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30 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer

SUBJECT   :   Revised draft of FBIS history titled
                "The Foreign Documents Division,
                1946-1967"

    1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and
approved the revised draft of the FBIS history titled
"The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967" by
                        has done an excellent job of revising
his draft and the paper is now ready for further
processing.

    2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that
the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed
"Conclusion" and made the final chapter of the history.
Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made
directly on the manuscript and are noted for the
record in the attachment.

    3. The Historical Staff will forward this
paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for re-
view prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.

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
THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1946 - 1967

VOLUME I

by

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│  SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES │
│      AND METHODS INVOLVED       │
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THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1946 - 1967

VOLUME I

by

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Approved:

Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1974

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Foreword

The purpose of this history is to record and contemplate the origin, growth, and maturation of foreign-language document exploitation in the US intelligence community. The work was written to provide future intelligence officers assigned responsibility for this function with a record of past accomplishments and failures in document exploitation for comparison and guidance in situations which may then apply.

In commenting on a survey on the usefulness of overt foreign literature performed by the Publications Procurement Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications, the State Department in 1957 declared that the study had conclusively demonstrated that open published material was "the principal source of information on the U.S.S.R. for many intelligence agencies and a major source of data for most organizations concerned with research on the U.S.S.R." There is ample evidence that this judgment applied equally for open literature from non-Soviet areas.

It was in light of the importance attached to overt documentary materials, as reflected in this statement, that the Foreign Documents Division was established following the end of World War II. The story related in the pages of this history describes the development of foreign-language document exploitation as it unfolded in the course of the next two decades. It sets out to show the many problems, dilemmas, and frustrations encountered, the occasional triumphs and satisfactions achieved, and the lessons learned in the process.

At the outset during and after the war the methodology applied in document collection and exploitation was largely hit or miss, and every "cook" in the community had his fingers in the pot. The history traces the evolution of the activity from this state of the art through the various stages of growth — the consolidation of foreign-language document handling under CIA, the division's quest for official recognition of its common-service mission, the honing and refinement of operations, the expansion of services, and, finally, failure of the attempt to retain independent status.

Of necessity, much of interest in the human sphere has been intentionally, though reluctantly, omitted. FDD's

most important asset was people, talented individuals who contributed immeasurably to whatever success the division en-joyed in performing its mission. Associated with their daily activity was much humor and pathos which in itself would fur-nish a fascinating account of intelligence production in action, but the limitations of time and space preclude dealing with this aspect in depth in the narrative which follows. The treatment herein has had to be confined to the higher levels of FDD policy and operations.

At this writing the Foreign Documents Division no longer exists. Its function -- overt publications exploitation -- still continues in a more restricted and somewhat altered form as an adjunct to total overt source monitoring, but the full-blown concept of the operation as the division conceived and nurtured it in the 1950s and early 1960s is now in limbo. Were I to state in brief what FDD's chief accomplishment in the 20 years of its life was, it would be this: it was the major contributor to the orderly and effective development of document exploitation as a primary intelligence function.

And finally, a brief word concerning my qualifications for writing the story of FDD. My academic training, under-graduate and post-graduate, was in the field of history. Following military service during World War II and after, most of it as a signal intelligence officer, I was employed as a civilian by the National Security Agency in 1949. In July 1952 I transferred to CIA and have been affiliated with the Agency since then, spending the major part of my CIA career as a member of FDD. In 1967, along with the division's complement and functions, I was absorbed by FBIS and have continued in this status since then. My professional interest and activity in this period were devoted exclusively to overt intelligence collection from open foreign document sources, specifically in the Soviet area -- initially in the economic field, then in political/sociological collection from 1958 to 1966, and finally a return to economic coverage. At the same time I was also an associate of FDD officers working in the various non-Soviet areas of document exploitation and was privileged to observe their dedicated and highly pro-fessional conduct of operations.

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Langley, Virginia
June 1973

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VOLUME I

CHAPTER ONE

Consolidation of Document Exploitation

in the Post-World War II Period

A. Initial Step

The emergence of the Foreign Documents Division of the
Central Intelligence Agency was the culmination of a trend
toward the organized exploitation of enemy documents which
had its inception in the last year or two of World War II and
in the immediate postwar period. The use of captured documents
as an intelligence source in the conduct of military operations
is, of course, as old as war itself; but until the mid-1940s
this source of information had been used by the United States
only on a narrowly tactical, largely disorganized basis with
little or no coordination among the various branches of the
armed services. Thus, to the extent that documents were
exploited at all, the results were usually incomplete and often
duplicative. The exigencies of conducting the war permitted
little more than this relatively primitive effort on the lower
combat and staff levels.

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With the approach of the war's end following the invasion

of Europe in the Western theater and the movement of Allied

forces against the Japanese home islands in the East, a new

factor entered the picture. The rapid progress of the Allied

armies, particularly near the end as the German and Japanese

home fronts disintegrated, led to the capture of an increasingly

large volume of documentary material by the advancing Allied

forces. In the absence of an over-all, coordinated plan for

handling and disposing of this material, most of it was

hurriedly gathered together and temporarily stored in various

depots in the respective war zones and here it remained until

the end of hostilities. While the war was still in progress,

some of the captured material was exploited for tactical

purposes by commands which had translation and prisoner inter-

rogation units attached to them for the production of low-level

intelligence. Document-processing organizations of this type

established in the Pacific theater were the Allied Translator

and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Area (ATIS, SWPA),

the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC),

the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA),

and the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center, China (SINTIC).

Formed primarily to meet the needs of operational intelligence,

these units were equipped to serve only incidentally the long-term strategic needs of the War Department, Army Air and Service Forces, and Navy. Even between the theater commands there was a lack of coordination and adequate liaison; much duplication and overlapping of effort existed. There was no overall plan regarding the types of documents to be exploited or methods of processing them and no effective exchange of techniques or operational results.

Accordingly, in the summer of 1944 the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), G-2, War Department General Staff (WDGS), developed a plan to establish a centralized agency to coordinate the efforts of all theater document sections and to serve the War Department and other authorized Federal and Allied agencies interested in long-range intelligence. As a result of this plan, the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service (PACMIRS) was activated on 6 September 1944 and based at Camp Ritchie in the Maryland mountains some 75 miles north of Washington. This new agency was at that time the sole organization in the armed forces, and in fact in the government, dedicated, if on a modest scale, primarily to the exploitation of foreign-language documents for strategic intelligence. PACMIRS effectively performed its assigned function down to the end of hostilities

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and beyond. Eventually it would serve as one of the building

blocks upon which further progress in the development of

formalized foreign-language document exploitation was to be

based.

B. The Washington Document Conferences

Near the close of 1944, with the end of the war

increasingly imminent, further thought had to be given to

formulating an overall plan for disposition of the captured

documents in both war theaters, in regard to both cataloging

and permanent storage in the near-term and eventual exploitation

of the material on a long-term basis. A step in this direction

was taken while the war was still in progress with the convening

of a conference in Washington, D.C., to discuss matters related

to the disposition of captured Japanese documents. The meeting,

held during the period 28 December 1944 - 15 January 1945 under

the chairmanship of Col. John R. Lovell, MIS, WDGS, was attended

by representatives of the army and navy zone-of-interior and

overseas commands, including the various intelligence units.

In the latter contingent were personnel from PACMIRS.

As stated prior to the conference, the problem facing

the assembled group was to coordinate the activities of all

Allied Japanese-language personnel under an over-all inter-Allied,

inter-service plan aimed at the production of a maximum of intelligence from document sources for each echelon of the Allied air, ground, and naval commands in the Far East and in Washington by utilizing the limited number of such personnel and their product in the most efficient manner.* 1/ The emphasis on centralization and on coordination of effort in this statement set the tone for future developments in the field of document exploitation, but as events were to prove, particularly during the formative years of the future FDD, the mere definition of the problem was a far cry from easy attainment of the goal stated at the Washington Conference.

To deal with the enormous mass of documents, which were of no tactical value but were considered strategically important, the conference advanced a number of recommendations. It set as the general mission of PACMIRS the establishment of a worldwide organization, with headquarters in or near Washington, for the translation and dissemination of strategic information extracted from captured documents forwarded to it from the various theaters. To facilitate the flow of material to the central headquarters, PACMIRS was to establish advance echelons in each Far East theater to perform the required screening, indexing, and transmitting functions. Precedent for establishment

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* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix G.

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of such advance echelons was to be found in the system of
document exploitation then in force in the Western European
theater of operations. PACMIRS was to have no control of
theater language units, whose sole function was to deal with
exploitation for tactical and local intelligence for theater
use.* 2/

In the course of the next few years the conference's
recommendations were acted upon and a gradual beginning was
made at bringing order to the chaotic postwar captured document
situation. In this connection, a further step was taken in
the summer of 1945 when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, issued a call for a second Washington
conference to deal with problems related to handling and
exploiting Japanese documents. In his memorandum Bissell
placed particular emphasis on securing approval from the
military agencies for the establishment of a single Japanese
Military Document Section to be located in the Washington
area. 3/

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* The proscription against interference by the central
exploitation facility with local translation units was to
carry over in later years during development of FDD-IAC relation-
ships.

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The second Washington conference on captured Japanese documents was held as scheduled from 29 to 31 August 1945 and covered much of the same ground as the earlier meeting but with refinements and, on the basis of experience gained in the intervening months, with a closer zeroing in on the target at hand. The conference was organized by a committee consisting of three PACMIRS officers — Maj. William M. Stremlau, Capt. Won Loy Chan, and Col. Sidney P. Marland, newly appointed chief of PACMIRS, who served as committee chairman — and was attended by representatives of all the services. Its findings and recommendations were far-reaching and in effect established the pattern of document handling and exploitation followed down to and subsequent to the integration of this function by the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) at the end of 1946. The agenda presented to the conference and the resultant recommendations covered a broad range and consisted of such varied items as a proposed plan for the physical handling of documents, coordination with existing overseas translation units such as ATIS, a plan for postwar document research, utilization of available personnel, Allied participation in document exploitation, and last, though perhaps most important, a proposal for a single service document center. 4/

With the end of the war approaching, the conference
recognized the receding importance of the great bulk of
captured documents for tactical operations. Lower echelons
which formerly had handled documents were therefore no longer
involved in the document evacuation process beyond locating
and safeguarding documentary material and the procurement
function would henceforth become the concern of the theater and
of interested agencies in the United States, usually, but not
always, in cooperation with each other. Moreover, the final and
complete exploitation would have to be shifted from the war
zones to the Zone of Interior. Accordingly, the conference
drew up a detailed plan for the selective collection and trans-
mittal to the United States of captured documents, with special
emphasis on coordination of this function with ATIS in Japan
and stressing the inter-service aspect of the operation. In
this connection, arrangements were also made for the dispatch
from the United States to Japan of an advance echelon which
was to facilitate the identification of pertinent depositories
and collections of captured documents and, following preliminary
scrutiny by ATIS for operational purposes, to see to the
expeditious forwarding of this material back to Washington for
final processing.

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Having considered the problem of postwar document handling, the conference also took up the task of planning for a general over-haul and streamlining of existing exploitation facilities in the United States. The war-time operations which had been set up to carry on this function were the product of necessity and, at best, considering the pressures of operating during hostilities, performed their task no worse than circumstances would dictate. Nonetheless, as the conference recognized, the manner of operation was wasteful, duplicative, and incomplete and therefore did not approach the standards envisioned for peace-time document exploitation. 5/ Thus, plans for reorganization were drawn up and subsequently implemented.

At the close of the war three agencies in the Zone of Interior were engaged in the handling of captured enemy documents. These were PACMIRS, already referred to; Op-32F141, established near the end of the war by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) as the naval counterpart of PACMIRS in Washington, D.C.; and the Washington Document Center (WDC), one of the fruits of the first Washington Document Conference, set up in February 1945 as a joint Army-Navy clearing station and evaluation board for captured Japanese documents received from the Far Eastern theaters. As mentioned earlier, the PACMIRS

mission was devoted to the strategic-level exploitation of
Japanese material and was aimed mainly toward Army and Air
interests. Op-32F141 functions were similar but were conducted
primarily with naval requirements in mind. The WDC task, as
then constituted, was largely a library function. In its
performance WDC forwarded to PACMIRS all documents relating to
Army interests, while with respect to Navy documents, only
those which WDC considered useful were sent on to Op-32F141,
the remainder being destroyed.

In considering this arrangement, three overriding factors
were readily evident to representatives at the conference: the
wasteful use of highly trained linguistic personnel, soon, with
the precipitant postwar demobilization just around the corner,
to be in limited supply; the overlapping interest in the
documents being processed, not only by the armed services, but
also by other government agencies and even non-government
organizations as well; and the impracticability of two or three
agencies, performing an identical type of operation, being
physically so widely separated. Carefully considering these
factors the conference recommended incorporation of Army and
Navy translating and research facilities into one working unit.
Since the Washington Document Center was the focal point for

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all captured documents evacuated from the Far East and since

Op-32F141 and PACMIRS were intimately associated with WDC, it

was considered appropriate that WDC expand to include the

functions then performed by these two organizations. The

consolidation was to include not only their translation

functions but also incorporation of the two document libraries

into WDC's holdings. At the same time, expressing doubt that

the full advantage of a consolidated document research center

could be completely realized unless it were placed in reasonable

proximity to the using agencies, the conference recommended

abandonment of Camp Ritchie as the PACMIRS site and the transfer

of PACMIRS personnel to Washington. 6/ In the matter of

personnel, the conference representatives expressed concern

that the imminent release from military service of the bulk of

the armed forces would cause unrest among the key specialist

personnel of WDC who had to be retained indefinitely in service.

This factor, coupled with the need for reducing Army strength

in the Military District of Washington, indicated to the con-

ference the advisability of providing Civil Service positions

for certain qualified translator and non-translator personnel. 7/

     With its work completed, the conference prepared a final

report and submitted it to higher headquarters. In retrospect

the recommendations and decisions adopted by the conference must reflect to the credit of its participants, in particular of its steering committee. The groundwork laid here did much to ease the transition to strategic-level peace-time document exploitation and the pattern of action adopted proved to be most effective in its subsequent development.

C. The Washington Document Center (Advanced)

With the end of hostilities in September 1945 and as a first step in implementing the recommendations adopted at the second Washington Document Conference, measures were taken to activate and dispatch to Tokyo the WDC forward echelon, which was designated the Washington Document Center (Advanced). Scheduled to leave for Japan early in October, delays for various reasons prevented the unit from departing before the last week in November. A complement of 29 officers and 31 enlisted men reached Tokyo on 24 November and upon arrival joined a Navy group already on the scene and working. In all, 91 Army and Navy personnel were involved in the project at its inception, of which 39 were officers and 52 enlisted men. Approximately half of the group were linguists. 8/ According to the recommendations of the second Washington Document Conference, WDC (Adv) was scheduled to remain in Japan only

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three to four months, but this estimate proved optimistic and the unit required about half a year to complete its work.

At the second Washington Document Conference a preliminary definition of the WDC (Adv) mission in the Far East had been drawn up. By the end of October these functions, basically unchanged, had been more closely defined through liaison between the officers concerned at both ends of the pipe-line, that is, in Washington and Tokyo. Approval had also been secured from Gen. MacArthur's SCAP Headquarters, specifically through the SCAP G-2, Gen. Willoughby. As set up, the plan called for close coordination between the Washington group and ATIS, the Tokyo-based document center, and in fact this meant, indirectly at least, that WDC (Adv) was to be placed in support of ATIS, since ATIS would be relieved of the burden of serving the Washington agencies and would thus be able to concentrate on meeting theater requirements. In this connection it was anticipated that in addition to Army-Navy requirements, WDC (Adv) would also look after the interests of authorized civilian government departments in its search for and handling of documents. 9/ It was felt that this arrangement would go far toward preventing a confused document situation like that which had arisen in Europe as a result of the independent action of many agencies after the conclusion of hostilities there. 10/

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As finally agreed, the functions of WDC (Adv) in the Far

East entailed essentially the establishment of a central document

clearing point in the Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK)

Building in Tokyo, which was to receive all documents selected

in the field, keep all collection agencies in Japan informed of

available materials, and see to shipment of the screened

documents to WDC in Washington. To avoid duplication and assure

expeditious evacuation of high-priority documents, technical

specialists on its staff were to maintain liaison with War

Department technical teams in Japan. The actual screening for

documents was to be accomplished by WDC (Adv) teams which were

to coordinate their activities with ATIS screening operations

in the field. This collection coordination was to extend to

Korea as well as Japan. As documents were seized, ATIS was to

extract from them all information pertaining to matters of

interest to the Supreme Allied Commander and then continue the

flow of documents to WDC (Adv) for shipment to Washington.

Finally, WDC (Adv) was to maintain a document information

center to serve all intelligence teams active in Japan. Its

function was to advise collecting agencies of the volume and

quality of material on hand or evacuated relating to subjects

of interest to the collecting agency. 11/

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Despite the usual initial confusion in setting up the operation, WDC (Adv) became a functioning organization by early December, largely through the efforts of the Executive Officer, Capt. Wesley Meginn. It was composed of six parts: the Headquarters Staff with an Army officer as chief and a Naval officer as his deputy, the Production and Information Section, the Special Acquisitions Section, the Liaison Section, the Documents Section, and the Teams Section. The latter was composed of 16 field teams, each consisting of a language officer, a language enlisted man, and a basic enlisted man. 12/

Thus established, the personnel of WDC (Adv) went to work. Immediate postwar conditions in Japan, and also in Korea, were chaotic, particularly, from the WDC (Adv) standpoint, in connection with enemy official documents and records. Because of the deteriorating home front near the end of the war, most of the collections, where they had survived destruction, had been neglected and left in great disarray and therefore required intensive screening. A screening team sent to Korea early in January 1946 found the situation tense and fluid. The hardening in Korean and American Military Government attitudes was such that a second screening team sent from Tokyo the following month was actually unsuccessful in evacuating material of any

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real value. The January survey revealed that considerable

valuable material was available. At the turn of the year and

only four months after liberation the Koreans were still so

anti-Japanese that they were willing to throw out anything

Japanese, but a month later, and possibly as a result of the

January survey, the value of Japanese records and official

documents was beginning to be recognized by the Koreans and

they therefore became much more difficult to obtain. 13/ This

instance was quite typical of the problems facing the WDC (Adv)

screening teams in the Far East. However, despite the numerous

problems encountered, the unit was eminently successful in

fulfilling the task it had been sent to do, and in the six

months that it spent in Japan it succeeded in collecting,

selecting, and evacuating to Washington 650,000 items, some

500 tons of documents. 14/

D. Consolidation of Exploitation Activities

Meanwhile, as the overseas work of WDC (Adv) continued,

progress was being made in Washington on the important move

toward consolidation of the various document exploitation

facilities in the Capital area. This was, however, not accom-

plished without delays and initial set-backs in the move. On

3 January 1946 an inter-service meeting, termed the Washington

Document Center Conference, was convened to discuss the general subject of postwar document exploitation. A number of recommendations were put forth which threatened to sabotage the earlier-expressed concept of centralizing document exploitation in PACMIRS and, subsequently, in its successor organization, the expanded Washington Document Center. This trend was protested by Sidney Marland's successor as chief of PACMIRS, Col. Gaspardi F. Blunda. In a memorandum to the Director of Intelligence Research, MIS, Blunda opposed the apparent purpose of the meeting's participants, who, in contravention to the August 1945 Washington Document Conference, seemed intent on decentralizing PACMIRS so that each government agency could start to exploit documents solely to satisfy its own requirements. Based on the Washington Conference deliberations and recommendations, Blunda vigorously emphasized the need to centralize linguistic effort in PACMIRS/OP-32F141 (the future WDC) since documentary research by the operational agencies could only lead to wasteful competition for and employment of the few available linguists and to inadequate dissemination of the information. With the increased load which would be put on the new WDC shortly it was essential that piecemeal and competitive attempts to obtain documentary

information should not be indulged in. The alternative, Blunda concluded, was that decentralization would result in PACMIRS being merely a clearing house, which was the present function of the old WDC and would obviate the need for an organization such as the Washington Document Conference had recommended. 15/

This impassioned plea did not allay the problem and pressures for decentralization were to recur frequently in the next few years. This was, however, a period of trial and error, and decisions and recommendations valid one day were often subject to change the next. The situation was one of flux. It was with problems such as this that the augmented Washington Document Center came into existence.

During the fall of 1945 and spring of 1946, while WDC (Adv) was actively screening and collecting captured enemy documents in the Far East, the entire Japanese document exploitation venture in the Washington area was being merged into a joint Army-Navy operation. On 17 April 1946, PACMIRS, Op-32F141, and the old WDC were combined as a single operation in one location, assuming the existing name of "Washington Document Center" (WDC) for the new composite grouping. In this form it operated as Section F-5 of the Office of Naval Operations until 1 December 1946 when it was transferred to the newly formed Central Intelligence Group as part of that agency's Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE).

This consolidation of document exploitation marked the actual inception of what was to become the Foreign Documents Division.

The new organization was first headquartered in the Steuart Building at Fifth and K Streets, N.W., in Washington and remained at this location for the next seven and a half months until its integration into CIG. The first head of the consolidated WDC was Ranson Fullinwider, a Navy captain. His tour in this assignment was relatively short, some three months, and he was succeeded in July by Cmdr. Mark T. Little, who remained in charge of the operation for the duration of its existence as a service-controlled organization.

The job of these two men and their subordinates consisted primarily of overseeing the transition of the enlarged document exploitation effort from a war-time to a peace-time basis. What this amounted to was the liquidation of document work based on war-related requirements, the preparation for and adjustment to an expanded document-exploitation program necessitated by the large influx of enemy documents sent to Washington by WDC (Adv), and, finally, readjustments required in connection with personnel shifts, a problem created not only by the new amalgamation but even more by the end of the war. It was doubtless the last of these aspects which caused the greatest difficulty. Still a service organization at this time, WDC was a hybrid of the most

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varied kind. It consisted of officers, enlisted men, and enlisted women, of linguists and non-linguists, of personnel from all components of the United States armed forces, from the British Army, Navy and Air Force, and from the Canadian Army. At the time of the amalgamation it even included some civilians. The major problem the unit had to face was the one of flux and impermanence. With the war just over and rapid demobilization the vogue, the chances of losing valuable experience and talent were, of course, infinitely greater than under war-time conditions or in a stable peace-time civilian economy. When the three units combined into one, the total complement amounted to 278 individuals. 16/ This figure varied from week to week but remained fairly stable until August 1946. Indeed, as reported in the weekly progress report of 24 July 1946, it once increased to a total of 309 personnel. From mid-August on, however, personnel totals gradually decreased until at the end of November — on the eve of the integration into CIG — the figure had declined to 161 individuals.

While the scope of operations of the new WDC was consider- ably enlarged by the April amalgamation, the functions of the three combined units changed little if at all. A gradual interchange of expertise and personnel occurred but actual

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change in the organization at first was more the result of the external influences already cited than of deliberate internal innovation. The task of coping with administrative shifts left little time for other matters, so that, qualitatively if not in quantity of workload, the organization marked time for its first seven months.

Organizationally, the Washington Document Center, as of 1 August 1946, included the administrative staff headed by Cmdr. Little as chief of the Center and three operational sections -- Library, Research, and Publications -- which were headed, respectively, by Lt. Joseph Becker, Lt. Cmdr. John Bagnall, and Capt. Wesley Meginn, the latter only recently returned from his assignment with WDC (Adv) in the Far East. The Research Section included seven sub-sections: Screening, Editorial, and the so-called Projects A, B, C, D, and E (code designations for the following research areas: Soviet Russia, Manchuria-Mongolia, China, Japan, and Scientific and Technical). 17/ It is of interest to note that the respective chiefs of the Publications Section (Meginn), the Soviet Russia Project (Talbot Bielefeldt), and the Scientific and Technical Project (Lawrence Bucans) continued as chiefs of these subject areas for the remainder of their professional careers. By the time these men retired, the importance and size of these components had grown considerably.

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The mission of the new WDC was threefold: the rapid
exploitation of the documents coming in from the Far East for
actual or potential strategic intelligence based on requirements
from the War and Navy Departments and other authorized agencies;
establishment of a central comprehensive library embracing all
Far Eastern documents received; and the disposal of those
documents deemed of no value to the War and Navy Departments
and their consignment to the Library of Congress.

In connection with its library function and to facilitate
research by its consumers, the first efforts of WDC were directed
toward completion of document cataloging and indexing according
to the MORI-KIYOSHI (Japanese dual-decimal system) and the BID
system (Basic Intelligence Directive). The potential gains from
this operation were considerable since the collection forwarded
to Washington by WDC (Adv) was at that time the world's most
complete source of information on the Far East.

As regards its exploitation function, WDC's major effort
was devoted to the processing of documents pertaining to the
USSR, Far East, and the Eastern European countries. Only a small
portion of linguist and non-linguist strength was spent on the
processing of material on other world areas on a long-range
basis. To facilitate the operation, close liaison was maintained

with the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments in order to obtain guidance in the exploitation effort. It was anticipated that by 1 October 1946 all documents pertaining to the USSR, Far East, and Eastern Europe would be scanned, and after that date, consistent with the personnel at hand, the Center's effort would be placed on the continuing exploitation, that is, translation and abstracting, of the highest-priority documents dealing with these areas as such material was received. At the same time WDC would continue to catalogue and index documents then in process. 18/ During this period, with a requirements regime based on the needs of potential users of the material still in a formative stage, the Center's work was largely of a contingency nature designed to bring order to a large mass of material.

By 1 August 1946 approximately half of the 500 tons of documents seized by WDC (Adv) and sent to Washington had been processed. This left the remainder to be catalogued, indexed, and exploited in the two months remaining if the 1 October deadline was to be met. 19/ This promised to be a formidable task in view of the deteriorating personnel situation. The loss of all civilian employees in WDC was anticipated by October and the continuing reduction in linguist officer and

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enlisted personnel strength through attrition would further handicap the successful completion of the mission. US Navy participation would be materially decreased as of 1 December 1946. That of the British Navy had ended on 15 August and the participation of the British Army would cease as of 1 January 1947. Moreover, Canadian Army and RAF operations after 1 January were still in question. The problem facing WDC was clearly evident and an appeal was made to augment the WDC personnel in the near future. 20/

Fortunately for the future of postwar document exploitation, planning was already under way to alleviate the crisis. Recognizing the increasingly precarious position of the Army and Navy as sponsors because of postwar budget cuts and aware of service plans for the abandonment, or at best the drastic de-emphasizing, of the operation, the recently established Central Intelligence Group initiated negotiations involving the Army, Navy, and CIG during the late summer of 1946 relative to centralizing the document exploitation effort under CIG control. 21/ This development and the adjustments attendant to it were now to occupy the Washington Document Center for the next six to twelve months; by that time the pattern upon which the evolvement of the organization was to be based had been fairly well established.

