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26/GS/CP

GENERAL SURVEY

Country Profile

The Society

Government and Politics

The Economy

Transportation and Telecommunications

Military Geography

Armed Forces

Science

U.S.S.R.

April 1974

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the NIS *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the *Inventory of Available NIS Publications*, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The *General Survey* is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.



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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area Brief • Summary Map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Labor • Health • Living conditions • Social problems • Religion • Education • Public information • Artistic expression

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate • Military geographic regions • Strategic areas • Internal routes • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement • Organization, planning, and financing of research • Scientific education, manpower, and facilities • Major research fields

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

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The Other Superpower

Winston Churchill's famous description of Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" seems less apt today. For more than a quarter of a century of cold war, the Soviet Union has been scrutinized and analyzed as the United States' chief adversary. Now it is coming more fully into view in the new light of the recent rapid development of unprecedented levels of peacetime contact with the West. The summit meetings of President Nixon and Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972 and June 1973, and the signing of nearly 20 agreements in little more than a year's time, have laid the basis for extensive cooperation between the two countries. But there still is no clear-cut answer to the question of Russia's real nature and intentions, no certain knowledge of the directions it will take at home and the role it will play abroad. The Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and its extraordinary influence in world politics make it the X-factor in almost all U.S. national security and foreign policy calculations. The

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awesome fact that the Soviet Union could virtually destroy the United States in a matter of minutes—however much this oversimplifies the complexities of U.S.-Soviet relations—gives the U.S.S.R. a unique position in international affairs: it alone ranks with the United States as a superpower.

These two countries soared to their unique status from vastly different backgrounds in less than six decades. Whereas America's culture has been predominantly Protestant and Anglo-Saxon, Russia's was Byzantine and Russian Orthodox. While individual liberty and democracy were developing in England, America's motherland, the Mongol horde tyrannized the conquered Russians for 250 years—turning the clock back, many Russians still believe, that far behind the rest of Europe. Russia had neither Renaissance nor Reformation. Its modernization, launched by Peter the Great, has been marked not by democratization but by the imposition of an oppressive, highly centralized, bureaucratic autocracy—first under the tsars, and then under the Communists. On the eve of World War I, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not yet exist, and its predecessor, Imperial Russia, was underdeveloped, weakened from its defeat by Japan in 1905, and menaced by the rising power of Imperial Germany. The two World Wars wrought an enormous revolution in international politics, politics which swiftly became polarized around the American and Soviet power that had emerged supreme. Even the remarkable post-World War II recovery of Western Europe, China, and Japan has been overshadowed by the colossal growth in economic, technological and, above all, military power of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Yet for all its immense power, the U.S.S.R. is strangely insecure. It is reaching out to the West and yet trying to hold it at bay, seemingly eager to promote reconciliation and yet anxious to limit its impact at home. It has achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States and has consolidated its dominance in Eastern Europe, yet it remains obsessed by rivalry with China, a country much weaker in economic and military terms. The Soviet Union's political tructure would appear to an outsider to be solid and secure, and its society, by Western standards, would seem to be a model of law and order. Yet political structure would appear to an outsider to be solid and secure, and its society, by Western standards, would seem to be a model of law and order. Yet the U.S.S.R. has tightened ideological controls and its secret police have been engaged in a relentless campaign to crush a small scattering of reform-minded and minority national dissidents as if they posed a real threat to Soviet power. It is a paradoxical country that is publicly triumphant but privately defensive, constantly proclaiming "socialist superiority" and yet fearful of not being able to compete effectively with the capitalist West. It has become industrialized yet not really modern. It has gained growth but lost momentum.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union—designated in the Constitution as the "leading core of all organization. . . . both public and state"—dominates the country and determines the course it is to follow, primarily by placing its people in key posts at all administrative levels of the government and in other vital institutions. Through this interlocking arrangement the party controls the machinery of government, runs the economy, directs the armed forces and police, manages the news and communications media, and regulates the country's purportedly independent educational, legal, cultural, and social institutions. It formulates policies and oversees their implementation. The party vests its decisionmaking authority in a tiny elite, the Politburo of the Central Committee, and "politics" becomes largely a matter of the conspiring and maneuvering among these party leaders, rather than a struggle between the party and special interest groups. The power wielded by these party leaders is checked only by the need to strike a consensus among themselves and by the inertia of the ponderous bureaucratic apparatus they manipulate.

The men cloistered in the Kremlin (the Russian word for fortress; its ancient walls in the capital city of Moscow enclose major government office buildings) serve both the Soviet national interest and an ideological commitment to promote world communism. And like Russian rulers in centuries past, they seem to be motivated additionally by a hatred of backwardness and a consuming desire to be considered equals by the West, especially by Washington. Like Russian tsars since Peter the Great, they are borrowing and adapting techniques from major adversaries the better to catch up with and surpass them.

The Soviet system remains a secretive one, whose communications media can extol the benefits of cooperation with the West without disclosing to the Soviet citizenry the giant grain purchases it had to make from Western nations in 1972. It asks Western bankers to put up millions of dollars in loans, but is reluctant to permit them normal financial information about its foreign-exchange reserves and gold supply. Foreign enterprises negotiating long-term deals for Soviet natural gas involving vast investments

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are not permitted the kind of easy access for their specialists that they are accustomed to receiving elsewhere. The Soviet leaders talk of opening up East-West relations, yet demand a ban on satellite television relay without prior approval of the programs.

This is a country of such anomalies that almost no portrait of it is quite accurate. It is proclaimed to be a classless society, yet many of its members appear to be more status conscious than their counterparts in the capitalist West. Those who make up the political, economic, and cultural elite are served by a special network of well-stocked, cutrate stores; they enjoy a host of privileges that are beyond the reach of the common man and are often more important than money in an economy of consumer shortages. Many ordinary citizens genuinely seem to consider their system a superior one, and indeed can imagine no other. What matters most is that they are better off now than ever before. Yet their standard of living is not only below that in the developed West but also below that in most of Eastern Europe.

Even though it is a superpower, extremes of advancement and underdevelopment, of the good and the bad, exist side by side. Although the Soviet economy and scientific community obviously are capable of great achievements—exemplified by the Sputnik of 1957 and the first manned space flight in 1961, the construction of the world's most massive hydroelectric complexes, the rapid development of Siberian oil fields, and the buildup of an advanced military arsenal— perhaps its most striking feature is the lopsided nature of its development. While earth satellites are being launched, there still are occasional shortages of potatoes and other staple foods. There are subways in several Soviet cities—Moscow boasts a superior one—and public surface transport is good. But away from urban centers, most of the roads are astonishingly primitive. At Voronezh, work progresses on a 1,500-mile-per-hour jet transport plane while, in surrounding villages, farmers with two buckets dangling from a shoulder yoke tote water from community wells to their weatherbeaten log homes.

