



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# Near East and South Asia Review



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**Articles****Iran: Power Struggles**

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Despite poor health, Ayatollah Khomeini played a key role in the past year, balancing radicals and conservatives in the choice of president, prime minister, and Cabinet. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani exploited the infighting during this period to strengthen his position and will consolidate his power as Khomeini's health deteriorates.

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**Israel: Leadership Struggle in Herut Intensifies**

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The Likud Bloc's dominant Herut Party continues to be wracked by serious infighting over the mantle of leadership once held by Herut founder Menachem Begin. The intense maneuvering has fed a growing public sense that Herut's leadership crisis seriously threatens Likud's ability to govern and could split the party

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**Lebanon: The Propaganda War**

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The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television stations in Lebanon is intensifying animosities among the country's rival militias as clandestine media spread rumors and disinformation designed to undermine the credibility of political opponents and seek to reinforce internal factional cohesion.

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**Libya's Increasing Ties to Radical Palestinians**

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Libya has sporadically provided funding, arms, training, and safehaven to most of the radical factions of the Palestinian movement since the mid-1970s, and Tripoli and the Palestinians are probably assessing each other's capabilities and intentions carefully, with an eye to determining whether closer ties are warranted.

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**Morocco-Saudi Arabia: Between Friends** [Redacted] 19

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[Redacted]

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Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close ties based on mutual interests even though the amount of Saudi aid has decreased and the disbursement of the funding has been erratic and less than King Hassan's expectations. [Redacted]

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**Suwar El Dahab: Sudan's Reluctant General** [Redacted] 21

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[Redacted]

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Suwar El Dahab's display of reluctance in the face of political opportunity results from a combination of cultural and personal factors [Redacted]

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Suwar El Dahab is [Redacted] unwilling to venture beyond his support network. [Redacted]

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*Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors, [Redacted]*

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## Israel: Leadership Struggle in Herut Intensifies [redacted]

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The Likud Bloc's dominant Herut Party continues to be wracked by serious infighting over the mantle of leadership once held by Herut founder Menachem Begin. Each of the rivals—Yitzhak Shamir, David Levi, and Ariel Sharon—has sought to manipulate preparations for the party's national convention in early March to enhance his hold over the party, but no one has gained a decisive advantage. The intense maneuvering has fed a growing public sense that Herut's leadership crisis seriously threatens Likud's ability to deal with national political events and, over the long term, could split the party. [redacted]

Defense Minister Arens, who has no group of supporters in the party, but who is respected because of his reputation for honesty and integrity. Arens has agreed with Shamir on most party matters, and he probably hopes that their alliance will strengthen his candidacy if he decides to contest Levi and Sharon for the party leadership after Shamir retires. [redacted]

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### Shamir's Tenuous Leadership

Vice Prime Minister Shamir maintains only a shaky hold on the leadership of Herut, which he inherited from Begin more than two years ago. Begin never formally designated his successor, always insisting that Herut would choose its next leader democratically. After he joined the party in 1969, Shamir was considered to be among the front-runners, although most Israeli pundits believed he would be only an interim leader until a younger Herut figure could take over [redacted]

Shamir's political acumen has been tested in recent months as he has sought to assert control of the scheduling and other arrangements for Herut's convention—the party's first national gathering since 1979—now set for 9 March. Controlling the convention is critical for Shamir because it will elect the party's Central Committee, which in turn will make the key party decisions for years to come. During the preparations for the convention, Shamir has managed to maneuver between Levi and Sharon, drawing support alternately from one and then the other, depending on the issue. [redacted]

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Shamir has made clear, however, that he does not view himself as an interim chief. He has relied on the support of the party's old guard—party veterans and former underground members—to outmaneuver his rivals. We believe the old guard has rallied to Shamir not so much out of personal loyalty, but out of a desire to scuttle the ambitions of Levi and Sharon. The old guard, which is heavily Ashkenazi or of Central and East European descent, is loath to hand the party over to Levi, who is a Sephardi or of Middle Eastern origin, because of longstanding anti-Sephardi prejudices. Nor does the old guard wish to see Sharon take over, given his obstreperousness and role in planning and implementing the ill-conceived invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which precipitated Begin's resignation. [redacted]

The maneuvering erupted into contention in early January when Shamir's allies on the party's Central Elections Committee invalidated the memberships of over half the 12,000 new members recruited by supporters of Levi. Levi had hoped to have the new members added to the party's rolls in time for the balloting in local party branches to elect the 1,200 delegates to the convention, which would have boosted Levi's chances for controlling the conclave. [redacted]

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In his battle to stave off the challenges from Levi and Sharon, Shamir has enlisted the aid of former

Shamir, hoping to isolate Levi further, then tried to add 400 extra convention delegates—almost all Shamir supporters. A close adviser to Shamir explained to US diplomats in Tel Aviv that, as Herut leader and the party's candidate for the premiership, Shamir should control an absolute majority at the convention. According to the US Embassy, Shamir even offered Sharon 30 percent of the supplemental list of delegates in return for his cooperation in cutting Levi out of the action, but Sharon balked at being part of such blatant convention packing. [redacted]

