

WEEK OF 11 JAN

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

## The World's Double Standard



To Americans, the world's judgment seems to be rigged up to a perverse double standard. Let only a rumor waft through, a propagandist's mischievous fantasy about the CIA's organizing the attack on the Sacred Mosque at Mecca, and rioters swarm like film extras against U.S. consulates from Turkey to India; in Islamabad, Pakistan, two Americans die and the embassy goes up in flames. Let the U.S. admit the deposed Shah for temporary medical treatment, and the Tehran embassy, with all occupants, becomes the property of overheated Shi'ite gunmen. But let four Soviet divisions move in to take possession of another country, and the world's response is somehow muted; the full orchestra of international outrage declines to perform.

Something in these allocations of censure strikes Americans as profoundly unfair. Through their anger over Iran and Afghanistan, there also runs a thin current of self-pity. It bewilders Americans to be hated. It astonishes them to come off second best in a moral comparison with the Soviet Union, with the keepers of the Gulag and the Lubianka, with the oafish jailers of Eastern Europe.

More than merely the Third World's resentment is involved. Americans in a vulnerable time detect even in allies and neighbors a certain selfishness; they experience the little chill a man feels when old friends stop answering his calls. Japan initially responds to the crisis in Tehran by trying to buy up as much Iranian oil as possible. Mexico's President José López Portillo gives Jimmy Carter lectures on American behavior; at a crucial moment he refuses to accept the Shah back into his country, despite earlier promises of refuge. Western Europe wants the protection of the American nuclear umbrella but parades a fastidious ambivalence about it.

American sensitivities have been sharpened by the spectacle of the Ayatullah's disgracefully successful tent show. But a nation that lives in a surfeit of images and excitements may have a short memory. Since the U.S. emerged as a superpower at the end of World War II, certain conventions of the historical art form—the assault on the U.S. embassy and the U.S.I.A. library, Uncle Sam burning in effigy, YANKEE GO HOME on the compound walls, the vilification of the “paper tiger”—have become so habitual as to represent a rich tradition. Anti-Americanism has grown in direct proportion to American influence in the world. For Americans now to become so agitated about anti-Americanism bespeaks not strength but skittishness, a faintly disagreeable tendency to ask: “Why are they picking on us? Why don't they pick on the Russians? How did we get to be the bad guys?”

The answers to those questions are historical, cultural, psychological and fascinating. The Soviets and the Americans have gone forth into the world with bizarrely different styles. They have aroused utterly different expectations and fears.

If the strongest anti-Americanism flourishes in the Third World, the most intense historical indictment of the U.S. focuses upon its habit of supporting right-wing anti-Communists, often dictators, against revolutionaries. The U.S. backed Chiang Kai-shek in China, Syngman Rhee in Korea, Diem in Viet Nam—followed by Ky and Thieu. It went along with the colonels in Greece, the Salazar regime in Portugal, on the theory—often correct but sometimes too lazily embraced—that such regimes were the only alternative to Communism. The U.S. has loosed the CIA to perform unsavory readjustments of leadership here and

there. Americans have too often forgotten John Stuart Mill's thought: “A government which needs foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens is one which ought not to exist.” (It is doubtful that the Soviets ever read that passage.) Much of the Third World believes that U.S. foreign policy seeks repressive stability in regimes round the world so that American business can accumulate maximum profit. Even U.S. foreign aid is taken not as charity but as a kind of reparations fund for offenses past and future. Aside from the usual resentment human nature feels at another's generosity, there is a Third World conviction that the U.S. is impurely promoting its own interests with aid. Few in the Third World believe that the U.S. values humanity more than money.

Russians are stolidly low-profile in their dealings with the outer world (except, of course, when they find an invasion necessary). The Soviets do make themselves obnoxious sometimes (the Egyptians threw them out in 1972), but their cultural penetration round the world is slight. One of their advantages over the U.S. is that they are represented ideologically in many countries by home-grown Communist parties. American influences, on the other hand, are everywhere, gleaming, tempting, polluting; they suggest wealth, power and a barbarically breezy insensitivity to old values. American ways seem to threaten morality and the family. They also arouse envy: the contrast between the American standard of living and that of much of the Third World can be engaging. American prosperity is a reminder of one's own poverty. John Updike's African dictator in his novel *The Coup* speaks of America as “that fountainhead of obscenity and glut.” The U.S., in Third World eyes, is a cultural and economic colonialist, the heir to everything hated in the old colonial powers. The U.S. taps a primordial sense of humiliation and resentment, the memory of what was once conquered and has not yet successfully recovered.

The Soviet Union is a closed and still somewhat enigmatic society. Its leaders are not believed to be sensitive to foreign opinion or outside pressure. The U.S. is regarded as a manically, foolishly open society that leaks state secrets in its newspapers, turns its wars into savage media entertainments, conducts such furious internal debates (including presidential campaigns) that its admirable democratic qualities get lost in a general chaos and indecisiveness. American responsiveness to outside pressures of all kinds actually encourages demonstrations and other anti-American gestures. In a practice bizarre to many foreign eyes, the U.S. pillories itself with an exuberant masochism; it even televises its humiliations, self-doubts, soldiers' atrocities. Then it wonders why the rest of the world joins in the denigration.

**T**he most dangerous development in world opinion is the growing belief that the U.S. is weak, that it has lost the will to act. The demonstrative anti-Americanism of the past few weeks results in part from a sort of contemptuous assurance among rioters that the U.S. will not retaliate. Soviet embassies do not get attacked. You don't pick a fight with a man capable of killing; attack instead that forbearing, civilized gent with the smudge of self-doubt in his eyes. One Southeast Asian diplomat said with brutal scorn last week: “Like your wife, America is always around, ready to get a beating. And you get the feeling that in the end she will not divorce you.”

Still, the state of anti-American agitation around the world



American flag burning in Tehran

CONTINUED

does not accurately reflect the state of relative affection for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Plenty of people, including most Eastern Europeans, would riot against the Soviets if they dared; Russia enjoys immunities purchased by its goonily abstracted disregard for the opinions of others. Geography also plays a part. The U.S. is thought to be so far away that the danger of retaliation seems similarly remote. In any case, the world's expectations of Russians are so much lower than of Americans that public opinion is less outraged by Soviet behavior. Russia operates in the world not with a morality but with an ideology, which it pursues with grim and slogging coherence.

It is a mistake to exaggerate foreign antipathy toward the U.S. America is a natural target for all kinds of random discontents ricocheting around on other continents; it is a handy distraction for incompetent leaders when things are not going well. Third World leaders who studied in the U.S., says Taiwan Foreign Affairs Analyst Chang King Yuh, "have found it easy to use the U.S. as scapegoat whenever they have encountered domestic difficulties, since the ammunition to use against the U.S. is so readily available." Authoritarian regimes will always be threatened by the very existence of the U.S. example. The relationship between the U.S. and many Third World countries is

elaborate and even Oedipal but, along with envy and frustration, the U.S. also stirs, still, a good deal of neurotic admiration.

In a way, today's anti-Americanism is founded on a misperception. The U.S. is not so weak as many in the world—or in America—take it to be. The nation remains militarily, economically and morally powerful—in the aggregate, far more powerful than Russia. The problem is not lack of strength but a bewilderment of will. The U.S. must decide how its strength should be applied, and if it is willing to pay the inevitably high price for applying strength. French Author Louise Weiss believes that the present American predicament began in "a search for a false popularity," a product of the chagrin over the Viet Nam years. The quest should be abandoned. Americans should recognize and accept the fact that much of world opinion runs against the U.S. now. Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested five years ago that the U.S. should assume a role of minority opposition. Ultimately, the U.S. must appeal, as it has often done successfully, to other people's self-interests. At any rate it must put together a tight, coherent and absolutely consistent body of principles that it represents and is willing to act upon. It may be that only by accepting their unpopularity will Americans have some hope of regaining the world's good opinion and respect. — *Lance Morrow*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 2

THE WASHINGTON POST  
PARADE MAGAZINE  
6 January 1980

## Walter Scott's **—personality parade—**

*Q. Is it a fact that Richard Helms and William Colby, both former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, hate each other so much that neither will appear in the same room with the other? What is the source of their enmity?—J.L., Arlington, Va.*

*A. Colby does not hate Helms, but Helms was found guilty of perjured testimony before a Senate committee and reportedly holds Colby responsible for releasing the "family jewels"—those CIA in-house secrets that subsequently brought him down. As director of the CIA, Helms believed he was working for the President of the U.S.; Colby believed he was working for the people. The difference in philosophies is responsible for the enmity, more pronounced on Helms's side than Colby's.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 118WORLD MARXIST REVIEW  
DECEMBER 1979

## The Sinister Doings of the CIA

"Dossier" *Carlucci/CIA*. Lisbon, Editorial "Avante!" Publishers, 1978. 167pp.

These documents and comments on US imperialist interference in Portugal's internal affairs, notably after the April 25, 1974 revolution, give an insight into the activities of the CIA and US officials in that country from 1973 to December 1977.

The opening chapters recount the practices of CIA agents in Portugal prior to the revolution and the initial response of the US State Department and Congress to the revolution. The Pike report, produced by the special commission set up by Congress, witheringly criticised CIA activities in Portugal, charging that its agents were in hibernation.

Indeed, the CIA was certain that the fascist regime was strongly entrenched in Portugal. William Colby, CIA Director at that time, considered posting to Portugal a "prize" for his agents. Nevertheless, members of Congress were apparently hasty in imputing all the "blame" to the CIA, which was caught by surprise at the scale of the events of April 25, 1974 and their subsequent development. The example of Portugal and other countries, Iran, for instance, shows that where objective conditions were ripe and the people united, organised and ready to battle, the CIA will never succeed in preventing the success of a revolution however hard it tries. Thanks to the strength of the mass movement and the patriotism of the heroic military and those who participated in the April 25 events, thanks to the alliance that took shape immediately after these events between the Armed Forces Movement and masses, the revolution followed a road the CIA could not have foreseen: Portuguese democracy gradually took an anti-monopoly and anti-landowner orientation.

It was not easy for spokesmen of the US administration to understand what was happening. This is what led to Stuart N. Scott's recall as Ambassador to Portugal and his replacement by Frank C. Carlucci—a trusted and tough man in contrast to Scott who, in Kissinger's opinion, underestimated the "communist danger" in Portugal (p40).

The new US Ambassador, Frank Carlucci, arrived in Lisbon January 17, 1975. But some facts of his biography, especially his "services" were well known long before he came to Portugal. The Lisbon weekly *Sempre Fixe* wrote that he had been expelled from Zanzibar after that country's security forces learned that this "diplomat" had telephoned for more weapons. Subsequently, Carlucci explained in English the word "ammunition" was innocuous and all he meant was "ammunition for arguments". At Lisbon's Portela Airport the new US Ambassador was more categorical saying there were no grounds for the "rumours" of CIA infiltration in Portugal (p44). Three years later, however, this man would be appointed Deputy Director of the CIA.

In Lisbon Carlucci lost no time. He presented his credentials to President Costa Gomes just a week after his arrival and met with Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves February 8. On February 21 he went to Oporto. Everywhere his schedule was heavy. He paid his respects to the Commander of the Northern Military District, met with the civilian governor, the Bishop of Oporto, and the chairman of the Municipal Council. Besides, pages 48 and 49 give the names of the ambassador's aides who likewise were up to their neck in the embassy's day-to-day "routine".

Aided by imperialism and European Social-Democratic parties, the local

CONTINUED

reactionaries started a savage assault in February 1975 to destroy the revolution. That was when NATO began war games on the Portuguese coast. On February 4, 1975, the Portuguese Communist Party issued a statement, declaring: "In the present political situation the NATO exercises in Portugal are totally inopportune . . . Objectively they may be regarded as an attempt to influence the political situation in Portugal".

Replying to this statement in an interview for the weekly *Expresso* on February 15, Carlucci made a thinly veiled threat. "Most important," he said, "is for a NATO member to fulfil its responsibilities. There will be no problems as long as Portugal is true to its commitments".

On February 20 the Portuguese Communist Party again noted that the situation was dangerous and that anti-communism had been visibly intensified. On March 3 the Lisbon evening newspaper *A Capital* carried an article headed "CIA Plans Coup in Portugal Before the End of March".

Carlucci called these reports "fantastic and blatant lies". But on March 11 Spínola led a counter-revolutionary rising which was crushed by the Armed Forces Movement aided by the people.

It is interesting to trace the link between ensuing events and Carlucci's comings and goings. On June 29, 1975, 89 PIDE<sup>1</sup> agents "escaped", while the day before, June 28, Carlucci suddenly fell ill and left for Madrid where he entered the military hospital run by the US base at Torrejon de Ardoz. On July 10 he returned to Lisbon. But during his stay in Spain, he met with Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA. Throughout this period acts of terrorism were committed in Portugal; there were 105 assassination attempts, 34 bombings, 20 cases of arson, three armed attacks, and five cases of manhandling. The Portuguese CP alone was attacked 77 times.

Suppression of Spínola's counter-revolutionary rising and the defeat of the rightist forces on March 11 compelled Henry Kissinger to urge a strong and reliable rightist, or, if necessary, a pro-fascist regime as an alternative to the success of the Left forces. In giving these facts the book refers the reader to a curious article printed in *Harper's Magazine* in 1977, saying that Kissinger was disappointed in "his man" sent to replace the unpugnacious Scott (p68). "The point apparently is that Frank Carlucci was a more flexible and resourceful spokesman of imperialist interest than his own bosses . . . There were two things the ambassador learned quickly: the first was that any efforts to reinstall the most reactionary rightist forces would inevitably unite Portugal's democratic forces, and, second, that broader opportunities could emerge for action in a more favourable situation if the 'moderates' were used and the stake was made on politicians advocating a 'European choice', and, if an alliance were formed with Europe's Social-Democrats . . . This would help erect a barrier to socialism and freedom in Portugal" (p68).

Carlucci won this round, as is evident from a speech by Kissinger in Alabama in August 1975, which *The New York Times* called a victory for his envoy.

The book deals extensively with the attention Carlucci and his aides gave to the events in Angola while the United States and its imperialist and racist allies were straining to prevent Angola's independence and the victory of the MPLA. That was exactly when former CIA agent Philip Agee supplied the British paper *Workers Press* with the names of 16 CIA agents operating in Lisbon. The book also details the changes in CIA agents in Portugal, Carlucci's actions in relation to the Azores and Lages where the Social-Democratic Party and Social-Democratic Centre were in the majority and where the Left parties, particularly the Communist Party, were persecuted and not permitted to function over the greater part of this territory.

In February 1977 Carlucci went to Washington, where he urged granting

CONTINUED

loans to Portugal and testified before the House sub-commissions on Europe and the Middle East and the Commission on Foreign Affairs. The debate was over the allocation of 30 million dollars for a NATO brigade stationed in Portugal. Transcripts of this debate, which lasted until March 1, 1977 (pp99-116) show clearly the extent of US interference in the affairs of Portugal, which imperialism looks upon as its own private domain.

Relative to the planned reorganisation of the armed forces, which two years earlier Carlucci had called a gang, he called the NATO brigade "the beacon illuminating their further development . . . giving them moral strength and sustaining their professional spirit" (p116).

The closing chapters deal with US handouts and the Socialist Party's credits policy which made Portugal more dependent than ever on the capitalist powers. Some sidelights on Carlucci's active "social life" reveal circumstances of no little importance. For instance his tennis partners included leaders of the Socialist Party Maldonado Gonelha, Jaime Gama, and Manuel Alegre, President of the Social-Democratic Centre Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral, and SDC Vice President Adelino Amaro da Costa, and SDC Secretary-General Basilio Horta, Chairman of the SDP Sa Carneiro and one of its leaders Pedro Roseta.

In the meantime James E. Carter replaced Gerald R. Ford in the White House. Learning that Carlucci stood high in Mario Soares' favour Carter left him in Lisbon until December 23, 1977, when finally the sensational news was released that Carlucci had been named Deputy Director of the CIA. That's the way it is, esteemed reader. On December 22, 1977 the newspaper *O Diario* wrote editorially: "This was an appropriate appointment by Carter; he officially formalised the position of a CIA veteran. Frank Carlucci, the insider, is now where he belongs. However, it will be some time before our people learn of the price the nation had to pay for what the present Deputy Director of the CIA was engaged in in Portugal".

And the weekly *Opcao* will ask: "What can we say about a country that sends future heads of its secret services to countries experiencing critical situations?" The answer to this question is self-evident and the question itself remains topical today, because in many parts of the world imperialism's "insiders" of the Carlucci type are implementing a policy of unparalleled diktat and interference in the affairs of sovereign states.

Domingos Lopes

---

<sup>1</sup>Salazar's secret police. After the April revolution its most brutal agents were tried and convicted.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C2

THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 January 1980

**The  
Federal Diary**  
**By Mike Causey**

CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci will talk about government in the 1980s at the Jan. 18 luncheon sponsored by the Society for Public Administration. Its local chapter will meet at George Washington University's Marvin Center. Make reservations by calling Dona Wolf at 357-1100.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-20

NEW YORK TIMES  
5 JANUARY 1980

# SALT Is Not a Favor to Moscow

There's no point in railing against the political climate that impelled President Carter to ask the Senate to delay the strategic arms limitation treaty. There is little chance of winning a two-thirds vote unless Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan soon, and that is unlikely. But SALT II, and the arms control process, remain beneficial to both sides, even more so now. If they must be put on a back burner, there is considerable point in at least keeping them warm.

The chief danger, obviously, is that if both SALT II and the SALT process chill, an uncontrolled arms race will resume. The State Department has announced that, pending ratification, the United States will continue to abide by the terms of SALT II, as well as SALT I, if the Russians do. Mr. Carter has rightly asked, and the Senate leadership has agreed, that the treaty be kept on the calendar, ready for debate at the first opportunity. But the possibility of a vote later this year would be greater had the President not linked SALT to the Afghanistan issue. The national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated a more promising position only last Sunday, in the wake of the Soviet invasion:

"SALT is not a favor to the Soviet Union, SALT is not a Soviet favor to the United States. SALT is a strategic accommodation in the most dynamic aspect of the relationship. If that relationship was even worse than it is today, we would need SALT even more then, because SALT introduces strategic stability... whether there are Soviet troops in Kabul or whether Soviet troops are marching back to Tashkent."