Typically, Soviet industry has developed the kind of brute strength represented by the giant Kama River project, a crash effort to build a manufacturing complex capable of turning out 150,000 big trucks and a quarter of a million diesel engines a year, dwarfing anything in Detroit, or anywhere in the West. It is a prime symbol of the Soviet passion for bigness, and

Moscow's Metro—an ornate subway with chandeliers

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the belief that bigger means better. But the centrally planned Soviet economy has been unable to generate enough quality technology and convert it into production fast enough. It lacks the driving force of competition that stimulates technological development in the West, and Soviet theorists and planners have yet to devise an adequate way to fill the void.

The picture is not entirely bleak, especially for the Soviet urbanite, for whom the quantity of new housing is impressive and the availablity of cars and even summer houses outside the city is on the rise. The state keeps housing costs low, and foots the bill for medical care. Nevertheless, random and unpredictable shortages of hundreds of everyday items seem to be almost endemic in the U.S.S.R. Alongside shortages there are surpluses—of poor-quality clothing and shoes, and outmoded models of television sets and washing machines. Such imbalances between supply and demand, along with evidence of gross waste of resources, have long been a part of the Soviet scene. But they have acquired a new dimension with the embryonic affluence of the Soviet consumer, long accustomed to the bottom position on the totem pole of Soviet investment priorities. Even though Soviet consumers today really can be considered affluent only in comparison with their past levels, there has indeed been a significant increase in recent years in the availability of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R.—enough, ironically, to increase the pressure on a system ill-designed to satisfy more sophisticated consumer demand.

One of the most critical tasks confronting the Soviet leadership is to forge the organization and design the incentives that will match supply and demand over the whole range of consumer goods and services with efficiency and dispatch. The Kremlin's characteristically topheavy, bureaucratic approach is exemplified by the fact that the agency created 7 years ago to study market demand is now engaged in coordinating a massive (and seemingly ineffective) demand-forecasting project involving 40 separate research institutes. This has produced frenetic activity and reams of reports by the multiple bureaus involved, but not the answers for such critical problems as how to generate incentives that will insure a rapid and precise response to demand forecasts on the part of producers and the distribution system.

Soviet medical students. With medical care offered to every citizen at state expense, the demand for physicians is enormous. Some 80% of the doctors in the U.S.S.R. are women.

The natural riches of the U.S.S.R.—including oil, gas, uranium, and gold—are vast indeed. But the Soviets still trail the United States in most fields of production—except for cement and coal. And in consumer goods, of course, there is no comparison—America's per capita lead is 3 to 1 in ownership of refrigerators, 2 to 1 in washing machines, and the United States far outdistances the U.S.S.R. in automobiles and household possession of ordinary appliances such as radios, TV sets, and vacuum cleaners. Growing concern about pollution provides a certain measure of the modernization of Soviet society. Water pollution, in particular, is becoming a serious matter, and other kinds—as indicated by the creation of a National Anti-Noise Committee—are

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getting attention. But Soviet citizens have been spared the battle against indestructible plastic bags, nonrecyclable cans, and "no deposit, no return" bottles largely because the bulk of the Soviet housewife's food purchases still are not sold in packaged form.

All these shortcomings in the Soviet economy are accentuated by the present decline in the impressive economic growth rates of the postwar period. Despite the growth of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) by about 80% over the past decade as opposed to a little over 60% for the United States, America's GNP is almost double that of the U.S.S.R., and last year the Soviet economy grew more slowly than that of the United States. In part, this is a result of the growing complexity of later stages of economic development. It is clear that the Soviet Union can no longer achieve growth so easily by adding to its labor force and its capital stock, as it did in the sixties. From now on, growth depends primarily on greater efficiency, and that has never been the strong suit of the Soviet economy.

Yet, despite the surprising signs of backwardness that can be noted in the Soviet economy, it has nevertheless built military muscle second in its overall strength and sophistication only to that of the United States. In recent years the U.S.S.R. has developed its weaponry to the point that the remaining differences between the military arsenals of the two superpowers are in large measure of a geostrategic nature, founded in the world distribution of land and sea. A comparison of their military forces reflects the inherent differences in land-based and sea-based power. Inasmuch as the United States has few neighbors, and the U.S.S.R. many,* with several in the enemy camp, there is a striking contrast in the number of intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles and of long-range and medium-range bombers, and in the number of aircraft and helicopter carriers that each possesses. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, being essentially independent of the land power versus sea power consideration, are comparable in quantity.

*The Soviet Union has more foreign states on its borders than any other country. The United States has common land frontiers with only two other countries, Canada and Mexico, and a radius of 500 miles extends only four more—Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and (from Alaska) the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has common boundaries with 13 countries: Norway, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, China, Mongolia, and North Korea. And within 500 miles of Soviet territory lie 17 more: Sweden, Denmark, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Nepal, Japan, South Korea, and the United States (Alaska). The 4,600-mile Soviet border with China is the longest land frontier in the world.

Reaching a position of strategic parity with the United States has given the Soviets a new confidence in their international standing. If that confidence is somewhat shaken by concern about economic shortcomings and the growth of China as a great power, the leadership has closed ranks behind Brezhnev's prescribed remedy—detente policies toward the West, mixed with tighter political and ideological controls at home. Brezhnev's preeminence in the Soviet leadership was dramatically underscored at the Soviet Communist Party plenum in April 1973. That sort of gathering is expected to put a rubberstamp of approval on a foreign policy program enunciated by the party's boss, but on this occasion the praise was uncommonly lavish and convincing. Premier Kosygin, President Podgornyy, and the leading party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov took the dais to endorse Brezhnev's foreign policy report, and the plenum gave the green light to his summit trips to Bonn and Washington. At the same time, major changes took place in the Politburo, the power center of the party. It features the addition of the Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense—men who are among Brezhnev's strongest supporters—and the explusion from the Politburo of two of his apparent critics.

