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# **Chile: Internal Security Forces**

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**A Research Paper**

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October 1987*

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# **Chile: Internal Security Forces** [Redacted] 25X1

**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with contributions from [Redacted] Office of Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. [Redacted] 25X1

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## Chile: Internal Security Forces

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### An Overview of Chile's Security Apparatus

Since a military coup brought him to power in 1973, President Pinochet has used Chile's security services—police, intelligence entities, and the armed forces—as an effective instrument of political control. US Embassy reporting has shown that he has employed the efficient, disciplined security apparatus to intimidate or eliminate serious opposition. During the last four years, the services have repressed popular protests and, notwithstanding an increase in high-profile terrorist incidents, largely contained leftist-inspired terrorism.

We believe the security forces will face new challenges as political opposition to the regime continues to grow. The regime has been unable to totally stop the anti-Pinochet activities of the moderate opposition, and polls show that support for a rapid transition to civilian rule—which most likely will be expressed through protest rallies and demonstrations—is mounting. The security forces have also neither stemmed the growth of the Communist party nor lessened its determination to upgrade, both in scale and sophistication, its terrorist capabilities and eventually launch an anti-Pinochet insurgency.

### Structure and Composition

Chile's security forces cover a broad range of responsibilities and include a number of distinct units:

- The 28,000-member *Carabineros* are a national paramilitary constabulary subordinate to the Defense Ministry. They perform regular law enforcement duties as well as a wide range of nonpolice functions.
- The *Investigations Police*, also under the Ministry of Defense, is a national plainclothes force of some 3,500 officers that investigates common crimes, pursues terrorists, monitors Pinochet's political opponents, and serves as the national immigration police.
- The *National Information Center* (CNI), subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, is the regime's central intelligence agency. The 2,000- to 2,500-member service gathers foreign and domestic intelligence, monitors the opposition, and carries out anti-terrorist operations.
- The *armed forces* and their *intelligence entities* help the other security services maintain public order and control the opposition, while the 60,000-man *Army* helps the National Police patrol the border and protect vital industrial and transportation infrastructure. The rise in protest activity in the last four years has led Pinochet to turn more frequently to the military—especially the *Army*—to counter opposition to his continued rule.



Figure 1. President and Capt. Gen. Augusto Pinochet

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**Human Rights and the Security Structure**

Since seizing power in a coup in 1973, the Pinochet regime has had a reputation for consistent human rights violations. The security forces have routinely intimidated, tortured, and, at times, murdered members of the political opposition, according to the US Embassy. While the regime has reined in the security services somewhat in recent months, human rights violations remain commonplace. [redacted]

The US Embassy indicates that most human rights violations are committed by the CNI, the Investigations Police, and several Army units. The Carabineros—in closer contact with the general population and concerned about their reputation as police officers—have largely avoided participation in the most brutal repression. According to the US Embassy, the CNI and the Investigations Police have made systematic use of torture; the CNI was responsible for 80 percent of the documented torture cases in 1986, the Investigations Police 10 percent, and the Carabineros only 5 percent. In our judgment, the CNI, and to a lesser degree the Investigations Police, are primarily responsible for the petty harassment, intimidation, and beatings of political opposition figures—114 cases in the first quarter of 1987 alone—which the regime blames on unidentified assailants. [redacted]

US officials report that the increased use of Army troops in crowd control also has led to serious human rights abuses. During the July 1986 general strike, for example, the Army may have been responsible for as many as 200 gunshot victims in Santiago's slums. Furthermore, an Army unit—probably at the instigation of intelligence officers—torched the US resident Chilean, Rodrigo Rojas, and his companion Carmen Quintana, during the strike, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

[redacted] the regime continues to rely on death squads to repress the political opposition. The assassination of former Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976 by agents of the CNI's predecessor, the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), illustrates the lengths to which the regime has been willing to go to neutralize its opponents. We believe that high-level security officials, acting on Pinochet's orders, direct death squad activities carried out by the CNI, Investigations officers, specially selected ad hoc Army units, or shadowy civilian groups linked to the security services. [redacted]

While the international furor resulting from the Letelier murder appears to have caused the security services to veer away from similar overseas actions, they have continued the selective assassination of opponents at home. CNI officers apparently killed labor leader Tucapel Jimenez in 1982, [redacted] and assisted a special Army unit in the murder of three Communists in March 1985. In September 1986 a group called the 11 September Command—the date of Pinochet's 1973 coup—murdered four leftists, apparently to retaliate for the recent attempt on President Pinochet's life. [redacted]

[redacted]

In an effort to improve his image as the 1989 presidential plebiscite draws near, President Pinochet has taken some steps to improve the human rights

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situation. He lifted the state of siege early this year and has allowed about 1,000 exiles to return to Chile. Responding to both domestic and international pressure, the government now requires the CNI to hand over most of the individuals it detains to the Carabineros or Investigations Police. Finally, the Carabineros, Investigations, and the CNI updated this spring agreements with the International Committee for the Red Cross allowing the ICRC more prompt access to detainees. [redacted]

According to the US Embassy, the recent improvement on the human rights front is cosmetic, designed to reduce foreign pressure on the regime and bolster Pinochet's reelection prospects. We believe that the regime will continue, if only on a selective basis, to use harsh tactics against the opposition. Even though the CNI cannot legally detain individuals, the Embassy reports that arbitrary arrest and detention still occur: according to the US Embassy, the CNI may be using cells in the Investigations Police headquarters to secretly detain and torture suspects; and the special prosecutor assigned to investigate the assassination attempt and the Cuban-supplied arms caches is not bound by the restrictions on the CNI. Moreover, [redacted] the CNI staged several shootouts in June—killing 12 alleged FPMR terrorists—to circumvent the restrictions on detention and avenge an increase in attacks on the security forces. Finally, we believe that the regime will not hesitate to use extreme repression if some dramatic event, such as another assassination attempt or a series of high-profile terrorist attacks, appears to jeopardize Pinochet's rule. [redacted]

Legally, the individual services that comprise the internal security apparatus report to the President through their respective ministries. The US Embassy reports that in practice, however, President Pinochet dominates the decisionmaking machinery through

personal contact with the services' leadership. According to the [redacted] coordinates internal security activities in weekly meetings with an informal council composed of the Minister of the Interior, the chief of the Defense Ministry's intelligence staff, and senior officials from the various intelligence and police entities. [redacted]

#### Capabilities and Problems

US Embassy, press, and government reports all underscore the fact that the Chilean internal security apparatus is well trained and highly disciplined. Training for all the services at the beginning and intermediate levels is rigorous, although advanced instruction appears to have declined in recent years. The Carabineros in particular are noted for their professionalism and enjoy the respect of the citizenry. With the exception of the Investigations Police—which is riddled with corruption, according to US officials—the Chilean security forces have a reputation for honesty. [redacted]

Working separately or together the security forces have demonstrated their capacities in a number of critical areas:

- They have performed **basic law and order functions** well. Stationed in almost every village, town, and hamlet in Chile, the Carabineros and the Investigations Police—the two principal law enforcement bodies—operate effectively in investigating and controlling criminal activity. Despite a recent upswing in criminality—primarily in Santiago—Chile remains one of the best policed societies in the region, according to US officials and press reports.
- The internal security forces have the capability to counter **violence by the far left**. Even though the CNI and the Investigations Police have suffered from intelligence gaps on the subversives' plans—illustrated by the assassination attempt on Pinochet in September 1986 and the only accidental discovery of huge Cuban-supplied arms caches in August 1986—they have recently improved their ability to respond to terrorist actions. They have penetrated

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the major subversive groups and apprehended a significant number of terrorists over the past year. Through stepped-up patrolling and installation security, the Army and the Carabineros have enhanced their capability to protect vital economic and industrial facilities, according to US officials.

