

. Han	÷	•
	1	

:	
:	

.

-..

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreward	i
Background, Purpose, and Scope	. 1
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Organization and Function	·
The Beginnings	2
The Eisenhower Years	4
The Kennedy Years	7
The Johnson Years	, 10
The Nixon Years	10
President Ford and the PFIAB	12
Conflicting Appraisals of PFIAB	
Appendix A	18
Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities, 1955	21
Appendix B	21
Clark Task Force, Recommendation No. 2, 1955	22
Appendix C	23
Hoover Commission, Recommendation (a) and (b), 1955	24
Appendix D	24
Executive Order 10656, February 8, 1956	25
Appendix E	25
Executive Order 10938, May 6, 1961	25
Appendix F	25
Rockefeller Report, Recommendation No. 5, June, 1975	20
Appendix G	29
President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1975	20
Appendix H	30
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Marchetti and Marks, Selected reproductions	32

# Background, Purpose and Scope

Two major governmental commissions studying selected areas of the intelligence community in the Federal Government, the 1955 Hoover Commission and the 1975 Rockefeller Commission, emphasized the importance of creating and supporting an advisory group of prominent citizens to provide oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency within the Executive Branch. Both reports stressed the need to preserve secrecy, but at the same time to undertake review of the operations of the CIA and other intelligence organs by a small bipartisan board of distinguished and respected citizens appointed by the President.

As a direct result of recommendation no. 2 of the Clark Task Force, which had been established under the Hoover Commission to study U.S. intelligence agencies, President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.  $\frac{2}{2}$ Despite a wealth of unclassified information on the U.S. Intelligence Community over the past twenty years, the Board of Consultants and its successor group, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), remain a mystery to most Americans.

1/ .

3/

( <del>9</del> )

For further discussion of the recommendations of the Hoover and Rockefeller Commissions recommendations, see Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government: Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Part II, Washington, D.C., May, 1955: 59-64, 71; Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Washington, D.C. June 1975: 79-82. 2/ 21 Fed. Reg.859 (February 8, 1956).

Unclassified bibliographies relating to U.S. intelligence can be found in most books on the subject. See Ransom, Harry H. The Intelligence Esta-blishment. Massachusetts, 1971: 274-285; Kirkpatrick, Lyman, B. Jr. Th U.S. Intelligence Community. New York, 1973-203;-see also, Raiford, William N. "U.S. Intelligence Activities: A Selective Bibliography." The Washington, Congressional Research Service, March 6, 1975.

the President and was not considered by the Commission. The classified report covered various aspects of the U.S. intelligence community's activities including, "overseas counter intelligence operations, carried out by the military and the CIA, as well as details and supporting factual matter relating to the recommendations."

of

ra-

enhower

)ence

as ::c

ie

end

e the

ly to

0<sup>...</sup>

<sup>•</sup>gani-)ctober,

1/

-..

h ry oved

classi-

The Clark Task Force submitted nine recommendations to the Hoover Commission, one of which dealt with the creation by the President of a "small, permanent, bipartisan commission composed of members of both Houses of Congress and other public-spirited citizens....." The Hoover Commission declined to incorporate the Clark Task Force's recommendation in its final report. However, the Hoover Commission did recommend (a) Presidential appointment of a citizens committee to report on Government foreign intelligence activities, and (b) the creation, by the Congress, of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence matters.

The first recommendation of the Hoover Commission did not carry out wholly the task force recommendation for a "watchdog" Commission. The Hoover Commission comment on this was specifically to the point that, "while mixed Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Joint Committee on CIA. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956 (84th Congress, 2nd Session. Report no. 1570) p. 9. 2/

For the full text of the Clark Task Force recommendation No. 2, See Appendix B of this report.

For the full text of the Hoover Recommendations (a) and (b), See Appendix C of this report.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Joint Committee on CIA, 1956, p. 13; Also see, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government-(Hoover) Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, Part I, Washington, D.C., June, 1955: 1-2.

1994 - 16

312

## The Eisenhower Years

As a direct result of the Hoover Commission Report submitted to Congress on June 29, 1955, President Eisenhower took the initiative to announce the creation, on January 13, 1956, of a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. According to the White House press release covering the Board's selection, the President, in his message to the Board members, commented as follows:

> "While the review by your group would be concerned with all Government foreign intelligence activities, I would expect particular detailed attention to be concentrated on the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and of those intelligence elements of key importance in other departments and agencies. I am particularly anxious to obtain your views as to the overall progress that is being made, the quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of specific projects and of the handling of funds, and general competence in carrying out assigned intelligence tasks. 1/"

President Eisenhower appointed eight Board members under the authority of Executive Order 10656, dated February 6, 1956, from "outside of government and on the basis of ability, experience and knowledge in national defense and security [affairs]." Board members served during their tenure without compensation. The members of the 1956 Board with their titles as of that date, are as follows:

1/ White House Press Release, January 13, 1956. p. 3.