The changes in the Politburo, by adding more government officials, give it somewhat more of the look of a traditional cabinet. But in this, too, the appearance is paradoxical. The shakeup actually indicated that personnel changes, instead of being on an institutional basis, still are made on personal and political grounds and that the Soviet system of rule remains one of men, not law. The system maintains an essentially closed society, and its security continues to rest, if somewhat less nakedly than in Stalin's time, on censorship, police controls, and persistent efforts to enforce intellectual conformity, even through threat of arrest and banishment to prison labor camps. In all of this there is evidence that many features of modern Soviet society are in fact bridges from the past. May Day and Revolution Day parades through Red Square, for example, when huge portraits of Soviet leaders are borne aloft, are not unlike religious processions in old Russia. Even Brezhnev's turn to the West for the acquisition of capital, advanced equipment, and technological know-how fits the fluctuating pattern of Russian history since Peter the Great opened his celebrated "window to the West" in the early 18th century. While its best may be based on the borrowed or copied, the outside world is never really admitted. For all the techniques from without, Russia today remains much a continent to itself.

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

Giant Land of Many Peoples

Tadzhiks in white shirts vie with Armenians in black during a "fur cap game" at a horse festival in the Soviet Central Asian city of Alma-Ata.

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The magnitude and diversity of the Soviet Union are almost incredible. It is an awesome land of prodigious dimensions, where herds of reindeer trek through arctic blizzards while caravans of camels are driven across burning deserts. Its rulers are still engaged in a centuries-old effort to develop and consolidate their immense territory and their multinational people. The political and economic benefits associated with a country of size and diversity are numerous, as demonstrated by the history of the United States. And for the U.S.S.R., which is at a lower stage of economic development, many of the benefits are only partially realized. But the problems related to the size and diversity of the Soviet Union are enormous, too—including long distances to be overcome by transport and communication lines, difficult climatic conditions, unassimilated national cultures, and maldistribution of resources in relation to population. The processes of development and consolidation are not nearly complete; the tasks and obstacles ahead are, like the land, of epic proportions.

The U.S.S.R. is by far the largest country in the world—more than twice the size of China, nearly 2½ times the size of the United States, and 40 times the size of France, the largest country in Europe. From its western border with Poland on the Baltic Sea, the Soviet Union sprawls across the northern half of Eurasia roughly 6,000 miles to its easternmost point, Ratmanov Island, in the Bering Strait of the Pacific. It covers the eastern half of Europe, takes up two-thirds of the Eurasian continent, and encompasses close to half of the northern hemisphere. From north to south it extends 2,800 miles from the Arctic Ocean to the Afghan border.

When on a summer evening the sun sinks below the horizon on the western borders of the U.S.S.R., it is simultaneously rising to greet the following day on the eastern borders. The Soviet Union is a country where the sun never sets—a phenomenon which actually is a product of its polar position, but which is also suggestive of the broad sweep of the land. Its territory stretches across 171 of the 360 degrees of global longitude and is wrapped around the Arctic Ocean and the North Pole—the strategic significance of which is illustrated by noting that to take the most direct route between Moscow and Los Angeles, one would travel northwards. The Soviet polar position is enhanced by the fact that its Arctic coastal waters are somewhat less bound by ice and land obstructions than those of North America. Soviet Arctic navigation and scientific research are more extensive than any other nation's. In addition to the observation that the shortest distance between the Soviet Union and the contiguous states of the United States is across the polar ice, the size and strategic location of the U.S.S.R. is further illustrated by its proximity to other key countries and areas, which gives it a natural interest and potential for involvement. In Asia, not only does it border China, North Korea, and Mongolia, but Japan lies just across the Sea of Japan, and even closer in the Kuril Islands. Pakistan is a mere 10 miles and India only 175 miles from Soviet territory. In addition to bordering on Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, the Soviet Union is separated from the Mediterranean only by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

The size of the Soviet Union gives it more diversity than any other country in natural conditions, resources, and peoples. Its great varieties of landscape, climate, and vegetation fall mainly into four major natural zones from north to south—tundra, taiga, steppe, and desert. Agricultural land has been carved out of the more hospitable taiga and steppe areas to form a distinctive region within the basic zones. There is also a relatively small subtropical zone on the Black Sea.

The often-frozen tundra of the Far North is characterized by extremely cold climate, sparse vegetation of mostly mosses and lichens, and poor soils. The few inhabitants maintain a bare nomadic existence, and reindeer herding is a primary endeavor.

South of the tundra is a broad belt of taiga forests, encompassing 4 million square miles and stretching across the country from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. The taiga is the world's richest and most extensive forest of pine, spruce, and larch. These conifers give way to broadleaf forests on the southern edge of the zone. The winters of the taiga are long and bitterly cold, especially in continental Siberia. Here some of the lowest temperatures on earth—more than 90 degrees below zero—have been recorded. Permanently frozen soils prevail in much of the area. Human settlement in these harsh conditions has been established chiefly to exploit valuable mineral and timber resources, but large urban-industrial centers thrive along the southern periphery of the taiga.

Ice "road" across the Lena River—here more than two miles wide—in Yakutsk.

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

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As cold dominates the tundra and taiga, drought is the key feature of the natural environment in the steppe and desert zones. The natural grasslands of the steppe support a large population, and vast areas are devoted to agriculture, particularly in the northern steppe where good soil and adequate rainfall prevail. Some of the most fertile soils—the chernozems—are located in an east-west belt extending from the Ukraine to Siberia and are the backbone of Soviet agriculture. The southern and drier steppe zone is the Soviet "dust bowl," where habitation as well as agriculture is marginal at best. The introduction of irrigation systems and measures to prevent erosion have improved land use there, resulting in more settlement toward the southern limits of the steppe.

Much of Soviet Central Asia is in the semidesert or desert zone. Rainfall is minimal because of the vast distance from the ocean, and there is little vegetation. Some of the highest temperatures on earth—over 120 degrees above zero—have been recorded in this region. But in spite of the inhospitable natural conditions, there are pockets of fertile land in river valleys and several large cities flourish in these oases. Elsewhere in the desert zone, agriculture has been introduced and established through extensive irrigation efforts, and the population is being extended into what once was barren wasteland.

The small subtropical region which rims the Black Sea provides a unique landscape in contrast with the four major natural zones. The southern coast of Crimea and the eastern Black Sea coast of Caucasia, which are sheltered from polar winds, have developed into the Soviet "Riviera," teeming with vacationers. The mild climate and high rainfall also make it possible to raise tea and citrus crops valued throughout the U.S.S.R.

The quarter billion inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. present contrasts as striking as those of the land. The Soviet Union is truly a multinational state and accords official recognition to each of its minorities, even to the point of giving the larger ones the trappings of national statehood. There are more than 120 distinct nationalities in the U.S.S.R., varying in size from the Russian nationality—which accounts for slightly more than half of the total population—to the Yukagir minority, with about 500 members. National traditions are as diverse; this potpourri of peoples includes the Europeanized Baltic peoples, the Turkic groups of Central Asia with their Middle Eastern lifestyles, and the dwindling Chukchi and Koryaks of the Far North, close relatives of the American Indian.

