

*Critique of New Foreign Policy*

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The USSR wanted all its participants to display a truly business-like and competent approach so that the culture and results of the dialogue at the session matched the lofty level of responsibility which rested today on all nations, Petrovskiy pointed out.

"There was a time," E.A. Shevardnadze said, "when controversial topics were not raised and opinions different from official views, even when they were inoffensive, were not expressed. This time is now past. But just look at what is happening. Bold, interesting, and questioning articles have appeared on many basic questions of internal life in all its forms, of party and state building, and of the economy, culture, art, and science. Yet there is nothing like this in the foreign policy sphere. Does this mean that everything here is correct and that there are no other options apart from the ones being implemented?"

**Egyptian Ties Developing**

LD1905141088 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT  
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[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—"The Soviet Union attaches great importance to Soviet-Egyptian relations and believes that they have been developing along the line of ascent over the past 2-3 years," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today.

"We do not limit Soviet-Egyptian relations to bilateral contacts," he pointed out. "In the opinion of the Soviet Union these relations are of great importance also for developing dialogue and resolving concrete problems in the region, for the Middle East settlement and, specifically, for setting into motion the mechanism of convening a conference on the Middle East."

Indeed, you will not find even a single mention of the slightest mistake or error in books and articles about our foreign policy. No matter what was done, everything is depicted as infallible. Of course, Soviet foreign policy enjoys high esteem. It has always been marked by its anti-imperialist orientation and has been aimed at ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies and at supporting the international workers movement and the national liberation struggle all over the world. But was everything done correctly? Is it possible to seriously believe that, while we were committing major mistakes in internal development, we managed to avoid them in the international arena in all those 70 years? This simply cannot be. To err is human. It is important to realize your mistakes and to learn from them. There were times when heated debates on foreign policy took place in our country also. Let us recall just the highly tense struggle of opinions—openly and fearlessly expressed—around the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

The USSR attached great importance to relations with Egypt at various international forums where that country adhered to a very constructive stance, he added.

"The USSR hopes that our relationship will not only be broadened during the forthcoming visit by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad 'Isamat 'Abd al-Majid, but will also be deepened and enriched," Petrovskiy said.

**Historian Questions Past Foreign Policies**  
PM1905115188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 18 May 88 p 14

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev: "East-West: Quest for New Relations. On the Priorities of the Soviet State's Foreign Policy"—boldface as published]

Our foreign policy now has no more urgent task than reliably ensuring security and peace for all peoples. This is why it is important to clarify above all the question of the nature and mechanism of the arms race and the launching of wars. "People," V.I. Lenin pointed out, "live within a state, and every state exists within a system of states which are in a condition of a certain political equilibrium relative to one another." Any desire on the part of a major state (or bloc of states) to sharply expand its sphere of influence produced a disruption of this equilibrium. To restore it, other states united within an "anticoalition" against the potentially or actually strongest state (in a given region or in the world). Moreover, the counterweight that was created might even be more powerful because the "anticoalition" was joined by more states and mobilized to the maximum all its material, spiritual, and human resources.

[Text] The realities of the nuclear age and of the scientific and technical revolution demand new thinking and new approaches toward the completion of foreign policy tasks. Movement in this direction is only just beginning. It is obvious that any serious changes will take much longer. This is because the most difficult task of all is to effect a restructuring of minds, to overcome the stereotypes and the departmental, group, and personal interests which influence foreign policy decisionmaking.

It is particularly important to get rid of incorrect ideas on a fundamental question like the correlation between war and politics. For decades our political thinking on this issue held positions which prevented us from finding the correct ways to solve the problems of peace and disarmament.

The "feedback" effect was often diminished by a series of factors. While the strength of a power which was expanding its sphere of influence rallied its enemies, its rejection of expansionist aspirations caused hesitations and disintegration within the "anticoalition" camp. Difficulties also emerged as a result of contradictions between its actual or potential members. Nonetheless, the "anticoalition" ultimately became so strong that the power challenging it could not withstand the military

*(Dashichev article)*

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and economic confrontation. Consequently, any hegemonism contains the seeds of its own downfall. Evidence of this is provided by the experience of two world wars.

