1:40 p.m., proceeding in a northerly direction as it passed through the Raritan Toll Plaza on the Garden State Parkway, approximately two miles north of the designated first contact site, the Cheesequake Service Area. Ten minutes later, Enger's car again passed through the Raritan Toll Plaza, but this time in the opposite direction. Ed, standing by the prescribed public telephone in the west side of a restaurant at the Cheesequake Service Area, received the initial call from Jim (Enger) promptly at 2:00 p.m. This call, which was monitored and recorded, directed Ed to retrieve a package taped to the underside of another public telephone located in the east side of the very same restaurant. (U)

The package retrieved by Ed, sealed in black paper wrapper and taped to the underside of the telephone booth, contained a photocopied map of the Garden State Parkway from the Cheesequake Service Area north to Exit 125; a photocopied hand-drawn map depicting the route from Exit 125 of the Garden State Parkway to a particular telephone pole on Fulner Street in South Amboy, New Jersey; three photographic pictures of intersections along the prescribed route to the telephone pole; and a one-page, typewritten letter instructing Ed to simultaneously load and unload a dead drop at the base of the telephone pole. The letter further identified the KGB's drop package as a crushed "Martinson Coffee Can" and a bank of public telephone booths just beyond the Raritan Toll Plaza as the site for a following telephonic contact. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-41-

CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, Ed

Thoroughly examine the map, the sketch & pictures. To-day we'll have the same kind of the operation we had last time. If everything is OK the whole operation will be completed in 20 minutes. So, please, be very attentive.

1. Right now you are at point "A".
2. After reading the instruction proceed to point "B" - place of DLBs. Your route there will be: GARDEN STATE PKWY (northbound), exit #125, MAIN str., FULNER str..
3. On your route to MAIN street from exit #125 you are to make three turns (right, left & again right) practically one after another. So, I urge you to be very attentive. While moving, please, follow the destination sign - "SOUTH AMBOY BUSINESS CENTER". Enclosed, please, find pictures of places where you are to make turns.
4. The place of DLB - beyond the 3rd lighting pole at FULNER street (counting from the intersection with MAIN str.) The pole is marked - "BT-4020".
5. Pick up our container & at the same place leave your container. Our container - crashed can from coffee - "MARTINSON The Premium Coffee". Colour - red & yellow.
6. Immediately leave this place & proceed to point "C". - telephones beyond RARITAN TOLL PLAZA. Your route there: MAIN str. - exit #125 - GARDEN STATE PKWY (southbound).

I'll call you there at 2.35 p.m., 2.40p.m., 2.45p.m. In case you are late I'll call at 2.50, then 3.00 & 3.30p.m..

Best of luck to You

Jim

As Ed passed northbound through the Raritan Toll Plaza enroute to the drop site, he was intercepted by surveillance personnel who photographed the pertinent dead drop instructions with a Polaroid Camera. A mobile ground surveillance unit, specially outfitted for surreptitious operation of CCTV equipment, thereupon was dispatched to the drop site ahead of Ed while, concurrently, the instructions were being relayed to aerial units. Approximately one-half mile from the drop site, surveillance personnel in the mobile ground unit observed Enger's

CONFIDENTIAL

-42-

CONFIDENTIAL

automobile, with Enger driving and Zinyakin seated in the passenger side of the front seat, proceeding north on Main Street in South Amboy and through an intersection with Fulner Street. The two Soviets were then observed backing into a parking space in front of a commercial firm on Main Street approximately three blocks north of the Fulner Street intersection as Ed simultaneously arrived at the drop site; deposited his package (a one-half gallon milk carton containing exposed film of classified documents and a personal note); and retrieved the Soviets' crushed coffee can. (U)


The CCTV-equipped surveillance unit quickly took up a position on the opposite shoulder of the road and one telephone pole removed from the drop site. Approximately 30 seconds later, at 2:26 p.m., Enger and Zinyakin drove past the pertinent telephone pole, made a U-turn, and re-approached the pole from the opposite direction apparently taking no particular interest in the seemingly unoccupied surveillance vehicle. Enger stopped his car directly in front of the telephone pole marking the dead drop, and Zinyakin got out of the passenger seat; walked in front of the car; and picked up the milk carton left there by Ed moments earlier. Zinyakin thereupon re-entered the car through the rear door on the driver's side, held open by Enger, and they drove off in the same direction whence they arrived. (U)