Slavic peoples make up the dominant element in the population—specifically eastern Slavs, the closely related Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. They speak mutually intelligible languages, and together make up more than three-fourths of the total population of the Soviet Union. Some of the non-Slavic nationalities show a strong tendency towards assimilation by the Russians, and are rapidly abandoning their languages. In physical characteristics, most Slavs are broadheaded, of medium height and stocky build and differ little in appearance from the populations of central and eastern Europe.

Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians all have their antecedents in the Rus, an 8th century mixture of Viking (or Varangian) overlords and Slavic commoners who held military and commercial hegemony in North Russia and south along the Don and Dnepr waterways to the shores of the Black Sea. Among the Rus, the Grand Princes of Kiev were in the ascendancy during the 9th and 10th centuries. After the sacking of Kiev by the Mongols (in 1230), however, Russian leadership gradually passed to Moscow, which was relatively safe in the forested north from the raids of steppe nomads. Vast territories in the south and west then came under the control of foreign conquerors—mainly Poles and Lithuanians—and the peoples of these territories developed separately from the Russians as Ukrainians and Belorussians. Muscovy, the state which succeeded Kiev and was to be the foundation of modern Russia, expanded its control over neighboring Russian states through a combination of fortuitous alliances and conquests. In the 15th and 16th centuries its grand dukes came to speak for all the Russian people and Moscow became the focus for a growing national self-awareness. Although checked and even thrown back in the west, the Russians expanded rapidly to the east, conquering the Tartar khanates along the Volga while merchant-adventurers and their Cossack freebooters penetrated into the depths of Siberia. Since then the Russians have been the main and decisive nationality and have largely determined the character of the subsequent political organization, culture, and historical destiny of all the non-Russian peoples that have been incorporated into Muscovy, the Empire, and the U.S.S.R. As a result, even though the terms are applied loosely, in general usage—outside the Soviet Union—"Russia" has long denoted the entire country and "Russians" its people.

The Soviets are clearly caught on the horns of a dilemma as they attempt to work out a coherent

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nationalities policy. The multiplicity of nationality political units, languages, customs, and preferences clearly is unwieldy and inefficient. Yet much as they might favor rapid assimilation, Soviet leaders find it difficult to apply pressures which smack of the russification policies of the tsarist era. They remain ideologically committed to Lenin's policy of assuring national diversity, a policy which was tactically designed to win for the Bolsheviks the support of the non-Russian nationalities on the eve of the revolution.

The result of that policy is a patchwork of nationality units evident in the division of the country into 15 Union Republics of widely varying size, each inhabited by a major nationality which gives its name to the republic. The Union Republics are divided into 120 territories and regions which are broken down into districts, towns, urban settlements, and rural districts. Within the territories and regions there also are a number of smaller nationalities formed into essentially self-governing units—20 Autonomous Republics, 8 Autonomous Regions, and 10 National Areas.

The smallest of the Union Republics, Armenia, is nearly as large as the states of Maryland and Delaware combined. By far the largest is the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), which covers all of the northern and western Soviet Union, occupying more than three-fourths of its total territory—extending to the Black Sea in the south and stretching eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Both Moscow, the U.S.S.R.'s chief metropolis and capital city, and Leningrad which, with a population over 3.5 million, is the country's second largest city, are located in the RSFSR.

The 14 other Union Republics border the Russian Republic on the west and south, forming an arc which runs counterclockwise from the Baltic Sea to the tip of Mongolia. The republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are located on the Baltic, below Finland and reaching to Poland. Belorussia, the Ukraine—the second largest Union Republic in population, having more than two- and one-half times the population of New York State—and Moldavia border on eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania). The republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan lie between the Black and Caspian Seas, and touch Turkey and Iran. Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia, and Kazakhstan are in Central Asia, running eastward from the Caspian Sea, above Iran, Afghanistan, and China's Sinkiang Province. Kazakhstan, the second largest Union Republic in area, is larger than all of the United States east of the Mississippi, while occupying only one-sixth as much territory as the RSFSR.

Although the U.S.S.R. has its crowded urban centers, including 10 metropolises of more than a million inhabitants, a larger proportion of the Soviet people reside in villages and on farms and have a very rural lifestyle than is the case in the United States. Only as recently as 1961 did Soviet urban dwellers outnumber rural residents, a statistical phenomenon recorded in the United States in 1918. Even now, less than 60% of the Soviet people live in urban areas but, as in the United States and elsewhere in industrialized states, migration to urban centers is strong. Indeed, population and labor maldistribution have become major problems in the Soviet Union—while the large cities are overcrowded, many rural and remote areas are experiencing labor shortages. Efforts are being made to curb the migration to cities, and workers are being offered incentives to work in remote regions where they are most needed for resource development.

The heaviest concentrations of population still are in the western or European U.S.S.R., but the highest population growth rate is in the Muslim Soviet Central Asian republics. Able-bodied workers are numerous there, but often lack educational opportunity and technical skills. Some conflicts and severe urban crowding have resulted from the recruitment of skilled Slavic workers for these areas. And this kind of problem in the distribution of the Soviet population is but one indication that the vastness and variety of resources and the cultural vitality of a multinational state are not unmixed blessings. With all its strength and great potential, the Soviet Union also suffers great difficulties because of its size and diversity. Complications include the fact that its varied cultures are unevenly developed, and assimilation produces social stresses. Vast areas of its land are unsuitable for habitation or agriculture. And exploitation and transportation of natural resources and the supply of goods are difficult over long distances and in the face of harsh climate and terrain.

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

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Producing Guns and Goulash

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The Soviet version of "guns or butter," the question of whether priorities of national power took precedence over consumer interests, was traditionally answered quickly by the Kremlin. For decades of central planning, the consumer sector was consistently low on the list of Soviet economic priorities, with armaments and heavy industry at the top. Talk of the hoped-for consumer blessings dubbed "goulash communism" during the time of Premier Khrushchev remained largely talk. Popular aspirations for a modest expansion of goods and services available were met with little more than the bare necessities of life. Beginning in the late 1950's, however, Khrushchev's prodding began to swing the economy to the mass production of standardized goods, gave the Soviet consumer new importance, and brought about significant increases in consumption, largely of more and better food and clothing. Ironically, these gains confronted Khrushchev's successors with a new set of economic problems—those of a slowly emerging consumer affluence. Steady increases in incomes and consumption during the 1960's (Soviet per capita disposable money income increased by more than 85% while per capita private consumption increased by less than half) put great pressure on a system ill-designed to satisfy more sophisticated consumer demands.

