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1976

**Soviet Military Policy  
in the Third World**

**Secret**  
NIE 11-10-76  
21 October 1976

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**NIE 11-10-76**  
**SOVIET MILITARY POLICY**  
**IN THE THIRD WORLD**

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## SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

### KEY JUDGMENTS

A. The Soviets perceive the Third World as a primary arena for the USSR's competition with the West and with China. Existing political constellations and ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area priorities;

- The Middle East will remain the major focus of Soviet military activities in the Third World. As long as Soviet relations with Egypt remain sour, Syria will continue to be the largest recipient of Soviet military aid in the area. Moscow will probably emphasize efforts in other Arab countries—Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.
- Southern Africa is the area of greatest current potential for the USSR. The Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploit troubles there even though they will have little ability to control or even predict developments.
- In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will continue to be the focal points of Soviet military policy. Moscow apparently intends to go on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not seem to expect any major changes in Asia or Latin America in the immediate future.

B. As they have been expanding their activities in the Third World, the Soviets have seen a reduction in Western military presence and influence there. The Soviets have given their highest priority to areas of

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strategic importance such as the Middle East but have also taken advantage of opportunities to use their military activities to weaken the West in areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola. While the Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism, the ideology of potential clients has not generally hampered the development of a military relationship; pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet guide in seeking new military relations.

C. There are a number of factors which inhibit growth of Soviet military presence in the Third World:

- The intense nationalism of most Third World countries makes them determined not to grant more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet forces.
- Regional powers have emerged which are loath to see any outside power play a dominant role.
- The Soviets are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the Third World politics, changes in domestic regimes, and reversals in the attitudes of local leaders.
- The Soviets have been able to make only limited advances in competing with Western cultural, political, and economic influence.
- The continued presence of US and other Western military forces in the Third World remains an inhibition on Soviet military activities.

D. Despite major setbacks in Indonesia, Egypt, and the Sudan, the Soviets are convinced that their efforts in the Third World have significantly increased Moscow's prestige and influence in world affairs and have contributed to Soviet national security. The motivation of Moscow's military activity is an aspect of its overall competition with the West, expressed in the Third World in efforts to weaken Western military, economic, and political positions while strengthening those of the USSR. Competition with China in this same arena reinforces this motivation. Given Soviet persistence, it is extremely unlikely that any future setbacks would cause the USSR to reverse course.

E. To achieve their objectives the Soviets use a variety of military instruments in Third World countries. Military aid has been Moscow's principal instrument, and its use is likely to increase. Over the last ten years Moscow has signed some \$15 billion worth of arms agreements, and two thirds of that amount was negotiated in the last five years. The Soviets have little interest in reaching agreements to restrain arms deliveries. Their efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this



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instrument that they would regard restrictions on military aid as drastically curtailing their opportunities.

F. In recent years, the Soviets have been exporting more of their latest and best conventional equipment. Air defense missiles and interceptors will continue to be among Moscow's best selling items. Increasingly sophisticated weapons will require Third World clients to rely more heavily on Moscow for spares, credits, and advisers to train local personnel.

G. The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as instruments to advance their position, and will support such groups as the PLO and guerrilla movements in southern Africa. We believe that Moscow will probably continue to act more boldly than in years past in support of liberation movements. Moscow's confidence has been bolstered by its current perception of Western disinclination to counter Soviet activities in the Third World, its tested experience in supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and its improved military capabilities. Soviet aid, often small in absolute terms, can have a decisive effect in unstable situations such as Angola. Soviet-Cuban cooperation in supporting a national liberation movement there may be repeated if suitable opportunities arise, but only when both countries judge such activity to be in their interest.

H. The Soviets deploy military forces to the Third World—primarily naval and air—which share in potential wartime missions and perform a variety of political and military roles by demonstrating Soviet support to Third World countries. Barring serious long-term crises or other unusual circumstances, Soviet general purpose naval deployments will probably not increase greatly in numbers but will grow significantly in capabilities. But Soviet air deployments to distant areas will often require overflight and staging privileges which the USSR may find difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain.

I. As Moscow's military presence in distant areas has increased, Soviet needs for supporting facilities have risen. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to seek access to facilities primarily in the Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa and the Indian Ocean.

—In the Mediterranean, we believe that Soviet prospects for gaining access to facilities comparable to those they lost in Egypt are dim.

—In the Atlantic, the Soviets probably hope to obtain port and air facilities in Angola as a hedge against further troubles in Guinea.

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—Given the assets they have in Somalia, the Soviets have less pressing requirements for additional facilities in the Indian Ocean but will continue looking.

J. In Third World crises Soviet forces have been used to provide assistance to the USSR's clients. The most extensive recent effort was in Egypt in 1970 when the Soviets deployed, over a period of months, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet pilots and missile crews operating under their own command and control network. The Soviets have also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and provide a visible symbol of Soviet support by interpositioning naval forces. Nevertheless, Moscow will be careful to avoid actions which risk precipitating a direct military confrontation with the US.

K. The Soviets have other military forces which could be employed in the Third World. Although Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed primarily for operations near the USSR, their training, coupled with the diversity and quality of their equipment, gives them a capacity to act in crisis situations. The Soviets have never conducted a military campaign in the Third World but, should they decide to intervene rapidly on the ground, the Soviets could send airborne units or small naval infantry contingents. Much larger ground forces could be moved by the Soviet merchant marine if there were enough time and no opposition.

L. Over the next decade, force improvements will continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be able to make more credible demonstrations of force and the Soviet navy will have better capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of land-based air support, Soviet capabilities will still be deficient to carry out an amphibious assault against determined opposition by sizable armed forces. The Soviets will face the same problems as today of limited air cover and assault lift and vulnerable lines of communications.

M. Although Soviet capabilities for direct assault will remain limited, that will not keep Moscow from continuing its efforts to cultivate military relations with Third World countries and to support insurgencies. Soviet involvement in conflicts in the Third World is likely to take the form of interpositioning naval forces, participation of advisers in combat, and the introduction of air defense units to assist a client.

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### Scope

This paper examines how the USSR uses military resources to support Soviet policies in the Third World.<sup>1</sup> It assesses Soviet propensities and capabilities for intervention and estimates future trends.

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<sup>1</sup> The term "Third World" refers to free-world, less-developed countries, most of which are nonaligned. We have included discussion of Soviet military relations with less developed Communist countries—Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Laos—in cases where that was needed for a comprehensive view of Soviet activities.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Soviet leaders in their lifetime have seen an impressive growth in Soviet military power and influence in world affairs. They can remember vividly the Soviet Union's weakness, isolation and insecurity in the years before World War II. As their military power grew in the postwar period, the Soviets began to use their military resources not only for defense of the USSR but also to seek positions of influence in the Third World. In the mid-1950s the Soviets saw in military as well as economic and diplomatic relations with less developed countries a means of breaking the "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR and of ending Western monopoly of Third World resources. Despite setbacks, the Soviets have continued to expand their activities, which they believe have contributed to the erosion of Western influence and power in the Third World, and to the building up of their own.

2. At the same time as the Soviets have been expanding their activities in the Third World they have seen a reduction of the Western military presence overseas. Over the last 30 years Great Britain has reduced what used to be a worldwide network of colonies to a handful of military bases, the Portuguese and the Dutch have dismantled their overseas empires, and the French have yielded rule in most of their former territories. The US has withdrawn from Indochina and cut back its bases abroad and to a lesser degree its commitments. Recently, the Soviets saw their cooperation with Cuba in Angola succeed without calling forth a military confrontation.

3. The decline in pro-Western attitudes in the Third World over the past two decades has resulted in a degree of receptivity to Soviet military initiatives. Soviet support for the anti-colonial, anti-Western positions of many Third World leaders has also encouraged them to turn to the USSR for military assistance. To exploit the opportunities created by these trends the Soviets use military aid, advisers, training, a deployed military presence, diplomatic support, and aid to liberation movements:

—In support of liberation movements, we believe that Moscow will probably continue to act more boldly than in years past. Moscow's confidence

has been bolstered by its current perception of Western disinclination to counter Soviet activities in the Third World, its tested experiences in supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and its improved military capabilities.

—In local conflicts, the Soviets are also willing to back their clients—even to the point of involving limited numbers of Soviet personnel in the fighting—but have been careful to avoid actions which would risk precipitating direct military confrontation with the US.

4. As a result of their efforts the Soviets have expanded military relations in areas formerly tied to the West and now use military facilities in Cuba, Guinea, and Somalia. But the USSR has gained substantial influence in only a handful of less-developed countries. There are a number of factors which inhibit an expanded Soviet presence in the Third World:

—The intense nationalism of most Third World countries has made them determined not to grant more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet military forces, even in exchange for large amounts of aid. The Soviets have been forced to operate within the constraints imposed by regimes sensitized, in part by the Soviets' own propaganda, to any hints of foreign interference or intervention in their affairs.

—Regional powers have emerged which are loath to see any outside power play a dominant role. These include such diverse countries as Iran, India, and Vietnam. Moreover, regional associations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America have discouraged member nations from exclusive or even close ties with the Soviets.

—The Soviets have proven vulnerable to changes of regime as in Indonesia and Ghana. They have also proven unable to dissuade political leaders who, for their own reasons, reversed their previous dependence on Soviet support, as President Sadat did in Egypt. Soviet efforts to manipulate the internal politics of Third World countries have often failed.

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—The Soviets have been able to make only limited advances in competing with Western cultural, political, and economic influence. Soviet markets cannot absorb the bulk of Third World exports, and these countries are well aware that Soviet products are generally inferior. They have not prevented the continued reliance of many countries on Western military support. Thus the Soviets have often been unable to build on the foothold created by their military activities and aid to expand their influence in other fields.

—Finally, the continued presence of US and other Western military forces in Third World areas remains a curb on the activity of Soviet forces. Western forces are generally more powerful, more diversified, and more capable of rapid reinforcement than those of the Soviets in these areas.

5. Another important factor in Soviet policy toward the Third World is competition with China, primarily in southern Africa and Southeast Asia. The Soviets feel a continuing need to assert their leadership of the international Communist movement and they believe they should protect their interests in almost every area in which the Chinese have or are expected to have influence. The Soviets have supported more liberation movements, provided more arms, and have deployed more military forces to Third World areas than the Chinese. China's inability to provide large amounts of military aid or to deploy forces to distant areas has given the Soviets an advantage. The disruptions of the Cultural Revolution also weakened the Chinese military aid program. Nonetheless, the Chinese have successfully competed with the Soviets in a few countries, such as Tanzania, and they will remain a source of concern to Soviet leaders.

6. Moscow's search for wider influence in world politics has been highly opportunistic:

—While the Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism, the ideology of potential clients has not generally hampered the development of a military relationship. The basis of Moscow's policy in the Third World since the mid-1950s has been toleration of nonalignment. The test for a potential client has been willingness to cooperate with the USSR and not Marxist orthodoxy. Indeed, Moscow has more than once courted Third World leaders who believed that the best place for local communists was in jail. To be sure,

once the Soviets establish a relationship with a client country they generally encourage it to adopt Soviet views and Soviet style institutions.

—Geographically, the Soviets have given their highest priority to clients in areas of strategic importance to the USSR such as the Middle East and South Asia. Moscow has not, however, confined its efforts to any particular area and the USSR has taken advantage of opportunities in far flung locations from Cuba to Angola. The level of Soviet investment may not always be an indication of expected payoffs. The Soviets probably anticipate a higher rate of return from a much smaller investment in southern Africa than they do from their continued heavy spending in Arab countries.