- The security apparatus can effectively *suppress most antiregime strikes and demonstrations*. Well-developed informant networks within the unions, political parties, and the violence-prone lower-class neighborhoods allow the security services to keep abreast of planned protests and stifle them by preemptive action. The regime's periodic security sweeps in the poorer sections also intimidate the inhabitants and disrupt the opposition's efforts to organize protests. In our view, only a protracted period of massive demonstrations would overburden the security forces' capacities. [redacted]

This is not to say that problems do not exist. The security structure suffers from troublesome jealousies and interservice rivalries. [redacted]

[redacted] the rise in protests and terrorism since 1983 has accentuated these tensions, with the Carabinero hierarchy clashing bitterly with • CNI, Investigations, and Army officials over the latter services' heavyhanded crowd control tactics and disdainful treatment of the National Police during demonstrations. In late 1986, for example, the Interior Minister complained that infighting and lack of coordination among the Carabineros, the Investigations Police, and the CNI were threatening the regime's internal security capabilities. [redacted]

[redacted]

In our view, Pinochet has deliberately exacerbated interservice rivalries in order to strengthen his personal control over the security apparatus and prevent any one individual or force from challenging his authority. For example, US officials report that he has often encouraged a service to assume responsibilities regularly carried out by another, thereby heightening the normal friction resulting from overlapping duties.



Figure 2. Carabineros chasing antigovernment demonstrators during the visit of Pope John Paul II in April 1987 [redacted] Manchete ©

Moreover, growing political pressure on the regime and the nearly successful attempt in September 1986 on Pinochet's life have made the President even more distrustful. This has been reflected in his increasing tendency to set up ad hoc intelligence groups—usually drawn from the Army—to carry out special missions, a practice US officials believe has almost certainly aggravated conflicts within the security apparatus. [redacted]

**Issues Ahead**

Notwithstanding the rivalries, we believe the security services can forestall any attempt by the opposition to use confrontational or violent tactics to topple Pinochet. Looking down the road, however, a number of key issues remain that will influence the vitality of the security structure. [redacted]

US officials report that budgetary stringencies imposed on the Carabineros have almost certainly reduced their ability to manage a rise in protests and violence. Determined to prevent the Carabineros from ever challenging the Army, Pinochet has consistently slighted them in budgetary appropriations. The US Embassy and the [redacted] that

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Figure 3. Army troops cordoning off slum during security sweep [redacted]

Pinochet's parsimony has caused severe equipment and personnel shortages, and, in concert with low pay, increasing casualties from combating terrorism, and Pinochet's favoritism toward the other security services, has led to a serious drop in Carabinero morale. [redacted]

In our view, interservice rivalries will grow, reducing the security services' capabilities and causing political problems for the regime. Aggravated by Pinochet's "divide and rule" tactics, increased infighting will complicate efforts at coordinated action. Pinochet's doubts about the Carabineros' reliability will lead him to rely more heavily on the Investigations Police, the CNI, and the Army to counter the opposition. This will probably lead to more human rights abuses, which will worsen the regime's already poor domestic and international image. [redacted]

Finally, in our judgment, Pinochet will find it increasingly difficult to count on the unstinting support of the security services to perpetuate his regime into the 1990s. As his options narrow because of rapidly diminishing popular support and the loss of even rightwing civilian political allies, Pinochet will be forced to rely almost exclusively on the security services to maintain power—thereby making himself increasingly vulnerable to their pressures and demands. Pinochet can probably depend on the loyal, but politically and militarily less significant, CNI and Investigations Police. On the other hand, we believe the Carabineros and the military services, even though they will be able to repress the opposition, will become increasingly restive and dissatisfied, and may lose the political resolve to persist in the demoralizing task of protecting a highly unpopular regime. In our view, relations between Pinochet and the Carabineros in particular are likely to become especially poor and the National Police could begin to oppose the President's plans to perpetuate himself in power, perhaps even engaging in some nonviolent protest if he tries some gambit such as rigging the voting to ensure his victory in the presidential plebiscite scheduled for 1989. [redacted]

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### The Carabineros: Chile's National Police

The 28,000-member Carabineros are the cornerstone of Chile's internal security apparatus. Formed in 1927 as a counterweight to the Army, the Carabineros soon developed into a competent and honest police service. Professionalism and integrity have won the service the respect of a majority of the public, despite its association with the Pinochet government—the Carabineros' director sits on the four-man junta that serves as the military regime's legislative body. According to a recent survey conducted by a Chilean socialist think tank, 63 percent of the residents of four lower-class housing projects in Santiago stated that they trusted the Carabineros more than any other sociopolitical actor, including the Roman Catholic Church. The US Embassy reports that, during the papal visit in April, the Carabineros earned public praise for their highly professional crowd control—most notably their restraint in the face of violent radical leftist provocation. [redacted]

#### Organization and Functions

The uniformed Carabineros, along with the plain-clothes Investigations Police, constitute Chile's forces of public order and security, according to the 1980 Constitution. Pinochet shifted the service, originally subordinate to the Interior Ministry, to the Ministry of Defense shortly after the 1973 coup. [redacted]

[redacted] the Carabineros are divided into five directorates—Order and Public Security, Personnel, Logistics, Training, and Welfare; the last administers the service's benefits and social assistance programs. The Directorate of Order and Public Security dwarfs the other divisions and performs the Carabineros' primary police duties: crime prevention, traffic control, and patrolling Chile's 2,500-mile border. For policing purposes, the service divides Chile into eight geographical zones that are broken down into 39 prefectures, 161 commissariats (equivalent to a precinct), 206 lieutenancies, and 491 posts—the smallest Carabinero unit that often consists of fewer than 10 men. This organization gives the force a presence in virtually every town, village, and hamlet of Chile, and contributes to its generally good relations with the population and wide range of sources and informants in both rural and urban areas. [redacted]

The Carabineros perform a much broader range of duties than do most US and European police services. While most officers are involved in standard police functions, a substantial number carry out tasks unrelated to internal security. For example, Carabineros manage an orphanage for abandoned children, rescue trapped mountaineers, and serve as forest rangers. Even though specialization is encouraged, a typical Carabinero will serve in a number of capacities in his career. [redacted]

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The Subdirectorate of Special Police Activities, which is subordinate to the Directorate of Order and Public Security, oversees most of the components carrying out nonpolice functions as well as the major specialized units—air wing, narcotics, and the special forces:

- **Air Wing.** This component employs five light airplanes and an equal number of helicopters in a variety of duties including search and rescue, crime prevention, and border and shore patrol. Stationed in Santiago, it is also used by the narcotics, special forces, and forestry units.