How long strategic stability and the SALT process can be preserved without ratifying SALT II depends first of all on Moscow. Its strategic programs are already constrained, both by the new treaty and by the expired 1972 SALT I treaty limitations that have been continued informally pending the new treaty. SALT II would, for example, limit the Soviet Union to testing

and deploying only one new type of missile and a maximum of 10 warheads on big missiles capable of carrying 30. If the test restrictions are violated now, it will be impossible later to verify that Moscow is conforming. Without such verification, Senate ratification of the treaty is almost surely impossible. None of these limitations are binding until the treaty is ratified, but Moscow already is conforming. There is no way to know how long it will continue to do so.

Another problem is that the expired SALT I agreement on offensive missiles requires Moscow to dismantle older missiles and missile submarines as it deploys new ones. Moscow has continued reporting what it has done at semi-annual meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission. It made such a report last fall. Will it make another report in March — or argue, as it can, that the SALT I limitations lapse without ratification of SALT II? If old missiles are kept in service and more warheads are added to new missiles, the Soviet Union could expand its missile force more rapidly than the United States could build "racetrack" bunkers for its new, mobile MX missile.

The future of the \$40-billion MX program will come into question if it begins to appear that SALT II ratification is out. Without the SALT limits on Soviet missile and warhead numbers, even 4,600 horizontal surface shelters will not be enough to hide effectively 200 MX missiles. There will be pressure to go back to an earlier scheme for vertical underground shelters that look like present Minuteman silos — a scheme that would make SALT agreements unverifiable.

For the moment, almost any measure to punish Moscow for invading Afghanistan is popular in Congress. But delaying and possibly killing SALT could punish the United States as well. It could add \$30 billion to American military spending over the next decade, Defense Secretary Brown has warned. Every effort must be made to keep the ratification delay as short as possible and, meanwhile, to keep the treaty alive.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
8 January 1980

# US secret code network: a history of costly slip-ups

By John K. Cooley  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor  
Washington

The possible seizure, intact, of United States coding equipment by Soviet agents or others in the occupied US Embassy in Iran would be only one of a series of serious breaches of US communications security since the 1960s.

Hostile assaults or penetration of this security included:

- The 1967 Israeli attack on the US intelligence ship *Liberty* off the Sinai coast.
- Seizure of the *Pueblo*, a similar but smaller vessel, by the North Koreans in 1968.
- The 1974-75 transfer by two Americans to Soviet agents of plans for two "spy-in-the-sky" satellites, complete with computer cipher key cards and clear-text messages (enabling Soviet cryptanalysts to solve the ciphers used), plus a supersecret plan, code-named *Pyramider*, for a worldwide, miniature, instant Central Intelligence Agency communications system — also by satellite.
- The 1978 sale to the Soviets in Athens of a top-secret manual on another major US satellite system. Former CIA employee William Kampiles was sentenced to federal prison in the case.

• Iranian takeover of top-secret US monitoring stations on the Soviet frontier during the overthrow of the Shah a year ago.

The 1974-75 case, in which Californians Christopher John Boyce and Andrew Dalton Lee exchanged the plans to TRW Corporation's *Rhyolite* and *Argus* satellites to Soviet agents in Mexico City, is described in a new book, "The Falcon and the Snowman," by John Lindsey, just published by Simon & Schuster.

Texas Gov. William Clements Jr., who was deputy secretary of defense while Boyce and Lee were selling the material to the Russians, commented on the TRW case: "Our intelligence community is in disarray. A major satellite intelligence system, developed and deployed at a cost of billions of dollars over the past decade, without Soviet knowledge, has been compromised by intelligence procedures as porous as Swiss cheese."

Boyce and Lee were sentenced to 40 years and life imprisonment, respectively, for espionage. Shortly after the TRW and Kampiles cases, whether by coincidence or not, the Russians began encoding the telemetry — electronic emissions — from their rocket and missile tests. This made US interpretation of them far more difficult. It made doubly important the monitoring sites which the US lost in Iran, but which it still operates in Turkey and elsewhere.

This led to serious doubts inside the intelligence and arms-control communities about American ability to verify the now-delayed SALT II arms-limitation treaty with the USSR.

When militants seized the US Embassy in Tehran, some files and equipment were at least partially burned, as prescribed, during the two to three hours between first warning of the assault and final occupation of the entire embassy compound.

Top US officials have been unable or unwilling to comment on reports that "outside experts" of unknown nationality were allowed by the "students" holding the embassy to examine, then remove, communications equipment, including cipher machines, to which thermite bombs normally are attached for their destruction. This reportedly was accomplished in the code room of the American Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, when mobs attacked it last November.

There is some reason to believe that equipment might have been lost, not during the current occupation of the Tehran embassy but during the Feb. 14, 1979, temporary takeover when Ambassador William Sullivan was briefly held hostage.

Leading cryptographic expert David Kahn, who wrote "The Code Breakers," a comprehensive history of secret communications, said in a telephone interview that, although he had no inside knowledge of what might have been lost at the Tehran embassy, "our newest systems are very, very strong, and the loss might not have been too serious."

"Of course," Mr. Kahn added, "they could get a good overview of our entire systems if they got whole machines intact, together with printed circuit boards and keying cards. If they got only the machines, or a part of the whole system, it would be doubtful that they could read our traffic."

High-grade, modern crypto-systems employ computers that use an infinitely varying key, which can be solved either not at all or only by exhaustive use of another, similar computer, Mr. Kahn explained.

Cryptanalysis of German and Japanese ciphers and codes considerably speeded allied victory in World War II, in the opinion of leading British and US intelligence experts who have described their victory in a number of books.

Supervision of US cryptology, including security and US efforts to solve systems of other countries, is the responsibility of the supersecret National Security Agency under Defense Secretary Harold Brown and directed by Vice-Adm. Bobby R. Inman, with headquarters at Ft. Meade, Md.

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

AFGHANISTAN

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 6

HUMAN EVENTS  
5 January 1980

THIS WEEK'S NEWS FROM

## Inside Washington

### Afghanistan Coup

While the United States has been focusing its attention on Iran, the Soviet Union, according to U.S. intelligence sources, helped foster the Afghanistan coup last week which saw the even more pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal seize power from President Hafizullah Amin and then have Amin executed.

According to State Department officials, the Soviets, just prior to the coup, had quadrupled—from about 1,500 to 6,000—the number of combat troops and military advisers inside Afghanistan, using a massive airlift from bases in Russia. As many as 20,000 Soviet military of all kinds may be in the country, department sources say, and as many as 50,000 soldiers are said to be massed at the Soviet-Afghanistan border. The assessment of U.S. intelligence officials is that Babrak is “an explosive character, as close as you could ever get to the classic Moscow-lining Communist.”

Not since Czechoslovakia have the Soviets been willing to use their troops to impose their will on a sovereign nation, and military analysts note that the swift airborne movement into Afghanistan underscores the Soviet capacity to move significant number of troops in a relatively short time.

The big question now seems to be whether the new regime, with massive numbers of Soviet combat troops, will be able to eliminate the insurgent Moslem groups that threatened Amin's rule, and then use Afghanistan as a launching pad to expand the Soviet power base in this area of the world.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE Da. 13THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 January 1980

Jack Anderson

# Analysts Fault Carter on Afghanistan

The professionals who watch Soviet moves have a disturbing explanation for the invasion of Afghanistan, but their superiors aren't likely to submit it to the White House. The reason: Nobody wants to hand President Carter an analysis that blames him for precipitating the Soviet intervention.

Yet the secret analysis demands the urgent and objective attention of the White House. Otherwise, the experts warn that the Russians can be expected to drive deeper into the vital Persian Gulf oil region. I have offered, therefore, to publish their unwelcome conclusions, hoping someone will be brave enough to show them to the president.

These conclusions are not the wild guesses of eggheads who suck them out of their thumbs. They have access to elaborate intelligence detailing what goes on inside the Kremlin. The conversations of Kremlin leaders have been intercepted, and their personalities have been closely analyzed. "I know Leonid Brezhnev better than I know my own father," one analyst told me.

According to expert opinion, the Kremlin czars are crafty but cautious old men, who have a wary respect for American military, industrial and economic power. They will push, however, into any world power vacuum where they find the resistance weak. Carter has left them with several vacuums.

The United States dominated the oil heartland when Carter took charge of American foreign policy in 1977. The world's two largest oil exporters, Saudi Arabia and Iran, were solid American allies. Then the Soviets began testing Carter's mettle.

In 1978, the Soviets dispatched a

Cuban military force to Ethiopia directly across the Red Sea from the Saudi oil kingdom. The Cubans, 20,000 strong, were trained, armed and subsidized by the Soviet Union. Soviet advisers, meanwhile, replaced American advisers in Addis Ababa. The analysts note that Egypt's President Anwar Sadat tried in vain to arouse Carter to action.

Encouraged by Carter's restraint, the Kremlin sent 500 Cuban shock troops to consolidate its hold on South Yemen in the toe of the Arabian peninsula. The Cubans, acting on Soviet signals, spearheaded an attack upon North Yemen. This set off alarms in neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose ruling sheiks appealed to Carter for military support. He rushed over a dozen unarmed F15 fighter planes.

The Saudis, as much in exasperation as desperation, made approaches to Moscow through Syria and Iraq. The Russians couldn't resist the chance to exacerbate Saudi-American relations. They took credit with the Saudis for calling off the fighting in Yemen.

Belatedly, Carter sent military aid to North Yemen, but it was too little and too late. North Yemen preferred to take out insurance in Moscow by signing an arms pact with the Soviet Union. There are intelligence reports, meanwhile, that the Russians have set up an underground movement operating out of South Yemen to overthrow the Saudi monarchy.

But it was Carter's mishandling of the Iranian crisis, say the analysts, that persuaded the Soviets it would be safe to take over Afghanistan. He failed to bolster the shah or establish a substitute government, acceptable to the United

States, in time to save Iran. During the last days of the shah, Carter ordered a carrier task force into the Persian Gulf but then canceled the order. The task force, headed by the USS Constellation, dropped anchor in Singapore.

In contrast, the Soviets didn't hesitate to airlift troops into Afghanistan to execute a recalcitrant leader and to install a more pliant president in his place. Yet Afghanistan isn't nearly the prize that Iran is, with its fabulous oil fields and access to the Persian Gulf.

The Kremlin leaders, for all their canny caution, are simply more willing than Carter to use military power to advance Soviet interests.

Footnote: In fairness, Soviet expansion into western spheres of influence began before Carter became president. The men of Muscovy correctly calculated that the U.S. defeat in Vietnam had sapped the American will to defend faraway lands.

The Russians moved quickly into the Vietnam vacuum, shouldering aside the Chinese who struggled briefly for position. Today, the Soviet presence in Vietnam exceeds in both influence and dimension the American contingent before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Before Carter's time, the Kremlin also dispatched Cuban shock troops into the former Portuguese colony of Angola to pluck off a prize African plum. This was naked aggression, not part of the black revolution in Africa. In fact, the Cubans put down a revolt by black leaders in 1977 and installed a Marxist regime headed by whites and mulattos. Today, Angola is patrolled by 25,000 Cuban troops who take their orders from Moscow.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE D-2NEW YORK TIMES  
9 JANUARY 1980

# Economic Scene

Leonard Silk

## Afghanistan, Oil, Arms and Inflation

**T**HE Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in bringing back the cold war with a vengeance, has powerful implications for the United States and the world economy. The threat to the industrialized world's access to Middle Eastern oil supplies has been intensified. President Carter has declared that a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan "is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies."

Was the Soviet move into Afghanistan, for which Moscow will obviously have to pay an immediate economic price in terms of forgone imports of grain and technology from the West, motivated chiefly by the need to safeguard its own access to Persian Gulf oil supplies and the desire for the ability to deny oil to Western Europe, the United States or Japan?

The Central Intelligence Agency, in a report that has had much impact on the Administration's strategic thinking, has forecast that by 1985 the Soviet Union and its East European allies will be importing 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels of petroleum a day. That would be equal to more than half the total United States imports in 1978.


But, in a study for the Council on Foreign Relations, Prof. Marshall I. Goldman, associate director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, concludes that the C.I.A. report was unduly pessimistic. He argues that the Soviet Union depends so heavily on petroleum exports, which account for more than half its hard-currency earnings, that it is more likely to substitute other fuels and conserve energy in order to have oil available for export.

With huge reserves of coal and natural gas as well as oil, Russia has considerable flexibility in choosing which fuels to consume or export. The Soviet Union is the world's biggest oil producer, bigger even than Saudi Arabia. In 1978, Soviet production exceeded 11 million barrels a day; Saudi production has recently been running at 9.5 million barrels a day, although the "permanent" target is 8.5 million. With the slash in Iranian oil output and exports after the 1979 revolution, the Soviet Union has become the world's second-largest petroleum exporter after Saudi Arabia.

But Moscow has had complicated relations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In the late 1950's, the Soviet push for export markets drove down prices and upset Middle Eastern and Latin American oil producers.

As Professor Goldman notes, "In a very real sense, Soviet action provoked the formation of OPEC" in 1960.

During the Arab-Israeli war and oil embargo of 1973 and 1974, Moscow provided important military and economic support for the Arabs, enthusiastically endorsing the oil embargo and huge price increases. Soviet oil prices climbed roughly in step with OPEC prices. The Soviet Union's enormous windfall gains permitted it to reduce the physical volume of its oil shipments, while earning more money.



Stuart Goldenberg

The Russians gear their foreign oil sales to what they need to pay for their imports. One unforeseen consequence of reduced United States and West European exports to the Soviet Union could be a cut in Soviet oil shipments to the West, putting additional pressures on prices.

The return of the cold war threatens to have other inflationary effects. The step-up in United States military expenditures announced by President Carter before the Afghan action was scheduled to average 4.5 percent per annum in real terms (adjusted for inflation). This could prove to be on the low side, especially since the Soviet move in Afghanistan has effectively killed the strategic arms limitation treaty.

Pressures on the United States balance of payments resulting from the climbing price of oil and the cutoff of wheat sales to the Soviet Union have given a military thrust to American export policy. President Carter has agreed to back efforts to build a new jet fighter plane, now called the FX, strictly for the export market.

The Administration's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and some officials in the State Department opposed Mr. Carter's decision as a major change in the policy of restraint in foreign arms sales. Under that policy the Administration had opposed military equipment built only to be sold abroad.

Heavier defense expenditures are regarded by most economists as particularly inflationary. Rudolph W. Hardy, a Boston economic consultant, in a report to European investors, states: "Trade in arms is likely to grow, because it is a readily available offset to imports of oil, especially to Middle Eastern countries. The economic consequences are, nevertheless, inflationary for the recipient countries and tend to ricochet via higher oil prices back to the United States. For those who seek short-term investments in the United States with Government-guaranteed profits, selected armament manufacturing can only be recommended."

This week American stock traders figured that out for themselves.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 16

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
14 January 1980

## Washington Whispers.

The Soviet Union, which had sent 50,000 troops into Afghanistan by early January, was reported by Western intelligence officials ready to commit as many as 200,000 in coming months to guarantee its control of the country.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 18-20U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
14 January 1980

# Biggest Shock Yet

It has been a painful learning experience for Jimmy Carter—discovering that the Russian threat is as serious as ever. The lesson is forcing the President into a far-reaching reassessment of his foreign policy.

Russia's invasion of Afghanistan confronts Jimmy Carter with the most clear-cut challenge of his Presidency.

The Soviet drive to conquer its small and primitive neighbor is widely viewed as an act of Communist aggression unparalleled since North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950—and a potential threat to vital American interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

Whether détente can survive the shock is considered doubtful. In fact, many in the U.S. and Europe see as inevitable a return to a form of cold war with Russia and a sharply escalating arms race. That conviction was summed up by Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.): "Détente is dead and the Soviets killed it."

In a televised address to the nation on January 4, the President announced a radical shift in the administration's foreign policy, which for the past three years has given high priority to cooperation with Moscow and ratification of a strategic-arms-limitation treaty.

His words: "Neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union."

Carter spelled out key features of a strategy aimed at making Russia pay a price for its aggression in Afghanistan. These were:

1. Food. A limited embargo was imposed on grain shipments to the Russians. Only 8 million tons of grain that the U.S. is committed to sell this crop year under a five-year agreement will be delivered. The delivery of an additional 17 million tons that Russia was authorized to buy this year to cope with a crop disaster will be barred. To cushion the impact on American farmers, the embargoed wheat and corn will be bought by the U.S. government—or its price supported—at an estimated cost of 2 to 3 billion dollars.

The food weapon, which Carter in the past ruled out, will be used in other forms. Soviet fishing privileges in American waters will be severely curtailed. And licenses for the sale of farm machinery and equipment to manufacture phosphate fertilizer will be reviewed.

2. Technology. All sales of high technology and other strategic items to Russia will be barred until further notice. The entire licensing procedure for these exports is to be revised with the aim of tightening the screws.

3. Cultural and economic exchanges. Most of the plans for exchanges in these fields will be deferred, and for the time being no new American or Soviet consular facilities will be opened. Carter raised the possibility that American athletes might not compete in the Moscow Olympics.

Besides these measures, the President moved on other fronts in retaliation against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he called "an extremely serious threat to



*"The action of the Soviets has made a dramatic change in my opinion of the Soviets' ultimate goals."*

peace." He asked the Senate to delay consideration of the SALT II treaty, generally regarded as the cornerstone of Soviet-American détente. However, the State Department announced that the U.S. will observe the terms of the pact as long as Russia does the same.

Also, Carter threw American support behind a drive for United Nations condemnation of Russian aggression and a call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

To meet the danger that Soviet aggression would go beyond Afghanistan, Carter announced a multinational plan to provide military equipment, food and other aid for Pakistan. This will require congressional action to rescind a ban on all American aid to that country because of its efforts to produce nuclear weapons.

White House aides suggested that the administration is ready to send arms and other assistance even to Iran to counter the Soviet threat if and when that nation is ruled by a government friendly to the U.S.