As a consequence of surveillance coverages effected at the drop site, three FBI Special Agents could positively identify Zinyakin as the individual clearing the drop; two Special Agents could positively identify Enger as the driver of the vehicle utilized in servicing the drop; and 35 millimeter photographs were obtained depicting Zinyakin bending down, picking up the milk carton, and returning to Enger's car as well as Enger concurrently sitting behind the wheel of his car. Zinyakin's actions in clearing the drop were also clearly captured on video-tape and an aerial surveillance unit took movie footage of the entire sequence of events at the drop site. In addition, photographs and plaster casts were made of the distinct impressions left by Zinyakin's ripple-sole boots in the soft dirt at the base of the telephone pole. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-43-

CONFIDENTIAL




Dead drop site (base of telephone pole in foreground) on Fulner Street, South Arboy, New Jersey. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 44 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Vladimir P. Zinyakin clearing dead drop on Fulner Street, South Amboy, New Jersey, March 11, 1978. (U)


CONFIDENTIAL

- 45 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Zinyakin, having cleared the dead drop, prepares to depart the scene. (U)



Plaster cast of heel impression left in soft dirt at dead drop site by Zinyakin. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

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
Ed received the follow-up call from Jim at the public telephone booth just south of the Raritan Toll Plaza on the Garden State Parkway at 2:36 p.m. They confirmed clearance of their respective drop packages and the next contact on May 13th (with alternate date of May 20th) at one of two public telephones located outside a supermarket on U. S. Route 1 in Woodbridge, New Jersey, in the vicinity of Exit 130, Garden State Parkway. (U)

Surveillance personnel, at approximately 2:50 p.m., observed Enger, Zinyakin and Chernyayev standing together in the parking lot at the Cheesequake Service Area. Enger subsequently shook hands with each compatriot; patted both on the back; and departed the area in his car. Zinyakin and Chernyayev thereupon drove off in a 1975 two-door Dodge Sedan bearing New York license tags 480 GPF, registered to another KGB officer who departed the U. S. earlier in the month. Enger was later observed, at 4:02 p.m., carrying a large brown manila envelope as he entered the Soviet residential complex in the Bronx, New York. (U)

The KGB's drop package, retrieved by Ed, contained \$3,000 and a typewritten letter detailing instructions for the next contact and a request for Ed to include material on submarine acoustic detection systems in his next drop package. The following picture depicts the contents of the KGB's package and the hand-drawn sketch of directions to the dead drop site. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-47-



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

The Apprehension

Based on the results of investigation conducted to this point, a complaint was filed on May 12, 1978, before a U. S. Magistrate in New Jersey charging Valdik Aleksandrovich Enger and Rudolf Petrovich Chernyayev with violations of the espionage statutes, specifically Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 794 (C) and 793 (G), and warrants for their arrests were issued. Vladimir Petrovich Zinyakin, because of his diplomatic immunity, was named as an uncharged co-conspirator. However, the arrest warrants could not be executed the next day for a myriad of reasons and, as a consequence, Ed was instructed to abort the scheduled activities on May 13th and, instead, appear at the initial contact site on the alternate day (May 20th). (U)

During the March 11th - May 20th interlude, various FBI components necessarily were involved in the processing and technical examinations of evidence submitted, as well as critical preparations for the pending arrest situation. The Laboratory Division conducted spectrographic (voice print) examinations of the recorded telephone conversations; typewriting, handprinting, indented writing, and linguistic character evaluations/comparisons of the Soviet messages; and scientific analysis of the paper, ink and tape used in the Soviet messages. The Latent Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division processed evidentiary items for latent impressions and comparison with available single fingerprints of Soviet personnel. The Technical Services Division, in addition to a variety of support activities preparatory to the imminent arrest, performed the comparison and synchronization of Enger's video taped telephone activity with the audio recording of the call received by Ed on February 18th, and thereafter dubbed the audio on the video tape for courtroom presentation. The New York and Newark Field Offices had to insure that two photographic copies of the "feed material" to be used in Ed's forthcoming drop package would be made under identical conditions, one for passage and one for evidentiary retention; that the camera used therefore would be marked in such a fashion that the photographs could be positively identified as originating