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- **Narcotics Unit.** Headquartered in Santiago, the large and active narcotics section is also represented in regional police districts and precincts. According to US officials, its officers are energetic, resourceful, and honest, although they often lack sophisticated training and sufficient operational funds.

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- **Special Forces.** Even though all Carabineros receive riot training, the organization has specialized tactical emergency response units. Stationed in major trouble centers—Santiago, Concepcion, and Valparaiso—they are deployed only on the orders of the director or deputy director. [redacted]

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[redacted] the detachment in Santiago has a standard complement of 1,200 men, while the Valparaiso and Concepcion units have 250 men each.

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#### Recruitment and Training

The Carabineros recruit openly through advertisements in the media. Official application is made at local police stations, but recruits may be assigned countrywide. [redacted]


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**Figure 4**  
**Organization of Carabineros**



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the service recruits enlisted men and officers separately and has established distinct career tracks for them. [redacted] Carabinero enlisted men have urban and rural lower-class backgrounds, while officers generally come from the lower middle class. Enlisted men must have two years of high school, officer candidates four; all recruits must be single when they join the force, have completed military service, and be at least 5 feet 5 inches tall. US officials report that potential recruits undergo a series of physical, educational, and psychological tests

prior to acceptance, and, since 1984, a background check conducted by the CNI. [redacted] the institution places considerable emphasis on the psychological examination in order to weed out individuals with overly aggressive tendencies. The service's few hundred women serve mostly in subordinate roles as traffic police and juvenile officers. [redacted]

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Figure 5. Carabineros on border patrol [redacted]

[redacted] that training for Carabinero enlisted men, NCOs, and junior officers is first rate. The institution operates four schools in the Santiago area: the academy, the noncommissioned officers' school, the officers' school, and the Institute of Superior Studies for senior-level officers. Carabinero enlisted recruits receive a good grounding in Chilean criminal, military, and constitutional law; investigative techniques; installation security; and sociology; as well as the standard self-defense and arms training. NCOs and officer recruits also take courses in command, administration, and advanced criminal investigations. Basic schooling for the enlisted ranks lasts nine months, while NCOs study for two years and officers train for three, receiving instruction comparable in length and quality to their counterparts in the Army. [redacted]

Advanced training for senior officers—majors and above—has apparently deteriorated in recent decades. [redacted]

[redacted] are often not kept abreast of procedural and technical advances in other parts of the world, especially in the United States and Europe. [redacted]

[redacted] the Allende administration's decision to stop sending officers to the International Police Academy in Washington, D.C.—probably to limit exposure of its officers to a country with which it was



Figure 6. Children and police officers at Carabinero-administered orphanage [redacted]

frequently in conflict—is in part responsible for the decline. Pinochet seconded the decision, probably in part as a result of his conflictive relations with the United States, but also because, as US officials have reported, he has doubts about the loyalty of the Carabineros. [redacted]

[redacted] budgetary constraints have also played an important role in restricting advanced training. [redacted]

#### Pay, Funding, and Equipment

[redacted] pay is low for officers and enlisted men. The Director makes about US \$1,700 monthly, generals \$1,300, and a colonel \$1,000. Junior officers—majors, captains, and lieutenants—earn \$250, \$180, and \$150, respectively. Enlisted men are paid about \$90 monthly; US officials report that this salary, although twice the minimum wage, is small even by Chilean standards. Although both enlisted men and officers are entitled to longevity increases every three to five years, the service has granted no such increases since 1984. US officials [redacted] report dissatisfaction in officer and enlisted ranks over the issue of pay. [redacted]

Low remuneration, however, is offset, to some degree by a good benefits plan. US officials report a Carabinero and his family are entitled to 80-percent coverage for medicines and specialized health care and 100 percent for professional medical attention at the large modern hospital run by the service in Santiago. Moreover, the institution runs a large discount supermarket-department store in Santiago for all Carabineros and dependents. US officials add that the

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institution provides low-interest housing loans to its members and has an attractive pension plan that enables retirees to live comfortably, especially outside Santiago. [redacted]

[redacted] President Pinochet has consistently restricted funding for the Carabineros to prevent them from developing a paramilitary capability that would enable them to challenge the Army. This policy has resulted in shortages and inadequacies in equipment, personnel, and training. [redacted]

there is often a dearth of uniforms; office supplies are scarce; and the automotive shop often lacks the necessary parts to repair patrol cars and antiriot vehicles. Furthermore, a US security official reports that marksmanship has suffered because of insufficient ammunition for practice. Budgetary stringencies have also resulted in a serious shortage of facilities in which to detain people arrested during public protests. [redacted]

[redacted] the Defense Minister complained in early 1986 to President Pinochet that the 28,000-man force was stretched too thin and needed to be strengthened to compensate for the increase in Chile's population, rising terrorism, and the expanding road and highway system. [redacted]

#### Tactics and Operational Effectiveness

The US Embassy and the press report that the Carabineros perform well in enforcing law and order despite the budgetary constraints. [redacted]

[redacted] the service patrols efficiently and responds rapidly to criminality in key urban areas—downtown areas and upper-class neighborhoods. The US Embassy and the press, however, report that the police often react less rapidly to crime in lower-class neighborhoods. The Carabineros' presence in almost every village in the countryside gives them good access to the population and enables them to function as an effective deterrent to crime in the rural areas. [redacted]

US Embassy and press reports indicate that the Carabineros have dealt effectively with the waves of anti-Pinochet protests and the upsurge of terrorism that have buffeted Chile over the last four years. They have, with some exceptions, controlled large demonstrations and have participated in the security forces' campaign against the terrorist threat. [redacted]



Figure 7. Carabiniero and attack dog subduing protester [redacted]

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The Carabineros employ highly effective, if sometimes brutal, crowd control tactics. [redacted]

[redacted] that officers exercise strict control during demonstrations and resort to force in a calculated, rather than spontaneous or reactive, manner. While the Carabineros use shotguns to pepper demonstrators with buckshot, and often administer beatings to agitators, they do not resort to the indiscriminate use of lethal force. Mounted and foot police use charges to disperse demonstrators, but are careful to leave protesters an avenue of escape to prevent a large crowd from becoming cornered and turning on them. They also disperse crowds by driving through them with small heavily armored trucks, and by using special water cannon from Austria that spew a noxious mixture of tear gas and water. [redacted]

According to US officials [redacted] however, large-scale protests over a period of days would overtax the Carabineros' capabilities. The Carabineros special forces—the primary crowd control units—would be unable to handle massive, prolonged demonstrations in the Santiago area, [redacted] and the service would have to commit students from the NCO school to control the protests. [redacted] the Carabiniero high command believes that the service's