Hegemonism has always been founded on a desire for political and economic subjugation of peoples and states. But from the time of the French bourgeois revolution, or rather the Napoleonic wars, it began to acquire more and more ideological overtones and operate beneath the banner of messianism, in other words the imposition of certain ideological values, a certain way of life, and certain social setup on other peoples and states. This hegemonism is typical mainly of countries in the grip of broad ideological movements. This ailment also afflicts the policy of the United States, which has for a long time striven to implant American values and the American way of life in the world. The famous U.S. diplomat R. Barkley wrote: "Ever since the first settlers, Americans have acted as if they were carrying out a divine mission... The foreign policy complications stemming from this factor are obvious. Because to be guided in one's actions by the feeling of being chosen by destiny and the awareness of one's own messianic role means pitting oneself against the mighty forces of the international community."

States with different sociopolitical system may unite to counteract hegemonism. Let us recall that, soon after the October Revolution's victory in Russia, France, Britain, and the United States offered to give help to the Soviet Government provided it agreed to continue the war against Germany on the Entente's side. (The subsequent intervention by these powers partially stemmed from their desire to bring to power in Russia a government which would continue the war.) An "anticoalition" of countries belonging to different social systems emerged, albeit greatly delayed, against Germany and its allies during World War II.

The classic configuration of forces in Europe, which developed by the end of the 19th century and prevailed until the middle of the 20th century, consisted of the central European grouping of states headed by Germany and the opposing triangle of "Russia (USSR)-France-Britain," which was joined by the United States and other states in wartime. Germany's two attempts to decisively alter the European balance in its favor by military means and to establish its domination in Europe ended in total collapse. The classic European balance of forces ensured the national security interests of Russia (USSR), France, and Britain in the face of German expansionism. V.I. Lenin realized the geostrategic importance of France and Britain for Soviet Russia. During the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, he categorically insisted that the armistice agreement with Germany include a provision prohibiting all transfers of German troops from the Eastern Front to the West. The Soviet Government thus demonstrated its consideration of the interests of the Western powers, against which the German command was planning to deliver a decisive blow after Russia's withdrawal from the war.

The classic configuration of forces in Europe did not only provide the Soviet Union with a counterbalance to German aggression. One of its other advantages was the fact that the formation of a united front of Western powers against the Soviet Union was ruled out. That was because France and Britain needed, as much as the Soviet Union did, an effective counterbalance to Germany in East Europe. Ultimately, these national-state interests of France and Britain were more powerful than their class and ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

German fascism reared its head in the thirties. All major powers realized that matters were leading to war. This was also realized in Moscow. It was realized, and right until 1939 attempts were made to create a collective security system in Europe. At that time there was just one possibility to curb a new German aggression: to revive the Entente. But the French and British ruling circles at the time did not make the proper efforts to create a coalition with the USSR in the face of the Nazi threat. As a matter of fact, they played up to Hitler, and Munich lies on their conscience.

This policy was dictated not only by anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. After Stalin had decapitated the Red Army by exterminating its best command cadres, Britain and France ceased to consider the Soviet Union as a serious and reliable military ally. Furthermore, they found it difficult to deal with a supreme leader who had trampled all human morality and had committed unprecedented repressions using cruel and criminal methods for the sake of establishing his authoritarian power.

Finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, Stalin ultimately concluded the nonaggression pact with fascist Germany. He hoped to avert, even if only temporarily, war at any cost.

When the Soviet Union left the traditional European configuration of forces, France and Britain were left alone to face fascist Germany. As a result of this, Hitler's command was given a unique opportunity to concentrate 136 divisions along the Western Front by the start of the offensive against France, leaving just 10-second line [maloboyesposobnyy] divisions in the East, against the USSR. This enabled fascist Germany to swiftly crush France and take over almost all of West Europe's resources. This later had the gravest effect on the security of the Soviet Union, when it found itself face to face with Hitler's Wehrmacht on 22 June 1941. In these circumstances, the Western powers could have stayed on the sidelines, adopting the posture of pleased third parties. Nevertheless, overcoming prejudices, antipathies, rejection of Stalin's regime, and the ill-feeling stemming from the Soviet-German pact, political circles in Britain, and later in the United States, chose what was, from the viewpoint of their national interests, the only correct

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path—that of support for the Soviet Union in its struggle against fascist Germany. The mechanism of balancing opposed forces in the European Continent operated once more.

The military-political situation in Europe changed sharply following World War II. The world socialist system started to emerge. The Soviet Union gained friendly neighbors along its Western border, while the Yalta and Potsdam decisions defined a postwar structure in Europe which took into account the legitimate interests of our security and our tremendous contribution to the rout of fascism.