Neglect of consumer interests has been apparent in industries producing soft goods and processed foods as well as in the production of durable household goods and passenger cars. Wearing apparel manufactured in the Soviet Union is improving, but some of it is still unsalable because of poor sewing, neglect of finishing details, poor sizing, monotonous styling, and other defects in workmanship. Shoe production is affected by inadequate supplies of raw materials, unimaginative styling, and outdated equipment. Radios, television sets, and wrist watches are now routinely available, but supplies of major electric appliances fall far short of demand.

In recent years Moscow has begun to focus directly on the problems of the consumer sector. The Ninth Five Year Plan (for 1971 through 1975), although subsequently altered, has as its so-called "main task" a substantial improvement in consumer welfare. According to the original plan, consumer goods industries for the first time were to grow at a faster rate over an entire plan than the heavy industries producing capital goods. But in 1972, Soviet authorities had to acknowledge serious plan failures. The country's gross national product (GNP) rose only by 2%, the lowest rate of increase since 1963 and only one-third of the planned increment of 5.9%. This was due in large part to failures in agriculture, but even industrial production grew by only 5%, the smallest percentage increase for that sector since World War II. The slowed industrial growth was caused partly by raw material shortages stemming from a poor harvest, but mainly by the failure to complete scheduled new industrial capacity on time and by a significant slump in the rate of growth of productivity.

In the face of these failures, Soviet planning authorities made significant changes in the 1973 annual plan, including an overall reduction in the industrial output goal. Once again, the consumer sector suffered. Its priority was reduced and precedence was restored to capital goods, with greater emphasis on the completion of numerous projects under construction. A much higher goal was also set for agriculture. An exceptionally (and suprisingly) good harvest did occur last year, and largely as a result of the boost it provided, the Soviet economy recovered sharply in 1973 from its performance the year before. Even though they are likely to be of a one-time nature, the 1973 agricultural gains enabled the Kremlin to renew its commitment to consumer welfare in the annual plan for 1974. But the 1973 recovery still did not make up for earlier shortfalls, and most of the goals of the current Five Year Plan apparently have been all but abandoned.

The current Soviet leadership seems aware of the risk of widespread alienation of the work force for lack of incentives, and clearly has pledged itself to finding ways of satisfying consumer needs. At the same time, however, the Kremlin has displayed no eagerness to alter its costly weapons development priorities and continues to be unwilling to make sacrifices in other economic sectors that traditionally have received most of its attention. Nor has it shown a readiness to meet the malaise in the consumer sector with bold or imaginative reforms. Instead, the leadership response seems to be one of muddling through with stop-gap efforts, and the Soviet economy, while demonstrably able to provide plenty of guns and an adequate ration of goulash, is still unable to provide the quantity and quality of goods and services the Soviet people desire.

Before the beginning of the 20th century, the country's industrial development was almost entirely concentrated in the European heartland. Raw materials were transported to industrial sites adjacent to the large coal deposits of the Moscow River Basin in Russia and of the Donets River Basin in the Ukraine. The major mineral base was the Ural Mountain region, which itself developed as a major industrial area. As coal and mineral deposits in western Siberia

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and Kazakhstan were developed, industry expanded eastward. Recent industrial development in the eastern regions of the country has been significant, especially in western Siberia and Central Asia, but it still does not approach the level of development of the industrial centers of the western part of the country, where skilled labor resources, industrial plants, and transportation networks are well established.

Outside these established centers, the rest of the U.S.S.R.—the North, large parts of Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan, and other locations in Central Asia—is engaged in exploring, building, and tying together. Efforts are being made to extend transportation lines, develop power resources, expand raw material production, build factories, and encourage settlement in these areas.

At the same time the older industrial regions and their cities are plagued by congestion, inadequate housing, obsolescence, pollution, power shortages and overtaxed supply systems. The government's efforts to encourage the expansion of industry and population in the east, which could solve some of these problems, have had only minimal impact. The government is also making slow progress in dispersing industry from congested centers to small and medium-sized satellite towns to create new regional industrial and population agglomerations.

To redress some of the major imbalances of resource and industry location, the Kremlin is promoting some grandiose schemes. Among these are efforts to bolster the European industrial regions by importing electric power from western Siberia and Kazakhstan and by diverting north-flowing river waters southward to the industrialized Volga region and the Caspian Sea, and also to the steppes and semideserts of Kazakhstan.

The Soviet Union has probably the largest raw material base of any country in the world, and a high degree of self-sufficiency in fuels and other energy resources. It is especially rich in metallic minerals, such as iron, manganese, copper, zinc, and lead, and in the energy fuels—oil, gas, and coal. It is impossible even to estimate accurately the extent of the mineral, timber, waterpower, and other resources still undeveloped in the very sparsely settled eastern half of the country. But the effective exploitation and development of these potentially enormous supplies of natural resources are seriously hindered by the extremely difficult climatic and terrain conditions and the great remoteness of most of these resources from established industries, transportation routes, economical sources of power, and areas of consumption.

Soviet industrial development since World War II has been rapid, although the rate of growth has declined from a peak during the early 1950's, when growth through reconstruction and through more intense use of existing capacity was relatively easy. As the economy has expanded, problems of planning have become more complex, and it has not been possible to sustain the rapid growth of earlier years. By the early 1970's, the industrial sector accounted for slightly over one-third of the country's GNP. But from 1971 through 1973, industry's rate of growth averaged less than 6% per year, rather than the rate of 8% planned for the 1971-75 period.

The Soviet GNP was an estimated $658 billion in 1973, second only to that of the United States ($1,223 billion in 1973). The Soviet economy as a whole grew at about 5% annually during the preceding 10-year period, compared with 4% for the United States, but well behind the 10%-11% growth rate recorded by Japan. The Soviet Union's performance was uneven, with the weather and other variables that affect agriculture determining the overall economic results in any given year to a degree not found in other industrialized countries. Moreover, annual increments in output in the early 1970's have fallen off substantially from those registered in the 1960's.

The Soviet population of 251.2 million at the end of 1973 gave the country a per capita GNP of about $2,619 or 45% of the $5,785 of goods and services produced per capita in the United States. The Soviet output level was also surpassed, on a per capita basis, by 12 West European countries and Japan. Of this relatively modest per capita product, about 60% consists of consumption, as opposed to investment and defense; as a result, the average per capita expenditure on all consumer goods and services in the U.S.S.R. is only slightly over one-third that in the United States. In recent years personal savings have increased steadily to record levels because consumer goods are not yet available in the quantities and qualities desired by Soviet consumers.