CHAPTER TWO

The Washington Document Center Joins

the Central Intelligence Group

A. Transfer of Document Exploitation to Civilian Control

In line with the general reorganization of the Central

Intelligence Group effected by Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg following

his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in

June 1946 and pursuant to the policy of replacing committee

procedure by direct executive action, the Interdepartmental

Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) was created on 20 July

with Donald D. Edgar as its head. During the next six months

this group initiated, planned, and completed a number of

important projects, one of which was the incorporation of the

Washington Document Center into CIG operations. As stated

earlier, this move was necessitated by the inability of the

armed services, because of budget and personnel cuts following

the end of the war, to continue the operation. From a financial

standpoint, the move of WDC to CIG proved successful and re-

sulted in a budgetary saving not only to each department in-

volved but to the government as a whole. However, as early as

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the initial stages of negotiations which led up to the transfer, it was foreseen that the benefits would be not only financial but in the long run would also include greater effectiveness in this type of operation. This was true because from the outset it was anticipated that the new organization, once separated from military control, could be used to form a nucleus for the further centralization of foreign document exploitation. The activity was at that time widely scattered, particularly among non-military organizations within the government; none of these could perform the operation as efficiently as a centralized unit. 22/

The groundwork for incorporation of the document exploitation operation under the CIG aegis was laid with considerable care. The task of investigating its feasibility and impact was assigned to Col. Sheffield Edwards, Assistant Executive Director, CIG. During a period of several months beginning in September 1946, he conducted a series of conferences and visitations which resulted in a variety of recommendations pertaining to the subject. As a first step, he visited the War Department's Washington Document Center to study its operations, functions, and value. As a result of his findings he recommended that CIG take over the 55 War Department civilian personnel of WDC without delay and before 9 October,

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their projected date of discharge, and, further, that plans be made to take over the entire Document Center in its existing location in the Steuart Building on or about 1 December. It was also as a result of one of Edwards' directives that the initial subordination of WDC within CIG was established. In September the Office of Research and Evaluation* was directed to make definite plans to take control of WDC by 1 December. 23/ WDC's assignment to ORE at this time appears, in retrospect, to have been a move of convenience, although there were those in ORE who felt then, as later, that the arrangement was proper because the true role of WDC/FDD personnel should be to serve ORE research efforts rather than to provide a common service for all government intelligence organizations. The Office of Operations (OO), to which WDC was subsequently shifted, was then not yet in existence, though it was established a month after WDC was assigned to ORE.

It is of interest at this stage to note that the problem of WDC/FDD subordination has been a recurrent one. At intervals throughout its life-time the question of the proper place of FDD in the general CIA scheme-of-things has evoked indecision.

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* This component was redesignated the Office of Reports and Estimates on 27 October 1946.

At least in part this was due to the "neither-fish-nor-fowl"
nature of the exploitation operation -- indecision as to whether
it was research, pure collection, a linguistic function, or a
library operation. It was in fact all of these and this made
its placement difficult. Its assignment to OO, when that
Office was established on 17 October 1946, was more or less
by way of compromise.

In view of the impending budgetary and personnel re-
ductions, the Army and the Navy, even at the intelligence
staff level, were not opposed to the loss of the document
exploitation operation to the new civilian organization and
in fact they actively sought the transfer. This attitude was
confirmed in separate memoranda by Col. Ennis, Chief of the
Intelligence Group, WDGS, 24/ and by Gen. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, WDGS, the latter speaking for ONI as well as
ID. 25/

A meeting between Ennis and Col. Edwards of CIG to discuss
arrangements concerning service personnel assignments in the
proposed transfer of the document exploitation function to
CIG was held on 8 October. At this conference 12 officers and
20 enlisted men, representing key personnel then on duty with
WDC, were authorized for WDC assignment for the period 1 December
1946 - 1 July 1947. 26/

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As a follow-up to the Ennis-Edwards conference, two ORE representatives, Col. Perry and _____ met on 10

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October with Cmdr. Little, the WDC chief, and Maj. William B. Pohlman, his deputy, to discuss details of the impending transfer. The outcome of the meeting was Perry's recommendation, subsequently adopted, that provision be made by CIG for the WDC Table of Organization (T/O), totaling 151, for the period 1 December 1946 - 1 July 1947. This T/O was to comprise 98 Army and 53 Navy people, including, respectively, 28 and 36 civilians. The latter figure included some 28 of the Naval officers who would be converting to civilian status. 27/ At the same time Little drew up a tentative T/O for continuance of the operation under CIG after 1 December. This organizational plan provided for a total of 156 employees and placed strong emphasis on retaining military officers in key positions. 28/

The preliminaries completed, the formal transfer of WDC to the Central Intelligence Group occurred in December 1946. On 27 November Col. Edwin K. Wright, Executive to the DCI, in replying to a memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy, stated that in pursuance of the request received from Gen. Chamberlin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Adm. Inglis, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Group would take over operation of the Washington Document Center on 1 December 1946. 29/

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For the first month WDC carried on its functions under its usual designation and as part of ORE; then, on 31 December, a memorandum was issued revoking the ORE subordination and making the organization, retroactive to 1 December, part of the Office of Operations (OO), a relationship which was to last for the next 17 years. At the same time, the name "Washington Document Center" passed into history and the unit was redesignated the "Documents Branch" of OO. 30/ On 2 January 1947 Documents Branch (DB) personnel were formally welcomed into CIG by the DCI 31/ and the transition from military to civilian control was completed.

B. Problems of Administrative Integration

The move to CIG marked the beginning of a period -- lasting well into 1947 -- of assimilation into the new parent organization and adjustment to new situations. The work of DB continued for the moment basically as before, with major emphasis on captured document exploitation. However, this was already beginning to change to a new concept of document work resulting from the fact that the intelligence to be derived from captured materials was running dry and was rapidly being replaced by a demand for information extracted from current sources.

It may be well at this point, for the record, to note briefly what the functions of DB were on the eve of its transfer

to CIG, since all subsequent changes in the unit's operations were based upon this statement of mission. At the time of the transfer WDC was operating, according to the Acting Chief John Bagnall, as "a basically factual research organization on the Far East, to provide CIG with current and background intelligence data on the Far East as found available in oriental language publications." 32/ With the change-over, the wording was revised and the new Documents Branch was designated as "an organization for the exploitation of foreign documents" tasked "to provide the CIG with current intelligence information on foreign countries as found available in foreign language publications." 33/ A memorandum issued by the CIG Executive for Personnel and Administration several days later spelled out in detail the functions of DB as follows:

> (1) To receive foreign documents for cataloguing, summarizing, and translation, the determination of documents to be received to be made in coordination between the Assistant Director for Operations (AD/O) and the Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination (AD/CD).

> (2) To prepare subject lists of accessions for distribution as determined by the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD).

> (3) To prepare extracts and summaries from documents in its possession to meet requirements received from OCD.

> (4) To prepare literal translations of documents in its possession to meet requirements received from OCD.

(5)   To provide such technical liaison with similar activities as might be authorized by the AD/O.

(6)   To establish exploitation projects on a continuing basis as required.

(7)   To dispose of documents not needed in accordance with policies set by the AD/O and Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates (AD/RE). 34/

As is evident, these functions were designed primarily for the processing of captured documents with which the organization was wholly concerned in the immediate postwar period. However, as stated above, a change to current material was in the offing and when this occurred, later in 1947, the functions listed above, with minor revision, remained applicable.

Operational adjustments were, however, not the only ones demanding attention. Of more immediate concern were administrative problems. Thus while operations initially continued nearly unchanged under rather disruptive circumstances, great emphasis in the beginning was placed upon solving organizational problems.

As a first step, the transfer of WDC to CIG was marked by a physical relocation from the Steuart Building to [   ]   25X1

[   ] This was to be the first of   25X1

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* A proposal to move DB to the Navy Yards and Docks Building near Arlington Cemetery had been rejected when it was found that that structure was not strong enough to support the weight of the many documents in DB's possession.

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four moves made by the unit. Consideration was then and in the future sporadically given to placing it in close proximity to its major consumers in CIG, and later in CIA, particularly so when the new Headquarters Building was under construction during 1959-1961, but a complete fusion never came about, and throughout its life FDD conducted its functions physically separated from its consumer offices. At best this arrangement constituted an inconvenience, at worst, it was inefficient.

The move to _____ was completed on the night of 30 November 1946 in coordination with _____   25X1

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_____ Strict security measures accompanied the move of the organizational equipment and documents, with commissioned Army and Navy personnel acting as guards.   25X1

The major concern of DB and its new parent organization during the transition period was, and was to remain for some time to come, the problem of personnel. There appeared to be no diminution of work during the postwar period and indeed, with the consolidation of intelligence operations under the DCI in 1946/1947 and the gradual intensification of the Cold War in the period following, the workload increased considerably.

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The problem, therefore, became one of finding, developing, and maintaining a staff commensurate in size with the work that had to be done. This proved to be a difficult undertaking.

Reference has already been made to the 650,000 captured documents received by WDC. At the beginning of 1947 about 120,000 of these documents had not been completely processed and it was estimated that of this number about 50,000 possessed intelligence value and deserved further exploitation. In addition, there was a backlog of 350 accession lists covering 70,000 documents. Accession lists were being published at the rate of ten per week but the backlog remained constant due to the fact that this output of accession lists only equalled the intake of documents. The receipt of material in early 1947 averaged about 10,000 items per month, composed of about equal parts of captured documents and current periodicals. 35/ At the same time, roughly ten requests per day were received from the 41 consumers with whom DB maintained liaison and by January 1947 there existed a current backlog of approximately 2,000 requirements which had accumulated since the creation of the amalgamated WDC in April 1946. 36/ Despite periodic efforts to weed out outdated requirements which were no longer valid, the heavy personnel loss due to demobilization and the disruptive effects of the transfer to CIG made the effort to keep

up with the remaining requests a losing one. It is easy to
see that if the trend toward personnel departures then under-
way had not been offset by an effective recruitment program,
the situation in document exploitation would soon have reached
crisis proportions. Even with the efforts undertaken then
and continued later on, the problem of securing and holding
qualified personnel sufficient to cope with DB's needs was
never completely solved. It came closest to solution after
establishment of the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)
some ten years later but even this was only a partial answer.

When WDC transferred to CIG on 1 December 1946, only 87
(28 Army, 14 Navy, and 45 civilians) of the 250 persons then
assigned to the organization actually made the change. 37/
According to the DB report issued at the end of the first
quarter of 1947, this total had increased slightly, to 92, by
1 January 1947, 38/ but the overall decline continued and on
11 February Donald Edgar, head of ICAPS, reported to the
Director that, due to losses in the military personnel assigned
to the Document Branch, its roster had been reduced to 69
persons and it was faced with a further reduction of about
20. From a numerical standpoint, this marked the nadir of
the DB personnel problem. Edgar recommended an augmentation

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of DB personnel in order to permit the unit effectively to ful-
fill the requirements of Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB)
agencies. 39/

The loss of military personnel in DB referred to by Edgar
resulted in part from a CIG memorandum of 9 January 1947, which,
in view of the current over-strength status of CIG, required
its components to take immediate steps to release excess officers
either to civilian life or back to the military services, de-
pending upon the category of the individual. 40/ This created
a particular hardship for DB, almost half composed of military
personnel at the time of its creation a month earlier. The
organization, however, took steps to comply with the order and
officers and men were gradually released, either by absorption
as civilians into DB, by discharge to civilian life outside
the unit, or by reassignment to the Army or Navy. Among those
in the first category were most of the top echelon of DB,
including Lt. Cmdr. John Bagnall, at this time Acting Chief
of the organization, and also many in lower ranks of DB who
in time to come were to form the nucleus upon which the ex-
panded FDD would be built. The phase-out process was a gradual
one and took approximately nine months to complete. The last
contingent, six enlisted men, was scheduled for release on
30 September. 41/

Thus the personnel estimate submitted by Cmdr. Little
early in October 1946 at CIG's request, amounting to 151, far
exceeded the actual number on duty. Prospects of meeting this
figure appeared bleak and the attitude of the top CIG adminis-
trators, faced as they were by their own diverse problems of
change, gave no promise of a rapid improvement. When [   ]   25X1

[   ] Advisor for Management, forwarded the memorandum   25X1

recommending the 151 T/O to the AD/O for his suggestions for

action, [   ] noted that "since it [WDC] is a going concern   25X1

it cannot be given first priority in the development of its
final organizational structure and personnel requirements." 42/

Although the personnel situation in DB in the formative
stages of the organization was discouraging and many of the
problems remained endemic, circumstances gradually improved
and with better organized recruitment, the branch, under a T/O
of 344 attained at the end of 1952, eventually reached a com-
plement of more than 300 employees. From 1953 on, it remained on
a plateau which seldom varied from a personnel figure of 290-300.

The end of the war and the subsequent transfer of document
exploitation activities from military to civilian control
created a problem for DB in another sphere, namely, an aspect
of security. To a limited extent at least, this also contri-
buted to the personnel shortage in the unit. The problem

pertained to the situation created by the attachment during
the war of Allied personnel, British and Canadians, to the
document exploitation units set up at that time. For example,
linguists from the Canadian Army Language School at Vancouver,
British Columbia, reinforced the language efforts of the
Americans at PACMIRS. Later on, in February 1945, as a result
of the first Washington Document Conference two months earlier,
where one of the recommendations pertained to consolidation of
inter-Allied language specialists, ten British linguist officers
were assigned to PACMIRS. One of these, Lt. Col. P. Pender-
Cudlip, who had served as British War Office representative at
the conference, was even designated chief of the Translation
Group at Camp Ritchie. Other British and Canadian officers
were appointed section heads. With the incorporation of PACMIRS
into WDC the British and Canadian contingents were transferred
along with their American counterparts. Now, with the move to
CIG, a civilian organization with higher security standards,
circumstances changed. Consequently, on 16 December 1946
                  the Assistant Executive Director, submitted
to the AD/O a memorandum involving a policy change relative
to Allied personnel. It directed that henceforth no Allied
personnel would be assigned to WDC; all prior commitments re-
lating to Allied force personnel at WDC were considered

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abrogated as of 1 December 1946, the date of transfer of WDC

to CIG; and the senior officers of the British and Canadian

groups would henceforth serve, with a reasonable number of

assistants, as liaison officers to WDC for their respective

services. The extent of their liaison functions was to be

set at the discretion of the Chief, WDC and the AD/O. 43/

A subsequent memorandum from the Executive Director spelled

out the future DB relationship with the British in additional

detail and stated in effect that requests for dissemination

of materials to the British had to come through channels,

via the Foreign Liaison Office of ID or the Director, ONI,

whichever had primary cognizance of the subject matter. In

recognition of the fact that this arrangement was somewhat

cumbersome, DB was authorized, with minor exceptions, to

maintain its earlier relationship with the British. This was

to be accomplished through routine day-to-day contacts by DB

personnel with a British liaison unit, an organization

eventually replaced by a single British liaison officer. DB

was authorized to continue furnishing the British with clas-

sified accession lists and with translations of a non-sensitive

nature. 44/ However, the use as heretofore of British personnel

in the regular operations of the component was discontinued.

In the long term the effect of the change in DB operations was minor, but its immediate consequence was to deprive the organization of badly needed, well-trained linguistic personnel.

C. Consolidation Completed

In the course of its 20-year existence there were numerous changes and adjustments in DB's structure and operational methods, but on the whole these were related to changing problems and requirements within the Agency and were relatively minor in the overall picture. The early period, on the other hand, was one of volatile transition, and changes came rapidly as all the loose ends of document exploitation were assembled under one authority. This assimilative process lasted until mid-1947 when the German Military Documents Section (GMDS) and the Special Documents Section (SDS), the last two document units still operating under military control, were gathered into the CIG fold. From then on, the structure of CIG's document exploitation facility was essentially established and changes were for the most part dedicated to refining the operation for maximum efficiency.

Unlike the earlier components incorporated into DB, all three of which were concerned with processing Japanese materials, GMDS and SDS operations were oriented to the European theater and therefore to German documents. GMDS, which during the war had

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operated under the War Department at Fort Hunt, south of
Alexandria, Virginia, performed primarily a library/depository
function. This required a relatively modest complement, which
in the fall of 1946 was authorized at 5 officers and 15 en-
listed men, 45/ but at the end of January 1947 was actually 8
officers and 14 enlisted men. 46/ On the other hand, SDS, also
part of the War Department, had been set up after the war, in
late May 1946, at Holabird Signal Depot, near Baltimore, to
exploit captured German documents dealing with the Soviet
economy and to a lesser extent Russian documents on the same
subject captured by the Germans. A series of research pro-
jects had been established at SDS in response to intelligence
requirements issued by the War Department Intelligence Division
and the Air Intelligence Division. The main SDS effort was
reserved for its Industrial Card File (ICF), an important
collection of Soviet industrial plant information, which was
highly regarded in the US intelligence community. It was ex-
pected that reconstruction of the most recent German intelligence
picture of the USSR economy would be completed by the end of
May 1947. 47/ The personnel strength of SDS in October 1946
was 6 officers, 5 enlisted personnel, and 44 civilians. 48/
By reason of their respective functions, GMDS, then in the
Pentagon, and SDS personnel worked in close conjunction with

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each other.

In October 1946, with the project for consolidation of the Japanese documents organizations well advanced and in line with the earlier policy decision to divest the military of the document exploitation function, Gen. Chamberlin of the War Department Intelligence Division suggested that GMDS and SDS also be included in the documents exploitation facility of CIG and proposed that this transfer be effected by 1 April 1947. 49/ The logic of incorporating German documents with Japanese documents exploitation seemed self-evident and a study was instituted under ICAPS auspices to investigate the advisability of this move. 50/ Despite the apparent soundness of incorporation there seems to have been some hesitation in carrying it out. Even as late as February 1947 no final decision had yet been reached, although it was expected that at least one of the units, presumably SDS, would be accepted. 51/ Finally, CIG expressed its willingness to take over the document exploitation responsibilities of SDS as of 1 June 1947 and to accept the transfer of the 44 civilians then employed by the organization. CIG also agreed to take over the document screening and intelligence operations performed by GMDS but it refused to accept the library functions of the section. In the matter of document custody CIG expressed its agreement with the tentative plan of ID to turn over to the Adjutant General

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documents in GMDS's possession as well as documents received

from the European theater after the GMDS transfer to CIG on

1 June 1947. This was to be contingent, however, upon provision

of ready access to these documents for CIG and other members of

the intelligence community. 52/ To facilitate the document

handling involved, DB provided a CIG detachment to operate in

the Pentagon in direct conjunction with the Adjutant General.

This group took over the title "German Military Documents

Section" and all the non-intelligence functions performed

earlier by the original GMDS. These included receiving,

library cataloguing, shelving, storing, loaning to other

agencies, recording, and otherwise handling and disposing of

documents. 53/

In connection with the transfer of SDS duties to CIG

some concern was expressed about the fate of the ICF. The

War Department Intelligence Division felt strongly about the

need for uninterrupted continuation of this project and had

so stipulated in a memorandum directed to the DCI. 54/ With

a subsequent memorandum in April CIG allayed ID's concern by

agreeing to assume full responsibility for continuance of the

Industrial Card File project of SDS. 55/ This did not

fully resolve the question of the project, however, at least

so far as CIG was concerned. Gen. Sibert, the AD/O, made the

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point that maintenance of the ICF was outside the scope of a

document branch since the operation involved the preparation of

cards from non-document sources. He suggested instead ORE

acceptance of responsibility for the activity when the transfer

was made on 1 June but he agreed to let DB handle it temporarily

in view of the difficulty involved in separating ICF functions

from document exploitation so soon after transfer. A division

of labor could be more easily arranged later on after approval

and implementation within ORE of the pending Foreign Industrial

Establishments Project. 56/ It was subsequently agreed that ORE

would take over ICF operations on or about 1 October 1947. 57/

Finally, dictated by changes within CIG which separated library

reference functions from ORE, a memorandum was issued in late

October which provided for the transfer of the ICF Project from

DB (now renamed the Foreign Documents Branch) to the Reference

Center, Administration and Management (A&M), by 1 December 1947

and its incorporation into the Foreign Industrial Register as a

central service. 58/ From then on FDB's only association with

ICF was its continuing contribution of data from foreign docu-

ment sources.

The official transfer of SDS and GMDS from the Intel-

ligence Division to DB was scheduled to take place on 1 June

1947 and was so authorized. At that time the units and their

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facilities and personnel were to be moved to the DB premises

SDS from Baltimore and GMDS from the   25X1

Pentagon. The move was to include all civilians and such

military as could be persuaded to take civilian employment.

It was suggested in the authorization that no grades higher

than P-6 should be offered and that these should be limited

to three or four in that grade for civilianizing officers.

Civilians then on duty were to be assured of permanency of

employment provided they could pass the Civil Service Board

and the necessary background investigations. 59/ Though not

then foreseen, the latter provision was to create considerable

difficulties in consummating the transfer. Early in May, be-

cause of doubt that security clearances on the civilians to

be transferred could be completed before the deadline and

also to permit the completion of certain short-range projects

and special translations still in process, the date of trans-

fer was delayed a month and set at 30 June. 60/

On 10 June, in preparation for the anticipated amalgamation

of SDS and GMDS with DB, a tentative new T/O was approved for the

augmented Documents Branch. It increased the T/O strength of the

organization to 250 and raised the personnel ceiling to 190. 61/

Unfortunately, the strict security requirements of CIG raised

havoc with the plan for assimilating the ID personnel into the

- 45 -

DB structure. More than two thirds of the SDS/GMDS civilians failed to pass the CIG security clearance. This proved to be a source of embarrassment to the War Department which found that it had employed on confidential projects people who could not be cleared by CIG standards. Since CIG Personnel and Administration (P&A) refused to take responsibility for informing these employees that they could not be cleared and could therefore not be employed by CIG, it was necessary for the War Department to terminate some of them and to find less sensitive positions for others. 62/

This was not the first such occurrence. The same problem had been encountered earlier in the year in connection with the transfer of military personnel in WDC when it was taken over by CIG. Most military personnel of WDC had been cleared for intelligence work of high security classification to the satisfaction of the War and Navy Departments' wartime standards. CIG's stricter requirements were quickly reflected when "waivers" were sought in vain for certain personnel not meeting citizenship or other requirements. The chief of the Security Division, CIG, noted in January 1947 that an exception in the case of Documents Branch might be possible but advised against it because of the difficulty in discharging undesirable individuals once hired. 63/ The security problem was eventually

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worked out and the crisis passed, but in view of the precarious
personnel situation in DB and the difficulty in securing trained
and knowledgeable intelligence officers and linguists, this
development was an extremely unfortunate one from the stand-
point of DB operations.

The transition from military to civilian control continued,
and pending the SDS/GMDS move to DB, changes in DB leadership
and structure were initiated. During the short period it
was under Navy control in 1946 WDC had been headed by Cmdr.
Mark T. Little. His deputy was an Army officer, Maj. William
B. Pohlman, former chief of PACMIRS. By December John J. Bagnall,
a former Naval officer and now DB Executive Officer, was serving
as acting chief in the prolonged absence of Cmdr. Little. The
formal relief of Little as Chief, DB, was announced on 28
February 1947 and the same memorandum formalized Bagnall's
position as acting chief, effective 1 March. 64/ A short time
after, on 13 March, he was named chief. 65/

The appointment of Bagnall to head the CIG document
exploitation operation was, at this point at least, con-
sidered to be only a temporary assignment. During March 1947
the Office of Personnel and Administration began compiling a
list of all positions in CIG which were to be considered "key
positions." This survey was conducted in order to inform

member agencies of IAB which positions were being occupied
by military, naval, and State Department personnel. 66/ The
following month Gen. Sibert, AD/O, submitted a number of
lists of key personnel assigned to positions in the Office of
Operations and in the forwarding memorandum he referred to his
search for an Army officer to become chief of DB at the time
that SDS and GMDS were to be taken into the organization. 67/
This matter was advanced further in July after the two sections
had been absorbed when [   ] Deputy Assistant Director   25X1
of Operations (DAD/O), designated several slots as key positions
and suggested they be filled by Army, Air, and Navy Department
personnel. The positions, their suggested grades, and the
service of assignment included chief of the branch (P-8)
to Army, chief of the branch's Far Eastern Division (P-6) to
Navy, and chief of the Scientific and Technical Division (P-6)
to Air. [   ] was then under consideration by   25X1
the AD/O as a candidate for the position of Chief, FDB. 68/
[   ] was actually appointed to this position later on in   25X1
1947 and held it for approximately a year, but this was the
extent of the assignment of "key positions" to the military.
The increasingly civilian-oriented complexion of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which replaced CIG in September 1947,
was reflected in the make-up of its document exploitation facility.

As part of the adjustment to DB's new functions and sub-ordination the branch entered a period of experimentation which resulted in a number of changes in its organizational structure. None of these alterations was profound; they were instead read-justments designed to seek and obtain greater efficiency. To a large degree they were in response to changing requirements from the intelligence community but this was more true later on than at this time. In 1947 it was more a matter of the organization getting its house in order to meet new challenges than anything else.

A tentative T/O was submitted on 4 December 1946 which differed slightly from that adopted by WDC the previous August.* The position of Operations Officer was dropped and Liaison and Control were divided into two separate offices. In addition, Screening and Editorial, heretofore units under Bagnall's old Research Section, were moved up and were themselves made sections. Total personnel under this T/O was set at ☐ only about two-thirds of which was filled. 69/ In a presentation of the WDC mission and functions on 17 December Bagnall submitted to the AD/O another T/O involving further changes in nomenclature

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* See p. 20.

and structure. By this move the Liaison Office was abolished and Administration and Control were designated, respectively, "Administration and Security Office" and "Control and Planning Office." The Editorial Section changed to unit status and, with a new Service Unit, was placed under the Publications Section. The new T/O called for a total of ☐ persons. Against this Bagnall proposed that recruitment be initiated to bring the current ☐ assigned and on duty to a strength of ☐ 70/

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Further T/O versions were submitted by DB on 2 and 12 May 1947 calling for certain changes in nomenclature and for expansion of the organization, 71/ but these were not approved. Then on 6 June ☐ Advisor for Management, submitted one to the Assistant Executive Director and this was returned approved on 10 June. It provided for the following organizational changes:

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> The position of Research Consultant in the Office of the Chief was eliminated.
>
> The Executive Officer was redesignated "Administrative Officer."
>
> The Personnel and Administration Section was abolished and its functions integrated into a new Administrative Staff.
>
> The Publications Section was abolished.

The new Document Source Survey Division, which had been activated earlier in the month, was approved.