The results seemed perfectly satisfactory for us. But the obvious consolidation of Soviet positions and the spread of Soviet influence in central and southeast Europe were perceived by our recent allies from the anti-Hitler coalition as an intolerable disruption of the European balance threatening their interests. Right after the end of the war the Western powers started hatching plans to counter the growing Soviet influence. In subsequent years these plans materialized in the form of the "cold war" launched against the Soviet Union. Backed by Britain and France, the United States filled the power vacuum created after Germany's defeat. The U.S. military and political presence on the European Continent became a mighty—and enduring, even to the present day—factor of anti-Soviet policy. All the Western powers united within the NATO military-political bloc aimed against the Soviet Union. West Germany, with its powerful potential, was brought into this bloc. The Warsaw Pact Organization which was created in response could rely, especially at the beginning, only exclusively on the Soviet Union's potential.

A united front of Western powers against the USSR thus emerged. An unprecedentedly large and mighty (with nuclear weapons and means for their delivery) anti-Soviet coalition was formed.

Was such a demarcation inevitable? Probably. The imperialist centers of power saw the growth of world socialism as a direct threat to their interests and turned to the concepts of "containment," "rolling back," and "deterrence." Their priority in the arms race which was launched after World War II was obvious. But, while we have extensive knowledge of the West's unseemly behavior, we still are inclined to assess our own stance at various stages as unequivocally correct and the only possible correct one. As a matter of fact, trends which could have been and were perceived as hegemonist operated also in Soviet foreign policy.

Let us recall V.I. Lenin. He, just like K. Marx and F. Engels before him, was a decisive opponent of "bringing happiness" to "other peoples." He mercilessly criticized the leftist plans (put forward by Trotskiyites after October) for the violent spread of revolution to West Europe, Afghanistan, India, and other countries, bluntly pointing out that "so far, no decree has been promulgated to the

effect that all countries must live according to the Bolshevik revolutionary calendar, and even if it were to be promulgated, it would not be implemented."

These principles did not differ from deeds. The dangerous illusions about "world revolution" were overcome. Conditions were created for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries. Is it not striking today that, after the civil war and right until 1931, the Soviet republic allowed itself an army of only 560,000 men? This shows the great services of a brilliant constellation of diplomats—Chicherin, Litvinov, Krasin, Borovskiy, and others—who managed to reduce the external threat to our country to a minimum. The size of our armed forces also indicated that the Soviet Union had no intention of threatening anyone. Only the growing military danger in the early thirties, especially after fascism's advent in power in Germany, forced the Soviet Union to multiply its defense efforts.

Lenin's principles of not only domestic but also foreign policy were seriously distorted during the time of Stalin's rule. In essence, the foreign policy practice of Stalin and his closest associates was based on the ultraleftist ideas of Blanquism and Trotskiyism which are alien to the nature of socialism. What came to the fore, especially after World War II, was the spread of Stalinist socialism wherever possible and its standardization in all countries regardless of their national features. Overcentralization in domestic policy inevitably engendered hegemonism and a great-power mentality in foreign policy. One indicative example was Yugoslavia's expulsion from the socialist system in 1948 and the attribution of all deadly sins to its leadership for the simple reason that it had refused to submit to Stalin and obey his orders. This was followed by the breach with China and Albania, and once again we made mistakes. Conflicts and frictions developed with other socialist countries.

Expectations that relations within the socialist framework could be built on the rigid principles of intraparty "democratic centralism" and the unity of socialism could be thus ensured were not to materialize. Sad to say, matters went as far as sharp confrontation and armed clashes between socialist countries.

The hegemonist, great-power ambitions of Stalinism which became rooted in foreign policy repeatedly jeopardized political equilibrium between states, especially those of East and West. In the process the interests of the expansion of social revolution pushed into the background the task of preventing the threat of war. Approximately the following propaganda argument operated for internal consumption: "Since Western imperialism is resisting the progressive social and territorial changes in the world emanating from the Soviet Union, it is the aggressor." On the one hand we heightened the level of military danger by advancing on the West's positions, and on the other we mounted a broad campaign in defense of peace and spared no resources to organize a mass movement of champions of peace (it is no accident that a joke current in the fifties said: "There will be such

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a struggle for peace that everything will be razed to the ground"). Over the years all this was embodied in stereotyped and cliché-ridden thinking and in the mentality of leading cadres, who effectively were prisoners of their own propaganda.