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Despite Sharon's and Levi's opposition, Shamir's supporters forced his scheme through the Central Committee, which approved adding 350 delegates to the convention to be selected by a committee dominated by Shamir's and Arens's allies from among youth groups, party veterans, former underground members, new immigrant organizations, and other groups. Levi immediately appealed this decision to the Herut Party court and won a compromise ruling. The court ruled that Shamir could add only 191 new delegates to the convention. [redacted]

Shamir and Levi, nonetheless, have managed to agree on postponing the convention three times from its originally scheduled date in late December 1985. Shamir presumably believes that the delays will strengthen the reluctance of the convention to openly challenge his authority so as not to give Prime Minister Peres an excuse not to honor the agreement to turn the premiership over to Likud in October. [redacted]

#### Levi Bides His Time

Levi has cooperated with Shamir on postponing the convention probably because he wishes to avoid—for the time being at least—an open challenge to Shamir that would publicly embarrass Herut and damage his own political prospects. He probably recognizes that any attempt to undermine Shamir that might prevent Likud from returning to power in October would not be popular among the party's old guard—whose support Levi needs to win control of Herut. He probably also believes he is better off deferring the convention than to insist on an early gathering he could not control. [redacted]

Levi has never tried to hide his ambition—and expectation—to be Herut's and Likud's next leader. He hopes to be the first Sephardi prime minister, but he does not sense any urgency to oust Shamir. He recognizes that he has broad support among the party's predominantly Sephardi rank and file, and he has little interest in a battle with Shamir, whose control of the party is likely to be temporary. Levi told the US Ambassador recently that he was looking to 1988 or whenever the next election is held to mount a major campaign for Herut's leadership. [redacted]

Levi's opposition to Shamir's efforts to enhance his control over the party thus stems only in part from concern that Shamir is trying to prolong his tenure. We believe Levi is more worried that Shamir is trying to exclude him from the top position in Herut and ease the way for Arens to succeed. [redacted]

To bolster his position, Levi and his supporters have sought to exploit his strength in trade unions, the Sephardi-dominated development towns, and at the party's local branches by raising the specter of his bolting the party if he is denied an early shot at the Herut leadership. We do not believe Levi will be content to be the party's number-two man beyond the next Knesset election. As a longtime Herut member, Levi presumably would prefer to remain in the party fold where he could use the party's organizational strength to support a bid for the premiership. But, faced with the prospect of exclusion from the Herut leadership, Levi might bolt the party and set up a new Sephardi grouping—or align with an existing one—taking away a large share of Herut's Sephardi constituency. [redacted]

#### Sharon Looks for an Opening

Since the Cabinet crisis in November—in which Peres tried to force Sharon's ouster from the government because of his personal attacks on the Prime Minister—Sharon has been remarkably discreet in both national and party affairs. Sharon probably did not intend to precipitate the breakup of the national unity government in November because he did not want to be held responsible for hurting Likud's chances of returning to power. He probably sought to weaken the government by forcing Shamir to side with him, thereby undermining the working relationship between Peres and Shamir and laying the groundwork for the coalition's eventual dissolution. He also hoped to strengthen his own party position by portraying himself as the staunch defender of Herut's principles. [redacted]

Sharon's uncharacteristic reticence in recent months probably stems from his desire to avoid assuming responsibility for bringing down the government as

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long as there is a chance it may fall on its own accord or with Peres's help. By this strategy, Sharon can capitalize on his image as Herut's ideological defender and, at the same time, score points among party veterans as a team player and cut into Shamir's—and Arens's—support. For the same reason, he has cooperated with Shamir against Levi on most convention arrangements [redacted]

element. Implicit in his approach is the recognition that Herut is courting disaster if its two main camps cannot be reconciled. [redacted]

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Because his support in the party—only about 20 percent, in our view—is less than Shamir's and Levi's, Sharon's reasons for self-control are likely to dissipate the longer the convention is delayed and as the date for turning over the premiership draws near. He cannot allow Shamir and Levi time to consolidate their positions in the party by deferring the convention or allow Shamir to assume the prime-ministership without hurting his own leadership prospects. Thus, he has opposed Levi and Shamir on postponing the convention, hoping that an early conclave would boost his own standing [redacted]

As the heir to his father's legacy, he has an advantage over the other contenders for party leadership if that is his goal. Or, if Herut's internal squabbling continues, the younger Begin may find the party appealing to him to impose the authority of his father's name on Herut's unruly house. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Although political logic would seem to dictate that Shamir and his rivals compromise to avoid an internal explosion in Herut, tensions remain high. Shamir is likely to try to postpone the party convention at least until after Labor's convention in April, which is expected to demonstrate strong support for Peres. He probably believes that, as the time approaches for him to assume the premiership, the party faithful will be less likely to challenge his authority to avoid jeopardizing Likud's return to power. [redacted]