Diplomatic observers in Washington said that the reprisals so far ordered by Carter against Moscow are unlikely to induce the Russians to abandon their invasion of Afghanistan—although the squeeze on grain deliveries will prove hurtful and doubtless came as something of a surprise to Kremlin leaders.

Carter had under consideration other options that, if implemented, would have a harsher effect on the Russians than anything yet announced. These would—

- Revive Central Intelligence Agency covert operations to help the Moslem rebels resisting the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan. Pentagon officials stressed that the effectiveness of the insurgents' stand would depend on availability of weapons, particularly hand-held antiaircraft missiles that can destroy Soviet gunships. These officials advocated American clandestine support also for anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola and Ethiopia who are fighting Moscow's Cuban proxy forces. Said a high-level American strategist: "With a little backing for the guerrillas, we could increase Communist casualties by a factor of three."

- Cooperate actively on defense with China, Russia's

CONTINUED

archenemy. The early-January visit to Peking by Defense Secretary Harold Brown gave special urgency to this proposal. Some ranking officials pressed for a change in the administration policy that barred the sale of American arms to China but that did not oppose weapons sales by European allies. With most European countries reluctant to risk Moscow's displeasure, these officials argued that the U.S. at least should provide China with technology to modernize its own defense industry.

■ Expand the American military presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean region quickly to counter Soviet ambitions in this strategically vital region. Somalia, Kenya and Oman already have offered the U.S. access to naval and air facilities. Some U.S. officials urged the administration to accept a new offer by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to use bases in the Sinai.

Whatever the long-term impact of Carter's strategy, one thing was clear: Moscow's massive invasion of Afghanistan struck at the very heart of Carter's foreign policy and shocked the President.

Early in his administration, Carter emphasized that his foreign policy would give reduced priority to the Soviet threat, which he tended to discount. In a speech at Notre Dame University on May 22, 1977, he set the theme of his approach toward Russia: "We are now free of . . . inordinate fear of Communism."

**A change of heart.** Now the President apparently has a far different perception of the Soviet threat, as evidenced by this confession in a December 31 ABC-TV interview: "The action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office."

Soviet-affairs experts say that Carter's shock reflected a lack of understanding of the fundamental difference between the American and Russian definition of détente. From the outset, Washington has viewed détente not only as a way of reducing the risk of nuclear war but also as a device for restraining Russian behavior around the world. For example, as recently as October 16, the State Department's special adviser on Soviet affairs, Marshall Shulman, said the U.S. has failed to establish "a broad understanding on ground rules for our continuing political competition, especially in the Third World."

The Russians, by contrast, have insisted all along that détente permitted them to continue and even intensify the

international class struggle and to support "national-liberation struggles" so long as they avoided a nuclear confrontation with the United States. Repeatedly since 1972, they have used that principle—and on an escalating scale.

In the 1973 Mideast war, they were aware of an imminent Arab attack and failed to honor a pledge to consult the U.S. to avert a potentially dangerous crisis. In Angola and Ethiopia, Russian military intervention, with the help of an army of Cuban proxies, had a decisive impact on the course of a local conflict. In South Yemen, they supported an abortive invasion of North Yemen, again with the backing of Cuban proxies. And in Indo-China they gave active encouragement plus large-scale material support to Communist Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia.

Administration officials assert that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army rather than by proxy forces represents "a quantum jump in the nature of Soviet behavior." In fact, strategic analysts—including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as well as experts in the Pentagon—for the past year have warned that Moscow was setting the stage for just such direct military intervention in local conflicts in the 1980s.

They pointed to two ominous developments. First, under the umbrella of nuclear parity with the U.S., Soviet policymakers were revising their estimate of how far they could go without risking a superpower conflict. Second, the impressive buildup of the Soviet Navy and airlift was providing the Kremlin with the capability to intervene militarily in distant regions. Considering these circumstances, strategic analysts say, the Russians' decision to cross a historic threshold by sending their own military forces into Afghanistan was not surprising. The invasion, they maintain, has profound strategic implications far beyond the borders of Afghanistan—even though the primary Soviet objective apparently was to prevent a Communist government from being overthrown by anti-Communist Moslem insurgents.

**Two-sided squeeze:** The military occupation of that country by the Red Army, the analysts maintain, is part of a double squeeze aimed at confronting China on one side and the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf region on the other.

In this the Russians are posing the most serious threat to American interests in a quarter of a century—namely, oil supplies vital to the U.S., and even more so to its European and Japanese allies. To quote Egypt's President Anwar Sadat: "The battle around the oil stores has already begun."

Growing turbulence in Iran—where 50 American hostages were still in captivity in Teheran—was seen as an invitation for a further move by Russia in the developing

"battle" for Persian Gulf oil. Besides its traditional interest in expanding its southern borders and pushing toward warm-water ports, Moscow now has a powerful new incentive to expand its influence in this area. The CIA predicts that the Soviet Union will require substantial oil imports in the 1980s.

It was against this somber background that President Carter was forced to reassess his foreign policy in the wake of the Soviet power play in Afghanistan.

In the view of some analysts, the Kremlin's willingness to use the Afghanistan operation as a model for future takeovers would depend in large part on the price they are forced to pay for their effort to absorb that nation into their Communist empire. □



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-2

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
8 January 1980

# Soviet said to quickly build force in Afghanistan, send marshal in

By CHARLES W. CORDRY  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Soviet Union, continuing to tighten its grip on Afghanistan, has dispatched a deputy defense minister to command operations from Kabul and is rapidly building up army and air forces for a long occupation, authoritative government sources reported yesterday.

There is not the slightest evidence that Carter administration warnings and actions have in any way slowed the determined buildup, these sources said, as the Russians continue to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan's main towns, roads and airfields.

Over the weekend, the government sources reported, Sergey L. Sokolov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, one of Moscow's three first deputy defense ministers, arrived in Kabul to take charge of operations and, in effect, of the country which is theoretically under the rule of Afghan Communist Babrak Karmal.

The sources also disclosed that a fresh Soviet division has begun to move toward Afghanistan from its base north of the Iranian border near Kizyl-Arvat, just east of the Caspian Sea.

At the State Department yesterday, spokesman Hodding Carter III estimated that Soviet troops in Afghanistan or on its borders number 80,000. Specifically, he said 50,000 to 60,000 now are in the country and another 20,000 to 25,000 are on the borders and possibly beginning to move in.

Counting all these forces, including those moving from the Iranian border, the Soviet Union now is believed to have five mechanized infantry divisions and the equivalent of a paratroop division committed to the invasion. Three squadrons of jet fighters and ground attack planes have been established on air bases north of Kabul and in the west near the main north-south road.

With the consolidation of their grip on population centers, highways and airfields, Russian specialists here said, the Soviet forces under Marshal Sokolov are likely to make the sealing of the Afghan border with Pakistan their No. 1 task.

With helicopter gunships and winter weather as their main allies, the forces will seek, by this judgment, to end Afghan rebels' use of Pakistan sanctuaries for cross-border forays. The risks here are self-evident, for they could lead to Soviet hot pursuit of rebels across the border.

The United States has warned that a Russian invasion of Pakistan could trigger the 1959 U.S. treaty with that country. The Russian specialists consulted yesterday predicted the potential for hot pursuit operations could bring sterner U.S. warnings.

In commenting on the Soviet buildup, the State Department's Mr. Carter called it no mere expeditionary operation but the "core of a permanent force" and said the Soviet role "is likely to continue growing, replacing the Afghan army units until a more loyal force can be raised." There have been widespread Afghan Army defections.

He was asked the obvious question, about the Soviet buildup continuing in the face of administration actions against Moscow, and replied this way: The invasion "amounts to contemptuous rejection by word and deed of the protests raised by scores of nations around the globe."

As for further U.S. responses, Mr. Carter said he would not go beyond those already announced—the chief one being a grain embargo—and certainly was not going to answer "anything to do with" the question of American arms supplies for rebel forces fighting the Soviet units.

By intelligence assessments here, there has been far less fighting than some accounts from South Asian points have indicated. There have been skirmishes as the Soviet forces swiftly moved into key areas, it was reported, but no battles of enough importance for the Russian commanders to call in reinforcements.

The Soviet forces—other than those flown in—entered Afghanistan on two main arteries. One ran south from Termez on Afghanistan's northern border, where Marshal Sokolov initially had headquarters, and wound into Kabul. The division that took that route is now deployed around Kabul, with control of all access routes, the government sources said.

The second avenue was from Kuska at Afghanistan's northwest border. Over this route, a rifle division made its way to Herat, took the airfield at Shindand, and sent advance elements to Kandahar in the southeast of the country.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A7

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
8 January 1980

## U.S. Estimates Soviets Now Have 85,000 Troops in Afghanistan

New York Times News Service

The United States says the Soviet Union, in "contemptuous rejection" of President Carter and other world leaders, has continued to reinforce its military presence in Afghanistan, raising the total over the weekend to as many as 85,000 troops.

U.S. officials said the number was likely to rise soon to more than 100,000.

Expressing the administration's anger at the accelerating intervention, the State Department accused Moscow of building up a large, permanent military presence in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union has said it was sending only a limited contingent and would withdraw it when its mission was over. The State Department said the facts challenged that statement.

In releasing the latest intelligence estimates, the department spokesman, Hodding Carter III, said the Russians were probably creating

"the core of a larger, permanent force to be deployed in the future."

"The Soviet military role and objectives in Afghanistan, therefore, are likely to continue growing, probably replacing the remaining loyal Afghan army units until a new, more reliable and effective Afghan army can be formed," he said.

When President Carter spoke out Friday against the Soviet moves, U.S. intelligence sources estimated there were 50,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the spokesman said. Over the weekend, he added, the number may have risen by an additional 20,000 to 25,000 men.

The spokesman said there were signs that two to three Soviet army divisions may be mobilizing north of the Afghan border, and other officials said they expected them to cross into Afghanistan shortly.

The spokesman said that "so far, the major Soviet military objective has been to secure the key cities and lines of communication."

# European Reaction to Events in Afghanistan... ..and Concern Over Saudi Arabian Security

By STEPHEN BRYEN and MICHAEL LEDEEN  
How secure is Saudi Arabia?

That's the bottom-line question nagging at the minds of Western officials and strategic thinkers as they attempt to come to grips with the turmoil in the Middle East. It's not something they like to talk about publicly; loose talk about weakness within the House of Saud could be destabilizing in itself. Saudi Arabia holds a quarter of the free world's known oil reserves.

Conventional wisdom has always been that the Saudi royal family has a firm grip on their country; that Saudi Arabia won't go the way of Iran because of deep religious, cultural, political and economic differences. Among other things, it's said, the Saudi government is more open than the shah's government, at least in the latter's final years, and more in tune with the people.

Much of that is certainly true. But the conventional wisdom has been severely shaken by the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in late November. Exactly what happened there is still something of a mystery; the Saudi government, deeply embarrassed by the incident, isn't saying much. But bits and pieces of information have been surfacing gradually in recent weeks, and the mosaic they form isn't reassuring.

If one gives credence to the available evidence, the seizure of the Mecca mosque was part of a well-organized effort to topple the royal family and replace it with a Khomeini-type regime. At least some of those who participated in the takeover were Saudi Arabians trained by radical elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization at camps in Lehaj, South Yemen, a client country of the Soviet Union. This same camp has been the training site for the terrorists who hijacked the airplanes in the Entebbe and Mogadishu incidents, and is under at least some control of Cuban and East German officers.

The attacks against Saudi authority apparently weren't limited to Mecca. It's reported that there were uprisings among foreign workers in at least five towns, mostly in the oil-producing eastern region, as well as a siege at the mosque in Medina, the second holiest site in the Moslem world after Mecca. There were also clashes between the Royal Army and the Saudi National Guard; some individuals in the Guard were reportedly involved in a conspiracy to overthrow

These reports are confirmed by a variety of sources, including well-placed sources within the international intelligence community. American sources who have worked at the highest levels of government report that they have received convincing information to the same effect in talks with well-placed Middle Eastern and other contacts. All asked that they not be quoted.

There has also been a welter of circumstantial evidence emerging in the press. Pilgrims who witnessed the Mecca and Medina sieges told reporters in Beirut that Iranians, Yemenis and Palestinians, along with local Saudi tribesmen, took part in the raids. The terrorists chanted *Khomeini bada rouchm Allah* ("Khomeini is the soul of God") in Arabic in front of Mohammed's tomb. They were supplied with gas masks of Soviet manufacture, permitting them to resist use of tear gas by Saudi forces. And a number were reportedly seen smoking cigarets in the Grand Mosque, hardly the sort of thing that would be tolerated by a band of Moslem "religious fanatics," to whom smoking in the mosque is forbidden.

Even Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has asserted that the Mecca attack was a political movement, not a case of "religious mania." Many of the attackers were members of the Oteiba tribe, Sunni Moslems with long-standing grudges against the Saud family that now rules the country.

It's of course possible that the reports are exaggerated, that what took place was a more or less spontaneous explosion of religious and civil feeling by malcontents who were at most egged on by Middle Eastern and leftist radical elements. The outbreak appears to have been effectively squelched, and it's possible no more will be heard of the matter.

But it's clear that the Saudis are taking the outbreak very seriously themselves, and not just as a means of gaining sympathy and support from the West. Saudi Arabia doesn't need American economic assistance, and their military requests have been regularly granted in Washington.

More importantly, the Saudis have long posed as the official protectors of the faith in the Persian Gulf. For a top member of the Saudi family and government to grant interviews—albeit not for direct attribution—to American and other reporters, in which he admitted that the uprisings had been political and had been abetted by out-

side forces, indicates unusual concern. The successful occupation of the Grand Mosque represented a profound humiliation in the eyes of devout Moslems throughout the Middle East. If the Saudis cannot guarantee the sanctity of the holiest shrines of Islam in their own country, it may be argued, how can the Saudis demand to become the protectors of the Islamic sites in Jerusalem?

For the Saudis to admit such a humiliation, they must be terribly worried. Many observers feel the Saudis are hoping to signal to their friends—the U.S. above all—that they might need some help.

American foreign policy remains hobbled by a deep-seated conviction that any application of national power outside our boundaries is immoral and, in the long run, counterproductive. The President has recently restated his repugnance for any application of military force to resolve problems that are the internal affairs of other countries.

Yet the Saudis may be trying to tell us that uprisings of the sort that took place in their country are not merely internal affairs. They are, instead, part of an international pattern of an ominous sort. They may require international solutions. Not to put too fine an edge on it, the Saudis are asking us whether we are prepared to tolerate indefinitely the acts of Soviet surrogates against our own national interests and those of our allies.

We might have dismissed the Saudi worries as typical of their rabid hatred and fear of communism in days gone by. In the wake of the Soviet Union's bald invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi concerns take on a more alarming hue.

—  
Mr. Bryen is acting director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and Mr. Ledeen is executive editor of The Washington Quarterly.

# Standing up to the Russian bear

## Rearming America

By Michael Ledeen

*Michael Ledeen is editor of Washington Quarterly, published by Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies.*

The Soviet Union has been the midwife at Jimmy Carter's latest rebirth.

The invasion of Afghanistan has compelled the president to alter his view of the Russians. But the president — and the country — must not simply look for a "punishment" or a face-saving device (although we must certainly attempt to restore our credibility). We must forthwith unburden ourselves of the dangerous mythology of the recent past and get down to some hard thinking and acting. This means that we must define our own strategic interests and find ways of advancing them.

The first step must take place in Washington. If, as he now says, the president has been systematically misled about the nature of the Soviet Union for more than three years, he must insure that he is properly ad-

vised in the future. Those advisers who failed to understand the Kremlin should step aside and be replaced by those who accurately warned about the consequences of Andrew Youngism and other forms of post-Vietnam folly. The president needs a crash course in strategy. Then he needs to ask for strategic tools to do the job.

This brings us to the second step: rearming the United States. We owe the Kremlin a great debt of gratitude for reminding us about the utility of military power, and we should emulate their careful preparations for strategic contingencies. Their action in Afghanistan is a great triumph for them (at least for the moment). But they could not have done it without years of military spending, research and planning. We must follow suit. Instead of laboring under the illusion that Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter share common visions (as the secretary of state put it just before the Vienna Summit), we must set about defending ourselves from our enemies.

If the American people are to support a serious rearmament program, they will have to be told why this ef-

fort is necessary. The Russians have made this task quite simple. All we have to do is explain the Soviet motives for the invasion of Afghanistan.

The Russians are now closing in on the vital Strait of Hormuz from two directions: from the North, across Afghanistan and Iran, and from the South, via South Yemen and the Horn of Africa on the opposite side of the Red Sea. If the Soviets control that part of the world, they will control the economies — and hence the civilizations — of the western world.

If it comes to that, we must prepare to fight, and win, a war for the Persian Gulf. The Russians are prepared to fight — they are stockpiling their best tanks and fighter planes in South Yemen.

Those who study military problems have not been encouraging of late. Even before the Russian move into Afghanistan, the consensus of Pentagon, CIA and private analysts was that we would be very hard-pressed indeed to match Soviet military power in that part of the world. This should not surprise anyone, since the Russians have been outspending (and out-investing) us for years in the military sector. The situation is urgent, then, and we must act accordingly.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 10TIME  
14 January 1980

# "My Opinion of the Russians Has Changed Most Drastically ..."



It was as though a time warp had plunged the world back into an earlier and more dangerous era. Soviet divisions had swarmed across the border of a neighboring country and turned it into a new satellite. Moscow and Washington were exchanging very angry words. Jimmy Carter accused Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev of lying, and the Soviets' TASS press agency shot back that Carter's statements were "bellicose and wicked." For Carter, the rapid series of events in Afghanistan seemed to provide a remarkable kind of revelation. Said he, sounding strikingly naive in an ABC television interview: "My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week [more] than even in the previous 2½ years before that." He added that it was "imperative" that "the leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot have taken this action to violate world peace ... without paying severe political consequences."

What those consequences might be was the subject of week-long strategy sessions, and then on Friday night Carter set forth his response to the bold Soviet challenge. Appearing for 13 minutes on nationwide television, he delivered the toughest speech of his presidency. Warned Carter: "Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease." He denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as "a deliberate effort by a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people" and said that a "Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping-stone to their possible control over much of the world's oil supplies."

Carter then announced that he was sharply cutting the sale to the Soviets of two kinds of goods they desperately need: grain and advanced technology. Contracts for 17 million tons of grain, worth \$2 billion, are being canceled. Soviet fishing privileges in American waters are also being severely curtailed, as are new cultural exchange programs; Carter further hinted that the U.S. might boycott this summer's Moscow Olympics. To shore up Afghanistan's neighbors, Carter said that the U.S. "along with other countries will provide military equipment, food and oth-

er assistance" to help Pakistan defend its independence.

These actions were only the latest in an escalating series of retaliatory moves. Carter officially requested the Senate to postpone any further consideration of the U.S.-Soviet treaty to limit strategic arms, once the chief symbol of superpower détente. The U.S. and nearly 50 other countries then called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council to condemn the latest Soviet aggression. That meeting convened on Saturday. And the U.S. summoned Ambassador Thomas J. Watson Jr. home from Moscow for consultations. (Not even during the crisis triggered by the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the American ambassador recalled from Moscow.)

**H**ad a new cold war erupted between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Not quite. At least not yet. But it seemed certain that the policy known as détente, which stressed co-operation between the two competing nuclear giants, had not survived the 1970s. The events of last week stood also as a grim reminder that it is not the American hostages in Iran that are the central object of U.S. foreign policy, but rather the potentially life-and-death relationship with the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan was an odd and remote focal point for such a U.S.-Soviet crisis. The snow-swept, mountainous land has few natural resources, and its Muslim tribesmen are more than 90% illiterate. Yet it was here that the Soviets chose to do something they had not done since World War II: in a blitzkrieg involving an estimated 50,000 soldiers, supported by tanks and helicopter gunships, the Soviet army crashed across the Afghan border to take control of a country that had not been a member of the Soviet bloc. By forcefully expanding its international sphere of direct control, the Kremlin in effect had violated a fundamental ground rule of East-West relations. In a meeting with his top aides, Carter said sternly that the Soviet invasion is "a quantum jump in the nature of Soviet behavior. And if they get through this with relative political and economic impunity, it will have

serious consequences on the world in years to come."

In an attempt to mobilize a broad international condemnation of the Soviet action, the President telephoned half a dozen foreign leaders and cabled about 25 others, stressing to them how gravely the U.S. viewed the matter.

The U.S. made a special effort to rally the NATO allies. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher flew to London to meet with high-ranking British, West German, French, Italian and Canadian diplomats, then on to a New Year's Day emergency meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The NATO allies agreed to review thoroughly their relations with the Soviet Union and to find ways to back countries near Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, which is not only frightened by the increased proximity of Soviet army units but is also deeply troubled by the mounting chaos in neighboring Iran. They also decided to solicit support from Third World states for a U.N. declaration against Moscow. The U.S. received the strongest support from the British; Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

has been taking a tough anti-Soviet stand since coming to office last year. Though the French were less firm, a French diplomat later said, "Like the U.S., we feel strongly that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is wrong."

One of the fundamental questions was why the Soviets had suddenly torn the fabric of U.S.-Soviet relations and international order by such an undisguised invasion. Moscow had its own rationale. According to the Soviet-government daily *Izvestia*, the U.S.S.R.'s troops had saved Afghanistan from being subverted by the CIA and turned into an American base. Other Soviet versions said the U.S. had teamed up with Pakistan, China and Egypt to carry out "primarily anti-Soviet designs." They described leftist President Hafizullah Amin, who was executed four days after the Soviet invasion

CONTINUED

began, as a tyrant working for the CIA.

When Carter used his hot line to send Brezhnev a tough protest about the invasion on Dec. 28, the Communist leader claimed that the Soviets had been invited by President Amin to protect the nation from an unnamed outside threat. It was this lame explanation that an infuriated Carter later denounced as "completely inadequate and completely misleading." Indeed, the Administration was acquiring evidence that the Soviets had masterminded the entire coup that had led to the crisis (*see following story*).

**T**he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was condemned not only by Western leaders but by numbers of Third World countries, including Egypt, Tunisia and the Sudan. The Saudi Arabia-based Islamic World League declared that "the Communist aggression aims at eliminating the Muslim presence in Afghanistan. In Turkey, which has been plagued by mounting economic problems and political instability (*see WORLD*), military leaders alluded to the Afghanistan crisis when they warned rival civilian politicians to start working together or face overthrow.

Even Iran's fanatical leaders denounced the Soviet invasion. During an audience with the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, Soviet Ambassador to Iran Vladimir Vinogradov tried to explain that his country had moved in Afghanistan against CIA and Zionist agents—two specters that Khomeini himself routinely invokes to justify his own actions. But the Soviet apparently got nowhere. A member of Iran's clerical establishment later said that the Ayatullah sharply told the envoy that "Brezhnev was stepping into the Shah's shoes and was heading for the same catastrophe that befell the ex-dictator. He said that the Soviets would come to grief if they remained in Afghanistan."

If anyone in the Administration could have smiled during last week's crisis, it was National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has long been trying to get Carter to take a tougher stance toward the Soviets, and who has long been paying particular attention to Afghanistan. Since July, he has regarded the leftist Afghanistan regime as vulnerable to the Muslim insurgents, and he has even enjoyed hinting, without saying so, that the U.S. might covertly aid those insurgents. To reporters and other visitors, he would recite statistics from secret cables that littered his desk. He could tick off the casualties the Soviets were suffering and would detail the number of coffins flown in to remove the dead.

Nor was Brzezinski alone. U.S. intelligence knew that Moscow had sent huge shipments of tanks, artillery and other weapons to the Kabul regime but that this failed to stop the rebellion, and that by midsummer the Afghan army had begun to crumble. Desertions cut it from a high of about 150,000 men to about 50,000. U.S. intelligence knew that Moscow sent a high-level military delegation to Kabul in August, headed by General Ivan Pavlovsky, chief of Soviet ground forces. U.S. intelligence knew that Pavlovsky reported after a two-month study that Afghanistan was falling apart and that the Soviet army could restore order quickly.

EXCERPTED

TIME

14 January 1980

# How the Soviet Army Crushed Afghanistan

*But rebels may find ways to fight back*



*When you are wounded and  
left on Afghanistan's plains,  
And the women come out  
to cut up what remains.*

*Just roll to your rifle and blow out  
your brains*

*And go to your God like a soldier.*

That was Rudyard Kipling's tribute to Afghanistan, a barren moonscape of a land at the "crossroads of the world," and to its proud and savage people. Conquered by Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C. and by Genghis Khan in the 13th century A.D., Afghanistan in the Victorian era served as a buffer between Imperial Russia and the British raj. The Afghans accepted it all, but they exacted a bloody price. For generations, the Hindus of India prayed for deliverance from "the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the tiger and the vengeance of the Afghan."

Today the target of the Afghans' anger is the Soviet force of 50,000 troops who have invaded and seized control of their land. "Shoravi Padar Lanath!" cried beggars and shopkeepers alike in the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan's shabby, snow-covered capital. The curse ("God-damn the Russians!") replaced morning pleasantries in the city's ancient bazaar. "Afghanistan is no more," lamented a bootblack in the shopping district of Share Nau. "We have lost everything."

And so it seemed. A week earlier, in a lightning invasion, four Soviet divisions moved into Afghanistan, the iron fist behind a coup that ended the three-month-old regime of President Hafizullah Amin. The unfortunate Amin, 50, who had turned out to be a more independent-minded nationalist than Moscow wanted, thus became the third leader of Afghanistan to be overthrown and killed within the past 20 months. In his place the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, 50, a former Deputy Prime Minister who had long been considered a Russian protégé.

The Soviet seizure had apparently been taking shape for several months. Moscow had disliked the truculent Amin ever since he had replaced a Soviet favorite, Noor Mohammed Taraki, in the coup of Sept. 15. As the Muslim insurgency kept gaining strength in the countryside, Moscow proposed to Amin that Soviet combat forces be brought in to put down the rebellion. Amin refused.

On Dec. 24, the Soviets made a last attempt to persuade Amin to cooperate, but again he said no. Apparently seeking to protect himself, or perhaps on Soviet orders, he moved from the People's House

in central Kabul to the Darulaman Palace, seven miles away, taking his elite guard and eight tanks along with him. It was too late, and the defense was too weak. That same night, the Soviets began their airlift of troops into Kabul.

Between Dec. 24 and 27, at least 350 Soviet aircraft landed at Kabul International Airport and at Bagram airbase, 25 miles north of the capital. The planes had been mustered from bases throughout the Soviet Union; they carried an airborne division from near Moscow and support troops from Turkestan. On Dec. 27, Russian airborne troops stormed the Darulaman Palace. Amin was captured and shot, along with some of his relatives. The only other serious clash was a skirmish outside Radio Afghanistan, just across from the U.S. embassy. In both fights, Afghan troops loyal to Amin resisted as best they could and inflicted about 250 casualties, but they were no match for the Soviets. By the next day, Dec. 28, the capital was entirely in Soviet hands. Amin, whom the Soviet press had treated with respect until only a few days earlier, was now being described as "a man who was in the service of the CIA" and a "usurper" who condemned former President Taraki to death.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE *A-16*

THE NEW YORK TIMES

6 January 1980

*U.S. Hoping to Limit Soviet in Afghan Area*

By DREW MIDDLETON

Only a minority of United States officials consulted in government departments believe that the Soviet Union can be deterred from completing the occupation of Afghanistan and eliminating all but scattered and ineffective resistance.

**Military Analysis** Accounts of fierce battles between guerrillas and Soviet forces emanating from Islamabad, Pakistan, and from New Delhi are not based on factual information, American intelligence aides said.

The United States is therefore searching for measures that will shore up the West's position in the critical area that stretches from Turkey to India. Such measures would be designed to stabilize the area and make the Soviet leadership think twice before resuming its thrust.

Most officials said they considered that the Soviet Union's strategy was to consolidate its position in Afghanistan and then exert pressure on Pakistan, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula.

Officials differ on the gravity and likely duration of the crisis. One official regards it as the gravest international situation facing the United States since World War II. He is one of those who expect the Russians to use Afghanistan as a base for further pressure.

**Move Called Predictable**

This view is rejected by State Department aides who view the intervention as a predictable reaction to the Soviet Union's fears that it was losing control of Afghanistan and that military and political chaos there might peril its security.

These officials believe that the Russians acted on the basis of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which calls for intervention to preserve Communist governments within the Soviet orbit. The doctrine was invoked in 1968, when the Soviet Union led an invasion of Czechoslovakia out of fear that a liberalized form of Communism there was endangering its control.

Despite these differences there is general agreement that the situation requires a credible American response.

Discussions of the military options open to Washington give priority to the establishment of bases in the region. Three candidates are Masira Island off Oman, Berbera in Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya.

Any agreements with the governments concerned are regarded only as a first step toward establishing operational bases. The length of runways, the depth of channels and harbors, the condition of existing storage and maintenance facilities must be determined before final decisions are taken. The earliest date for the completion of these studies is early February.

**Need for U.S. Ground Forces**

Some officials contend that the presence of naval and air forces alone will not deter the Russians. They are convinced that the deployment of American ground forces is necessary. But they wonder whether Saudi Arabia, for example, would accept the stationing of, say, an American brigade, about 4,800 men, in its territory in view of the current controversy over the Saudis' Westernization program.

The potential danger to Pakistan arising from a Soviet presence in Afghanistan appears to many officials to be more worrisome than the prospect of anti-Western rebellion in Saudi Arabia. They favor an early transfer of arms to Pakistan despite the likelihood that this would drive India closer to the Soviet Union.

Differences also exist among officials over the usefulness of sending arms to the Afghan rebels through Pakistan or a covert American operation.

Some officers say the weapons would not be used effectively as long as the Afghan guerrillas remain disunited and

hostile to internal discipline or outside control. Others argue that the guerrillas, as the only forces engaged against Soviet troops, should be helped.

One policy that looks attractive to many officers is the start of arms transfers to China, which are now prohibited. Senior officials said that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, now in Peking, is likely to discuss Chinese arms needs.

An increase in Chinese strength, it is said, would divert the Soviet Union from further moves in Southwest Asia. Critics of such a view say that any program that would affect significantly China's military potential vis-à-vis the Soviet Union would have to be so large that it would be beyond the capacity of the United States and its West European allies.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 22NEWSWEEK  
14 January 1980**PERISCOPE****JIMMY'S TALE OF RUSSIAN DECEIT**

Jimmy Carter's hot-line exchange with Leonid Brezhnev over Afghanistan was not his first personal encounter with Soviet duplicity. In the summer of 1978, Carter told White House visitors about an experience with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who had come to the Oval Office to discuss the pending SALT II negotiations. Sitting on Carter's desk at that moment was an intelligence report so detailed—and accurate—that it not only supplied chapter and verse on Soviet involvement in Ethiopia's war against the Somalis, but named a Russian general who had been taken ill in Africa and rushed back to Moscow. Carter repeated the incriminating data to Gromyko, who listened stoically and replied in effect: "Mr. President, what general? What troops? We have no troops in Ethiopia." Telling the story to his guests, Carter ended by saying: "And that man sat there and lied to me. He lied to my face. I just can't imagine an American diplomat doing that sort of thing."

STAT

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

FAVORABLE EDITORIALS  
(CAN'T BELIEVE -- NOW A SEPARATE CATEGORY  
FOR FAVORABLE EDITORIALS)

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

7 JANUARY 1980

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-11Cord Meyer

## A return to covert action?

One inevitable result of the events in Afghanistan and the frustrating stalemate in Iran will be a move by a majority in Congress to lift the restrictions that now prevent the U.S. from taking any effective covert action abroad.

In the debate over what kind of covert action is necessary and how it should be authorized, the Carter administration will have to fight on two fronts in Congress. Then the president will be obliged to resolve basic differences between Secretary of State Vance and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In this complex dispute, there is near unanimity on one point. The Hughes-Ryan amendment, passed in 1974 in reaction to Nixon's unilateral intervention in Chile, needs to be changed. Under this legislation, eight committees of Congress, about 200 elected representatives and staffers, must be informed of any proposed secret intervention abroad. There is broad agreement that the secrecy essential to the success of covert action cannot be preserved under these circumstances.

The liberal majority on the Senate Intelligence Committee has conceded this point, and in a new legal charter for the CIA worked out between the committee and the administration there is a provision that in the future only the Senate and House Intelligence Committees need be informed of covert operations. These two committees have a de-

served reputation for tight security.

But other liberal senators are pressing for legislation that would require the president to report in detail and in advance to the two committees on any proposed covert intervention. The administration is resisting this prior reporting requirement as an invasion of the president's constitutional authority.

While this unresolved dispute is holding up committee agreement on the new CIA charter, the Carter administration faces an entirely different situation in the House Committee on Intelligence and in the Congress as a whole. Among a majority coalition of moderate Democrats and Republicans, enthusiasm for a new restrictive CIA charter is notably absent.

These moderates see no chance in this election year of passing any charter and they want to proceed immediately to vote for a change in Hughes-Ryan to restore to the CIA its lost covert action capability.

The Carter-Mondale strategy is to reach early agreement with the Senate liberals on a charter that is much less restrictive than the original Senate version. Repeal of Hughes-Ryan will be included as a "sweetener" to attract conservative votes.

The more realistic White House advisers acknowledge that even a long-leash CIA charter has no chance of passage in the present atmosphere. They plan to ad-

vise the president to settle for what he can get in the form of a separate vote on Hughes-Ryan.

But this loosening of congressional restrictions on covert action will only bring to the surface fundamental differences between Vance and Brzezinski as to the role and purpose of covert intervention.

During his Senate confirmation hearing, Vance said that covert action should be used "only in the most extraordinary circumstances" when it is "vital to the national security." Under this doctrine, covert intervention is seen as morally repugnant and only justified as a last resort.

White House national security staffers criticize this doctrine as "the extreme unctious" version of covert action, the kind of desperate intervention which is least likely to be effective.

Pragmatic White House aides have no illusions that covert action is an Aladdin's lamp for the harsh dilemmas of our times. They realize that it takes time to build confidential relationships and far-sighted judgment to decide what political groups merit support.

Carter himself will have to decide between these two quite different attitudes toward covert action. Having preached with moralistic fervor the virtue of non-intervention, the president will not find it an easy choice to make. But the Russian invasion of Afghanistan has changed perceptions across the board.

PALMER TEXAS RUSTLER  
29 November 1979

## CIA Officers Must "Live and Die" in Anonymity

By Sen. Lloyd Bentsen

AT A STOPLIGHT ON ROUTE 123 in Northern Virginia—across the Potomac River and eight miles from downtown Washington, D.C.—is a road leading to the western entrance to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters.

At first glance it appears to be a tree-shaded country lane sloping back into a thick forest. But then you spot the poles for the high intensity lighting system that marches along the road and the chain link fence set back from the roadway and, at the end, a modernistic guardhouse with a red light, a stop sign and the ever-present guards.

The layout of the place, by design, creates the atmosphere of a college campus. The 219 acre facility is dominated by the 1 million square foot main building.

On the south wall of the central lobby in that building are carved the words from the Book of John, Chapter Eight, Verse 32:

And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.

On the north wall of the lobby are 35 stars. Each of those stars is a memorial, honoring a CIA employee whose life was lost in service of country.

The Bentsen bill will provide needed assistance to those widows and children whose husbands and fathers are killed overseas as a result of hostile or terrorist acts, or in connection with intelligence activities that carry a substantial degree of risk.

Benefits such as this are already available to employees of the U.S. State Department killed under similar circumstances. And the federal government also provides death benefits to the survivors of public safety officers killed in the line of duty in this country.

We are familiar with the name of one of those individuals: Richard Welch, CIA Station Chief in Athens, Greece. He was shot down by three gunmen at about 10 p.m. on the night of December 23, 1975 as he drove up to his house in an Athens suburb from a Christmas party.

THE NAMES OF THE OTHERS are generally unknown. The names of many of these dedicated Americans can never be revealed.

It is the nature of their work that CIA officers must live, and die, in anonymity.

But it is not necessary that their passing go completely unnoticed by a grateful nation.

I have introduced legislation to provide a year's salary to the widows and children of CIA employees killed in line of duty.

We live in a time of global instability and danger. We face aggressive, provocative and dangerous behavior by adversaries who are bent on the destruction of freedoms we Americans have come to take for granted.

I WOULD HOPE THAT BENEFITS never have to be paid out under the bill I have introduced. Nevertheless, the dangers of the world in which we live are very real and make necessary its passage.

It is fair legislation. It is just. It is a clear statement in support of intelligence officers who serve their country at great personal risk and I am hopeful it will be given swift approval by Congress.

There are eight medals awarded by the CIA for heroism or meritorious service.

The highest medal they can bestow is the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, awarded for: "...a voluntary act or acts of exceptional heroism involving the acceptance of existing dangers with conspicuous fortitude and exemplary courage."

There is also an Exceptional Service Medal, for those who are injured or killed in line of duty.

There is, of course, a caveat that accompanies medals given out by the CIA. Recipients, or their survivors, are cautioned not to tell anyone about them.

If in the future, God forbid, a survivor is ever notified that the Exceptional Service Medal has been awarded, I would like to see it accompanied by a full year's pay. It's little enough.

THE PITTSBURGH PRESS  
16 December 1979

## Reviving The CIA

Among other things, the Iran crisis is forcing critics of the Central Intelligence Agency to rethink their gunz-ho desire to gut the CIA.

The mindless rush of recent years to hold the CIA up as a bunch of stumble-burn spooks spreading havoc around the globe has severely damaged the U. S. intelligence-gathering and covert-action apparatus.

It has not only undermined morale at the CIA but it has resulted in restrictions so severe that the agency can hardly make a move without telling so many people about it that it may as well post a public list of what it's doing every day.

No fewer than 150 congressional-committee members and aides are privy to any "covert" action that the CIA might want to undertake. That's because a law passed in 1974 requires that the CIA promptly notify seven separate Senate and House committees.

A covert action is one aimed at influencing the course of events in a foreign country to our country's advantage. It might range from spreading propaganda to supporting a coup.

When the anti-CIA crowd was in full

cry, there was serious debate about prohibiting the agency from carrying out any covert actions. Congress eventually rejected that. But it put into effect such strict reporting requirements that it's almost impossible for the CIA to undertake any covert action.

It is simply ridiculous to have 150 members of Congress and staff aides looking over the CIA's shoulder. It gives any one of them an instant veto over any CIA covert activity — by simply "leaking" word to some reporter.

★ ★ ★

Nobody can justify everything the CIA has done in the past. And certainly the CIA should not be given leave to go around plotting the assassination of foreign leaders or arranging the overthrow of governments.

But there's a big difference between reining in the CIA and destroying its ability to function effectively in a mean and devious world.

As one intelligence officer recently observed: "We need something between sending in the Marines and doing nothing."

NEW HAVEN REGISTER  
20 December 1979

## *Need For Strengthening Intelligence Forces*

Who but glossy-eyed visionaries and other assorted woolly-minded thinkers could feel content over the dismantling of America's intelligence services over the past decade?

We doubt that, even today, such individuals and others of the so-called liberal intelligentsia would concede the damage done to this country by the attacks of the 1970s on the CIA and FBI.

The ordinary citizen, with a practical, down-to-earth perception of what is happening in world affairs, can readily grasp what a disadvantage we've dealt ourselves by the probes, condemnations and constraints which have been the plight of our intelligence-gathering services during these years.

It is a perception that garners no solace in the harsh conclusions drawn by a foreign affairs specialist, British writer David Rees, that "the American security system has been seriously weakened" as a result of this country's self-flagellation.

Rees, writing on "The Crisis in United States Intelligence" for the Institute for the Study of Conflict, a private research group, found that "the glaring congressional and media investigations of the intelligence services in the mid-1970s resulted in loss

of morale and secrecy, compounded by political interference and bureaucracy, with consequent loss of efficiency."

Rees blamed a certain elite — members of the academic world, the media, think tanks and the bureaucracy — for the crippling of America's capabilities around the world, on the twisted premise that America's strength was immoral and dangerous, while on the other hand, the world presumably had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union.

We see the results. The Soviets are moving troops en masse into Afghanistan, but the exact number is a matter of speculation. As is the Russian's purpose. There is the hostage situation in Iran. Then there was the confrontation over Soviet combat troops in Cuba. And so on. America is faltering on the foreign policy front, deprived of an essential guide, the intelligence that could be obtained from a potent and effective CIA.

The Soviets mean business; they've never stopped meaning business. We can't let the eggheads who refuse to believe the Russians, aided by their KGB, are still intent to dominate us, one way or another, prevail.

Restoring strength and purpose to our intelligence services should be a high priority item.

BOSTON HERALD-AMERICAN  
25 December 1979

## We've crippled our intelligence

Someone once said, "We will rue the day we pulled the teeth from the FBI and the CIA, for we will be left like sitting ducks."

Well, in these days of trial by Iranian fires we can change "will rue the day" to "are rueing the day," for the folly of defanging our intelligence services is painfully apparent.

No one wants to be unkind to Iranian students studying in this country, supported, by the way, by money allocated by the deposed shah as part of his program to improve Iranian education. But isn't it fair for this country to discern hints of subversion, however remote?

We cannot, because the FBI's powers of surveillance are severely restricted. Even protecting a President has become more difficult in cities where police files of subversives or potential subversives have been destroyed.

Criticisms of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency have not been entirely unwarranted. Many have been justified. In many instances, however, they have backfired. The extent of the backfiring is demonstrated, by our inability to find the few Iranians, if any, who would aid and abet those who imprison Americans in Teh-

ran. It is also sharply focused in a comment by writer John Chamberlain, who noted:

"... Former Acting Director of the FBI Patrick Gray and some of his subordinates were indicted for the terrible crime of invading the civil liberties of the Weathermen after that underground group had inadvertently blown up a house in New York City's Greenwich Village, killing three of their own who lacked finesse in handling explosives."

The hue and cry against the FBI and its sister service, the CIA, was that their cops were robbing our liberties and turning the nation into a "police state."

A "policeless state" is worse.

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

IPAN

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 49

THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)  
9 January 1980

# Tehran Militants Out of Control, U.S. Now Thinks

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

After hoping for weeks that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini might decide to order the release of the American hostages, the administration is now moving toward the view that the militants holding them are out of his control.

President Carter has received new information that makes him think it a serious possibility that the militants holding the U.S. Embassy in Tehran cannot be controlled by the Khomeini regime. U.S. moves since the embassy was seized Nov. 4 have been intended to pressure the regime into having the hostages released.

This view — long held by some intelligence specialists, but now more widely accepted here — deepens officials' pessimism about obtaining the hostages' release any time soon. The administration has flatly rejected the militants' demands for the return of exiled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his money as the price for releasing the estimated 50 American hostages.

Instead, it still hopes that a steady tightening of pressure on Iran will bring about a change of thinking in Tehran that will lead to their release. It hopes to isolate the militants from the support they have been receiving.

An effort to isolate them began publicly yesterday when White House Press Secretary Jody Powell suggested that the militants were pursuing Communist aims that were against the interests of Iran.

Powell told reporters that "developments and conversations" had raised questions about Khomeini and his Revolutionary Council's being able to control the militants. This provoked further questions about the militants' motives, he said.

"There is some reason to question whether they may not see chaos and disintegration in Iran as beneficial to their ends, and whether they are concerned about the fate of their fellow citizens, or more concerned about their own political ends," Powell said.

Noting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and suppression of the Moslem nationalist resistance there, Powell suggested that Iranians should be concerned about letting the militants pursue their own goals in a way that could endanger their nation's integrity and independence.

A senior official at the State Department said that the administration "is having considerable difficulty these days with the proposition that anyone has effective control" over the militants and could get them to back down on their demands.

The official was commenting on reports from Tehran that quoted diplomats there as warning that U.N. economic sanctions would impede efforts to negotiate the hostages' release. He said the United States intended to continue pressing for sanctions.

There is no indication, officials here conclude, that the negotiating efforts that a number of friendly countries and the United Nations have made on behalf of the United States are getting anywhere. The negotiations are with the Iranian government that is responsible to Khomeini, not with the militants themselves.

"It is not clear," the senior official said, "that anyone can give an order (for the hostages' release) that would be promptly obeyed" by the militants. This included Khomeini, although the militants identify themselves as "student followers of the imam's policy," referring to the ayatollah.

U.S. knowledge of the situation inside the Tehran embassy remains limited. The militants are clearly divided into factions, with some reports even describing a system of strings within the 27-acre embassy compound to divide different factions' territory. But it is uncertain what views and goals the different groups hold.

An unsatisfactorily limited amount of intelligence on the identity of the militants has been collected. It shows some to be genuine students who have quit going to school to devote full time to political activities. Others seem to be older, more professional political activists.

The official said there is no definite information on reports that some Palestinian terrorists are in the embassy.

The divisions among the militants apparently make it difficult for them to reach any conclusions, and statements from the embassy are sometimes contradictory. Even if some factions were to decide to end the hijacking, a small hard-line minority might be able to keep the Americans captive.

But the administration still hopes that eventually its pressure on Iran will have results. The senior official explained that, unlike most terrorist situations in which hijackers find themselves isolated, the militants are presently "swimming in a sea of popular support."

"It would be useful to separate them from that sea," he said. So the United States is bringing pressure on Iran in hope of convincing the people and Khomeini's regime that supporting the militants costs too high a price.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 JANUARY 1980

# U.S. NOW INDICATING THAT CRISIS IN IRAN COULD LAST MONTHS

## AN EFFORT TO PREPARE PUBLIC

Carter and Vance Say at Briefings  
They See No Imminent Break  
in the Hostage Situation

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — The Carter Administration, frustrated by its inability to negotiate the release of the American hostages in Iran, has begun in the last 24 hours to prepare the American public for a crisis that might last for weeks or months more.

With the hostages now in their 67th day of captivity, President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance told 80 members of Congress last night and a group of distinguished Americans this morning that no break was imminent or seemed likely in the Iran situation even though every effort was being made, through a variety of channels, to obtain their release.

A White House aide reported that Mr. Carter said at the breakfast meeting attended by many former Government officials that "he does not see developments that would lead to an early and successful conclusion at this point."

### Change Not Held Likely

This gloomy assessment will persist, one State Department official said, regardless of whether the United Nations Security Council approves the American request for economic sanctions against Iran.

Signs were strong today that the Soviet Union, which had gone along with previous Council resolutions against Iran, would veto such a move now, to gain influence in Iran and to offset its loss of prestige elsewhere in the Moslem world following its military intervention in Afghanistan.

A senior State Department official said tonight that if the Russians block passage of a sanctions resolution, the United States expected to act along with its major allies to suspend all exports to Iran except food and medicine, thus carrying the provisions of the resolution anyway.

A month ago, high Administration officials were saying that if the hostages were not released, an American blockade seemed inevitable. Time was running out, officials said in mid-December, and no effort was made to discourage speculation on possible American military moves.

### Military Move Held Remote

Several participants in this morning's meeting said, however, they had the impression that the idea of military actions on behalf of the hostages was more remote than ever, though Mr. Carter assured them that the United States was taking steps to augment its military forces in the region.

When asked about this, an official who last month predicted a blockade by mid-January in the absence of a solution, said that signals had changed, in part because of the Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

President Carter, who last night said the Soviet actions in Afghanistan were "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War," has sought to cultivate Islamic support against the Soviet intervention in a Moslem state.

The Administration now judges that any American military actions against Iran would turn Moslems against the United States and dissipate anti-Soviet sentiment.

Another factor was the analysis of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations and others that the militants holding the United States Embassy were not subject to the control of either Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council.

Last night Mr. Carter said: "The most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or the kidnappers who are holding our hostages. Whenever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed."

This analysis is not necessarily shared by many in the intelligence community who believe that Ayatollah Khomeini could order the hostages released.

Mr. Carter said that as a result of the radicals' control of the embassy situation, "there is no legitimate political bargaining leverage that can be exerted on them and there is no entity there with whom one can negotiate."

### Efforts Are Undercut

Mr. Vance said at the breakfast briefing that every time he had believed some negotiating approach was possible, some faction had undercut the effort.

The President said last night that the presence of "a very strong military force in the Arabian Sea has deterred them so far from taking action that would have been even more abhorrent to the rest of the world."

"It is an ever-present consideration of mine and yours," he said, "and I am determined that this country will not forget for a moment those hostages and the last hostage there is just as important to me as the first one."

Ruling out the possibility of a military rescue of the hostages, Mr. Carter said: "I think most people who have studied the situation and who had looked at the map, who have seen where the embassy is located within Teheran, can see that a strike force or military action that might be oriented toward the release of the hostages would almost certainly end in failure and almost certainly end in the death of the hostages."

"We pray that something will happen and that eventually Iran will recognize that the threat to them is not from the United States but even more vividly from the Soviet Union who have, on Christmas Eve, invaded Afghanistan."

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE  
29 December 1979

## Some early lessons from the Iranian crisis

Lessons from Iran can already be drawn, says former Undersecretary of State George Ball. In a way, his conclusions seem premature: The hostage crisis persists, and not even an ayatollah can predict what other crises Iran's erratic leaders might provoke. But the lack of imminent solutions is no reason to avoid examining the causes of the predicament and its likely consequences.

One consequence was evident early. Ball describes it as American reaffirmation of a fundamental principle: "concern for the individual as against the compulsions of world politics." He is reassured by the overwhelming opposition to using the shah as a pawn or to retaliating militarily. "There is nothing more invigorating to a nation than to be true to itself," Ball writes in Life magazine.

The events in Iran, he says, should help the country learn the right lessons. Two are familiar: The United States should act to reduce energy dependence instead of merely talking about it. And Americans should be less sensitive to diplomatic slights, especially from European allies who remain "regional — even parochial — in their outlook."

A third lesson is more controversial. Ball urges an improvement in U.S. conventional military forces, which he says should be able to respond quickly to

threats anywhere in the world. President Carter's defense proposals reflect that view. It recognizes the fallacy of expecting a surrogate, like Iran under the shah, to uphold American security interests. It assumes that a more visible U.S. military presence would give friendly nations confidence in U.S. protection and would deter others from attacking them. The main question about that "lesson" is whether many situations are likely to arise in which U.S. forces could appropriately be used.

Ball's fourth point concerns the limits on American ability to influence internal affairs in other countries. Appropriately, he cites CIA operations in Chile as an example of misguided meddling in the past. But avoiding such practices should not mean ignoring what goes on abroad. "We dare not be the only major nation without an effective intelligence service," he argues.

If intelligence capabilities have been crippled to the extent Ball charges, that lesson may be the most important. Now, he says, the United States has the worst of both worlds: The "vituperative post-mortem" to past abuses "has reinforced the fantasy prevailing throughout the Third World that the CIA is cunning, pervasive and capable of unimaginable feats of interference, while almost totally destroying our intelligence instrument."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A23THE WASHINGTON POST  
9 January 1980*Rowland Evans  
And Robert Novak*

# Fickle Friends Of the Shah

The unearthing of a diplomatic cable to Washington from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran describing Sen. Edward Kennedy's visit in May 1975 casts a shadow on the senator's description of the shah's regime as "one of the most violent in the history of the world."

The routine cable, addressed to then secretary of state Henry Kissinger but which he probably never saw, provides a cloudy backdrop to Teddy Kennedy's latter-day verbal assault on the toppled shah. Kennedy not only accepted, gratis, an Iran Air Boeing 727 "for travel within Iran," but he was also "provided rooms at the best hotels in Tehran and Isfahan, lavish hospitality for all 12 members of [his] party" and police escorts "usually offered only to visiting heads of government."

Paragraph four of the diplomatic cable barely touched on the issue that, 4½ years later, Kennedy singled out in his Dec. 2 verbal assault on the shah—the matter of human rights. It said that during the senator's 80-minute private session with the shah and talks with other top officials, Kennedy "also touched lightly on human rights issues." His "basic themes" were the dangers of a Mideast arms race and the need for greater "international cooperation to redress economic inequities."

The contrast between Kennedy's acceptance of the shah's "lavish hospitality" ("imperial court treated senator as . . . front-runner for presidency") and his sudden recollection last month of the shah's "most violent" regime has not been unique among politicians. Others, possibly trying to milk votes out of the Iranian tragedy, have done the same.

After years of relative silence, for example, Sen. Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader and a presidential contender, has criticized U.S. policy toward Iran, saying on Jan. 7—two weeks before the Iowa caucuses—that he would "stay away from the business of shoring up a dictator."

More pointed has been the about-face in Moscow. On Dec. 5, two days after Kennedy's attack on the shah, Tass called the shah a "criminal." Referring to U.S. assistance that helped restore the shah to his throne in 1953, Tass asked: "For was not international law also flouted by the actions of the U.S. special services [meaning the Central

*"Reversals of field  
following political  
upheavals have less to  
do with facts than with  
the hope of reward."*

Intelligence Agency], which organized the overthrow of the legitimate government in Iran and foisted the shah's lawlessness on the Iranian people [for] a quarter of a century?"

For 15 years before that knock at the shah, Moscow nurtured him with a benign public attitude and a plethora of economic goodies. On Nov. 18, 1963, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech during a state visit by the "criminal" and his wife that "I would like to stress that the distinguished and respected visitors will be received in our country with joy and hospitality."

In words that gushed with affection, the late Soviet leader Nicolai Podgorny on Nov. 18, 1974, at the end of another state visit from the shah, praised "the strengthening of trust" with the "criminal" of five years later.

Such reversals of field following political upheavals in foreign countries have less to do with facts than with the hope of reward. In Kennedy's case, he was judged guilty of overkill immediately after his Dec. 2 outburst and was widely criticized. The uncovering of the June 3, 1975, diplomatic cable seems to confirm that criticism.

It was signed by then ambassador Richard Helms. Helms had arrived in Tehran from Washington during Kennedy's last day there and, other than having Kennedy to dinner that evening, took no part in the visit and did not write the routine cable describing the senator's visit. Messages from a U.S. embassy are invariably signed with the ambassador's name.

The special treatment accorded Kennedy by the shah, with no indication of on-the-scene remorse by Kennedy, included his 80-minute audience with the shah; two sessions with "representative" groups of students at the University of Tehran; a dinner at the house of Ardeshtir Zahedi, then Iran's ambassador to the United States, "hosted by his daughter, Princess Mahnaz [the shah's granddaughter] to which the cream of Iranian establishment was invited."

Kennedy's Boeing 727, courtesy of Iran Air, took him on a two-day, all-points sightseeing tour around the country, including over-flights of the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz—that critically important passage for the West's and Japan's oil supplies that the shah protected with U.S. help for a quarter of a century.

The last paragraph of the cable from Tehran noted the visit had been Kennedy's first. It gave him an "excellent opportunity to evaluate the situation as it really is and to balance some of the negative impressions about Iran" that Kennedy appeared to bring to Iran with him.

Until Dec. 2, 1979, that summing up seemed to hit the nail on the head.

**Page Denied**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5THE NATION  
5-12 January 1980

## Savak U.S.A.

The crowds outside the American Embassy have dwindled, their passions cooled for the moment by the onset of Teheran's snowy winter season and no doubt simple boredom at the interminable length of the show. But the crisis drags on and, as frustrations mount here at home, Americans must continue to remind themselves of the historical roots of the fanaticism, fear and seemingly absurd paranoia displayed by Iranian leaders.

Take Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the opportunistic Foreign Minister who recently announced that he may be a candidate for the Presidency. Ghotbzadeh, like many of the other members of the powerful Revolutionary Council, had actively campaigned to overthrow the Shah during nearly two decades of exile in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. Not surprisingly, he became a target of Savak, the Pahlevi regime's American-trained secret police. Savak, the Shah himself admitted, was allowed to operate freely in the United States. Mike Wallace reported on a March 6, 1977, 60 Minutes broadcast on CBS that Savak had hired one Jules Compera, an exiled Frenchman, to assassinate Ghotbzadeh and an associate, Nasser Afshar, the publisher of *Iran Free Press*, a dissident newspaper based in Washington, D.C. The Frenchman decided not to carry out his Savak assignment and instead tipped off Ghotbzadeh.

(As Received)

What is disturbing about this little story is Wallace's report that our own intelligence agencies were aware of Savak's death squads. Wallace interviewed Prof. Richard Cottam, a former diplomat who once served in Teheran, who said, "I was told by someone in Government, a friend of mine whom I trust very much . . . that this was true, that assassination squads had been dispatched to the United States and Europe by Savak. This individual wanted me to inform some of the possible victims." Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency regularly exchanged information with Savak, and actually passed on information about Afshar to Savak.

Ghotbzadeh no doubt is quite certain that the American Government cooperated in Savak's efforts to assassinate him. The story of the American Government's complicity with Savak operations of this sort will remain incomplete, however, without a full accounting by the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. Their files on the subject should become a part of the public record through an independent investigation of the Shah's "crimes" and the entire Pahlevi-American cooperation—an investigation that would be desirable and necessary even if it were not an adjunct to the resolution of the Iranian-U.S. impasse.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 10THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
8 January 1980

# Tehran's latest best seller

## Secret US documents sold openly on streets

By Ned Temko  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Tehran, Iran

Revolutionary Tehran's latest paperback smash is reviving a question that has nagged diplomats since Muslim militants captured the US Embassy over two months ago: Did the Americans do enough to prevent the hostage crisis?

The consensus answer is both yes and no. Few analysts, Western or Iranian, think Washington could have foreseen an officially sanctioned attack on the embassy.

It is true the mission had been attacked by a mob in February, 1979. "But as for an occupation with the full and open support of the Iranian regime . . . that was something none of us foresaw," one Western ambassador commented.

Yet most diplomats are shocked at the range of embassy documents and equipment the attackers seem to have seized intact. "Western embassies," one diplomat said, "went through a severe trimming down process after the revolution, so that all sensitive papers and equipment could be quickly destroyed, if necessary."

If embassy documents released by the student captors prove to be genuine — and most Western diplomats here seem to think they are, despite United States denials — then they would point to what one diplomat terms "surprisingly lax operations."

A photograph released by the students along with photocopies of some of the documents — now bound in a minor best seller hawked along with food and a mélange of "anti-imperialist" souvenirs in front of the embassy — also indicates that some equipment was captured intact. The photo shows a telex and communications system. Diplomats say it is impossible to determine how sensitive the machinery is, but that coding equipment may have been compromised.

The purported documents, under normal international legal practice, are probably more embarrassing than incriminating. If genuine, they would indicate that some American spying and immigration violations were going on. But none of the papers so far released specifically documents "anything more serious than use of a false passport," one diplomat points out.

"Still, at the very least, it seems incredible that documents linking embassy officials, even indirectly, with illegal activities of any kind should have been allowed to survive," a Western political officer maintained. There was a period of several hours between the militants' Nov. 4 attack on the embassy and its final capture.

The Iranian, a centerist Tehran political journal, goes further: "The United States," it says, "should have been aware that any documents, innocent or not, which could fall into the wrong hands would be interpreted at the expense of guiltless citizens of both nations."

"One thing is certain, that had the embassy been as clean as a pin as a matter of routine, lives would have been considerably less at the mercy of irresponsible students and a public . . . hungering for 'evidence' against the US."

Another thing now is certain: The alleged US papers, many of them marked "secret," are hardly secret any more. Some are out in a paperback entitled "Exposing Imperialism." Its cover caricatures a man with the letters CIA in place of a head, in a uniform adorned with American insignia and the Israeli Star of David. At a mere 15 cents per copy, the book is selling almost as fast as the kebab and soup now warming the ragtag winter crowds in front of the embassy.

Remaining documents, photocopied and already issued singly, are to be collected in a second volume.

The documents are old news by now. But as a body they are viewed by many diplomats here as a stunning indictment of American nonchalance.

One, dated 1977, appears on stationary marked as "Optional Form 152a(H) (Formerly FS-413(H)a), January, 1975, Dept. of State."

Ostensibly setting out US policy priorities in Iran, it argues that Washington should "maintain US intelligence gathering privileges in Iran, and continue to provide quid pro quo liaison support in response to these privileges."

# INTELLIGENCE

## Iran demonstrates the utter folly of wrecking CIA

RANK-AND-FILE Americans will probably never know the extent to which the the great Iranian debacle of 1979 was attributable to the failure of the United States' intelligence apparatus — the inability to foresee and influence events.

Yet it is likely to be increasingly clear, as the history of this year is fully assembled, that, from the time Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi abandoned the Iranian throne, through the establishment of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as Iran's *de facto* dictator to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the confinement of its staff as hostages, the United States has been operating in the dark — operating, moreover, like a helpless giant incapable of protecting its own legitimate interests, including the lives of its citizens.

The disappearance of Iran as a pro-Western outpost in the most explosive corner of the world ranks (if we can believe former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger) as one of the two or three most consequential reversals of the post-war period. *Yet it is a reversal the United States was powerless to resist because the United States had unilaterally disarmed itself in the ongoing intelligence war between East and West.*

"The Iranian crisis," wrote Ray S. Cline, former deputy director for intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the *New York Times* the other day, "illuminates tragically the low state to which the U.S. central-intelligence system has been reduced. In the last five years, savage news-media and congressional criticism as well as Carter-Mondale punitive restrictions on the CIA have disastrously weakened our capability for conducting clandestine intelligence operations abroad.

"While violence, anarchy, war and anti-Americanism have been spreading, the government has retired or dismissed nearly all of the experienced intelligence officers tempered in the conflicts of the 1950s and '60s. It has dampened CIA morale, chilled energetic efforts to collect hard-to-get information, and cut Americans off from many valuable foreign intelligence sources."

Ironically, the United States has been getting the worst of both worlds from the Iranian experience: Iranian "students" have issued daily denunciations of the CIA and accused its operatives of attempting to manipulate Iranian affairs, while the CIA, crippled and exposed by its domestic enemies, has been powerless to do any of the things of which it stands accused.

Anyone, accordingly, who imagined that the emasculation of the CIA would bring the plaudits of the world reckoned without an appreciation of the utter ruthlessness of the forces arrayed against us.

The Iranian impasse underscores anew the usefulness — indeed, the indispensability — of an aggressive clandestine intelligence service. For such a service's primary contribution to a great power is providing a range of options for its leaders. This is something President Carter manifestly has not had in the Iranian crisis: On the one hand, he could have undertaken military action against Iran in the face of what amounted to an Iranian act of war, or, on the other, he could have capitulated to the kidnappers and returned the former shah to Iran. Mr. Carter has had no other choices; hence, the continuing stalemate with its attendant damage to the prestige and credibility of the United States and the continued exposure of U.S. nationals to

Clearly, President Carter, once the Iranian crisis is resolved, will have no more urgent task than the swift rebuilding of a sound and effective intelligence apparatus.

Washington outsider that he was, Mr. Carter, as a presidential candidate, said some singularly silly things about the CIA and its mission in the shaping of U.S. policy. Surely, he has had ample reason to repent of his misjudgments. Surely, he sees by now that the United States cannot act intelligently without the most complete information gleaned from all conceivable sources. Surely, he recognizes by now that a President needs choices other than capitulation or all-out war — choices that only a clandestine intelligence service can make possible.

America has paid dearly for the education of Jimmy Carter. America must look to the day — and soon — when he and his successors can forestall a repetition of the events of 1979.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE E 3

THE NEW YORK TIMES

6 January 1980

# 'Plots' Everywhere in Iran And C.I.A. Plots Everything

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

TEHERAN

**W**HEN United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was here last week, the Iranian Government abruptly announced that it had uncovered a terrorist plot to kill him; that was the explanation for not disclosing his schedule. No details of the alleged plot were given, though it was attributed to "foreign agents" of a shadowy terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for murders of prominent Iranians.

In the absence of harder evidence, some members of Mr. Waldheim's party did not seem to take the threat seriously. Rather, speculation developed that the Government produced the plot because it wanted to keep Mr. Waldheim isolated or because it could not control the public demonstrations that had been whipped up against him.

Eggs and soap powder may be in short supply in Teheran these days. Conspiracy theories are not, even among the well-educated. The United States, Israel, "international Zionism," and assorted other "imperialists" are blamed for almost every difficulty in revolutionary Iran; from assassinations and ethnic unrest to traffic jams, drug addiction and, of course, unfavorable Western press coverage. The grandest plot of all still involves the occupied United States Embassy, where Americans have been held hostage for more than two months on the strength of charges that they were running a "den of espionage."

Revolutions have invariably thrived on plots and counterplots, whether real or imagined, and Iran's experience is no exception. But paranoia and xenophobia are also inevitable legacies of the terror that prevailed for years under the deposed Shah. His secret police, known as Savak, was so pervasive that Iranians hesitated to talk openly even to close friends. The Shah played upon his American connection, leaving the United States the logical target for Iranians who remembered the coup that saved the Shah's throne back in 1953.

A diplomat here suggested that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's insistence upon the extradition of the Shah and his wealth was rooted not merely in vengeance but in a fear that the millions of dollars spirited to the West could be used eventually to bankroll a return to power. "Without his money, the Shah would be a sick old man," said the diplomat. "But Khomeini feels that if the Shah dies, his son can still use the money for a counter-revolution."

When the militants seized the American embassy and its staff, Ayatollah Khomeini supported them in part because he shared their conviction that the embassy was engaged in espionage. The evidence produced so far has identified a few intelligence agents there but otherwise revealed only routine information-gathering operations common to most embassies around the world. Nonetheless, says one Asian diplomat, "Khomeini and the students really believe the U.S. embassy was a spy center."

With this fear for openers, it has not taken much more effort to blame the United States and others for Iran's domestic hardships, notably the discontent that has percolated among the ethnic minorities. The sporadic hostilities of the Kurds, Baluchis and Azerbaijanis and others have been explained away by Iranian officials as the work of sinister outsiders. Ibrahim Zahdi, a troubleshooter for the new Government, was dispatched to the Baluchi provincial capital of Zahedan last month, where violence resulted in at least 12 dead and 30 wounded. He contended that the bloodshed was instigated by "foreign elements."

Such explanations have only aggravated the feelings of local minorities who contend that they are expressing legitimate complaints. After Ayatollah Khomeini attributed the brief Azerbaijani uprising in Tabriz last month to "elements of imperialism," and "plotters who receive their orders from America," Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, the Shiite religious leader followed by the Azerbaijanis, delivered a rare reproach: "Everything that happens in this country should not be blamed on international Zionism and imperialism," he warned. "The legitimate demands of the Azerbaijani people should not be dismissed."

Some plots sound even more fanciful. A Teheran taxi driver explained that he thought the city's notorious traffic jams were the handiwork of American agents. "They get people to do unnecessary things and make the drivers frustrated and lose their temper," he said. When shopkeepers complained that itinerant vendors were setting up tables in front of their stores and demanded their removal, there were allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind the frictions.

The use of narcotics in Teheran, which has not diminished since alcohol was prohibited, are also part of a plot by the superpowers, according to Ayatollah Khomeini. He explained last month that "a heroin addict cannot think about politics" and would be useless in time of military invasion. When Mohammed Mofateh, the dean of the Divinity School at Teheran University, was gunned down several weeks ago, the nation's Revolutionary Council blamed the C.I.A. and Savak agents, though no fewer than four local terrorist groups claimed responsibility.

Some political cliques jockeying for power in Iran have tried to discredit opponents by accusing them of complicity with the C.I.A. Abbas Amir Entizarn, Iran's Ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, was arrested last month for allegedly having such connections after the militants in the American embassy produced diplomatic correspondence showing that he offered to help improve relations between the United States and Iran.

It may sound bizarre to most Americans, but the skyrocketing oil prices that helped push the United States into an economic recession are the result of a plot by its own Central Intelligence Agency, according to one of the many conspiracy yarns making the rounds. Never mind that Iran under the deposed Shah spearheaded the drive of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Company to raise the price of oil and that the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini proposed at OPEC's conference in Caracas last month that the base price be pushed up to \$34 a barrel.

According to this theory, as related by an Iranian engineer, the C.I.A. realized that the Western European countries were forging ahead of the United States in economic growth and contrived the jump in oil prices to punish the Europeans. As for Iran's role, the Shah was only a puppet of the United States.

BUFFALO COURIER-EXPRESS  
16 December 1979

Public Affairs Journal

# Iran Exhibits U.S. Need Of Intelligence Agency

JOHN F. KENNEDY once said that in a democracy, every person holds office and responsibility.

But in the super-sensitive arena of the American intelligence community, the last president's ideal of democracy could present a difficult challenge to those officials who possess the responsibility of protecting our national security. How do you or how should you protect secrets in an open society?



Genrich

Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of Central Intelligence, has been addressing that puzzling question. In several recent speeches, Admiral Turner has been articulating an unprecedented sensitivity to the public's demand for a greater accountability of our intelligence agencies.

"The most significant change in American intelligence is the introduction of effective external oversight mechanisms from both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government," Turner observed during a recent speech. The CIA and other intelligence agencies are evaluated by an Intelligence Oversight Board, appointed by the president, that is comprised of three members from outside government. Anyone is free to report activities that they suspect may be illegal or improper to this group.


ALSO, THERE ARE congressional oversight committees in both the House and the Senate. The House committee has a staff of approximately 30 and the Senate panel has a

staff of about 60, including clerical assistants and consultants. Finally, Admiral Turner has been quick to note the effective role of the press. "We view the media as another important oversight mechanism in reassuring the public and in preventing abuse," Turner stated.

Turner has been perceptive to note a similarity in the current environment of both the press and the intelligence community. "We in the intelligence community are professionals dedicated to secrecy but we are constantly defending ourselves against being pushed into excessive openness. And the press are dedicated professionals who are facing — because of Supreme Court decisions — great pressure to dispense with your secrets."

As director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner has also quickly acknowledged publicly that the abuses of civil liberties, exposed during the Nixon Watergate debacle, must never be repeated. But Turner has also been vigilant in his pursuit of the CIA's special integrity to fulfill its mission in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947. "By reducing the excessive amount of information that is kept secret, we engender respect for that which remains classified," Turner explained. "But, it takes more than mere openness to preserve genuine secrets," Turner remarked, "there must be some renewed acknowledgement in the media and in the public that secrecy is legitimate."

TURNER IS RIGHT. It has become increasingly clear that the United States cannot take sides in all international conflicts. And it is also vital, as



Stanfield Turner

...puzzling question

the events in Iran have demonstrated, that our national security requires impeccable intelligence in order to relate where and when it would be in the long-term interests of our nation to intervene.

The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., is currently preparing a new charter for the intelligence agencies. This charter will provide guidelines — specific dos and don'ts — for the first time to be applied to the intelligence agencies. Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., is a member of the Senate subcommittee that is drafting the document that will eventually be considered by the full Senate. Sources on the Senate Intelligence Committee staff told the Courier-Express, however, that the events in Iran have postponed the completion of the draft charter document and that it probably won't be ready for consideration until February 1980.

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

CIA STUDIES

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

SCIENCE MAGAZINE  
21 December 1979

## Much Ado About Soviet Trucks

A festering quarrel within the Department of Commerce over an old and seemingly innocuous decision to export truck technology to the Soviet Union is exciting renewed debate about the adequacy of safeguards against Russian military gain from civilian trade with the United States. The dispute, which pits an export control official against his department, threatens to disrupt implementation of recent changes in the export control law. Because resolution does not seem near, American firms seeking federal approval for high-technology exports to the Communist bloc may be faced with unusual delays in the months ahead, while Congress and Commerce officials sift through the varying claims of culpability.

The center of the dispute is the Kama River truck factory in Siberia, built with the assistance of American companies. For now, the Commerce Department is holding up only an application for export of spare parts to the factory. But an official of the department notes that "with all the tension and discord, everything is not running as smoothly as we would hope, particularly with new licensing procedures to be implemented." And the department is clearly under pressure to scrutinize licenses more carefully in light of the controversy.

Lawrence Brady, the dissident bureaucrat causing headaches for top Commerce officials, says in raising the Kama River case that the entire export control system "has been gradually dismantled to the point where the Soviet Union and other controlled countries are capable of acquiring some of the most sophisticated Western technology and diverting it to military forces." Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.), who acted as Brady's sponsor during recent hearings of the Senate subcommittee on international finance, says "I am concerned that the Commerce Department has succumbed to too much business pressure to issue licenses for technologies that have potential military utility." Department spokesmen told the committee this is hogwash, and that Brady has been disseminating "false and misleading information" both about Kama River and about the department's vigilance in preventing diversion of civilian trade.

Although the decision to export U.S. technology to the Kama River plant was made 8 years ago, the department's imbroglio did not arise until April, when the Central Intelligence Agency presented evidence that civilian trucks constructed at the plant were being used by military forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The evidence left department higher-ups unconcerned, but it clearly upset Brady, then the acting administrator of the export control administration. He insists that this newly discovered use has strategic implications. "What the Soviets need and want most is economy of scale, and we handed it to them; their capability would have been delayed for years if the United States had not participated," he says.

Disclosure of the CIA evidence was made in May before a forum eager for that sort of information, the Senate Armed Services Committee. The senators promptly interrogated Stanley J. Marcuss, then a deputy assistant secretary for trade regulations; Marcuss, a Carter political appointee, is Brady's boss. Marcuss told the senators that, alarming as this truck threat was, no one seemed to be at fault. The export decision had been made knowingly, he said, and no actual violation of the export regulations occurred because the Soviets had never committed themselves as to what use the trucks would ultimately be put.

It was at this point that Brady jumped ship and accused the department of covering up an apparent rules violation, of "an unwillingness to face up to the Soviets' violation." Neither the rules nor the Soviets' promises were in the slightest bit vague, he says; they signed a promise that the exported equipment would produce either "trucks" or "civilian trucks," and never said anything about "military trucks." Brady says that such a pledge is binding, and that the department ought now to punish the Soviets by denying them any additional truck factory exports.

Exactly where this narrow dispute will settle in the broader issue of high-technology civilian trade with the Soviets is uncertain. But it is clear that those who have opposed such trade in the past are delighted to have a new hook on which to hang their claims, even as tiny a hook as the Kama River truck plant. —R. JEFFREY SMITH

SCIENCE MAGAZINE  
21 December 1979

# Gain in Soviet Oil Reserves Doubted

*In the battle among the estimators, the CIA's pessimists are winning ground*

Estimating Soviet oil reserves and production rates—once a specialized task among Sovietologists—has been a popular spectator sport since April 1977, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put out a report predicting trouble in the Russian oil industry within a few years. The CIA was accused of spreading pessimistic propaganda. Other experts put out reports refuting the CIA's work, and then there were refutations of the refutations. Since then, the debate has rumbled along, occasionally breaking to the surface in a new batch of academic papers. A fresh harvest of forecasts appeared this fall.

The prevailing view among American experts is that although the CIA may be wrong on some of its numbers, it is correct in its pessimism about the Soviets' ability to increase oil production before 1985. If correct, this conclusion means that the Soviets, already sinking into an economic slump, will encounter more severe productivity problems in the next few years. And for oil consumers generally, it means that the Persian Gulf oil fields will acquire greater strategic importance. According to the CIA scenario, a decline in production will compel the Soviets to import oil in order to supply clients in Eastern Europe. In competing with the West as buyers, the Soviets will accelerate price inflation in the world market through the 1980's.

The CIA view gained credibility in late November when Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet chief of state, gave a gloomy report on the nation's economic performance this year. Oil production failed to meet the planned goal for the third time in 3 years, and the increase in production in 1979 was the smallest in two decades. Next year's goal has been reduced from a level of 12.8 million barrels a day to 12.1 million. (The current level is 11.7 million.) Brezhnev reportedly spoke of the need for "shock work" to improve economic growth and conserve energy in 1980.

Recent papers on this question differ most glaringly on two points: on the correct way to describe the Soviet oil reserves and on the likelihood that these

reserves will be developed quickly and exported. The extreme optimists' view is put forward in a report by a group known as Petrostudies, based in Malmö, Sweden. In an updated version of a report issued a year ago, Petrostudies claimed this fall that Soviet reserves are at 150 billion barrels, just a little less than Saudi Arabia's. This is by far the highest figure used anywhere; it contrasts starkly with the CIA's estimate that proved reserves amount to around one-fourth of that figure, or about 30 billion to 35 billion barrels.

The CIA also says that Soviet production will drop from the present level to around 10 million barrels a day or less in 1985, at which time the Soviets will be importing more than 2 million barrels a day. Petrostudies suggests otherwise: "There is no danger at all that the USSR will become a net importer of oil in the next 10 years at least, and compete with other nations for purchase of OPEC oil."

Oil analysts in commerce and academe fall between these two extremes in their forecasts, agreeing with the CIA on pro-

years ago when he introduced his first energy program, citing it to bolster his argument that the oil shortage is a world-wide phenomenon demanding quick and radical action by the United States. The decision to publish a paper by America's spy service was controversial in itself, for it put a new political burden on supposedly neutral estimators.

Changes outside the United States also contributed to the interest in oil guesswork. In the late 1970's governments have found it important to know precisely where future petroleum supplies will come from, and in what quantities. Yet at the same time, the Soviet Union, which has always treated reserve data as a state secret, has begun to cut back on the quality and quantity of information it is willing to release. This happened just as the Soviet Union became the world's largest oil producer and second largest exporter. When official data are lacking, guesses become more interesting.

Finally, the forecasters do have something tangible and troublesome to work with: there are signs that the Soviets are experiencing a real oil crisis of some kind. In 1976, the Soviet government clamped down on the publication of certain kinds of data—for example, making secret the previously available figures for oil trade and regional oil production. This is taken to be a sign that the government is embarrassed by poor performance in some areas. It is also agreed that in 1977 the Soviets began a crash development program in the Siberian oil fields because the older oil areas west of the Ural Mountains—near the big cities—are being depleted at an alarmingly rapid pace. Since the Soviets have been silent on this matter, Sovietologists have been working overtime.

Goldman, a moderate among the forecasters, argues that both the CIA and Petrostudies reports are wrong. Although he has not yet read the updated Petrostudies paper, he is scornful of its conclusions. "Nobody seems to know who these people are," he said, and he suggested, as others have, that this forecast had been published as an "answer" to the CIA, either for its propaganda val-

---

**Oil production failed to meet the goal for the third time in 3 years . . .**

---

duction estimates, but challenging the notion that the Soviet Union will be forced to import oil. Two of those who spoke with *Science*, Marshall Goldman of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University and Leslie Dienes of the University of Kansas, have given detailed justifications for their views in a report published in October by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

Forecasting of this kind has attracted attention recently for several reasons. The Carter Administration made it important by releasing the CIA's paper on Soviet oil and giving it wide circulation. The President leaned on it himself 2½

CONTINUED

ue or simply to sell optimism (at \$735 per copy) to worried, oil-short European governments. The first Petrostudies report reads like "disinformation," Goldman said.

"The CIA is right to say that the Soviets have lots of problems in their oil fields," Goldman explained, "and the Swedes are right to say the Soviets have a huge potential which is not being utilized." But it is wrong to expect any dramatic change in the world oil market because of what is happening in Russia. Goldman expects that the Soviets will continue to have trouble producing oil, and he even agrees with the CIA that production rates may level off in the next few years. However, Goldman thinks the Soviets will deal with shortfalls by imposing conservation measures and substituting other forms of energy—notably gas, which the Soviet Union has in abundance.

Dienes thinks the CIA report contained only minor errors and seems "almost exactly on the nose" now in its forecast of Soviet oil production rates. He believes the peak may have occurred already, or will occur in 1980. However, he does not expect as rapid a decline as does the CIA. He believes the CIA has understated Soviet reserves, but not significantly.

Despite their vast reserves and centralized authority, the Soviets will not be able to respond quickly to the crisis, Dienes argues, because there are few opportunities for conservation or fuel substitution. New oil fields are remote from the centers of population and will require massive investments of equipment and labor before they will yield any fuel. The Soviets lack the machinery and the expertise these sites demand, and Dienes argues that the Soviet government is too cautious to make the decisions that must be made quickly to avert a production slump. When asked about Petrostudies' optimism, he answered, "It's totally idiotic; they can't even read Russian correctly."

Arthur Meyerhoff, a petroleum geologist who serves as a consultant with the Soviet oil ministry, says that the CIA's predictions are working out "perfectly . . . they've been remarkably accurate." Meyerhoff himself has had "a running gun battle" with the authors of the Petrostudies report, for he thinks they have overstated Soviet proved reserves by a factor of 5. The Soviets have vast resources, he says, but they will not be able to tap them rapidly because they lack the drills and pipes necessary for working in deep reservoirs and cold climates.

The Soviet Union is 28 years behind the United States in technology, according to Meyerhoff: "To drill a 10,000-foot well, it takes 34 days in the United States and 14 months in the Soviet Union." And he says that pipes made in the Soviet Union are so brittle that, on the coldest days in Siberia, they shatter when kicked. Meyerhoff thinks it will take the Soviets 15 years to develop an indigenous oil industry capable of exploiting the difficult fields—precisely the ones that must be relied on to fill the looming gap in production.

Robert Campbell of Indiana University at Bloomington, another Sovietologist, was skeptical of the Swedish paper: "Some say the Petrostudies people are connected with the Russians. Their extreme evaluation makes you wonder about it." He added that "it is irrelevant to talk about oil reserves [in Russia] in any case. I'm prepared to believe that there's a lot of oil in the Soviet Union and on its continental shelf." But he said it is pointless to stress numbers because the real questions are when and how the Soviets will be able to produce the oil. Campbell expects production to decline. He agrees with the CIA's engineering analysis, which described numerous problems with the pumps and wells in Soviet oil fields, but he does not endorse the CIA's figures for production rates or reserves.

Campbell, like Dienes and other oil specialists, awaits the publication of the next 5-year plan for the Soviet oil fields, due to come out next year. Meanwhile, officials in the Soviet oil ministry are reportedly as bewildered as the CIA by Petrostudies' claims that huge reserves are waiting to be tapped. Pressed already to explain the disappointing record of the last few years, these officials find that Petrostudies is making their task more difficult.

The truth of the matter is that even the Soviets have an imprecise inventory of their petroleum resources. The full extent of these will not be known until prospective fields in Siberia and on the continental shelf have been thoroughly explored.—ELIOT MARSHALL

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-8THE WASHINGTON STAR  
6 January 1980

# Grain Cutback to Unsettle High-Priority Soviet Effort

## Hopes to Boost Livestock Jolted by U.S. Crackdown

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Putting more meat into Soviet diets has been the centerpiece of the Kremlin leadership's program to convince its people that life is getting better, the CIA noted in a study last year.

In coming months life will get a lot better in terms of eating meat. Soviet meat markets, noted for their long lines of people grumbling over the scarcity of meat and the poor quality available to consumers who lack Communist Party or military connections, will have larger supplies than usual.

But the reason will be the distress slaughtering of livestock herds that Soviet authorities had been trying to build up in a long-term program to increase meat supplies. The short-term benefit of more meat in the Soviet Union will be followed by poorer future diets and, possibly, popular unrest.

The slaughtering appears to U.S. specialists to be an inevitable result of President Carter's decision to block the sale of 17 million metric tons of grain to the Soviet Union because of its invasion of Afghanistan. The United States will allow the Soviets to buy only 8 million of the 25 million tons that they want in the sales year that began Oct. 1.

"This grain," Carter explained, "was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds."

Despite a shortfall of 48 million tons from the 1979 grain production plan of 226.8 million, the Soviet people are expected to have enough of their usual starchy diet of bread, potatoes and cabbage. The approximately 34 million tons of grain that the Kremlin had planned to import from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Western Europe and other sources in this 12-month period were either animal feedgrains or good quality wheat for humans that would release poorer Soviet wheat for animals.

The first major program launched publicly by Leonid I. Brezhnev after he succeeded Nikita S. Khrushchev as head of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1964 was for the long-term improvement of agriculture. In March 1965 he promised massive investments in overcoming chronic farm shortages.

These have continued despite competing demands on scarce resources, especially the major program that was launched secretly to build up the Soviet armed forces. But agricultural investments have failed to yield the expected results despite a farm subsidy now estimated at well over \$22 billion a year.

Part of the continuing grain problem is climatic. Little of the Soviet grain belt lies as far south and has as good soil as the American Middle West. Most is like the Canadian wheat belt or worse.

Part is Communistic. Soviet agriculture, and Soviet industry too, has suffered from an unwillingness of the present geriatric leadership to reform the political and economic controls laid down by Joseph V. Stalin in the 1930s, even though the controls have crippled output with bureaucracy that stifles incentives and initiatives.

Averaging out annual fluctuations, grain output has increased steadily during the past 15 years. In 1978 it reached a record 237.2 million metric tons but last year it slumped to 179 million.

A constant increase is needed to feed larger herds. Soviet authorities have reacted to bad crop years by spending some of their scarce foreign exchange for enough feedgrains to keep the livestock program going.

As a result, per capita meat consumption for the 265 million Soviet citizens rose from 90 pounds a year in 1970 to 110 pounds last year. The average American eats about 240 pounds of meat a year as part of a much more varied diet.

A CIA study on the long-term outlook for Soviet grain imports called the meat program "the centerpiece of Soviet consumer welfare policy." It takes precedent over an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in grain output, the study said, but is threatened by the possible decline of Soviet oil exports that earn money for buying grain.

The study said the planned growth of meat supplies at 1.5 percent a year for the next five years will require massive grain imports. Without them, specialists now say, the whole program is endangered.

The CIA study commented that "consumer unrest will rise should the USSR drastically cut back the growth of per capita meat supplies." Other specialists noted that the only significant rioting reported in the Soviet Union in recent decades was over food shortages, especially of meat.

Normally the first to be slaughtered in a bad crop year are hogs and chickens. Swine and poultry herds can be rebuilt quickly because of large litters and egg production. Cattle are kept as long as possible because cows only have single births, making the recovery from cutbacks very slow.

The amount of feedgrains available to the Soviet Union from its own production, the eight million tons of U.S. grains that Carter is permitting, and other imports should allow the preservation of dairy herds. It might even be possible for the Soviets to offset some of the U.S. cutback.

Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland said yesterday that Moscow might be able to find up to seven million metric tons of grain in the world to make up the 17 million U.S. denial. But Bergland's own department has been publishing statistics making the 7 million figure doubtful.

Other countries in the Soviet bloc had a bad crop year in 1979 as well. Poland and Czechoslovakia are importing as much grain as their facilities will permit, with the United States providing about half of each country's imports.

GALE CONTEMPORARY REFERENCE BOOKS  
November 1979

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONS 1979

This Gale reprint of the CIA's January, 1979 edition of the *National Basic Intelligence Factbook* will make available to a broader spectrum of students and researchers a variety of information on 187 political units. Emphasizing up-to-date economic and governmental data, *Handbook of the Nations* also provides details on each political unit's land, people, communications, and defense forces. Additional features include maps of each entity, eight reference maps, and tables detailing the structure of the United Nations. 232 pp. (ISBN 1028-7) 1979. \$20.00. (Just Published)

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

**Page Denied**

Approved For Release 2009/05/06 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501340001-1

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-18THE NEW YORK TIMES  
7 January 1980

## Trial by Agee

Philip Agee, the onetime C.I.A. agent whose passport was revoked last week, has earned the hatred of his former employers and the suspicion of many others by systematically identifying United States agents around the world. His writings have made intelligence much more hazardous. And lately, from West Germany (he has been kicked out of three other countries) he is bad-mouthing American intelligence again.

Gut feelings aside, though, the United States must obey its own laws in dealing with him and it's doubtful that those laws permit lifting his passport. That action seems to have been provoked by his public suggestion that the C.I.A.'s Iran files be exchanged for the hostages in Teheran. The idea was offensive, but not a crime. The State Department's fear that the former agent will go to Iran to participate in a trial of the hostages seems based on a misreading of an unconfirmed news report. He says he hasn't been invited and wouldn't accept such an invitation.

The Government considers Mr. Agee a threat to "national security or the foreign policy of the United

States" but it has yet to accuse him of violating any law. The Supreme Court made clear two decades ago in the *Rockwell Kent* case that citizens who haven't broken the law can't be denied passports under the statutes on the books. Even if Congress clearly conferred such power on the State Department, the Court said, there would be serious constitutional objections because the right to travel has become a recognized part of personal liberty. We await with interest the Government's legal justification as it resists Mr. Agee's suit to regain his passport.

We have our own quarrel with Mr. Agee. Aside from endangering the lives of certain countrymen abroad, he has brought discredit on those who want to expose C.I.A. misdeeds, but for the worthy purpose of bringing intelligence agencies within the rule of law. Like the Nazis of Skokie who gave freedom of assembly a bad name two years ago, Mr. Agee tests not only our laws but also our commitment to law. We're tempted to join Jules Feiffer's recent call for "a better class of victim." But time and circumstance will not let us wait.

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS  
3 January 1980

Philip Agee:

## Surprise, Surprise

The most astonished man in the world is possibly Philip Agee, former CIA agent, author of a hate-filled book "exposing" his former employers and disclosing the names, so Agee claimed, of numerous CIA undercover operatives.

The other day, Agee, who lives abroad, had his passport lifted by the State Department. Not for stabbing his country in the back, nor for endangering the lives, and compromising the effectiveness, of CIA employees; rather, for offering to the Ayatollah Khomeini documents concerning CIA activities in Iran in exchange for the hostages.

The question likely raised in some minds is what Agee was doing with a passport in the first place, given his record. The answer is obvious: For its enemies and maligners, such as renegade CIA agents, contemporary America has forgiveness and tolerance. Toward its sustainers — such as FBI agents caught reading the mail of terrorists — America, alarmingly often, shows the face of righteous intolerance.

What a shock, then, for Agee. Burned by his own government. We're not convinced he won't get his passport back eventually, but we'll take our cheer where we can get it.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-6

THE WASHINGTON POST  
7 January 1980

## McLean Man's 'Unbelievable' Exploits in the Arms Trade

By Blaine Harden  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Frank Terpil of McLean is an international arms dealer plagued with what his friends and law enforcement authorities say is a hazardous habit. He likes to boast.

Before he was arrested two weeks ago for trying to sell 10,000 machine guns to undercover detectives in New York City, Terpil allegedly told one of them he had personally observed and participated in torture and murder in Idi Amin's bloody Uganda.

The statements Terpil allegedly made "may appear so fantastic as to be unbelievable," says Matthew Crosson, an assistant Manhattan district attorney in charge of the Terpil case there. "But, on the other hand, Terpil did a lot of unbelievable things that were real."

Known to his McLean neighbors as a friendly but quiet importer-exporter who was frequently away from home, Terpil's business activities gave him a vastly different reputation among authorities.

According to New York prosecutors and sources close to a two-year federal grand jury investigation of Terpil in Washington, Terpil has been one of the world's major merchants of lethal weapons, torture devices and explosives to repressive governments since at least 1973.

Sources say Terpil, 40, provided the handgun in a failed plot by Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi to assassinate one of his political enemies in 1976. Terpil, according to sources familiar with the federal investigation, also maintained an office in the Libyan Embassy in London where he entertained Qaddafi.

Prosecutor Crosson in New York said Terpil contracted in 1976 with Qaddafi to provide bombs in the form of ashtrays, lamps and exploding desks, along with timing devices

and former American special forces personnel to help train Libyan terrorists.

Documents show that in 1977 in Uganda, Terpil, working through a Paris-based company, sold \$3.2 million worth of weapons, surveillance equipment and explosives to the government of Idi Amin. Documents also show he helped train Amin's dreaded State Research Bureau murder squads in the "art of intelligence sabotage." Sources say that at other times Terpil sold Amin torture equipment, including "electrical collars."

At a hearing on Friday in New York State Supreme Court, Crosson said that Terpil bragged to undercover detectives that in Uganda he put a liquid explosive in the car of an unidentified foreign diplomat, then blew the car to pieces with a radio-controlled detonator.

Until Amin was chased from Uganda last spring, Terpil flew to Kampala as often as twice a month where he stayed as a personal guest of his "very good friend Amin," according to Eldad Wapenyi, the current Ugandan ambassador to the United Nations. Terpil sold nearly \$800,000 in military supplies to Amin last year, Wapenyi says. He adds that the present Ugandan government is still trying to figure out if Terpil has been paid for the equipment.

Terpil, who sources say made up to 1,500 percent profits on his arms and equipment sales, also bought personal items for Amin, including picking up a Maseratti sports car engine in Italy and delivering it to Kampala, sources say.

In New York, where Terpil and another arms dealer, George Gregory Korkala, were arrested on Dec. 22 on weapons charges, Terpil's lawyer, James LaRossa, acknowledges that his client deals in international arms, but claims all the dealings are legal.

Korkala's lawyer, Gustave Newman, concedes that his client tried to sell 10,000 machine guns to undercover detectives posing as South American revolutionaries, but also claims no crime was committed.

"It may be unfortunate, it may be immoral, but it is perfectly legal," Newman said in a recent New York court hearing. On Friday, lawyers for both Terpil and Korkala argued that their clients had done extensive legitimate work for federal agencies such as the FBI, the Secret Service and the Federal Aviation Administration. Sources in Washington say Terpil has done no work for federal agencies in the last five years.

A New York Supreme Court justice on Friday set bond for Terpil and Korkala at \$100,000 each, despite prosecution arguments that they may flee the country. The two, who pleaded innocent to nine counts of conspiracy and other weapons violations, had not made bond by yesterday afternoon.

In New York, Terpil and Korkala face maximum possible prison sentences of 25 years if convicted. State Department officials say any unauthorized shipment of arms out of the United States is a violation of federal law.

Sources close to the grand jury investigation of Terpil in Washington say the panel is looking into possible violations of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (10 years maximum prison term) and the Munitions Control Act (eight years maximum prison term).

Before his arrest, authorities say Terpil lived a good part of his life aboard airplanes, shuttling to his "safe" house in Crews, England (where his confederates in the arms trade allegedly stayed), to Paris, to Geneva (where he allegedly keeps large amount of money in Swiss banks) and to the palaces of arms customers in Africa and the Middle East, including Syria and Lebanon.

Sources say Terpil is a "super salesman" with a knack for charming influential people and maintaining close contacts with sources of business associates. His weaknesses, sources say, are that he kept shoddy business records and had a tendency to brag about business successes to other arms dealers.

Terpil, 40, a stocky, brown-haired man with a thick mustache, lived until his arrest with his wife and two teen-age sons in a \$260,000 Japanese contemporary home on Chain Bridge Road in McLean. Since his arrest, the house, which he purchased in 1978, has been put up for sale.

Frank Edward Terpil was born in Brooklyn and enlisted in the Army when he was 18. He spent an uneventful six years in the military, serving his second tour of duty in Arlington with the Army's security branch. His job was to repair cryptographic (code-breaking) equipment and his electronics training was extensive, according to Army records.

When he left the Army in 1965, Terpil joined the CIA as a communications specialist. Although the CIA has refused to comment, sources close to the grand jury investigation in Washington say Terpil was fired from the agency in 1971 because his boastful and unpolished manner did not fit his superiors' expectations.

While in the CIA, Terpil spent time in the Middle East and East Pakistan, sources close to the investigation say.

Terpil next came to the attention of federal authorities in 1975 when he began selling the silenced Mac-10 and Mac-11 Ingram machine guns manufactured by Mitchell WerBell III of Powder Springs, Ga., sources say. The Mac-11 machine gun weighs less than four pounds, fires 850 rounds a minute and makes a soft phyyt sound when fired. It has been featured in such movies as "Three Days of the Condor" and "Killer Force."

WerBell, an internationally known arms dealer, said yesterday "that from time to time Frank has worked for us" selling the machine guns. But WerBell said that any dealings he had with Terpil were approved by the State Department office of munitions control.

According to federal sources, the machine guns were sold to a number of Third World countries.

In 1976, Terpil began supplying arms and other military equipment to Libya's Qaddafi. Sources say Terpil became a working partner with former CIA operative Edwin P. Wilson, who owns a large firm in Loudoun County and was also linked to the aborted assassination attempt of one of Qaddafi's political opponents in 1978.

Terpil and Wilson, working through relatives of Qaddafi, became friends with the Libyan leader and began supplying him with a total of \$2.5 million worth of military supplies. The hardware ranged from small arms to at least one American-made ground-to-air Red Eye missile, according to sources close to the grand jury investigation.

Sources say that Terpil and Wilson manufactured timing devices for explosives at a production cost of \$4 to \$6 each and sold them to Libya for about \$650 each during 1976 and 1977.

The Central Intelligence Agency, angered and embarrassed by Terpil's dealings with regimes that the agency was trying to monitor, assisted the Justice Department and Treasury officials in gathering information on Terpil, according to sources close to the grand jury investigation.

Terpil and Wilson, sources say, recruited teams of American-trained guerrilla fighters and electronics experts to teach Qaddafi's troops how to fight and make bombs. Later, Terpil and Wilson apparently had a disagreement and stopped working together.

Terpil—using connections he had made in Libya—began selling arms to Amin in Uganda, sources say.

According to a contract stamped "secret" found in the State Research Bureau files in Uganda after Amin's fall, Terpil's company sold \$3.2 million worth of equipment in August 1977. This included disguised antennas, attache cases fitted with tape recorders, explosives, remote radio detonators, a 56-track telephone monitoring system and all kinds of interrogation devices.

In 1978 and early '79, Ambassador Wapenyi said, Terpil had an office in the Ugandan Mission on 45th Street in New York. Terpil helped with the installation of an elaborate surveillance system that placed listening devices in various rooms in the mission, enabling the monitoring of Amin's diplomats, Wapenyi said. The ambassador said that Terpil had the equipment, valued at \$1 million, removed when Amin's government was overthrown.

During the years when Terpil was selling arms to Libya and Uganda, he frequently stayed in Geneva, where sources say he keeps an undisclosed amount of money. Sources believe that Terpil often returned to the Washington area with large amounts of money, which he used to pay his mortgage and other bills.

Terpil's family refused to comment on the arms dealer's activities.

New York police said they became aware of Terpil while investigating an unrelated case. Undercover detectives were sent to meet Terpil in England where they were shown a large quantity of machine guns, prosecutor Crosson said.

Terpil and Korkala were arrested at the New York Hilton hotel after undercover agents allegedly paid them a \$56,000 deposit on 10,000 machine guns, worth \$2 million, Crosson said.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-2

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
7 JANUARY 1980

# International Arms Dealer Has Low Profile in McLean

By Allan Frank  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Frank Edward Terpil, an international arms dealer who government prosecutors say bragged about helping former Ugandan President Idi Amin poison people, prefers to keep a low profile at home in McLean, Va.

Terpil, 40, lives quietly yet ostentatiously with his wife, Marilyn, and their three children at 1102 Old Chain Bridge Rd., just three houses away and across the street from Hickory Hill, home of the family of the late Robert F. Kennedy.

For a man who claimed on recent arrest forms on file in New York Supreme Court that he makes only \$28,500 annually, Terpil lives extremely well.

Fairfax County real estate assessors value the Terpil home at slightly less than \$300,000, although Terpil and his associates have given the impression to neighbors and writers for newspaper real estate sections that the one-story Japanese-style home cost between \$5 million and \$6 million.

Like other Terpil ventures, the home is not listed in his own name. It is owned by Capital Investment of Virginia Inc. Edgar J. Woodman, an officer of Capital Investment, declined to disclose Terpil's involvement in ownership of the home.

Woodman, an accountant, also is treasurer of Oceanic International at 2020 Connecticut Avenue NW, a Terpil firm that sold the Amin regime \$3 million in goods.

As much as he may make of his prestigious address, Terpil reaps more attention by emphasizing his links to another neighbor less than a mile away — the CIA.

Assistant Manhattan District Attorney Matthew T. Crosson told a New York Supreme Court hearing last Friday he has confirmed officially that Terpil was "unfavorably terminated" from his job as a communications and electronics technician at the CIA in 1971 after six years' service.

Crosson said Terpil, a Brooklyn native, who was in the army from 1960-65, still leads people to believe that he works for the CIA and claims the agency once provided him with a State Department cover.

Only in the last several months has Terpil's public facade of mysterious anonymity begun to crack.

His name surfaced briefly in April 1979, when the Amin government fell and documents seized at the State Research Bureau — Amin's secret police organization — showed that F. Terpil of Intercontinental Technology had sold the Ugandan government, in August 1977, \$3.2 million in surveillance equipment and "special secret weapons."

Later last year a federal grand jury here began investigating international arms sales for a variety of offenses. In mid-November, undercover officers from the Manhattan District Attorney's Office got in touch with Terpil and George Gregory Korkala, 38, of Nutley, N.J., about purchasing large amounts of weapons.

Posing as Latin American revolutionaries, the undercover agents were shown samples of, or brochures about, silencer-equipped pistols and rifles, exploding briefcases, letter bombs and cigarette lighters and ball point pens that converted to guns.

That equipment, as well as bomb detection and surveillance devices, were to be supplied by a Korkala company, Amstech International of Nutley, and by Terpil firms in London and Paris.

Crosson said Terpil told the undercover agents, who were taken to England to inspect machine guns, that he still worked for the CIA.

Crosson added that Terpil told the undercover agents dozens of stories about his derring-do before he and Korkala were arrested Dec. 22 in the New York Hilton in connection with a plot to sell 10,000 machine guns and 10 million rounds of ammunition for \$2 million.

The prosecutor said Terpil claimed that he:

- Was still close to Idi Amin in exile.
- That he trained the international terrorist, Carlos Ramirez.
- That he could obtain phony passports from Lebanon and elsewhere that he would sell for \$2,500.

Terpil also is believed to have sold guns to various groups and governments in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Among his clients have been Libya, Lebanon and the Soviet Union, Crosson said.

While law enforcement officials have been unable to verify all of Terpil's claims, Crosson made it clear at the arraignment for the two defendants Friday that the prosecutors are certain that the two indeed do have access to high-level foreign contacts and vast amounts of money.

Terpil's attorney, James M. LaRossa, admits that his client is a major international arms dealer, but said that he is fully licensed.

LaRossa said Terpil represents InterArmco of London, a major international dealer, although he said that Oceanic in Washington sells mostly "nautical supplies." Woodman said Oceanic sold no weapons to Amin, just T-shirts bearing "His Excellency For Life's" picture and equipment for marching bands.

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

ARTICLE APPROVED  
ON PAGE C3THE BALTIMORE SUN  
8 January 1980

## Most of suit by spy's widow thrown out

By SHERIDAN LYONS

A federal judge yesterday threw out most of a civil suit by the widow of an American spy who was found electrocuted in a Fort Meade motel room in April, 1976.

Ilse Sigler, of El Paso, Texas, claimed in the lawsuit that Army and Central Intelligence Agency officials either killed her husband, Chief Warrant Officer Ralph J. Sigler, or drove him to suicide because he was assembling memoirs of his career as a counterintelligence agent since his enlistment in the Army in 1947.

His duties, Mrs. Sigler said, included selling false information about American radar and missile systems to intelligence agents of various foreign powers, thereby identifying foreign spies.

On April 4, 1976, he arrived at Fort Meade after being summoned by government officials. There, according to his wife, he was subjected to severe interrogation. On April 13, he was found dead with electrical wiring wrapped around his arms that had been cut from

a lamp in the room and stripped of its insulation.

She cited a letter, dated three days before Mr. Sigler's death, in which he told her: "Should anything happen to me, suicide, death or accident, sue the US Army . . ." and naming specific persons to be sued.

Mrs. Sigler did so, seeking damages totaling more than \$100 million on various claims for violations of her husband's rights, for return of his papers and for injuries to her and her daughter. She said that officials feared her husband might write from memory after they illegally seized his papers.

Chief Judge Edward S. Northrop, however, granted government motions to dismiss the claims on behalf of Mr. Sigler, citing the broad doctrine of government immunity for injuries to members of the military. He cited cases dealing with secret use of LSD, allegations of brutality, a forced march into a nuclear explosion and others to demonstrate the scope of that military immunity.

While the courts have recognized the

"unconscionable results" that the doctrine may cause, the judge said, the facts of a case do not affect it.

The doctrine, however, does not apply to the claims of violations of the constitutional rights of Mrs. Sigler and her daughter, he said, and gave the defendants another 30 days to file other defenses to those claims.

The judge also rejected the demand for the return of Mr. Sigler's papers, after reviewing a classified affidavit to support the government's claim of a state-secrets privilege.

Clifford Alexander, secretary of the Army, said in an affidavit filed with the motion to dismiss that the papers "explain in great detail, day-by-day, many of the intelligence activities that Mr. Sigler undertook on behalf of the Army . . . nearly everything he knew or could glean about the foreign intelligence services."

The lawsuit originally was filed in El Paso, but was transferred to Maryland when the Texas judge said the case must be tried where the death occurred.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON POST  
8 January 1980

# Damage Suit Denied in Death of Double Agent

By Chris Schauble

Special to The Washington Post

BALTIMORE, Jan. 7—A federal judge here today rebuffed an El Paso, Tex., widow seeking to sue the Army, the CIA and FBI for allegedly conspiring to kill her husband, an Army intelligence double agent who was electrocuted in a motel room near Fort George G. Meade in April 1976.

U.S. District Judge Edward S. Northrup invoked a legal principle known as the Feres Doctrine to rule that the military and civilian superiors of Ralph J. Sigler, the agent, cannot be sued for damages because Sigler's "alleged injuries were incurred incident to service."

In a two-year legal battle, Sigler's widow, Ilse Sigler, and her daughter, Karin Mears, sought \$100,000 in damages as a result of Sigler's mysterious death on April 13, 1976, a month before his 48th birthday and three months before his planned retirement.

Sigler, whose job was to sell misleading information to Soviets, was found dead at a motel in Jessup, Md. Electrical wiring, stripped of its insulation, was wrapped around his upper arms and plugged into a wall socket.

Maryland police and Army authorities concluded that Sigler committed suicide.

For 10 years he had dealt with the Russians, identifying their agents in this country and abroad by selling them military secrets, often fabricated, about American radar and missile systems.

Then, during a debriefing he flunked a lie detector test about his activities with the Russians. He was sent to Fort Meade, where he was interrogated for nine days, according to Mrs. Sigler.

Then, he was found dead. Army psychiatrists concluded in an official report that he "was not mentally responsible at the time of the act which caused his death."

But Mrs. Sigler believed that Army intelligence had done "something wrong," that her husband knew too much about it and that Army person-

nel murdered him for this reason. She said she hoped her suit would shed light on the matter.

According to James Kenkel, Mrs. Sigler's attorney, the doctrine invoked by the judge applies solely because Sigler "was on active duty in the military on military orders and ordered to Fort Meade."

Kenkel said he plans an appeal and called the Feres Doctrine "a throw-back to the days when the king could do no wrong. I think that's too harsh in this day and age."

"Look at all the recent abuses," Kenkel continued. "We have big Watergates and little Watergates and we've learned that national security is a shield for a whole host of wrongdoings. A complete shield is wonderful. You can do anything."

Richard R. Beauchemin, one of the defense attorneys, said, "Our hearts and sympathies go out to the individual and rightly so. But sometimes you just have to stand back and say wait a minute, the whole community could go down the drain."

"My God, we'd never be able to function without it [the Feres Doctrine]," said Beauchemin. "My comments, I guess, would be called waving the flag. But these are necessary requirements for our country being able to operate in an international sphere."

The judge also denied a request by Mrs. Sigler that the Army return materials it confiscated from her house in what she called "an illegal search and seizure." He said the materials, which he inspected in his chambers, could jeopardize national security.

But Northrup did not dismiss the entire case. He said Mrs. Sigler and her daughter could still sue for damages possibly suffered as a result of the search and seizure if the government would not be jeopardizing national security by naming the agents who took the materials.

But Kenkel claimed that the heart of the suit "has been gutted with the ruling on Feres . . . We can't even question how he [Sigler] died."