2/ Executive Order 10656-Issued by the White House February 6, 1956, printed in Federal Register February 8, 1956, effective as of January 13, 1956; 50 U.S.C. 403 (1958 Ed.); 21 Fed. Reg. 859 (1956). For the full text of Executive Order 10656, see Appendix D of this report.

CRS-5

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (chairman), President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Adm. Richard L. Conolly, retired, President, Long Island University;
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Commander, U.S. Air Force in the Far East, in World War II;
Benjamin F. Fairless, Director and member of a finance committee of the United States Steel Corp.;
Gen. John E. Hull, retired, former Commander, U.S. Air Force in Far East, President, Manufacturing Chemists Association;
Joseph P. Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain: Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of State;
Edward L. Ryerson, Chairman of Executive Committee, Inland Steel Corp. <u>1</u>/

255

2 . .

li- .

mented

1, 2

S

n-

ense

ſ

:ed 1956;

.ext

۰<u>۲</u>

In appointing the first Board, Eisenhower anticipated that it would provide both Congress and the public with the assurance that the work of the CIA and other intelligence agencies was being conducted effectively and efficiently.

Initially, the President's decision was met with general public approval and specific Congressional disapproval. Senator Bridges of New Hampshire, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, declared that in creating a citizen's advisory board the President was indirectly suggesting that intelligence matters were too delicate for Congress to handle. Bridges saw in this strong implications that "outsiders were more to be trusted than Members of Congress." These sentiments were echoed by other congressional Members. Some comments from the press seemed to indicate that a permanent Joint Congressional Committee with oversight powers on intelligence activities, was preferable to a part-time board of private citizens.

17 White House Press Release, Op. Cit., p. 1. 2/ New York Times, February 22, 1956: C18. 37 See Senator Mansfield's remarks, New York Times, January 14, 1956: 1,4, or Congressman Horace Seely-Brown, Jr.'s remarks in the Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 102, January 31, 1956: A 987. See, Washington Star, January 15, 1956: A26.; New York Times, January 26, 1956: 2.

During the five years of its tenure, President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities met a total of nineteen times (usually in two-day sessions) and had five meetings with the President. The Board submitted over forty-two major recommendations relating to a wide range of activities, such as control and coordination of the intelligence community, especially in the area of covert operations, improved strategic warning systems, and the management of the National Security Agency. According to the present staff of PFIAB, the effort to develop and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities had a high priority and was pursued by all the principal agencies involved. Working in concert with these agencies, PFIAB contributed to the institution of a number of new developments, such as the establishment of the U.S. Intelligence Board, improved methods of handling sensitive intelligence information, closer supervision of NSA operations by the Department of Defense, and more effective coordination and evaluation of covert operations.  $\frac{1}{}$ 

1/ Information supplied by PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975.

### CRS-7

## The Kennedy Years

The Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities resigned nes on January 7, 1961, in anticipation of the new Kennedy administration. The For four months the Board remained inactive.

ange One of the major factors which led President Kennedy to reactivate nity, the Board was the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion by anti-Castro Cubans. 2/ stems, Several sources have indicated that the Bay of Pigs fiasco was directly responsent sible for the Board's reestablishment.

11-On May 4, 1961, less than one month after the abortive Bay of PigsIvolved.operation (April 17, 1961) President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10938onestablishing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).elli-The wording of the Executive Order was similar to President's Eisenhower'son,order outlining the previous Board's responsibilities. Provisions were made,ehowever, for the payment of compensation to the PFIAB members, in addition to

1/

2/

-.-

See, Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B. The Invisible Government. New York Random House [1964]. p. 187. The resignations were effective January 20, 1961. Washington Star. May 3, 1961. p.1.

 See, For example Ransom, Harry H. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Harvard University Press [1970] p. 229; Marchetti, Victor and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York. Alfred A. Knopf [1964] p. 35; Washington Evening Star, May 4, 1961. D. A-4.

Executive Order 10938-Issued by the White House May 4, 1961, printed in the Federal Register May 6, 1961, effective as of May 4, 1961; 50 U.S.C. 403 (1968 Ed. Supp. v.) (January 7, 1959-January 6, 1964 p. 2847-7848); 21 Fed. Reg. 3951 (1961) For the full text of Executive Order 10938, see Appendix E of this report. expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board.