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**The Ghost of Begin**

Herut's inability to sort out its leadership has led many to look for a "Begin" to restore order. Begin's name and image have not lost their luster among the Herut rank and file. The recent television appearance of his son, Dr. Binyamin Zeev Begin, caused a stir in the party, leading some Herut faithful to label him their future leader. US diplomats commented that Dr. Begin demonstrated the physical appearance, wit, and savoir faire of a younger Menachem Begin. He knew what he wanted to say, and he said it well. His main message was that the two rival camps led by Shamir and Levi should unite for the benefit of the party. He also urged Sharon's isolation within the party. [redacted]

His maneuvering, however, may push Sharon and Levi into an alliance, threatening Shamir's leadership and endangering Likud's partnership with Labor in the government coalition. Peres may be tempted to cite the blatant leadership problems in Likud as an excuse for not turning over the premiership to Shamir in October. Sharon's behavior over the next several months will be critical in this regard because he has the most to lose from Shamir's becoming prime minister. Sharon would be much better served by having Likud enter the opposition so that he could assert his own leadership from the position where he operates best—on the attack from the outside. [redacted]

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It is uncertain whether Dr. Begin has pretensions to the Herut leadership vacated by his father. His television appearance during the runup to the convention may be merely another variable in an already confusing Herut equation, but it fostered the impression that he is preparing to enter politics. For the time being, he seems to have decided to evoke his father's name on behalf of Shamir and Levi against Sharon by recommending the unification of the two forces that brought the party electoral success in 1977 and 1981—the old guard and the younger Sephardi

Over the longer term, the leadership crisis in Herut—reminiscent of the crisis Labor experienced while out of office from 1977 through 1984—could erode the party's support and hurt its electoral prospects. Prolonged animosity between the rival leaders, moreover, could eventually split the party. [redacted]

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## Lebanon: The Propaganda War

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The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television stations in Lebanon is intensifying animosities among the country's rival militias. In the face of the government's helplessness, the clandestine media thrive on spreading rumors and disinformation designed to undermine the credibility of political opponents but also seek to reinforce internal factional cohesion. The confusion in the media is symptomatic of the disarray that has characterized Lebanon since the beginning of the civil war in 1975.

The broadcasts by the various factions are a mix of propaganda and reporting in which everyone claims to speak in the name of freedom, legitimacy, democracy, justice, peaceful coexistence, and nonsectarianism. During periods of acute tension, propaganda messages compound the mistrust and hatred among the various groups and create a climate of fear, which often complicates cease-fire negotiations and leads to renewed fighting.

The factional militias have found it expedient to switch to psychological warfare to intimidate and demoralize one another. Broadcasting stations are favorite targets for terrorism and artillery shelling. Programming is subject to the patronage of the dominant local militia. Stories that the shrinking official media consider too inflammatory or likely to incite factional fighting are quickly aired by the illegitimate media in open defiance of government authority.

The mushrooming of private radio and television stations has also depressed government revenues, as some stations have begun introducing commercials into their programs. According to press reports, the Lebanese Government is apprehensive about the loss of advertising revenues and blames the illegal media for the sharp dip in such revenues in 1984-85.

Propaganda employed by the Lebanese antagonists often conceal the sources of information, attempt to exaggerate the military or political prowess of the original initiator, and attempt to discredit the goals

and accomplishments of the enemy. Disinformation campaigns, which are common, are the main source of rumors among the Lebanese population.

The Lebanese, however, have been hardened by their civil war experiences and view factional propaganda with considerable skepticism. Thus, propaganda has only a limited effect, since it generally reinforces rather than weakens the bonds between leaders and followers on both sides of the fence. The result is increasing polarization.

### Secret Wars: Spreading Lies About Your Foes

Propaganda attacks appear to increase with the level of fighting between the rival militias but remain high even when there is a lull in the fighting. There is a continuing propaganda war between the two principal Christian radio stations—the Voice of Lebanon and Radio Free Lebanon—and the radio station of the Druze militia, the Voice of the Mountain. Beirut Domestic Service, the only remaining government radio station but currently under Shia Amal control because of its location in West Beirut, is locked in a similar war with the Voice of Hope, the radio station operated by the Army of South Lebanon under Israeli supervision. Beirut Domestic Service is considered by most Lebanese as neutral except when it reports on issues dealing with South Lebanon—an area of major concern to Amal.

The unofficial Christian media often put out stories reflecting heightened tensions between the Druze and the Shias. A recent Radio Free Lebanon broadcast stated that a high-ranking Shia official was ambushed by Druze gunmen on the coastal highway while on his way to the south. The Voice of the Mountain promptly responded, calling the broadcast the work of “suspect radios broadcasting tendentious rumors and seeking to spread confusion and sedition.” In another case, the Voice of Lebanon reported heavy clashes between Shia Amal militia and combined Hizballah, Palestinian, and Lebanese Communist Party

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**Lebanon's Clandestine Radio and Television Stations**

**Voice of Hope.** Mouthpiece of Army of South Lebanon. Closely aligned with Israel and run by the fundamentalist Christian Broadcasting Network. Also operates the Middle East television station from Marj Uyun. Vehemently anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian. Claims to be nonpolitical. Funded by Christian groups and individuals.