—Hope of economic gain has not been the primary driving force in Soviet expansionism. After World War II the Soviets did not go into the Third World specifically in search of resources or trade, nor did they expect their ventures to show economic profits per se. On the contrary, Moscow has spent heavily in its efforts to buy influence. Nevertheless, the Soviets are becoming more interested in some resources of Third World areas and in earning hard currency in arms sales.

7. The Soviets will continue their efforts to support their forces and protect their interests in distant areas. In order to guarantee their air and sea lines of communication, to protect vital imports and their fishing fleet, and to improve the support of their military forces—not only for peacetime operations but also in the event of war—the Soviets will continue to seek relationships with client states for access to ports and airfields, overflight and staging rights, and other privileges.

8. In sum, the motivation of Moscow's military activity is an aspect of its overall competition with the West, expressed in the Third World in efforts to weaken Western military, economic and political positions while strengthening those of the USSR. Competition with China in this same arena reinforces this motivation.

9. *The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the interpretation presented in paragraphs 1 through 8 minimizes both the increased propensity of the Soviet Union to take international risks and the growing*

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*Soviet confidence in its ability to project military power in the Third World. The statements and actions of the Soviet leaders reflect their belief that the international "correlation of forces" clearly favors the interests and the objectives of the USSR. Soviet behavior since the October 1973 Middle East war demonstrates that Moscow is willing to select from an ever expanding choice of conflict options. The Soviet concept of "imperialism" views Western economic relationships with the Third World as becoming increasingly vulnerable. The growth in Soviet conventional and strategic capabilities offers the USSR an opportunity to manipulate those vulnerabilities to its own advantage.*

## II. INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

10. The USSR has a variety of military resources it can use to support its policies in the Third World:

—The most extensive use of Soviet military assets in the Third World has been in the provision of military assistance. Soviet aid includes equipment, technicians and advisers, and training of military personnel in the USSR. The Soviets provide assistance to guerrilla movements as well as to governments.

—Soviet naval presence in distant areas has been used to demonstrate Soviet support for client countries and to discourage outside intervention. At the same time, Soviet military use of facilities in Third World countries—often obtained following Soviet military assistance—can improve Soviet capabilities against the US.

—Finally, the Soviets have forces in the USSR which could be used to intervene in a local conflict.

### A. Military Aid

11. Military assistance has played some role in most of the relationships which the USSR has established with less developed countries and has been a crucial element in Moscow's most important links to the Third World. Over the last ten years, Soviet arms agreements with all Third World countries have totaled around \$15.3 billion (see Table I). Of this amount, over twice as much has been with non-communist Third World countries (\$11.2 billion) as with Communist ones (\$4.2 billion). Moreover, Soviet arms agreements during the first half of this decade

(\$10.1 billion) were almost twice the level of the late 1960s (\$5.2 billion). Deliveries have also increased sharply, running about \$8.4 billion during 1971-1975 as opposed to \$5.3 billion in the previous five year period (see Table II). More than half of the arms deliveries in the last five years have been to the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

12. As these figures suggest, there is normally a time lag between conclusion of an agreement and completion of deliveries. Moreover, some recipients have canceled contracts or simply not drawn down the agreed amount within the time specified in the agreement, often complaining of delayed deliveries, inadequate supply of spare parts, etc. In other cases, the Soviets themselves have canceled the arrangement for political reasons.

13. Normally credits for Soviet military aid have been extended on lenient terms, typically at 2 or 2½ percent annual interest with eight to ten years to repay. Despite the leniency of the repayment terms, the Soviet leadership has shown a preference for extending the grace period or rescheduling the debt of hard-pressed clients, rather than excusing the debts outright. In a few cases cash down payments have been required. Increasingly, the Soviet leadership has required cash payment for military goods.

14. *Soviet Arms Exports.* In recent years, the Soviets have been exporting more of their latest and best equipment; at times the most favored of Moscow's Third World clientele compete with Warsaw Pact countries and even with Soviet forces for the distribution of some of the world's most modern conventional armaments. A variety of factors have contributed to the change:

—the military needs of Third World customers such as the Arab countries have risen sharply;

—some clients want sophisticated gear for the prestige it affords, even though their forces cannot absorb it;

<sup>2</sup> The estimated values for Soviet agreements and deliveries cited in this Estimate and its accompanying tables and annexes are minimum figures derived by using the aggregate values (at Soviet trade prices) of agreements known, or by pricing the materiel delivered through analogous prices noted in the arms agreements between the USSR and Third World countries. Soviet trade prices do not represent either production costs in the USSR or value in the US market.

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TABLE I

**SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD**  
**1960-75**  
*(Million US Dollars)*

	1966-75	1966-70	1971-75
Total	\$15,333	\$5,231	\$10,102
Middle East	7,860	1,980	5,880
Egypt	2,260	975	1,285
Iran	826	325	501
Iraq	1,485	371	1,114
Lebanon	4	Negl.	4
Libya	855	35	820
Syria	2,239	240	1,999
Yemen (Aden)	137	17	120
Yemen (Sana)	54	17	37
South Asia	1,782	679	1,103
Afghanistan	357	88	269
Bangladesh	35	—	35
Burma	Negl.	Negl.	—
India	1,307	525	782
Pakistan	70	66	4
Sri Lanka	13	—	13
Pacific	3,880	2,259	1,621
Cambodia	8	8	—
Indonesia	10	10	Negl.
Laos	1	—	1
North Korea	883	376	507
North Vietnam	2,978	1,865	1,113
Africa	1,369	193	1,176
Algeria	600	50	550
Angola	131	—	131
Burundi	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Cameroon	Negl.	Negl.	—
Central African Republic	8	2	6
Chad	2	—	2
Congo	32	12	20
Equatorial Guinea	6	2	4
Ethiopia	3	2	1
Gambia	Negl.	—	Negl.
Guinea	40	Negl.	40
Guinea-Bissau	Negl.	—	Negl.
Malagasy Republic	1	—	1
Mali	17	—	17
Morocco	63	2	61
Mozambique	16	—	16
Nigeria	75	25	50
Sierra Leone	Negl.	—	Negl.
Somalia	150	11	139
Sudan	87	85	2
Tanzania	76	2	74
Uganda	50	—	50
Zambia	12	—	12
Latin America	442	120	322
Cuba	309	120	189
Peru	133	—	133

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TABLE II  
SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD  
1966-75  
(Million US Dollars)

	1966-75	1966-70	1971-75
Total	\$13,662	\$5,297	\$8,365
Middle East	6,879	1,830	5,049
Egypt	2,475	1,100	1,375
Iran	555	193	362
Iraq	1,357	291	1,066
Lebanon	4	Negl.	4
Libya	398	35	363
Syria	1,951	186	1,765
Yemen (Aden)	114	8	106
Yemen (Sana)	25	17	8
South Asia	1,754	822	932
Afghanistan	305	160	145
Bangladesh	35	—	35
Burma	Negl.	—	Negl.
India	1,375	641	734
Pakistan	26	21	5
Sri Lanka	13	—	13
Pacific	3,876	2,255	1,621
Cambodia	10	10	—
Indonesia	4	4	—
Laos	1	—	1
North Korea	883	376	507
North Vietnam	2,978	1,865	1,113
Africa	760	270	490
Algeria	245	152	93
Angola	56	—	56
Burundi	Negl.	Negl.	—
Cameroon	Negl.	Negl.	—
Central African Republic	3	—	3
Chad	2	—	2
Congo	7	3	4
Equatorial Guinea	6	Negl.	6
Ethiopia	3	2	1
Gambia	Negl.	—	Negl.
Guinea	40	4	36
Guinea-Bissau	Negl.	—	Negl.
Mali	14	2	12
Morocco	16	2	14
Mozambique	12	—	12
Nigeria	64	25	39
Sierra Leone	Negl.	—	Negl.
Somalia	140	21	119
Sudan	82	51	31
Tanzania	7	2	5
Uganda	54	6	48
Zambia	9	—	9
Latin America	393	120	273
Cuba	309	120	189
Peru	84	—	84



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- in some areas the Soviets must compete with the technology available in Western markets;
- the Soviets have welcomed the chance to test new equipment on the battlefield, e.g., the SA-6 in Egypt and Syria.

15. Interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles have been among the military hardware most sought after by Third World clients. Because of their complexity, these systems require more training than most other weapons. This has provided the Soviets with an opportunity to send large numbers of advisers abroad and for training Third World military personnel in the USSR. Air defense systems have been sent, for example, to Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, North Vietnam, Somalia, and Syria, and most of them have had their air defense personnel trained in the USSR. Export of air defense systems has brought the USSR into the closest relations with clients involved in local conflicts; Soviet personnel associated with air defenses have engaged in combat activity in North Vietnam, North Korea, North Yemen, Syria, and Egypt.

16. Arms deliveries to Third World clients thus far have covered a wide range of non-nuclear weapons. Indeed, the USSR exported jet fighters as early as 1950, and was the first exporter of supersonic jet fighters (1959), surface-to-air missiles (1961), missile patrol boats (1961), and self-propelled radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns (1970). In recent years FROGS and Scud missiles—almost certainly equipped with conventional warheads—have been delivered to Middle East countries. However, in order to keep some of their most sophisticated electronics from Western hands, the Soviets often ship weapons systems with less than their best electronics. Because the Soviets draw upon an arsenal of weapons created in the first instance for Soviet forces, changes in that arsenal are reflected in Soviet exports. Perhaps the greatest improvement in Soviet exports has been in tactical fighters which now have capabilities for ground attack of a quality heretofore lacking in Soviet aircraft.

17. *Air Delivery.* When Soviet policy requires, the aid process can be rapid. During the past ten years the Soviets have shown an increasing propensity to use airlift as a means of getting high-priority military assistance to clients quickly, thus demonstrating their willingness and ability to help when needed.

18. Over the past ten years, the Soviets have gained increased experience in overseas airlift. The most notable of these operations included:

- After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets made 350 flights in four weeks to resupply Arab forces.
- The Soviets airlifted supplies to Nigeria in the late 1960s to support that government in its civil war against Biafra.
- During the 1970 "War of Attrition," Military Transport Aviation (VTA) was instrumental in the buildup and support of Soviet and Egyptian air defense units. In addition to personnel, ammunition, and SAMs, the Soviets probably also transported fighters and missile launchers.
- In 1970 the Soviets attempted to stage an airlift to Peru to provide disaster relief. It arrived late and suffered the loss of an AN-22 Cock.
- Prior to the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, the Soviets conducted a small airlift to India (via Egypt and South Yemen).
- While the October 1973 war in the Middle East was in progress, the Soviets mounted about 800 flights, followed by some 120 more flights during the remainder of the month. The 1973 operation demonstrated VTA's ability to act quickly and effectively in a crisis situation near the USSR. While this airlift was the most extensive ever attempted by the Soviets, it used only half of VTA's aircraft and virtually none of Aeroflot's, the Soviet national airline.

19. The most recent demonstration of Soviet overseas airlift capabilities has been in Angola. From late October 1975 through February 1976, more than 35 VTA aircraft conducted nearly 70 round trip flights to deliver weapons and supplies to MPLA forces in Angola. Fifty-five of the flights were made by AN-22s and the remainder by AN-12s. The latter staged through Hungary, Algeria, Mali, and Guinea and ultimately unloaded either at Brazzaville in Congo or Luanda itself, while the AN-22s usually made two enroute stops. Moreover, concurrently with the Angolan airlift, VTA also flew 15 round trip missions to South Yemen.