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**Crime in Chile**

Historically, Chile has been a well-policed country that enjoyed one of the lowest crime rates in South America. Highly concerned with order and security, the Pinochet regime has sought to buttress this tradition by using its extraordinary police powers to combat crime as well as repress the political opposition. Nevertheless, [ ] a marked increase in crime in the last four years: the incidence of armed robberies, burglaries, and thefts has risen dramatically, primarily in urban slums. An Investigations Police report observed in September 1986 that, while Chile's overall population was growing at 2.2 percent annually, its prison population was rising at a rate of 6.7 percent. [ ]

We attribute much of the surge in criminal activity to poor living standards in the urban shantytowns. The press and the US Embassy report that, despite the last two years of strong economic growth, rampant unemployment and substandard housing and health care remain the norm in those areas. Indeed, the US Embassy reports that unemployment is highest among young males between 18 and 25—the age group that is usually responsible for most violent crime. They add, however, that inadequate policing also has contributed to the crime wave. While the Carabineros and Investigations Police patrol heavily in upper- and middle-class neighborhoods, they have reduced their presence in—or even withdrawn from—many slums because of manpower shortages and

heightened terrorism. US officials have noted an increase in vigilantism and report that slum dwellers frequently complain to government officials about the lack of adequate police protection. [ ]

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In our view, the periodic security sweeps conducted by the Army, Carabineros, and Investigations Police have had a mixed impact on crime in the poor neighborhoods. While the sweeps are aimed primarily at rooting out political opponents of President Pinochet, the government has touted them as crime fighting measures, since authorities use the identity checks to nab criminals. Nevertheless, even though the sweeps have frequently broken up organizations responsible for mounting antiregime protests, they have simultaneously undermined community structures, such as neighborhood watch groups, that play an important role in countering criminality, according to the Institute of Police Studies, an association of former police officers. [ ]

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Despite the increase, crime has not become a major social or political issue in Chile. In our view, however, the government's continued inability or unwillingness to ensure the safety of the lower-class neighborhoods will help fuel the socioeconomic unrest that has made those areas tinderboxes of antiregime activity. Moreover, spread of crime into middle- and upper-class areas contributes to the erosion of confidence in the regime among its chief supporters. [ ]

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antiriot capabilities are good at the small unit level, but begin to break down when the need arises to mass large numbers of police to deal with a severe situation. According to US officials [ ] a shortage of officers and NCOs would result in confusion, a deterioration in discipline, and an increase in human rights abuses. [ ]

The National Information Center (CNI)—rather than the Carabineros—is Chile's principal antiterrorist force, although the National Police have been involved in bolstering security at vital industrial, transportation, and communications installations. Moreover, [ ] the Carabinero director established within the special

forces a small elite antiterrorist unit—the Special Police Operations Group (GOPE). The main force of the unit (some 60 men) is stationed in Santiago, although smaller detachments serve in Valparaiso and Concepcion. Initially the unit received rigorous training in advanced combat and hostage rescue techniques at the Army Special Forces school, but in recent years instruction has declined because of funding problems. Despite the existence of this special unit, its members have participated in few, if any, antiterrorist operations, and have been used mostly in normal riot control. [ ]

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Figure 8. Carabineros arresting demonstrator in the main plaza Santiago [redacted]

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


Figure 9. Carabiniero attending comrade mortally wounded by terrorists [redacted]

While not strictly an antiterrorist force, the Carabineros have paid a high price in the counterterrorist war. Stepped-up patrols and infrastructure security have heightened their profile and made them easy targets. Indeed, the Carabineros have borne the brunt of the casualties in the struggle against the radical left—according to the US Embassy, from 1979 to 1984, 22 Carabineros perished at the hands of terrorists, and in 1986 alone six died. [redacted]

#### Morale

Despite the high degree of professionalism there are signs that the institution has suffered from sagging morale over the last four years according to US officials. In our view, the lack of funding, which has hampered their abilities to perform their duties, the increasing risk of terrorist attacks, and low pay are the major factors contributing to a significant decline in morale. [redacted] criticism from family and friends that the service is propping up the Pinochet government may also be affecting the morale of rank-and-file Carabineros, who mostly reside in lower-class areas where socioeconomic discontent and antiregime feeling are high. According to US officials [redacted]

[redacted] morale problems have not translated into significant corruption in the force. The US Embassy reports that Carabiniero patrolmen and officers rarely take bribes and have generally resisted the numerous opportunities for self-enrichment inherent in antinarcotics activities. [redacted]

#### The Carabineros and Pinochet

The US Embassy and [redacted] that the Carabineros are probably the security service most opposed to Pinochet's remaining in power after 1989. Notwithstanding their dutiful performance in quelling antigovernment demonstrations, a majority of Carabineros appear to favor a speedy return to civilian rule. [redacted] most officers back the efforts by Director Stange—one of Pinochet's most outspoken critics on the junta—to oppose the President's plans to gain the plebiscite nomination. We believe that a growing number of enlisted men and NCOs may also privately share many of the social and economic frustrations of the working-class milieu in which they operate. [redacted]

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**Rodolfo Stange Oecklers**



*Director General, Carabineros; member, junta (since August 1985)*

*Gen. Rodolfo Stange is highly regarded within the Carabineros. After serving as deputy director for three years, he assumed the top post amidst accusations that police officers had kidnaped and murdered three Communists. To improve the force's public image and upgrade morale, he quickly disbanded a unit that had been accused of involvement in the incident. Stange is often credited with the restraint shown by police in handling opposition demonstrations.*

[redacted]

*Stange has indicated that the military should gradually withdraw from politics and that Carabineros should not participate in the electoral process, even by voting.*

*Stange's relationship with Pinochet has deteriorated markedly during the past two years, largely because the Carabinero chief has surprised the President by pressing more and more openly for an accelerated transition to civilian rule, according to the US Embassy. For example, in June he joined two of his fellow junta members in calling for a civilian candidate acceptable to a broad cross section of voters in the scheduled presidential plebiscite. Pinochet treats Stange in an openly condescending manner and on several occasions threatened to fire him. Tensions between the two men are exacerbated by interservice rivalry, especially over the Army's increased role in maintaining public order,*

[redacted]

*Stange has told US officials that he believes Chile will be thrown into turmoil if Pinochet insists on trying to remain in power beyond 1989. He is worried that the police would have to handle most of the violence resulting from opposition to Pinochet's continued rule and fears that the force lacks sufficient manpower to confront widespread public protest and expanded terrorist actions.*

*Stange was born on 30 September 1925. He is formal but friendly in his dealings with US officials. He has strong family ties to Germany and visits there regularly.*

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We believe, however, that the major source of Carabinero disenchantment with the regime is Pinochet's determined effort to subordinate the service to the military and to himself personally.

[redacted] that most Carabineros would prefer to return the institution to the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. The Carabinero officer corps was infuriated when in 1985 Pinochet attempted to replace the service's Director—who had resigned following the revelation of Carabinero involvement in the murder of three Communists—with an Army officer. The Carabinero officers resisted the President's ploy, finally persuading him to promote the

deputy director, Rodolfo Stange, to the number-one spot. US officials indicate that many Carabinero chiefs are also worried by Pinochet's maneuvering to build a base of support in the Carabinero leadership.