**Voice of Lebanon.** Currently under Christian Phalange control; loyal to President Gemayel. Also operates Channel 11 television station and the Voice of Right and Dignity. Notorious for broadcasting false reports.

**Lebanon Broadcasting Company.** The quasi-governmental television establishment whose channels—2, 4, 7, 9, and 11—are often pirated by the illegal media.

**Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation.** The television center for the Christian militia of Samir Ja'Ja, located in East Beirut. Also controls Radio Free Lebanon and has inaugurated a new radio station, the Voice of the Lebanese Forces.

**Ihdin Free and Unified Lebanon.** Former President Suleiman Frangieh's radio station in the Zgharta region in northern Lebanon. Sometimes represents Syrian perspective on Lebanese events.

**Islamic Unification Radio.** The former radio station of Shaykh Said Sha'ban in Tripoli. Represents Iranian views and other radical fundamentalist ideologies. May now be under Syrian control.

**Voice of the Mina.** Radio station under one of the Islamic Unification leaders, Shaykh Hisham Minqara in Tripoli. Anti-Syrian and pro-Islamic fundamentalism. May now be under Syrian control.

**Voice of the Syrians.** A Christian radio station located in the Christian enclave. Claims to be nonpolitical and designed to represent the Syriac culture from which former Christian militia commander Fadi Fram emerged.

**Voice of the Mountain.** The Druze radio station in the Shuf region under the control of Walid Jumblatt. Anti-Christian militia and often attacks President Gemayel. Will soon begin television broadcasting.

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militiamen. Beirut Domestic Service responded by reading an official Amal statement denying that these clashes took place.

Spreading rumors to increase tensions in their opponent's camp is also practiced by the Voice of the Mountain, especially against President Gemayel and the Christian militias. The Druze radio station often resorts to name calling, referring to Gemayel as the "Somoza of Ba'bda" and labeling the Christian militias as separatists, while praising militia forces opposed to the Christians as nationalists. When the so-called Flag war flared up last November between the Druze and the Shia militias loyal to Amal, the Christian media quickly seized the opportunity to widen the hostilities between the two former allies with exaggerated stories of Druze and Shia massacres and atrocities.

**A Propaganda Case Study: Hubayqa Versus Ja'Ja**

The propaganda war is so important to the political survival of the various factions that it occasionally is employed to win internal factional power struggles. In January 1986 Elie Hubayqa, former commander of the Christian militia, in a bid to consolidate his grip on the Christian community following his signing of the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Accord directed all the media under his control to attack his political rivals Samir Ja'Ja and President Gemayel. The Voice of Lebanon, which was under Hubayqa's control, found itself in direct confrontation with Radio Free Lebanon, controlled by Ja'Ja.

The newly emerging Christian factions had earlier wrested control of most media inside the Christian enclave from the wing of the Phalange Party

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**Lebanon's Clandestine Radio and Television Stations (continued)**

**Beirut Domestic Service.** Lebanon's official radio station now under the control of the Amal militia in West Beirut. Anti-Voice of Hope and primarily anti-Israeli. Has provided surprisingly evenhanded coverage, but continues to exaggerate Lebanese guerrilla successes against Israel and the Army of South Lebanon.

**Voice of Arab Lebanon.** Mouthpiece of the pro-Nasirite Sunni militia, Al Murabitun. Broadcasts from a mosque in West Beirut and will soon begin operating a television station.

**Voice of the Homeland.** Sunni station of the moderate philanthropic foundation Al Maqasid in West Beirut. Its director is Tamam Salam. Advocates continued amicable relations with traditional Christians.

**Voice of the South.** Set up by Israel to overcome the propaganda fallout from Israel's repression of Shia guerrilla warfare in the south. Broadcasts counter Amal, Hizballah, and Syrian messages dealing with suicide, martyrdom, and heroism.

**Voice of the Armenians.** Represents the views of the leftist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).

**Voice of Heaven—The Armenian Radio Station of Lebanon.** Status quo station, anti-ASALA, and mouthpiece of the Dashnak Party.

**Voice of the Islamic Revolution.** A Hizballah-run station in Balabakk, supported by Iran. Calls for Islamic revolution and broadcasts radical religious messages and slogans. Anti-US and anti-Israel.

**Voice of Arab Revolution—The Voice of National Resistance.** Newly inaugurated station directed against Israel and Army of South Lebanon. Believed to be financed by Syria but operated by group of Lebanese Shias, Communists, and Syrian National Socialists. <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Syria is encouraging former Christian militia leader Elie Hubayqa to set up a radio station beamed at the Christian community from the Natn region.

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traditionally loyal to the Gemayel family. At the outbreak of hostilities on 13 January, Hubayqa controlled the Voice of Lebanon, the major Christian television station, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, the Al Amal Phalange newspaper, and a daily newspaper called *Al Jumhuriyah*. Ja'Ja controlled Radio Free Lebanon and the *Al Masira* magazine. *Al Amal* was forced to suspend publication, and its offices in East Beirut were soon occupied and subsequently ransacked by Hubayqa's supporters. Issues of *Al Masira* opposed to the Tripartite Accord were confiscated on Hubayqa's orders.