20. *Advisers.* Soviet personnel accompany most deliveries of military equipment (see Table III). They assemble and set up equipment, train local personnel,

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TABLE III

**SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN<sup>1</sup> MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN THIRD  
WORLD COUNTRIES  
1970-75<sup>2</sup>**

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total .....	13,125	12,450	12,660	9,020	9,780	10,090 <sup>3</sup>
Middle East						
Egypt .....	6,500	5,500	5,500 <sup>4</sup>	520 <sup>5</sup>	200	215
Iran .....	30	30	30	60	75	70
Iraq .....	320	400	500	785	1,035	1,035
Libya .....	—	20	20	10	145	345
Morocco .....	20	—	—	10	—	10
Syria .....	750	800	1,140	1,780	2,150	3,050
Yemen (Aden) ..	120	180	210	225	260	260
Yemen (Sana) ...	100	100	100	130	120	120
South Asia						
Afghanistan .....	160	160	200	425	425	350
Bangladesh .....	—	—	—	100	50	35
India .....	150	150	220	300	300	300
Pakistan .....	10	—	—	—	—	—
Sri Lanka .....	—	85	5	—	—	15
Southeast Asia						
Laos .....	—	—	—	—	—	300-500
Vietnam .....	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	400-500
Africa						
Algeria .....	1,000	1,000	1,000	650	650	650
Central African						
Republic .....	—	—	—	—	—	10
Chad .....	—	—	—	—	—	5
Congo .....	15	30	30	30	30	30 <sup>6</sup>
Equatorial Guinea	—	10	10	10	10	30
Guinea .....	65	80	110	110	110	110
Guinea-Bissau ..	—	—	—	—	—	65
Mali .....	30	15	10	45	15	35
Mozambique .....	—	—	—	—	—	25
Nigeria .....	50	70	70	70	60	45
Somalia .....	250	300	400	700	1,000	1,000
Sudan .....	500	500	100	20	90	80
Tanzania .....	10	10	—	—	5	55
Uganda .....	45	10	5	25	30	100
Zambia .....	—	—	—	—	—	10
Latin America						
Peru .....	—	—	—	15	20	35
Cuba .....	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	2,000

<sup>1</sup> East European technicians are estimated to account for about 10 percent of the total and, more often than not, are salaried under Soviet account.

<sup>2</sup> Minimum estimates of persons present for a period of one month or more. Soviet technicians in North Korea are not included.


<sup>3</sup> Excluding Southeast Asia.

<sup>4</sup> By the end of 1972, only about 100 Soviet technicians remained in the country.

<sup>5</sup> Most of these arrived with equipment supplied after the outbreak of the October war.

<sup>6</sup> 300 additional Soviet military technicians were in Congo associated with arms deliveries to Angola. The Soviet technicians in Angola are excluded because it was not an established government.

### Soviet Arms Deliveries to the Third World, 1966-75 (U.S. \$)



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and generally work closely with and attempt to influence the military of the host country.

21. The results of the Soviet advisory effort have not always been successful. While the military personnel of client states probably realize that the training and expertise offered by the Soviets, especially in advanced weaponry, are indispensable, there have been frictions. Some Third World military personnel have charged that Soviet advisers often are arrogant or indifferent, have involved themselves in local political activities, or have been slow in providing the full range of training required for the most sophisticated equipment.

22. The total number of Soviet and East European advisers in the Third World has declined over the past five years because of withdrawals from North Vietnam and the expulsion from Egypt. Elsewhere they have increased. The countries that show the most significant increases are Iraq, Somalia, Libya, and Syria.

23. Soviet training of Third World military personnel in the USSR is also increasing. Since 1971, the number of countries sending personnel to the USSR has about trebled, and the number of personnel being trained there has also shown a large increase to almost 4,000 (see Table IV). Much of the training in the USSR is on advanced weaponry. However, these training periods also enable the Soviets to emphasize Soviet military doctrine and to promote some affinity with the potential leaders of Third World countries—many of which have military regimes. While there are frictions connected with some of this training, in part related to the austerity, cultural barriers, and other rigors of life in the USSR, the Soviets do feel that these programs provide important opportunities to make their influence felt in the Third World.

### B. Aid to Insurgencies

24. The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as instruments to advance their position in the Third World. Over the past 20 years, however, the USSR has developed extensive relations with established governments which can do more for the Soviet Union than insurgents whose prospects for power are uncertain. Nevertheless, the importance of Soviet assistance to revolutionary movements in unstable areas has been underscored by the civil war in Angola and the prospects for further trouble in sub-Saharan Africa. While their assistance to Angola was small in absolute

terms, it had a decisive impact in an unstable situation.

25. In its relations with the West, the Soviet Union has sought to separate its support for insurgencies in the Third World from its policy of seeking East-West detente. The Soviets argue there is no contradiction between the two, and seek to dampen or minimize Western reaction to their actions. In its dealings with the Third World Moscow has benefited from its assertion that national liberation struggle is a form of "just war" and from its identification of Soviet communism with anticolonialism.

26. While the Soviets prefer to support left-leaning radical movements, they do not follow any rigorous ideological standards in granting aid to insurgents. Instead, pragmatism and opportunism prevail. The Soviets do not insist on total control of the guerrilla movements they support. They consider it sufficient that the insurgents share a common interest with them in weakening the position of a local government and diluting Western or Chinese influence and presence. Broad Soviet objectives are thus often served with only marginal control or participation in a movement.

27. Moscow's initial investments in guerrilla movements tend to be small and spread rather widely. Minimal at inception, such aid may develop at a pace and scope conditioned by a broad range of considerations, the most important of which has been the USSR's assessment of a movement's chances for success.

28. The characteristic Soviet pattern of arms support for a guerrilla movement is first indirect and then direct. The Soviets have usually chosen to try to conceal their direct involvement during the early stages of an insurgency by supplying the guerrillas through third countries. If a movement subsequently demonstrates cohesiveness and shows promise, Moscow may risk increasing its visibility and become directly involved.

29. During the advanced stages of an insurgency, Soviet shipments of military equipment are routed directly to guerrillas. These shipments are typically delivered to the ports of sympathetic third countries and picked up at dockside by guerrilla representatives. For example, Soviet aid for the insurgent movements in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola was initially routed through the governments of Guinea and Tanzania. By 1973, shipments of increasingly

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TABLE IV  
MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN  
THE USSR  
1955-75

	1955-75	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total .....	37,495 <sup>1</sup>	660	2,320	2,155	3,400	3,965*
Middle East						
Egypt .....	5,665	300	220	100	—	—
Iran .....	280	—	25	15	35	35
Iraq .....	2,950	40	145	350	700	250
Libya .....	900	—	—	—	300	600
Syria .....	3,325	50	530	700	530	300
Yemen (Aden) ..	735	25	120	65	180	180
Yemen (Sana) ...	1,055	—	—	15	75	100
South Asia						
Afghanistan .....	3,305	150	200	355	410	300
Bangladesh .....	395	—	250	65	65	15
India .....	2,085	—	170	115	305	100
Pakistan .....	45	—	—	—	5	—
Sri Lanka .....	5	—	—	—	—	5
Pacific						
Cambodia .....	30	—	—	—	—	—
Indonesia .....	7,560	—	—	—	—	—
Africa						
Algeria .....	1,970	—	—	—	—	50
Burundi .....	75	—	—	40	—	35
Congo .....	335	15	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea	200	—	—	—	—	200
Ghana .....	180	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea .....	840	—	185	70	15	70
Guinea-Bissau .....	100	—	—	—	—	100
Mali .....	200	—	—	—	—	50
Morocco .....	75	—	—	—	—	75
Mozambique .....	210	—	—	—	—	210
Nigeria .....	465	20	—	75	175	100
Somalia .....	2,375	60	450	—	150	500
Sudan .....	310	—	—	—	—	—
Tanzania .....	885	—	—	—	145	400
Uganda .....	665	—	—	190	200	100
Zambia .....	35	—	25	—	10	—
Latin America						
Peru .....	250	—	—	—	100	100

\* Data refer to the estimated minimum number of persons departing for training, and includes some that were still undergoing training as of the end of 1975. Figures for Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Laos are unavailable.

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sophisticated equipment were delivered to ports in Guinea and Tanzania by Soviet ships, and picked up there by guerrilla representatives.

### C. Soviet Military Forces Deployed in Third World Areas

30. Soviet military forces—primarily naval and air—complement military aid in the pursuit of Soviet policy objectives in the Third World. These forces contribute to the defense of the USSR, and perform a variety of political and military roles, such as showing off Soviet military might through port visits, asserting Soviet rights on the high seas, protecting maritime interests, demonstrating support of their Third World clients, and inhibiting Western military initiatives.<sup>3</sup>

31. *The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that the Soviets' deployed naval forces also provide them with the capability to threaten shipping to Western countries which are highly dependent on imports of Third World resources such as oil and other critical materials. The Soviets are unlikely to use force to interdict trade in peacetime—since to do so would invite retaliation and risk of war—but the very existence of a Soviet capability could be a psychological factor in crisis situations, even if the Soviets make no direct threat.*

32. *The Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency believe that, in the absence of a direct Soviet threat, any implicit risk to Western shipping posed by Soviet naval forces in Third World areas would not significantly affect Western responses to a crisis. During the 1973-74 energy crisis, for example, developed countries heavily dependent on overseas resources were far more responsive to the policies of Third World producers than to Soviet actions. Although Western countries would take Soviet forces into account in a future crisis, they probably would regard the Soviets as deterred from active interference with their shipping both by the presence of sizable Western naval forces and by the danger of escalation.*

<sup>3</sup> NIE 11-15-74, "Soviet Naval Policy and Programs," discusses Soviet naval activities in support of foreign policy objectives.

33. *To Protect Maritime Interests.* Soviet merchant vessels and fishing ships have from time to time violated other countries' territorial waters, and there have been incidents between Soviet crews and foreign nationals in ports. These incidents are rare and have generally been resolved through diplomatic channels. When Soviet merchant vessels were detained by local authorities—for example, in Ghana in 1969 and in Libya in early 1974—Soviet naval ships supplemented diplomatic initiatives by taking up positions offshore.

34. *To Demonstrate Soviet Support to Third World Countries.* The Soviet navy has been used in low-risk situations to show support to client states:

—In the spring of 1970, the Soviets made prolonged port calls at Mogadiscio to demonstrate support to the Somali regime, then under threat of being overthrown.

—In December 1970, the Soviets established a naval presence off the coast of Guinea to demonstrate backing for President Sekou Toure against an attack on Conakry. In the ensuing years, the Soviet naval presence there took on a permanent character.

35. On the other hand, the Soviets are aware that the presence of their naval units in the Third World can expose Moscow to undesirable risks at times of crisis. Thus, on October 5, 1973, Soviet ships in Port Said and Mersa Matruh in Egypt put out to sea, presumably to avoid becoming involved in the then imminent hostilities between Egypt and Israel.


36. *To Inhibit Western Military Initiatives.* In periods of tension the Soviets have endeavored to deter possible US action against a Soviet client and to provide a visible symbol of Soviet concern by interpositioning naval forces.

—During the May/June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets increased the number of missile-launching surface ships in the Mediterranean from two to five and used them to trail one British and two US carriers.

—During the Jordanian crisis in September-October 1970, Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean increased, and their ships took up positions in close proximity to those of the US.