[redacted]

General Stange has become increasingly irritated at Pinochet's efforts to undercut his authority by cultivating his subordinates.

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In addition, [ ] and Embassy reports indicate that the Carabinero hierarchy resents Pinochet's increasing use of Army units to stifle protests and demonstrations. High-level Carabinero officials complained bitterly to Army generals when on several occasions the government used Army troops to quell riots and disperse protesters. [ ]

[ ] Stange has stated privately that he believes the subordination of the Carabineros to the Defense Ministry, limitations on the service's budget and personnel, and tentative plans to create municipal police forces add up to a concerted campaign by the regime to reduce the Carabineros' status and effectiveness. [ ]

Pinochet's handling of the investigation into the 1985 murder of three Communist militants engendered a particularly sharp reaction from the Carabineros. [ ]

[ ] then Director Mendoza was shocked that Pinochet allowed the CNI to issue a public report that cast all the blame on their institution when in reality the crime was committed by rogue Carabinero officers—operating outside the formal hierarchy and possibly without the knowledge of Mendoza—in conjunction with a joint CNI-Army unit. According to press reports, some Carabinero officers reacted to the report by meeting clandestinely to plot undefined actions against the government.

While these rumors are unconfirmed, there is no doubt that the incident badly soured relations among the Carabineros, the CNI, and Pinochet. [ ]

[ ] Di-rector Stange is pressing to have the case reopened in order to clear his institution's name. [ ]

In our view, relations between Pinochet and the Carabineros are likely to worsen over the next two years. Declining morale, Pinochet's growing use of the Army in internal security matters, and Pinochet's persistent favoritism toward the CNI and Investigations Police will translate into increased resentment toward the President. We believe that under these circumstances the Carabineros may begin to resist Pinochet's efforts to perpetuate himself in office.

Recently, Stange publicly agreed with calls by the Air Force and Navy chiefs for a civilian candidate in the presidential plebiscite. In our view, officers and enlisted men are likely to become increasingly disaffected from the regime, and perhaps more vocal in their support for a transition to civilian rule. [ ]

We believe that a gambit by Pinochet to ensure his victory in the plebiscite—such as using the CNI or the Investigations Police to intimidate antiregime voters—could spark a reaction from the Carabineros. General Stange has publicly affirmed that the Carabineros should guarantee the security and integrity of the electoral process. In our view, the Carabineros might be galvanized into some form of nonviolent protest, such as remaining in their barracks or refusing to vote, if they believed the regime was trying to rig the plebiscite. [ ]

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### The Investigations Police

The 3,500 man Investigations Police (also frequently called the Investigative Police or the Civil Police) is Chile's plainclothes civilian investigative agency. Originally a branch of the Carabineros, it became an independent police agency in 1938, falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Shortly after the 1973 coup, Pinochet—using the same tactic he employed with the Carabineros—subordinated the force to the Ministry of Defense. [redacted]

#### Organization and Functions

[redacted] the Investigations Police is organized geographically and functionally. The Director General and his staff supervise the two large subdirectorates—Police Operations and Administration—that perform the majority of the law enforcement and administrative functions. The Subdirectorate of Police Operations (SOP) administers the five geographical zones—north, central, south, austral (far south), and Santiago metropolitan. At the zone level, the organization is further subdivided into districts and precincts that usually have specialized units to deal with homicide, robbery, and other crimes. The Police Services Support Command—that includes the narcotics, technical, and statistics departments, the crime lab, and the Special Operations Prefecture—that supervises the Intelligence Brigade and the files department—is also subordinate to the SOP. Finally, four smaller commands—Inspector General, General Counsel, Interpol, and the International Immigration Police—report directly to the director and his staff. [redacted]

Since 1973, however, the agency's functions have narrowed considerably, according to US officials. Prior to the coup, the Investigations Police had primary responsibility for intelligence and internal security, including counterterrorism and foreign counterintelligence—President Salvador Allende, for example, relied on it heavily as a secret police force. The agency now shares these functions with the National Information Center (CNI), which, in our view, is increasingly overshadowing Investigations Police in the crucial counterterrorism field. Its main duties include investigating major crimes such as narcotics trafficking, murder, customs and maritime violations, and serving as Chile's immigration police. [redacted]

#### Recruitment and Training

The Investigations Police recruit openly in the media, according to US officials. US officials report that candidates must have a high school education and are generally from the lower middle class. The press has reported, however, that Pinochet in recent years has detailed a substantial number of CNI and Army intelligence officers to serve in the Investigations Police. We believe this reflects the President's interest in staffing the security services with politically reliable officers rather than any recruitment shortfalls in the agency. [redacted]

The Investigations Police operates a large academy on the outskirts of Santiago that all recruits attend for a year. US police officials familiar with the organization say recruits leave the academy well schooled in Chilean military, constitutional, and criminal law; investigative techniques; and police administration. The agency augments this training by sending selected graduates and experienced officers to the CNI's intelligence school. Because of the rise in terrorism over the past four years, a substantial number of Investigations officers now attend the Army's Special Forces School for advanced combat and counterterrorist training, according to US officials. [redacted]

#### Pay, Funding, and Corruption


Although data are sparse, US officials believe the pay of the Investigations Police on average is probably somewhat better than the Carabineros; indeed, we have no indications of serious dissatisfaction in the ranks as a result of low pay. As with the uniformed police, the benefits structure compensates to some degree for the low remuneration. Investigations officers and their families receive 80-percent health care coverage for medicines, eye care, and dentistry, and full coverage for professional attention at the Carabiniro hospital. They also are entitled to low-cost housing loans. After 20 years of service they can retire with a monthly pension of 70 percent of base pay. [redacted]

Finally, we suspect that many Investigations agents make ends meet by supplementing their income illicitly. In sharp contrast to the Carabineros, US officials report, the service suffers from serious corruption and

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**Figure 10**  
**Organization of the Investigations Police**



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lacks popular respect and trust. [redacted]

officials report, however, that senior officials in the Investigations Police have either turned a blind eye to the transit activities or actually shielded them. In 1985, Washington made a demarche to the regime, charging that numerous top officers of the Investigations Police, including the deputy of operations, were receiving payoffs from drug traffickers. The force removed two of the officials named, but [redacted]

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Narcotics-related corruption appears to be a major problem in the highest levels of the organization. At present, Chile is not afflicted with a high incidence of narcotics abuse or illicit drug production, although it serves as a transit route for traffickers transporting cocaine from Bolivia to Argentina and Europe. US

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


Figure 11. Investigations Police station in Valdivia, Chile [redacted]



Figure 12. Investigations Police at the scene of murder of an officer by terrorists [redacted]

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[redacted] narcotics-related corruption remains rampant and continues to be tolerated by the director. [redacted]

We believe that lack of discontent over money matters also reflects the service's generally adequate funding levels. The Investigations Police have a far higher per capita annual expenditure than the Carabineros—\$6,000 and \$4,000, respectively. We believe this difference is probably explained by the close personal and political ties between Pinochet and the agency's Director, Gen. Fernando Paredes, as opposed to the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the President and Carabinero chief Stange. [redacted]