The former research projects (A, B, C, D, and E), in conformance with their substantive functions, were consolidated and redesignated the "USSR and Satellites Division," the "Far East Division," and the "Scientific and Technical Division." 72/

The 10 June reorganization allowed a T/O of [ ] but the problems   25X1
of security clearance referred to earlier made prospects of
approaching even close to this figure extremely poor. The in-
creased personnel demands for reproduction and publication
constituted a large problem, and the branch was faced with
increasing difficulties of recruiting and clearance against
the ordered decrease of military personnel. The same held true
in respect to securing qualified civilian personnel.

On 27 June 1947 Gen. Sibert officially announced the
reorganization and redesignation of the Documents Branch. By
this memorandum SDS and GMDS were transferred to CIG as of
29 June; Documents Branch was redesignated the "Foreign Docu-
ment Branch" (FDB) and was to include the reorganized divisions
and administration referred to above; and John Bagnall, Chief
of Documents Branch, was appointed deputy chief and acting
chief of the new FDB. 73/ With its new T/O of [ ] at the end   25X1
of June, FDB was operating with a ceiling [ ] and a complement   25X1
of [ ] individuals on duty. 74/   25X1

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The date 29 June 1947 serves as an important bench mark in the history of CIG document exploitation. With its re-organization completed, the new branch had basically attained the structure and character with which it was to carry on its operations for the balance of its life. Many changes lay ahead, to a considerable degree in the branch's structure but more particularly in the nature of its functions and its developing relationships with the rest of the community. This would be especially so in the near future with the transition from captured document to current exploitation. In its essentials, however, the trend of development was fixed.

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CHAPTER THREE

New Approaches to Document Exploitation

A. The Move Toward an Exploitation Function

When it was integrated into CIG on 1 December 1946,
DB was performing as a documents processing center with the
bulk of 650,000 captured Japanese documents, the outgrowth
of the earlier WDC (Adv) survey, as its main source material.
This large volume of documentary material constituted the
chief contribution of WDC upon its incorporation into the
new organization. A small number of documents had also been
received from State, War, and Navy department channels and
about 10,000 documents per month, including newspapers
and periodicals, were being received at that time from the
current collection of G-2, SCAP, in Tokyo.

DB initially screened this material and segregated it
into four categories, namely: items of immediate intelligence
value; items of possible future value; items of interest to
American industry (to be disseminated by the Commerce
Department); and documents of no intelligence or industrial

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interest. The latter were routinely forwarded to the Library
of Congress. Based on this screening, DB prepared an
average of 2,500 abstracts weekly from the captured documents
and proceeded with a continuing exploitation of the material
based on a review of these abstracts against the requests
generated by the consumer agencies receiving the abstracts.
When requested, summaries were prepared giving more complete
information on pertinent material. Translations, in whole
or in part, were also prepared to meet requirements submitted
through OCD by consumer Offices. Documentary research,
perhaps the most effective form of exploitation and the
forerunner of what was to become the primary form of operation
in the branch, was conducted on the basis of requirements for
specific information which were answered by preparing the
desired data in its most readily useable form. This might be
in the form of cards, statistical tables or charts, extract
translations from a number of documents, or studies combi-
ning the results of research in a subject unit. Thus, in
December 1946 when the branch became part of CIG, the form of
DB output consisted of the following materials: accession
lists, summaries, translations, research projects, reports,
and card files. There were at this time some 50 translations,

14 documentary research projects, and 350 accession lists
in process. The backlog of documents awaiting processing
amounted to 145,000. 75/

The organization in early 1947 had a potential of
31 different languages, ranging from such common tongues
as German and Russian to the rarer Esperanto, Tagalog, and
Urdu. As was to be expected with the recent conclusion of
the Pacific war and the fact that the German-language
oriented SDS and GMDS had not yet become part of the new
branch, Japanese was the principal medium of exploitation
at the time, but it was anticipated that all major languages
and even many of the minor languages and dialects of the
world would be exploited in DB in the future. The personnel
then assigned to the branch formed a competent nucleus for
the beginning of the work. 76/

The processing of the vast stock of captured documents
in the immediate postwar period often seemed an insurmountable
task, especially when one considered the large and increas-
ing backlog of materials together with the thin ranks of
competent personnel available to the intelligence community
to handle this load. Even then it was already recognized
that captured documents as a continuing source of overt

intelligence had limitations. This was true because the
backlog of available captured materials, large as it was
in late 1946, would eventually come to an end; also, whether
captured documents were available or not, the content of the
materials was bound to become completely obsolete with the
passage of time. Recognizing this fact and also aware of
the potential loss to the country should the expertise
in document exploitation developed during the war be per-
mitted to dissipate, the intelligence community began early
to give some thought to the future of document processing.
With the eventual end of captured documents processing
in view, the obvious answer was to place increased emphasis
on the development of the exploitation of current materials.
In this connection William A. Eddy, Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence at the State Department, on
25 October 1946 addressed a letter to Gen. Vandenberg
urging his sponsorship of an interdepartmental meeting to
consider the subject of foreign press and periodical exploita-
tion as a source of intelligence information. Eddy cited
the press and periodical analysis service provided by the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war, a
function subsequently discontinued because of personnel
shortages. As opposed to the catch-as-catch-can operation

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used then solely to meet the needs of particular departments, he suggested filling this gap by establishing a systematic monitoring service for the benefit of the whole community. He advocated re-establishment of such an operation on a centralized basis subject to the overall jurisdiction of an indepartmental board under the DCI and operated in or near the Library of Congress. Its chief benefit, Eddy opined, would be the elimination of duplication with its resultant waste of time and effort. 77/ The proposal was a far-sighted, if obvious, one. Steps to coordinate community action on this matter were taken as early as 1948,* but it was not until almost seven years later that the CIA document exploitation operation received official sanction as the intelligence coordinator for this function. Meanwhile, DB's services along these lines were developed internally, within the CIA structure.

Nonetheless, a start toward centralized responsibility for document exploitation was made. On 5 November 1946, ICAPS sponsored a meeting to discuss the desirability of having OO expand its collection activities to include foreign press and periodicals as well as the product of radio

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* See p. 75.

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intercept. Although no concrete decisions were reached
at this meeting, provision was made for further discussion
of the problem by ORE, OCD, and OO. Consideration was also
directed to a definition of the term "processing," presumably
at the insistence of ORE. [   ] representing OO,
made clear that it was the intent of his office to provide
consumer offices not only with all raw material available,
but to provide it in its most useful form for evaluation
and analysis. OO, he declared, recognized that it was
outside OO jurisdiction to make any analysis of the material
collected. Its function was to be limited solely to a
process of condensing the huge volume of material collected
on a daily basis in order to effect a time-saving factor
for the benefit of ORE. 78/ This aspect of "processing" or
"exploitation" would in the future require further refine-
ment. The problem, a recurrent one, will be more fully
treated on subsequent pages.

The opportunity offered by the State Department memo-
randum of 25 October and the subsequent ICAPS meeting in
November was not wasted by DB. Once the disarray created
by the shift of document exploitation to CIG control and
the problems of establishing a work regime had been taken
care of, John Bagnall, then Acting Branch Chief, turned his

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attention to defining the DB mission in terms of the sugges-

tions offered by the State memorandum. Addressing the AD/O,

he pointed out that DB would complete processing of the

present backlog of documents, aside from current Far Eastern

publications, by the end of 1947. He further stated that

currently some 7,500 foreign-language periodicals and

newspapers were being received by the State Department for

distribution to various government agencies, including at

least 4,000 periodicals of intelligence value. It was an

obvious fact that a single periodical contained a variety

of information, only part of which was of interest to the

agency receiving it; as a consequence, much of the remain-

ing information was lost to other agencies due to a lack of

centralization. He therefore requested that DB be authorized

to amend its defined functions so as to receive and process

current foreign periodicals and to make available to the

community all intelligence information contained in them. 79/

With its linguistically and substantively trained personnel

the branch was well organized to carry this out. The request

contravened an earlier definition of DB functions which had

prescribed DB exploitation of documents "with the exception

of current material." In a follow-up memorandum two days

later, Bagnall devoted a lengthy paragraph to his definition

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of the term "processing" as employed in the earlier message. 80/

On 2 April, Gen. Sibert, the AD/O, proposed the gist

of the Bagnall request for current exploitation in a memo-

randum to the Chief, ICAPS. This amendment of DB's functions

was, however, to apply only to periodical exploitation,

and handling of the daily press was specifically excluded.

Sibert further suggested that OCD make arrangements for DB use

of periodicals on temporary loan from the Library of Congress

and other depositories and also proposed that DB receive

cooperation and advice from ORE on requirements and reporting

format. 81/ Formal approval of the plan by higher authority

was forthcoming on 17 April with the provision that, for the   *17 April 1947*

present, periodical coverage would pertain only to the USSR

and the Far East. 82/

The immediate outcome of these exchanges was the publica-

tion of the first formal DB report under the new arrangement.

This was the so-called *Periodical Abstracts*, first issued on

2 April 1947 under the customary DB format. This format

consisted of items consecutively printed on a page. The

report in this style was discontinued on 23 June after only

five issues, but it was resumed in July as a report divided

into two parts and published as "Scientific" and "General"

abstracts. A revised format was adopted which entailed publication of the abstracts in card-cut form, eight to a page, with about 120 entries in the average issue. The "General" abstracts report was initially issued on 12 September and continued for a little over a year but was then discontinued on 9 November 1948 in favor of new information reports series. The "Scientific" abstracts report, first published on 6 August 1947, survived two brief suspensions, being revived each time by consumer demand, and continued in existence for a considerably longer period of time.

Then when SDS and GMDS were incorporated into the new unit in mid-1947, the branch, redesignated the Foreign Documents Branch, inherited the functions of these two organizations, including continuation of an SDS survey project on USSR railroads, collection of material for the Industrial Card File, and the cataloging of GMDS information for the Intelligence Catalogue. SDS had, on a limited scale, also conducted some press exploitation for extracting industrial economic data.

This, then, constituted the body of the exploitation program of FDB in mid-1947 during the period of transition from captured document to current exploitation. To repeat, the move toward greater emphasis on current material with

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the expectation that this would eventually become the sole

target of FDB operations was logical and inevitable. But

while the goal of "currency" had been stated and approved,

the functions of the branch continued, at least for the

time being, to be carried out in the same slow and unwieldy

manner as before. To remedy the situation John Bagnall in July

1947 forwarded to the AD/O a proposal which he termed a "Dynamic

Approach to Captured Document Exploitation." This new plan,

in essence, involved the development of a comprehensive

informational plan which would result in a spontaneous

production of useful and needed information through document

exploitation. Under the existing method, FDB prepared and

issued thousands of abstracts from the large backlog of

war documents which were rapidly aging and losing their

value. The intelligence community, almost completely

absorbed in current intelligence--indeed, requirements being

received by FDB ran two to one for current information--

found only occasional abstracts of captured documents of

sufficient interest to request exploitation. Consequently,

the development of basic intelligence information from

foreign documents was dependent on haphazard, piece-meal

requirements. This method was time-consuming, wasteful, and

very inefficient. It was not even logical. Bagnall therefore

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proposed that consumer offices place greater confidence in the qualified personnel of his branch and grant them an increased degree of responsibility for selective document exploitation. To carry out the plan he suggested that a detailed overall set of requirements on the USSR and Far East be drawn up by ORE, the primary FDB consumer; that intra-area priorities be assigned for the development of specific basic information; that accession lists of captured documents be discontinued; that accession lists of only current material be issued; and that FDB undertake as a basic program the spontaneous development of information from available captured documents according to the ORE re-quirements and priorities. He stated that the basic program would not handicap action on current requirements but rather would provide a sound foundation and a constructive, logical approach to foreign document exploitation. 83/

The Bagnall proposal, the thrust of which was in-corporated later in the month in the ICAPS survey of OO, was an important harbinger for the future development of FDB operations. An indication that it had found favor at least insofar as OCD was concerned was received on 1 August 1947 when Capt. Olsen, the AD/CD, spoke in favorable terms of the Bagnall memorandum. He stated that action on all but

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the publication of current accession lists rested within the present authority of OO, ORE, and OCD and expressed belief that a dynamic exploitation program would result in better service and more valuable information to the intelligence community than would be the case under the old system. 84/ Regarding the establishment of overall detailed requirements, Olsen indicated that by order of the Executive Director a survey on this would be made. 85/ Based on these develop- ments, FDB's operations and service to the other offices had progressed to such an extent that by the end of the year Sibert was able to inform Olsen that the receipt of large numbers of requirements from ORE and the issuance of OCD's "Estimates of Intelligence Target Potentials" had given FDB sufficient information to warrant cancellation of the then still-pending survey on requirements. 86/

A further development in the FDB mission during 1947 was the augmentation of the branch's translation service function. This new move was largely attributable to the component's staffing problems.

Following informal liaison, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), CIG's covert Office, on 28 August 1947 requested FDB assistance for translation of approximately 120 pages per month of documentary material in various

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languages. The serious personnel shortage of FDB was con-
sidered in relation to the possibility of seeking a ceiling
rise (from 170), and establishment of a "translation pool"
was suggested. 87/ However, the Acting Chief, FDB, declared
that the branch could handle the OSO request with available
personnel and turned down the suggested increase as unneces-
sary. 88/ In view of the frequent requests for branch
personnel augmentation in the years following, this stand
seems surprising and was perhaps one of the few times, if
not the only time, that John Bagnall disregarded such an
opportunity.

A time for second thoughts on the personnel problem
soon followed, for in the ensuing weeks and months the demand
for translations from requester offices, not only in CIA
(which replaced CIG on 18 September 1947) but in other IAB
agencies as well, increased rapidly. The problem of furnishing
service for these requests now had to be squarely faced, and
with the increasing workload it was no longer a question of
whether it could be accomplished but rather how large a
personnel complement would be required to do it. At a
14 October 00 staff meeting the matter was thoroughly dis-
cussed and the old issue raised of whether FDB should
establish a translation pool or whether the branch itself

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should serve as a CIA translation service. 89/ OO and FDB

opted for the first choice and on 6 November 1947 the branch

was authorized to establish a central translation service*

for CIA which was designated the Translation Service Division

(TSD) of FDB. 90/ In implementing this move, [   ]   25X1

on 21 November submitted to the CIA Executive for Administration

and Management a tentative T/O which provided for a total

complement for the new division of 86 individuals, 67 of

these to be linguists and the balance support personnel. 91/

A subsequent revision cut this total to 44, including 37

linguists, and final approval was granted on 26 December. 92/

Addition of the new division brought the FDB T/O to [   ] a   25X1

new high. To circumvent the long delays caused by clearance

procedures and to get the new unit operative as early as

possible, it was decided to segregate the Translation Service

Division with its assigned linguists awaiting clearance

from the already-cleared FDB employees, and arrangements

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* The definition of FDB's function as a central translation
service was updated in late 1951 and reissued on 12 January
1952 as CIA Regulation [   ] One change, among others,   25X1
incorporated in the new version was the right of the organiza-
tion to reject requests (as a safeguard against indiscriminate
dumping).

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were therefore made to provide space on the first floor

of [   ] for the use of newly   25X1

recruited linguist personnel for TSD.

The recruitment of qualified linguists for FDB opera-

tions was and remained a chronic problem and will be more

fully treated below. It also affected TSD in that the

T/O for the unit was maintained only with difficulty. How-

ever, the unit proved its value by enabling the immediate

use of new personnel, thereby doubtless saving for FDB many

of the new people who otherwise, discouraged by the long

drawn-out security clearance, might have sought employment

in less sensitive agencies. Perhaps TSD's primary draw-back

was the lack of direct communication between the "temporary"

TSD employees and FDB.

The unit continued as a division of FDB until August 1949,

when it was eliminated in a branch reorganization. Its

functions and personnel at that time were distributed through-

out the area branches; this allowed for broader and more

efficient use of its resources.

Already in May 1947 the spectrum of FDB operations had

been broadened beyond CIG limits by a CIG move to coordinate

foreign press exploitation among the various agencies of the

IAB through the pooling of effort to ensure better coverage
suited to the particular requirements of each participating
agency. Capt. Ford, the Executive Director of CIG, requested
copies of all standing collection directives covering foreign
press exploitation conducted by the IAB agencies and proposed
a study on the overall problems of efficiency and economy. 93/

FDB activities and contacts were still further expanded
in this period by continuing and extending the wartime arrange-
ment which SDS had maintained with the British in connection
with the SDS-produced ICF cards.   25X1
                                                           25X1
                                                           25X1
                                          In support of
the argument for US cooperation, Gen. Sibert pointed out
to the DCI that the USSR provincial press was a valuable
source of industrial information not generally available in
                                                           25X1
the Soviet central press.
                                                           25X1

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
B. First Try for a Charter

With the function of FDB as an "exploitation" organiza-
tion now apparently authorized, the way seemed clear for a
gradual shaking down of the branch into a routine of
document handling. However, the new procedure did not deal
with and thus had not solved the matter of carrying on
the continuing involvement of FDB in its original basic
function, namely, that of providing translation services
to the community as these related to current sources.
There was in this early period still no charter for implementa-
tion of FDB's operation as a "service of common concern,"
in straight translation as well as in exploitation. Now,
concurrent with the development of the exploitation function,
the branch took steps to solve this second problem.

As has been shown above, practical steps were taken to
deal with the large volume of translation requests levied
on FDB by the intelligence community, but what had been done
in no way solved the nagging problem of ultimate responsi-
bility for translation exploitation in the community -- whether

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this was to be a function of each agency on behalf of

its own needs or whether it was to be a centralized operation

handled by CIA, that is, FDB. By provision of the proposed

DCI Directive 1/5 mentioned earlier, under authority of

National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 1,

the exploitation of all captured documents and current

periodicals and press, together with appropriate dissemina-

tion and coordination of related activities, was to be the

function of CIA. 99/ Consideration of that directive was

part of the general review by the National Security Council

of all former National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and

CIA directives which was initiated at the first meeting of

the NSC on 26 September 1947. Clarification of the FDB

mission would apparently depend upon an IAC or NSC decision

relative to the so-called implementing supplement 1/5.

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1947 action had begun on

preparation of a new NSCID 8, which was in effect the first

effort to draft a charter for foreign document exploitation

in the intelligence community. After considerable discus-

sion and revision, a proposed version of this document was

circulated on 13 January 1948. Like the Director of Central

Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/5, it provided the DCI with

authority to exploit captured documents and current materials

for the benefit of the community. 100/ The 13 January

version of the new directive was not viewed favorably by

FDB, and on 29 January [   ] Chief of FDB,　　　　　25X1

forwarded to Gen. Sibert a detailed critique of the proposed

directive in which he dwelt especially on its restrictive

nature, emphasizing in particular the lack of clearcut

authority of the DCI in the matter of document exploitation

and also the limitation of the field of exploitation ex-

clusively to governmental agencies. 101/ As a result of

[   ] objections, as well as some by the Army, which had　　　25X1

been the originator of the initial request for an NSCID,

still another version was prepared in early March 1948 by

OO and circulated by ICAPS for consideration by the

Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies. The stumbling

block this time was the State Department, which felt that

exploitation should be conducted on the basis of prior agree-

ments between CIA and the requesting agency in all individual

instances. CIA believed this arrangement to be too cumber-

some to be workable and thus impractical. In view of the

State position, CIA felt that issuance of an NSCID at this

time would serve no useful purpose. 102/ Consequently,

ICAPS recommended to the DCI that the proposed NSCID 8,

"Foreign Document Exploitation," be abandoned and that this

work continue to be done by working level agreement under

NSCID 3, "Coordination of Intelligence Production." 103/

This development brought to a close the first phase of the

effort to create a charter for FDB operations. From a

practical standpoint its lack did not deter the branch from

performing its functions effectively; however, it is doubt-

less true that under the aegis of a charter many of the

problems which subsequently arose could have been much more

easily resolved than was the case.

Despite this setback the Agency continued to promote

the concept of centralized exploitation and translation. The

logic of this effort was well expressed by ⬚ in   25X1

reacting to the NSCID 8 failure; he pointed out that surveil-

lance of the press could not be successfully done in a hap-

hazard, sporadic manner and that coverage had to be complete

and continuous, so that nothing would be overlooked. Those

in the IAC opposed to the directive who expressed the feelings

that proper exploitation could be done in the various embassies,

by military and naval attaches, or by individuals assigned

to the proper area desk in the appropriate agency in Washington

were, he felt, under a misapprehension as to the enormity of

the language problem as well as the large volume of material

to be handled. 104/ In this ⬚ was quite right. The   25X1

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coordination of all governmental foreign documents exploita-
tion and translation could only be done in a really effective
manner by establishing a central point to exercise control,
whether in CIA or some other agency. Logically this focal
point appeared to be FDB by reason of its function and develop-
ment. A proliferation of the same activity by the various
members of the IAC, not to mention other divisions of
the government, spelled at best inefficiency, duplication,
and wastefulness; at worst, chaos.

In August 1948 George Carey informally learned of a
proposal for creation of two separate translation pools in
the government, one an Air Force project known as "Treasure
Island," the other a central translating group for the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. He pointed out the obvious fact that
lack of an NSCID opened the field of foreign document transla-
tion legitimately to any IAC member who wished to enter
it. 105/ This information about the new proposal triggered
early CIA action. On 3 September, calling attention to the
above developments, the Agency invited IAC member participa-
tion in a meeting to explore, as it pertained to intelligence
materials only, the degree of interest in the IAC for
establishment of a central document exploitation and transla-
tion service as envisaged in Paragraph 7 of NSCID 1. At

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the same time the Agency expressed its willingness to main-
tain such a service provided all IAC members cooperated on
the basis of certain prescribed rules. 106/

FDB was fully involved in the CIA planning, and, with
Bagnall representing the branch, the Agency held discussions
with ICAPS regarding the feasibility of a central transla-
tion and exploitation unit for foreign-language documents.
These evolved two months later into discussions concerning
the agenda for an IAC ad hoc committee which was to consider a
centralized translation service. At that time Bagnall sub-
mitted a memorandum to ICAPS through the AD/O outlining
FDB's position relative to the discussions and recommending
use of FDB to process all non-covert foreign-language materials
for CIA as an inherent function. 107/

The 3 September initiative of CIA bore fruit by the
end of 1948 with the formation of a committee composed of
representatives from all IAC agencies which was designated
the Ad Hoc Committee on Central Translation. Although of
relatively short duration, this body represented the
first in a series of what may be termed "watch dog" or
"guidance" organizations within the intelligence community
whose overall function was to oversee all aspects of foreign
language document handling. As such, it and its successors

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played a very important role in FDB activities from this time on. The new organization's first meeting, called at the behest of CIA, was held on 10 January 1949 and concerned itself with a three-part agenda, as follows: translation being done by present agency staffs and by CIA, translation being done by contract outside the community, and transla- tion desired but not being done due to shortage of staff or funds. 108/ A participant in this and subsequent meetings of the group was John Bagnall, once again the Acting Chief of FDB following the transfer of   to another

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assignment in October 1948.

As a result of the first meeting of the new Ad Hoc Committee, together with attendant staff work, a report was submitted to the DCI in March 1949 presenting a concensus of the committee members' views on document handling. Briefly stated, it was their opinion that a really centralized translation bureau would be too complicated and too unwieldy; that individual intelligence agencies needed their own trans- lation sections for limited amounts of priority special- interest material; that desirable coordination could be accomplished by maintenance by CIA of a central file of translated intelligence material and periodic dissemination of a consolidated list of translations in process, completed,

and available from each of the agencies; and that a common

service of exploitation of foreign language publications

(collection, screening, and processing) would be desirable,

not only for the IAC but others as well. Based on these

views, the following recommendations were submitted: mainte-

nance of individual agency translation sections; coordination

by CIA of translation work accomplished by such sections; and

establishment of a new committee, designated the "Committee

on Exploitation of Foreign Language Documents," to study the

problems on centralized exploitation, and to make recommenda-

tions through normal channels to the IAC. 109/ The 16 March

proposals by the DCI based on the Ad Hoc Committee's recom-

mendations were promptly approved by the respective intel-

ligence chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force during

April. 110/

The importance from the FDB standpoint of the develop-

ments just described cannot be overemphasized. Although a

formal charter on foreign-language documents processing

was still in the somewhat distant offing, here for the first

time had been formulated an official declaration by members

of the intelligence community recognizing the need for

centralized handling, a problem still unsolved more than

four years after the close of hostilities in World War II.

It was a step long overdue, for the nature of the source

material with which foreign language documentation was

concerned had by now drastically changed. Most of the

captured documents had already been turned over to the

Library of Congress and the National Archives.

Approximately 85 percent of FDB's workload at the end

of 1948 consisted of current material, 111/ and the time

was not far distant when work on captured documents would

be wholly exhausted. Important as well was the emphasis

placed upon the distinction between "translation" and

"exploitation," for with the growing volume of materials

to be processed and the limited personnel to do this work,

exploitation appeared to be the only method to cope with

FDB's increased responsibilities. Straight translation,

as the Director made clear, could be carried out as an

operation of "common concern" only for other than normal

needs. The statements in the IAC March declarations were

broad and somewhat nebulous, but they were nonetheless a

significant step forward in the delineation of FDB func-

tions in relation to the overall intelligence field.

On 11 April 1949 the Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign

Document Exploitation, with John Bagnall as chairman, was

established by agreement of the IAC at the final meeting of

the Ad Hoc Committee on Translations. Its purpose, as defined

by the DCI, was to assist and advise CIA on current IAC

exploitation of foreign-language documents with a view

toward eliminating duplication and achieving more complete

coverage. 112/ The new committee and its successor organiza-

tions were eminently successful in accomplishing this purpose.

From 18 April on, the Exploitation Committee met weekly

until its last meeting on 25 July 1949. At that time it

prepared a final report which included the following major

recommendations for official IAC concurrence: CIA should

assume responsibility for the overall coordination of foreign-

language document exploitation and for performance centrally

of necessary exploitation; a permanent Foreign Documents

Exploitation Committee should be established to assist the

DCI in the exploitation program; and appropriate instructions

and directives should be formulated embodying the recommenda-

tions outlined. 113/ Together with this report, a redraft

of a proposed NSCID, prepared by Bagnall at the AD/O's direc-

tion, was submitted for ICAPS approval, but it met the fate

of earlier drafts. No final action was taken.

CHAPTER FOUR

The People and the Organization

A. Staff Development

With the gradual evolution of FDB from a group of largely
dissimilar units engaged in the processing of captured enemy
documents under conditions of war into a peace-time organiza-
tion with an increasingly diverse and complex function, a
state of change became the norm rather than the exception in
the formative years. In this period, lasting from 1946 to
about 1953, the concepts, objectives, organization, workload,
personnel requirements, and methods of the branch changed
drastically and were chronically in a state of flux. These
changes were largely attributable to concurrent CIA growth
and reorientation and to changing world conditions. Important,
therefore, to the fulfillment of FDB's mission under such
circumstances was the establishment and development of an
organizational structure responsive to the needs of the intel-
ligence community, but even more important was the recruitment
and training of a competent, highly motivated staff of
linguist-intelligence officers. As noted earlier, the branch

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inherited an important nucleus of linguists at the time it was
incorporated into CIG, but with the rapidly increasing workload
as the mission emphasis gradually shifted to world coverage,
the need for a sizable augmentation of the staff was foreseen
and steps taken to bring it about. Unfortunately, the problem
was not eased by the fact that changes in intelligence targets
after the war, particularly the lessening emphasis on captured
document processing, made the available language resources
inherited by FDB less meaningful. In the war and immediate
postwar period German and Japanese had, of course, been the
primary exploitation languages; by the end of the 1940s and
early 1950, as the Cold War atmosphere intensified, these
languages were replaced in importance by Russian and Chinese and
by the languages of Third World areas in which Communist
influences were strongly in evidence.

In addition to the language problem, still another
change affecting the FDB personnel situation was the growing
emphasis on exploitation, alluded to earlier. This was a
development created by the need to cover large and increasing
volumes of source material with a limited cadre. Since it was
possible to exploit -- that is, translate selectively -- considerably
larger amounts of material than could be covered by straight
and complete translation, it was logical to use the former

method. This procedure was eventually carried a step beyond the exploitation function when the organization began to conduct basic or, more properly, preliminary analysis through its production of collated reports. Thus, the nature of the FDB personnel complement was changing. From pure translation the branch engaged increasingly in the preliminary functions of analysis, that is, the selection of materials which would contribute to the final analytical solutions of intelligence problems. Nevertheless, despite the change to exploitation, translation work continued and, in fact, did so at an increasing rate. This aspect of the staffing problem also required consideration.

Since the time of the conversion from military to civilian control at the end of 1946, the problem of personnel shortages in FDB had been a chronic one. Some of the reasons for this have been discussed earlier. For example, the inability of some of the former WDC and SDS military and civilian employees to pass the much stricter CIG and CIA security clearance had resulted in their elimination; furthermore, the strict security requirements made recruitment more than usually difficult. Also complicating the problem was the desire of some individuals making the transition from military to civilian life to seek employment in other government

agencies or in non-government fields of endeavor. This re-
flected a wish on the part of some to find positions in which
they could use their substantive talents in preference to
their linguistic skills. For these and other reasons the
personnel shortages continued and were a persistent drag on
the capability of FDB to accomplish its tasks. Because of
recruitment difficulties and the imposition of ceilings for
hiring by the Agency, designed to hold the numerical employ-
ment within bounds of the organization's requirements, the
tables of organization established for the branch were for
the most part theoretical rather than actual.

Recruitment problems were unique for the branch as
compared with many other parts of the Agency in that the ideal
applicant for employment in FDB was required not only to possess
a command of at least two languages, one foreign and the
other English, but he was also expected to have a substantive
knowledge of the area or field to which he was to be assigned.
Such recruits were sought but were difficult to find, particu-
larly in the face of competition from other units, in and out
of the Agency, many of whom could offer higher grades to
prospective candidates. Since the ideally equipped employee
was hard to find, the branch settled on a policy of hiring a
linguist when available and training him in the substantive

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aspects of his job after he had entered on duty. In some instances FDB undertook to train a number of its own personnel in the rarer languages. Even to obtain linguistically trained individuals was not always easy, for it was only after the war that language training and language-area studies became an important part of the college and university curriculum. Thus, at the beginning, the competition for recruits was very sharp. Later on, as more language graduates entered the labor market, this pressure decreased somewhat.

Recruitment was conducted at many US institutions of higher learning, resulting in a constant flow of potential job candidates to FDD. In this connection contacts were established and cultivated with key faculty members, usually in language departments, who were encouraged to recommend prospective employees from among their students. This cooperation was as a rule freely and generously given. At times, the organization's ardor in pursuing this means of obtaining badly needed linguists led to complications. For example, in 1947, FDB promised jobs _____ prospects before the CIA   25X1
Personnel Branch had interviewed them. In the interim, certain positions had been downgraded and in some instances individuals failed the security investigation. As a result, some applicants accused the Agency of discrimination and

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complained to their Congressmen, 114/ creating an awkward situation. Eventually coordination among Agency components improved and such misunderstandings were generally avoided.

This discussion of the development of a document officer corps through recruitment and training leads to the question of what the typical FDD professional was like and what the nature of his work was. The term "typical" is difficult to apply to FDD officers. FDD personnel came from a diversity of backgrounds. They ranged in age from young, inexperienced individuals recently out of school, with only a modicum of language training, to middle-aged emigrees who spoke a native tongue and for whom English had until quite recently been a foreign language. While generally college graduates, the educational background of FDD employees also varied widely, from the high school level to the highest of graduate degrees. Their substantive backgrounds were equally diverse, ranging from, say, a history or political science discipline to one in mathematics or physics. They were assigned within the division according to their qualifications and were then, by work experience, trained in the specifics of their jobs.

A typical work regimen usually consisted of assignment to the employee of selected foreign press and journal sources of a particular country, supplemented from time to time by

book and monograph material. These were regularly scanned, significant articles or selections were extracted on the basis of periodically updated consumer requirements lists, and the selected material was translated or summarized either in-house or was sent out for translation on contract. The results of these labors eventually evolved as periodically issued reports. On frequent occasions, specific requests were received from consumer offices and these were exploited as required. In addition, qualified FDD officers would engage in special tasks, some of which will be treated below, but in general the routine described above was their typical daily job.

The difficulties encountered in recruitment applied not only to professional people in FDB but were also evident as regards clerical personnel. Here the problem was primarily one of competition with other parts of the Agency for a commodity in short supply, although in this instance the security clearance aspect was also a factor. There are numerous references in FDB personnel reports of the period which emphasize the acute shortage of clerical personnel. The critical aspect of this shortage was the disruption created in the production of the finished FDB product once the research and translation had been completed. In August 1947, for example, it was reported that the shortage of clerical personnel in the

Editorial Section of FDB had limited production to only

45 percent of the material received during the month, 115/

and during the following month, of eight issues of the FDB

Periodical Abstracts prepared, only one was issued due to the

acute shortage of clerical personnel. 116/   Although these and

similar instances were not the only reason for delays in FDB

output then and later, they were an exasperating contribution

to the branch's poor reputation among consumers for slow

dissemination of its production.

When the new Documents Branch became part of CIG late in

1946, CIG took cognizance of the need to strengthen its fledgling

acquisition, and one of its first official acts relating to

DB was to recommend an immediate increase in the branch's

complement from 90 to 161 bodies. This was designed to effect

a more efficient operation and to make a start on dissolving

the large backlog. 117/   For the reasons stated earlier, the

figure 161 proved an elusive goal. Indeed, with the endemic

problems of recruitment and attrition, this figure was not

reached until some two and a half years later.

Throughout its history there were, as one would expect,

considerable variations in the T/O and ceiling levels applied

to the branch (later, division). To cite these figures

merely for the record would prove boring to the reader and

would serve no practical purpose. What is more important is to call attention to trends and changes in the personnel situation in the organization as these occurred and to direct attention only to changes in personnel levels which reflected significant developments.

The recommendation of 17 January 1947 for the DB T/O increase   signalled the beginning of a rather rapid rise,   25X1 and by mid-1947 when SDS and GMDS employees were added to the branch the T/O level was fixed at   118/ This figure stood   25X1 until December when the Translation Service Division was added to the branch. After some maneuvering, a T/O allowing for a total complement of   was established to permit the staffing   25X1 of this division. Slight internal changes in the branch brought this figure up to   119/ A branch reorganization   25X1 resulted in the reduction for Fiscal Year (FY) 1949 to a T/O of   120/ and in mid-1949, with discontinuance of the TSD,   25X1 this number was reduced still further, to   121/ a level   25X1 which was maintained to the end of 1950.

The branch ceilings, meanwhile, had roughly followed the convolutions of the T/Os. Up to the beginning of 1949 there was generally a differential ranging from approximately 25 positions to about 80. In early 1949 the ceiling finally overtook the T/O and from then on, with exception of lags as

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T/Os were increased, the two figures were generally identical or at least close together.

Unfortunately, until approximately the final quarter of 1949 the same could not be said for the numbers of individuals on duty in FDB. Regardless of the number of T/O positions allotted to the branch or the ceiling established, recruitment continued to fall far short of meeting FDB requirements. With the increasing emphasis on the Soviet and Satellite areas, the shortage of Russian and East European linguists remained acute. For example, during the first three months of 1948 an average of 60 applicants had been under consideration at all times but the number of individuals hired remained discouragingly small. The majority were rejected due to language deficiency or were eliminated for security reasons. 25X1

and 25X1

This response was quite typical.

During its formative period as CIA's document center, FDB was the frequent target of criticism by the intelligence community for its apparent inability to meet the document exploitation and translation requirements levied on it. The various offices of CIA seemed to fail to understand the special

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problems facing the branch in its recruitment program and showed a tendency to place FDB in the role of whipping boy for the problems rather than to attribute these to actual circumstances over which FDB had no control. The reason for this attitude is not quite clear although it may have been at least partially due to poor public relations on FDB's part and to a lack of meaningful communication among the parties concerned. Whatever the cause, FDB sought all possible means to extricate itself from a bad situation not wholly of its own making. Already in 1947 the Chief, FDB, had suggested that improvement in procurement of personnel might be effected if an FDB representative were allowed to contact foreign-language departments and foreign-language majors in various universities prior to the end of the academic year. In this way qualifications determination and clearance procedures could be carried out during the school year so that new personnel could go to work immediately upon graduation. 123/

In pursuit of solutions to the critical manpower situation, [   ] and John Bagnall met on 20 January 1948 with representatives of the CIA Personnel Branch. Two points were discussed -- the location of new sources for recruiting language personnel, and the use of an unclassified typist pool as a means of holding clerical personnel until clearance was

25X1

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completed. One outcome of the meeting was Personnel Branch's assurance that it would make a concerted effort to recruit linguists, first in the Washington area, and then through colleges and language schools elsewhere in the US. In addition, FDB was instructed to canvass present employees and forward to Personnel Branch all possible references. 124/ The employment of such recruitment practices became a standard means of securing new applicants for FDB and was applied with increasing success.

The second proposal, the formation of an unclassified typist pool, was also implemented. A pool for uncleared typists was established near the main operation but separate from it and proved very successful, both from the standpoint of assisting in the work of the established clerical force and of holding potential employees.

The search for solutions continued, but in February, in answer to a request for assistance from Gen. Sibert, [   ] 25X1 the Executive for Administration and Management, placed at least part of the blame for the personnel shortage on FDB itself and cited 21 pending cases already in FDB hands for as long as a month where administrative action on FDB's part would have speeded up clearance and made personnel available. 125/ On the same day, Walter Ford, the Executive Director, continued

the attack. Referring to Sibert's contention that basic

reason for the unsatisfactory personnel situation in FDB was

the lack of adequate personnel procurement, Ford spoke of an

approximate 30-percent turnover, by resignation or transfer,

of personnel in FDB, a rate four-to-five times greater than

that in other CIA units. To Ford this indicated the possi-

bility of an unsatisfactory situation in FDB's internal manage-

ment, and in view of this he declared his intention to

initiate a combined management and classification survey of

the branch. 126/

Sibert and ⬚ took strong exception to the allegations   25X1

expressed in these memoranda, and at Sibert's request ⬚   25X1

prepared a six-page memorandum in answer to the contentions

of ⬚ and Ford. To refute the inference of sub-standard   25X1

leadership in FDB, he went into person-by-person detail on

reasons for the above-mentioned losses, and expounded at con-

siderable length on the "peculiar" circumstances of FDB's

inclusion in the Agency, namely, the fact that it was the only

organization taken over by CIA that then had to be put on a

peace-time footing. The "weak management" charge seemed to

have touched a particularly sensitive nerve, and ⬚ took   25X1

pains to point to the large volume of intelligence produced

by the branch since its activation despite the handicaps

under which it labored. 127/ [ ] apparently made a good   25X1

case in his memorandum defending FDB operations, for no

further reference to poor management appeared in subsequent

exchanges. A&M conducted the scheduled survey in the spring

of 1948, but the results caused no furor, and OO, with minor

exceptions, readily concurred with its findings. In retrospect

the flare-up in February appeared to have been simply the

result of a case of bad communications between Personnel Branch

and FDB.

Meanwhile, the FDB work force was increasing in numbers and

becoming more stabilized. Whether this was because of economic

stress in industry in the United States and the resultant decrease

in private employment, because of the return to this country of

accomplished linguists formerly employed abroad, or because of a

wider acquaintance with FDB's recruitment program by government

agencies, a steady increase in the number of acceptable

candidates was apparent during the first half of 1949. Though

potential employees were still lost through failure to meet

FDB requirements or through delays in security clearance,

more qualified linguist-intelligence officers actually entered

on duty in three months in early 1949 than during all of

1948. 128/ By this time the branch complement hovered in the

vicinity of 150 individuals and in the succeeding months this

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figure gradually moved upward. From mid-1949, when the T/O

reduction had taken place, until the beginning of 1951, when

it was once again increased, the number of FDB employees rose

from [   ] and this trend continued. To carry the story   25X1

somewhat ahead, in mid-1953, following the promulgation of

NSCID 16, the long-sought charter, the Foreign Documents

Division (FDD), as FDB was by then called, achieved a personnel

complement in excess of [   ] individuals. From that time on,   25X1

and throughout the 1950s, the FDD personnel count remained

generally static at approximately [   ] employees, and this   25X1

figure corresponded roughly to the T/Os and ceilings of this

period. After 1953, there were no longer shortages in terms

of the overall number of employees. If shortages did occur,

they were usually in terms of language specialists within

that number.

Returning, however, to the earlier period when FDB's

rather sparse personnel was still failing to keep pace with

the increasing requirements, several devices were adopted to

help alleviate the situation. Early in 1948 the branch

sought and received authorization to resort to what was

termed an "overtime program" in an attempt to reduce the

backlog of translations and later to provide for increased

press and periodical exploitation and to meet the demands for

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translation service. 129/ At the start, approval of Budget

and Finance was required to authorize the needed overtime

allowances for the branch, but with commencement of the Korean

action in June 1950 and the beginning of a period of six-day

work weeks, overtime became standard procedure. The degree to

which this means was used to manage the FDB workload is evident

from the following figures for hours of overtime: 1948 - 1,900;

1949 - 18,400; 1950 - 15,600; 1951 - 32,800; 1952 - 44,000. 130/

The "overtime program" served the purpose for which it was

instituted but it was nonetheless an artifical expedient.

Other methods used or contemplated were the employment

of qualified linguists called up for duty with the armed ser-

vices and detailed to FDB, 131/ use of a provisionally cleared

linguist pool, and authorization to recruit at 10 percent in

excess of the T/O. So far as is known, the first of these

was never implemented. The second had been standard operating

procedure (SOP) for some time, but in December 1948 the

Executive Director threatened to curtail it. On 7 January 1949,

however, a memorandum from the DCI to the Executive Director,

outlining FDB justifications, approved continued use of the

pool. 132/ The third method, triggered by the AD/O's appeal

for a small increase in the FDD T/O, resulted in no increase

but did grant FDD authorization to apply the 10 percent

formula in recruiting, an important concession toward helping
solve the personnel problem. 133/ In connection with recruit-
ing, briefing sessions were initiated and held periodically
to acquaint field recruiting officers with the division's
needs.

The devices just described were helpful to a degree,
but they were still not sufficient to bring relief to the
beleaguered division. Faced with an estimated workload of
some 98,764 pages of classified foreign-language material
during 1951, George Carey on 5 December 1950, with the con-
currence of FDD's consumer offices in CIA, requested an
increase of 70 linguists and ten clericals in the division's
personnel complement. This was designed to augment FDD's
current capacity for translation of 20,000 pages a year. Aside
from the fact that added personnel was actually needed to
accomplish the mission, the request was also designed to side-
track a threat to the integrity of FDD's function as a "service
of common concern." OSO, the main requester for this large
bulk of translation, and some of the other CIA Offices had
suggested recruitment of their own linguists, and in the absence
of any progress up to this time on the formulation of an
appropriate NSCID, the threat to FDD was very real. 134/

Fortunately, the request for an increase, designated CIA Project No. 00-68-51, was approved by the Project Review Committee on 6 January 1951. On the same date another request, CIA Project No. 00-67-51, authorizing an additional two positions to service a new FDD Unclassified Translation Project involving the contractual translation of 37,000 pages of unclassified material was also approved. 135/ The latter was a completely new departure from the earlier function of FDD and had far-reaching effects on its future procedures. It will be the subject of a later chapter in this history.*

In a memorandum sent later in January, Carey informed Bagnall of his approval of the latter's request that the new employees be permitted to be used both for exploitation and translation. This was based on Bagnall's contention that employment of this combination for the new personnel would result in a higher morale among them than if the new people were subjected to the rather deadening routine of continuous straight translation work. This proviso was, however, granted only with the understanding that the quota of 90,000 pages of translation per year was to be met. 136/

With the large increment of 82 positions added to the FDD T/O at the beginning of 1951, bringing it to a total of

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* See Ch. Eight.

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[   ] and with increasing success in recruitment, which had   25X1

raised on-board personnel from 186 at the time the new T/O

became operative to [   ] at the beginning of the third quarter   25X1

of 1952 when the T/O was again changed, 137/ it would appear

that the division had reached a personnel level which would

require little or no change for the foreseeable future. In

actual fact this was not to be, and the relentless press of

new requirements and the growing workload made another appeal

for help inevitable.

In June 1952 Bagnall submitted a request for new people

based on current receipts of source material and on the esti-

mates of the needs of various CIA Offices. Breaking down his

request in terms of clerical personnel and professionals,

the latter including analysts for press propaganda analysis

work (a new operation being undertaken by FDD for the first

time),* Bagnall declared that 98 new positions were necessary

and could reasonably be recruited in Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954.

He therefore recommended a T/O increase for FY-1953 to 380

positions with a ceiling of [   ] 138/ The 98 total was a   25X1

considerable reduction from the figure of over [   ] cited by   25X1

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* See Ch. Eleven.

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Bagnall in his memorandum as actually needed to do all the work, but even the reduced T/O request met with serious criticism from the Planning and Coordination (P&C) Staff in OO. The part most severely criticized was not the number of additional bodies asked for but rather the statement that these could be "reasonably recruited." Louise Davison of P&C Staff pointed out that the net gain of 56 new recruits in the previous 18 months (January 1951 - June 1952) amounted to an average of 3.1 per month, a rate which would require to the end of FY-1955 to obtain 98 people. 139/ A re-examination of priorities and recruitment probabilities resulted in scaling down Bagnall's request from 98 to 62, including a reduction in propaganda analysts from nine to seven, and bringing the final total to [ ] This T/O was approved on 22 September 1952. 140/ This figure was the highest ever attained by FDD. In the fall of 1953 it was reduced by 13 and in 1954 by ten more. From that time on throughout most of the 1950s the FDD T/O remained in the [ ] range, but in the 1960s it was gradually reduced to the [ ] and then to the [ ] range.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

B. Training

A factor of utmost importance in the development of a competent staff in FDD came into play, as it would in any

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organization of this nature, after the process of personnel

procurement had been essentially completed. This factor was

the training of the new recruits for the job that they were

expected to do for the duration of their careers with the

division. In FDD, perhaps more than in most parts of the

Agency, this process was unique in that it involved the neces-

sity to train individuals entering on duty in the division to

perform a dual function. As we have noted, procurement of

personnel for FDD concentrated on obtaining individuals with

a linguistic background. This in itself created difficulties,

particularly in the early years, in that the labor market for

this type of individual was limited and the competition both

within the government and with private industry for good

linguists was exceedingly keen. FDD was, of course, fortunate

in that it had inherited an excellent nucleus of accomplished

linguists when its wartime predecessors were absorbed by the

Agency. This nucleus proved to be a valuable platform upon

which to build the type of organization that was foreseen

when the transfer was effected. However, the new group in

its initial stages was small indeed and the job of creating

a viable and productive organization proved to be a formidable

one. Contributing to the difficulty was the inevitable and

recurrent factor of attrition, for various reasons, which

was and continued to be an irritant factor throughout the life of the division. It was not an uncommon phenomenon to employ a promising candidate, train him in his job for many months, have him gain long-term experience, and then lose him to what to him seemed greener fields.

The fact that individuals had been hired and slots occupied did not mean that the problem had been solved. This was only the beginning. Knowledge of one or more foreign languages did not mean that the new employees were ready to fulfill their function and that the division could leave them to their own resources. They had to be trained and given careful guidance in order for them to exploit their capabilities for the greatest benefit to the organization. The unique nature of their employment in FDD came into play here. They were expected to be not only linguists but area specialists as well. While it is true that some recruits, but relatively few, had received such dual training in the area studies courses becoming popular after the war in the nation's colleges and universities, the majority had not. Even for the few so educated, the special nature of intelligence work required a type of preparation not available in a college department. This was also true of academic training solely in languages since these courses usually prepared the students as generalists

rather than as the linguistic specialists that the intelligence community needed.

A related problem was the limitation of college offerings in the rarer languages and dialects needed by CIA. Training in many of these was simply not available on the outside, and special classes therefore had to be set up in the Agency to provide these capabilities. Fortunately, the major languages sought for intelligence work, Russian and Chinese, were becoming increasingly available.

The variety and methods of language training as it affected FDD employees ranged widely. There was first of all the "on-the-job-training" nature of his employment whereby his knowledge of the language with which he entered on duty broadened through experience to the extent that he became an expert in it and in the specialized vocabulary associated with his field. Another method, the most prevalent, involved full- or part-time enrolment in language classes sponsored by the Office of Training (OTR). If OTR did not offer the language, the employee could be sent for training to another agency such as the National Security Agency (NSA) or the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, to one of the universities in the Washington area or elsewhere, or to a commercial language school such as Berlitz. Sometimes, for

special cases or critical needs, external language training

involved sending the employee abroad for as much as a year of

study in a foreign university. In instances where training

in given languages or dialects was not available elsewhere

and a teacher could be temporarily recruited on the premises,

courses would be set up and training provided in FDD itself.

Such instruction was usually of the tutorial type, a method

which proved especially useful for FDD purposes since it

enabled the division to adapt the instruction to fit exactly

the needs of its type of work and thus reduce to a minimum

the time necessary to prepare actual producing linguists. On

infrequent occasions individuals from other parts of CIA

requiring language preparation were permitted to participate

in FDD-sponsored courses.

Language training was not limited solely to professionals.

Classes in elementary Russian for the benefit of clerical

and screening personnel were started in 1951 and conducted

periodically thereafter. This course proved very helpful in

familiarizing support personnel, not normally language-oriented,

with at least the rudiments of Russian and thus helped them

do a more effective job.

The detail involved in providing language training for

FDD personnel early became so great that provision was made to

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plan and regularize all facets of the program, and in June 1952

[   ] was assigned to the newly approved post of   25X1

Language Consultant on the staff of the Chief, FDD. 141/ On

9 January 1953, [   ] was formally designated as Coordinator of   25X1

Language Training, 142/ a position he held until near the

end of 1954 when the post was combined with the Language

Consultant Service to form the new Linguistic Support Staff.*

The preparation of FDD intelligence officers for their

jobs was by no means limited exclusively to language training.

Like other members of the CIA community they had available to

them all the pertinent courses offered by OTR, and many took

advantage of these. Some instruction, like the Basic

Intelligence Course, required of all new employees, was compul-

sory, but most courses were voluntary. Some segment of FDD

was always in a training status, in a variety of courses which

might range from a typing class to attendance at one of the

armed services strategic intelligence schools or at a senior

management course at some prestigious university. As in the case

of language instruction, some of the non-language training

participated in by its employees was FDD-initiated. For example,

periodic courses on the techniques of report writing were

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* See Ch. Eleven.

conducted by a member of the FDD Editorial Section. For eight weeks in the summer of 1952 a series of seminars on Soviet history, politics, and economics was conducted for the benefit of 40 FDD employees by three experts in these fields brought in from the academic community. During a three-month period in 1954, 120 FDD officers attended a series of lectures on Marxism-Leninism given by the chief of the Propaganda Analysis Staff.

Other forms of training available to FDD employees were area familiarization tours, plant tours, and attendance at professional meetings. The first of these usually ran from several weeks to about three months' duration and enabled the more fortunate FDD intelligence officers — from among those employed in the "free world" areas of the division — to travel to parts of the globe as diverse as Arctic Canada and Africa, Scandinavia and Indonesia. This privilege, for obvious reasons, was not open to officers in the Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist areas of FDD although some assigned to the latter did go to Formosa or Hong Kong.

The extent of FDD involvement in training is evident from a sampling of the division's training statistics. The numbers of individuals receiving some degree of training, internal or external, amounted to 200 in 1953 (up from 94 the previous

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year), 143/ 166 in 1954, 144/ and 180 in 1955. 145/ This

sample of figures indicates a broad use of the available

opportunities by FDD officers and suggests a strong desire

for self-improvement. (or something)

C. Organizational Development

Concurrent with the development of a staff of linguist/

intelligence officers and support personnel to carry on the

work of FDB, there evolved gradually an organizational structure

designed to permit the branch to conduct its operations and

fulfill its mission in conformity with the designs and purpose

of higher CIA authority. Since, however, the Agency itself

was still in a state of flux in the early period, with its

components often working at apparent cross-purposes and with

their relationships with one another not yet fully defined,

the task of FDB in relating to these stresses was oftentimes

a difficult one. The failure to provide the much-desired NSCID,

which would have authoritatively defined the branch's function

and permanently fixed its place in the community, intensified

the problem. Despite the lack of a charter, FDB rested its

case on the general understanding and agreement in the CIA

and, to a lesser degree, in the IAC that it constituted the

"service of common concern" for document exploitation and

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it proceeded to develop its own organization in a reasonable
and logical manner according to existing circumstances. As
these changed, FDB adjusted to conform with new conditions
within the Agency. The result was a gradual shake-down period
which lasted until roughly 1953, and the organization which
had evolved then remained more or less stable for the next
seven years until June 1960 when a consolidation of FDD
components occurred.

The organizational structure of FDB, as it was established
in mid-1947 following the acquisition of SDS and GMDS from
the War Department,* remained unchanged for only about six
months. On 22 December 1947 the new Translation Service
Division with a T/O of [ ] positions was established and space   25X1
was cleared [   ]   25X1
[   ] to accommodate the linguist personnel of   25X1
the new division who were to be used there on unclassified
materials pending clearance for work in the other divisions.
The new component was to provide a central translation
service for the CIA and, when circumstances permitted, the
other IAC agencies. The scope of its capabilities was quite

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* See Ch. Two, p. 40.

broad; in 1949, for example, its translators handled 30 languages. 146/ With the addition of TSD, FDB had five divisions.

The first change of major proportions in the FDB structure occurred some six months later. On 3 June 1948, the so-called "Sunshine Project," a field procurement operation initially conducted by CIA's ORE and involving a T/O of six positions, was taken over by FDB. More will be said about this project in the next chapter. Then, on 29 July, in response to requests for wider and more comprehensive coverage of sensitive areas, further changes were authorized. Three new divisions were added: the Document Screening and Reference Division, which assumed the duties of what had formerly been the Administrative Staff's Library Section; the Eastern European Division, which, with a newly designated USSR Division, represented a split-up of the old USSR and Satellites Division; and the Near East/Africa Division, a move toward expanded branch coverage. Appointed as acting chiefs, respectively, of the new divisions were

	25X1
continued as chief of the reorganized USSR	25X1
Division.	25X1
remained as the respective chiefs of the Far East,	25X1

the Scientific and Technical, and the Document Source Survey

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Divisions. In addition, the Control Section under the Administrative Staff was changed to the Records Section. 147/ It was felt that the new organization would put FDB on a more realistic and fundamentally sound operating basis.

During this period of change in FDB, there also occurred the shift in branch leadership briefly mentioned earlier. This involved the assignment of [_____] a field artillery colonel, to a tour of duty as chief of FDB. [_____] served in this capacity for almost exactly one year, from 20 October 1947 to 26 October 1948, and performed commendably in defending the interests of the branch. During this period of "military" leadership in FDB, John Bagnall, who had served as chief of the old Documents Branch and then as acting chief when DB was redesignated the Foreign Documents Branch, was assigned as [_____] deputy. When [_____] was relieved in October 1948 for assignment elsewhere, Bagnall was restored as acting chief of the branch. On 14 February 1949, he was officially designated chief of FDB and then held this position for the next 15 years until he left FDD to become Deputy Assistant Director, OCR. His deputy during most of this period was Benjamin B. Cain, formerly of Contact Division/OO. Cain served in this position until his retirement from the Agency at the end of 1959.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The next major reorganization in FDB occurred in mid-1949.
This move was undertaken in the face of a reduction in T/O and
ceiling from [   ] positions. As a first step, the

25X1

Translation Service Division was abolished and its personnel
assigned to operational divisions in the branch in accordance
with their individual language qualifications. 148/ This
change, in effect, brought the exploitation and support
(translation) functions into closer conformity with each other,
thereby providing a better translation product through coordina-
tion with area specialists and also a diversification of
activity for FDB personnel which resulted in an improvement
in morale. From the consumer standpoint, nothing was
lost; indeed, there was a gain in quality.

This reorganization also involved further readjustments
and reassignments among the area branch personnel. It called
for formation of a new organization to be designated the
"Operations Division," but this name was subsequently dropped
in favor of "Documents Control Division." The new unit combined
the functions formerly assigned to the Documents Source
Survey Division and the Documents Screening and Reference
Division. A new Reports Division, to which were shifted the
functions of the Administrative Staff's former Records and
Editorial Sections, was also set up. 149/ Appointed as

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chiefs of the new divisions were [   ] (who had headed   25X1
the Document Source Survey Division) as chief of the Documents
Control Division, and [   ] as chief of the Reports   25X1
Division. Both had been members of the old WDC.

 While this reorganization was pending, FDB was in the
throes of a physical change. The impending transfer of the
[   ] from CIA control had necessitated plans for   25X1
moving the branch to a new location. Various sites were
considered and as late as 23 June it was thought probable
that this location would be 1155 Champlain Street, N. W., and
a moving date of 1 July was expected. 150/ This proposal was,
however, rejected and the new home finally selected for FDB
was [   ]   25X1
[   ] in   25X1
Northeast Washington. The site was a considerable distance
from the main area occupied by CIA, and this factor, isolating
as it did the branch from its consumers, was to create coordina-
tion problems which would not have existed under more normal
circumstances. The problem of maintaining effective liaison
was a formidable one, and failure to fully solve it made FDB's
service function much less effective.

 The 1 July moving date was not met but the move was
made later in the month and completed by 1 August with a

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minimum of disruption in branch operations. Allocation of

space in the new quarters had been made with the reorganization

plan in mind. Upon approval of the T/O in late August, FDB

was organized in the form which was to stand substantially

unaltered for the next two years. One minor change did occur

shortly afterward when, on 29 September 1949, the titles of

the "former" Foreign Documents Branch and its component divi-

sions were reversed by CIA order and the organization from

then on was known as the "Foreign Documents Division." Its

subordinate units were thereafter designated "branches." 151/

The large increase in personnel which was authorized for

FDD to accommodate the increased demands of consumer offices

for translation and which was reflected in the new T/O of

25 February 1951* did not change the physical arrangements of

the division since the new assignments were distributed in

relation to the requirements levied on the various branches.

However, a fourth wing of the second floor _____ was   25X1

taken over in May to provide space for the newly augmented branches.

This expansion and one further on in October 1952 to meet

the need for additional space when the FDD T/O was increased

once again proved to be sufficient from then on to serve the

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* See Ch. Four, p. 98.

space needs of FDD.

Organizational expansion of the division had, however, not yet reached its limit and, concomitant with increasing demands for translation service, a new commitment in the exploitation field had to be made by FDD. At least partially due to the heavy workload and limited personnel as well as concentration on higher priorities, the division had up to this point performed no service to the community on Western European source material. In fact, the Chief, FDD had earlier answered a consumer requirement for such service with the statement that OO, in view of personnel restrictions on FDD and increased demands for service, had established a policy that FDD would not process information on Western Europe. 152/ In March 1951, however, as the result of a reorganization of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and increased Agency emphasis on Western European developments, that Office reversed its earlier position that coverage of Western European sources by FDD was unnecessary and requested that a unit for this purpose be set up. The reason given was that the language competence which ORR originally possessed no longer existed. 153/ FDD thereupon initiated action to establish a new branch and submitted a request for an additional 26 employees to staff it and to exploit the 200 newspapers and 3,000 periodicals

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considered to be of potential value. 154/ However, in light of
the T/O increase approved for FDD earlier in the year, the
still unfilled overall complement of the division, and the so
far unproved potential of the newly formed external translation
project, the AD/O refused at this time to ask for additional
personnel although he did request authorization of the
proposed new branch to meet the needs of ORR. 155/ The result
was the establishment, effective 27 June, of FDD's eighth
branch, with _____ designated chief 156/ and an

25X1

initial T/O of 19, which was obtained by reducing three of
the other substantive branches by this amount. 157/ Space
to accommodate the new Western Europe Branch was already
available by virtue of the recent expansion to the fourth
wing of Y Building.

The recurrent problem of personnel losses among potential
employees due to long delays in granting security clearances
still plagued the division. Another attempt to solve it was
attempted in April 1951 when FDD proposed employment of these
people in an "unclassified translation pool" to work on un-
classified materials while awaiting clearances. 158/ In addi-
tion to preventing loss of personnel, the plan had the additional
benefit of providing a work force to assist in holding down
backlogs in the large volume of unclassified translation

requirements still levied on FDD. In this respect, the new

organization was similar to the old Translation Service

Division which had been discontinued some two years before;

however, it was not as formal and did not become an organized

part of the division as the former had been. The new

provisional pool was set up in early summer 1951 and space

for it was provided in a sealed-off part of the FDD area in

Y Building. [   ] was transferred from the Ad-   25X1

ministrative Staff and appointed the first chief of the un-

classified pool. 159/ The pool remained active for several

years and served well the purpose for which it was established.

　　　　With success achieved in its request for Western

European coverage by FDD, ORR made a further pitch in November

1952, asking that Latin America be taken into the FDD exploita-

tion program. This request was denied for the present because

of other commitments, although Bagnall agreed to search for

Latin American information on a regular basis in sources

covered outside the Latin American area. However, the door

was not closed to consideration of this expansion provided ORR

could justify it and FDD could obtain the needed personnel. 160/

For the moment nothing further was done.

　　　　While the division increased in size and its operations

expanded, changes were also made on subordinate levels. To

improve FDD capabilities, the area branches within the division
were reorganized during 1952 to better fit their operations to
those of consumers on a counterpart basis. This provided for
greater specialization in subject categories. Emphasis on
projects of a research nature also continued to grow. Through
reports resulting from these projects an attempt was made to
save the consumers' time in assembling scattered items of
information and to conserve the linguists' efforts by concentra-
ting production solely on material of value to the project,
thus eliminating the wastefulness of literal and complete
translation. 161/ At the same time, a restudy and reclassifica-
tion of 188 linguist positions as of 7 May 1952 marked an
attempt, and one that was a definite success, to build the
confidence and morale of the operational personnel. The new
ratings were intended to be commensurate with the increased
responsibilities and greater specialization which had accrued
to the positions held by FDD intelligence officers. Similarly,
23 clerical positions were reclassified as of 10 December
providing for an expansion of duties in these positions and
for greater flexibility in operations. 162/

The description of the staff and organizational develop-
ment of FDD up to this point represents the status of the
division just prior to the issuance of NSCID 16, FDD's

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charter of common service. It did not mark the end of changes
and innovations in these aspects, for these continued throughout
the life of the organization. More followed and they will be
treated in turn.

D.   The Question of Subordination

An issue of considerable importance to FDD's organization
in the formative years pertained to the question of who was to
control the division. The Washington Documents Center,
forerunner of FDD, was initially assigned to ORE. It has been
suggested that this may have been done partially because of
early staffing difficulties. In 1946, in the absence of an
approved T/O for WDC, slots were borrowed from other Offices,
and WDC personnel, among others, were carried against OSO or
ORE T/O positions which they never held. WDC's assignment may
also have been due in part to the active role played by ORE
representatives in the early negotiations for the transfer of
document activities from the military services to CIA. 163/
On 31 December 1946, however, a retroactive order was issued
assigning WDC, effective 1 December 1946, to OO, which had
been established two months earlier to supervise the Agency
function of overt intelligence collection. This subordina-
tion remained in force until 23 December 1963 when the division

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was transferred to OCR. Despite the transfer of administrative
subordination to OO, WDC (and later, DB and FDB] remained under
the operational control of other CIA Offices. The 31 December
order provided for close coordination by ORE and OCD to deter-
mine requirements and priorities for DB production, prescribed
OO coordination with ORE to determine final disposition of
exploited documents, and designated OCD as DB's point of
contact with other government agencies. 164/

In January 1948, the National Security Council designated
Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias V. Correa to
investigate CIA and the national organization for intelligence.
In the course of its survey the group studied FDB activities
as part of OO operations, and in its report to the NSC on
1 January 1949 it recommended that the branch be incorporated
in a proposed "Research and Reports" Division (subsequently
ORR). This decision was based on a conviction that FDB's
work could best be performed in close relationship with and
under the guidance of the consumer agencies. 165/ NSC 50,
issued on 1 July 1949, approved the recommended transfer.
However, no action was taken and the question of FDB's
subordination remained at issue.

The question of the continued existence of OO, and thus
of its control of FDB, hung fire for a considerable length of

time after issuance of the Dulles Report. There was a general feeling among those reviewing the report that the common function of OO's three divisions, the collection of intelligence information from overt sources, had not been fully recognized by the committee, particularly in connection with the overlap of FDB operations with those of the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB). 166/ Another factor militating against the transfer of the branch to ORR, after the latter's formation, was ORR's specialization in economic and geographic research. Since the other CIA Offices and the IAC agencies all had need of FDB's services, it was felt that the branch should not be controlled by just one of CIA's research units. To do so would tend to make document exploitation an adjunct of research and analysis operations for the primary benefit of a few rather than to facilitate its growth as the common-service collection organization that it was intended to be. 167/

In its comments on the Dulles Report in February 1949, ORE declared its disinclination to assume FDB's functions, provided the latter's services continued to be conducted in support of ORE. In view of the fact that FDB was basically "a source exploitation facility" involving a substantial library and reference function, the Office proposed that the branch remain in OO or be attached to the CIA Library. 168/

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The latter part of the ORE proposal appeared to be the
Agency choice when, in mid-1949, the DCI had considered the
possibility of transferring the branch to OCD. 169/

Complications followed. NSC 50 had directed abolition
of OCD and dispersal of its functions to other CIA elements.
The NSC, therefore, in a 7 July meeting approved the recom-
mendations in NSC 50, including the proposed transfer of FDB
to ORE, and directed the CIA to carry them out. 170/ In the
course of preliminary hearings on the CIA budget for FY-1951,
representatives of the Bureau of the Budget stated their
opinion that the branch belonged in ORE rather than OO.
Thereupon, the DCI, determined to resolve the problem once
and for all, requested the Management Office in December 1949
to initiate a study and make a recommendation of where best
to place FDD. 171/

In the discussions during the fall of 1949, George Carey
had vigorously argued the case for keeping OO in existence
and retaining FDD in this Office. He pointed out the incon-
sistency of considering the division's transfer to OCD, an
Office largely devoted to library and reference functions,
and emphasized that FDD collected information rather than
documents. He dwelt on the close relationship of the

division's collection function with that of the Foreign

Broadcast Information Division (FBID) and the Contact Division

(CD), FDD's companion divisions in OO. If strategic considera-

tions dictated otherwise, however, and a change was inevitable,

Carey opted for FDD's transfer to ORE in preference to OCD. 172/

The problem pertaining to FDD's transfer elsewhere

in the Agency appeared to be closely related to the concurrent

disposition of FBID and CD. Contact Division had been destined

for merger with the covert Offices and the Dulles Report had

recommended the transfer of FBID to a new and primarily covert

"Operations Division." The latter provision was, however,

disapproved by the NSC six months later. For this and other

reasons, the provisions of NSC 50 relating to the rest of OO

were never implemented and FDD remained under OO administra-

tion. 173/

The issue of a possible transfer of FDD to OCD was

briefly revived in the latter half of 1951 when William H. Jackson,

at the DCI's behest, made a special survey of OO during the

period 24 August - 10 November 1951. In a lengthy memorandum

prepared in October and forwarded by the AD/O to Jackson,

John Bagnall presented a detailed analysis of FDD operations

in which he spelled out the dissimilarity of FDD and OCD

functions. The gist of the memorandum was that FDD exploited

documents to produce raw intelligence whereas OCD's handling
of documents represented a library and reference function,
that is, procurement, storage, dissemination, and similar
activities. 174/ The case presented by Bagnall seems to
have contributed to Jackson's recommendation to maintain the
status quo with respect to FDD.

The Jackson survey apparently put a final quietus on
the question of FDD's subordination. From then on, the matter
was no longer at issue and was not again revived until the
1960s when the transfer to OCR was consummated. This will be
the subject of a later chapter. For the moment, however,
let us consider in the next chapter or two the materials with
which the staff and organization were concerned.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Sources

A. Community Cooperation

Near the conclusion of World War II, as noted earlier, the acquisition and preservation of captured enemy documents became a matter of increasing concern to the intelligence community. To prevent the loss of this material through inadvertent or deliberate destruction and also to plumb sources which during hostilities had not been open to the intelligence organizations, a widespread search and procurement effort was initiated. This was an extensive undertaking, involving all the services. One of these projects was the effort of the WDC (Adv) team, discussed earlier, which functioned at the close of the war in Japan and during a six-month period selected and evacuated some 650,000 captured document items to Washington and also provided for the continuing flow of materials which served as the basis of WDC (later DB and FDB) operations until captured documents as a source gradually dried up. With the decrease in volume and value of this source, the

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nature of intelligence exploitation slowly changed from its earlier stress on the old captured material to a new emphasis on current sources, and the procurement effort was revised to conform to the new need. In this form, it became an important and permanent part of the intelligence function.

The role played by FDD and its predecessors in source procurement represents, of course, only a small part of the total effort. In actual fact source procurement is primarily a library operation, intrinsically not part of FDD's functions. It has been, and is, engaged in by many parts of the government, non-intelligence as well as intelligence, IAC as well as CIA. Within the CIA it was a major function of what gradually evolved into the Office of Collection and Dissemination. FDD's interest in collection of source material was thus peripheral but, since the quality and quantity of its own product depended upon the same factors in source collection, its concern with the problem was nonetheless great. As the WDC (Adv) survey in 1945-1946 had illustrated, during the early period WDC, FDD's forerunner, had depended mainly on its own initiative for document procurement, but with its integration into the Agency, its source collection function was for the most part conducted through, or at least coordinated with, OCD. What

follows deals with publications procurement only to the extent that FDD was involved.

In the spring of 1947, during the formative period of Documents Branch, the move toward gradual conversion from the exploitation of captured documents to the exploitation of current publications was already underway. At this time the document status in the branch was as follows: the branch had on hand approximately 40,000 low priority documents to be screened and abstracted and about 5,000 captured documents a month were being received. Operations then consisted of screening and abstracting the material being currently received plus approximately 2,000 captured documents a week of the backlog. 175/ At this rate the backlog would last another 20 weeks. The number of current foreign language periodicals estimated to be available from abroad at this time was about 4,000, of which some 1,760 were from Eastern Europe, the Near East, and the Far East, the developing major target areas. 176/ It was therefore obvious that the volume of current materials was more than adequate to fill the void that would be left by the dwindling backlog of captured documents.

There were several methods by which these periodicals could be procured. The most promising was through the Serials Branch, Acquisition Division in the State Department. This

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unit acted on the basis of requests from any government agency
desiring foreign periodicals and took steps to procure them at
no charge to the requester for the service. The only expense
entailed was the cost of the subscription itself. Another
State Department source was its Reference Division, which had
expressed its readiness to offer its sources on temporary loan
to other government components. The same was true of the
Library of Congress, which, in addition to receipts from the
State Department, also received some periodicals by means of
international exchange, gifts, or purchase. A fourth source
was the Hoover Library, which received a number of USSR
periodicals and had indicated a willingness to make these
available at Stanford University for abstracting. Finally, all
current Japanese periodicals were directly procurable from SCAP,
Tokyo, at no cost to CIG. 177/ Current source procurement
appeared to be no problem at all.

The importance of document procurement was recognized
early when, in the branch reorganization of June 1947, the
Document Source Survey Division was created. It was to play an
important role in surveying repositories throughout the United
States and the rest of the world to determine the existence and
availability of foreign-language documents of actual or potential

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intelligence value. In this connection a start was made in
October 1947 when FDB, in coordination with Contact Branch of
OO, began a survey of governmental and academic institutions
to determine the extent of documentary material held by them
which would be of value to FDB. This activity was subsequently
expanded to include research foundations and private industry.

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
178/

The procedure established was to have an FDB representative in
company with a Contact Branch officer visit an institution,
check out the potential of its sources, and then establish a
working relationship with a key person there who would be
witting of the CIA representatives' activities. The system,
almost without exception, worked well and was employed by the
branch for as long as it was needed.

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
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The CIA Library's role in FDD procurement operations was
no less important although its function pertained more to the
normal collection routine of source acquisition than did that
of Contact Division and OSO. On occasion, however, this
cooperation took a more direct form. For example, in the early
years while the Library was in the process of building up its
English-language holdings, it conducted surveys in various
parts of the United States to ascertain the existence and
availability of material of interest. FDD utilized this op-
portunity and, with OCD consent, had the Library representative
check the same depositories for foreign-language holdings. 181/
This activity proved very productive.

In addition to procurement assistance inside the CIA
there were also sources among organizations elsewhere in
government. In the latter half of 1947, when FDB exploitation
was shifting gradually from captured documents to current
sources, arrangements were completed with the Intelligence
Division of the War Department, the Library of Congress, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the Naval Research Laboratory,

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the Smithsonian Institution, the National Research Council,
Intelligence Acquisitions Division (IAD) of the State
Department, and the Bureau of Mines for the loan of current
periodicals of intelligence value from the Far East and the
USSR to be abstracted by FDB. 182/

Among these non-Agency organizations providing procurement
assistance for FDB in the early years, the most important was
the Library of Congress. In practice, the arrangement was a
two-way street, especially in the immediate postwar years,
since much of the source material received from the war theaters
was sent to the Library of Congress as final depository. In
this connection, the Japanese Document Committee, WDC, decided
at a meeting held in early 1946 to send directly to the Library
of Congress all Japanese documents of a purely cultural nature. 183/
Arrangements were subsequently made to forward to the Library
much of the additional captured material following its processing
by the intelligence agencies.

In respect to the flow of materials in the other direction,
that is, current sources from the Library to FDB, some initial
difficulty was encountered, but a meeting between Dr. Evans, the
Librarian of Congress, and   served to resolve the
problem amicably. The Library at first refused to release any

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documents, then agreed to a three-day loan period which proved impractical, but finally settled on a two-week loan agreement with FDB. 184/ This cooperation was carried a step further when, in the summer of 1948, FDB, with Library of Congress approval, sent a screening team to the Library to ascertain what books were of intelligence value in a backlog of 6,000 titles which had accumulated there. Specific items were selected and sent to FDB, where a bibliography was prepared for the benefit of the IAC agencies. 185/ FDD's collaboration with its procurement sources yielded significant results. In the course of four years, 1948 through 1951, the division processed a total of about 674,500 foreign-language documents. Of these, the State Department furnished approximately 422,000, the Army 68,000, the Navy 9,000, other CIA Offices 128,000, the Library of Congress 41,500, and the Smithsonian Institution 6,000. 186/

As these figures indicate, the State Department very early took over the Library of Congress's role of principal supplier of sources for FDD. To a very limited extent the Department used screening teams, as for example the despatch to Korea in 1948 of such a team which brought back a small number of documents useful to FDB. 187/ Much more important were the

publications procurement officers (PPO) of the State Department.
The significance of their contribution to the intelligence
effort, and to FDD in particular, is readily evident when one
considers that in FY-1952, for example, the PPOs, in conjunction
with the State Department's Foreign Documents Branch, procured
180,000 foreign-language publications. This constituted 70
percent of all documents received by the intelligence community. 188/
Because of their importance to FDD, it was standard operating
procedure for all State Department PPOs to be briefed by the
division prior to their departure for overseas posts. This
arrangement was beneficial to both parties; it defined the PPOs'
target more closely, and this, in turn, provided better service
for FDD.

Until the spring of 1953 State had provided for full-time
PPOs in London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, Berlin, New Delhi, and
Hong Kong and part-time PPOs in about 25 other posts. However,
the budget cuts referred to above had placed the entire program
in jeopardy. By May the position in Rome had been abolished,
the Moscow position had been vacant for nearly a year, and the
Berlin PPO had been instructed to cease procurement in the Soviet
Zone due to personal danger. Thus, by the end of FY-1953, only
four of the full-time posts were active and it was anticipated

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that the budgetary situation would allow only three to be

permanently occupied during FY-1954. 189/ With exception of a

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tion. 191/ This plan was approved by the State Department in

September 1953, 192/ but no change resulted.

Periodically, consideration was given to the possibility

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B. The Search for Sources

Following the transfer of WDC to CIG and especially after
its reorganization as the Documents Branch in mid-1947, there
began a series of survey and procurement trips made at varying
intervals to repositories throughout the United States and the
world which gave promise of yielding significant volumes of
source material of value to the intelligence community.

In the spring of 1948, in connection with its search for
domestic sources of foreign-language documents, FDB became
involved in a procurement undertaking known as the "Sunshine
Project," FDB's only field operation until the establishment of
the organization's contractual field units in later years.
From FDB's standpoint the Sunshine Project was a shortlived
affair, although it had been in existence for more than a year
at the time the branch became involved. Inherited from ORE,
the project had largely accomplished its original mission when
taken over by FDB. However, OO and the branch had been
interested in it from its inception because of its relation to
foreign-language document sources.

The original intent of the project involved ORE's desire
to examine the document holdings located at the Hoover Library
of War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University in Palo
Alto, California, for the purpose of surveying and screening

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this material in connection with an IAC project on psychological

warfare directed against the Soviet Union. As a first step

Col. Edwin K. Wright, Executive to the DCI, Mr. Donald Edgar,

Chief of ICAPS, and Capt. S. B. Frankel, Chief of ORE, had

visited the Hoover Library during the period 2-6 December 1946

and reported on its large volume of Far Eastern documents, on

hand and being received. They also commented on the assent of

the library authorities to the group's proposal for establish-

ment of a CIG research unit at the library to process Russian,

Chinese, and Japanese documents for intelligence information. 195/

On 17 February 1947 Col. Wright requested the services of

_____ of Documents Branch as a Chinese area expert   25X1

to screen the Hoover collection and make arrangements for

transmission of copies of the target material to Washington. 196/

_____ began his assignment on 10 March and for the next two   25X1

and a half months made an exhaustive examination of the Hoover

Library materials. He submitted three detailed reports on the

results of his study.

Meanwhile, on 24 March Col. Wright, now DDCI, ordered the

project to be set up under ORE and assigned _____ to temporary   25X1

duty with the research group in a screening capacity. 197/

Disagreement with this arrangement was expressed by John Bagnall.

In a brief note on 3 April he recommended that [   ] be   25X1
withdrawn from the project for reasons relating to the fact
that his military rank was subordinate to the ORE civilian
supervisor at Palo Alto. Bagnall also stated his opinion that
screening of documents was the responsibility of Documents
Branch as a central service and should therefore be done by
DB. 198/ This sentiment was echoed by [   ] in his final   25X1
report. 199/ On 29 May he completed his work and returned to
Washington. With his departure direct OO participation in the
project ceased for the time being.

By the following spring, the Sunshine Project was begin-
ning to approach the stage of diminishing returns from the ORE
standpoint. While full exploitation of the Hoover collections
had not been quite completed, ORE's specific mission of mining
the material for information useful for psychological warfare
had reached the point where added information on the subject
could in future be supplied by new material available in
Washington. Termination of the project by the end of FY-1948
was therefore recommended by ORE. 200/ This was followed on
4 May by Wright's order transferring the project, including
personnel, equipment, and facilities, from ORE to OO. 201/
The transfer was consummated and six additional slots were

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added to FDB's T/O and ceiling in June to accommodate the new
personnel. 202/ Earlier, however, Bagnall had made a thorough
survey of the project in its current status and concluded that
continuation of the project, from an intelligence and management
standpoint, was not in the best interest of the Agency. He
pointed out that larger quantities of material which showed a
better than ten-to-one ratio of greater intelligence value
were being received in Washington but were not being touched
due to lack of personnel. 203/ Bagnall's recommendation to
close out the Sunshine Project, with concurrence, was forwarded
to the AD/O by [ ] a week later, 204/ and finally on   25X1
2 July the DCI approved the termination date of 30 September 1948
suggested by the AD/O. 205/

Discounting the benefits derived by ORE from the mission,
the impact of the Sunshine Project on FDB was minimal. It
resulted in a thorough review of the holdings available at the
Hoover Library and in the preparation of bibliographic listings
which made this information easily available to the intelligence
community. Some of the material found there was important, but
the bulk of it proved to be of historical interest only and
therefore of limited use for the current needs of intelligence
analysts. Other than the survey performed by [ ] FDB's   25X1

only active participation in the project was the preparation

of an annotated bibliographic list in cooperation with the

China Desk of ORE. 206/ With termination of the project,

arrangements were made to maintain contact with the Hoover

Library so that FDB would be continually informed of future

acquisitions. So far as the six researchers in California

were concerned, in the end only one reported for duty in

Washington; thus, the valuable experience gained by the

participants on the project was lost to FDB. Even the benefit

of the additional slots was lost when FDB reverted to the old

T/O of ☐ and at the beginning of FY-1950 dropped down to ☐   225X1

One further gain was achieved in the project's final stage,

however. John Bagnall travelled to the West Coast to close

out the project and while there took the occasion to survey

materials available in certain West Coast universities and also

to establish contacts in a number of college faculties with a

view to FDB personnel recruitment. 207/ Thus, the Sunshine

Project was not a total loss.

Concurrent with the search and survey of domestic sources

of foreign-language documents, FDB engaged in similar activity

abroad during the postwar period. A number of trips were taken

by branch personnel to examine various overseas repositories

and to provide the means for making significant materials
available to Washington.

One of the first of the expeditions was a procurement
trip organized and sponsored by the War Department (WD) through
its Special Documents Section just prior to the latter's
incorporation into DB. On this occasion Henry Jarvinen, then
still an Army officer under WD orders, and a Mr. Danciger were
sent to Great Britain and Germany on a temporary duty assignment
which lasted from 6 February to 30 May 1947. In London they
screened, examined, and made available to the War Department a
collection of German and Russian documents   25X1
containing material of value to the study of the USSR's
economic potential. This was the Wannsee Collection, so-called
because it included documents on the Soviet Union and adjacent
countries used by the German Wannsee Institute during the war.
It had been evacuated from the St. Lambrecht monastery after
the war by the British, but only about a third of the material
was held by the British, since the remainder had inadvertantly
fallen into the hands of the Russians. Some 400 of the
documents were found to be of immediate intelligence value and
these were forwarded on loan   Jarvinen also   25X1
used the occasion of the trip to examine the documentary

resources of the British Air Ministry and of other document

collections in the European theater as well as to meet with

the document control officers in various army units in

Europe. 208/

In 1948 FDB sponsored a second document survey trip in

Western Europe. The desire on the part of military authorities

in the European theater to arrange for the final disposition

of the captured documents problem made it imperative that CIA

establish formal liaison with the European Command (EUCOM) in

Germany in order to permit an orderly examination of available

materials and to arrange for the procurement of documents having

intelligence potential. Much of the material was improperly

catalogued and therefore considerable quantities of documents of

low-grade value were being returned to the United States.

Moreover, a considerable part of the existing volume was

subject to destruction in the event of an emergency as well as

to loss through the return of captured materials to their

former owners. For these reasons further delay, it was feared,

would result in the permanent loss of many valuable documents.

In view of all this,   initiated a proposal to send   25X1

a small survey party to Europe to examine existing US Army

repositories, to identify strategic intelligence documents

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required in the Zone of Interior (ZI), and to arrange for the

acquisition of these documents for the benefit of the intel-

ligence community. It was ascertained that the Navy and Air

Force were no longer interested in the documents held in the

European theater. However, the State Department and the Army,

having expressed considerable interest, signified their

willingness to have the FDB screening group represent them in

all matters related to the selection and return of documents

to the United States. 209/

The upshot was authorization on 28 May 1948 for the

selection of a three-man team from FDB to go to Europe for a

period of approximately 60 days to conduct the survey. 210/

The persons proposed by FDB and ultimately approved by CIA for

this assignment were _____ as head of the group;   25X1

_____ of the old GMDS; and _____   25X1₁

formerly of SDS. The composition of the survey group and its

mission were also approved by State, the Army, and EUCOM. The

survey team left Washington on 12 July and returned to the

United States on 19 September. During this period the group trav-

elled almost continuously and consulted as many knowledgeable individ-

uals and custodians of documents and visited as many repositories

in Germany as time permitted, some 13 locations in all. Over-

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all, the team found about 200 tons of documents of interest to Washington agencies. Of this quantity, over 20 tons were found to be of value to the exploitation operations of FDB. 211/ In general, adequate steps for safe-guarding, destroying, or otherwise accounting for all documentary material were initiated. On the team's return, [   ] prepared and submitted a formal report showing the group's findings and recommendations, including the suggestion that in order to assure an exhaustive monitoring of the disposition of the scattered sources in the European theater trips similar to the one just completed be made at least once every two years. 212/

25X1

No overseas survey trip was taken in 1949, but in the following two years FDD was again involved in procurement abroad -- a survey of Near East published materials in 1950 and a survey in the Far East in 1951. Near East publications as a source of intelligence information had been the subject of discussion between the State Department and FDD in September 1950 and it was felt that this region would be a lucrative source. CIA had been receiving some titles through State auspices, but since State had not had one of its publications procurement officers in the area since May 1949, it was felt that many titles were being missed. CIA was therefore anxious to dispatch a competent linguist to the region for a survey trip of approximately two months' duration

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to determine the current status of vernacular publications in the area. 213/ The outcome was the assignment of John Bagnall to make the trip to the Near East. Bagnall departed Washington on 25 October 1950 and returned exactly two months later, a period during which he visited 13 cities, mainly capitals, at his destination and en route. The purpose of the stops en route was to locate for FDD unique reference materials on rare languages. 214/

The results of the trip, to judge by the voluminous report submitted by Bagnall upon his return, were worthwhile. He emphasized the great need for a regular PPO in the Near East and, in connection with the considerable time-lag (three to four months) in the transmittal of publications to Washington, he recommended assignment of a well-qualified publications analyst to Teheran to monitor the large volume of sources there for information to meet intelligence requirements. 215/ Bagnall followed up the latter proposal in 1951 and recommended, for a six-month's trial period, [ ] of FDD's Near East/Africa Branch for the assignment. 216/ There is no record that this proposal was implemented, although [ ] did attend a three-month's training seminar in Beirut, Lebanon, about a year later. 217/

25X1

25X1

In 1951 FDD dispatched a documents survey team to the Far East, the first to be sent from Washington to this region since the WDC (Adv) group in 1945, before the division even existed. When the WDC (Adv) was dissolved, all initial exploitation, screening, and shipment functions pertaining to Japanese documents became the responsibility of the Document Section, Translator and Interpreter Service (TIS), G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FECOM), and remained with this unit from that time on. The work of TIS in the intervening period had come under some criticism. In December 1948, George Carey had complained about the paucity of material received by FDB and the generally poor quality of what was received. He deplored in particular the non-receipt of Russian language material formerly held by Japanese research and intelligence agencies which WDC (Adv) records showed existed in Japan. 218/ In answer to Carey's complaint, the Army's Intelligence Division promised to do better and to consolidate its documents collection activity in response to CIA requirements. 219/

The opportunity for a closer relationship with G-2, FECOM, and its source material came in the spring of 1951 when Gen. Riley F. Ennis replaced Gen. Willoughby in Tokyo as the new G-2.

In the course of an OO briefing before his departure for the
Far East, Ennis tendered an invitation to send an FDD document
survey team to [____] and this was promptly accepted. 220/ The   25X1
necessary arrangements were speedily made and [____]   25X1
[____] were designated as the two members of the   25X1
FDD field survey team. They were assigned to FBIS, [____]   25X1
[____] for administrative purposes. FBIS further contributed   25X1
to the mission's success by facilitating direct liaison
between TIS and FDD through the use of its communication
facilities. 221/ In a briefing prior to their departure,
[____] were assigned the mission of surveying   25X1
documents captured in World War II and the Korean War, current
Asiatic Mainland publications (including Russian) received in
Japan, and Japanese repositories; they were also instructed to
take measures to solidify the recently established TIS-FDD
liaison. 222/ The two men left Washington on 29 July 1951,
successfully completed the assigned tasks [____] and   25X1
returned on 24 September. Among the items of interest in the
report they submitted after their return were the statements
that FECOM still held approximately 3,000 World War II captured
documents; that UN forces in Korea had captured to date
approximately 10,000 documents of tactical and 22,500 documents

of strategic value; that the Army and Air intelligence

organizations had established their own procurement channels

for serial publications of Far Eastern countries and had agreed

to share these with FDD; and that all problems arising from

the approved TIS-FDD liaison had been discussed and resolved,

with TIS agreeing to contribute regularly to FDD's Consolidated

Translation Survey (CTS).

25X1

223/

25X1

More document survey missions were in the offing, but

the foregoing serve to illustrate the benefits derived by FDD

and, in turn, the intelligence community as a result of these

undertakings. They were chiefly of value in that they clarified

the confused status of document holdings abroad and contributed

to a systemized method of liaison between FDD and document

repositories abroad, thereby assuring that available data of

intelligence value would in the course of time be made known

to the community and further assuring that losses of information

would be held to a minimum.

C. Interdepartmental Rivalries

We turn briefly now to a consideration of the day-to-day

procurement and flow of the documents which constituted the

raw material on which FDD's routine production was based. As

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has been mentioned, aside from captured documents which the military provided, the main purveyor of current material at first was the Library of Congress. In the evolution of source procurement the Library's contribution gradually diminished and the major media for acquiring current foreign-language documents from abroad became the State Department, the service attaches, and Allied nations through third countries. There was some direct procurement by FDD, but for the moment this was an exception.

In March 1948, the AD/CD called the DCI's attention to the urgent need for improving exploitation of Russian-language periodicals and cited the cumbersome system whereby the Library of Congress received incoming periodicals from State and, after screening them, sent them on loan to FDB for a two-week period. At the same time he reported that State suggested it be authorized to procure the periodicals for CIA and send them to the Agency directly. 224/ As a result of a subsequent dialogue on this subject between CIA and State, agreement was reached that State would forward to FDB all foreign-language publications received from the USSR, Satellite countries, the Far East, the Near and Middle East, and Scandinavia. The branch was to screen the documents and then

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return them to State. 225/ On 4 June 1948, the Agency provided
for a working fund to reimburse State for the procurement
project and FDB submitted lists of periodicals desired. 226/
In this connection FDB also undertook the briefing of State's
PPOs about to leave for foreign assignments and continued this
practice from then on. The result was an improvement of the
quality of intelligence content of documents received by FDB.

In mid-1948, the intelligence procurement program was
expanded beyond the CIA-State agreement. With John Bagnall in
attendance, a conference of IAC representatives was held on
2 July at which the first step toward a coordinated IAC program
for procurement of foreign publications was taken. By general
agreement, the first efforts under the new program were directed
to the procurement of Yugoslav documents through State Department
sources. The material was to be channeled by State to FDB for
centralized processing and the preparation of accessions lists
and abstracts. 227/ The program was slow in getting underway
and the first shipment of publications was not received until
April 1949. 228/ Gradually it increased in regularity and
volume and in time was expanded to include all major world
areas.

The elimination of the Library of Congress roadblock in
the FDB procurement program did much to improve the flow of

the documents from their source to their final destination in
the branch; unfortunately, it was only the first of a number
of irritating problems to plague this aspect of the branch's
operations. Another involved recurrent bickering between FDB
and OCD on matters relating to procurement. Jealously guarding
its prerogatives as the "library" Office of CIA, OCD adopted
a wary stance against any FDB initiatives in document procure-
ment, choosing to regard such activity as an incursion in its
allotted domain. OCD took pains on occasion to remind the
other Offices of its assigned authority in this field. 229/
However, whether FDB wished to be or not, it was much involved
in activities of a library nature, including procurement, and
if it occasionally trod on OCD toes, this is not surprising.
The rather strained relationship on this score between FDB and
OCD in the early period of CIA's existence, when the functions
and missions of the Agency's components had not yet been fully
defined, was not eased by FDB's contention that the OCD
procurement service was unsatisfactory, especially when
contrasted to that of the State Department. 230/ Bickering of
this sort made it evident that informal coordination of the
several Offices' procurement needs was no longer adequate to
deal with this and related problems and therefore an attempt

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was made to resolve them by creating a CIA Document Procurement Committee. The committee was formed on 17 March 1949 and met regularly thereafter. The CIA Librarian, Joseph Becker of OCD, was to chair the new organization and all CIA Offices were to be represented. John Bagnall was designated to represent FDB, and [ ] OO. The committee's function was to coordinate all procurement activities for the various CIA Offices. 231/ Although the Procurement Committee did not resolve all procurement problems to FDB's complete satisfaction, it contributed considerably to alleviating a potentially chaotic situation.

25X1

FDD's procurement problems were not limited solely to OCD. Despite the commendation of State's procurement service cited above, a deterioration of sorts set in as regards FDD's relations with IAD, the State Department procurement organization. There were several problems which required solution. One, which surfaced in early 1950, pertained to a change in IAD's dissemination policy. Over and above certain specific titles paid for and distributed directly to CIA, State obtained many other periodicals for its own use which had in the past also been sent first to FDD. This arrangement was deemed detrimental to State interests and FDD was placed second on

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the distribution with the result that issuances of some titles were delayed and in certain instances they were never received at all. The problem was resolved by the allocation of funds sufficient for State to procure the publications in question -- some 600 -- directly for FDD's benefit. 232/ This improvement was enhanced when the Document Procurement Committee on 27 April 1950 authorized direct publications purchasing by OO field stations outside Washington. 233/

Another source of contention in IAD-FDD relations arose in 1950 when, due to a misunderstanding in connection with a State allocation in February 1950, IAD announced its intention to divert 55 newspaper and periodical subscriptions needed by FDD for intelligence exploitation to non-IAC agencies -- the Library of Congress, the Army Medical Library, and the Department of Agriculture Library -- with the provision that these organizations supply copies of the titles to FDD by means of photostats or microfilm. 234/ Bagnall, in a memorandum for George Carey's signature, protested this arrangement and declared IAD's decision to be incompatible with the best interests of national intelligence. He stated further that intelligence needs required that FDD be supplied with the subject titles at the earliest possible date after receipt in

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Washington and that the document "trading" suggested by IAD would be detrimental in economy of time and inappropriate from the standpoint of security. 235/ A series of meetings on this matter was held during the spring of 1950 and the solution reached was to permit the IAD arrangement to stand for FY-1950 and to make the necessary readjustments for FY-1951. 236/

During most of its life, and especially in the early period, FDD had to depend upon outside Offices and agencies to conduct its document procurement operations. Though they recognized the central-service function of FDD, these organizations were in the business of procurement for the entire government community, non-intelligence as well as intelligence, and for this reason first priority was not always reserved for FDD. The division, on the other hand, conducted a continuing battle to assert its function of serving all consumers. This inevitably led to conflict, as the examples described above well illustrate. Other disputes could be cited. Partly, these conflicting interests were the result of the growing pains of any new operation with the inevitable dislocations attendant thereto; partly, it was a jealous concern by the respective Offices for the requirements of their own functions. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to understand

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why a perfect solution was never achieved. In view of the heat generated on occasion, it is indeed surprising that the system worked as well as it did. With the passage of time and with compromise and adjustments on the part of the organizations involved with procurement, circumstances gradually improved.

FDD disenchantment with State procurement policies which placed FDD on a par with the less sensitive non-IAC agencies and also the time-lag in receipt of document sources from State led to a move in 1951 to by-pass this channel in favor of direct procurement overseas by the division. In this connection the proposal was also made to assign several FDD multi-linguists in strategic areas overseas, such as Europe, the Far East, and the Near East, to serve as PPOs for CIA. 237/ As a first step, Carey suggested a trial run on direct procurement from Western Europe, 238/ but this proposal met with a cool reception from both OCD and State. The OCD reply clearly demonstrated the lack of communication between OO and OCD. Carey was informed that direct procurement of foreign-language publications had been commenced by CIA Library some two years before because of difficulty with the State channel and now accounted for 18 percent of sources being received from Western Europe. This figure included some 56 percent of the

Western European periodicals needed by FDD. Expansion of this arrangement, he was informed, was anticipated. OCD felt that to let FDD procure its own sources would lead to confusion in covert channels. Moreover, since the CIA Library used the same channels to obtain certain English-language materials, it would be unwise to transfer the procurement operation to FDD. 239/ The effect of this information was to deflate the FDD/OO plan for direct procurement. Carey did not hide his displeasure at being kept in the dark about OCD activities but did agree that OCD direct procurement obviated the need for FDD participation in this activity. 240/ Bagnall concurred in this and also suggested holding in abeyance the plan for placing FDD PPOs overseas until the effectiveness of OCD's procurement activity could be tested. Thereby he hoped to determine which area or areas should be supported by PPOs and which could be effectively covered by OCD without such aid. 241/ This brought to an end for at least the next few years FDD pressure for direct procurement and for overseas representation.

D. Development of Procurement Procedures

While a *modus vivendi* relating to document procurement was being slowly hammered out, activity in seeking out and obtaining current overt sources covering intelligence target

areas did not slacken. However, concurrent with the problems
discussed above, FDD encountered procurement difficulties from
another direction. This related to the direct procurement of
sources from the major target areas — the Soviet Union and,
subsequently, Communist China. In the spring of 1948 the
State Department reported that procurement of Russian newspapers,
including the provincial press, was becoming more difficult.
Some existing subscriptions had been cancelled by the Soviets,
new subscriptions were denied, and multiple copies of periodicals
and newspapers were denied or drastically reduced. State
believed that the Soviets were aware of the use of provincial
newspapers for intelligence purposes and that the denials were
therefore due to security measures. 242/ In the face of these
denials of sources, the possibility of so-called "third-country"
procurement — that is, the obtaining of the desired Soviet-
published sources from countries outside the Soviet Union, in
particular the Satellite and Scandinavian areas contiguous to
it, was given serious consideration. Beginning in August 1948,
FDB, in cooperation with OCD and the State Department conducted
an informal survey of US and "third country" sources from which
Soviet documents could be obtained. The search involved contacts
with numerous private individuals and enterprises, libraries

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and schools, government agencies, and foreign embassies of the
Free World. The response was very favorable. In the course
of the survey the branch suggested that arrangements might be
made with the governments of countries benefitting under the
American Aid program to have access to all publications procured
in the USSR by such countries. Such an arrangement with the
Chinese Nationalists, who had diplomatic representatives in
11 cities in the USSR (whereas the United States had representatives
in only two Soviet cities), would be particularly fruitful,
especially in regard to the Soviet Far East, where material
was very scanty and hard to obtain.   who conducted   25X1
the overall survey for FDB, suggested approaching State on this
matter. 243/

In September, the State Department approved George Carey's
19 August 00 memorandum conveying   recommendation and   25X1
immediately instructed its representatives in Moscow and Nanking
to initiate informal contact with the Chinese Nationalists
relative to Soviet sources. Similar arrangements were made for
the procurement of Chinese Communist material. 244/ In early
January 1949, on the basis of a memorandum from   Carey   25X1
reported that annual subscriptions for Soviet periodicals had
been placed by the Chinese Nationalist representatives but

warned that the availability of these sources depended upon
the ability of the Nationalist Government to maintain the
status quo in China. In view of the Communist threat to the
latter, he strongly recommended that immediate efforts be
made to stockpile all other provincial publications available
to the Chinese Nationalist consular offices. 245/

The success of the new arrangements was almost immediately
apparent. In February 1949, the first two air shipments of
USSR provincial press publications were received by FDB and in
the succeeding months many more shipments of this material
arrived. These shipments represented one of the high points
in the FDB-State Department Coordinated Procurement Program. 246/
This cooperative arrangement was designated the "Sochi" Program.

The return to China of the Chinese ambassador to the
USSR in May 1949 caused some concern in FDB about the continued
receipt of vital press material from the USSR, but the shipment
of these sources to Washington continued into late 1949. In
response to FDB's query, State assured the branch that attempts
to increase the stockpiling of all categories of publications
from the USSR would continue; however, the security of the
"Sochi" project was of primary concern. 247/ With the take-over
of the Chinese mainland by the Communists in October 1949 the

"Sochi" project came to an end and all activity in connection with it was terminated. The success of the project is evident from the fact that during the ten months prior to its termination, FDD received more than 1,100 Soviet provincial newspapers from points east of the Urals, sources which would otherwise have been unobtainable. 248/

When the procurement of hard-to-get Soviet sources through the medium of Chinese Nationalist consular posts became a dead issue, emphasis on Far Eastern sources was greatly increased. Some effort was directed to the procurement of non-Chinese sources; for example, special arrangements were made in November 1949 to initiate the flow of underground publications from French Indochina and the procurement, through the Army, of North Korean sources. 249/ However, with the advent of Communist power in China, greatest emphasis was put on this area. Special steps were planned to revitalize the procurement of current Chinese publications, which recent events in China had seriously impaired. In view of the increasing importance of the more than nine million overseas Chinese, a survey of publications issued by and for them was made at the end of 1949 with particular emphasis on Chinese publications issued in Central and South America. 250/ Then, in January 1950, the British indicated a

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willingness to have their facilities on the Chinese mainland
and in Hong Kong used for procurement of Chinese Communist
publications. 251/ At FDD's request a procurement program was
started and in May 1,200 Chinese Communist newspapers from 15
Chinese cities were received in the division, 252/ a number
increased to 18 cities by September. 253/ Coverage was
eventually curtailed when the number of British stations in
China was reduced from nine to three, but these continued to
supply Chinese acquisitions on a limited scale. 254/

On 18 January 1951, [   ] proposed a revival in   25X1
somewhat altered form of the "Sochi" project employed in 1948
and 1949, this time directed against the Chinese Communists
instead of the Soviets. [   ] believed that in exchange for   25X1
US aid to the Chinese Nationalists, arrangements could be
effected with Nationalist officials to permit American access
to overt and captured Communist materials. This operation
would in effect constitute the use by the United States of
the widespread Chinese Nationalist intelligence network in
China and Southeast Asia. 255/ The proposal was considered
by OO and in April Col. Lawrence K. White, Acting AD/O, posed
the feasibility of the undertaking to the Office of Special
Operations. 256/ The response was favorable and OSO agreed

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to take on responsibility for procurement of Chinese Communist
sources for FDD, by regular overt subscription in Hong Kong
while circumstances still permitted or by clandestine means
when and if conditions changed for the worse, as then seemed
imminent. 257/ Like "Sochi," the new project, designated
"Earwig," also proved successful though to a more limited
degree. The first shipment of Chinese Communist publications
under "Earwig" arrived in March 1952 and thereafter shipments
were received on a fairly regular basis. OSO subsequently
served under other programs as procurer by clandestine means of
sources from many parts of the world outside the Far East. 258/

In 1952, a further development in the procurement effort
occurred when, in evaluating recent surveys and estimates, ORR
and the Office of National Estimates (ONE) called attention to
the extent of the Agency's ignorance with respect to Communist
China, particularly in the economic field. This concern was
reviewed with other members of the IAC and resulted in the
issuance of a paper by ONE on 25 July 1952 entitled, "Statement
of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27." It pointed
out the need for coordinating, translating, indexing, and
distributing the material already available in the intelligence
community on Communist China. 259/ FDD, together with OCD and

IAD/State, became closely involved in the resulting project.

Although in its eventual evolution the SE-27 Project resulted

in the handling of increased translation and exploitation

requirements and in the indexing of new sources, its more

immediate effect on the division related to the survey/

procurement effort involved. Thus, on 8 September agreement

was reached that FDD, in cooperation with OCD, would investigate

and identify all overt and covert Chinese literature in the

United States dealing with Communist China. 260/ On

29 January 1953, George Carey reported to the Assistant

Director of Intelligence Coordination (AD/IC), who was in

charge of coordinating activities pertaining to the SE-27

Project, that beginning on 1 February and for a period not in

excess of five months, FDD would prepare annotated bibliog-

raphies of Chinese Communist material on Chinese economics

and science. Operations were to begin with the facilities at

Harvard University and would proceed to other institutions

until full coverage had been achieved. 261/

As we have seen, FDD had already for some time engaged

in the collection and survey of Chinese source materials.

Prior to Carey's announcement, FDD had, via IAD/State,

initiated the "Third Country" Program for procuring Chinese

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documents. In addition, in December 1952 FDD had completed a

survey of Chinese-language holdings at the Library of Congress,

the Harvard-Yenching Institute in Cambridge, the University of

Chicago, and at various West Coast institutions, including the

Hoover Institute. Among other procurement arrangements, FDD

had established through OO's Contact Division a system to

receive all current serials from various repositories through-

out the country. 262/

In January 1953 [   ] Chief of the Far East Branch   25X1

of FDD, went to Harvard University to set up procedures for

preparing annotated bibliographies of the holdings there and

to arrange for the regular receipt of the university's new

acquisitions for the preparation of supplementary bibliographies

on a continuous basis. 263/ In February, [   ] also of the   25X1

Far East Branch, reported to Harvard to begin the preparation

of the bibliographies, a task which he completed in April. 264/

Meanwhile, [   ] proceeded on a tour of 32 American libraries,   25X1

colleges, and universities to survey the Chinese Communist

publications at these places. On his return in April he

reported finding only two institutions with any significant

collections of such publications, namely, the Hoover Institute

and the library of the University of Southern California. 265/

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In the course of his trip [ ] located a total of 1,230 documents on the target subject. Combining this number with the holdings in FDD, he was able to report 1,759 documents as answering the SE-27 Project requirement. Of the total, 1,064 were non-duplicated items. 266/

25X1

By 1953 the methodology of routine procurement employed by FDD through its contacts with OCD, State, the military services, and others was firmly established, and, to the extent that the division could control it, the flow of raw source was reasonably smooth. Little could be done about out-of-the-ordinary developments, such as the curtailment and denial of Soviet and Chinese Communist sources, but the division had learned to adapt to such crises. Special procurement assignments like the SE-27 Project just described could also be taken on and were dealt with as they occurred, usually, as experience increased, in an efficient and thorough manner. The result of the procurement operation was an increasing volume of raw source material,* the growth of which created a new problem: how to synthesize and reduce this mass to a manageable and meaningful product. This is the subject of the next chapter.

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* During a 12-month period in 1951 and 1952 some 248,144 foreign-language documents were received by FDD. 267/

CHAPTER SIX

The Products

A. Phase-Out of Captured Document Processing

Almost from the beginning of the postwar phase of document exploitation, the end of captured documents as source material was anticipated and plans were made to abandon them in favor of current sources. The change-over was made and organization and operations geared to it, but the transition was not abrupt. While processing of current sources was increasingly emphasized, from 1946 to 1950 captured documents were systematically exploited by FDD and its predecessor organizations for information on the USSR and Eastern Europe. This operation yielded important data of considerable benefit to the intelligence community; the information was mainly, however, of a basic nature. Over 40,000 cards from German and about 52,500 cards from Japanese sources, incorporated in the SDS-initiated Industrial Card File, were produced during this period, turned over to OCD, and included in the CIA Industrial Register (IR). Also produced were 88 studies in depth on various Soviet industrial and economic

subjects, 42 studies on a Soviet railroad project drawn from German sources, and 195 accession lists and some 750 miscellaneous economic reports from captured Japanese documents. 268/

When the research and exploitation functions of GMDS were transferred to CIA in June 1947, custody of captured German and Italian* documents was assumed by the Adjutant General, War Department. Accordingly, FDB maintained a screening team physically located in the Pentagon. The team rapidly scrutinized the large volume of documents continually being received and prepared abstracts of the small percentage of documents possessing intelligence value. The abstracts were reproduced in card form and disseminated to interested agencies. The second step in this procedure was the exploitation of these documents to meet intelligence needs. This was done on the basis of requirements submitted by recipients of the abstract cards and also in accordance with special continuing projects established in the branch to obtain certain types of needed information. Exploitation necessitated the borrowing by FDB of original documents from

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* The number of captured Italian documents held by GMDS was small, only about 4,000. 269/

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the GMDS unit in the Pentagon. Following their processing,
they were returned to the Pentagon shelves. Processing
of captured Japanese documents was similar, with the exception
that this material was in the custody of FDB rather than the
War Department and therefore did not have to be borrowed.
Moreover, abstracts of Japanese documents were distributed in the
form of accession lists rather than cards. 270/ The lists
were issued at irregular intervals under 11 general subject
headings — geographic, political, technical, etc. 271/

FDB's work on captured documents moved along at such a
pace that the backlog of Japanese materials, numbering 756,000
items as of 1 December 1946 when CIG took over the branch, and
of German documents, amounting to 50,630 on 1 September 1947
following FDB's incorporation of SDS and GMDS, was estimated
to have been reduced to 26,500 and 22,000 items, respectively,
by 1 September 1948. Meanwhile, approximately 1,000 to 2,000
captured documents per month for each national category were
being currently received. 272/

In addition to routine document handling, FDB from time
to time also engaged in the screening and, when warranted,
exploitation of special document collections captured during
the war. These collections, some of which were very exten-
sive, varied widely in the amount of intelligence information

they contributed. The so-called Rosenberg Collection, estab-
lished by the Nazi ideologue of that name before and during
World War II to assist in the study of theories and practices
inimical to Naziism, was said to contain a large quantity of
documents of sociological, political, and psychological war-
fare value and was highly recommended to the DCI by George F.
Kennan, then on the staff of the National War College. 273/
FDB scanning of the Rosenberg materials in late 1947 and
early 1948 revealed nothing of intelligence value, however. 274/

Other collections of this nature screened by FDB in-
cluded the following: the Tambach Collection of German
documents, dealing mainly with naval information, which was
processed in 1948; 275/ the Berlin-Dahlem Library, a collection
of 50,000 items primarily of reference value on Eastern Europe,
and the Sven Hedin Institute Library, another reference facil-
ity, both screened in the fall of 1949; 276/ the Vladimir Bruza
Documents, a collection containing valuable information on
Czech industry, which was located by FDD late in 1949; 277/ and
the Anders Collection at the Hoover Library in California. The
latter collection, consisting of some 62,000 pages of Polish-
language interrogation reports and statements gathered during
1939-1942 by the Second Polish Corps under Gen. Anders and

describing personal experiences and observations on the Soviet occupation of Poland, was highly regarded by the intelligence community. 278/ Originally destined for full FDD exploitation, the Anders project was downgraded and the division's role was eventually limited to a preliminary investigation in 1950. In early 1951, financial and operational responsibility for the project was finally turned over to the Air Force, which appeared to have primary interest in it. 279/

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, FDD once again became engaged in captured documents exploitation, and arrangements were made for the division to examine captured enemy documents returned to the Zone of Interior by FECOM. 280/ As a result, numerous shipments of captured war documents were received by FDD for exploitation. 281/ There was a difference, however, between this and the older World War II material in the factor of currency. The documents captured in the Korean War and forwarded to FDD were integrated into the division's regular exploitation program. Beyond the continuing effort to beef up the FDD cadre to contend with the increased workload, no special adjustments were made to cope with this category of sources.

By 1950, war document exploitation had reached a point of diminishing returns from the standpoint of intelligence yield.

Brief revivals of captured document research occurred, such as
the Korean War operation noted above, but these occasions repre-
sented minor deviations from the routine. They will be treated,
as applicable, later on.

Despite the voluminous output from captured documents in
the immediate postwar years, this activity was primarily a
phase-out operation. As such it generated several problems
quite apart from those connected with exploitation of the
diminishing volume of captured documents. One such problem
concerned the disposition of the documents after their use by
FDB for intelligence purposes, that is, the question of which
documents to retain and store in permanent depositories, which
to return to their former owners, and which to destroy. Many
non-IAC agencies and non-governmental institutions, knowing
of the acquisitions by occupying forces in Germany and Japan,
sought to obtain a share in the documents. Related to this
was the question of ownership which came up briefly after the
war. Agreements with the Allied forces, which had cooperated
in the collection effort, had to be reconciled with the US
requirements. In early 1947, the British broached the matter
of document ownership and custody of Japanese documents and
approached the DCI concerning the question. Since the armed

services had had original custody of the documents before trans-
ferring them to CIG in 1946, Hillenkoetter directed the question
to the War Department. He was informed that Intelligence
Division files contained nothing to deny sole US title to the
documents in WDC. An informal working agreement with the
British on joint participation in exploitation activities
existed, but there was no record of binding agreements re-
quiring British or other foreign concurrence prior to public
release of materials. 282/ The British argued that Japanese
documents were jointly owned because of their capture by Gen.
MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 283/ but
this reasoning was not accepted by the United States. On the
basis of a 1945 British-American agreement on captured docu-
ments, the British contended strongly that unless and until a
peace treaty determined otherwise, the German documents,
whatever their physical location, belonged to the combined
governments. 284/ From a practical standpoint, the question
of custody insofar as it related to the British had little
effect on FDB operations nor did it adversely color FDB's
relations with its British counterpart in the postwar period.
The relationship remained one of cordiality throughout.

The problem of disposal of exploited captured materials was considered early and decisions were made on what to do with the documents. As mentioned in a previous chapter,* in keeping with the recommendations of the Japanese Document Conference held in January 1945, all non-military documents having no intelligence value were divided into two parts. Those of cultural or historic interest were sent to the Library of Congress and the remainder, at a later date, to the National Archives. Documents of intelligence value were retained and exploited in FDB and subsequently retired to the National Archives, destroyed, or returned to the Japanese and Germans. The branch's legal authority in document disposal was based on a statement by the General Counsel, in answer to a query from the AD/CD on 19 August 1947, that initial responsibility for declaring that intelligence exploitation of these documents was completed and that they were subject to final disposal rested with the Documents Branch. 285/

The branch was able to perform a beneficial service to private United States industry by making available for public use a good part of its captured document holdings. This was done in

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* See Ch. One.

conjunction with a 1945 executive order* which declared it to be
US government policy, subject to the requirements of national
security, to make available to the public free and general dissemi-
nation of enemy scientific and industrial information. In
accordance with this order, DB, in January 1947, released to
the Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services (OTS)
between 1,300 and 1,400 captured Japanese scientific and in-
dustrial periodicals. Duplicate copies of these documents
were retained by DB. German documents of this category were
also released to OTS, which planned to prepare abstracts based
on the contents of the periodicals and to publish them in
accession lists subscribed to by American industrial firms.
All of the documents held by DB were classified, but since
the periodicals concerned had originally been publicly issued
in Japan there appeared to be no difficulty in declassifying
them. The problem of securing authority to do this was left
in the hands of the Department of Commerce. At the same time,
DB also made available to OTS all Japanese patents held by
the branch which were not primarily designed for military
application, so that these could also be released to the
public. 286/ This step represented the first instance of the

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* Executive Order No. 9604, 27 August 1945

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branch's contribution to the American public through OTS. In
future years, with establishment of the organization's field
units, this function would be considerably expanded and based
on current sources rather than on captured documentary materials.
This development will be more fully treated in a later chapter.

The disposal of FDB's holdings of captured enemy documents
continued apace, and in 1948 [   ] reported the completion, 25X1
on 1 April, of the cataloguing and transfer to the National Ar-
chives of 1,478,611 captured Japanese documents. 287/ Immediately
thereafter, the FDB library was screened to eliminate material
of no intelligence interest. As a result, by 1 September,
157,685 captured documents had been forwarded to the Library of
Congress. 288/ This process of transfer to other depositories
continued at a decreasing pace in the succeeding months as the
volume of documents diminished, until, by the end of 1948,
captured documents represented only a minor part of FDB hold-
ings. 289/ By mid-1949, the majority of captured documents had
been processed and the emphasis from then on was almost entirely
on current publications. On 9 January 1950, legal title to all
captured Japanese documents which had been sent to the Library
of Congress was transferred by CIA to the Library. 290/ By
March 1951, the number of captured documents remaining in FDD's

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possession amounted to about 40,000 items. 291/ These were documents of basic intelligence interest and were to be re-tained on a permanent basis.

The diminution of captured document holdings in FDD did not bring to a complete end the exploitation of this type of source material. Even as late as 1957 sporadic efforts were made to glean the last bit of potential intelligence data from these sources. This was not through FDD initiative since the division, from its experience with captured documents, was aware of the small likelihood of finding more material in them. Usually the impetus for a new "go" at the documents came from other parts of CIA. It proved difficult to convince many of the Agency analysts that the lode had been thoroughly mined. However, when projects for new searches were suggested, the division, depending upon the legitimacy of the request, would with reluctance offer its services, since the exploitation function was by authority assigned to it and the division was the unit best equipped to carry it out.

Among such instances was a joint ORR/FDD program conducted to exploit available intelligence by extracting statistical tables from Japanese-language documents held in FDD. The pro-ject, conducted during the period May-October 1953 by two FDD in-telligence officers, resulted in the preparation of 4,488 tables. 292/

Concurrent with this project was one initiated by an ORR-sponsored exploitation committee headed by [   ] Acti- 25X1
vated in January 1953, this group prepared plans for a thorough exploitation of the German military documents stored after the war in the Federal Records Center at Alexandria, Virginia, under control of the Adjutant General's Office. 293/ A series of mis-understandings and lack of coordination led to some friction with FDD. John Bagnall reminded [   ] that the ORR project 25X1 was properly an OO function. He further called attention to the earlier FDD exploitation of these same sources during the period 1947-1949. Despite this, Bagnall reluctantly agreed to support the project. 294/ An FDD officer, [   ] was 25X1 assigned to the project to assist ORR analysts in screening the GMDS collection and this activity was carried out in 1953 and 1954.

A related undertaking and one also concerned with the captured German documents at Alexandria was a psychological-warfare project initiated in 1951 as the War Documentation Pro-ject (WDP) under the code name [   ] This undertaking was 25X1 designed to support the planning and conduct of operations against the Soviet Union and international Communism. Its importance lay in the fact that the captured German documents comprised the most complete available record of the only period in recent history

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when a large segment of Soviet territory was open for study and operation. The project envisaged the preparation of three reports, viz: "Political and Police Controls in the Red Army During World War II," "The Peasantry as a Source of Soviet Vulnerability," and "Soviet Agent Operations in the German-Occupied Territories During World War II." It was initially established under an Air Force contract with Columbia University with Philip Mosely of Columbia as the senior consultant. After production of the three reports by the Columbia staff, the project was terminated in May 1955, but prior to that, CIA was approached about continuing the work. The Requirements Staff/Office of Intelligence Support (RQM/OIS) canvassed the CIA offices and found that one of the major requirements would be for the preparation of histories of Soviet military units and, in this connection, a compilation of related German documents. 295/ It was proposed that FDD handle all DD/P requirements related to the project, and this the division agreed to do. The appropriated cost was only $8,500 for overtime, for which funds were to be provided by DD/P. Scheduled to cover 13 man-months of work, the overtime was to supplement 20 man-months of regular time spent on the project. This initial estimate contrasted favorably to the nearly $100,000 spent for external research at Columbia University. Eight FDD German document experts were assigned at various times to the WDP project and work

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commenced on 1 July 1955. 296/ The early estimate for the project's duration proved overly optimistic and work continued until May 1957. It was, however, finally brought to a successful conclusion and FDD's contribution earned high praise from RQM/OIS. At the latter's request, citing the further need for WDP material, FDD budgeted funds for continuation of research on the German documents, at least through the next fiscal year. This was to be contingent, however, on maintenance of the levels of FDD funding and personnel then in effect. 297/

During the 1950s, additional exploitation of Japanese and German documents was conducted by the division, but diminishing returns finally brought this aspect of document exploitation to an end. The product of the captured document research had provided valuable information for the Agency's analysts; however, the processing of current sources held a higher priority, and the greatest part of FDD operations, even during this period, was devoted to current exploitation.

B. Transition to Processing of Current Materials

The phase-out of captured document exploitation and transition to processing of current materials necessitated an increased alertness on FDB's part to the requirements of the consumer Offices in the Agency. The target areas after the war had shifted away from the erstwhile enemies, Germany and Japan, at first primarily to the Soviet Union and its Satellites and subsequently to Communist China. Throughout the Agency the emphasis changed

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gradually from basic research to current reporting, and this shift,
as we have seen, was reflected also in FDB's services to the
community. It required a change from methodical extraction
of data from old, sometimes out-dated documents to rapid re-
porting based on current publications such as newspapers and
journals. This change did not come about all at once; indeed,
the transition was at times exceedingly slow and, when accom-
plished, was not always successful. But the commitment was made,
and the branch strove to implement it as rapidly and effectively
as possible. Because FDB as an organization and the concept of
centralized exploitation were both new, the procedures employed
to develop a program were often hit-or-miss -- sometimes success-
ful, sometimes not. The branch was not adverse to adjusting to
valid criticism and suggestion from the outside and, when this
was missing, to engaging in introspection to develop improved
methods on its own. The final result, an integrated and ex-
panded reporting program based on a language capability that
increased over the years from some 30 to about 90 languages,
was, by and large, successful and served capably in the long run
to the satisfaction of most of it consumers.

As has been pointed out, the program FDB inherited in
mid-1947 from its predecessors was, with the exception of a

small current press exploitation operation by the old SDS, basically oriented to war documents. "Current," in connection with a few press receipts from the British, was a deceptive term because the newspapers processed were already relatively old when received by the branch. Moreover, only the economic portion was extracted from the newspapers since political items were translated by the Joint Press Reading Service at the US Embassy in Moscow. Small though it was, this operation represented the first press exploitation engaged in by the new organization.

Another inherited operation, the publication of accession lists of Far Eastern documents, was re-examined in the light of an earlier ICAPS survey of DB operations to determine the need for its continuance. It was decided that, due to lack of interest in the lists on the part of FDB consumers, only those having a "special or current interest" would be continued. Authorization to effect this change was granted on 9 September 1947. 298/

On the basis of the same ICAPS survey, the AD/O was instructed on 30 July 1947 to arrange for publication by machine records of bibliographies of source materials and at the same time to establish a program for exploitation of foreign-language documents by Documents Branch in response to detailed requirements

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and priorities to be formulated by OCD. 299/ This directive
is of interest in that it represented the first move in the
direction of an organized program of formal levying of require-
ments on the branch. In August, Gen. Sibert reported that FDB
would compile all relevant bibliographic data on current docu-
ments of intelligence value but not by machine records since
this was a function of Reference Center, ORE, and not of OO. At
the same time he indicated that an exploitation program coordi-
nated with definite requirements and established priorities was
being prepared by OO in cooperation with OCD. 300/ The formu-
lation of such a program was another first for the branch.

Action on bibliographic operations by FDB was not long
in coming. At a meeting of the Projects Review Committee on
10 December 1947, attended by   Bagnall, and other OO   25X1
people, Project OO-20 was approved providing for a complete
bibliography of current Soviet periodicals to be undertaken by
OO upon receipt of a statement of requirements from ORE. The
initial proposal provided for the Library of Congress to conduct
the operation, but when the choice of supporting an outside
activity or utilizing CIA funds to improve internal efficiency
was considered, the latter course seemed preferable and the
project was assigned to FDB. As presented to the committee, the

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project had been limited solely to scientific and technical

periodicals, which were regarded as having greater intelligence

value, but after some discussion it was decided to include all

Soviet journals. 301/ On being questioned concerning FDB's

capability to perform the work, Sibert replied that insofar as

factors such as workload, availability of personnel, and the

priority situation were predicable, FDB could undertake the

additional responsibility on a continuing basis. 302/ At a

meeting attended by [   ] and Bagnall on 17 February, agreement

was reached that FDB would receive direct from the State De-

partment all incoming Russian-language periodicals of potential

intelligence value and the Library of Congress would continue

to receive from State cultural journals and the like. It was

further decided that FDB would conform to a pattern of priorities

in the following order: Complete bibliographic service (trans-

lation of all tables of contents), abstracts, and translations. 303/

The project, involving preparation of the new FDB weekly publica-

tion *Bibliography of Russian Periodicals*, was initiated on 25 March

1948, 304/ and by April the first bibliographies were ready for

distribution. 305/ The first issue of the new series was dissemi-

nated on 12 May and publication of the bibliographies continued

until 29 March 1949. By that time a total of 656 had been

published. 306/

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In April 1948, arrangements were made with the Library of
Congress to disseminate the FDB bibliographies to recipients
elsewhere in the government and also to private individuals,
with references to their CIA genesis omitted. At the same
time, the Library agreed to perform a similar bibliographic
service on current USSR cultural publications and to complement
this coverage by performing the same service on all Soviet books
and monographs available to it. The medium of dissemination was
to be a new Library of Congress publication entitled *Monthly
List of Russian Accessions* (MLRA). 307/ By the following spring,
it had become evident that the bibliographic operation was
proving more time-consuming than FDB had anticipated and was
creating delays in the production of classified material. The
Library, which had been distributing FDB's *Bibliography* as a
supplement to its MLRA, indicated its willingness to assume
responsibility for reproducing this information for general
distribution after translation by FDB. Its intention was to
incorporate the material in the MLRA. The advantages of this
arrangement were readily apparent and Carey requested immediate
approval. 308/ This was granted on 5 April 309/ and the effec-
tive date of the transfer was set as 20 April 1949. 310/ The
shift of the publications part of the operation to the Library of

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Congress resulted in a considerable saving of time and helped
ease somewhat the press of work on the short-handed FDB clerical
staff. The use made of the *Bibliography of Russian Periodicals*
was broad. It received a wide distribution, both inside and
outside the government, and the secret of its origin as a CIA
product was a poorly kept one. Presumably it was useful to many
of its recipients, but as to its value to ORE, the original
requestor, and other purely intelligence users, AD/O was of the
opinion that it was slight. 311/

Concurrent with the branch activity just described, FDB
in early 1947 began a phase of development which was to estab-
lish the pattern for its major form of activity from then on.
On 2 April 1947, a new report entitled *FDB Periodical Abstracts*
came into existence on the basis of the authorization granted
the branch to exploit current foreign-language periodicals.
Then, as a result of the exchange   25X1
which called for FDB processing of Soviet provincial newspapers,
a second report, designated *Soviet Press Extracts,* was issued
for the first time on 26 January 1948. The initiation of these
two reports may be said to mark the official beginning of FDD
press and periodical exploitation.

The FDB *Periodical Abstracts,* in its original format, was
issued only five times and then discontinued on 23 June 1947.

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The following month, the report was reconstituted as a two-part publication, that is "Scientific" and "General" abstracts. The "Scientific" abstracts series was issued for the first time on 6 August 1947 and, with the exception of a brief hiatus in 1951 when OSI unsuccessfully attempted over the opposition of the other IAC members to reinstate the earlier *Bibliography* operation in place of the abstracts, continued until May 1954. Publication of the "General" series started on 12 September, but the report survived for only a little over a year. In the fall of 1948, [   ] declared this method of periodical exploitation to   25X1
be unsatisfactory and submitted a plan for discontinuance of the *Periodical Abstracts - General* — the "Scientific" series would be retained — and its replacement by a new series of information reports. The latter differed from the old abstracts, which had featured summaries of journal articles, in that they were to include only the intelligence information extracted from each article and to exclude the verbose padding characteristic of Soviet literature. The extracted items would, moreover, be grouped or collated on one subject or area and thus permit direct routing to interested parties. [   ] initiative was doubtless   25X1
based on the precedent set by the branch in using this method in its press exploitation. The advantages foreseen from extracting

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rather than abstracting were quite definite in terms of lower costs and better service. 312/ On 9 November the "General" abstracts were discontinued and information reports were subsequently substituted for them. 313/

While the effort to improve reporting methods was going on, the exploitation of the press [   ] 25X1 FDB continued and issues of the *Soviet Press Extracts* were disseminated sporadically as these shipments were received. Exploitation [   ] was primarily confined to 25X1 the extraction of all industrial information.

Meanwhile, the search for other sources of the Soviet press was underway and in April 1948 a survey undertaken by OCD and FDB revealed that copies of approximately 45 Soviet newspaper titles of interest were being received by various agencies in Washington. Arrangements were therefore made with the Departments of State, Army, and Navy to obtain these sources for exploitation purposes. 314/ One by-product of the search for new sources was the receipt from the Army of a number of Yugoslav publications sent from Belgrade by the US military attache. To handle these, plans were underway to develop translation facilities in FDB to exploit Serbo-Croation material and it was anticipated that qualified linguists would be obtained

in the next several months. FDB therefore requested continued
receipt of this material until arrangements could be made with
State to obtain the publications on a regular basis through its
facilities. 315/ Plans were also formulated for procurement of
other Satellite sources through embassy channels. 316/ The re-
sult was an expanded output of intelligence. This was further
broadened when, in May 1948, FDB was authorized to move into
the field of Chinese press exploitation, 317/ a development
which resulted in the first issuance of a *Chinese Press Extracts*
report on 30 July. At about the same time, on 28 July, the
branch published its first *Finnish Press Extracts*. Publica-
tion of Korean, Indochinese, and Indonesian press reports
followed soon after. 318/

    This expansion continued for several years. In 1952,
among the lesser languages, for example, coverage of the Bengali
and Urdu press and the Afrikaans press was initiated. A Diaspora
Unit was established to expand coverage of the Jewish world, and
reports were prepared for the first time from information based
on Uzbek, Turkestan, Tatar, and Azerbaijani documents. At the
same time, coverage of Western Europe was enlarged with exploita-
tion of an increased number of newspapers and periodicals re-
ceived from that area. 319/ Expansion by FDB into other linguistic

areas of the world, some as remote as Tibet, was effected as personnel with the pertinent language capabilities were re-cruited, until eventually full coverage of strategic world areas was achieved. The striking expansion in press exploitation in FDB is underlined by the fact that from a total of 4,470 issues of newspapers and periodicals handled in 1947, already by 1948 the number of newspapers alone had risen to 56,630, while 6,616 journal copies were also processed. 320/

With the flood gates open, so to speak, the branch was well on its way to complete foreign-language overt coverage, the only drawback being the shortage of linguistic officers with the required competence to handle all the new sources. Recruitment efforts to fill the void continued unabated and the number of languages handled by FDB gradually increased, so that from 36 in 1948, 321/ by 1950 the branch had attained a capability of 54 languages and dialects, 322/ by 1951, 67, 323/ and by 1952, 93. 324/ Since FDB had expanded considerably be-yond Russian- and Satellite-language exploitation, in September 1948 the press extract report was redesignated the *Foreign Press Extracts*. Augmentation of its language capabilities permitted the branch gradually to expand its operations to cover the major target areas of the world. At the end of 1948, these included

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the Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East, the Far East, and South America. 325/

The expansion of source procurement and of the area of
coverage in FDD was accompanied in the next few years by efforts
toward refining the techniques for reporting the intelligence
collected and continued attempts to improve their application.
The effort did not always succeed but this was not from lack of
trying. Among changes in the division was the gradual reshaping
of its reporting program to conform to the needs of the community.
With the shift to greater emphasis on press exploitation, the
program, which had consisted of abstracts, extracts, complete
translations, bibliographies, and accession lists, was altered.
The bibliographies and accession lists were dropped early; the
translation function was retained and expanded, particularly
from 1951 on; abstracting was reduced in scope and limited to
scientific and technical sources; and extracting took the form
of the compilation or collation of information. The latter
change was designed to employ the limited cadre of the division
and its work qualifications to best advantage and to serve the
consumer Offices in the most efficient manner. The changes in
reporting techniques resulted in the development of a series
of special report categories which reflected both the characteris-
tics of FDD's source material and consumer requirements on the one

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hand and the division's accumulated experience on how best to

serve as a "common concern" facility on the other.

The report categories included in the FDD program in 1951

were as follows:

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FDD Summary — Essentially similar to the ___ report but exceeding 15 pages in length and more elaborate, with tables and illustrations as required.

25X1

Q Information Report — A translation of an un-published foreign-language document or material from covert sources in response to a specific request, but containing information of general interest.

FDD Translation — The same in content as a Q Report but including reportage in excess of 15 pages or em-bodying tabular or illustrative material.

U Report — An unpublished translation prepared in a single-copy typewritten draft in response to a specific request of interest only to the requester.

FDD Periodical Abstracts — Brief translated items abstracted from foreign scientific and technical journals (issued in card form after 1954).

FDD Reference Aids — Collections in terms, lists, tables, and the like extracted and collated in the course of routine translation and exploitation in the Division.

In general, the format developed by FDD was well received

by consumers and, with modifications, remained essentially in the

1951 form for the life of the division.

The development of the FDD report program was, unfor-
tunately, not without its problems. Although the consumer
Offices were in general favorably inclined toward the exploita-
tion method employed by FDD, considerable dissatisfaction was
expressed over the interminable delays experienced between the
publication date of the basic source and the date of the exploited
information's dissemination by FDD. For example, at the start of
the press exploitation operation, the first report issued in
January 1948 contained items from issues dated September 1947,
a delay of more than four months. 326/ These were ___ newspapers,   25X1
and as procurement shifted to State Department facilities, the
situation improved, but never to the full satisfaction of the
consumers. This type of criticism was endemic in the division's
relations with its consumers in the early period and put it con-
stantly on the defensive, with the result that FDD officers spent
considerable time explaining to consumers the reasons for delay.
While the delays were partly the inevitable result of hitches
occurring in the organization's "shakedown" period, much of the
problem was beyond FDD's power to rectify. In complaining in
October 1947 that the *Periodical Abstracts* had not been on a
"current" basis since its inception in mid-July, John Bagnall
cited a number of reasons for this, including the higher priority

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accorded captured document processing and ICF production, repro-
duction difficulties outside FDB, and the critical personnel
situation. Various solutions were suggested 327/ and some were
applied. These and other problems persisted, however, and much
time was spent attempting to find solutions.