—In December 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani war, the US and USSR deployed additional naval

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Operations of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces  
Outside Home Waters, 1965-75\*

forces to the Indian Ocean. Following the arrival of the USS Enterprise, four Soviet cruise-missile-equipped units reached the scene. The Soviets maintained surveillance of both US and British naval forces.

—During the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the Soviets doubled their forces in the Mediterranean and increased surveillance of the US Sixth Fleet. In effect, this gave notice that the risks attending a direct US intervention in support of Israel had risen. Soviet warships also could have provided protection to Soviet merchant ships sailing to Egyptian and Syrian ports.

—To back up the Cuban intervention in Angola in late 1975 and early 1976, the Soviets augmented their naval combatants off the west coast of Africa. This augmentation included a guided missile cruiser supported by increased ocean surveillance from satellites and TU-95s flying from Conakry and Havana.

37. Soviet capabilities to interposition naval forces depend upon availability of ships in nearby waters and the time required for reinforcement:

—In the Mediterranean, the Soviets now maintain about 11 major surface combatants and ten

submarines. In the Indian Ocean they usually have three or four major surface combatants and one submarine. Elsewhere, one or two warships are on patrol off West Africa, and a varying number of warships and submarines are normally underway in the Atlantic and Pacific in transit.

—Surface ships in the Mediterranean can be quickly reinforced from the Black Sea (the Soviets file contingency declarations in accordance with the Montreux Convention to pass the Turkish Straits). Submarine reinforcement from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean takes substantially longer—some ten days at a minimum. Movements from the Pacific Fleet to the northern Indian Ocean take even more time.

38. *To Strengthen Defenses of the USSR.* Military involvement in the Third World also contributes to the USSR's efforts to strengthen its overall military position. Since the 1950s the Soviet navy has extended its operations from nearby coastal waters into ocean areas. This facilitates their anticarrier and antisubmarine (ASW) missions.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The platforms and tactics developed by the Soviets to oppose Western naval forces and carriers in particular are treated in NIE 11-15-74, pp. 20-23.

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39. Since 1968, the Soviets have sought to operate their ASW, reconnaissance, and—in one instance—strike aircraft from Third World countries. In recent years, they have conducted only reconnaissance missions. Primary targets of Soviet surveillance are US aircraft carriers in their transit lanes to and from operating areas. US carriers are also reconnoitered by aircraft flying from the USSR and by ocean surveillance satellites. Despite the improvements in satellite capabilities, the Soviets probably consider the flexibility and timeliness of forward-based reconnaissance aircraft to be valuable in monitoring US naval operations. We expect that they will continue to attempt to expand air operations from Third World facilities.

#### D. Soviet Use of Naval and Air Facilities Overseas

40. As their presence in distant areas and their needs for support have risen, the Soviets have sought access to foreign shore facilities for logistics purposes, major repairs, communications, and support of aircraft deployments. The Soviets use communications facilities in the Middle East, Cuba, and Somalia. These facilities supplement improvements in command and control the Soviets have made through communications satellites, airborne command posts, and command and control ships. The Soviet navy's moves toward greater use of foreign facilities have been cautious, and at this time Soviet surface ship deployments probably could be sustained essentially at current levels without access to foreign facilities.

41. *Mediterranean.* The Soviets established a submarine base in Albania in 1958 but were expelled in 1961. A campaign to obtain access to facilities in Egypt bore fruit as a result of Soviet aid during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In 1968 Nasser granted the Soviets exclusive use and control of portions of facilities in Egyptian ports for major ship repairs and replenishment, and in Egyptian airfields to station and operate naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft. The Soviets also stationed missile strike aircraft in Egypt, but these were never operated over the Mediterranean and were eventually turned over to the Egyptians. In 1972 Sadat terminated these operational air activities and restricted Soviet use of Egyptian naval facilities. By April 1976 he ended all Soviet use of Egyptian ports and anchorages. Currently the Soviets can only use Egyptian airfields for airlifts to Egypt and other countries.

42. Operating under various limitations Soviet naval units currently use ports in Syria and Yugoslavia. Since 1972 Moscow has maintained two or three reconnaissance-configured Cub aircraft in Syria which have been used solely in support of the Syrians against Israel.

43. The Soviets are seeking greater access to naval facilities throughout the Mediterranean. For the near term, we believe that Soviet prospects for the kind of controlled access to Mediterranean<sup>1</sup> shore facilities that they desire for substantial repairs and sustained replenishment are dim except in Yugoslavia, where Moscow's prospects are marginally better but still problematic. Syria may be the next best bet, but, like Yugoslavia, Syria continues to insist on restricting Soviet use of and access to its limited port facilities. Moreover, Syrian-Soviet relations continue to deteriorate over Lebanon.<sup>5</sup>

44. *Indian Ocean.* Soviet naval units routinely receive logistic support at Berbera in Somalia, and to a lesser degree at Umm Qasr and Basra in Iraq and at Aden in South Yemen. Only in Somalia have the Soviets constructed facilities for their own use. At Berbera they have built barracks and a communications relay facility for their exclusive use. They have built a missile-handling and support facility which apparently will service Styx missiles for the Somali navy but in the future is expected to handle more modern cruise missiles for the Soviet navy. The facility could also service and stock surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles as well as other types of naval ordnance. They have brought in a floating drydock which substantially increases Soviet naval repair capabilities. Finally they could have access to the POL storage facility at Berbera whose capacity the Soviets have doubled.

45. The Soviets are building, albeit slowly, an airstrip at Berbera which, when completed, will be capable of supporting all types of Soviet aircraft. The Soviets are also improving several other fields in Somalia which their aircraft could use. The Soviets have occasionally used Somali airfields at Hargeisa and Mogadiscio and the airfield at Aden in South Yemen to operate IL-38 ASW and AN-12 reconnaissance aircraft over the Indian Ocean. In October 1976, the Soviets began deploying TU-95 Bear

<sup>5</sup> See IIM "Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities," August 2, 1976, for further details.



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reconnaissance aircraft to Somalia. These aircraft can cover all shipping lanes from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Malacca.

46. The Soviets may increase the frequency and regularity of such deployments if they do not encounter difficulties in obtaining overflight clearances. They could also deploy naval strike aircraft to Somalia after the airfield at Berbera is completed. Currently, the Soviets could send such aircraft to Somalia during a crisis to operate from the fields near Mogadiscio and Chisimaio.

47. The Soviets are aware of the desire of some littoral countries to curtail great power presence, and Brezhnev has publicly denied that the USSR has or wants to have any base in the Indian Ocean. While the Soviets have given sympathetic public treatment of the idea of an Indian Ocean "Peace Zone," there is no indication that Moscow will abandon its facility in Berbera or yield on the principle of freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.

48. *Atlantic.* The Soviet use of port and air facilities in the Atlantic has centered on Cuba and Guinea. Periodic and often simultaneous reconnaissance flights by TU-95 Bear aircraft from Havana and Conakry permit the Soviets to monitor some shipping as well as Western naval operations, particularly in US carrier transit lanes.

49. In 1970 the Cubans built for the Soviets a housing and recreation area on an island in Cienfuegos Bay. The Soviets installed submarine nets and brought in a rescue tug and two special-purpose barges of a type that is used in servicing nuclear submarines at naval bases and shipyards in the USSR. Apparently the Soviets intended to use Cienfuegos for regular support of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines—including SSBNs—deployed to the Atlantic but were deterred by Washington's sharp reaction. To date no Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have used the support facilities or barges at Cienfuegos, although nuclear-powered attack submarines have called at Cienfuegos as well as other Cuban ports. The barges have been recently moved to Havana, possibly for repairs and return to Cienfuegos, or possibly in preparation for being shipped back to the USSR.

50. Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope reprovision at

Conakry. However, so far as is known, combatants have not refueled at Conakry.

51. We foresee a continued Soviet military presence in West Africa. Through September 1976 the Soviets had made 17 deployments of TU-95 Bear aircraft to Conakry for reconnaissance operations. The Guineans halted Soviet air operations at Conakry in July 1976 but the flights resumed in September. The Soviets would wish to hedge against the permanent loss of access to Guinean facilities. Thus, we expect that they will seek to improve relations with other central West African states that might give them access to additional shore facilities.

### E. Merchant Marine and Fishing Fleet

52. The Soviets have used their merchant fleet to deliver military aid as well as to provide logistic support for forces in distant areas. It could also be used to carry ground forces to a friendly port. The merchant fleet has over 1,700 ships of 1,000 dead-weight tons or more. The USSR has just begun to acquire a fleet of roll-on/roll-off vessels whose ability to load and discharge wheeled and tracked vehicles rapidly make them particularly useful for military support.

53. The large Soviet fishing fleet does not routinely conduct reconnaissance or make contact reports. It could, however, be used in a crisis to assist Soviet naval intelligence reporting. Soviet fishing support vessels have replenished Soviet intelligence ships operating off the coast of the US.

### F. Additional Soviet Forces Capable of Deployment to the Third World in a Crisis

54. In addition to the navy, the Soviets have other military forces which have been or could be used in crisis in distant areas. Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed to operate primarily in the contiguous areas of the Eurasian land mass. Although the Soviets have not developed assault forces comparable to a US Marine Amphibious Force, Soviet training (under a wide variety of climatic conditions), coupled with the diversity and quality of their equipment, gives them a capacity to send forces to distant areas in crisis situations.

55. *Air Defense.* Air defense units manned by Soviet forces have been the mainstay of Soviet direct military

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involvement abroad; they were sent to North Korea (1950), Cuba (1962), North Vietnam (1965), Egypt (1970), and Syria (1973). The most extensive recent effort was in Egypt during the 1970 "War of Attrition," when the Soviets deployed, over a period of months, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet pilots and missile crews operating under their own command and control network. This form of assistance has proven to be highly responsive to client needs.

56. Soviet capabilities to respond quickly with air defense units in an overseas crisis heretofore have been limited by the Soviet practice of transporting their fighter aircraft by ship or airlift. The advent of longer-range fighters gives the Soviets a capability to ferry fighter aircraft to distant areas. However, the Soviets have never flown fighter aircraft long distances over open water.

57. *Airborne.* Should the Soviets decide to intervene rapidly on the ground in the Third World, selected units from any of the seven operational airborne divisions would be the most likely forces to be employed initially. These divisions are maintained at a high state of readiness and, because of their small size and lightweight equipment, have relatively good strategic mobility. They are also receiving new air-droppable amphibious combat vehicles and increased numbers of artillery, shoulder-fired surface-to-air-missiles, and antitank missiles. These will considerably increase their tactical mobility and firepower, including their antitank capabilities. Nevertheless, the capabilities of Soviet (like other) airborne divisions to stand up to major opposition are limited. Compared with modern tank and mechanized forces, they still have extremely limited firepower, armor protection, and tactical mobility.

58. *Naval Infantry.* Soviet naval infantry now numbers about 12,000 men, of which 9,000 are assault elements dispersed among the four fleets. Although lightly armed, a Soviet naval infantry unit would compare favorably with most Third World ground units of similar size. Soviet naval infantry lacks organic air support and in a Eurasian operation would be supported by Soviet tactical aviation. In a Third World intervention, the use of naval infantry forces probably would be limited, most likely as a demonstration of force or as a shore party to protect evacuation of Soviet personnel. For example, it would take at least five days for the Soviets to sealift the

Black Sea naval infantry regiment of 1,900 men to a Syrian port. Small contingents are usually deployed on Soviet amphibious ships in the Mediterranean and at times in the Atlantic and Indian oceans; any naval infantry at sea in the eastern Mediterranean could reach Syria or Egypt in a day or two.