CONFIDENTIAL

-49-

CONFIDENTIAL

with that specific camera; and Ed's drop package, containing the film would be appropriately marked for identification purposes in establishing the necessary chain of evidence upon retrieval of same at the time of arrest. (C)

The NIS, for its part, was called upon to provide a classified document for inclusion in the photographed "feed material" that would sustain a substantive count of espionage, i.e., meet the legal test of having an impact on national defense. Department of Justice representatives also played a vital role in the preparations for terminal action, as they provided the necessary advice and counsel as to ideal arrest situations from a potential prosecutive standpoint. Underlying the entire circumstances and timing of the pending arrest situation was, of course, the fact that the film of the classified national defense document could not be lost or allowed to be delivered to the USSR and under no circumstances could the dead drop be filled by Ed until coverage of the site had been established to prevent loss of the national defense information. (C)

Beginning at approximately 5:45 a.m. on May 20, 1978, and continuing throughout the rest of the morning, the three KGB principals in this operation were variously placed under physical surveillance. At 12:43 p.m., Zinyakin and Enger, both seated in the latter's car, and Chernyayev alone in his car, were observed in the parking lot of the A & P Store located off Exit 130, Garden State Parkway, in the vicinity of Route 1 and Fords Avenue, Woodbridge Township, New Jersey. Almost concurrently, Ed was meeting with FBI Special Agents in the vicinity of Red Bank, New Jersey, where installation of a radio transceiver in his personal automobile was effected and the drop package, secreted in a Tropicana Orange Juice carton, was turned over to him. Two Special Agents of the FBI then assumed camouflaged positions in the rear of Ed's car and, with Ed driving, they proceeded northward along the Garden State Parkway toward the A & P Store for the initial telephonic contact. (C)

Ed (and the two Special Agents) arrived at the A & P Store approximately 1:50 p.m., and he waited near the two designated public telephones on the building's northeast exterior wall. A few minutes after Ed's arrival,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 50 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Chernyayev was observed driving his vehicle behind the store and dropping something at the southeast corner of the building under a "No Parking" sign. At 2:00 p.m., simultaneous observations were made of Ed receiving a telephone call (which was consensually monitored) and Enger making a call from a telephone located on the northwest side of the same building. The calling party, recognized as Jim from previous calls, directed Ed to retrieve an A & P Whipped Cream package located under a "No Parking" sign at the southeast corner of the building, which he did. (U)

While Ed was still at the parking lot of the A & P Store, surveillance personnel followed Chernyayev's departure from the area and observed him filling a drop approximately three quarters of a mile due east or, more specifically, behind a group of three trees on Highview Drive in Woodbridge Township, New Jersey. Chernyayev then drove to a point approximately 100-200 yards due east, and in direct line of sight, of the drop site, where he parked his car and stood looking back towards the drop. (U)

Meanwhile, back at the A & P Store Ed had extracted the contents of the Whipped Cream carton and found typed directions, with accompanying photographs, to a drop site that exactly corresponded to the dead drop just filled by Chernyayev. There was also a diagram of a route from the Highview Drive site to public telephones located at the entrance of a "Stern Brothers" Store a short distance away, and to which Ed should proceed after placing his material and retrieving the Soviet package (a "Bartlett Pears" can) at the same drop site. The carton further contained a series of questions for Ed to answer relative to his personal status. (U)

Ed proceeded in accordance with the KGB instructions to the drop site on Highview Drive. As several FBI surveillance units watched, he picked up the Soviets package; left his own; and departed the area enroute to the "Stern Brothers" Store. Shortly thereafter, Enger and Zinyakin drove up to the drop site in Enger's car. Zinyakin exited the vehicle, carrying a large paper bag, and walked toward the three trees. Immediately following his clearance of the drop, arrest teams moved