In practice, the Investigations Police have taken a backseat to the CNI in the antiterrorist struggle over the last decade, even though they are empowered to investigate terrorist acts. In 1986, however, they achieved a notable success by nabbing five of the individuals involved in the September 1986 attempt on President Pinochet's life. According to US officials, Investigative Police technicians lifted a fingerprint from a beer can at the site of the assassination attempt, and, by a painstaking manual search of their files, identified the suspect and arrested him. Subsequent interrogation led to the arrest of four others. [redacted]

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**Operational Effectiveness**

FBI agents—who have official liaison contacts with Investigations officers—report that they are generally competent. They appear adept at investigating, following up leads, and setting up informant networks. US officials assert that the service's crime laboratory is the best in Chile and perhaps the region, excelling particularly in arson investigations. [redacted]

[redacted] the force often resorts to violent, if effective, techniques to track down criminals and terrorists. They frequently use intimidation and blackmail in order to obtain and manage informants, and utilize physical and psychological torture much more commonly than the Carabineros. [redacted]

**Political Attitudes**

US officials report that, unlike the Carabineros, the Investigations Police appear to solidly support the Pinochet regime. Director Paredes is a longtime crony of Pinochet and is beholden to the President for his status and wealth. Paredes, a hardline supporter of Pinochet's continued rule, has surrounded himself with a like-minded staff that has no qualms about using the service to harass regime opponents and help Pinochet remain in power after 1989. According to the US Embassy, the Investigations Police actively

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**Gen. (ret.) Fernando Paredes Pizarro**

*Director General, Investigations Police (since August 1980)*



*Paredes has a mixed record as head of the Investigations Police. Named by Pinochet to head the service at a time when its detectives had been implicated in a wave of kidnappings of suspected leftists, he marginally improved the service's image by signing an agreement allowing officials of the International Red Cross access to detainees. Furthermore, he has improved the service's crime-fighting capability by upgrading training and introducing modern technology. However, US diplomats distrust and avoid dealing with Paredes, who they say has ignored corruption and refused to dismiss some high-level police officials who have been protecting drug traffickers.*

[Redacted]

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*Former Army Gen. Fernando Paredes, who is reportedly close to President Augusto Pinochet, shares Pinochet's hardline views on many issues, including political dissent and international Communism. For example, [Redacted] in the past Paredes has favored punishing military officers who openly disagreed with official policies, expelling foreign priests involved in antigovernment activities, and banishing students and professors who took part in antiregime protests. He has repeatedly in public accused the Soviet Union of sponsoring protests and has charged Cuban President Fidel Castro with promoting Chilean terrorism, including the September 1986 attack on Pinochet. [Redacted]*

[Large Redacted Area]

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propagandize for the regime. For example, the organization recently released its own polls that purport to prove that Pinochet's popular backing has reached 44 percent of the population. To offset the boost in prestige that the Church—frequently critical of Pinochet—received from the highly successful papal visit in April 1987, the Investigations Police released calculations on the size of the popular turnout, claiming

it was much lower than the numbers given by religious officials. Finally, US officials report that the service is intimidating government workers suspected of disloyalty to Pinochet and forcing all employees to sign documents in support of the President's reelection bid. [Redacted]

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### The National Information Center

The National Information Center (CNI) replaced the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA) in 1977 as Chile's principal intelligence agency. The government abolished DINA following revelations about its involvement in the murder of former Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington the previous year. Because of the domestic and international political fallout from DINA's notorious activities, the junta restricted the arrest and detention powers of its successor, but still gave the CNI overall responsibility for national security and VIP protection. [redacted]

#### Organization

Legally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, the 2,000- to 2,500-man CNI has two principal officers, the director and assistant director. The Chief of Staff for Intelligence supervises the director's personal staff, the elite antiterrorist unit, and the center's analytical section. The highly secretive antiterrorist unit has a complement of about 100 men, stationed in Santiago, divided into 10 patrols each headed by a lieutenant. The analysts—military and civilian experts divided into internal, foreign, political, and economic intelligence units—prepare daily and long-term studies for President Pinochet. [redacted]

[redacted] the assistant director directly supervises the head of the Internal Security Brigade who supervises the operations department, the national intelligence school, and the Joint Information Center—the clearinghouse for all communications from regional units and other armed forces institutions. The CNI is divided into six geographical and functional divisions which carry out the basic intelligence collection and security activities:

- **Metropolitan Division.** Responsible for the greater Santiago area, this division has an assigned strength of about 200 to 250 men and is divided into six subunits. The largest—the antiterrorist section commanded by an Army captain—has about 150 officers who track the far left, focusing primarily on the Moscow-line Communist party and Chile's two

terrorist groups, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). Highly trained volunteers from each section form a special team—equivalent to a US police force special weapons and tactics team (SWAT)—used in dangerous arrest situations. The five other units—each with about 15 members—monitor the activities of nonviolent groups, including the Catholic Church and its human rights affiliate the Vicariate of Solidarity, moderate political parties, labor unions, and student organizations.


- **Regional Division.** This division—with about 800 members assigned to 15 geographical sections—performs similar duties outside the Santiago metropolitan area. 25X1
- **Foreign Intelligence Division.** Located in Santiago, this division manages about 80 officers involved in foreign intelligence collection. US officials report that the CNI stations about 12 to 14 officers overseas, primarily in neighboring countries.
- **Psycho-Political Division.** Headquartered in Santiago, this unit is responsible for propaganda activities. The command monitors the opposition press, plants progovernment stories in the news media, and conducts disinformation campaigns against the opposition. 25X1
- **Technical Support Division.** The telephone intercept and telecommunications sections target the communications of domestic opponents and foreign embassies and monitor foreign antiregime broadcasts into Chile. The television and photography section provides a wide range of photographic and television support functions to other operational components, including photographic support for the President's security detail. The explosives operation section has about 25 personnel divided into two detachments: a conventional bomb disposal squad and a subunit that determines the type, origin, and manufacture of bombs. 25X1

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**Figure 13**  
**Organization of the National**  
**Information Center**



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Figure 14. Presidential security team [redacted] Que Pasa ©

which they receive technical instruction, classroom and on-the-street training in trade-craft techniques, as well as weapons and self-defense courses. Senior officers usually return for an advanced operations course and special classes that focus on management and administration of intelligence operations. [redacted]

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Foreign intelligence organizations and private firms have played a significant role in the development of Chilean intelligence officers since the establishment of DINA in 1974. [redacted]

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Brazilian, French, and Israeli intelligence specialists have taught at the intelligence school. [redacted]

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• **Files and Information Division.** This division maintains both computerized and manual records on over 1 million individuals—nearly a tenth of Chile’s population—considered to pose a threat or potential danger to national security. The CNI quickly receives or sends information to and from regional offices via a secure microwave telephone system. [redacted]

**Recruitment and Training**

[redacted] that the CNI’s staff is drawn almost exclusively from active duty Army personnel, although the Center’s directors claim the agency has a large civilian component. According to the US Embassy, the Air Force pulled its officers out of the CNI eight years ago and the Carabineros recently followed suit; the Navy intelligence apparently still retains a small representation in the agency. [redacted]