In his letter to members of the PFIAB, President Kennedy stressed several very broad areas of possible review: "evaluation of the objectives and conduct of U.S. foreign intelligence activities and agencies.... performance of those civilian and military intelligence elements of key importance to the Government...and any modifications which would enhance the acquisition of intelligence..." Other specific areas of concern were addressed by members of the PFIAB, but many of these remain classified.

The members of the Kennedy PFIAB and their titles as of their appointment in 1961 were as follows:

> Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., chairman PFIAB, chairman, Corp. of M.I.T. Dr. William O. Baker, Vice President, Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories

> Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, USAF (ret.) Chairman of the Board, Space Technology Laboratories, Incorporated. Dr. William L. Langer, Professor of History, Harvard University Robert D. Murphy, President, Corning Glass International General Maxwell Taylor, USA (ret.), President, Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Incorporated.

Edwin H. Land, President Polaroid Corporation

1/

John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1961. "Letter to Members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." May 4, 1961. No. 168. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1962. p. 352.

<u>2/</u>

One such area is discussed in Marchetti and Marks. Discussing how PFIAB was asked to investigate why the CIA had not discovered the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba sooner, the authors report that PFIAB found "two accurate agent accounts of the Soviet buildup buried among the thousands of irrelevant reports which had piled up at the agency in the months before the crisis. With perfect hindsight the PFIAB declared that the CIA should have recognized the truth of these reports and rejected all the others. Similarly, in 1968 President Johnson had the Board investigate why the CIA had not determined the precise timing of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in advance." Marchetti, Victor and John D. Marks, op. cit. p. 335.

Dr. Killian had served as Chairman of the Board from early 1956 until 1958, and both Dr. Baker and General Doolittle had also served on the Board during the Eisenhower years. On May 15, 1961, two additional members were appointed to the Board. They were: Gordon Gray, who had been Army Secretary in the Truman administration and Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, and Clark Clifford, special counsel to President Truman and an advisor to President Kennedy.

Between May and November 1961 the PFIAB held 25 meetings, met with the  $\frac{2}{}$  President 9 times and forwarded over 53 recommendations.

Some of the areas the PFIAB staff and Board members investigated and recommended changes in were related, to the National Security Agency's operations, coordination of covert programs, improvement of science and technology in their application to intelligence gathering, consolidation and reorganization of various defense related intelligence activities, and development of various photographic reconnaissance capabilities. In addition, para-military programs, under the CIA auspices were reviewed.

- 1/ New York Times. May 15, 1961, p. 1. In addition, J. Patrick Coyne, former FBI and National Security Council official, served as Executive Secretary of the Board. Washington Evening Star. May 4, 1961, p. A-4. Also see Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's remarks in the Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 107, May 3, 1961: 6670-71.
- 2/ Information obtained from PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975.
- 3/ Marchetti and Marks suggest that the PFIAB's "most notable contribution to the nation's intelligence effort" was the work of a subcommittee headed by Polaroid Corporation's Dr. Edwin Land which conceived several new technological collection programs in the 1950's and 1960's, most notably the U-2 spy plane. Marchetti, Victor and John D. Marks op. cit.: 335-336.
- 4/ President Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor as a special one-man task force to review U.S. para-military planning on April 23, 1961. General Taylor reported to the President on May 27, 1961. Washington Post. May 28, 1961, p. A-14.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/04 : CIA-RDP02T06251R000900290008-0

the

.I.T.

:S

e

t-

or the

.d

÷.,-

Working in concert with other intelligence related agencies, PFIAB contributed to suggestions which led to the establishment of the directorate of science and technology within the CIA, improvement in reconnaissance, capabilities, passage of congressional legislation relating to the activities of NSA, and revision of the functions of the "54-12 group" to assure political control and review of all covert and para-military operations. <u>The Johnson Years</u>

President Johnson continued to keep the PFIAB intact and functioning after his accession to the Presidency upon President Kennedy's assassination. President Kennedy's Executive Order 10938, relating to the Board's activities, was kept intact as was the membership of the Board. President Johnson, speaking before a January 19, 1968, press conference, declared that "when I became President.....I continued him [Clark Clifford] in that capacity, [as Chairman of PFIAB] as I did most of the men serving with President Kennedy.

......

......

<sup>1/</sup> The 54/12 Group is the nomenclature adopted for an earlier version of the 40 Committee. The Committee functions have remained the same, the approval or disapproval of covert operations.

<sup>2/</sup> Information obtained from PFIAB Officers, August 18, 1975.

<sup>3/</sup> Lyndon B. Johnson. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1968-69. "The President's News Conference of January 19, 1968." No. 18 [2]. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1970. p. 39-40.