The procurement problem was partially alleviated when the
receipt of the foreign press was arranged through State Depart-
ment facilities, and the use of air transport, first for the press
and subsequently for periodicals, also helped a great deal. Other
operational improvements of various kinds aided in providing
quicker service. At the request of certain FDD consumers, partic-
ularly ORE, a study was undertaken to correct delays. The outcome
took shape in what the division termed its "high speed press" pro-
cedure, designed to process, exploit, and publish press material
within 48 hours after receipt of the source in FDD. 328/ This
method, adopted in October 1949, aided considerably in improving
FDD operations and had the effect of dampening much of the
criticism.

Other efforts to solve the time-lag problem were made. For
example, arrangements for short-cuts in dissemination were worked
out by FDD to provide other Offices with more rapid receipt of
overt OCD 329/ and covert OSO materials, 330/ and the editing of
unclassified translation was dispensed with to speed up delivery

to requesters. 331/ Other devices were employed, the purpose in each case being to provide better service to consumer organizations. In the long run the operational capabilities of the division improved to a point where criticisms of its methods and their results were reduced to a tolerable level.

Much of the division's progress in improving production occurred under the aegis of the Ad Hoc Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Documents, during its brief existence in 1949 and subsequently under its successor committees. The primary accomplishment of these IAC committees was to define more closely the FDD mission and to guide the division's operations so as to permit it to serve the community in the best and most efficient manner possible. The early ad hoc committees in effect directed FDD to perform the "common service" function which was eventually formalized in May 1953.

In addition to exploiting current publications, the division continued to service the community's translation requests. As foreign-language document receipts increased and the volume of unprocessed material grew in CIA Office files, it became obvious that extraordinary effort was necessary to deal with this material. FDD surveyed Offices having need of translation service and presented its findings to the Projects Review Committee. As a result, funds for contracting translation of unclassified material and

creating additional positions in FDD for classified translation were approved in January 1951. The effect of this step was soon evident. By June 1951, translation service to CIA was 100 percent above the amount provided six months earlier. 332/

A citation of FDD's output during these years in terms of English pages produced demonstrates this effect even more graphically and also serves to illustrate the rather dramatic growth of FDD operations. The division produced some 20,500 pages in 1947. With the onset of greater stability in 1948, annual production attained a plateau of 50,000-60,000 pages in the period 1948-1950. With the augmented T/O of 1951 and the start of the contractual facility, production almost doubled, about 114,000 pages, and increased to roughly 136,000 in 1952 and 165,500 in 1953. 333/

Among other functions of FDD were activities of a relatively minor nature which, in essence, amounted to by-products of the main operation. These included the preparation of reference aids, the performance of reverse translations, and a brief trial at exploiting the domestic (US) foreign-language press. The contribution of these and similar functions in terms of volume were in the overall not great, but they served in many instances to expedite the work of the intelligence community and should be mentioned for this reason.

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In July 1951, George Carey called attention to already extant reference aids compiled by FDD personnel and declared that more were contemplated. These included glossaries of technical terms, transliteration tables, generic standardization lists, and similar collections not normally available in regular reference sources. A sampling of these aids had found considerable favor among IAC agencies. In view of FDD's capability to undertake this type of project, permission was requested for the division to start a new, unclassified publication series entitled *Reference Aids*. 334/ Since the additional workload to prepare the new series would be negligible, the Advisor for Management, DDA, recommended approval and this was granted on 27 September 1951. 335/ FDD preparation of reference aids continued until the end of 1955, when, on recommendation of the Inspector General, responsibility for this function was transferred to the Office of Central Reference (OCR) with a stipulation of FDD assistance if translation work was involved. By that time, FDD had produced a total of 46 reference aids. 336/

Reverse translation was a part of FDD operations almost from the division's beginning to its end. The function of translating documents, usually but not always from English, into a second non-English language was in the strict sense not part of FDD's

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defined mission, since it did not involve the collection of raw
intelligence. It was accepted as an added function simply be-
cause the division was the only organization in the community
capable of performing it on a broad scale. However, it further
increased an already heavy workload. Bagnall complained of
this fact in 1951 on the grounds that many of the reverse-
translation projects -- for example, a guerrilla warfare manual
and a short wave radio manual -- were destined for combat opera-
tions rather than to serve intelligence needs. He therefore
proposed a choice of refusing further work of this kind, re-
cruitment of additional personnel, or curtailment of the normal
workload. 337/ He was advised to do none of these but to con-
tinue to perform reverse translation as best he could with the
facilities available. 338/ Thus, the work went on.

The domestic (US) foreign-language press as a source of
intelligence was exploited on a limited scale during World War II.
There were in this country at that time more than 1,000 foreign-
language newspapers and journals which, according to the 1940
census, served a large minority of 11,500,000 foreign-born
individuals and some 23 million citizens of foreign parentage
resident in the United States. It was therefore felt that these
constituted an important source of foreign and domestic intelli-
gence, particularly for giving advance notice of events

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in foreign countries which had not yet reached the attention
of the United States government's usual sources of information. 339/
Even before World War II, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
had exploited these publications in the interest of internal
security, and during the war the intelligence organs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Corps had to some degree searched the domestic
press for intelligence information. The only agency to engage
in a comprehensive coverage of this material was the Foreign
Nationalities Branch of OSS, which did so from 1941 until its
deactivation in the fall of 1945. Thereafter, the only coverage --
and on a limited scale -- was conducted by the State Department. 340/
In July 1946 it was agreed that State would retain responsibility
for coverage of the domestic foreign-language press, but with
coordination by the DCI. 341/

In 1948, the AD/O requested FDB to make a trial run of one
month's issues of 16 domestic newspapers to determine the value
of exploiting the emigre press. The results were largely negative.
The best sources were found to be Swedish and Greek publications,
but these covered areas better served by readily available native
newspapers. FDB therefore recommended abandonment of the project.
Of the 733 known foreign-language publications issued in the United
States in 1948, the FDB study revealed that less than two percent
had any potential intelligence value. Despite the meagre

results, in November 1949, a new study was undertaken by FDD

and this effort yielded two Albanian, two Chinese, two Jewish,

and several Russian newspapers of some value. 342/ In 1951,

further monitoring disclosed several new newspapers serving

emigres from Satellite countries which gave promising results. 343/

At State Department request, FDD continued monitoring and

exploiting the emigre press for the next few years, but this

source was at all times suspect because of the possibility of

foreign control with the attendant lack of credibility in such

publications. In 1956, finally convinced of the unproductive

nature of the undertaking, the State Department expressed its

opinion that emigre publications were, at best, confusing and,

at worst, unreliable. It therefore recommended an end to the

project. 344/ In November 1956, on the basis of this recommenda-

tion, FDD ceased to include information from emigre publications

in its scheduled reports. 345/ As a source for FDD exploitation,

the emigre press proved to be a very minor part of the division's

program. Though the effort devoted to it was small, the time

spent on it at the expense of more valuable sources was grudgingly

given. What is surprising is the fact that the project lasted as

long as it did.

C. Special Problems

1. Source Curtailment and Security Classification Policy

As is true of any operation of the magnitude of FDD's mission, problems of one kind or other and in varying degrees of severity were bound to arise, particularly in its early stages. One of these problems for FDD already touched on, pertained to the severe limitations the USSR placed after 1947 on the export of publications not only greatly restricting the number of titles, but also the number of copies released. Although approximately 8,000 newspapers and 1,400 periodicals were known to be published in the Soviet Union by 1954, foreign subscriptions were generally limited to the Moscow newspapers (the so-called central press), to two newspapers from each of the republic capitals, and to approximately 300 periodicals ranging from pure propaganda items to technical journals. The limitations on the number of sub-scriptions allowed were most stringently applied to scientific and technical journals. 346/

The use of published material and "open" sources for intelli-gence information had undoubtedly long been familiar to the Soviets as to any other government. The Soviets had been aware of German exploitation of such USSR material before and during World War II. In fact, an officer of the US Embassy in Moscow was informed in

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1947 that the wartime use of provincial newspapers for intelligence purposes was well known to the Soviet government and that the government had no intention of allowing such use to occur again. In general, this situation also applied in varying degrees for the areas within the Soviet orbit outside the USSR. It appeared likely, therefore, that the diminution of sources was part of a general policy rather than due to the Soviets' specific knowledge of US and British exploitation of the material, although this awareness of the latter could be assumed. 347/

By 1950 the rapid and continuing decrease in the quality and quantity of information from the USSR and from areas under its control had reached such a level as to create concern in the Agency, and various avenues to relieve the situation were explored. Among methods suggested was the peripheral stationing of US personnel in strategic posts, such as Paris, Frankfurt, Vienna, and Trieste, to facilitate collection of printed matter from the Soviet Bloc through contacts with refugees and defectors as well as by other means. 348/ The Peripheral Reporting Program established as a result of this initiative was endorsed by the DCI in August 349/ and proved quite successful.

Despite emergency efforts such as this, the situation created difficulties for the division and the Agency. In essence,

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it came down to a problem of whether or not to classify FDD publications and, if this were done, what level of classification to apply. A high classification would protect the continuing receipt of source material but would defeat the desire of the intelligence community to give as wide dissemination of FDD's output to the public sector as possible. A low classification would have the opposite effect. This created a dilemma.

In 1948, FDB press exploitation was, as we know, based primarily on sources obtained from the British. In November of that year, George Carey reported to the DCI concerning a conference ⬚ 25X1

⬚ Chief, FDB had been re- 25X1
quested to consider upgrading the *FDB Press Summaries* from a "Confidential" and the *Periodical Abstracts* from a "Restricted" classification to "Secret." FDB's *Bibliography of Russian Periodicals*, unclassified, ⬚ 25X1

⬚ had not been discussed 25X1
at the meeting, but Carey was of the opinion that these publications would also have to be considered. Carey foresaw no problem in reclassifying the *Soviet Press Extracts* since its dissemination was limited to the IAC agencies but, in view of the wider distribution given the other publications, he believed there would be

open criticism of CIA for "classifying newspapers and magazines"
if security measures were suddenly applied to this material. The
distinction of an intelligence agency processing this material on
a selective and immediate basis would, he felt, not be apparent
to non-intelligence users. Carey emphasized the urgency of re-
solving the problem by pointing out that from 1947 to 1948
receipt of periodicals of intelligence value (economic, military,
etc.) had declined and receipt of scientific journals had been
reduced from 150 to 100. 350/ The outcome was a general reclas-
sification of FDB publications to a higher level. In January
1949, DCI Hillenkoetter, with IAC approval, informed the British
that the *Soviet Press Extracts* and the *Periodical Abstracts
(Scientific)* had been classified "Secret" and the *Periodical Abstracts
(General)* would be discontinued and replaced by separate information
reports classified individually but no lower than "Confidential." The
Bibliography of Russian Periodicals would remain unclassified. 351/

In November 1949, in a follow-up to the more stringent clas-
sification policy adopted relative to Soviet sources, Bagnall
recommended a minimum classification of "Confidential" for all
information extracted by FDD on Satellite countries. This rec-
ommendation was based on a speech by the Hungarian party chief
in which he warned that press publication of economic data could be

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detrimental to the Hungarian national interest and stated that
production figures should be expressed in percentages rather
than hard totals. A similar situation existed in Poland. 352/
Bagnall's proposal received prompt approval.

The Soviet Bloc's restriction on release of source
material was a long-term phenomenon, but there was a gradual
erosion in the FDD policy on classification, in large part the
result of consumer pressure to permit broader dissemination. For
example, in 1950, an Office of Policy Coordination request for
clearance to release the contents of classified _____ 25X1
reports was disapproved by Bagnall, 353/ but by September 1951
Carey formally requested a downgrading of classification of
FDD publications. This request was based on the change in the
report format from collated to individual extracts from open
sources which did not disclose intelligence requirements. Carey
recommended that the existing minimum restriction of "Secret" be
rescinded and FDD authorized to classify individual extracts and
translations from Soviet sources according to the nature of the
information and the security of the sources. 354/ This concept,
in general, governed FDD's classification policy from then on.

2. Transliteration

Inherent in FDD operations was the rendition of clear
and accurate English text from an increasing number of foreign

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languages and dialects. This function was complicated during
the early period of the organization's growth and expansion
not only by the burgeoning linguistic requirements encountered
but also by the many-faceted subject content of the source
material processed by the division. A further complication was
created by the growing number of linguists, of varying degrees
of competence and drawn from widely separated war-time units,
who were involved in the work of the division. The result was
a lack of uniformity in the translation of common foreign text
into English. Even greater difficulties were encountered in
the rendition and standardization of proper names and specialized
technical terminology unique to particular subject categories.
It became obvious very early that a program of standardization
would have to be instituted in order to create in the intelli-
gence community a feeling of confidence in the fidelity of the
division's product. Since the division was only one, if the
largest, unit in the community engaged in translation service, the
problem was not limited to FDD alone and was therefore approached
from a community-wide standpoint. However, as a "common service"
organization, the division played a leading role in the formu-
lation of standards during the next few years.

As early as May 1947, following a meeting of CIG Office
representatives — including John Bagnall — to form an ad hoc

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committee to consider the problem of foreign geographical names, DB expressed great interest in establishing standards for geographical names based on its unique collection of sources and its exploitation of foreign documents. 355/ In October 1948, as a result of the studies on this problem which the committee had initiated, through George Carey, recommended further studies leading to the establishment of a permanent government board similar to the US Board of Geographic Names (BGN) which would be empowered to decide on the authorized transliteration and spelling of all personal names and words other than geographic. 356/ The proposal was enthusiastically endorsed by the other CIA offices, 357/ a committee was formed on 8 December 1948, and on 29 December the first meeting of the CIA Transliteration Committee (CTC) was held. Bagnall, temporary chairman of the meeting, was elected permanent chairman of the new committee. The initial objectives of the CTC were to determine the most acceptable transliteration system for each language with a view toward establishment of transliteration standards throughout CIA and to recommend to ICAPS that discussions be held with IAC members to reach agreement on the subject. Subcommittees were formed to deal with major categories of languages -- that is, Slavic, Near Eastern, and Far Eastern -- and the appropriate FDB division chiefs

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were appointed respective chairmen of the subcommittees. 358/

The new groups met in the course of the next few months
with representatives of the IAC agencies and on the basis of their
deliberations the CIC recommended the use of the appropriate BGN
system wherever possible or, otherwise, familiar systems already
in use. The recommendation was approved by a memorandum for the
DCI to all IAC agencies on 7 July and was given official force
by issuance of an Administrative Instruction on 27 June 1949
(subsequently replaced by CIA Regulation   dated 31   25X1
January 1952). This provided for the transliteration of Slavic
languages by the appropriate BGN systems, Chinese by the Wade-
Giles system, Japanese by the Hepburn system, and Korean by the
McCune-Reischauer system. Instructions for other languages were
to be issued when appropriate systems had been approved. 359/
The committee further determined that, in accordance with Public
Law 242 of the 80th Congress, the BGN and the Secretary of Interior
were to provide for uniformity in geographic nomenclature and
orthography throughout the federal government. To avoid the
confusion of establishing a separate system of transliteration
for words other than geographic names, the CIC approved in
principle the concept that wherever the BGN had established a
transliteration system for foreign geographic names, that system
would be adopted as standard for all transliteration. With this

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determination in mind, systems for all the major foreign languages were developed and approved by the CTC. 360/ By March 1951, transliteration tables for some of the lesser Far Eastern and for the Near Eastern languages were adopted. It was agreed that systems for the rare languages be held in abeyance until problems relating to these arose in the Agency. 361/

This action provided a basis for uniform transliteration practices in the intelligence community and, with some exceptions, it proved successful. The differences which arose were essentially minor in nature and were usually resolved by liaison between FDD and the differing parties.

To formalize the procedures adopted and to make the trans-literation systems more accessible to their users, preparation was undertaken in mid-1951 of a *Transliteration Handbook* which covered the broad spectrum of all major languages handled by FDD. In order to assure wide dissemination, it was decided to issue the publication in unclassified form under the imprimatur of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) without reference to CIA. FDD therefore turned over the material it had prepared for the document to FBIS. 362/ The *Handbook* was completed and pub-lished in early 1954; 363/ and a CIA regulation* was issued

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* CIA Regulation

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authorizing its use in official Agency intelligence reports and publications and by collection offices insofar as sources and operations permitted. With its work completed, the CTC was dissolved and from then on any further transliteration problems were to be referred to Chief, FDD. 364/

Meanwhile, in mid-1951, to implement the decision on standardization, the CTC had appointed a five-man subcommittee called the Ad Hoc Committee on Standardization of Translated Russian Terminology; Bagnall, and later ⬚ served 25X1 as chairman. Other members were ⬚ 25X1 and ⬚ all of FDD. The subcommittee met five times 25X1 between 17 June 1951 and 13 January 1952 and in that period dealt with USSR Ministries, Russian organization and administrative terms, and agencies of the Soviet Council of Ministers. The sub-committee presented its final report on 29 May 1952. It then adjourned *sine die* and the results of its work were transferred for action to the IAC Advisory Committee established under the new NSCID-16. 365/

The transliteration standardization problem was one which resisted full resolution and remained with FDD as long as the division existed. In 1955, Bagnall, as chairman of the NSCID-16 Exploitation Subcommittee, brought up the subject again after

a review of transliteration problems in the community and re-
quested a survey in the IAC agencies on the use made of the
Transliteration Handbook. 366/ The problem surfaced again in
1957 when the question was posed as to the extent of progress
in getting other agencies to use the recommended Russian trans-
literation system. 367/ In 1961, [   ] representing   25X1
CIA at a conference on standardization of Russian transliteration
sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF), reported that
the attendees recognized the need for standardization but the
majority of them, with the BGN dissenting, favored adoption of
the British Standards Institution system. 368/ Finally, in 1965,
a Working Group on Transliteration, with [   ] in attend-   25X1
ance for FDD, discussed the need for a standard unambiguous
transliteration system (computer oriented) within the United
States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and, if necessary,
the development of such a system. 369/ To hope to achieve full
standardization was to expect the impossible. The work of the
CTC had made an important contribution in standardization for
the CIA and to some extent the IAC, but enforcement beyond this
level seemed unlikely.

3. Copyright Constraints

A recurrent and irritating problem in FDD operations
throughout the life of the division was the risk of copyright

infringement involved in the use of foreign publications. It
was a problem which also affected other parts of the Agency but
it was particularly relevant to FDD due to the nature of the
division's activity. This risk was never a factor in FDD's use
of Soviet documents since the USSR was not a signatory to either
of the major international conventions relating to copyright,
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and the International
Copyright Convention (ICC). The United States, on the other hand,
was a signatory of the first although not of the second. The
complications inherent in copyright laws as they related to FDD
operations had to be considered, however, in connection with the
processing of Western publications, and in the late 1950s this
was also becoming a factor in the exploitation of Satellite
sources as some of the Soviet Bloc countries took steps to join
the UCC or to establish bilateral reciprocal copyright agree-
ments with the United States.

Although FDD had earlier shown some uneasiness about pos-
sible copyright infringement and had requested guidance on the
Agency's policy in this matter, 370/ the division's problems re-
lating to safeguards against infringement really developed in
November 1953 with an executive order eliminating the the clas-
sification "Restricted." To cover copyright material, FDD

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initially resorted to the use of the newly created control "For Official Use only" (FOUO) in conjunction with a caveat concerning laws relating to copyright, limiting the material to FOUO and placing the onus of violation on the releasing individual. After 1953, FDD's uneasiness about the publication of copyrighted material resulted in several revisions of the above-mentioned caveat. 371/ The actual value of this caveat was suspect, at least in the opinion of [   ] the AD/IC, who believed   25X1

that it served only as OO's (and FDD's) attempt to confine the use of copyright information to official purposes without really providing a legal safeguard against liability. [   ] proposed   25X1

that OO, with General Counsel assistance, recommend appropriate legislative or executive action to provide adequate protection to the DCI. 372/ A bill, HR 6716, to provide some measure of protection against copyright infringement finally came before the Congress and was approved in mid-1955. 373/

In a review of FDD copyright procedures in October 1955, the Office of the General Counsel cited a disturbing feature of the new law which immunized the federal government but not federal employees from copyright infringement. The law further provided that suit against the government could not be brought by a US citizen but made no mention of the degree of liability, if any, if the suit were brought by a non-citizen. 374/

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The continuing concern about the copyright problem cropped up once again in October 1957. Carey pointed out that it was FDD practice to keep the classification of its reports as low as was consistent with security. Where possible, the division used devices, such as the use of non-USIB organizations, to disseminate its material as widely as possible to US industrial, academic, and scientific sources.

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
In October 1958, particularly in the interest of safeguarding FDD's expanded publication efforts through JPRS, Chief of JPRS/DC, conferred with George D. Cary, Copyright Office, Library of Congress. Cary stated that few registrations were made with the US Copyright Office by publishers or authors in the Eastern European nations with which the United States had bilateral reciprocal copyright agreements. At that time no Soviet Bloc nation belonged to the UCC to which the United States had subscribed. Cary recommended that unclassified FDD (JPRS) reports based on Soviet

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Bloc material make no mention of the existence of a copyright.
In the case of Western European material, he discouraged the
use of a copyright warning and recommended instead obtaining
permission of the copyright holders prior to release. 377/

Based partially on Cary's advice, FDD practice from then
on was to use no copyright warning on publications derived
from Soviet Bloc materials. On unclassified reports from
Western sources involving copyright restrictions, however, the
division continued to apply a revised warning, suggested by
Cary, under the restrictive control FOUO. 378/

In 1960, FDD was compelled to make a change in its pro-
cedures when it became known through the US Embassy in Prague
that Czechoslovakia had ratified the UCC agreement in September
1959 and had adhered to its principles effective 1 January 1960.
To cover this development, the division applied the same practices
in regard to Czech material as was done with that of the Western
nations. 379/ There also appeared to be some justification for
concluding that other East European nations would follow the
Czech lead and become signatories to the UCC in the near future.
In light of this possibility a ruling on FDD's legal obligations
with respect to East European copyrights was requested from the
General Counsel. 380/ FDD made preparations to deal with the
problem should it arise, but with the exception of Czechoslovakia

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it never became an issue.

In 8 September 1960, Public Law 86-726 was enacted. This legislation amended a section of the US code covering inventions and patents so as to include copyright. The amendment appeared to safeguard any federal employee or contractor concerned and provided recourse to the copyright holder through action against the United States for recovery of damages. However, a second paragraph of the amendment provided that the section did not apply to any claim arising in a foreign country. It thus appeared that the US government was subject to suit by foreign nationals for copyright infringement, but it was still unclear whether such suit could also be directed against government employees as individuals as opposed to suit against the US government. In view of this, for greater protection FDD adopted a policy of applying more restrictive classification or controls and, in the case of copyright material, to limit the number of copies for dissemination. 381/

In the long run, the copyright problem did not interfere seriously with normal FDD operations, but the potential threat of legal action created the necessity for extra vigilance and thus an additional complication in operational procedures.

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4. Dissemination and Reproduction

FDD operations were rather seriously hampered during the formative years by dissemination problems, in particular the persistent time lag which developed in providing consumers with the FDD product. The physical distance separating FDD from the Offices and agencies which it served caused the division to perform less effectively in supplying overt information to the consumer than would have been the case had it been more favorably located. In this connection, FDD was a victim of security and logistics syndromes in the Agency.

Distance was not the only factor, however. Delays of one kind or other, whether in the receipt of sources, their actual processing, or the final publication and dissemination of the product, were perhaps even more to blame. Whatever was at fault, the problem led to recurrent recriminations and bad feeling between the division and other units of CIA. To dispel some of this, urgent needs were satisfied in rare instances with "advance copies" of FDD reports prior to submitting them for publication and, as time passed, this device was used with increasing frequency. This was, however, an expedient and did not solve the basic problem. As with other difficulties encountered by FDD, attempts at solution were protracted, but persistent effort on

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the part of those concerned brought some improvement in dissem-
ination by the mid-1950s.

Regarding itself as the victim of circumstances over which
it exercised little or no control in the matter of dissemination,
a responsibility mainly of OCD, FDD engaged in an exchange of
memoranda with the latter in 1952 and finally to a mutual study
of the problem. In July 1952, George Carey informed OCD that
an OO survey of FDD reports had revealed a time lag of 16-17
days between the time the duplimats were transmitted from FDD
and the final reports were distributed by OCD. 382/ The Deputy
Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination (DAD/CD)
disputed Carey's figure and cited an OCD survey which had shown
the delay factor to be 7.3 days, the difference accounted for
by OO's use of calendar rather than working days. 383/ OO
countered with a third survey which revealed a time-lag range
for disseminating FDD reports of from 7 to 15 working days, the
7-day elapsed-time figure representing FDD's *Periodical Abstracts,*
which was distributed not through OCD but directly from the Re-
production Division. 384/ A subsequent survey by FDD, covering
the last three months of 1952, showed little improvement. The
dissemination time-lag this time ranged from one to 39 days,
with an average of 14. 385/

The effort to solve the problem continued during 1953. A series of conferences with OCD was without result, and still another survey, covering the period November 1953 - February 1954, revealed no progress. 386/ Persistence began to pay off, however, and by mid-1954 dissemination delays were considerably reduced. Revised methods of processing reports through OCD, assisted by FDD's cooperation in supplying multiple copies for screening, dropped the average elapsed time from 14 to ten working days. 387/

Unfortunately, OCD's improvement in dissemination did not measurably affect the time required to place FDD reports at the consumers' disposal. Report reproduction was another delaying factor. As demands on CIA's Reproduction Division increased, time-lags built up and in extreme cases delays of as much as 79 to 90 days occurred in the printing and reproduction of FDD reports, 388/ accompanied by continuing complaints from Agency analysts. This resulted in a shift of FDD's attention to the Reproduction Division in an effort to break the log jam. A conference between FDD and Reproduction Division officers was held in July 1955 to examine the cause of printing delays and to try to get production on a current basis. This meeting led finally to improved results and much of the backlog was eliminated as a result of suggestions stemming from it. 389/

The foregoing account of the dissemination/reproduction issue is by no means exhaustive but serves to illustrate the magnitude of the problem. It was a situation over which FDD exercised no direct control, but since the success of the division's operations was directly related to the speed with which its reports were dispatched to its consumers, FDD was vitally concerned in eliminating or at least alleviating the persistent difficulties in this area.

This chapter has presented an account of the origins of FDD's production program as well as a recital of some representative problems encountered in its development. Once established, the program did not remain fixed but was from then on attuned to the intelligence goals of the Agency. As a result, it came under constant self-scrutiny and, as CIA needs evolved, it was adapted to the directions called for. This made necessary close FDD cooperation with consumer Offices and the coordination of FDD reporting methods with consumer requirements. The next chapter deals with this aspect.

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