The CNI places great emphasis on the training of its officers, according to US officials. Although not a line command, the directorship of the Center’s National Intelligence School is considered one of the most responsible senior CNI positions. The school’s permanent staff of about 30, along with a cadre of contract specialists, teaches both CNI agents and students from other security services. US officials report that the school’s standards are fairly rigorous. In addition to a short intelligence orientation course, officers attend a five- to six-month basic operations course in

Training for the CNI’s antiterrorist unit is extensive and excellent, according to US officials. Regular training consists of daily calisthenics, sports, karate, and hand-to-hand combat with the “corvo,” a native fighting knife. Members also undergo day and night marches, survival training, infiltration into and exfiltration from enemy territory, resistance to interrogation, and weekly parachute jumps. The unit holds monthly simulated field exercises in hostage rescue techniques. [redacted]

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**Salaries, Funding, and Equipment**

Pinochet has been generous to the CNI, which he rightly considers one of the bulwarks of his regime. US officials report that regular middle-grade Army officers are unhappy about low pay—a captain makes roughly \$400 dollars a month—and often moonlight to supplement their salaries. Officers detailed to the CNI, however, are much better off financially: they receive a 50-percent increase to their base pay, preferential housing, and an operational expense account.

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**Terrorist Organizations in Chile**

*In the decade following the 1973 coup, the Castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was the only significant terrorist group in Chile. A few hundred MIR members, supplied and trained by Cuba, kept alive the minimal armed resistance to Pinochet in the late 1970s, carrying out isolated bombings, bank robberies, and attacks on policemen. In the early 1980s, however, the MIR upped the ante in the struggle against the Pinochet regime by assassinating the mayor of Santiago and a high-level Army intelligence officer and seriously wounding a Supreme Court justice. In the last five years, however, infighting and successful penetrations by the security services have seriously debilitated the MIR, leading its leaders to almost cease activities.*

*In September 1980, the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), the largest and best organized far-left group in the country, announced a strategy of "armed struggle" against the Pinochet regime. Over the past four years the PCCh has carried out recruitment drives, enlarged its clandestine wing, built up its military apparatus, expanded indoctrination of the rank and file, and systematically tried to broaden the party's appeal, especially in the slum areas ringing Santiago and other cities. In 1983 the PCCh supported the creation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which has committed the lion's share of subversive acts in the past four years, including the assassination attempt on Pinochet.*

[redacted]

*[redacted] the MIR's militant cadre at about 200 to 300 in country and a few hundred more overseas.*

*[redacted] the FPMR,*

*[redacted] has grown from only a few dozen militants at its inception to 1,500 to 2,000 at present. Originally the FPMR drew a significant percentage of its membership from non-Communist radical leftist*

*groups, including renegade MIR members. In the last two years, however, members of the PCCh's militant wing have displaced many of these leftists as the party has attempted to bring the FPMR fully under its control.*

[redacted]

*We believe that the Communists and the FPMR are committed to a long-term strategy of promoting an insurgency in Chile, aimed at overthrowing the Pinochet regime and establishing a Sandinista-type government under their control.*

*[redacted] prior to mid-1986*

*[redacted] the PCCh was content to wait until at least 1989—when Pinochet's term ends—to begin insurrection. We believe the party calculated that by then Pinochet's insistence on retaining power would have so antagonized popular opinion and discredited the moderate opposition that other political groups would recognize the Communists' advocacy of armed struggle as the only viable option against Pinochet.*

[redacted]

*The arms caches and the assassination attempt, however, suggest that at least some elements in the PCCh and the FPMR wanted to speed up the timetable for launching an insurrection.*

[redacted]

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*We believe, however, that the Communists and the FPMR lack the capability to mount an insurrection in the next two years. The discovery of the arms caches and the failed assassination attempt, in our judgment, have put the Communists on the defensive. Press reports indicate that the public opposes terrorism and Communist-led protests. Moreover, moderate opposition parties want to avoid even the appearance of cooperating with the far left, and, in our view, improving economic conditions have dampened prospects for Communist agitators to capitalize on social discontent to foment unrest. In our view, even Communist leaders probably believe that their prospects for mounting an insurrection before the early 1990s are poor. Communist leaders are emphasizing the PCCh's so-called political line and are trying to cultivate the moderate opposition, while playing down the military option even to the party rank and file.* [redacted]

*In our view, however, the far left is planning to increase significantly the level of violence in the near future. We believe that the PCCh—which has a demonstrated ability to learn from its mistakes, improve security, and rebound—can withstand the security services' intensive antiterrorist operations. Last summer the FPMR stepped up bank robberies, bombings, and assaults on police officers despite the casualties they suffered from the security services. [redacted] the FPMR and the PCCh are pressing forward with recruitment despite recent losses. Even though the FPMR and the Communist party probably cannot mount an insurgency any time soon, we believe they will keep pressing the increasingly burdened security structure and continue to pose a threat to any transition formula worked out by the moderates and the military. A rapid escalation of violent activity—in particular a series of coordinated assaults on senior officials—could overtax the security services and provoke them into a harsh crackdown that could undermine chances for a peaceful transition.* [redacted]

These benefits—along with the high degree of integrity prevalent in the Chilean Army—have precluded the development within the CNI of the systematic and widespread corruption that characterizes the Investigations Police.<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

Pinochet's largess is also reflected in the CNI's funding and equipment, [redacted] US officials report that the CNI's technical and communications equipment is first rate and that the agency has systematically upgraded the nationwide secure microwave telecommunications network installed by DINA in 1976.

#### **Professionalism and Operational Effectiveness**

The CNI performs effectively, monitoring—and at times intimidating—both the moderate opposition and radical leftist groups. We believe that the agency's counterterrorist record, to date somewhat mixed, is improving. [redacted]

The CNI is well informed on the activities of the major moderate opposition groups. According to US officials, it regularly uses telephone taps, surveillance, and a well-developed informant network to keep tabs on the moderate parties, the church, and the unions.

<sup>2</sup> The only serious financial scandal that has touched the CNI was the involvement of two officers in a bank robbery and murder in 1981 in northern Chile. Following an internal investigation, military courts convicted—and later executed—a regional director and another officer for the crime. The CNI intensified background checks on all its personnel following the incident; these checks have helped prevent similar occurrences. [redacted]

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Figure 15. Terrorists of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front

The agency has detailed knowledge on the inner workings and deliberations of the moderate opposition parties. This information has enabled the regime to tailor propaganda to exploit internal dissension in the parties, formulate strategy to counter the moderates' political tactics, and often harass and arrest democratic opposition figures.

The CNI has also played a significant role in stifling labor unrest and popular protests. Its extensive network in the labor sector has allowed the regime to keep a tight rein on union activity. US officials report that the CNI frequently counters antigovernment demonstrations by planting agents in their midst to disrupt the activities. Moreover, US officials report that CNI thugs, posing as progovernment counter-demonstrators, frequently attack and beat protesters. Finally, the CNI uses threats and physical intimidation to secure informants in the lower-class neighborhoods where the most violent protests generally occur.