How did the opposing side perceive the USSR's policy and goals, and, indeed, how does it continue out of inertia to perceive them even now? In the eyes of the overwhelming proportion of the Western public the Soviet Union is a dangerous power whose leadership wants to eliminate the bourgeois democracies by military means and to establish a Soviet-type communist system throughout the world.

The thesis of Soviet expansion served as the main cement for rallying the states of the other social system against the USSR. The NATO countries' ruling circles viewed any progressive social processes almost exclusively through the prism of a further change in the global political balance in favor of the Soviet Union. This greatly impeded the activity of progressive forces in the capitalist zone and in the developing world, and massive repressions rained down upon them.

Washington actively exploited the "Soviet military threat" to secure a dominating influence in West Europe, to advance its own hegemonist interests in various regions of the world, and to create an extensive network of strategic military bases. Ill-considered actions on our part provided U.S. expansionist circles with the desired pretext for acts of aggression against many peoples, for the deployment of powerful armed forces, and for the creation of more and more new types of lethal weapons. What about the dangerous extremism and adventurism of U.S. policy? They too leached on the "Soviet threat."

→ By the early seventies the Soviet Union had reached a level of nuclear missile forces that made global nuclear conflict unacceptable to the United States. A period of East-West detente began. Western politicians' gaze turned toward peaceful means of achieving anti-Soviet political goals. Particular hopes were pinned on the economic weakening of the Soviet Union and the inefficiency of its economy. This held out to the West the prospect of an erosion of the USSR's international positions and a contraction of its sphere of influence. The implementation of this policy required a departure from "cold war," the removal of strain [ostrota] in relations with the USSR, and the attainment of compromises on a wide range of issues.

→ Detente also gave a chance to the Soviet Union. The opportunity emerged to reduce confrontation with the West to the minimum level and thereby to prevent the process of the buildup in the forces of the "anti coalition." Additional resources could be used for the resolution of internal tasks, political and social development, and the democratization of the country, and its economy could be switched to the path of intensive development.

It soon transpired that detente was acceptable to the United States and its allies only if the international political and strategic military status quo was preserved. However, as the West saw it, the Soviet leadership was actively exploiting detente to build up its own military forces, seeking military parity with the United States and in general with all the opposing powers—a fact without historical precedent. The United States, paralyzed by the Vietnam catastrophe, reacted sensitively to the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa, the Near East, and other regions.

All this was interpreted in the West as a further increase in the Soviet threat. The extreme right-wing political circles that came to power in the United States and the other NATO countries turned sharply away from detente toward confrontation. The Soviet Union found itself faced with unprecedented new pressure from imperialism.

The expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence reached critical limits in the West's eyes with the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In earlier times this could have been grounds for unleashing war. But the threat of nuclear annihilation did not permit the West to resort to a frontal military clash with the USSR. The "anticoalition" turned to other means of pressure. The main one was a massive race in the most modern arms that even the mighty Western economy finds it difficult to sustain. The spiritual and material resources of the capitalist world united against the Soviet Union. A "crusade" against the USSR was proclaimed.

The operation of the "feedback" effect placed the Soviet Union in an extremely difficult position in the foreign policy and economic respects. It was opposed by the major world powers—the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, Canada, and China. Opposition to their vastly superior potential was dangerously far beyond the USSR's abilities.

Could such a severe exacerbation of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late seventies and early eighties have been avoided?

Unquestionably so. It is our conviction that the crisis was caused chiefly by the miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership toward the resolution of foreign policy tasks.

The general goals were quite correctly formulated: peace, security, disarmament, cooperation, noninterference in internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. But there was a manifest lack of purposeful, competent, scientifically substantiated and tested actions. We were wrong in assessing the global situation in the world and the correlation of forces, and no serious efforts were made to settle the fundamental political contradictions with the West. Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisers), and diplomatically involved

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in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West and on their entire system of relationships.

There were no clear ideas of the Soviet Union's true national state interests. These interests lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries. The genuine interest lay in ensuring a favorable international situation for profound transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and sociopolitical system. However, at that time it was believed that no transformations were needed...

The uncreative nature of the decisions resulted in our foreign policy becoming exceptionally costly. The Reagan administration foisted a colossal increase in military spending on us. In the United States it grew from \$122 billion in 1979 to \$284 billion in 1985. To maintain military parity, we tried to keep up with [tyanusis za] the United States in this colossal unproductive spending, which totaled over \$1 trillion over the 5-year period.