In letters of October 1965 and May 1968 President Johnson again stated his desire that PFIAB continue to operate under the provisions of Executive Order 10938.

Between January 1964 and January 1969 the PFIAB met a total of 29  $\frac{2}{2}$ times. While it had only three meetings with the President during this period, the members enjoyed a close and continuing contact with President Johnson's National Security Advisor, Mr. Walt Rostow, and from time to time individual members met personally with the President.

The Johnson PFIAB submitted over sixteen composite recommendations, which included investigations into the areas of satellite reconnaissance systems, data storage and retrieval operations, and deficiencies in the collection and analysis of intelligence from Southeast Asia. PFIAB's recommendations resulted in various changes relating to the activities of the intelligence  $\frac{4}{2}$  community.

1/

<u>2/</u> ns.

: <u>3/</u> ly.

> James H. Doolittle resigned in August of 1964 and was subsequently replaced by Admiral John H. Sides, USN (ret.) in August of 1965. General Maxwell Taylor resigned in July 1961 and returned to the PFIAB in August of 1965 as Chairman. 2/

Information supplied by PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975.

3/

See, Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1966. "The President's News Conference at the LBJ ranch." No. 320 [2]. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1967. p. 703.

4/

Information supplied by PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975.

### CRS-12

## The Nixon Years

Shortly after assuming the Office of the Presidency, Richard Nixon issued a new Executive Order relating to the PFIAB. Executive Order 11460 was substantially the same as those relating to previous Boards. However, President Nixon specified various functions for the PFIAB as follows:

(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities comprising the overall national intelligence effort;

(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intellgency Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;

(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligency Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and

(4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence éffort in meeting national intelligence needs.

In addition, the Executive Order provided for a "staff headed by an Executive Secretary (and) such personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Board's duties." The Board had, however, operated since its creation with a small, full-time, staff of secretaries and assistants.  $\frac{2}{2}$ 

2/ 34 Fed. Reg. 5535 (1969).

......

<sup>1/</sup> Executive Order 11460-Issued by the White House March 20, 1969, Printed in the Federal Register March 22, 1969, effective as of March 20, 1969; 50 U.S.C. 403 (1964 Ed. Supp. V) January 4, 1965-January 18, 1970, p. 3633-3634); 34 Fed. Reg. 5535 (1969).

## CRS-13

President Nixon's initial appointments to the PFIAB were as follows:

General Maxwell D. Taylor, president, Institute for Defense Analysis.

Admiral (Ret.) George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations

William O. Baker, vice president, Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated

Gordon Gray, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Edwin H. Land, president, Polaroid Corporation

Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander

Franklin D. Murphy, chairman of the Board, Times-Mirror Corporation Robert D. Murphy, chairman of the Board, Corning Glass International Franklin Pace, Jr., president, International Executive Service Corps Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York

It should be noted that about half of President Nixon's appointees were formerly associated with the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson Boards.

The membership of the PFIAB changed during the Nixon Presidency. General Maxwell D. Taylor resigned as Chairman and member of the Board effective April 30, 1970. Admiral Anderson (Chief of Naval Operations from 1961 to 1963, and U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, 1963-1966) succeeded to General Taylor's  $\frac{2}{}$  position as Chairman of the Board effective May 1, 1970.

-.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>1</u>/ President Richard M. Nixon. Compilation of Presidential Documents. "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: Announcement of Executive Order [E.O. 11460] Reconstituting the Board." March 20, 1969. p. 441.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>2</u>/ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." Washington, D.C., May 2, 1970. p. 588.

On November 30, 1970, President Nixon announced the appointment of former Texas Governor John Connally to serve as a member of the Board, effective December 1, 1970. Governor Conna-ly served on the PFIAB until February 11, 1971, when he assumed the position of Secretary of the Treasury. After his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury on June 12, 1972, President Nixon reappointed Connally who served on the PFIAB until January, 1975.

Additional appointments were announced by President Nixon on two occasions. On June 28, 1973, four members were added to replace four who had dropped off. The new members were: John S. Foster, Jr., Clare Boothe Luce, Leo Cherne, and  $\frac{2}{7}$  Robert W. Galvin. Wheaton Byers, the Executive Secretary of PFIAB, was also appointed at that time. The second announcement related to former Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz's appointment on June 5, 1974.

The Nixon PFIAB met a total of 35 times between April 1969 and August 1974. It met eight times with the President and submitted over 70 recommendations relating to the organization and management of the intelligence community. Specific recommendations and the results of the recommendations are classified.

