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RM-5416-ISA
SEPTEMBER 1967

THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS

Dankwart A. Rustow

PREPARED FOR:
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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PREFACE

This Memorandum is a contribution to RAND's continuing research program, undertaken for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), on some of the critical problems of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The author, Professor Dankwart A. Rustow of Columbia University, is a RAND consultant and was asked to provide a general study of the conflict in Cyprus, to analyze the implications of future conflict in or over Cyprus for U.S. and NATO strategic postures, and to consider the outlook for the settlement of outstanding issues. This work was originally used in draft form to provide background for RAND work for ISA early in 1966; it has been revised and brought up to date in order to make its contents more widely accessible.

Professor Rustow is well known for his contributions to Western understanding of Turkey's military, political, and social development. He has lived and traveled in the Near East; he spent portions of 1953 and 1954 in Istanbul and Beirut, respectively, as a university lecturer. His best known works are: Politics of Compromise: A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden, Princeton University Press, 1956, and Politics and Westernization in the Near East, Princeton University Press, 1956. His latest book, A World of Nations, is being published by the Brookings Institution this summer.

SUMMARY

Communal strife on Cyprus, independent since 1960 under an uneasy constitutional compromise arrangement, is a constant threat to collaboration between the two nations on NATO's southern flank, Greece and Turkey. Violence broke out on the island in December of 1963; a United Nations force of 6000 was dispatched there in the spring of 1964; both Turkey and Greece threatened to intervene; and despite international conferences in Geneva and frequent diplomatic interchanges between the Greek and Turkish Governments, the essential issues remain unresolved. In retrospect, it seems clear that negotiations failed largely because they were conducted between Athens and Ankara, and any settlement would have had to apply first and foremost to Cyprus.

After briefly examining some of the history and issues in contention since 1959, the author turns to an examination of the strategic and political implications for the United States and for NATO, with particular reference to the roles of Greece and Turkey. Three strategic contingencies are analyzed: thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union; limited Soviet operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Africa; limited Western operations in the Middle East, Northeast Africa, and Southern Asia. Greece and Turkey are found not only to have significant strategic value to NATO and the West, but also to exemplify the political values that the alliance is meant to serve.

The final portion of the study deals with the possibilities for settlement of the divisive issues. These are discussed successively from the points of view of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United States. Political instabilities in Greece and Turkey both inhibit the possibilities of compromise and divert the attention of their governments from this unresolved problem. In Cyprus, time appears to improve the Greek majority's ability to dominate any final solution. Lacking satisfactory resolution of the issues, there is a prospect of more outbreaks of violence. One possible solution worthy of exploration is a communal compromise along "Lebanese" lines, where parliamentary representatives would have both Greek and Turkish constituents although government offices would be shared on some proportional basis to secure the rights of the minority group.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus conflict that erupted in December 1963 and abated, at least temporarily, in August 1964 is one of an ever-lengthening list of small-scale conflicts -- including regional wars, border disputes, guerrilla incursions, regional uprisings -- involving the smaller, newly independent, or developing countries. In the world at large at least three factors have contributed to this proliferation of limited conflict, and each of these is to some extent reflected in the Cyprus crisis:

(1) Since 1945 the number of independent states in the world has roughly doubled, and each of the newcomers has asserted its more or less precarious claim to sovereignty. Most immediately, the Cyprus dispute is one of the more awkward legacies of colonialism. In view of the restrictions imposed by the Zurich and London agreements of 1959-60 (see below), the country's claim to sovereignty is more precarious than most.

(2) The nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union has shifted much of their rivalry to less-than-vital areas and to less-than-nuclear levels of conflict; the partial disengagement of the superpowers, in turn, has allowed a wider margin for maneuver to medium-sized and smaller powers. A smouldering dispute involving two members of NATO such as Greece and Turkey would have been hard to conceive at a time when Stalin's expansionist policy was directed alternately at Europe and at the Middle East and when United States policy was intent on strengthening the regional forces of resistance.

(3) Alignments whether within the Soviet-Chinese or within the Western camp have progressively loosened. The Cyprus conflict may be seen as an early instance of the centrifugal tendencies in NATO of which De Gaulle's recent policy has been the sharpest manifestation.

The political environment of the Cyprus problem is such that American policy makers cannot by any simple analogy apply solutions that may have served well enough in other crises. We cannot side with one of our allies against Communism, for both Greece and Turkey are our allies, and Communism has not been an immediate issue. We cannot side against colonialism in favor of independence, for the conflict does not array colonial settlers against indigenous people or former rulers against former subjects. To condemn the aggressor or insist on the sanctity of treaties is not enough, for what past treaty provisions are presently applicable and who is aggressing against whom are precisely the questions over which the protagonists divide.

The population of Cyprus is only about half a million, and its area smaller than Connecticut. There has so far been no direct Russian-American confrontation on the island, nor does such a development seem very likely. Since August 1964, moreover, violence on the island has abated. It is thus entirely possible that the parties to the dispute will come to accept, however reluctantly, the current de facto situation.

There are other factors, however, that might force the unresolved issues of 1963 and 1964 out into the open and thus lead to a resumption, or even an intensification,

of the conflict. The island holds an important strategic position, roughly midway by air between the Soviet Union and the Suez Canal and midway also between Europe and the oil fields around the Persian Gulf. The dispute involves not only the Greek and Turkish communities on the island itself but also Greece and Turkey, two of America's closest allies. For these and other reasons, it would be unwise to overlook the issues that the Cyprus conflict poses, immediately or in the future, for United States policy.

The present paper will seek to analyze the nature of the current impasse (Section II), to identify the larger American interests that are directly or indirectly at stake (Section III), and to assess the future prospects in the dispute, including some alternatives confronting United States policy (Section IV).

II. THE CURRENT IMPASSE

A. COLLAPSE OF THE 1959 SETTLEMENT

Seventy-nine per cent of the Cypriotes are Greeks and Orthodox Christians, eighteen per cent Turks and Muslims, and the remainder mostly Armenians. Between the two major ethnic communities, the 1959-60 agreements sought to erect a delicate structure of checks and balances, buttressed by Greece, Turkey, and Britain as guarantor powers. The constitution allowed the Greek Cypriotes to elect the President of the Republic and 35 representatives, the Turkish Cypriotes the Vice-President and the remaining 15. In the administration, a similar ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks was to be maintained. Through its official spokesmen, the Turkish minority obtained a veto in major issues of foreign affairs, of defense, and of finance. Each community remained free to devise its own regulations on education, marriage, and inheritance. In the cities and towns, separate municipalities were to be installed by mutual agreement. The Greek or Turkish flags could be flown along with the newly adopted flag of Cyprus. Rather pathetically, the design for the latter was a map of the island in pale yellow on white -- since blue, red, and green had been preempted by Greece, Turkey, and Islam, and most pictorial symbols would have proved divisive. (Not surprisingly, Cypriotes have made little use of their official flag.) Greece and Turkey received the right to station military contingents upon the island; the United Kingdom retained sovereign rights to two bases on the southern coast at Akrotiri and

Dhekalia. Major changes in these provisions would require the concurrence of the two communities on the island as well as the governments at Athens, Ankara, and London. Enosis, long the dream of Hellenic nationalists in Greece and Cyprus, was ruled out.