Financing economic development in the Soviet Union is essentially a function of state financial institutions, which channel resources in accordance with comprehensive economic plans. Banks exert a controlling influence over enterprise operations by handling virtually all enterprise financial transactions, allocating most capital investment funds, and providing short-term credit for working capital. Financing of major economic programs is provided for in the state budget, which relies on turnover taxes and enterprise profits as major sources of revenue. The

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largest expenditure item is generally that covering economic development, followed closely by the funding of cultural and social programs. Overt expenditures on defense have been stable at 17.9 billion rubles in the budgets of 1970 through 1973, equal to roughly 10% of total budgeted expenditures. These sums, however, significantly understate the defense burden because they exclude some expenditures on nuclear weapons, research and development on advanced weapons systems, and military elements of the space program.

The imbalance within Soviet industry in favor of the producer goods sector and the urge to meet quantitative output goals have resulted in the production of excessive amounts of simple, heavy, general-purpose equipment at the expense of the sophisticated, specialized equipment required by technologically advanced industries. On the other hand, Soviet industry has demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in the production of modern weapons and carriers for the country's military forces and in the production of the hardware and precision instruments essential to the country's space exploration program.

Machine-building is the largest industry in the U.S.S.R., but it remains inferior to comparable industries in developed Western countries in terms of technology, degree of automation, and quality of output. Consequently, the Soviets are interested in obtaining through imports many items of high quality, often embodying the most modern Western technology. Soviet accomplishments in the production of sophisticated defense and space equipment, however, demonstrate a high degree of competence in research and development, which could be channeled into civilian use in a different system reflecting radically changed priorities.

Raw and intermediate materials for the machine-building industry are overwhelmingly of domestic origin. Production of metals has been consistently emphasized, and by 1973 the production of crude steel soared to 131.5 million tons. World leadership or near-leadership has been achieved in the production of many nonferrous metals and minerals, and ferro-alloying materials. As with the country's extensive deposits of fossil fuels and hydroelectric power resources, most reserves of industrial raw materials are located east of the Urals in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The country also produces significant quantities of rare and precious metals. It ranks second as a world producer of gold, and the development of uranium production has been intensively pursued.

Agriculture is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy. Growing seasons are short and water supplies are inadequate and undependable. Although the country is larger in land area than any other in the world, the amount of arable land in the Soviet Union is only slightly greater than that of the United States, and potential cropping areas are poorly situated for high yields. Commercial farming is considered virtually impossible in 90% of the country, with some two-thirds of the land area rendered almost completely useless for agriculture by low temperatures alone. The most favorable agricultural area lies west of the Ural Mountains, where rainfall and temperatures are influenced by air currents from the Atlantic Ocean. The remainder of the country is covered by forests, tundra, deserts, marshes, and mountains, and may never be developed agriculturally. Beyond the effects of the environment, the agricultural sector is also adversely affected by poor planning, centralized control, insufficient equipment, and inadequate incentives to producers. Soviet agriculture is organized in collective and state farms, with small plots accounting for about 4% of the total arable area allocated to individual farmers. These plots account for a large proportion of the vegetables, dairy products, and livestock produced in the country.

Soviet foreign trade is conducted as a state monopoly by specialized foreign trade corporations. The overall volume of trade is relatively small as the U.S.S.R. is self-sufficient in most industrial raw materials and finished goods, and has followed a policy of development that relies primarily on the country's domestic resources. Trade is conducted according to centralized planning by which imports of goods required to meet domestic production goals are specified, and exports are undertaken essentially as a means of paying for these imports and for past credits. Changes in the planning are occasionally required to compensate for underfulfillment of production goals, as in 1972, when the failure in agriculture required huge unanticipated imports of grain. Foreign trade is conducted largely with other Communist countries, with imports and exports more or less balanced annually, through bilateral agreements. In trade with the West, however, planned Soviet imports, heavily weighted with sophisticated machinery and equipment and modern technology, almost always exceed exports. The U.S.S.R. has made increased use of Western credits to finance the resulting deficits. It now is also selling gold to help offset the deficits, and is certain to continue its search for Western, especially American, technology.

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The Government and Its Critics

Passersby in Moscow look at poster attacking the works of dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was banished from the Soviet Union on 12 February 1974. The book shown in the poster is titled "Creations of Solzhenitsyn"; the caption at the bottom calls him a "traitor," guilty of "anti-Communist slander," and the group of musicians is labeled "the Anti-Soviet Orchestra."

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Absolute power arbitrarily exercised is common throughout Russia's long history. To understand the Soviet Union it is necessary to recognize that, Marxist-Leninist ideology notwithstanding, the Soviet state owes much to its Russian heritage. In many respects the Soviet system represents a continuation, in new trappings and with different jargon, of practices and organizational patterns rooted deeply in the Russian past. The domination of the country by the ruthlessly despotic Tartars for two and a half centuries during the Middle Ages effectively prevented whatever native movement there might otherwise have been toward individual liberty and self-government and cut Russia off from any liberating influences from the West. The tsars who replaced the Tartars were entrenched in their own autocratic rule over Imperial Russia 200 years before the time of the American Revolution.

Historically, the vast majority of the Russian people were inclined toward blind submission to a central authority that they regarded as sacrosanct. There was an official religion, the highly dogmatic Russian Orthodox faith, which gave autocracy its legitimacy and inculcated in the masses the virtue of conformity and the sacred obligation to obey the central authority. The tsar's power was limited only in the way that all autocratic power is limited—he was dependent upon subordinates to carry out his will. The broad scope of state power naturally gave rise to a vast bureaucracy. There was an elaborate system of censorship and police controls, and no area of life was secure against tsarist intervention. The state controlled the movement of its people through such devices as police registration papers and internal passports. Indeed, Russians have always lived in danger of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the freedoms of speech and press as well as other basic liberties have either been absent or at best only feebly exercised.

In addition to its control of the political and even the spiritual life of the nation, the state has historically been the principal initiator of economic activity. In Old Russia the only capitalism that developed was essentially state capitalism. In agriculture, state farms occupied great areas of land and commanded the involuntary services of many individuals, including state-owned peasants. Peasant life was traditionally organized in communes. The state managed various industries, and even those small areas of the economy left to private operation were expected to gear their activities to the military and economic needs of the state. Old Russia grew at the expense of its subjects, establishing a rigid pattern of absolutism upon which the Communists could build—and did.