- 1/ See Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents. "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." Washington, D.C. December 5, 1970: 1616-1617; Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 64. January 18, 1971, p. 84; Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 67. August 21, 1972. p. 211; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," President's Foreign Intelligence Adivsory Board." Washington, D.C. August 7, 1972, p. 1200.
- <u>2</u>/ Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 69. September 3, 1973. See Appendix for biographies of the new appointees.
- <u>3</u>/ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. "Digest of Other White House Announcements." Washington, D.C. June 10, 1974. p. 586.
- 4/ Information supplied by PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975. One unclassified source indicating an area of PFIAB investigation was revealed by President Nixon in discussing the ABM problem. "I have directed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...to make a yearly assessment of the threat [Soviet and Chinese] which will supplement our regular intelligence assessment." White House Press statement of the President, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Problem", March 14, 1969, p. 3.

## President Ford and the PFIAB

971,

s.

d

0

4.

ntelli-17;

200.

for

ident

the gence

-...

3e

President Ford has continued the operations of the PFIAB under Executive Order 11460. The present membership of the Board can be found in Appendix G of this report.

The PFIAB continues to meet on the first Thursday and Friday of every other month, with ad hoc committee meetings as required. The Board met with President Ford in December 1974 and August 1975 and continues to meet with various intelligence principals, Cabinet officers, and other officials, as necessary.

PFIAB's agendas are worked out by the Chairman and the Executive Secretary and reflect issues or questions raised by the President, his advisors for national security affairs, or by individual Board members.

The staff of the PFIAB is quite small, consisting of only the Executive Secretary, appointed by the President, and one assistant, currently a U.S. Navy Commander, and three secretaries. The Board occasionally uses consultants and can draw on elements of the intelligence community for additional assistance where necessary.

Members of the Board are eligible to receive, but not all accept, a consultant's fee of one hundred dollars per day, plus per diem and travel  $\frac{1}{2}$  expenses. The annual budget for the Board is approximately \$100,000.

Information supplied by PFIAB office, August 18, 1975.

## CRS-16

The Board is able to give advice to the President on various aspects of U.S. intelligence. According to the PFIAB, the effect of this to advice is to:

- influence the composition of the intelligence community.

- improve the development of major intelligence systems.

- define the degree of emphasis that is given to substantive areas.

Through meetings with intelligence principals, substantive briefings, and visits to intelligence installations at home and abroad, the PFIAB seeks to:

> identify deficiencies in the collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence.

- eliminate unnecessary duplication and functional overlap.

 insure that major programs are responsive to clearly perceived needs.

- develop up-to-date technological expertise.

 examine allegations of intelligence failures or major breaches of U.S. intelligence security.1/

Information obtained from PFIAB offices, August 18, 1975.

1/

As a direct result of press and public charges that the CIA's domestic activities involved large scale spying on American citizens, keeping dossiers on large numbers of American citizens, opening personal mail in the United States, and engaging in illegal operations within the territory of the U.S., President Ford issued Executive Order 11828 of January 4, 1975, establishing a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. The President directed the Commission to determine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded that Agency's statutory authority and to make appropriate recommendations.

The Commission began weekly hearings within eight days after its appointment and submitted a final report to the President on June 6, 1975. The report focused briefly on the functions of the PFIAB in addition to other aspects of the U.S. intelligence community. Under a section entitled, "Control by Special Commissions and Panels," PFIAB functions were reviewed and recommendations were made to greatly expand the Board's staff and responsibilities. Specifically, the Commission observed that the PFIAB:

> "does not exert control over the CIA. In fact, the CIA is the Board's only source of information about CIA activities. It [PFIAB] has not considered domestic intelligence activities, except that in the early 1970's it explored the relationship between the CIA and the FBI in connection with foreign intelligence activities which could successfully be accomplished within d the U.S."2/

The Commission recommended broadening the functions of PFIAB in its relation with the CIA. This would include assessing compliance by the CIA

Report to the President... on CIA Activities, op. cit., p. 73.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/04 : CIA-RDP02T06251R000900290008-0

ed

17

÷.,

See, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the U.S., Op. Cit., p. 299. [Executive Order 11828 can be found on p. 271 of that report.] 2/

with its statutory authority, the quality of foreign intelligence estimates and collection, the organization and management of the CIA, and making recommendations where necessary. In addition, the Commission recommend that the Board's chairman be made "full-time" and roles be expanded to meet this new responsibility. Audit and investigative authority of CIA expenditures and activities were also recommended for the PFIAB.

## Conflicting Appraisals of PFIAB

A major problem in evaluating the effectiveness of PFIAB is the lack of adequate data upon which to base a judgment. Over the years various administrations have looked on the Board as a critical and independent source of advice for the President on the effectiveness of foreign intelligence agencies. The Board's members rarely comment on its meetings or recommendations, and little is reported to the public on the workings of the Board.