Archbishop-President Makarios and other Greek Cypriotes have since implied that this was the best bargain they could exact from the British and that when Cyprus became independent and a member of the United Nations there would be time enough to modify the arrangement. But even if all sides had accepted the 1959-60 settlement in good faith, it might well have proved unworkable. It had been an attempt to solve a political problem by legal finesse. Perhaps a homogeneous people long practiced in the arts of self-government might have worked the cumbersome engine of checks and balances, of reserved rights and reciprocal vetoes. Two rival communities just released from colonial rule plainly could not. Nor was there much hope for greater solidarity in the future: there were no common symbols, no common education, no joint activities in which Cypriotes might forget that they were Greek or Turk. The presence of Greek and Turkish soldiers might prevent some minor clashes, but it also might render the islanders more intransigent and embroil their mainland cousins in the quarrel. It had taken two years to draft the constitution and the related treaties. In less time than that the documents proved unworkable, and in three and one half years the whole fragile structure collapsed.

The details of the collapse are of no great interest. The Heidelberg law professor who was to preside impartially over the constitutional court soon resigned in despair.

Agreement on separate municipalities proved impossible: the Turks vetoed a major money bill and the Greeks set up town administrations of their own. Archbishop Makarios in November 1963 published a thirteen-point program of constitutional revision; the Turks, in resisting it strenuously, hoped for support from the mainland. Late in December 1963, the situation had grown so supercharged that an ordinary street brawl in Nicosia set off a wave of violence throughout the island. Turkish Cypriotes, outnumbered four to one in the population and five to two in military force, watched some of their more isolated villages burn to the ground and withdrew into a number of hastily fortified enclaves. Contrary to the most basic provisions of the constitution, Greek Cypriote ministers and representatives henceforth met, and enacted laws and decrees in the absence of their Turkish colleagues. A Turkish Cypriote leader who traveled abroad was barred from re-entering his home country.

A United Nations force of 6000,[1] dispatched under a General Assembly resolution of March 4, 1964, found itself vastly outnumbered by Greeks and Turks and hampered by ambiguous instructions. Makarios, for one, insisted that the task at hand was not one of separating two belligerent forces and of restoring the constitution but rather one of suppressing an armed rebellion against his legitimate government. United Nations units, in effect, could do

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[1] Authority for the force (known as UNFICYP) has been periodically renewed for three- or six-month periods. The withdrawal of various national contingents early in 1966 brought the force down to a level of about 4000.

little more than propose local truce lines, prevent accidental clashes, provide safe-conduct for persons or food supplies, and return to Greek Cypriote officials the arms collected from some of their irregular supporters. Nor could the United Nations mediator, Sakari S. Tuomioja of Finland, or his successor Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, find a successful approach to a diplomatic solution.

B. DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPTS (1964-1965)

It was the threat of Turkish military intervention that first brought the diplomatic scene to life. In March 1964 there were some signs of Turkish preparations for a landing on the island. On June 4, 1964, as a small landing fleet once again assembled in the Bay of Iskenderun, Prime Minister Ismet Inönü warned publicly that it was no longer possible "to protect the rights and security" of the Turkish Cypriotes by "peaceful means and internationally adopted measures." The next day President Johnson secretly warned Inönü that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus would mean a Greek-Turkish war and possibly "direct involvement by the Soviet Union." "I hope you will understand," Johnson continued in his message, "that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."[2] Following a hurried trip by Under-Secretary of

[2] Johnson to Inönü, 5 June 1964; the text of the correspondence was released by the White House, following disclosures in the Turkish press, on 15 January 1966 and reprinted in the Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 107, part 5, pp. 304-305.

State George Ball to Athens and Ankara, Prime Ministers Inönü of Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece separately visited President Johnson in Washington (June 22 and 24). While Inönü readily accepted the suggestion of a meeting with his Greek colleague at Camp David, Papandreou firmly declined. Meanwhile, General George Grivas, once the popular leader of the Cypriote guerrillas of 1954-59, arrived on Cyprus to take command of the National Guard, along with several thousand Greek soldiers from the mainland. Some of these were said to be Cypriotes returning from their studies on the mainland; others, deserters from the Greek army. This reinforcement of the mainland Greek position on the island, it might be expected, would make it easier to coordinate the policy of Nicosia with that of Athens.

Serious negotiations began in Geneva in July 1964 as an American delegation under Dean Acheson met alternately with Greek and Turkish diplomats. State Department sources denied that there was an "Acheson Plan." Press reports, however, indicated that the topics explored included enosis, autonomy for Turkish Cypriotes in two districts on the island, cession to Turkey of Castellorizo (a small barren island off the Southern Turkish coast), and a Turkish military base (leased or sovereign) on Cyprus itself. Papandreou at first seemed conciliatory. On a visit to London he indicated (July 21) that he would restrain Greek forces on Cyprus if Turkey would undertake not to invade the island, and that he might consider a NATO base on Cyprus and even territorial concessions to Turkey. But following a visit by Makarios to Athens

(July 27-29) the Greek and Cypriote governments declared that any solution should be sought within the United Nations framework: it was Makarios who announced that Greece had rejected as "absolutely unacceptable" proposals by Mr. Acheson based on the principle of compensation for Turkish rights. Soon after the Archbishop's return to Cyprus there was a flare-up on the island as Greek forces besieged a northwestern Turkish enclave and in turn were attacked by Turkish jets from the mainland. After one last attempt to bring the two sides together, Acheson left on September 2. Whatever hopes there might have been that Grivas and his mainland soldiers might restrain Makarios, the outcome at Geneva suggested that Makarios could far more effectively restrain Athens.

Another assumption underlying earlier American diplomacy was soon shaken. The Russian interest in the conflict, of which Johnson had warned Inönü, became fully apparent in the fall and winter, but it was not a one-sided philhellene interest. On September 30, 1964, the Soviets signed a secret agreement for the delivery of a quantity of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other arms to the Greek Cypriote government. (The total cost, Nicosia later revealed, was $28 million, half of it gift and half of it sale.) But on October 14, the Soviet Union and Turkey announced plans for jointly developing the Arpaçay -- a truly remarkable project if it is recalled that this rivulet flows along one of NATO's land frontiers with Russia and that Soviet territorial claims beyond this border were a major reason why Turkey joined the Western defense system. After a week's visit to Moscow by Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin, a joint communique urged the "recognition

of the existence of two national communities" on Cyprus (November 6, 1964). Later, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a statement to Izvestiia, January 21, 1965, specifically rejected enosis and endorsed a federal solution such as had long been advocated in Ankara. Like sentiments were voiced during exchanges of official visits in January and August 1965.

Meanwhile, the Soviet missiles destined for Cyprus were being stored in the United Arab Republic, though some accessory equipment reached the island. On March 28 Pravda denounced American attempts to prevent installation of the missiles; the State Department subsequently confirmed that a Greek freighter destined for Cyprus returned to the UAR without unloading its cargo.

Soviet motives remained somewhat obscure. Perhaps the Russians (on Erkin's plea or in consequence of the transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Kosygin in mid-October) had shifted their support to Turkey even though honoring their previous agreement with Makarios. Conceivably the SAMs had reached Alexandria before Erkin's visit in November. More likely, in offering missiles to one side and sympathetic communiqués to the other, the Soviets were doing their part to keep two NATO allies embroiled while staying on good terms with both.[3]

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[3]This last interpretation coincides with Thomas W. Wolfe's persuasive summary of Soviet diplomacy between December 1963 and October 1964: "The main feature of the Soviet approach seems to have been to nurse the situation along ... so as to enhance its divisive impact on NATO, while at the same time taking care to keep the pot from boiling over in order to avoid the unpredictable dangers of a widening war. In the process, the Soviets also

Exploratory talks were resumed in Ankara in June 1965 between Foreign Minister Işik and Greek Ambassador Sgourdeos but received little publicity. This time Makarios did not intrude himself. Turkey was willing to consider enosis, but in return asked for territorial concessions equivalent to 18 per cent of the land area of Cyprus (or 643 square miles).[4] Greece was willing to talk about a NATO base on Cyprus and about resettling ethnic Greeks from Istanbul as well as ethnic Turks from Cyprus, but she would hear of no cessions of territory except a long-term lease for Castellorizo or Symi (another small island in the Dodecanese) or both, or else a border adjustment in Thrace. What piece of land was small enough to be offered as a frontier rectification yet large enough to be received in compensation for two-elevenths of the isle of Cyprus? The negotiators adjourned without solving the riddle. Soon their countries were absorbed in other affairs at home, Turkey in a major election campaign and Greece in a protracted constitutional crisis.

C. NATURE OF THE DEADLOCK

There was no intrinsic reason why the Cyprus problem could not be solved in some manner satisfactory to Greeks and Turks both on Cyprus and the mainland. Many international problems, of course, are not amenable to short-run

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established the point that they considered their security interests impinged upon by the developments on Cyprus." Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare, Conventional Operations and Limited War (RAND Memorandum 4305-PR, December 1964), pp. 61f.

[4] See Eleftheria (Athens), June 7, 1965.

or dramatic solutions. Israel and her Arab neighbors have been officially at war for nearly two decades, and the Kashmir dispute after eighteen years erupted into a second military campaign. But the complexities on Cyprus are less deep-seated. India and Pakistan have viewed each other with hostility since their independence; Greece and Turkey were close allies until the recent dispute and officially still are. Unlike Israelis and Arabs, Greeks and Turks have shown that they can live at peace with each other: they did so under Turkish, under Greek, and under British rule whenever political authority was clearly vested in a single group. The Greeks retained their language, religion, and customs under half a millennium of Ottoman sway and rebelled only when the Ottoman Empire began its secular retreat before the rising power of Europe. The life of the 60,000 Greeks in Istanbul was, by and large, peaceful until Greece and Turkey became embroiled over Cyprus in 1955 and again in 1963. That of the 150,000 Turks in Western Thrace has continued peaceful even afterwards. On Cyprus itself, Greeks and Turks lived in social isolation but with little friction under 300 years of Ottoman and 75 of British government; only the headlong dissolution of the British Empire (India 1947, Palestine 1948, Suez 1954) created the setting for the Greek Cypriote guerrilla movement of 1954-59. More than anything else, it was uncertainty of political control that exacerbated Greek-Turkish relations. The crucial flaw of the Cyprus settlement of 1959 was that it sought to perpetuate and institutionalize such uncertainty.

Greek and Turkish diplomats in several rounds of conversation since 1964 have explored many elements of a

possible solution. Turkish acceptance of enosis, a military base on Cyprus for NATO or for Turkey, regional autonomy for Cypriote Turks, relocation of Turks from Cyprus and Greeks from Istanbul, lease of this or that Greek island to Turkey, frontier adjustments in Thrace -- all these were on the agenda. Considering the stark clash of initial positions -- enosis versus "Partition or Death" -- the two sides covered more than half the distance toward compromise. They discussed a far wider range of issues and showed more flexibility than did the Palestine or Kashmir negotiators who had to content themselves with cease-fires and armistice lines. The most serious difficulty of recent Cyprus diplomacy has not been the issues discussed but the identity of the discussants.

It is clear in retrospect that negotiations failed mainly because they were conducted between Ankara and Athens, whereas any settlement would have to apply first and foremost to Cyprus. The choice of the wider Greek-Turkish context was not at all unreasonable. Greece and Turkey could offer each other a greater variety of compensations than were available on Cyprus. At Lausanne in 1923, they had solved a far thornier problem: the peaceful exchange of more than a million nationals after four years of war. Had it not been for the exceptional status of Cyprus as a British possession, the 1923 settlement would very likely have extended to that island. Nor was it wholly fanciful to suppose that enosis as worked out between Athens and Ankara would prove irresistible in Nicosia, or else that Grivas and 10,000 Greek soldiers would provide an effective check on Makarios.

Plausible as these assumptions were, they proved wrong. In Geneva in 1964 and in Ankara in 1965, each side was thought to hold a proxy, but one of the proxies turned out to be spurious. Ankara presumably has been able to speak for the Cypriote Turks: they are a small group wholly dependent on the mainland in any conflict. There has been some competition for leadership among Cypriote Turks, notably Fazil Kuchuk and Rauf Denktash. Still, the Turks' sense of solidarity and hierarchy tends to draw them together in crisis. But there is no analogous relation between Greeks and Greek Cypriotes. If Britain and Turkey had conceded it in 1959, enosis would indeed have been compelling, and Athens would now represent the Cypriote Greeks -- but then the dispute in its current form would not have arisen. As things are, Athens cannot speak effectively for Cyprus. The Cypriotes are more prosperous than the Greeks of the mainland, and they have never been ruled from Athens. Their government, representing a sovereign state to the world at large and in the United Nations, is an independent diplomatic agent. Grivas' arrival was not enough to cancel out those divisive factors. His reputation as an extreme conservative already had tarnished his earlier popularity, and his political skills never equaled his valor as a guerrilla leader. Governments at Athens, moreover, were notoriously brittle. George Papandreou, for example, had won the largest election victory in Greek history in 1963, yet a year later 44 of his Center Union deputies deserted him in his fight with the King to form a government precariously supported by Papandreou's rightist

opponents. No cabinet of the sort Greece had between 1963 and 1965 can expect to carry out an unpopular policy of firmness toward Makarios and conciliation with Turkey. Greek diplomats at Geneva, therefore, were able to negotiate but not to deliver their side of any potential bargain.

4 Archbishop Makarios, in contrast to men like Papandreou and Grivas, showed himself to be a shrewd, tenacious, and resourceful politician. He has never publicly disavowed enosis, though his policy has consistently aimed at full independence and unfettered majority rule for the Greek population of Cyprus. He has known how to probe and how to retreat without losing sight of long-range goals. By calculated indiscretions he has been able to disrupt talks between Athens and Ankara, much as Adenauer used to disrupt talks between Washington and Moscow about Berlin and Germany. In addition he has been able to use the United Nations as a forum for denouncing colonialism and outside interference in domestic affairs. As long as Makarios is president of a legally independent Cyprus and enjoys the political support of the majority of Cypriote Greeks, there can be no settlement without his concurrence.

III. AMERICAN INTERESTS AT STAKE

From its inception in 1963, the Cyprus conflict created grave risks to the entire Western relationship to Greece and Turkey. In assessing these risks, it will be useful to distinguish the strategic-military importance of the two countries from their political-psychological importance -- although the two are of course intimately connected. Under each heading, some things can be said about both countries, and others need to be said that differentiate the importance of Greece and that of Turkey.

A. STRATEGIC-MILITARY

For the military strategist, Greece and Turkey are important in three types of contingency: (1) a thermonuclear war between the United States and Russia; (2) more limited Soviet operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Africa; (3) Western operations in the Middle East, Northeast Africa, and Southern Asia.

(1) The first strategic aspect was crucial when Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Of all present members of the Atlantic Alliance, only Norway and Turkey have a land frontier with Russia. Airfields, radar sites, and other military installations in Turkey are closer than those in any other NATO country to centers of Soviet power, including heavy industry, petroleum production, and testing sites for nuclear bombs and for missiles. In the 1950's much of our information about Soviet military progress and much of our retaliatory power against Russia depended on the use of installations in Turkey. The U-2 that was

shot down in the spring of 1960 had been based at a Turkish airfield. For several years, a number of Jupiter missiles were based in Turkey. But in the late 1960's the importance of the installations in Turkey has been declining as global strategy has shifted from manned bombers to missiles launched from land or submarines, and as photographic reconnaissance is coming to rely on satellites rather than high-altitude planes. Within a context of global thermonuclear strategy, the instrumental value of Greece and Turkey may be expected to diminish further: even now, little if any of our nuclear retaliatory power against Russia would be lost if Turkey or Greece were taken out of the Western defense system.

As long as strategic thinking was focused on conflicts arising in Europe (e.g., over Berlin) and on conventional operations plus nuclear bombers, this first strategic aspect of Greece and Turkey was paramount. A detour via Turkey or Greece could not advance Soviet strategy against Europe; but just because Greek and Turkish membership in NATO was an essential part of the American nuclear deterrent, it became thereby a major cause of Soviet complaint.

(2) It should not be forgotten, however, that for the Soviets, Greece and Turkey had been a strategic objective in their own right before NATO was ever formed. The bid by Communist guerrillas to take over Greece (1945-49), on Turkey's other flank the Soviet-sponsored Azerbaijan People's Republic in Iran (1945-47), and direct Soviet demands for "joint defense" of the Turkish straits and for cession of several Eastern Turkish provinces (1945-46) were all part of that same strategy. If Greece and Turkey

were to leave the Western defense system, a broadly analogous Soviet strategy might be resumed.

The most important gain, from a Soviet perspective, probably would be the vastly increased possibility of political-military maneuver in the Middle East and Northeast Africa. In the past there have been regimes temporarily friendly to the Soviet Union in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan, and in view of the endemic instability of Arab governments, similar pro-Soviet regimes might take power elsewhere. So far, Russia has tried to secure the friendship of governments in the region mainly with such unreliable blandishments as economic or military aid. Sooner or later, therefore, most of these countries turned away from the Soviets; Nasser's Egypt has executed a number of tactical shifts since 1955 between a more pro-Soviet and a more pro-Western position. If, at any time in the future, the Soviet military position in the Eastern Mediterranean becomes greatly enhanced, Russia could more directly influence or control such political developments.

(3) The third strategic aspect, like the second, continues to be of undiminished significance. The Eastern Mediterranean countries provide an important waystation for any Western military operation in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Africa. Considering the likelihood of local conflict in Asia and Africa, this aspect is of immediate interest. It will be recalled that the British base on Cyprus was constructed after 1954 as a substitute for that on the Suez Canal, and that the ill-starred Anglo-French operation against Port Said in 1956 was in part

launched from Cyprus. Two years later, some U.S. forces stopped in Turkey on their way to Lebanon.[5]

Access to Turkish airfields enhances America's military (and hence diplomatic) potential in an area from Egypt and Kenya to Iran and Eastern India. This region is too far east to be reached nonstop by military transport planes from Western Europe and too far west to be conveniently reached via the Pacific. (A Pacific route would require political and technical arrangements for several intermediate stops. Above all, it would mean fewer troops and less materiel, or more planes and greater expense, or delay in reaching final destination -- in short, a substantial reduction in effective military power.) Air access via Turkey enables us to meet challenges in this area with more than paper protests and with less than thermonuclear rockets, and to meet them promptly enough to affect delicate diplomatic outcomes. Use of Turkish airfields therefore allows us to act effectively as a world power in an area of chronic turbulence.

Situations that might call for our limited military response in this region are not hard to imagine. There might be a Soviet intrusion into Iran not massive enough to bring into play our nuclear umbrella. The Chinese might launch a new attack along India's Himalayan frontier. There is the possibility of a conflict between two states

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[5] Yet it should be remembered that the use of any of these facilities as waystations requires overflight rights all the way to the ultimate destination. The British bases on Cyprus, for example, would be of little use in any local conflict in the Persian Gulf unless British planes would fly over Syria and Iraq or some alternative route.

in which we might be called upon to intervene alone, or in concert with others, or as agent of the United Nations. (In the past two decades, wars in Palestine, on the Sinai Peninsula, in Yemen, and in Kashmir have actively involved American diplomacy; and there have been lesser conflicts between almost any two states in the region that one might care to name.) There are likely to be many more internal upheavals, and in some of these a threatened government might invoke our help -- say in one of the oil-rich states surrounding the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, challenges of the Communist, the intraregional, and the domestic variety would be sure to multiply vastly as our ability to meet them declined. By its very ability to apply military power in graduated doses, the United States exercises a stabilizing influence throughout the non-Communist world. In the region around the Indian Ocean, use of the Turkish airfields is an essential ingredient in this graduated power.

It is worth dwelling a moment longer on the Communist threat to Iran. A direct Soviet attack comparable to that on Finland in 1939 is quite unlikely -- not just because of our guarantee but even more because it is in the Soviets' interest to prove such guarantees unnecessary. But recent Iranian history suggests many other, more delicate contingencies. If a Mossadegh-type government, supported by the intellectuals and the urban masses, were to overthrow the Shah, the Communists could try to take it over through popular-front tactics. If a military coup deposed him, they could join any guerrilla resistance that might develop. Once local Communists had proclaimed an Iranian People's

Republic, the Soviet Union could move in quickly to consolidate it -- and such an expansion of the Communist orbit would constitute a major victory in the Soviet contest with the Chinese. Here might be concrete proof that the Russians rather than the Chinese actually are speeding history on its inevitable march toward global Communism -- and this might be an important step in reasserting Russian leadership among Communist parties throughout the world.

Gradualist tactics such as the Communists might apply in Iran would afford no opportunities for American threats of nuclear retaliation. The only sound, long-run defense against them, of course, is political rather than military: more economic progress, popular organization in support of the Shah's reform policies, less reliance on courts-martial and secret police, and an eventual reconciliation between the present regime and the dissatisfied urban educated class. In the meantime, American conventional forces might at crucial junctures come to the aid of a threatened friendly government.

For some strategic purposes, Greece and Turkey are interchangeable. For example, most destinations in Russia and the Middle East that can currently be reached from Turkey could also be reached from alternative facilities that might be constructed in Greece. Similarly, Russian naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean would gain equally from access to bases in either country, Greece being slightly preferable because it has many more harbors and because it is the more forward position. The West, therefore, needs to maintain access to at least one of the countries but to deny both of them to the Soviets.

If a choice had to be made, the West would find Turkey to be of greater military value than is Greece. A take-off from Turkey extends the range of any given plane six or seven hundred miles eastward, and the air facilities and other special installations are already in existence. Turkish territory, moreover, is immediately adjacent to two perennially unstable Middle Eastern countries -- Syria and Iraq -- and to a third -- Iran -- that is perhaps the most vulnerable pro-Western position along the entire Soviet periphery. Turkey, finally, has the larger population and territory, including larger armed forces and natural resources.

B. POLITICAL

In the situations considered thus far, Turkey and Greece have a significant instrumental value to the West -- as bases in a thermonuclear or conventional war with Russia and for transport and staging in local wars in the Middle East-Indian Ocean region, and as naval bases to be denied to the Soviets. But beyond this, Greece and Turkey hold political significance for the United States.

Greece and Turkey were the scene of the first major East-West confrontation immediately after the Second World War. They did not reluctantly join the common defense against Communist expansionism in response to diplomatic pleas or in return for economic aid. They were already struggling against Communist absorption when American diplomats were still pursuing the elusive dream of "Big Three Unity." The need for military aid to Greece and Turkey prompted President Truman to proclaim our policy

of containing Communism, and in both countries that policy proved a striking success. Since 1947, Greece and Turkey have been recipients of large amounts of American aid -- military, economic, and technical. Greek-American and Turkish-American cooperation has not, of course, been free from frictions, but it has been close and wide-ranging. And despite evident shortcomings and temporary setbacks, the results have compared very favorably with those in other aid-receiving countries. In fact, if we look at concrete results and disregard recent psychological cross-currents, Greece and Turkey come as close to being "show-cases" of American aid as we are likely to find in this imperfect world. Turkey and Greece provide a demonstration that American policy can be positive as well as negative, that Americans can not only display effective strength but also cooperate with others -- and encourage them to cooperate among themselves -- for constructive peaceful tasks.

The developments which support such broad judgments (i.e., the individual items in the "showcase") may be briefly detailed. Greece along with Malaya and the Philippines remains the only country where a major Communist guerrilla operation was defeated. Similarly, Turkey's diplomatic firmness and military buildup would appear to have contributed to a reversal of Soviet policy: one of the first foreign policy measures of the post-Stalin regime in 1953 was to renounce the earlier territorial claim in Eastern Turkey.

Both countries since the beginning of the large-scale American aid program have maintained creditable rates of economic growth. Turkey went through a period of chaotic

overexpansion in the fifties and faces a threat of rapid population growth, but since the monetary stabilization of 1958 and the political stabilization of 1960-61 has made reasonably rapid and more balanced progress. The recent acceptance of Greece and Turkey as associates of the European Common Market both acknowledges and reinforces their economic progress.

Politically, both countries have been, for most of the last two decades, elective democracies. Here, too, there are important qualifications. Turkey's first democratic experiment miscarried in 1960, but the military coup of that year restored civilian rule after seventeen months (a unique record among Middle Eastern juntas) and meanwhile established a better foundation for democracy in constitutional and social legislation. In Greece, a two-party system emerged after 1952, although the conflict of the summer of 1965 between Prime Minister Papandreou and King Constantine created a constitutional crisis that reached its climax in the military coup of April 1967. Greece and Turkey are among the few developing countries to have had a series of free elections, and among the very few where governments have changed as a result of such elections. The Turkish record is marred by Menderes' repressive policies and the military coup that overthrew him: yet Turkey remains one of the few countries that made the transition from dictatorship to democracy by the voluntary decision of the dictator (Inönü in 1945). In Greece, the coup of April 1967 has set aside democratic procedures for the time being. Turkey is also the only country of non-Christian and non-European cultural background which, after a period

of intense Westernization, has thus been received into the Council of Europe and other organizations of the European community. Along with Japan she provides an important demonstration that Western institutions, even in the absence of European settlement, can be successfully exported and adapted in the world at large. Turkey, in short, is an important part of the West's answer to the Russian and Chinese claim that only Communism has the requisite dynamism to transform backward countries into full-fledged members of the modern world.

The United States has had close relations with Greece and Turkey only for the last twenty years. Relations between Greeks and Turks themselves have been intimate, though certainly not always happy, for seven centuries. They are the only two peoples in the world who fought their respective "wars of independence" against each other, the Greeks in 1821-30, the Turks in 1919-23. These violent encounters have alternated with periods of peaceful relations after major issues were settled -- e.g., for a generation after the recognition of Greek independence and again after the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-23 and the subsequent population exchange. The historical record thus suggests that Turks and Greeks can live peacefully side by side or fight each other fiercely, but that they cannot ignore each other. Whether in the next decade or two there will be peaceful relations between them or fierce animosity depends very largely on the outcome of the present Cyprus crisis.

IV. AFTERMATH AND OUTLOOK

A. IN GREECE

Conversations between representatives of the Athens and Ankara governments have taken place in one form or another every summer or spring since 1964 without so far resulting in any settlement for Cyprus. These efforts toward a solution must be assessed in part in the light of domestic political developments in each country.

The official Greek position on Cyprus became somewhat more conciliatory between 1964 and 1967, and General Grivas' command of the Greek Cypriote National Guard since the summer of 1964 appeared to give the Athens government, in effect, a veto on military operations on the island -- although Makarios has tried to shake off this control (see below). Nonetheless, a standstill in the fighting is not in itself enough to settle the Cyprus problem, and governments in Athens have been too weak and too beset by domestic political problems to take more decisive steps toward a settlement. It seems unlikely, for example, that any government with marginal electoral support or with a precarious military base would be able either to grant Turkey any significant territorial compensation for its interests on Cyprus, or to impose enosis or other aspects of a global settlement on a reluctant Makarios. Cyprus has not in fact been the prime issue in Greek politics of late, so that potential alignments on Cyprus cut across other political divisions. Any decisive action with regard to Cyprus might therefore antagonize enough supporters of any given government to bring it down.

George Papandreou, leader of the Center Union, promised in his victorious election campaigns of 1963 and 1964 to seek enosis, which was assumed to be Makarios goal as well, and from which Papandreou hoped for further gains in his own popularity. But events of 1964 and 1965 showed that Makarios was unenthusiastic about enosis -- at least in any form likely to be worked out between Athens and Ankara -- and that even the mainland Greek electorate was somewhat unconcerned. At any rate, the Papandreou government fell in the summer of 1965 and the resulting constitutional crisis soon overshadowed any concern for Cyprus or enosis.

The crisis had its origin in a contest between Premier Papandreou and King Constantine for control of the Greek armed forces, and it involved mutual charges that the palace or that the Premier's son, Andreas Papandreou, had been trying to politicize the officer corps. Throughout the late summer of 1965, various dissidents from Papandreou's Center Union vainly tried to carry out the King's mandate to form a parliamentary cabinet. On the fourth such attempt, Stephanos Stephanopoulos was installed as premier with the backing of the conservative National Radical Union, the Center Union dissidents, and others -- by a margin of only four votes. For several months, the new premier kept the parliament adjourned; later his majority on occasion dwindled to two votes or even a single vote. Stephanopoulos resigned after fifteen months in office (September 1965 to December 1966), a caretaker cabinet was installed with the backing of George Papandreou and of National Radical Union leader Panayotis Kanellopoulos, and elections announced for May 1967. Sharp protests against this arrangement by

Andreas Papandreou and a confrontation between father and son within the Center Union party added to the uncertainty of the situation.

Before the elections could be held, a military coup on April 21, 1967, led to the dissolution of parliament and parties, to the arrest of both Papandreous and of many other leftist and left-of-center figures, and to a general curtailment of political freedoms. King Constantine, who seemed to have been caught by surprise, reluctantly acquiesced in the new regime.

The military rulers appeared to lack both prominent leadership and a clear program. With regard to Cyprus, there was some speculation that the soldier-rulers might wish to bring about the same kind of fait accompli in Nicosia that brought them to power in Athens and then proclaim enosis. A major question in such a contingency would be Ankara's reaction. Conceivably, generous concessions proclaimed along with enosis might ward off Turkish intervention. Yet it was hard to see how there could be any coordination in advance, even secret, let alone overt. Any uncertainty, or any prolonged intra-Greek fighting on Cyprus, on the other hand, might invite Turkish military action. Furthermore, the same domestic tensions that might make the Athens junta wish for enosis as a major patriotic success might prevent its accomplishment.

IN SUMMER 1967

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(3)

B. IN TURKEY

Turkey has recently overcome a period of political instability such as Greece is currently undergoing. After several years of mounting tension, a military junta in 1960 deposed Premier Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party,

and stayed in office until Menderes was tried and executed and a new, democratic constitution enacted. In October 1961, the junta's leader, General Gürsel, was elected to the largely ceremonial post of President under the new constitution. For the next three and a half years, Ismet Inönü, Menderes' long-time antagonist and leader of the Republican People's Party, formed a series of coalition cabinets. The military commanders remained in the background except when it proved necessary to protect the civilian governments from renewed attempts at coups by middle-ranking officers.

By late 1964, the military and the Justice Party (successors to Menderes' Democrats) were becoming reconciled. Süleyman Demirel, a professional engineer and head of the moderate wing, assumed the party leadership. A cabinet, headed by a nonpartisan with Justice Party support, succeeded in the spring. Following a Justice Party landslide in the elections of the fall of 1965, Demirel himself assumed the premiership. When President Gürsel died in the spring of 1966, he was followed by another military figure, former Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay.

Meanwhile, Turkish-American relations, which had been extremely close in the nineteen-fifties, were becoming strained. Turkey was experiencing the dislocations of rapid and uneven economic development and an even more rapid population increase. The zigzag political course of the nineteen-fifties and early sixties by turns aroused and disappointed the political expectations of farmers, businessmen, industrial workers, and urban intellectuals. Turkey's heavy reliance on American military and economic aid and a sizable American presence (military and AID

missions in Ankara, air installations near Adana, etc.) made it natural that some of this frustration should be vented in anti-American sentiment. American policy on the Cyprus question focused this reaction and increased its fury.

Inevitably, too, both the Cyprus question and Turkish-American relations became the objects of partisan recrimination. In the 1965 election campaign Demirel had been able to ignore widespread insinuations that, as Turkish representative of the Morrison Knudsen engineering firm, he was an American puppet. Soon after Demirel's accession to the premiership, a vociferous debate on the Cyprus question began in parliament and the press. For a while it looked as if the Demirel administration might be readying itself for military intervention in Cyprus. Instead, the Cyprus debate took a dramatic turn with the publication in mid-January 1966 of the exchange of letters between President Johnson and Premier İnönü two years earlier. (The Johnson letter was printed in the January 13 issue of the Istanbul daily Hürriyet. The Turkish government had that issue confiscated but at once requested Washington to release the correspondence; this the White House did on January 15.) The immediate popular reaction was one of sharpened frustration and anti-American resentment. In the Turkish political debate, however, each side sought to turn the Johnson letter to its own interest. Republicans cited the events of June 1964 as avidence that they would have defended Turkish rights on Cyprus by force if the United States had not interfered. Followers of the Justice Party blamed Republicans for having given in to such pressure and thereby missing the opportune moment for intervention.

It should be emphasized that despite the sharp Turkish-American differences over Cyprus in 1964, official Turkish policy remained quite moderate. Even after the limited Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and the exchange of official visits in the winter of 1964-65, for example, Turkey went no further than to disassociate herself from plans for a NATO multilateral force (13 January 1965) -- a project not very actively pushed by Washington at that time -- and to reject NATO requests for increased force levels (statement by Defense Minister Sancar, 26 January 1965) -- which many other allies had done before. A year later, the news of an arms deal between the Czech government and President Makarios (see below) created a chilly atmosphere during Premier Kosygin's visit to Ankara. At the level of popular sentiment, however, Turkish-American relations are likely to remain strained. Just as the Cyprus problem was only one contributing factor to that strain, so a solution -- even one acceptable to Turkey and promoted through American diplomatic efforts -- would relieve the tension only partly.

With regard to Cyprus itself, the Turkish attitude may be characterized as one of watchful waiting and of recurrent efforts to work out a settlement with Athens. The occasion for military intervention would seem to have passed in the summer of 1964 or at the latest by early 1966 and will not recur unless there should be major new incidents on the island. The situation still is essentially as Dean Acheson described it sometime after his return from Geneva: "If [Makarios] is foolish enough to push the Turks too far, no one will restrain him again. If not, prescriptive rights from time's grant will accrue from Turkish inaction."[6]

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[6]Address before the Chicago Bar Association, 24 March 1965.

C. ON CYPRUS

On the island itself, time indeed seemed to be working in favor of Makarios and his Greek Cypriote supporters. The final report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza Lasso, submitted on 26 March 1965, supplied them with a number of potent additional arguments. Plaza discounted not only a return to the status quo ante, but also such solutions as enosis, geographic separation of Greeks and Turks on the island (which, he predicted, would create a "highly provocative frontier"), or territorial compensation for Turkish rights under the 1959-60 agreements. His plea for demilitarization of the island presumably was directed against present British bases as well as future ones controlled by Turkey or NATO and accorded well with Makarios' bid for neutralist and Communist support in the United Nations and in the world at large. Plaza further suggested that Turkish Cypriotes receive assurances of minority rights (presumably in verbal enactments by a Greek Cypriote government), and that "any Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things would have the right to be resettled in Turkey...." In view of recent Greek-Turkish relations on the island, few Turks were likely to feel such confidence; this, indeed, had been the reason for calling in a mediator in the first place. Understandably the Plaza report was firmly rejected by the Turkish government and widely denounced in the Istanbul and Ankara press. A year later, in March 1966, Secretary-General U Thant designated Carlos A. Bernardi as his personal representative with instructions to bring about discussions in any form or any level suitable -- and

in doing so studiously avoided the term "mediation." By June 1966, Bernardi, too, reported the failure of his efforts.

Makarios' own policy took clearer shape in the summer and fall of 1965. In late July the Greek rump of the House of Representatives passed a series of bills abolishing the Greek and Turkish communal chambers, merging the separate Greek and Turkish rolls for national elections, declaring the Vice-Presidency and the Turkish seats in the Council of Ministers vacant -- in short, setting aside all the essential provisions of the constitution -- and prolonging its own term of office and that of President Makarios (which were to have expired on August 15, 1965). The service of Greek Cypriote conscripts, extended previously from six to twelve months, was extended once more to eighteen, which meant a tripling of the legal strength of the Greek Cypriote forces, not counting the regulars infiltrated from Greece and irregulars armed among the island population. On 11 October 1965, the Greek Cypriote Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, submitted to Secretary-General U Thant two documents that would implement some of Plaza's recommendations, including a declaration of rights for Cypriotes patterned on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a statute giving autonomy to Greeks and Turks in matters of education, religion, and personal status. (How this autonomy was to be implemented in the absence of the communal chambers, dissolved by the July laws, was not made clear.) In December 1965, a resolution by the General Assembly gave further support to Plaza's and Makarios' view of the conflict as essentially an internal matter to be resolved within Cyprus.

No internal solution can take full effect, however, unless peace can henceforth be maintained without external help, and this in turn presupposes a basic agreement between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. There have been few outbreaks of violence on the island since August 1964. This lull has been due in part to the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). But because this force was inadequate to prevent fighting in the spring and summer of 1964 and since then has been reduced from about 6000 to about 4500 men, it seems reasonable to look for two other explanations. One of these is the control of the Greek Cypriote National Guard by General Grivas and other officers who have taken their instructions from Athens. The other is the possibility of military retaliation from the Turkish mainland, as demonstrated in August 1964. By the end of 1966, moreover, there were clear indications that Archbishop-President Makarios was doing his best to break this stalemate as upheld by Grivas' National Guard, UNFICYP, and the latent Turkish threat. In late November, the Makarios government decided to cut the budget for the National Guard by $1 million and to increase that for the police forces (which were under Makarios direct control). A week later it was learned that the Makarios government had ordered a quantity of Czech arms to equip this enlarged police force. While the Greek government insisted that a first shipment of these arms be turned over to its officers on the island, Turkish naval units were reported to be steaming off "for a month of maneuvers" in an apparent attempt to prevent the delivery of a second.

If the Makarios government at any future time gains control of the National Guard or of sizable fighting forces of its own, or if the United Nations forces are withdrawn, the precarious peace on Cyprus might suddenly cease. A second round of Greek-Turkish fighting might well assume larger proportions than in 1964 and almost certainly would bring into play renewed threats of Turkish intervention by air or through landings.

Meanwhile, even without any fighting, the economy of the island suffers -- from a lack of tourist income (normally a major item in the foreign exchange balance), from disruption of internal production, trade, and government services, and from the wholesale conscription of young men. The hardship is obviously greatest on the Turkish community of whom more than half are crowded together in various enclaves. But there are indications that the government of Cyprus, too, is feeling the financial pinch of this economic disruption.[7]

Peace on the island might perhaps result from a new agreement between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus approved by the other signatories of the London-Zurich treaties, but with the Makarios and the Ankara governments playing the leading role in direct negotiations. It would seem unlikely that such an agreement could be

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[7] It may be taken as a symptom of this that the Times of London reported (November 11, 1966): "Some surprise in official and diplomatic quarters in Nicosia" at the prospect of early British withdrawal from the base at Dhekalia. In 1965 the two bases together had brought Cyprus a foreign exchange income of about $40 million, compensating for more than half of the island's trade deficit.

based on one side's accepting the substance of the other's demands (i.e., Makarios' accepting full autonomy for a Turkish community resettled in a suitable portion of the island, or the Turks' agreeing to majority rule on Cyprus with only conventional guarantees of minority rights). Perhaps a more hopeful approach would be a revision of the constitutional system in line with principles long applied in Lebanon.

In Lebanon, as in Cyprus under the 1960 constitution, high government offices are divided among the two major communities, with the president a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and other offices divided among Christians and Muslims in a ratio of six to five. But in sharp contrast to the Cyprus constitution of 1960, the laws of Lebanon use the electoral process to unite rather than to set apart the various communities. Under the old Cypriote system, Greek voters chose among Greek candidates for the Greek setas in the House, Turks among Turkish condidates for Turkish seats. Under the system enacted by the Makarios government in July 1965, all ethnic distinctions would disappear, so that with the normal operation of majority elections no Turks would sit in the legislature at all. Under a "Lebanese" system, parliamentary seats would still be reserved for Greeks and Turks in a set proportion as in 1960, but there would be a single electoral roll as in 1965. The island would be divided into a number of large, ethnically mixed constituencies, which would send a fixed number of Greek and Turkish representatives to Nicosia -- say, two Greeks and one Turk or five Greeks and two Turks, depending on population ratios. But every voter -- Greek and Turk -- would exercise his vote for every one of the seats in his constituency,

choosing among Greek candidates for the Greek seats and among Turkish candidates for the Turkish seats. Under the 1960 system, every parliamentarian was accountable only to constituents of his own ethnic community, and Greek and Turkish legislators faced each other in two hostile phalanxes. Under a "Lebanese" system, every member of parliament would have both Greek and Turkish constituents. Since "balanced tickets" (to use the New York expression) would be required by law, success in election campaigns would depend on alliances across ethnic lines. There would be a premium on moderate and conciliatory attitudes rather than on divisiveness and antagonism. At the same time, the legislature could act by majority votes without distinction among Greek and Turkish members: there would be no need and no place for the communal vetoes of the 1960 constitution. Only such a new set of institutions can be expected to provide in time that "basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things" that Senor Plaza vainly sought in verbal declarations.

D. FOR THE UNITED STATES

The United States in June 1964 stopped Turkey from landing troops on Cyprus -- a right Turkey claimed under the Treaty of Guarantee. The United States did not, however, prevent the arrival of an entire division of Greek soldiers in clear contravention of the 1960 treaties. In August 1964, the United States did not prevent the Turkish air force attack on Mansoura and Kokkina, but the following spring American pressure prevented the delivery of Russian SAMs to Cyprus. Meanwhile, since 1964, the United States

has paid about 40 percent of the cost of the United Nations force on Cyprus.

United States action was consistently aimed at preventing military encounters or at reducing their intensity. We deterred the Turks from landing troops on a hostile shore, but did not prevent the arrival of the Greek soldiers in friendly ports. We did not stop the Turkish air strikes -- and perhaps could not have done so short of attacking Turkey's American-built jets with our own jets. But we dissuaded Greece from delivering the Russian missiles which, in an extreme situation, we could have intercepted by naval force.

United States policymakers presumably did not intend any partiality in intervening in various phases of the Cyprus dispute -- but then it is not easy, even with the best of intentions, to intervene impartially in a two-way fight. The United States in fact has played a quiet but decisive role in determining the current situation on Cyprus. We allowed a sharp increase in the superiority of Greek land forces on the island while preserving Turkish superiority in the air. Meanwhile, since 1964 the United States has paid a subsidy without which UNFICYP probably would not have come into existence. With some oversimplification, it may be said that United States policy has helped determine the level of military forces on either side and then paid for a third military force to patrol the resulting deadlock.

The military situation, moreover, has had important political implications. The Greek ground troops which we permitted to land and the Turkish air threat which we have allowed to be maintained have contributed to restraining Makarios activism. But as the situation shaped up in early

1964 and as it has since evolved, Makarios has been much closer to reaching his maximal goals than have his Turkish antagonists. Time, moreover, may well seem to be on the Archbishop's side. Politically, therefore, the indirect beneficiary of our policy has been Makarios, in whom few American officials reposed any trust, and the most serious loser Turkey, traditionally our closest ally in the Eastern Miditerranean.

By preventing a military showdown, we staked our policy on the assumption that diplomacy could solve the crisis. The course of diplomatic conversations to date -- whether with participation by Americans or United Nations representatives or directly between Greeks and Turks -- has not borne out that assumption. This impasse of United States policy with regard to Cyprus may be attributed to two main reasons. First, we have exerted ourselves more to restrain means than to promote ends. We were more concerned not to have the Cyprus dispute solved by fighting than to have it solved in any particular way -- or indeed to have it solved at all. Second, in helping explore the possibilities of a diplomatic solution at the time of the Acheson mission in the summer of 1964 we concentrated on Ankara and Athens rather than Ankara and Nicosia.

In the foreseeable future, the Cyprus situation may be expected to develop along one of three lines -- continuation of the present deadlock, a military showdown, or a political solution.

A continuation of the present deadlock is desired by no one and in no one's interest. Nonetheless, the experience in Kashmir and along Israel's frontiers shows that

provisional arrangements of this sort can endure for many years (even the United Nations forces at Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh retained their stations for fully ten years). And no matter how undesirable in itself, such a lingering provisional arrangement would seem preferable, from a point of view of global peace and of United States interest, to a full-scale local war that might well spread beyond the region.

It seems doubtful, however, whether the present deadlock can continue indefinitely. In contrast to Palestine and Kashmir, there is no geographic separation of the antagonists. The current stalemate may be upset almost instantly by a number of developments -- if Makarios manages to gain control of substantial Greek forces, if Grivas or his successor should receive different instructions from a new government at Athens, if fighting breaks out spontaneously, or if Ankara shifts to a more militant attitude.

A second round of fighting is almost certain to assume larger proportions than did the first in 1964. There are many more arms and men now on the island, and it seems less likely that Turkey would once again allow its forces to be restrained. While a new major military clash would thus almost certainly involve Turkish mainland forces, it seems less likely that Greece (which is much further away) could effectively intervene, except with its forces already on Cyprus. Nor is there any reason to assume (as did the Johnson letter of 5 June 1964) that Russia would be involved -- especially if American policy concentrated on warning Russia rather than Turkey against such intervention. Warfare on the island therefore need not spread beyond its

immediate region of origin, but it would inevitably take a heavy toll of lives and property among the Cypriote Greek and especially the Cypriote Turkish communities -- about whose rights the conflict first erupted.

A permanent political solution would seem a far more hopeful way of forestalling a second military round than does the present stalemate. American diplomatic efforts so far have concentrated on encouraging the Athens and Ankara governments to find such a solution. Since Greek-Turkish conversations have yielded no tangible result, it would seem preferable now to encourage direct contacts between Ankara and Nicosia. Although an enormous amount of distrust and animosity would have to be overcome, any solution arrived at by such direct contacts could be readily implemented -- as a solution endorsed by Athens rather than Nicosia could not. A "Lebanese" plan of representation, as outlined above, might provide a tangible basis for discussions between the Makarios and the Ankara governments. Such a solution would have the virtue of reconciling rather than compromising the two interests involved. A United Nations force and a guarantee by outside powers still might be required for a number of years to ensure a transition to the new system, but their efforts would be directed less at preventing war than at building peace.

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