CONFIDENTIAL

-51-

CONFIDENTIAL

in and apprehended Zinyakin about four feet from the trees and Enger in his vehicle on Highview Drive. Chernyayev was simultaneously placed under arrest at his vantage point approximately 100 yards east of the drop site. At the time of Zinyakin's arrest, the paper bag was removed from his possession and found to contain the Tropicana Orange Juice carton placed at the drop site moments earlier by Ed and within which the filmed, classified national defense document was secreted. (U)

The three KGB subjects were immediately transported to the FBI's Newark Field Office. None of the subjects made significant admissions during interview, but numerous items of potential evidentiary nature (e.g., two hand-held CB radios and pieces of paper depicting apparent dead drop and/or contact sites in the New York metropolitan area) were taken from their persons and vehicles consequent to physical searches incidental to arrest. Zinyakin, who claimed diplomatic immunity, was released upon establishment of his identity by Soviet Consular officials later in the afternoon. Enger and Chernyayev appeared before a U. S. Magistrate, District of New Jersey, during the evening of May 20, 1978, and were ordered to be held in lieu of two million dollar bonds each. Upon their failure to post bond, they were remanded to FBI custody and thereafter incarcerated in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York City. (U)


Subsequent examination of the Soviets' drop package retrieved by Ed determined that it contained \$4,000 in twenty dollar denominations; two pages of typed instructions; and a xeroxed copy of a map of the Woodbridge Township area of New Jersey with handwritten directions to a Sunoco Service Station located therein as the next contact site. Perhaps one can perceive a touch of irony in the opening remarks of Jim's latest instructions:

"Dear Ed,
On behalf of my Headquarters I would like to inform you that we appreciate your work and are interested to continue our mutual cooperation." (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 52 -

CONFIDENTIAL




Zinyakin, at 1:00 p.m. on May 20, 1978, is pictured jotting down numbers of public telephones on northeast exterior wall of the A & P Store in Woodbridge Township, New Jersey. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 53 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Arrow points to A & P Whipped Cream carton dropped at southeast corner of the store by Chernyayev shortly before 2:00 p.m. on May 20, 1978. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 54 -

CONFIDENTIAL




Aerial view of the actual arrests of Zinyakin and Enger at the dead drop site on Highview Drive, Woodbridge Township, New Jersey, May 20, 1978. Zinyakin (in white T-shirt) is standing immediately in front of the clump of trees while Enger remains seated in his automobile (foreground). (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 55 -

CONFIDENTIAL



CB radios removed from a paper bag carried by Zinyakin at the time of his arrest on May 20, 1978. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 56 -

CONFIDENTIAL

A Judicial Conclusion


On May 30, 1978, a Federal Grand Jury in Newark, New Jersey, returned a three count indictment against Enger and Chernyayev, with Zinyakin, who departed the U. S. four days earlier, named as an unindicted co-conspirator. The trial of Enger and Chernyayev commenced on September 30, 1978, before U. S. District Judge Frederick B. Lacey, and ended on October 13, 1978, when the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts against the defendants. Enger and Chernyayev were each sentenced, by Judge Lacey on October 30, 1978, to 50 years in the custody of the Attorney General of the U. S. Both subjects were allowed to continue on bond in the custody of the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, subject to severe travel restrictions and pending appeal of their convictions. (U)



Vladimir P. Zinyakin



Rudolf P. Chernyayev



Valdik A. Enger

CONFIDENTIAL

- 57 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Analysis

This operation, nine months in duration from the time Ed "volunteered" his services until the apprehension of the three KGB principals, met all prescribed objectives and can be adjudged an unqualified success. Three well-trained and experienced KGB officers were effectively neutralized and, once again, the Soviet Government's blatant exploitation of its representation at the United Nations for espionage purposes was exposed to the international community. The KGB paid a total of \$20,000 for the "feed material" made available by the NIS and passed to the principals through Ed; and surfaced a rather complex modus operandi in agent handling. (U)