The arms race—like war—may be regarded as the continuation of policy by other means. To abate the arms race and make it pointless, you have to remove political contradictions and balance the sides' interests.

Of course, it is wrong to separate the solution of political problems and military problems. It is certainly possible to solve them in parallel. But the primacy of political issues is self-evident. Evidence of that is provided by the sad failure of all efforts to curtail or limit the arms race between the United States and the USSR in the seventies. What defeated these efforts was precisely the fact that fundamental political problems were unsolved.

To radically and irrevocably curb the arms race, it is necessary to fundamentally reorganize Soviet-Western political relations. Mere talks on military issues are not enough here. Ultimately the point is not what quantity of nuclear and other weapons each side possesses or how far the level of armaments should be reduced. The main problem is whether a political modus vivendi is attainable between the USSR and the Western powers, whether they can secure a high level of mutual trust. It is here, in the politico-ideological sphere, that the key to disarmament lies. It is on this sphere that the further operation of the "feedback" effect and the strength or weakness of the "anti coalition" opposing the USSR will depend.

The USSR and the Western powers must renounce total confrontation, must not interfere in the internal affairs of each other and of third countries, must organize broad peaceful cooperation, must refrain from pressing the other side's sore points, must not damage its interests, and must not seek unilateral benefits and advantages.

The removal of political and military tension between the USSR and the West is a process that requires mutual efforts. Our part of the way is the total surmounting of Stalinism in domestic and foreign policy, theory and practice, organizational structures, and the public mind. It is also a question of creating favorable international conditions for socialist building. For the narrowly elitist nature of foreign policy decisionmaking, the distorted picture of the outside world, and the Soviet Union's isolation from the international community for a long time doomed it to sociopolitical, economic, scientific and technical, and cultural stagnation.

Throughout the 20th century the nature and content of the struggle for social progress have changed substantially. After 1945 the Soviet Union played the role of military guarantor of the expansion of the sphere of socialism in the world. As a result it was dragged into an extremely sharp confrontation with the main forces of imperialism. Nuclear missile weapons lent an exceptionally dangerous and risky nature to this confrontation.

Now socialism has become an invincible force. So it is vitally important from the viewpoint not only of preserving peace but also of the further development of world socialism to ensure that the center of gravity of the struggle for social progress moves again from the sphere of Soviet-Western interstate relations into the sphere of the internal sociopolitical development of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and the Western and "Third World" states. If in 1917 it was possible to break the chain of imperialism in a single country—Russia—without outside assistance, immeasurably better conditions now exist for the advance toward socialism on a national basis. The Soviet Union can and must influence world social progress exclusively via its economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes. That is the fundamental Leninist tenet regarding the Soviet state's role and tasks in the international community. The full restoration of the significance of this Leninist idea is one of the noble aims of restructuring.

Such a turnaround in our policy in no way presupposes some kind of "socialist isolationism." On the contrary, it will greatly expand the scope for inter-nation collaboration and the mutual influence and mutual enrichment of socialist forces in the political, economic, theoretical, scientific, and cultural spheres. Socialist solidarity will become richer and acquire an organic nature.

The totally new tasks of the struggle for social progress in the nuclear age also require radically new ways and methods of realizing them—such is the conclusion of the 27th CPSU Congress, which initiated a fundamental reassessment of values in foreign policy thinking. What has been established as the keystone of our foreign policy activity is a principle that develops Lenin's ideas: The interests of saving human civilization from nuclear annihilation take precedence over any class, ideological, material, personal, and other interests.

## S U M M A R Y

OUTSPOKEN SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE OPENED A NEW FRONT FOR GLASNOST BY ADVANCING REVISIONIST CRITIQUES IN THE HITHERTO ALMOST SACROSANCT DOMAIN OF FOREIGN POLICY. THE PURPOSE EVIDENTLY IS TO BOLSTER SUPPORT FOR GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA OF INCREASED COOPERATION WITH THE WEST AND OF REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, THE OPENING OF THIS AREA TO CRITICAL REVIEW RAISES THE RISKS OF ELICITING BOTH A CONSERVATIVE REACTION AND ATTEMPTS TO GO BEYOND LIMITS DESIRED BY EVEN A REFORM-MINDED LEADERSHIP.

## END SUMMARY

A BENCHMARK ARTICLE IN THE 18 MAY LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, BY REFORM ADVOCATE VYACHESLAV DASHICHEV OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM, SEEMS AIMED AT USING AN EXPOSITION OF TRADITIONAL BALANCE OF POWER THEORY AND RADICALLY NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY UNDER STALIN AND BREZHNEV TO BUILD UP SUPPORT FOR GORBACHEV'S 'NEW THINKING' IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE. PRESENTING THE ARGUMENT THAT AN AGGRESSIVE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE CAN DAMAGE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND HAS IN FACT DONE SO IN THE PAST, THE ARTICLE EXPLAINS THAT CHALLENGES TO THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN MET BY AD HOC COALITIONS OF RIVAL POWERS SEEKING TO CORRECT PERCEIVED IMBALANCES.

ELABORATING HIS MAIN POINT, DASHICHEV ASSERTS THAT SINCE THE TIME OF NAPOLEON COALITIONS OF STATES HAVE REPEATEDLY FORMED IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE TO COUNTERACT THE EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS OF A 'HEGEMONISTIC' POWER--HE IMPLIES THAT THIS APPLIED AT TIMES TO THE USSR--AND THAT STATES WITH 'DIFFERENT SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEMS' (SUCH AS THE NATO COUNTRIES AND CHINA) CAN EASILY UNITE TO 'COUNTERACT HEGEMONISM.' TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT, DASHICHEV OFFERS SEVERAL NOVEL--FOR SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY--INTERPRETATIONS OF EVENTS IN SOVIET HISTORY:

① ON THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA IN 1918, HE WRITES THAT IT WAS MOTIVATED NOT ONLY BY ANTICOMMUNISM BUT BY AN UNDERSTANDABLE 'DESIRE TO BRING TO POWER IN RUSSIA A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD CONTINUE THE WAR' AGAINST GERMANY. MOSCOW HAS TRADITIONALLY PUT ALMOST EXCLUSIVE EMPHASIS ON THE ALLIES' ALLEGED DESIRE TO STRANGLE BOLSHEVISM IN ITS INFANCY.

② ON THE ISSUE OF THE RUNUP TO WORLD WAR II, HE ARGUES THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT THE RISE OF NAZI GERMANY IN THE 1930'S COULD HAVE BEEN CHECKED WAS THROUGH THE RENEWAL OF THE ALLIANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA AND THAT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE STALIN HAD 'DECAPITATED THE RED ARMY BY EXTERMINATING ITS BEST COMMAND CADRES.' THIS MADE GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE USSR'S ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS A 'SERIOUS AND RELIABLE MILITARY ALLY.' MOSCOW'S USUAL POSITION IS TO ALLEGE THAT BECAUSE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH PERFIDY, THE USSR HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SIGN THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT TO GAIN TIME.

③ ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, DASHICHEV SEEMS TO LAY A PORTION OF THE BLAME ON THE USSR, ASSERTING THAT THE 'CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET POSITIONS' AND THE 'SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE' IN EAST EUROPE, WHILE CONSISTENT WITH THE YALTA AND POTSDAM AGREEMENTS, WERE SEEN BY THE WEST AS AN 'INTOLERABLE

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DISRUPTION OF THE EUROPEAN BALANCE THREATENING THEIR INTERESTS'' AND PROMPTED THE SOVIET UNION'S ERSTWHILE ALLIES TO BAND TOGETHER WITH WEST GERMANY IN THE NATO ALLIANCE. INTIMATING THAT THE USSR IS PAYING FOR THESE MISTAKES UP TO THE PRESENT DAY, HE SAYS IT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL THAT AN ''OVERWHELMING PROPORTION'' OF THE PEOPLE IN THE WEST VIEW THE SOVIET UNION AS ''A DANGEROUS POWER WHOSE LEADERSHIP WANTS TO ELIMINATE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACIES BY MILITARY MEANS AND TO ESTABLISH A SOVIET-TYPE COMMUNIST SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.'' DASHICHEV CHALLENGES A NUMBER OF OTHER SACRED COWS OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO CURRENT AND FUTURE SOVIET POLICIES:

① ON THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HE BLAMES STALIN--AND BY IMPLICATION STALIN'S SUCCESSORS--FOR TRYING TO SET UP ''STANDARDIZED'' REGIMES IN ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR INTERNAL CONDITIONS. HE EXPLAINS THAT OVERCENTRALIZATION IN MOSCOW'S DOMESTIC POLICY LED TO ''HEGEMONISM'' IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY, AND THIS PRODUCED THE RIFTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA, AND ALBANIA. MATTERS WENT SO FAR AS ''SHARP CONFRONTATION'' AND EVEN TO ''ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.''

② HE ALSO ACCUSES THE ''BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP,'' WHICH HE DESCRIBES AS ''INCOMPETENT,'' OF SQUANDERING THE OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE ATTAINMENT OF STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE ENSUING DETENTE OF THE EARLY 1970'S. INSTEAD OF USING DETENTE AS A BREATHING SPACE AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ADDRESS ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP ''EXPLOITED DETENTE'' TO BUILD UP ITS OWN MILITARY FORCES, SEEKING MILITARY PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE OPPOSING POWERS ADDED TOGETHER--''A FACT WITHOUT HISTORICAL PRECEDENT.'' THIS, DASHICHEV ARGUES, LED ULTIMATELY TO A 'MASSIVE RACE IN THE MOST MODERN ARMS' THAT THREATENS TO UNDERMINE ''EVEN THE MIGHTY WESTERN ECONOMY''--NOT TO MENTION THE WEAKER SOVIET ECONOMY.

DASHICHEV ALSO CONDEMNS PAST SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEREBY LENDING HIS VOICE TO THOSE INSISTING THAT MOSCOW SCALE BACK ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS. HE ARGUES THAT IN

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TEXT:

ELABORATING ITS THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE 1970'S THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD ''NO CLEAR IDEAS'' OF THE COUNTRY'S ''TRUE NATIONAL STATE INTERESTS'' AND SQUANDERED MATERIAL RESOURCES AND POLITICAL CAPITAL BY PURSUING ''PETTY AND ESSENTIALLY FORMAL GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH LEADERSHIP COUPS IN CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.''

SUPPORTING GORBACHEV -- WHILE DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE DOES NOT MENTION GORBACHEV BY NAME, IT VOICES STRONG SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO REDEFINE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND RESTRUCTURE THE ECONOMY, IMPLICITLY SUPPORTING REDUCED MILITARY SPENDING. IT SAYS IT IS THE LEGACY OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS THAT THE SOVIET UNION FINDS ITSELF ENGAGED IN AN ''EXCEPTIONALLY COSTLY'' ARMS RACE WITH THE WESTERN STATES, JAPAN, AND CHINA, WHOSE COMBINED ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IS FAR GREATER THAN ITS OWN. DASHICHEV ARGUES

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THAT TO OVERCOME THIS SITUATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO 'RADICALLY AND IRREVOCABLY CURB THE ARMS RACE' BY 'FUNDAMENTALLY REORGANIZING' THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SO AS TO REPLACE HOSTILITY AND SUSPICION WITH A 'HIGH LEVEL OF MUTUAL TRUST.' FOR THE SOVIET UNION, HE STRESSES, THIS WILL REQUIRE THE OVERCOMING OF 'STALINISM IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, THEORY AND PRACTICE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, AND THE PUBLIC MIND.' BUILDING ON A THEME FREQUENTLY ELABORATED BY GORBACHEV, DASHICHEV ASSERTS THAT IN THE FUTURE THE SOVIET UNION MUST REFOCUS ITS COMPETITION WITH THE WEST FROM CONFRONTATION IN THE MILITARY SPHERE TO 'ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL SUCCESSES.'

EARLIER SIGNS OF GLASNOST DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE KICKS DOWN THE DOOR TO CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY THAT WAS ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF BEING WEDGED OPEN, POSSIBLY WITH GORBACHEV'S CAUTIOUS BACKING. IN MAY 1986, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A STINGING INDICTMENT OF THE PAST CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TO A MEETING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. (IN AN INDICATION OF THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN POLICY GLASNOST AT THAT TIME, WHILE SOVIET MEDIA REPORTED THE MEETING, GORBACHEV'S SPEECH WAS PUBLISHED IN SUMMARIZED FORM IN A LIMITED CIRCULATION BULLETIN AND THEN ONLY AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL DELAY.) A MAY 1987 SPEECH BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD ALSO CALLED FOR RESTRUCTURING IN THE WORK OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN THAT SPEECH SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED TO SUPPORT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE SAID SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS BECOMING THE 'OBJECT OF CRITICAL AND EXACTING ATTENTION' FROM THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THAT 'OUR DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO STRICT APPROVAL BY THE NATION.' THIS, HE SAID, 'DOES NOT MAKE OUR WORK EASIER, BUT HELPS MAKE OUR FOREIGN POLICY MORE EFFECTIVE.' IN 1987 AND INTO 1988 THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP'S APPROVAL OF GREATER FOREIGN POLICY GLASNOST MAY HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN INCREASING DEMANDS FROM PROMINENT COMMENTATORS FOR A MORE OPEN DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CRITICAL ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA TO FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ISSUES.

STRETCHING THE LIMITS ALONG WITH DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE, OTHER RECENT MEDIA CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET POLICIES AND OF HOW THEY WERE FORMULATED HAVE SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOW PERMITTING MORE OPEN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. IN A 22 MAY SOVIET TELEVISION COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF MOSCOW'S AFGHANISTAN INVOLVEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, IZVESTIYA'S OUTSPOKEN POLITICAL OBSERVER ALEKSANDR BOVIN CLAIMED THAT THERE ARE TWO LESSONS THAT SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM MOSCOW'S EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST, BOVIN SAID, IS RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT 'THE VICTORIOUS PROLETARIAT CANNOT MAKE OTHER PEOPLES HAPPY BY FORCE.' THE SECOND IS THAT THE DISPATCH OF SOVIET FORCES ABROAD 'TO TAKE PART IN COMBAT ACTIVITIES' SHOULD BE DONE ONLY AFTER DISCUSSION IN, AND WITH THE CONSENT OF, 'THE HIGHEST LEGISLATIVE ORGANS OF THE COUNTRY.' THIS IS ONE OF THE 'ESSENTIAL SIGNS OF THE STATE OF LAW WE WANT TO CREATE,' HE ADDED.

MOSCOW HAS ALSO BROKEN A LONGSTANDING TABOO BY DISCLOSING THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY HAD LOST 13,310 DEAD, 35,478 WOUNDED, AND 311 MISSING IN AFGHANISTAN.

IMPLICATIONS THE FORCE OF THE DASHICHEV ARTICLE'S ASSAULT ON THE STALIN AND BREZHNEV ERAS SUGGESTS THAT GORBACHEV FEELS CONFIDENT OF

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HIS CONTROL OVER THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTOR AS THE NEXT SUMMIT WITH THE UNITED STATES AND A MAJOR PARTY CONFERENCE APPROACH. THE UNPRECEDENTED SCALE OF THE ARTICLE'S CRITICISM OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SUGGESTS THAT ITS PUBLICATION WAS SANCTIONED BY ELEMENTS OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP, PRESUMABLY BY GORBACHEV HIMSELF. THIS IMPRESSION IS REINFORCED BY ITS TIMING, WHICH FOLLOWS THE PUBLICATION OF THE LANDMARK PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE ON 5 APRIL ASSAILING CRITICS OF GORBACHEV'S POLICIES OF DOMESTIC REFORM AND GLASNOST. ✓

WHILE DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE CRITICIZES ONLY PAST MISTAKES AND STRONGLY DEFENDS GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DISARMAMENT PROGRAM, ITS PUBLICATION, ALONG WITH OTHER STRIKING CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES SUCH AS BOVIN'S, RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC DEBATE AND, AT SOME POINT, PUBLIC CRITICISM EVEN OF THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP'S FOREIGN POLICIES. DASHICHEV QUOTES FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AS SAYING THAT WHILE "BOLD, INTERESTING, AND QUESTIONING ARTICLES" HAD APPEARED ON ALL ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC POLICY, THERE "IS NOTHING LIKE THIS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE." "DOES THIS MEAN EVERYTHING HERE IS CORRECT AND THAT THERE ARE NO OTHER OPTIONS APART FROM THE ONES BEING IMPLEMENTED?" IN REPLY, DASHICHEV LOBBIES FOR ALLOWING CRITICISM OF CURRENT POLICIES, RECALLING THAT IN LENIN'S TIME HEATED DEBATES ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH OPINIONS BEING EXPRESSED "OPENLY AND FEARLESSLY." IT IS WRONG, HE CONCLUDES, TO ASSUME THAT ANYONE IS INFALLIBLE, CITING THE PROVERB THAT "TO ERR IS HUMAN" AND ADDING THAT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS TO RECOGNIZE MISTAKES AND LEARN FROM THEM.

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