Despite this lack of information, conflicting appraisals of the value of PFIAB have appeared in open sources. Supporters and critics have voiced their arguments on PFIAB's effectiveness in books and articles on the intelligence community. The following is a brief list of major points made by the opponents and proponents of PFIAB:

#### PRO

- -Members are experienced and respected citizens.
- -Members have respect of the President and access to his office.
- -Members have access to entire intelligence community for information.
- -Board not responsible to any agency of Government aside from the Executive Office.
- -Board is well qualified to deal with specific problem areas and also with broad policy matters.

•• .•

CON

- -Board meets irregularly for only one or two days.
- -Intelligence agencies allegedly determine what information to supply the Board.
- -Members are alleged to have close ties to the Pentagon and defense contractors and are therefore not likely to be entirely objective.
- -Board considered as a safe, "in-house" Presidential investigative unit and is not taken seriously by Intelligence Community.

1993 - Sec. - -

PRO

CON

-Board lacks authority, due to its advisory role.

- -Staff is too small to permit effective work by the Board and does not have the expertise to make independent evaluations.
- -Some members are too busy in their own careers to pay much attention to Board's problems.
- -Clandestine operations are almost never considered unless already publicly disclosed.

-Board's activities and recommendations are not open to public inspection.

Several authors in the U.S. intelligence field have been outspoken in their criticism of PFIAB. Jerrold Walden suggests that "...although PFIAB has access to all of the information it has required from the various intelligence agencies...it has not been particularly effective as an overseer of national intelligence." Marchetti and Marks are also critical of the Board in their book, <u>The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence</u>. In summing up their estimation of PFIAB's value they declare that, "in general, the various members of the intelligence community look on the board as more of a nuisance than a true  $\frac{2}{}$  control mechanism."

PFIAB has not been without its supporters. Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., former Inspector General of CIA and also liaison officer between the CIA and PFIAB from 1956 to 1962, considers that the criticisms of PFIAB.

1/

Walden, Jerrold L. The CIA: A Study in the Arrogation or Administrative

Powers. The George Washington Taw Review. v. 39. no. 1., October, 1970. p.91-93.

2/

See Appendix H for a reproduction of pages 334-335 of the Marchetti and Marks book.

...are invalid and are based more on prejudice than knowledge. The argument that the board is simply a mirror of the system ignores the broad experience of the members. Most board members are more familiar with the weaknesses than the strengths of the intelligence system...it was my experience that the President's Board was one of the severest critics of the intelligence system. 1/

Harry Paul Jeffers writes in a book about the CIA that the Board "serves as a reminder to the intelligence community that it is, in fact, servant and not master and that the man who finally decides this country's intelligence policy is, the President of the United States."  $\frac{2}{}$ 

As indicated above, the recommendations contained in the 1975 Rockefeller Report relative to CIA activities within the United States reflect the Commission's belief that the role of the Board "should be expanded...It should be headed by a full time chairman and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role." The Commission's Report lists several specific functional areas in which PFIAB should have greater responsibility. They are as follows:

1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.

2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.

3. Assessing the quality of the foreign intelligence estimates.

4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.

5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.

6. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjects to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.

The Report also recommends that:

• .

1.22.2.2.2

b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA. It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and activities on its own initiative.

101

c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate. 3/

1/ Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Jr. The U.S. Intelligence Community. New York, Hill and Wang (1973).

Jeffers, Harry Paul, The CIA, A Close Look at the Central Intelligence Agency. 2/ New York, Lion Press (1970). p. 144.

3/ June, 1975 Rockefeller Commission, Report to the President...pp. 15-16.

## CRS-20a

Both the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees are continuing their investigations into various aspects of the U.S. intelligence community. Final legislative recommendations and reports from the Committees are due in early 1976. The expected Congressional debate on the recommendations of the Select Committees will likely include discussion of the role and future of PFIAB as a potentially important element of executive oversight of the U.S. intelligence community.

- .-

. .

### crs-21

## Appendix A

## Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities, 1955

Mark Wayne Clark. General, U.S. Army (retired). United States Military Academy. President, The Citadel, Charleston, S.C. In World War'II commanded Allied ground forces in Italy and effected first large scale surrender of a German field command in Europe. June 1945, Commander-in-Chief of United States Occupation Forces in Austria and U.S. High Commander for Austria. Deputy to U.S. Secretary of State in London and Moscow with Council of Foreign Ministers negotiating Austrian treaty. May 1952, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, serving simultaneously as Commanderin-Chief, United Nations Command, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East. July 1953, signed Korean armistice agreement, by the United Nations and North Korea.