59. *Army Forces.* A Soviet decision to send substantial ground forces to a Third World area would involve a major sealift operation. For example, for the Soviets to send motorized rifle or tank divisions to the Middle East would require a minimum of two weeks for the first division to be assembled, moved to Black Sea ports, loaded, transited to the Mediterranean, and offloaded in a Syrian port. Deployment of larger forces—e.g., the equivalent of two combined arms armies totaling at least 120,000 men—would require two to three months. The USSR could divert sufficient merchant shipping to accomplish this task.<sup>6</sup>

60. *Airlift Capabilities.* The Soviets have increasingly used Military Transport Aviation to delivery high-priority items of military equipment and emergency resupplies to client forces. The VTA can also deploy limited combat forces overseas.

61. VTA currently has over 600 AN-12 Cub transport aircraft in its inventory. Prior to the introduction of the AN-22 Cock in late 1960s, the Soviets had no capabilities for long-range strategic lift. Since then, VTA has received around 50 AN-22s and about 40 IL-76 Candid aircraft. Over the last five years, VTA's capacity has been raised by 5,500 tons to a total of 19,000 tons. The rise in numbers of Candid (which are comparable to the American C-141s) will significantly enhance VTA's capability to carry large cargoes and increased numbers of troops over long distances. The AN-22 is the only Soviet aircraft which can carry outsized equipment—such as medium tanks. Production of this aircraft has stopped and Soviet heavy lift capacity will be limited unless a follow-on is produced.

62. By diverting all of their military airlift capacity, the Soviets could airlift only the assault elements of two airborne divisions (or one division with all its combat equipment) in a single lift and transport them, say, to Syria within three to five days. Such a

<sup>6</sup> See also NIE 35/36-1-76: "Middle East Military Balance (1976-1981)," Section 4, for further details of Soviet capability to intervene in the Middle East.

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rapid deployment could preclude VTA from airlifting other forces or supplies. A deployment could also be made to Southeast Asia or Africa with refueling stops. For example, the Soviets could ferry forces to southern Africa by staging through Algiers and Conakry. The assault elements of an airborne division could be deployed to Angola in a few days, but would arrive with only the most basic supplies of ammunition, medical supplies, and food.

63. *Aeroflot.* Aeroflot constitutes a substantial reserve which potentially triples the Soviet capability to airlift troops. Aeroflot could augment VTA's cargo capacity by 25 percent, but Aeroflot planes cannot carry outsized cargo. While Aeroflot is not subordinated to VTA, the Minister of Civil Aviation, who directs Aeroflot, has the rank of Marshal of Aviation, most air crews are air force reservists, and the fleet could be quickly militarized. During the semiannual rotations of Soviet conscripts in Eastern Europe, Aeroflot has made more than 1,000 flights over a 17-day period without any apparent disruption of its normal services. These flights could have carried more than 100,000 men in each direction. Beginning in January 1976, Aeroflot IL-62s flown by Soviet crews airlifted Cuban troops and materiel to Angola. These flights have continued and now appear to be used for returning sick and wounded Cuban troops and possibly for troop rotations.

### G. Other Limitations

64. *Overflights and Staging.* The need to obtain overflight or staging privileges complicates airlift operations. Although the Soviets regularly overfly neighboring countries on a variety of military-related missions, permission to overfly key countries, such as Iran, Turkey, and even Yugoslavia, is neither automatic nor assured. Permission to stage military flights through a third country, which implies support of Soviet action, is even more uncertain.

65. *Capabilities Against Significant Opposition.* Beyond the range of Soviet land-based air or of air support from a local ally, Soviet intervention forces are vulnerable to interdiction either in the air or at sea. Their capabilities to directly intervene ashore against well-armed Third World countries, such as Algeria or South Africa, suffer from lack of air defense, close air support, and amphibious forces capable of establishing and holding a large beachhead. The V/STOL aircraft carried aboard the Soviet Kiev-class

ASW aircraft carrier, which became operational this year, could provide limited seaborne air support. Evidence on this subsonic aircraft is sparse, but it is apparently designed for air defense and antiship missions. Only a small number of aircraft would be carried—some 12-15 in a mix with helicopters (with a theoretical maximum of 36 if only V/STOLs were aboard). Available in limited numbers, these aircraft would be only marginally effective in support of ground operations.

### III. THE USSR AND ITS THIRD WORLD CLIENTS

66. Moscow's primary instrument of military policy in the Third World has been military assistance. Over the past 20 years Moscow has delivered military equipment to a total of some 50 less developed countries. However, only a few have been willing to rely heavily on the USSR, and the lion's share—some 70 percent—of the deliveries has been to six countries: Egypt, Syria, India, Iraq, Cuba, and North Vietnam.

67. Moscow's heaviest investment has been in the Middle East. Despite their mistrust of Moscow, Arab countries proved eager to have Soviet weapons because of their confrontations with Israel and each other. The largest flow of Soviet weapons continues to be to the Middle East despite the cut-off of supplies to Egypt.

68. Sub-Saharan Africa is the area which has the greatest potential for new Soviet gains. Here, Soviet support of national liberation movements will be especially important.


69. India and Cuba continue to be major recipients of Soviet military assistance, but we do not expect Moscow will find major new clients in either Asia or Latin America in the next five years.

#### A. Middle East

70. Despite recent setbacks, the USSR possesses a substantial potential to affect the military balance and thus to influence the level of regional tension. The USSR is providing large quantities of military equipment to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria. Military aid and the USSR's capability to project military power into the area strengthens Moscow's credentials as an Arab ally and counterweight to US influence.

71. *Egypt.* The deep military involvement which developed between the Soviet Union and Egypt in

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1967-1972 had elements of a pattern which could be repeated in Soviet relations with other clients. Nasser mistrusted both Soviet and Egyptian communists, but he badly needed Soviet weapons—especially to replace equipment lost in the 1967 war and in 1970, when he needed air defense equipment and personnel against Israeli deep penetration raids.

- From Moscow's standpoint, Egypt was vulnerable enough so that Nasser was willing to pay for Soviet equipment in terms of military facilities; at the same time, Egypt was not so weak as to be beyond help and was thus a viable partner.
- While Egypt was an expensive client, Egyptian needs were ones which the Soviets could meet. This was especially true in 1970 when Egypt needed air defense—a field which the Soviets had long emphasized in their own military programs. Moreover, in Egypt as in Vietnam, provision of air defense had the political virtue of putting Moscow in the position of helping to defend a client country.
- The Soviets gradually developed a substantial presence in Egypt to conduct three major missions. With Soviet equipment came Soviet advisers and technicians whose function was to help the Egyptians improve their forces. Soviet personnel operated SAMs for the Egyptians and Soviet pilots flew air defense and reconnaissance missions. The Soviets also used Egyptian ports

and airfields to support their naval ships and aircraft, which operated against NATO forces in the Mediterranean.

72. As the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship developed, Egypt became increasingly dependent upon the USSR not only for new equipment but for the spares and replacements necessary to keep its previously acquired equipment usable. Sadat's decisions to expel the bulk of Soviet military personnel in 1972 and his final closure of Egyptian ports to Soviet use this year were difficult decisions: he had to be prepared to accept a weakening of Egypt's military forces as the price of getting rid of the Soviets. The Soviets probably hope that Sadat will fall and relations with Egypt will improve, but they probably do not expect to regain their former military facilities in Egypt.

73. *Syria*. Since the souring of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1972, Syria has been the largest recipient of Soviet military aid. The \$1.2 billion of arms the Soviets delivered from the end of the 1973 war through 1975 not only replaced Syria's war losses but also enabled it to expand and upgrade its air and ground forces. There are about 3,000 Soviet military advisers in the country, and President Asad is pressing for a continuing supply of sophisticated weapon systems. Syria, however, has persistently refused to sign a friendship pact with the USSR and differs with Moscow over the proper approach to a Middle East

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peace agreement. Serious differences over Syrian actions against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon have reportedly led Moscow to threaten to withhold new arms agreements, although shipments under existing agreements have continued.

74. Since the decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1972, the Soviets have made increasing use of Syrian ports, particularly Tartus, where they replenish submarines and minor combatants alongside auxiliary ships. Syrian ports lack the facilities found in Egypt and are not a substitute for the use of Alexandria. The Soviets, however, are playing a major role in the construction of several new commercial docking and warehouse facilities in Latakia aimed at doubling the port's limited berthing capacity. Syria's internal transport system (rail, roads, and air) is also undergoing major improvements with Soviet assistance.

75. *Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)*. The Soviets have trained Palestinians in the USSR and provided the PLO with limited quantities of small arms, funneled primarily through Syria. In November 1974 the Soviets reportedly reassured Arafat that they would supply the weapons and equipment necessary to continue and expand commando operations inside Israeli territory.

76. Direct shipments apparently were instituted, but we do not know the amount of arms involved. In addition to small arms the PLO has machineguns, mortars, 75-mm antitank guns, and some BTR-152 armored personnel carriers. Most of these weapons are of Soviet manufacture, but the majority of them were supplied through third countries, principally Syria (until late 1975) and more recently through Iraq, Egypt, and Libya.

77. The Soviets are clearly distressed by the plight of the Palestinians in Lebanon. While they have maintained a fairly steady public stand in favor of the PLO and criticized Syrian intervention, the Soviets have done nothing that might seriously jeopardize their relations with Damascus.

78. The Soviets are distrustful of Arafat, doubtful about the PLO's organizational discipline, and have urged moderation in the conflict in Lebanon. Nonetheless they regard the PLO as a likely entre into the Arab-Israeli settlement process. They probably envision any future Palestinian state, squeezed between a hostile Israel and a suspicious Jordan, as a logical

future recipient of Soviet assistance—and possibly a useful client in the area.

79. *Libya*. The Soviet-Libyan relationship is marked by suspicion on both sides, and it is unlikely that the Soviets are counting on rapid progress toward a close coordination of policies. Nevertheless, they signed an agreement for more than \$700 million worth of arms in 1974. Libya has received TU-22 Blinders, MIG-23 Floggers, Scud missiles, and the first of several Osa II missile patrol boats. The Soviets have increased the number of advisers there to around 600; they are training Libyan personnel in aircraft and SAM operations and maintenance but these advisers are not and probably will not be integrated into ground force tactical units.

80. The Libyans have received more equipment than they can absorb. For example, they have stockpiled around 1,500 Soviet tanks. President Qadhafi probably hopes that possession of weapons such as these will give him visible trappings of power and leverage in Arab politics. He probably wants to build up an "arsenal of arms" for other Arab countries in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war. However, if the equipment is not properly maintained, in a few years it will begin to deteriorate. Qadhafi uses Soviet-supplied small arms to support terrorist and guerrilla groups in a number of countries and maintains training camps for them in Libya.

81. We have examined the question of whether the Soviets might use equipment in Libyan stockpiles in the event of a Soviet intervention to support Arab countries against the Israelis. How the volatile Qadhafi would view such a proposal is a moot point. Whatever his reaction, the Soviets would face serious problems:

- The equipment is not likely to be maintained at Soviet standards.
- There would be major gaps in the inventory of crucial support equipment—including prime movers, tank transporters, artillery, engineer, communications equipment—necessary to support Soviet ground divisions.
- Storage sites near Tripoli are about 1,200 miles from the Suez Canal, and forces starting even from Benghazi would have to cover some 700 miles to the Canal area, mainly over a single road

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having few facilities for logistical support and vulnerable to interdiction.