As the fighting among the Christians intensified, so did the propaganda war. Hubayqa took to the air first, claiming he was forced to move against Ja'Ja and

Gemayel for security reasons. His real motives had more to do with his belief that Gemayel and Ja'Ja masterminded a failed assassination attempt against him on 31 December. The Voice of Lebanon described Hubayqa's opponents as "highwaymen and felons." Hubayqa's operation, commented the radio, was designed to "ensure the safe movement on the main roads of all citizens . . . from agitators, hirelings, and payday gunmen. . . . The responsibility for the situation must be borne by the 'Man of the Palace'" (Gemayel).

Outsiders quickly sought to inflame the Christian quarreling. Beirut Domestic Service, under Amal influence, broadcast rumors and false reports to

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increase Christian suspicions, such as claims that Israeli gunboats had attacked Hubayqa's headquarters in Karantina. Similarly, Baghdad's Voice of the PLO falsely reported that Hubayqa was killed in a gun battle on 15 January. The Druze Voice of the Mountain claimed that Gemayel and Ja'Ja's forces were taking advantage of the fighting by executing kidnaped Lebanese that were being held in the Christian militia's barracks.

Addressing his Christian constituency, Ja'Ja stated that "remaining silent now means collusion against you, every child, old person, man and woman, and even crime against our values, principles, and future." The Voice of the Mountain attacked Gemayel by stating that "choosing between the emperor and his interests and whims or the interests of the homeland, the nationalist forces have adopted the national option out of their commitment to the agreement supported by Damascus. When the Somoza crimes became intolerable, the nationalist forces attacked his stronghold in Bikfaya and the eastern areas." Radio Free Lebanon responded by announcing that "certain well-known suspect information media have been spreading fabricated and false reports about alleged attacks and advances in the direction of the eastern areas."

A propaganda technique utilized effectively by the two Christian camps was the jamming of each other's radio stations. The Voice of Right and Dignity, which supports President Gemayel, had to change its FM frequency after being jammed by Hubayqa.

Hubayqa's defeat by Ja'Ja and his departure from Lebanon continue to generate propaganda in the Christian camp. After car bombs exploded in East Beirut in February, Ja'Ja's militiamen began rounding up former Hubayqa supporters and announced on their Radio Free Lebanon that "certain individuals involved with Hubayqa took advantage of the prevailing freedom to reassemble a number of sabotage teams and to implement a terrorist plan supported from abroad." Hubayqa, in exile in Damascus, replied that Ja'Ja's broadcast about terrorist cells in East Beirut was designed to justify Ja'Ja's repression and arrest of innocent civilians. Seeing an opportunity to sow conflict between Ja'Ja

and Gemayel, the Druze Voice of the Mountain reported that gunmen belonging to Ja'Ja had assassinated a Phalange notable, Elie Karameh, a Gemayel loyalist.

The Christians also seek to divide their enemies. Their Voice of Lebanon frequently reports that savage fighting between the Amal Shia militia and the Palestinians is erupting or about to erupt in the Palestinian camps. Such announcements are designed to maintain a high level of distrust between the Palestinians and the Shias. Pro-Amal Beirut Domestic Service counterattacks by minimizing reports of fighting and announces that "suspicious-minded" media have been spreading false reports about clashes between people in the Palestinian camps and outsiders.

#### **Foreign Propaganda**

Highly sophisticated propaganda campaigns have been directed at the Lebanese since 1948 by both Israel and Syria. Most recently, Damascus radio has been airing commentaries critical of the United States for hindering the Syrian peace plan for Lebanon. Syria is known to have occasionally financed the Druze Voice of the Mountain to attack President Gemayel and the Christians as circumstances warrant.

Israel responds through the Voice of Hope in South Lebanon run by the Army of South Lebanon. A unique Israeli attempt to divide the Shia Hizballah extremists and Syria is the publication and distribution of anti-Syrian pamphlets in Lebanon that accuse Syria of torturing Muslims as well as "impugning" the character of radical Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli.

To cement its relationship with its Lebanese constituency, Jerusalem Domestic Service often broadcasts Israeli Government statements on South Lebanon. Thus, it carried an Israeli official's address to a gathering of Christian supporters on the anniversary of the death of the founder of the Army of South Lebanon. The Israeli official said, "When I come here to represent the Government of Israel, I have only words of peace, friendship, and love."

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**Outlook**

The propaganda war is likely to intensify in light of the failure of the Lebanese to reach a political compromise. Technical assistance from abroad will probably enhance the various factions' abilities to expand programing and to improve communication effectiveness.

The proliferation of clandestine radio and television stations is likely to continue fulfilling political rather than social functions and will increase hostility and mistrust between the various combatants. The result is likely to be increased Lebanese reliance on rumors as a means of reinforcing beliefs they already hold about perceived enemies. The air is likely to remain filled with accusations of wrongdoing, plots, and conspiracies. Such a climate will encourage intensified fighting, since propaganda of this sort aims to consolidate power within each group, bolster morale, maintain allegiance to commanders, and keep fighters engaged in combat rather than tell the truth.