Paradoxically, the Russian tradition of political absolutism is accompanied and opposed by a noble humanitarian tradition, sparked and kept alive largely by a succession of writers whose libertarian voices—from the time of poet Alexander Pushkin to the present period—have not been stilled despite the efforts of tsarist and then Soviet secret police. Stalin was not long in his grave before Boris Pasternak attracted world attention with a moral force reminiscent of Tolstoy. Then from a Stalinist labor camp came the voice of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who carried a message from his prison hell as had Dostoyevsky a century before. And others warned that the ghost of Stalin could yet haunt the land.

The small group of dissident writers who exist today have been joined by some prominent Soviet scientists in a loose collection of critics of the Kremlin. These critics operate partly underground and partly in the spotlight of international publicity. At the center of this harassed and unorganized group, which its members sometimes call the "Democratic Movement," is physicist Andrei Sakharov, a brilliant scientist often referred to as the father of the Soviet H-bomb. He first came into public view in 1968 with the publication, abroad, of his "Manifesto," a call for democratization of Soviet society and for Soviet-American collaboration to combat global problems of war, overpopulation, hunger, and disease. Sakharov issued a second "Manifesto" in 1970 as a blueprint for gradually changing the Soviet Union from a Communist dictatorship to an electoral democracy. He formed a small public committee on human rights, and won the general support of the impressive circle of intellectuals who circulate their views in *samizdat*—photocopied or mimeographed manuscripts passed from hand to hand but which never have been formally published inside the U.S.S.R. They include such works as Solzhenitsyn's explosive "Gulag Archipelago," an expose of the Soviet secret police and prison camp apparatus, published in the West at the end of 1973.

Widespread publicity in the West for these intellectual dissidents and for the Soviet Union's Jewish minority often tends to exaggerate both the nature and extent of the discontent they express. The Soviets do not appear to have singled out the Jews for special persecution; instead the Kremlin upholds the Marxist tenet of disapproval for all religions, and with varying degrees of subtlety makes it difficult for any faith to flourish in the Soviet state. But a number of Soviet Jews, emboldened by Israel's stunning defeat of Arab forces in the 6-day war of 1967, began agitating for freedom to leave the Soviet Union and migrate to

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Israel. They have since attracted considerable attention abroad by making common cause with the intellectual dissidents and by capitalizing on the sentiment (and political weight) of sympathizers in the United States. But they lack the widespread support in the Soviet Union that they enjoy in the West. Dealing with the Jewish minority—albeit an unsettling problem for Moscow—is more a foreign policy complication than a threat to internal security. In its dealings with the West, of course, the Soviets are at pains to maintain that such problems are strictly internal matters that should be kept out of the international arena. Nevertheless, Moscow has grudgingly allowed some emigration to Israel and has been flexible in responding to pressures from the West on this issue and in defense of dissident writers. With growing attention from the Western press centering on Solzhenitsyn early this year, the Kremlin exiled him as the best means of limiting damage and getting rid of the policy problem of coping with outspoken criticism and defiant defense of his rights.

Neither the nature of present-day intellectual dissent nor the regime's response is entirely new. Tsar Nicholas I, for example, had 19th century Russian philosopher Peter Chaadayev declared insane and confined to his home because of his "radical" political opinions. Nevertheless, there are important ways in which the kind of dissent being heard in the Soviet Union is a new phenomenon in its character and implications. For one thing, the ranks of the present-day dissidents are drawn in significant numbers from the scientific and technological community on which the Soviet Union is dependent for its continued competitive position as a military and industrial power. For another, these critics are not all bent on the destruction of the Soviet system. No doubt some of them despair—as does dissident Russian historian Andrei Amalrik, in his essay, "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until 1984?"—of the present system's ability to reform itself. In general, however, the critics believe that it can be changed to correct its deficiencies. Their objective is for the regime to eliminate the discrepancies between theory and practice, to reduce the gulf between the ideals and realities of Soviet life. They are not directly trying to wrest political control from the party, but would have it permit the development of a more diverse, pluralistic society that would allow more people the means for an independent life.

From within the U.S.S.R., Amalrik is one critic who has expressed doubt about the staying power of the Soviet system. At some future date—he picked 1984 for symbolic reasons—he sees the system being torn apart by the trauma of a devastating war with China, from which only a truncated Soviet state survives. His vision is too apocalyptic to win many supporters, and he was condemned to a prison camp for promulgating it. The scientist Sakharov is perhaps more representative of the "democrats" in his assertion that the country must change and that the party must set the process in motion. Only if the party relaxes its grip and abandons gray conformity, he argues, can it reinvigorate Soviet intellectual, artistic, and scientific life; if it does not, the country cannot hope to stay abreast, let alone gain an advantage, in international competition.

Thus, central to their criticism is the Communist Party's virtual monopoly of power and its influence on almost every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. The dissidents also object to the very nature of the party and question the ideological base by which it rationalizes its rule. They consider parasitic the ruling Communist bureaucracy, contending that its members come into their privileged positions neither by merit nor any other rational criterion of advancement. Instead, they see the party advancing its own. In the critics' eyes, it exploits society in its own interest and is dedicated above all not to the welfare of the people nor to intellectual growth nor even to economic development, but to the consolidation and expansion of its own power.

Finally, critics question the viability and relevance to an increasingly complex and industrialized society of a dictatorial party that dominates and interferes in virtually everything in the name of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nor is it only some intellectuals who are disillusioned. Large segments of the Soviet population display no enthusiasm for the dogmatic materialism of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Young people are bored by it. They are more interested in those phenomena of Western youth which have been imported across their frontiers—the dress, the talk, the dances, the music and, to a small but increasing extent, the drug culture. They are restless and alienated.

The party is concerned about this growing ideological void, but has had little success in trying to fill it. One upshot has been to give grudging approval to an increasingly popular revival of interest in the Russian past. In recent years this interest has developed into a kind of movement encompassing a variety of scholarly, popular, and faddish efforts to rediscover the past and elucidate the essence of the "Russian soul." It has become a favorite pastime to search for icons and other examples of folk art and handicraft. Organizations have been formed to

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Guitars, rather than balalaikas, are "in" with Soviet youth like these at Silver Pine Forest Beach on the Moscow River.

preserve historical and cultural monuments, and expeditions scour the Russian countryside for old books and manuscripts.