—The use of airlift to move supplies from Libya would degrade Soviet capabilities to resupply the Arabs from the USSR in a crisis.

In view of these problems, we believe it highly unlikely that the present Soviet-Libyan arms arrangements represent a Soviet prepositioning of material for their own forces.<sup>7</sup>

82. *Algeria.* In 1975 Algeria sought new Soviet armaments as it headed toward a confrontation with Morocco. Moscow apparently welcomed the opportunity to improve its relations with Algiers, which had been cooling. Moscow signed a \$500 million military aid agreement with Algeria. In order to get weapons to Algeria quickly, Moscow persuaded Libya to send material from its inventory by promising to replace what the Libyans gave the Algerians. By the end of that year the Soviets had the additional incentive of guaranteeing Algerian cooperation in allowing the Soviet airlift to Angola to stage through Algerian airfields.

83. The Soviets almost certainly understand that Algeria is using some Soviet-supplied arms to equip the Polisario Front guerrillas in the former Spanish Sahara. Moscow has publicly favored Algeria's position of self-determination in the dispute, but the Soviets have not officially endorsed the Front. We have no confirmation of Moroccan-inspired reports of Soviet personnel in Spanish Sahara or of Soviet arms shipments directly to the Polisario.

84. *Morocco.* The Soviets maintain a modest military sales and training program with Morocco.

<sup>7</sup> *The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force notes that large stockpiles of war materiel now established in Syria and Iraq, as well as Libya, are greatly in excess of local requirements or the ability of Arab Forces to employ. These resources would presumably be available to Soviet troops and fighter or air defense elements in the event of their insertion into renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities. Also such prestockage appears consistent with sensitive source data regarding the desirability of establishing reserves of materiel outside of Warsaw Pact areas as a prerequisite for military operations. The use of this equipment in conjunction with airlifted Soviet antitank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile BMP regiments could have a decisive impact on the outcome of hostilities. Further, given the growing will and enhanced operational capability of the Soviets to directly intervene, a variety of military options are available which would not entail excessive airlift support nor the classical commitment of heavy armor as a precondition to success.*

Soviet diplomats, largely because of Moscow's interest in obtaining Moroccan phosphates and fishing rights, have tried to prevent further deterioration in relations by privately stressing Moscow's neutrality in the Sahara conflict and describing Morocco's takeover of the Spanish Sahara as a fait accompli that Algeria will have to accept. This has not, however, allayed Rabat's suspicions.

85. *Iraq.* Despite frictions in Soviet-Iraqi relations and Baghdad's attempts to diversify its sources of arms supply, Soviet deliveries to Iraq have run about \$300 million annually in the past two years and substantial deliveries are likely to continue. Moscow has sent some of its most advanced equipment—Scuds, TU-22 Blinders, MIG-23 Floggers, and SA-6s. Unlike Syria, however, Iraq has turned increasingly to Western suppliers, thus reducing its dependence on the USSR. Iraq's largest purchases in the past two years have been from France and West Germany.

86. The Soviets have intermittently stationed a repair ship in Basrah which has serviced Soviet naval vessels in addition to training Iraqis in ship repairs. The Soviets are unlikely to increase their use of Iraqi ports in the confines of the Persian Gulf as long as they can rely on Berbera, Somalia—a port whose approaches are less restricted.

87. *Iran.* Although Tehran relies on the West for all of its sophisticated weapons, it has purchased almost \$850 million worth of Soviet arms and support equipment, such as trucks, armored personnel carriers, engineer vehicles and equipment, and artillery for its ground forces since 1967. Despite these agreements, Iran is working to eliminate any Soviet naval presence from the Persian Gulf, is committed to the defeat of leftist insurgencies in the area, and is building up its armed forces in an effort to become the dominant regional power.

88. *Arabian Peninsula.* As a result of the Soviets' increased use of their complex of support facilities in Berbera, they will push less to increase their use of facilities in Iraq and South Yemen (PDRY) over the near term.

89. The Soviets are trying to legitimize their relationships with Persian Gulf states. In the face of Saudi Arabia's increasingly active foreign policy in the region, Moscow is continuing to give military aid and offer agreements, especially to Kuwait and the two Yemens. While the Soviets would welcome—and may

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have been attempting to encourage—insurgencies, there is little chance for the moment that a revolutionary government sympathetic to Moscow will emerge in the area.

90. The USSR has provided 85 percent of Aden's total arms imports since 1968. Despite this Soviet military aid, the PDRY has not granted Moscow expanded use of the port of Aden. So far the main benefit of that port to the Soviets has been the supply of water, although ship reprovisioning and some refueling are known to have occurred. Aden has served also as a staging base for Soviet airlifts of military supplies to India, Somalia, and East Africa. In late 1975 Moscow mounted an airlift to Aden, evidently to support Yemeni forces helping the Dhofar rebels. While there is little reliable information on the subject, we believe that the USSR was the principal source of arms, through the PDRY, for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

91. North Yemen's relations with the USSR are not as close as they once were, and the government would prefer to limit its involvement with Moscow. Now that the Saudi military aid program appears to be under way, it seems unlikely that Sana will take up any Soviet offers.

## B. Africa

92. In absolute terms, Soviet military aid to sub-Saharan Africa is quite small. Total Soviet military deliveries to all of the area for the past 20 years amount to about \$700 million—less than the USSR gave Indonesia in Sukarno's heyday. But because military forces in the underdeveloped countries of sub-Saharan Africa are small and poorly equipped, limited amounts of Soviet military assistance can have a significant impact. Soviet military assistance helped bring to power Soviet-supported factions in some of the former Portuguese colonies and has helped to obtain a Soviet military complex in Somalia and the use of facilities in Guinea. Because the military is frequently the most important element in African politics, Soviet military aid has helped the USSR to compete with both the West and China for influence in Africa.

93. *Angola.* Moscow's assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola dates back to the early 1960s. When the MPLA suffered setbacks in

October 1975, the Soviets initiated an air and sealift from the USSR to help its client and in January 1976 began providing an airlift for Cuban forces between Cuba and Angola.

94. The Soviets evidently believe that the victory of a Soviet-supported national liberation movement has increased Soviet prestige in the Third World. The Soviets probably hope that Angola—where a substantial Cuban presence will probably remain for some time—may also assist the USSR in providing Soviets an entree to other national liberation movements in southern Africa—such as SWAPO. In October 1976 the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation to consolidate their political position. In addition, they may hope to obtain access to port and air facilities as an alternative to those in Guinea.


95. *Mozambique.* Although not as extensive as that of the Chinese, Soviet aid in the form of military equipment, training, and funds assisted the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) to come to power when Mozambique achieved independence in June 1975. FRELIMO will probably continue to receive substantial financial and military aid both from the USSR and the PRC. Mozambique provides training and base areas for guerrilla operations against the white minority government of Rhodesia, an activity to which the Soviets have given both military and political support. President Machel kept the Soviets at arm's length immediately after independence but has been friendlier to them recently. Agreements have been reached to train Mozambique officers in the USSR possibly in preparation for deliveries of military equipment.

96. *Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands.* Prior to the independence of these territories in July 1975, Moscow gave strong backing to their current ruling party, the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), provided arms and training through Guinea, and stationed a permanent naval presence off Conakry to discourage Portuguese intervention against rebel sanctuaries in Guinea. Cubans collaborated with the Soviets in supporting the PAIGC, and this aid was instrumental in assisting guerrillas to come to power.

97. Currently Moscow is the major source of weapons and military training and has provided some economic aid to these impoverished countries as well.

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There have been unconfirmed reports that Moscow has asked for military privileges in Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands, but neither government has granted any and both have said that they do not intend to allow foreign bases on their territories.

98. *Tanzania.* During the past two years Moscow has expanded its ties with Dar es Salaam. New arms agreements—the first since the mid-1960s—have put the total value of Soviet military aid on a par with the Chinese. Soviet interests in Tanzania are more than mere rivalry with the PRC. Tanzania's proximity to Mozambique and Rhodesia offers the Soviets channels to anti-Rhodesian liberation groups that traditionally have been based in Tanzania.

99. Tanzania was also the locus of the most extensive PRC activity in Africa, notably the recently completed TanZam railway project. Prior to 1974 China had been the principal supplier of military assistance and will probably remain the major donor of economic aid. During the past few years some friction has developed between China and Tanzania over China's military assistance. In this atmosphere Moscow has significantly increased its military aid and has established a military advisory mission there.

100. *Somalia.* Beset by economic troubles and engaged in a traditional confrontation with Ethiopia, the Siad government has welcomed Soviet economic and military assistance and has afforded the Soviets a high degree of military and political influence. To support the construction and operation of their facilities and the military aid program in Somalia, the Soviets have tripled the size of their presence there since 1973. There are now an estimated 1,000 Soviet military technicians in the country, and this number probably will increase further.

101. The Soviets will probably encourage Somalia to avoid the risk of war with Ethiopia by confining Somali actions in Eritrea to insurgency and subversion. Moscow has not interfered with Somalia's support of the insurgency in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, which Mogadiscio wants to annex after the French depart. The Soviets may hope eventually to gain access to the naval base at Djibouti.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> For additional discussion, see SNIE 76-1-76 of March 1976, "Prospects for and Implications of Conflict in the Horn of Africa Over the Next Year or So."

102. *Guinea.* Moscow's influence in Conakry has been strong since Guinea's independence in 1958, but the Soviets did not gain access to military facilities there until after the abortive Portuguese attack in 1970. In recent years, the Soviets have maintained a permanent naval presence off Conakry and used the port. In addition they have used the airfield at Conakry for TU-95 Bear deployments. Guinea has received some \$40 million in Soviet arms and equipment over the last ten years as well as military training and economic assistance.

103. Conakry served as the port of entry for Soviet arms to insurgents in Guinea-Bissau before that country won its independence from Portugal, and last year Guinea, along with Algeria, served as a staging area for Soviet airlifts to Angola.

104. In the past, the Guineans asked for Soviet—and even Chinese—assistance to build a naval facility on Tamara Island. For their part, the Soviets reportedly sought control of portions of the base. The Guineans eventually rejected the Soviet terms.

105. *Mali.* Mali's first President, Modibo Keita, welcomed Soviet assistance in order to lessen Mali's dependence on France and to enhance his credentials as a radical socialist African leader. The regime which overthrew him in 1968 improved relations with France and other Western countries, but has continued to seek military assistance from the USSR and the army officers who are now Mali's political leaders are almost totally dependent on the USSR for military equipment and training.

106. About 50 Soviet advisers provide armor, artillery, and parachute training and all Mali's pilots are Soviet-trained. Soviet personnel maintain Mali's civilian as well as military aircraft and all depend entirely on the USSR for spare parts. The Soviets have improved Mali's air force base at Mopti and are now surveying other Malian airfields. Moscow has signed military agreements with Mali totaling \$21 million since 1960. The Soviets occasionally used Malian airfields to stage arms supply flights during the Angola crisis, and Mali would probably grant Moscow transit privileges for the support of other southern African liberation groups.

107. *The Gambia and Senegal.* After responding to a Gambian request for small arms shipments, the Soviets demonstrated some interest in expanding military cooperation. But the Gambia turned down a

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Soviet offer of military advisers. President Senghor of neighboring Senegal deeply distrusts Soviet intentions toward West Africa, and Soviet involvement in Angola has nourished his suspicions.

108. *Equatorial Guinea and Congo.* The Soviets have reportedly sought—but failed to get—use of naval facilities in both countries. Moscow delivered three patrol craft to Equatorial Guinea in 1975 and probably will increase the number of advisers there. Brazzaville is reported to be discontented with the way Soviet aid projects are being implemented and the amount of Soviet assistance given in contrast with that given by the Chinese. Some Congolese students returning home after training in the USSR are disillusioned, and Soviet fishing off the Congo rankles that country. Nonetheless, Brazzaville allowed the Soviets to use Pointe Noire to channel supplies to African liberation groups in Angola and southern Africa.

109. *Sudan.* The Soviet Union began supplying arms in 1960 and concluded a major armaments agreement in 1967 after the Six-Day War. The Numayri government has returned to a more balanced policy in East-West relations following the defeat of the communist coup in 1971. Since then Soviet influence has declined, especially after the abortive coup of July 1976. Nearly 100 advisers are still present, and the Soviets recently delivered some old jet fighters as a gift. Nevertheless, Khartoum has turned once more to the UK and to Egypt for most of its assistance. The PRC, while keeping a low profile, is also furnishing assistance in both military and economic fields.

110. *Uganda.* In 1973 the Soviets began sending advanced military equipment to Uganda, including tanks and a squadron of MIG-21 fighters, and Soviet instructors. Despite Soviet wariness toward President Amin and a temporary break in relations in late 1975, the Soviets apparently still see Uganda as a target of opportunity, and there have been reports that they are negotiating a new military assistance agreement.

111. *Kenya.* Neither the USSR nor the PRC has much current influence in Kenya. The Soviets have offered arms and made approaches in connection with repair of their fishing vessels. Nairobi, however, continues to address its arms requests to the UK and the US and maintains a policy by which the US Navy

has access to Mombasa for replenishment and recreational purposes.

112. *Nigeria.* Soviet relations with Nigeria reached a high point during the Biafran rebellion, but the Nigerians evidently declined to help the USSR stage its airlift to Angola. Nevertheless, the USSR continues to supply some military aid to Nigeria.

## C. Asia

113. In South Asia the USSR has devoted most of its attention to India because of its location, size, and population and because the Soviets regard it as a counterweight to China. In Bangladesh, however, they received a setback in 1975 with the change in leadership to a regime less sympathetic to Moscow.


114. Moscow sees the communist victory in Indochina as a victory for Soviet interests, as well as a setback for the US. Nevertheless the USSR has not achieved a stable or leading position there.

115. *Collective Security.* The USSR has persisted in proposing an Asian collective security system without specifically defining it. In mid-1975 the Soviets made low-level demarches to generate support for a security conference, suggesting that it might be analogous to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The results of these efforts to convene a conference were uniformly negative, as the Soviets undoubtedly anticipated. Nevertheless, they will probably continue to plug for Asian collective security in order to assert their credentials as an Asian power and because it is a useful device for testing Asian attitudes toward the USSR. Moreover, despite Soviet protestations to the contrary, the proposal is an anti-Chinese device, designed to force Peking either to accept a leading Soviet role in Asia or to appear ambitious and bellicose. At the same time, the generalized pledges of national independence and regional cooperation that are part of the Soviet proposal provide a propaganda counter to Chinese charges that Moscow seeks hegemony over Asia.

116. *India.* Over the years the Soviets have become increasingly interested in India. The mutual interests of the two countries underlay the 1971 treaty and led the Soviets to give strong support to New Delhi—including the deployment of major combatants to the Indian Ocean—at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. Although India has been the recipient of large amounts of Soviet military aid, this assistance

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has not been as central to its relationship with the USSR as was the case in Syria and Egypt. Moreover, India has been determined to protect its independence from Moscow and has effectively turned back Soviet overtures for regular access to Indian air and naval facilities.

117. Since 1965 India has imported almost \$1.4 billion worth of arms from the Soviet Union, and Moscow has become India's primary source of high-performance jet aircraft, submarines, destroyer escorts, landing ships, and guided-missile patrol boats. Moscow also has provided over \$200 million in plants, machinery, and raw materials to help expand India's arms industry. The bulk has been used to develop facilities to produce military equipment under Soviet license, including MIG-21 jet fighters and Atoll air-to-air missiles, and to build naval facilities at Vishakhapatnam.

118. The USSR has provided a substantial amount of technical assistance to supplement its arms-supply program. Since 1961, more than 2,000 Indian military personnel, mostly from the navy and air force, have undergone training in the USSR, but the Indians have sought to hold down the number of people involved. About 300 Soviet military technicians were in India during 1975. Soviet military technicians generally are employed to assemble Soviet equipment shipped to India and to train Indian personnel in its use and maintenance. In recent years New Delhi has required that most of the training be conducted in India, ostensibly to reduce the cost of sending personnel to the USSR, which was estimated to have been more than \$1 million annually during the late 1960s.

119. India aspires to self-sufficiency in arms production but is likely to remain dependent on foreign suppliers for sophisticated equipment. The USSR almost certainly will remain one of India's major foreign suppliers of sophisticated arms through the 1970s. Despite the delays India has had in acquiring spare parts from the Soviet Union, New Delhi feels that the West has proven to be an unreliable source in time of crisis and that it has not offered payment terms as liberal as those of the Soviets.

120. *Afghanistan*. Kabul has relied almost exclusively on Soviet sources for its armaments over the past 19 years and has received \$450 million worth of military assistance. Kabul also has about 350 Soviet

military advisers and technicians to instruct Afghan personnel in maintenance of equipment.

121. A number of unconfirmed Pakistani and Iranian reports have suggested Soviet involvement in aiding Afghanistan in the training and equipping of Pakistani tribal guerrillas. There is no evidence to support these reports and some are known to be fabricated.

122. *Pakistan*. In the mid-1960s the USSR signed arms contracts worth \$65 million with Pakistan. Moscow believed that an arms aid program might eventually undercut Chinese and Western influence and lessen Islamabad's hostility toward India. However, New Delhi objected. In mid-1969 Moscow bowed to Indian pressure and stopped arms shipments after delivering only \$22 million worth of equipment. Moscow sold some \$2 million worth of MI-8 helicopter spare parts in 1974, but it is not expected to resume significant shipments of arms.

123. *Bangladesh*. When the state of Bangladesh was formed in late 1971, the USSR was quick to offer assistance in establishing an air force, providing 10 MIG-21s as well as several helicopters and transport aircraft. The Soviet navy undertook the clearing of mines and wrecks from the port of Chittagong. About 400 Bengalis have gone to the USSR for training since 1972.

124. The overthrow of the Mujib government in August 1975, followed by additional coups in November, jarred Moscow. Moscow felt that Mujib offered the best prospect for ensuring a stable government that was friendly to both India and the USSR. Moscow is worried that the political instability and anti-Soviet attitude of the new leaders might give Peking opportunities to enhance its influence, and is trying to stay on good terms with General Zia's regime.

125. *Southeast Asia*. The USSR has persistently tried to improve its position in Southeast Asia. The general Soviet approach has been to promote normal state-to-state relations, to expand its economic presence, and to fan suspicions of Peking. The Soviets have at one time or another approached nearly every country in the area with specific suggestions for strengthening bilateral ties.

126. *Vietnam*. It has been Hanoi's policy to balance its relations with Moscow and Peking. The USSR was

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quick to provide the Vietnamese and Laotian communists with economic assistance needed to begin reconstruction following their recent victories. At the same time, Hanoi has had problems with Peking, including conflicting territorial claims and possible rivalry for regional influence. The Soviets appear to enjoy better relations with Hanoi than do the Chinese, but this will not buy them much because Vietnam cannot afford to go too far in provoking Peking and will seek to preserve its freedom of maneuver. Soviet military assistance has declined, but it continues to be important to Hanoi since there is no indigenous industry capable of producing major items of equipment.

127. There is no reliable evidence that the Soviets have sought military facilities in Vietnam. Furthermore, the Vietnamese are concerned with China's reaction and determined to avoid the establishment of any foreign military presence on their territory. We believe they would reject any Soviet overtures for regular military use of air and port facilities.

128. *Laos.* The Soviet presence in Laos has been steadily increasing since the departure of most Americans in late May 1975. The Soviets have been careful not to reveal the size of their presence, but it is estimated at about 500 people, a substantial increase from the fewer than 100 present before the US exodus. In December 1975 the Soviets mounted an airlift from Hanoi and Bangkok to Vientiane to help make up for goods shortages in Laos caused by the closure of the land border with Thailand.

129. Vientiane's decision to permit an increase in the Soviet presence may reflect a desire to strengthen Moscow's position vis-a-vis Peking as well as its need for technical assistance. The Lao continue to maintain intimate relations with the Vietnamese—some 27,000-30,000 Vietnamese troops are stationed in Laos—and any shift toward the Soviets would probably reflect Hanoi's approval. The Vietnamese consider that they have a proprietary interest in Laos and therefore would probably not want either a Chinese or Soviet challenge to their position.

130. *Singapore.* The Soviet Union's relationships with Singapore are essentially commercial in nature. Since 1968 Soviet naval auxiliaries and naval-associated ships have stopped at Singapore's Keppel Shipyard for replenishment while transiting to and from the Indian Ocean. The shipyard has handled

repair work on a growing number of Soviet naval support ships and commercial vessels; it is not used, however, for repairing these ships in mid-deployment. Repair of Soviet vessels in Singapore relieves pressure on the busy facilities on the USSR's Pacific Coast. Recently, Singapore has also granted Soviet noncombatants access to the Sembawang Shipyard which is also used by US warships.

131. *Other Countries.* The Soviets have no military agreements with Cambodia, Thailand or Burma, and the Indonesians have shown no interest in cooperating with Soviet schemes to stem PRC influence in Southeast Asia. While Philippine President Marcos desires to balance his relations with Peking and Moscow, he continues to believe that the USSR needs him more than he needs it. The small independent island nations of the southwest Pacific have been the focus of some recent Soviet diplomatic initiatives. So far, these efforts have been directed at the acquisition of facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet, but in the longer term efforts may be made to include Soviet naval visits.

132. *Support for Liberation Groups.* Moscow may be sympathetic to further revolutionary changes in Southeast Asia, but will probably have few opportunities to play a meaningful role. The Chinese will continue to take advantage of their proximity to influence guerrilla movements and the Vietnamese have such a surfeit of weapons that they would have little need of Soviet assistance to supply such activities.

#### D. Latin America

133. Latin America does not now rank high in the scheme of Soviet foreign policy priorities. To be sure, the Soviets seek greater influence in the affairs of the region, but they are realistic about their prospects, and current Soviet policies for the region represent a pragmatic and opportunistic approach that does not anticipate early dramatic gains. The Soviet goals in the near term are to weaken links between Latin America and the US by encouraging anti-imperialism and nonalignment.

134. *Cuba.* Cuba must be counted as the USSR's major success in the region. After the 1962 missile crisis, the Soviets continued their military aid and their support of the economy to achieve a close relationship with the Cuban government.

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### Latin America



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135. A Soviet military mission of about 2,000 men is permanently stationed in Cuba. Of these, 1,500 are probably assigned to advise their Cuban counterparts in operating and maintaining Soviet-supplied equipment and in related training activities, concentrating on those areas where the most advanced technology is used, i.e., the air force, surface-to-air missile system, radar networks, and certain naval units. Soviet advisers also work closely with Cuba's intelligence services, which were organized with extensive Soviet guidance and training and which collaborate with the Soviets in intelligence operations abroad.

136. In 1970 the Soviets acquired the facilities at Cienfuegos but Soviet use of them has been constrained by the US-Soviet understanding regarding Soviet basing. In addition, Soviet personnel operate Soviet communications and intelligence collection facilities in the Havana area, including SIGINT and radar tracking of US military movements.

137. In years past Moscow was obviously discomfited by Cuba's effort to export revolution in Latin America. Since the late 1960s Castro has pursued a policy of restraint and selectivity in his support of revolutionary groups in Latin America, but at the same time he has been increasingly willing to encourage and support promising national liberation movements in other parts of the world. The Angolan conflict afforded an occasion for close Soviet Cuban cooperation in support of an insurgent movement, with their goals in concert. This collaboration may be repeated if suitable opportunities arise, but it will not be automatic. Moscow and Havana will each want to be sure that such an undertaking furthers its own interests.

138. *Other Countries.* The virtual monopoly enjoyed by the US as an arms supplier in the Western Hemisphere after World War II has declined as a result of restrictive US arms policies and deterioration in political relations. But the bulk of Latin American arms purchases from non-US suppliers has gone to Western Europe; between 1970 and mid-1975 Latin American countries had already received or contracted for more than \$3.2 billion worth of arms from European countries.

139. The Soviets' efforts to get arms clients in Latin America in addition to Cuba have had no success except in Peru, although they have approached most other South American countries. Between 1972 and

1975 the Soviets delivered or agreed to deliver over \$130 million worth of arms there—less than half of Peru's total arms purchases in that period. To gain entry to the Peruvian market as elsewhere, Moscow provided quick delivery dates, generous credits at low rates of interest, and discounted some items of equipment at well below world market prices. Peru's expected purchase of 36 SU-22 aircraft (probably the export version of the SU-17 fighter-bomber) has a price tag of \$250 million.

140. Peruvian purchases do not necessarily set a precedent for other Latin American buyers, and it appears unlikely that the USSR will become a major arms supplier in this hemisphere. Latin American countries are used to dealing with the West and are still unsure of both the quality and reliability of Soviet equipment and spare parts arrangements. Moreover, the Latins remain wary of Soviet political aims and will be jealous of their own interests when deciding on arms purchases. Nevertheless, the Soviets are expected to be persistent in seeking arms customers in the hemisphere. And the Latin Americans may accept some offers or seek to use them to extract concessions from the US.

141. Allende's failure to prevail in Chile reinforced Moscow's cautious approach to the support of radical change in Latin American governments. Nevertheless, in concert with the Cubans the Soviets are continuing their contacts with Latin American radical groups and are urging them to form broad leftist fronts under Communist guidance. The Soviets are also continuing to train some Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare; apparently hoping that, in time, changing conditions will provide suitable opportunities for insurgency. In the meantime, carefully cultivated state-to-state relations—including economic, commercial, and cultural—will receive top priority in the Soviet policy for Latin America.

#### IV. FUTURE TRENDS

142. The Soviets are evidently convinced that efforts in the Third World over the past 20 years have significantly increased Moscow's prestige and influence in world affairs and that this has contributed to Soviet national security. The most compelling evidence of determination to press on has been Soviet persistence in the face of major setbacks, e.g., in Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, and Sudan. Given this persistence, it is extremely unlikely that any future

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setbacks would cause them to reverse course. In fact, as opportunities for the use of military resources in the Third World present themselves, the Soviets will almost certainly respond.

### A. Military Aid

143. The cutting edge of Soviet military involvement in Third World countries will continue to be the provision of military assistance. There is no evidence that the Soviets are developing weapon systems designed for the export trade only. Rather, the Soviets seem likely to continue to export systems which were developed for Soviet forces. The Soviets will have a variety of weapons for export:

- For some recipients, older but still serviceable Soviet equipment will be appropriate. In sub-Saharan Africa, the T-54 tank is still a formidable weapon.
- Soviet air defense systems will probably remain in high demand. Clients who fear air attack can obtain comprehensive, high-technology air defense. Moreover, the defensive character of SAM systems makes it easy to justify their purchase.
- Moscow's most favored clients are likely to get more substantial offensive capabilities from such weapons as newer models of tactical aircraft with greater range and payload, self-propelled guns, and FROGs and Scuds.

The clients who receive sophisticated and expensive weapons will perforce find themselves in closer relations with the USSR on three counts: debts will be higher despite discounts and credit terms, more Soviet technicians will be required, and reliance on the USSR for spares will be greater.

144. In making policy on military aid, the Soviets are only partly reactive to US and other countries' military aid programs. In some areas they will, of course, react to American sales to a country which is at odds with a client of theirs. In other areas, the Soviets will take advantage of situations in which the US cannot or will not make sales. In still other cases they will be alert to opportunities to break into new markets, regardless of what the US does. In any case, we believe that they will be little disposed to reach agreements for mutual great-power restraint in military assistance. Their efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this instrument that they would

regard such restraints as drastically curtailing their overall opportunities in the Third World.

### B. Deployments, Force Developments, and Capabilities

145. The USSR will continue to deploy air and naval forces to the Third World, as well as to improve the forces which might be used in distant operations.

146. *Deployments.* Following the rapid growth of Soviet naval presence in Third World areas from 1964 to 1970, routine deployments of Soviet general-purpose naval forces have reflected a trend toward stabilization. Despite temporary increases in the intervening years for unusual circumstances—harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh, reaction to the Arab-Israeli War, and minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Suez—Soviet ship days for 1976 will probably amount to only some 3 percent more than the total for 1970. Although the numbers of Soviet ships deployed will probably not increase substantially, their quality and combat capabilities will continue to improve.

147. Staging for long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft promises to be the most important benefit the Soviets receive from their overseas facilities. Despite improvements in ocean reconnaissance satellites, seagoing intelligence collectors, and ground intercept capabilities in the USSR, the Soviets will rely heavily on reconnaissance aircraft and will continue to seek facilities from which to operate them. The force of Soviet reconnaissance, patrol, and strike aircraft will drop slightly in total numbers, but the overall force will be qualitatively improved through the addition of Backfire and other new models projected over the next decade.

148. *Force Trends.* Moscow has never conducted an assault operation in a distant area, and Soviet involvement in crises and conflicts in the Third World has taken the form of Soviet assistance to a client. Nevertheless, modernization programs over the next ten years will improve the forces which could be used to intervene in distant areas, even though most of this modernization is being carried out primarily for other military purposes.

149. Airborne divisions will remain the same in number—eight, including one training division. They will gradually improve their fire power and mobility, but will retain their present combat limitations. The total number of Soviet transport aircraft will decline



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slightly through 1980 and remain relatively stable through 1985. The total lift capability will rise during the remainder of the 1970s with the continued deployment of the IL-76 Candid.

150. New transport aircraft—for which there is no present evidence of construction—could be in use in the 1980s:

- Production of the AN-22 Cock stopped after only 50 were delivered to VTA and the Soviets may have a requirement for a follow-on long range heavy transport capable of carrying outsized cargo. Such a follow-on could be in service in the early 1980s, although there is no evidence that such an aircraft is under construction.
- The mainstay of Soviet military transport aviation is the AN-12 Cub, a medium assault transport which entered service in the late 1950s. While there is no evidence of a follow-on aircraft, the Soviets could decide to develop one.

If these aircraft appear, the Soviets would increase their capability to lift airborne troops by about half over the next ten years.

151. Actual and potential developments in naval forces include improvements in underway replenishment and amphibious lift capabilities:

- The Soviets are continuing to construct large underway replenishment ships. Six of these ships have become operational since 1970 and at least two more are under construction.
- There is currently a large ship under construction in Kaliningrad that appears to be an amphibious unit of a new class. It has a ramp for roll-on/roll-off cargo handling and clam-shell bow doors.
- Five Ropucha-class amphibious ships have been built for the Soviet navy in Poland, and construction of additional units is expected to amount to at least two per year. The Ropucha is smaller than its predecessor, the Alligator, but unlike earlier Soviet amphibious ships, these units appear to provide troop quarters adequate for long periods at sea.
- The Soviets have been active in developing air cushion vehicles for naval application. ACVs are not now available for Soviet operations in distant areas because there are no ships to carry them into an assault. It is possible, however, that a

large ship now being built for the Soviet merchant marine in Finland could be employed to carry ACVs.

152. Potentially the most significant force improvements would be in the development of carrier aviation which might reduce the principal deficiency—the lack of air support—in Soviet capabilities for combat in distant areas:

- One Kiev-class carrier is in operation, another is fitting out, and a third is under construction and expected to be in service in the early 1980s.
- We expect there will be an improved V/STOL aircraft for use on the Kiev in the early 1980s. Such an aircraft would have greater ordnance-carrying capability and greater in-flight performance than the YAK-36 Forger.

153. Within the next five to ten years, these improvements will enable the Soviets to better assist their allies and clients, particularly by supplementing local defenses. Soviet ships will be able to make more credible demonstrations of force and better their capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of land-based air support, the Soviets would be unable to carry out an amphibious assault against determined opposition by sizable armed forces.

154. A new class of aircraft carrier, with catapult and arresting gear to handle larger numbers of high-performance aircraft, would mark a fundamental improvement in Soviet capabilities to support an assault in a distant area. There is no evidence that the Soviets are working on such a carrier. If the Soviets were to build a carrier of this type, the first unit could not be available before the mid-1980s. Even then, one new carrier would be able to provide only a limited amount of air cover, and problems of insufficient assault lift and vulnerable lines of communication would still remain.

155. Even though the Soviets' capabilities are improving, we believe their active intervention in the Third World is likely to continue to take the form of military aid, interposition of naval forces, and supplementing air defenses of selected clients with whom they already have substantial military relationships, rather than by direct armed assault. Nonetheless, the growth in Soviet capabilities will be noticed

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by Third World states and may enhance Soviet efforts to influence events in distant areas.

### C. Geographic Emphasis

156. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to seek additional access to overseas facilities to support their ships and aircraft. Moscow is likely to pursue its quest for access in the fashion it has displayed in the past—repeated and increasingly frequent visits of ships or aircraft followed by acquisition of facilities for exclusive Soviet use where possible. Strong efforts along these lines will continue to be made in the Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa and the Indian Ocean.

157. Existing political constellations and ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area priorities:

—Southern Africa is the area of greatest current potential for the USSR. The Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploit troubles even though they will have little ability to control or even predict developments. Moreover, the Soviets are providing the arms and the training (with Cuban assistance) to increase insurgent activities, and they stand ready to react to developing situations.

—The Middle East will nevertheless remain the major focus of Soviet military activities in the Third World. As long as Soviet relations with Egypt remain sour, Syria will remain the major recipient of Soviet military aid, and Moscow will probably emphasize military exports to other Arab countries—Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.

—In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will continue to be the focal points of Soviet military policy. Moscow apparently intends to go on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not seem to expect any major changes in Asia or Latin America in the immediate future.

158. While Soviet interests in major areas are likely to endure, present relations with individual countries can change abruptly. The relationships the Soviets have established are subject to the vicissitudes of politics in the Third World, and Moscow has seen substantial gains swept away overnight. Despite such setbacks, the Soviets will remain persistent and highly opportunistic in developing new clients. To the extent that the Soviets have increased the use of airlift to speed their assistance to clients in need, Moscow is able to develop a new military relationship more quickly now than in the past.

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