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**Libya's Increasing Ties to Radical Palestinians** [redacted]

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The attacks on the El Al ticket counters in the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December have focused attention on the degree of Libyan involvement in these acts of terrorism. Even more significantly, they may be one more signal of increasing ties between Libya and radical Palestinian terrorist organizations like the Abu Nidal Group. [redacted]

operations. Groups such as Abu Nidal and the PFLP appear to be searching for alternative or supplementary backing to that provided by Syria, their longtime patron. They may believe that Damascus tries to exert undue control over them or that Syria views the Palestinian cause as less important than its own goals in Lebanon. They may also hope to gain use of Libyan diplomatic facilities to help stage their attacks [redacted]

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Libyan leader Mu'ammr Qadhafi began supporting more radical Palestinians in the mid-1970s after deciding that Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization were becoming too moderate. Since then, Libya has sporadically provided funding, arms, training, and safehaven to most of the radical factions of the Palestinian movement, notably the Abu Nidal Group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Fatah dissidents, Sa'iqqa, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). [redacted]

**Financial Support**

Libya is more willing—or perhaps more able—than Syria to provide funds to radical Palestinian groups.

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[redacted] Libya is again increasing aid to these groups and provides logistic support to terrorist operations. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Qadhafi probably would see great profit in linking his regime more directly to these militants and their activities. They share common enemies—Israel and its supporters and moderate Arab and Palestinian leaders—as well as a ruthless approach to pursuing their struggle. The Palestinian groups are rich in manpower and have extensive operational networks in Western Europe. Their successful attacks on two continents have attracted significant international attention. By joining forces with them operationally, Qadhafi could probably trade increased financial and logistic support for a role in the Palestinians' target selection and use of their personnel and West European support apparatus for Libyan operations. [redacted]

Qadhafi has not kept all his promises to provide money. As late as November 1985, the Palestine National Salvation Front had not received the \$2 million Qadhafi had repeatedly pledged to rebuild the refugee camps destroyed in the camp wars last June in Lebanon. [redacted]

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[redacted]

**Safehaven**

The radical Palestinians' search for alternatives to Syrian hospitality to avoid the strings that Damascus attaches—such as tight supervision of in-country activity—has led several groups to consider other countries as bases for their operations. At least two of

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The radical Palestinians would have their own reasons for more active cooperation with Libya and, in at least one case, have proposed joint planning for terrorist

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these radical groups give signs of moving their operations to Libya, which may make benefits in addition to safehaven—such as passports and similar documentation—available to them. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Military Aid and Training**

Libya has given military training to Palestinian groups for more than 15 years. Current training of Palestinians occurs both inside and outside Libya. It is well established that Libya provides weapons to several Palestinian groups. [redacted]

[redacted] among recent instances of Libyan support:

[redacted]

- Libya provided weapons to radical Palestinians who fought against the mainline Shia Amal movement in last summer's camp wars in Lebanon.

As with money, Libya does not follow through on all of its commitments. Fatah dissidents, for example, requested arms from Iran, saying that Libya had not delivered the weapons it promised. [redacted]

**Intelligence and Terrorist Cooperation**

Most alarming is the increasing Libyan-Palestinian cooperation in intelligence gathering and terrorist operations. The Palestinian groups that appear to have such operational ties to Qadhafi are Abu Nidal, the PFLP-GC, and the Fatah dissidents. [redacted]

[redacted] all of these parties favor cooperation in terrorist activity, and there is some evidence indicating that such cooperation is developing. [redacted]

[redacted]

[Large redacted area]

**Outlook**

Tripoli and the Palestinians are probably assessing each other's capabilities and intentions carefully, with an eye to determining whether closer ties are

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warranted. Nonetheless, greater cooperation may have limits. Each of the Palestinian groups, particularly Abu Nidal, has its own agenda and values its autonomy. Consequently, we expect none of these groups would be willing to become fully dependent on Libyan support. Moreover, in many respects, Syria is a natural ally and should continue to play a key role. Nevertheless, to the extent that links between Libya and the Palestinian radicals increase—a process that appears to be under way—the range and effectiveness of each partner's terrorist operations will also increase.