In reviewing this case, several factors both operational and psychological should be highlighted. Operationally speaking, the case demonstrated that well planned surveillance measures could be implemented despite Soviet vigilance. Our surveillance techniques were massive, but well disguised and coordinated. Initially, the surveillances were relatively passive---consisting of pickets positioned at key points leading to the contact site and established well in advance of the day's first contact time so the KGB principals, separately or together, would filter through a web of observers. The Soviets, for their part, were oft times ingenious. Past experience repeatedly had shown KGB officers go to extraordinary lengths to insure they are free from surveillance, and their tactics in this operation proved to be no exception. The three KGB principals began their days of agent contact by individually departing their residences around 6:00 a.m., thus allowing some eight hours to "clean" themselves. Several of their drop sites were impossible to cover without detection, and Ed's allotted periods of travel from site to site provided little, if any, lead time. The KGB's instructions to Ed, with accompanying graphic displays, were clear and precise, as was the division of responsibilities between Enger, the caller, Chernyayev, the countersurveillant, and Zinyakin, the drop servicer. (U)

Under the foregoing circumstances, normal vehicular surveillance tactics were impractical, if not impossible. However, as the operation progressed and the outline of the KGB's modus operandi became more

CONFIDENTIAL

- 58 -

CONFIDENTIAL

clearly defined, limited moving surveillances were gradually introduced and fixed-winged aircraft were utilized as an integral part of the overall surveillance effort, both as a communications relay link and photographic platform. As a communications link, the aircrafts' "line of sight" capabilities with ground units proved invaluable in directing surveillance personnel to pertinent locations as well as away from obvious countersurveillance traps via secure short-range radio transmissions. As the KGB principals generally became more confident in their operation, and particularly in Ed, their vigilance began to wane, as evidenced by some obvious security lapses, e.g., establishing an identifiable pattern for their second contact point; using the same site for their and Ed's dead drop; doubling up in one car during the course of a day's activities; and meeting together in a public area to view the day's "intelligence take". Convenience gradually replaced vigilance and, as they began to evince more and more careless attitudes, so the surveillances became bolder, assuming greater risks in terms of physical and technical coverages until, at the end, virtually every action of each KGB principal was noted and recorded. (C)

In summary, the success of this counterintelligence operation can be attributed to a variety of causal factors. Above all, the close working relationship between the two cooperating counterintelligence services, i.e., the FBI and NIS, throughout the course of the operation certainly contributed to the outcome. Ed was a most credible "agent provocateur" playing the role to perfection. The FBI Laboratory, Technical Services and Identification Divisions provided timely technical support every step of the way, and the advice and counsel offered by Department of Justice officials significantly enhanced the prospects of judicial process. Last, but not least, the individual and collective performances of personnel of the Newark and New York FBI Field Offices exemplified professionalism, dedication, and ingenuity. Perhaps the comments of presiding Judge Lacey, at the conclusion of the trial of Chernyayev and Enger, are sufficient to describe the collective investigative effort that went into this case. After the jury was dismissed, and in considering a request that Chernyayev and Enger be allowed to continue bail pending sentencing, Judge Lacey remarked that he had never, as a jurist or trial attorney, been involved in a case in which there was such a tremendous accumulation of evidence against defendants. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-59-

CONFIDENTIAL

Epilogue

Ed, for his vital contribution to this joint FBI-NIS endeavor, was awarded the Legion of Merit by the Secretary of the Navy on May 7, 1979. He is now retired from the U. S. Navy and employed in private industry. (U)

Enger and Chernyayev, following their indictments on May 30, 1978, were suspended with pay by the United Nations Secretariat and administrative procedures were initiated to terminate their employment contracts. On April 27, 1979, at approximately 3:30 p.m. in Hangar 17 of the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, Enger and Chernyayev were exchanged for five prominent Soviet dissidents: Alexander Ginzberg, a well-known writer; Mark Dymshits and Edward Kuznetsov, both associated with an abortive 1970 airline hijack plot to fly from Latvia to Sweden; Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian historian and writer jailed for a major portion of his life for his writings; and Georgi Vins, a Baptist leader in the Ukraine imprisoned for his religious activities in the Soviet Union. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

-60-

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL