

DDA 77-2496

4 MAY 1977

?
DDA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Classification

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DCI dated 25 April 1977, same
subject (ER 77-7344)

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for comments on the handling of Top Secret material.

2. Background: Agency procedures for handling noncompartmented Top Secret material are consistent with the requirements established by Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive. It is true that the procedures for handling CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are less complex in terms of transmittal and receipting than those for Top Secret documents without compartmented controls.

In CIA the volume of noncompartmented Top Secret material represents a relatively small percentage of the total volume of classified material, therefore, no significant problems exist in adhering to the letter of Executive Order 11652 requirements.

On the other hand, CODEWORD material i.e., sensitive compartmented information, represents a large percentage of the total volume of Agency material and generally requires rapid dissemination to a large audience. Imposition of receipting requirements as strict as those that apply for noncompartmented Top Secret material would seriously inhibit such rapid dissemination.

The Office of Security has no evidence that CODEWORD designations, i.e., compartmented channels, are being used to avoid the stricter dissemination and receipting procedures of the Top Secret control system. Further, it would not appear to be a logical alternative,

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE) DDA

since fraudulent and unnecessary application of CODEWORD control on a document would limit its dissemination within the Agency, where all staff employees hold Top Secret clearances but not all are approved for compartmented access.

The appropriate regulations governing the handling of both noncompartmented Top Secret material and CODEWORD material, i.e., sensitive compartmented information, are regularly under review. The current requirement that every reader of a Top Secret document acknowledge access by his signature is currently under review by the Agency.

We do not feel that a change in Agency or community compartmentation procedures in this area is necessary or desirable at this time.

/s/ John F. Blake
John F. Blake

Distribution:

1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
✓ 1 - ER

procedures

25 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDA
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Classification

I understand that the procedures for handling CODEWORD material with regard to signatures, etc., are less complex than for handling TOP SECRET. Thus, many of our people use CODEWORD classification where it is not needed in order to take the easy route. Would you check on this and let me know if we should change our regulations. If so, should such a change apply to the Community as well.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

cc D/DCI/IC

Administrative - Internal Use Only

SECRET

Executive Registry
77-3861/3

IC

DCI/IC 77-1909


14 APR 1977



25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

25X1

FROM : 
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

SUBJECT : Compartmentation and Security Classification

REFERENCE : Your Memo to me dated 5 April 1977, Same
Subject

1. Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. Background: This memorandum responds to referenced
request for additional information in preparing for the next meeting
with the Vice President on this subject.

3. Attached is the requested list of the basic compartmentation
divisions and the number of people cleared in each category.

4. Also attached are the ten copies of the Inventory of
Intelligence Community Periodicals you requested for the next
meeting with the Vice President. Table I has been modified as
you requested. It now shows the highest level of security classifi-
cation, the number of copies delivered to "External National Level
Customers" and a rough idea of where they go.

25X1



Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED When Removed
From Attachments

IC

25X1



SECRET

Page Denied

5 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
FROM: DCI _____
SUBJECT: Compartmentation & Security Classification

1. Your memorandum of 29 March and your notebook on security classification and compartmentation are both extremely valuable. I'd like to ask a slight bit of additional help in preparing for the next meeting with the Vice President on this subject. Would you take Table I of the Annex - Inventory of Intelligence Community Periodicals - and expand it in three dimensions:

a. For each of the 29 publications, indicate in another column the highest level of security classification ever included in the publication.

b. Under the columns for "External National Level Customers," list the number of copies delivered by sum X.

c. In addition to total addressees, indicate as best as one can succinctly a rough idea of where they go. Attach then all the other sections of the Annex without necessary modification, and reproduce in ten copies for me to take to the next meeting with the Vice President.

2. Could you also take the various appendices on compartmentation and brief it down markedly just to indicate the basic divisions and the number of people cleared in each category. I simply want to give an idea of the magnitude of the task of bringing this under any tighter control.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy



SECRET

25X1

25X1

SECRET

Executive Registry
77-3861/1

29 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

25X1

FROM:

[Redacted]

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT:

Compartmentation

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.

2. Background: This memorandum responds to your 22 March request for a review of the most sensitive compartmented programs.

3. A description of the formal compartmented programs has been provided to you under separate cover. There are some specific actions that can be taken to improve this facet of the security system. I intend to task each collection manager to review the formal compartmentation systems under his control, assess their effectiveness in protecting material, and suggest any steps that might be taken to improve security and to protect truly sensitive information. In addition, I will ask each collection manager to review on a semiannual basis the compartments under his control to insure that clearances are given only to those who require access to sensitive information. Institution of a single administrative system for all formal compartments would be a major step forward; the IC Staff currently has work under way toward this end.

4. In addition to the formal compartmented programs which have been summarized for you in response to an earlier request, there are a number of subcompartments or specially controlled projects with highly restricted access. These projects are established by collection managers when broad dissemination of the information produced by a particularly sensitive source or

25X1

25X1

SECRETARY FILE

IC

SECRET

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

method may jeopardize the collection activity. Dissemination of such information usually is on a designated-name basis to only a few senior level officials. There is no common criteria for establishing such informal compartments, but individual collection managers are in a position to assess the trade-off between source protection and the need to disseminate information.

25X1

5. The category of specially controlled projects includes activities under the direction of the [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] programs, some DDO/CIA activities and a number of special [redacted] DDO provides special protection to the intelligence obtained from about [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] At any given time only 10 to 12 people, including case officers, communicators, and senior officials, have access to this reporting. NSA has about [redacted] projects that are given special protection including [redacted] on which you were recently briefed. The product of all these special collection programs is blended with other intelligence reports to the fullest extent possible.

25X1

25X1

25X1

6. I believe that the sensitive, special projects are essential to the protection of particularly vulnerable sources and methods and that they can best be administered by program managers. I will ask collection managers to review these special projects and eliminate access of those who do not have a demonstrable need for the information. Although it is possible to establish a central register and provide some periodic reporting on the personnel who are authorized access, such formal arrangements might increase the risk of compromise. Consolidated lists and a mechanism to maintain them will bring together in one place a considerable amount of sensitive information and will necessarily involve clearances for personnel involved in purely administrative activities. I am reluctant to initiate action in this area without further discussion with you and the various program managers involved.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

Memo for DCI from D/DCI/IC,
Subject: Compartmentation

DCI/IC 77-0408

Distribution:

Orig - Addee

1 - D/DCI/IC

✓ 1 - ER

1 - ICS Registry

1 - EO/ICS

1 - Chron

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

22 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Compartmentation

1. After the briefing I had from NSA on Monday morning, I am increasingly concerned about the importance of controlling our highly compartmented programs. I know that I have already asked for a major review of compartmentation in response to the Vice President's request. In anticipation of it, however, I would like to look urgently at what you consider to be the ten most sensitive compartmented programs that we have. I would appreciate receiving a list of those programs with a brief description of their content and a list of all the individuals who are cleared for each.

2. I would also like to know who is authorized to add to or subtract from these access lists.

3. What I have in mind is the possibility of issuing an immediate directive requiring your personal approval of any additions to these lists and directing you to pare them down if you think it appropriate.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

cc DDCI

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ED 2 IMPDET CL B *Signer*