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**Morocco-Saudi Arabia:  
Between Friends** [redacted]

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Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close ties based on mutual interests. King Hassan provides political support for Riyadh's foreign policy goals and assists Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab regimes in internal security and military training. Riyadh provides financial assistance that strengthens Hassan at home and bolsters stability within Morocco and the Maghreb generally. Although Riyadh's decreased oil earnings may reduce the level of Saudi financial assistance over the next two or three years, we believe mutual political interests will continue to foster close Saudi-Moroccan relations. [redacted]

in an attempt to ease tensions. According to the US Embassy, it was also at Saudi behest that Hassan began to improve relations with Colonel Qadhafi—a process that led to the Moroccan-Libyan union in 1984. [redacted]

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**Mutual Interests**

Morocco and Saudi Arabia have developed a strong working relationship. Hassan and Saudi King Fahd maintain close personal ties based on similar political interests that include shoring up conservative Sunni regimes, supporting moderate Islamic organizations and objectives, encouraging free enterprise, and advancing moderate Arab goals for a Middle Eastern peace. [redacted]

**Saudi Support**

**Economic Ties.** Financial assistance from Saudi Arabia has helped stabilize the Hassan regime and enabled Rabat to sustain the Western Sahara war. [redacted]

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Saudi military and economic grants to Morocco probably amounted to \$3 billion during 1980-85, with an additional \$700 million in loans. As part of an oil package in 1985, the Saudis delivered to Morocco without charge some 2 million metric tons of oil, worth about \$375 million and equal to half of Rabat's annual consumption. This is the first time Saudi Arabia has provided oil free of charge, and it helped considerably to ease Morocco's foreign exchange problems. [redacted]

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In 1982, Morocco and Saudi Arabia worked closely together at the Arab League summit meeting in Fez to obtain endorsement of the "Fez Plan" as the official Arab League position on a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1984, Fahd and other moderate Arab leaders engineered the reintegration of Egypt into the Islamic Conference. Hassan and Fahd maintain close personal ties and consult regularly on a variety of matters including Sudan, the PLO, and the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis have tried to reduce the friction between Morocco and its Maghreb neighbors. While diplomatically and financially favoring Hassan's position on the Western Sahara, the Saudis have played an important, if somewhat unsuccessful, role in encouraging better relations between Morocco and Algeria. For example, they set up the first heads-of-state meeting in 1983, and, following Moroccan reversals on the Western Sahara issue in the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, they were in touch with both leaders

[redacted]


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**Security Assistance.** Saudi financial support helps Morocco provide security assistance to moderate African and Arab governments. This cooperation grew out of an understanding reached between the two conservative monarchies in the mid-1970s as members of the now defunct Five-Power Intelligence Committee—Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt,

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and France—that multilateral effort was needed to thwart radical initiatives, counter Soviet inroads in Africa, and combat international terrorism. The spirit of the agreement continues on a bilateral level between Rabat and Riyadh. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Morocco will undoubtedly continue to pursue strong bilateral ties to Saudi Arabia. Although Hassan's preoccupation with growing domestic concerns may lead him to retreat somewhat from involvement in general Middle Eastern issues, economic realities, as well as his diplomatic isolation in Africa, will require continuing close attention to relations with potential Arab donors and oil suppliers. [redacted]

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Since the Grand Mosque incident at Mecca in 1979—when several hundred armed religious fanatics seized the Grand Mosque and called for the overthrow of the Al Sa'ud dynasty—Morocco has furnished security training to Saudi personnel. According to the US Embassy at Rabat, the Saudi Government is financing the presence of some 1,500 to 2,000 Moroccan Army, Air Force, and gendarmerie personnel to train Saudi security and military personnel as well as to undertake specific internal security responsibilities in Saudi Arabia. [redacted]

In our view, as Saudi oil revenues drop, a greater percentage of remaining money will be dedicated to domestic expenditures and to rewarding or placating Saudi Arabia's nearest neighbors. Nevertheless, according to US Embassy officials, Morocco remains the hinge on which Saudi policy toward the Maghreb turns. Rabat plays a key role in Saudi efforts to enhance Arab and Muslim unity and support moderate Arab positions. Although the amount of Saudi aid may decrease [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe the relationship will continue as long as the regimes in Rabat and Riyadh retain their current character and common interests. [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia is no longer an important source of military funding for Morocco. [redacted]

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**Suwar El Dahab:  
Sudan's Reluctant General** [redacted]

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Shortly after reluctantly joining the military coup in April 1985 that deposed Sudan's President Gaafar Nimeiri, Gen. Suwar El Dahab promised to hold elections for a civilian government within a year. He appears eager to effect this transition of power by April 1986. We believe he is sincere in his promises to resign following successful elections, but we do not rule out the possibility that his intentions could change. [redacted] Suwar El Dahab would probably not step down if the election process threatened Sudan's precarious stability. Furthermore, if he were offered an administrative post in the new government, such as head of a Sovereignty Council, he might accept, emphasizing that his sense of duty overrides his strong personal wish to retire. [redacted]

armed forces commander in chief and is also chairman of the Transitional Military Council, which has governed Sudan since Nimeiri was deposed. [redacted]

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**Personality: Honor, Duty, Country**

[redacted] characterized Suwar El Dahab as intelligent, even tempered, scrupulously moral, and gentlemanly. Meticulous in his appearance and abstemious in his personal habits, he is, in our view, highly sensitive to public opinion. Publicly, he minimizes any attachment to his career, professing greater interest in the unassailable and private realms of family and religion. [redacted]

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
A member of the Khatmiyyah sect of Sufi Islam, which, [redacted] has traditionally enjoyed strong representation in the Army and its high command, Suwar El Dahab carefully balances his religious convictions with his civil duties. In recent interviews he stated that he believes that politics and religion—like politics and the military—should be kept separate. He added that, while he opposed the imposition of sharia (Islamic law) in Sudan, he is deferring such matters to the future civilian government. On several occasions he has indicated that he is eager to retire to pursue Koranic studies. [redacted]

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**Personal History**

Abdel Rahman Suwar El Dahab, 52, is a member of a large and prominent Khatmiyyah (Sudan's second-largest Muslim sect) family that has included in its number many high-ranking military officers and religious leaders. He graduated from the Sudanese Military College in 1955 and has attended a six-month military intelligence course in the United Kingdom (1961) and the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia (1967). Public accounts of his career indicate that Suwar El Dahab was twice dismissed from the Army. He first ran afoul of his superiors for refusing to serve alcohol at official functions while military attache in Uganda in 1969. He was again separated from the Army in 1971 following a failed Communist coup, in which one of his cousins played a prominent role. Following his reinstatement in the Army by President Nimeiri in 1972, he rose steadily to the highest echelons of the military. In the seven years before the coup that toppled Nimeiri, Suwar El Dahab served as deputy chief of staff for operations and training (1978-82), deputy chief of staff for logistics (1982), deputy commander in chief of the armed forces (1982-85), and armed forces commander in chief and Minister of Defense (March-April 1985). He continues to serve as

**Leadership Style: Paternal and Accommodating**

[redacted] characterized Suwar El Dahab's leadership style as paternal—he tends to lead by example. Stern, but not overbearing, he will avoid

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and ignore people who do not live up to his expectations. [redacted] he reacts to stress with stoic composure and only rarely shows anger. As a result, subordinates can present him with bad news without fear of recrimination.

[redacted]

In our judgment, Suwar El Dahab is concerned with maintaining an image of unity, concern for the common good, and consistency in the decisionmaking process. [redacted] when Suwar El Dahab is confronted with a problem, he often defers to his staff, but he reserves final judgment for himself. He guides the course of discussions and relies on his colleagues and subordinates for creative, substantive contributions. [redacted]

**Possible Future in the Government**

[redacted]

Suwar El Dahab's apparent lack of ambition. We believe his display of reluctance in the face of political opportunity results from a combination of cultural and personal factors. Demonstrations of personal ambition are unseemly, and even dangerous, in a culture where one man's gain is usually equated with another's loss. Furthermore, Suwar El Dahab, in our judgment, [redacted] unwilling to venture beyond his support network, especially in the face of Sudan's overwhelming economic, social, and military problems. [redacted]

Because of Suwar El Dahab's nonconfrontational style and his reputation for honesty, he could conceivably be regarded as a useful resource by a government faced with prospects for severe ethnic and regional factionalism. Suwar El Dahab would provide a facade of legitimacy for a highly ambitious and energetic political leader who needed time and maneuvering room to consolidate power. While his year at the helm of the Transitional Military Council has been taxing, his survival has probably reinforced his self-confidence and provided him with an opportunity to extend his support network, should he choose to use it. We believe Suwar El Dahab might accept an administrative post, such as head of the Sovereignty Council, but that he would do so only after emphasizing his reluctance. In the event that the elections result in chaos, and if his colleagues do not preempt him, he may feel compelled to assume the leadership of another coup. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Near East and South Asia Briefs**

**Libya**

**Lobbying for Arab Largess** [redacted]

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Libya has approached Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arab Gulf states for financial assistance in the event of severe cash-flow difficulties because of the US assets freeze. In late January, a Libyan envoy requested Saudi financial aid and asked other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to remove funds from US institutions in retaliation for US sanctions, [redacted]

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While token aid may be forthcoming, large-scale assistance or movement of assets from US investments is unlikely. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have refused Libyan aid requests in the past because of their size or the perceived political implications of assisting Qadhafi. The diversion of US investments would be difficult for Gulf states to achieve without reducing the rate of return on their large holdings. Moreover, Libyan agitation for reductions in Gulf state oil production to remedy the soft oil market probably rankles GCC members because of Tripoli's record of price discounts and oil barter deals. Tripoli may threaten retaliation, but the Saudis at least are not likely to be intimidated. [redacted]

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**Purchase of Italian Refinery** [redacted]

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Tripoli is consolidating control over its recently purchased TAMOIL refinery in Milan. The Libyans plan to double refinery output by late 1987 and to expand the distribution network within Italy, [redacted] The refinery is the most modern in Italy with a distribution system of 850 service stations. The refinery and distribution network will guarantee Tripoli access to the Italian market and help stabilize Libya's oil exports and revenues during the current soft oil market. Tripoli plans to discharge all employees of Jewish descent and to utilize only Libyan or Cuban crude. Havana produces only a small amount of crude oil, but its high sulfur content makes the crude a good blending stock for the refinery, which cannot operate efficiently solely on low sulfur Libyan oil. Moreover, the deal will help bolster Havana's foreign exchange position and provide a secure outlet for difficult-to-market Cuban crude. [redacted]

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