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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 16, 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for
SCC Meeting on MIG's in Cuba

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the
SCC Meeting on MIG's in Cuba held November 13, 1978.

This Summary should be held closely and distributed
only to those persons in your department/agency with
a strict need to know basis.


Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Attachment

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

November 13, 1978

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Time and Place: 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., White House
Situation Room

Subject: MIG's in Cuba

Participants:

State
Ambassador David Newsom
George Vest

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Stanley Resor

NSC
Robert Pastor
Reginald Bartholomew

JCS
General David Jones
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert Bowie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Purpose of the Meeting. To determine the kind, number, and capabilities of MIG's currently in Cuba as well as those (MIG-25's) which are expected to be delivered soon; to determine whether the escalation in weaponry constitutes a threat to the U.S. and a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings between the U.S. and the USSR; and to recommend a strategy for dealing with the introduction and future delivery of these weapons.

2. Evidence. Present evidence indicates that there may be 12 MIG-23's in Cuba--one or two MIG-23 D/F have been sighted and possibly as many as 5-9 are present. We do not know whether the general attack MIG-23's are F (normal export model) or D (30% of which are apparently used by the Soviets for nuclear missions). There was a consensus that both D and F represent a significant jump in offensive capabilities for Cuba in that both are specifically designed for air-to-ground attack. The D represents an additional issue in that its nuclear capability and previous deployment only with Soviet forces raises questions about ultimate Soviet intentions. MIG-23 B/E (of which Cubans

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have at least three) and MIG-25's which the Cubans claim they expect to receive soon) are interceptors, designed primarily for air-to-air attack, though all of these represent a decidedly enhanced capability for Cuba over the MIG-21's which they presently have.

3. Threat. All of the planes can be modified to carry nuclear weapons, and all can reach the U.S., though the D/F's have the widest range (600-800) miles).

There were three hypotheses suggested as to why the MIG-23's were deployed now: (1) natural upgrading of Cuban air force capabilities; (2) a deliberate act designed to test the 1962 and 1970 understandings; or (3) to increase the capabilities of Cuba's air force so that they could use the weapons in Africa.

While no one thought that the reason the Soviets introduced the weapons was to deliberately thwart the understandings, there was a consensus that the introduction of offensive weapons (defined as air-to-ground attack aircraft--MIG-23 D/F) did constitute a violation of the two understandings.

4. Objective. There was a consensus that our objective should be to seek a halt on further deployment of MIG-23 D/F, and if possible to obtain their withdrawal.

5. Approach. The consensus was that we should approach the Soviets, preferably Secretary Vance to Ambassador Dobrynin, inform them we are following the recent deployment very closely, and register our concern with the introduction of MIG-23's. (We should not make a distinction between D's and F's.) We should inform them that we view MIG-23 D/F's as offensive weapons, that their deployment in Cuba constitutes a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings, and that their deployment will affect our relationship and could jeopardize ratification of the SALT treaty by calling into question Soviet adherence to past understandings. We would express our willingness to indicate a capacity to rationalize the presence of one or two MIG-23's temporarily, but no more.

6. Congressional Consultations. State will forward recommendations on who to consult in Congress and what to say. We would not consider any public statement until that time.

7. Consultations with Latin Americans. most Latin Americans are likely to view this as a U.S. problem, but at some future point, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina should probably be briefed and consulted.

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