### Members

- Richard Lansing Conolly, Admiral, U.S. Navy (retired). Brooklyn, N.Y. Served at sea throughout World War I and awarded Navy Cross. In World War II commanded Destroyer Division Six; served in Office of Chief Naval Operations, and on staff, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Postwar duties included Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Advisor to European Advisory Commission, President of Naval War College.
- Ernest Frederick Hollings. Lawyer. Charlestown, S.C. The Citadel and University of South Carolina. During World War II, served in African and European Theaters with U.S. Army. Former member South Carolina State Legislature. Lieutenant Governor, State of South Carolina, U.S. Senator, S.C.
- Henry Kearns. Manufacturer, inventor, and executive. Orange Oaks Ranch, La Verne, Calif. University of Utah. Past president, U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce; vice president, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and Director, Tournament of Roses Association. Chosen as "California's Most Useful Citizen," 1944. Fellow, American Institute of Management.
- Edward Vernon Rickenbacker. Aviator. New York, N.Y. International Correspondence School. In World War I commanded 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron, personally credited with 26 air victories. World War II activities included special missions for Secretary of War to nine foreign countries and areas. United States and foreign government awards include Congressional Medal of Honor. Formerly executive with American Airways, Aviation Corporation, and North American Aviation. Since 1933, with Eastern Air Lines, Inc. as general manager. president, chairman of the board.
- Donald Stuart Russell. Lawyer. Spartanburg, S.C. University of South Carolina and University of Michigan. Practiced law in Spartanburg. Formerly member Price Adjustment Board, War Department; Assistant To Director of Economic Stabilization; Assistant to Director of War Mobilization; Deputy Director, Office of War Mobilization Reconversion; Assistant Secretary of State. President, University of South Carolina.

1/ Intelligence Activities, A report to Congress. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government. Washington, D.C. June, 1955. pp. vii-viii.

### CRS-22

### Appendix A cont.

er

ons,

٦y

2. .:

:ne, :e;

:e

I

:ral

-.

James George Christiansen. Major General, U.S. Army (retired.) University of Calfornia, United States Military Academy. Former Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Tex,; Commanding General, 6th Armored Division, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.; Chief Engineer, Far East Command; Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rome, Italy.

1:

:

## crs-23

### Appendix B

Clark Task Force Recommendation No. 2, May 1955

"That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organizations, functions, policies, and results of the Covernment agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually, and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed "watchdog" commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed Commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation."

•

## CRS-24

## Appendix C

th	
utmost	Hoover Commission Recommendations, June, 1955
e	"(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced
f the	private adat
rt,	private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to
he	examine and report to him periodically on the work of
ue	Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee
be	should also give such information
owered	should also give such information to the public as the
[t	President may direct. The committee should function on a
<b>、</b> .	part-time and per diem basis.
3ranch	(b) That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional
versons	Commission on Foreign Lateria
list	Commission on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint
lty,	Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees,
,	one Presidential and the other congressional could collaborate
	on matters of special importance to the national security"
·.	

:

-.

### CRS-25

### Appendix D

Executive Order 10656, February 8, 1956 (21 Fed. Reg. 859)

"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and in order to enhance the security of the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. There is hereby established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities hereinafter referred to as the President's Board. The members of the President's Board shall be appointed by the President, from among persons outside the Government and on the basis of ability, experience, and knowledge of matters relating to the national defense and security, and shall serve without compensation, but may receive transportation and per diem allowances as authorized by law for persons serving without compensation.

Sec. 2. The President's Board shall conduct an objective review of the foreign intelligence activities of the Government and of the performance of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and shall report its findings to the President semi-annually or at more frequent intervals as the President's Board may deem appropriate. Such reports shall embrace the quality of the foreign intelligence provided to the executive branch of the Government, the performance by the Central Intelligence Agency of its functions, the performance of their respective foreign intelligence functions by the principal intelligence elements of executive departments and other agencies, and any other related foreign intelligence matter which the President's Board deems appropriate."

. Likeren

## Appendix D cont.

con-

: of

ltants t's si-

y,

tion ompen-

e

not the

-- <u>.</u>.

f the to 's

he rmance

igence

'Sec. 3 The members of the President's Board, individually and sitting as the President's Board, shall consult from time to time with the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and with intelligence elements of other departments and agencies. The Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence elements concerned are authorized to make available to the President's Board or to its individual members any information concerning foreign intelligence activities relating to the national interest which the President's Board or its members may require to fulfill their responsibilities to the President under this order.

Sec. 4. Each member of the President's Board shall execute an undertaking not to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his service on the President's Board except to the President or to such persons as the President may designate.