While it has done well in controlling the moderate opposition and helped stifle public protests, the CNI—Chile's principal counterterrorist agency—has performed in only a mixed fashion against the violent left. The Center, according to US officials, has been plagued by large gaps in knowledge of the plans and operational procedures of the Communist party and its terrorist affiliate, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). For example, the CNI reportedly was

surprised and embarrassed by the discovery in August 1986 of the huge Cuban-supplied arms caches.

The CNI—by statute responsible for VIP security—also has a spotty record in protecting high-level officials from terrorist assaults; it has failed to obtain reliable information on terrorist targeting of senior officials and has been remiss in security procedures. In late 1981, terrorists seriously wounded the chief justice of the Supreme Court and in late 1983 murdered the mayor of Santiago, a high-ranking military officer. Even the officers detailed to presidential security have been guilty of poor security practices. only an alert driver and armor plating on the presidential vehicles saved Pinochet's life in the 1986 assassination attempt.

Finally, the CNI—we believe acting on Pinochet's orders—has not hesitated to engage in death squad activity.

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


Figure 16. Presidential escort car destroyed in assassination attempt 7 September 1986 [redacted]

**Brig. Gen. Hugo Salas Wenzel**

Director, National Information Center (CNI) (since December 1986)

Gen. Hugo Salas Wenzel owes his current position to his predecessor, current Army junta member Gen. Humberto Gordon, under whom he served as CNI deputy director during 1984-86. He apparently still defers to Gordon, who, [redacted] still controls the CNI. [redacted] as a hardline supporter of President Augusto Pinochet and a staunch anti-Communist. They say he is very well disposed toward the United States. [redacted]

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[redacted] while serving as deputy director of the CNI, Salas met with officials of the Communist and Christian Democratic Parties to discuss the political situation; he almost certainly informed Pinochet of those talks.

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**Political Attitudes and Support for the Regime**

[redacted]

[redacted] Disquiet is growing in both the middle and senior ranks of the Army about Pinochet's plans to remain in office after 1989. Since CNI assignments are directed, we suspect that some of the Center's officers may reflect that disquiet as well. We believe, however, that, given the pay differential CNI officers receive and the political vetting to which they are doubtless subjected, loyalty to the regime is probably more militant than within the Army as a whole.

[redacted]

Salas Wenzel was born on 3 October 1935. He graduated from the Military Academy as an infantry officer in 1952. He has been commander of the Rancagua regiment in Arica (northern Chile); in the Army Intelligence Directorate (1973); guest instructor at the US Army School of the Americas, Canal Zone (1973-74); commander, Army Intelligence Corps (1975-76); vice director of the Enlisted Officers School; director of the Military Academy (1979-81); and military attache to Argentina (1982-83). [redacted]

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By all accounts Pinochet closely controls CNI operations and has effectively turned the Center into a personal police force that hounds his political enemies. The US Embassy reports that the Vicariate of Solidarity, the Catholic Church's human rights group for which Pinochet has a particular aversion, is constantly under surveillance and has had its offices burglarized, probably by the CNI. Last year ruffians, probably CNI officers, beat up employees and ransacked the


offices of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, an international organization that assists exiles and has been criticized openly by the regime.

[redacted]

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More recently, the agency has been supporting Pinochet's efforts to bolster his chances for winning the presidential plebiscite and remaining in power after 1989. The regime is using the CNI to funnel money to the hitherto minuscule ultrarightist party National Advance (AN), which has now become the primary political vehicle for Pinochet's plebiscite campaign.



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### The Military's Role in Internal Security

During most of the Pinochet regime's tenure the military has played a backup role to the Carabineros, the Investigations Police, and the CNI in maintaining internal security. The military intelligence agencies—chiefly the Army service—have to some degree monitored the opposition, but have focused most of their attention on intraservice security and overseas intelligence operations. Military units have also traditionally assisted the Carabineros in patrolling the border and the shoreline. The serious rise in antiregime activity in the last four years, however, has led Pinochet to turn more frequently to the military, especially the Army, to counter opposition to his continued rule. [redacted]

#### Intelligence Functions

The three military branches have intelligence services that operate domestically and abroad, independent of the CNI. [redacted] they are smaller, less well equipped, and, in most respects, less effective than the principal security services:

- **Army Intelligence.** The Army has reduced the size of its Directorate of Intelligence from 500 to 127 staffers over the past two years, probably to strengthen the CNI. While the Directorate's small operations section seeks to obtain military intelligence on potential foreign enemies, such as Peru and Argentina, it focuses primarily on countering leftist attempts to infiltrate the Army and on monitoring the political leanings of both officers and troops.
- **Air Force Intelligence.** The Air Force Directorate of Intelligence has a complement of about 100 officers and enlisted men who mainly carry out intelligence collection and operations against Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru.
- **Naval Intelligence Service.** The smallest of the military intelligence services, it focuses almost entirely on naval developments in Peru and Argentina, and on movements of Soviet Bloc and Cuban naval and commercial fishing fleets in the area. [redacted]



Figure 17. Army troops patrolling slums during July 1986 protests [redacted]

#### Counterterrorist and Internal Security Roles

Since antiregime protest and violence erupted four years ago, Pinochet has often deployed military units to quell riots and combat terrorism. In the spring and summer of 1983, he called out Army and Air Force units to suppress—often with considerable bloodshed—the monthly demonstrations and strikes mounted by labor and the political parties. During 1985 the regime deployed troops to intimidate protesters and conduct security sweeps of Santiago's lower-class neighborhoods. In May 1986, Pinochet shocked the public, and even many government and police officials, according to the US Embassy and the press, by blanketing Santiago with soldiers to prevent demonstrations during the meeting of the Latin American parliamentary congress and by supplementing the police with regular Army units during the general strike in July of that year. Finally, the regime has also expanded the Army's role in patrolling the Argentine border to intercept an alleged influx of leftist subversives and arms, and has detailed more troops to guard vital bridges, power plants, factories, and other potential terrorist targets. [redacted]

Increasingly concerned about the security services' ability to control dissent, Pinochet, in our view, has slowly shifted the Army's traditional focus on the external threat from Argentina and Peru to an emphasis on internal security. [redacted] last year Pinochet ordered stepped-up [redacted]

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counterguerrilla, commando, intelligence, and demolitions training for regular Army units. In early 1986, Vice Commander of the Army Sinclair—closely identified with the notion that the Army must concentrate on the enemy within—created so-called Basic Anti-subversive Units in all major Army commands to complement the Carabineros' riot control functions.

[Redacted]

Pinochet also has formed special units drawn from regular Army commands to carry out intelligence functions and, at times, to eliminate political opponents. A paramilitary Army unit assisted by the CNI, for example, was responsible for the murder of three Communists in 1985.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Pinochet, however, has drawn criticism from within the services for the military's stepped-up internal security role. [Redacted] senior and middle-grade Air Force officers, for example, have strongly opposed the use of their units in security sweeps and crowd control. In late August 1983, following the killing of a dozen protesters by poorly trained Army draftees, senior Army generals complained directly to Pinochet about the use of their troops for police functions.

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