Sec. 5. The transportation and per dem allowances referred to in section 1 of this order, and any other expenditures arising in connection with the activities of the President's Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in Title I of the General Government Matters Appropriation Act, 1956 (Public Law 110, approved June 29, 1955), without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and Section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1037, (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673).

Sec. 6 This order shall be effective as of January 13, 1956."

### CRS-27

### Appendix E

Executive Order 10938, May 6, 1961 (21 Fed. Reg. 3951)

"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Sec. 1. There is hereby established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security.

1130 Sec. 2. In the performance of its advisory duties, the Board shall conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of other executive departments and agencies having such or similar responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields, and shall report thereon to the President each six months or more frequently as deemed appropriate. The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other in de la vec departments and agencies concerned shall make available to the Board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the Board may require 24 for the purpose of carrying out is responsibilities to the President. The infor-1: 14**0** - 10 mation so supplied to the Board shall be afforded requisite security protection as prescribed by the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

Sec. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter. Such compensation and allowances and any other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in Title I of the General Government Matters Appropriation Act, 1961, 74 Stat. 473,

. .

4

**- .** '

Appendix E cont. ÷ and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which States, may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard Ver en 🚅 to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the - .. ence act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673). ..... nt Sec. 4. Executive Order No. 10656 of February 6, 1956, is hereby revoked." -**-** \* ' THOM: HAR . **.** . ? . 1. A. S. d • . ts . and the second states . 1 . e. . 97. 11.5 onduct . . . igence . milar . 1 re-. 1 . . . . 1 ÷ : 1.1 A. 15 1. . . . . 1.5 \$1..." ر\_\_\_\_ infore. 1.1 equire . 19. 2 infor-30 ection ť 12.4 - -Stor in ... 1.1 ersons · • . 2 conso-JL. 11 **0** . wances • ز •.•• hall · ts" in ~ • . 473,

### Appendix F

.....

Rockefeller Report Recommendation No. 5, June, 1975

Recommendation (5)

"a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA. This expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA should include:

1. Assessing compliance by the the CIA with its statutory authority.

2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.

3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.

4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.

5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.

6. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjects to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence,

and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.

b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA. It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and activities on its own initiative.

c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate."

#### CRS-30

### Appendix G

# President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Anderson, George W., Jr. — Appointed by President Nixon on May 1, 1970 to replace General Maxwell Taylor as PFIAB Chairman; former Chief of Naval Operations; former U.S. Ambassador to Portugal; presently director of several large corporations. Admiral (USN ret.) Chairman appointed 1 May 70, member appointed 20 March 69.

Baker, William 0. -- Originally appointed to the Board by President Eisenhower and reappointed by each succeeding President; currently president, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated; member of the National Academy of Sciences and numerous other governmental and quasi-governmental boards and commissions. Appointed 24 Dec. 59.

ird

;ht

ve

IA

s

:tly

- Cherne, Leo -- Noted economist; presently Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, Incorporated; member of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; member of the Board of Advisors of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and numerous other boards and commissions. Appointed 28 June 73.
- Foster, John S., Jr. -- Physicist; presently Vice President for Energy Research and Development, TRW, Incorporated; former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; and former Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Associate Director of Berkeley Laboratory. Appointed 28 June 73.
- Galvin, Robert W. -- Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola, Incorporated; Director of Harris Trust and Savings Bank; Director and past President of the Electronic Industries Association; and former member of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment. Appointed 28 June 73.
- Gray, Gordon -- Publisher; director of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and several other large corporations; former Secretary of the Army, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; former Chancellor and President of the University of North Carolina. Appointed 16 May 61.
- Land, Edwin H. -- Inventor of the Land Polaroid camera; presently Board Chairman of Polaroid Corporation; member of the National Academy of Sciences. Appointed 4 May 61.
- Luce, Clare Boothe -- Novelist and playwright; former U.S. Ambassador to Italy, and Congresswoman from Connecticut; presently member of the White House Preservation Committee; the Academy of Political Science, the American Institute for Foreign Trade, and numerous other boards and commissions. Appointed 28 June 73.

1/ Information obtained from PFIAB offices, 18 August 1975.

.....

٩

## CRS-33

## Appendix H cont.

These PFIAB post-mortems can be of great value to the intelligence community in pinpointing specific weaknesses and recommending solutions; they could be even more useful in making clear that certain events simply cannot be predicted in advance, even by the most efficient intelligence system. However, the PFIAB had tended to operate with the assumption that all information is "knowable" and that the intelligence community's problems would be solved if only more data were collected by more-advanced systems. This emphasis on quantity over quality has served to accentuate the management problems that plague American intelligence and, in recent years at least, has often been counterproductive.

1.5