The historical movement, if indeed that is what this line of popular thinking can be called, has resulted in a new Russian chauvinism. It is not revolutionary but conservative, seeking to preserve old values and restore old traditions. It is espoused largely, but not exclusively, by youth, and participation is centered in the relatively well educated urban population. It is helped along by a growing disenchantment with the dehumanizing effects of industrialization, and the pollution and exploitation of irreplaceable resources that it brings. Poets, who have folk-hero popularity in the U.S.S.R., speak of the contrast between asphalt and birch trees, clearly preferring the latter, and despair of the pollution of Lake Baykal and the destruction of ancient churches, as well as other examples of historical architecture, to make way for government hotels and housing projects. All of this has spawned a Soviet parallel to the ecology movement in the United States—similar in sentiment, and increasingly in organization and impact on government policy.

The regime tries to construe these sentiments as patriotic in motivation and generally constructive in nature, and evidently is able to accept them as such. This acceptance may be based on the assumption that such sentiments are better than no sentiment at all. But even if these interests should grow with the party's blessing, it is doubtful that they would breathe new life into the system or inspire devotion to its ideological and organizational underpinnings. If anything, such sentiments represent a kind of escape from general alienation or an outlet for feelings of discontent. Although they are not as pointed, articulate, or dramatic as the views the dissidents put forward, they also constitute a questioning of the relevance of the Soviet system in its present mold.

There are outside observers who believe that the Soviet system is not inert, and that the future holds the prospect of a more pluralistic, dynamic society with a

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broadened decisionmaking base. Some expect the advance of technology to help bring that about by making it necessary for an increasing number of functional specialists and innovators to come into positions of leadership and influence. Others see a new kind of politics emerging, a participatory bureaucracy with information, advice, recommendations, complaints, etc., flowing not only from the top down, but upward as well. Still other observers cite forces at work in Soviet society that tend to undermine the authoritarian features of the system; one such force is the rising educational level of the party leadership. Some say the fact that many of the system's critics come from the same stratum of Soviet society as the ruling elite will tend to make it less likely that criticism will be ruthlessly suppressed.

Dissent in the Soviet context can be considered a natural step in an inevitable chain of events. On the one hand is contemporary Soviet society, now at a rather high level of development, modernizing, maturing, and growing more complex and diversified. On the other hand is the essentially defensive role of the highly centralized party bureaucracy, which developed primarily as a device for control and only secondarily as an instrument for the management of modernization. The Soviet formula fit the society into which it was introduced several decades ago, but there is a real question now whether control has since become the end rather than the means. The crux of the issue is change—the ability of the Soviet system to respond and adapt.

Perhaps if years continue to pass with no essential change in the atmosphere inside the Soviet Union, increasingly numerous elements of that vast country will accumulate just causes for grievance and will generate mounting pressures for change. Sometime in the future the moment may arrive when the sterile bureaucracy of the gray Soviet state will no longer be able to cope with the disparate contentions of dissatisfied intellectuals, disaffected youth, discontented consumers, disillusioned workers, and a multinational, multisocial populace. The collapse of the Soviet system, barring the massive trauma of a protracted war such as Amalrik suggests, seems as unlikely in the foreseeable future, however, as does the emergence of an open, democratic society along U.S. or West European lines.

The best hope for change in the U.S.S.R. may be the younger members of the Soviet intelligentsia, some of whom feel that it is not the system as such which is unresponsive, but its present aged and rigid leadership. According to this view, those who joined the party after Stalin's death cannot be as authoritarian in outlook as the present generation of leaders who rose to prominence during the purges of the 1930's. Although now obliged to mimic the slogans of their superiors, today's younger party leaders, untainted by Stalinism, are expected by many to be much more receptive to new ideas and open to change after taking over the reins later in this decade and in the 1980's.

Although that kind of optimism may not be entirely unfounded, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continues to promote through its narrow ranks only those whose attitudes it considers acceptable. It has governed in a relatively stable style, and seems likely to continue doing so. It is also significant in this respect to note that the U.S.S.R. is, after all, a remarkably stable society. During an era when many would-be revolutions have turned out to be rather ephemeral, the Soviet state and party have survived a bloody civil war, a coercive transformation of the countryside costing millions of lives, Stalin's terrorism, and the devastation and loss of additional millions of lives during World War II. Few governmental systems can boast such staying power.

In addition, the average party functionary has a real stake in preserving the Soviet system. The vast party apparatus lives by the status quo, and within it there is intense sentiment for holding on to what one has, to resisting change because it may mean a loss of status, privilege, or perquisites. Moreover, the prevailing political environment links the governing elite and the masses more closely together than it links the critics to either. The pattern of rule that developed under Stalin was in accord with the legacy of Tsarist Russia and the current situation continues to fit this pattern. The Soviet masses even today do not on the whole demand freedom and representative institutions, which to them remain abstract and unfamiliar concepts. Their day-to-day demands for food, housing, and consumer goods are modest and are being met, even though slowly and with occasional setbacks. By their own standards, which of course are the only ones that really matter, they have never had it so good. As for the critics whose names are now widely known in the West, many Soviet citizens have never heard of them. The reaction of those who have generally ranges from incomprehension to hostility. Critics and the dissent they express may be a natural phenomenon of Soviet society at this stage of its development, but equally natural is the failure of the critics to strike a responsive chord among the masses, whose conservative mentality is similar in many important ways to that of the party functionaries who govern in their name.

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Moscow and the World

For some years following the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, Soviet foreign policy was marked by uncertainty, defensiveness, and considerable immobility. Pressing internal problems—especially economic concerns—took precedence for Moscow's new decisionmakers. Then too, such international developments as the 1967 Middle East war, the Czechoslovak crisis, and the steady increase in Sino-Soviet tensions kept the Kremlin off balance and served to delay agreement on a broad and coherent new foreign policy line. Finally, at least at the beginning of their tenure, the new leaders faced U.S. strategic power markedly superior to their own.

By the end of the 1960's, however, the Soviets had acquired confidence in their capacity to engage their foreign adversaries on favorable terms, and in the prospects for increasing their international influence, to adopt a more assertive and innovative approach to foreign affairs. Attainment of rough parity with the United States in strategic weapons was the key consideration underlying this change of mood in the Kremlin, but there were other important contributing factors as well. For example, Moscow was encouraged by the internal and international difficulties then being encountered by the United States over Vietnam and by the cracks that had appeared in the NATO alliance. Despite the storm of protest it had evoked, the invasion of Czechoslovakia (and its subsequent justification on the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet "duty" to "protect socialist gains") strengthened the U.S.S.R.'s position in Eastern Europe without serious long-term damage to Soviet interests elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Kremlin had succeeded in substantially improving its military and political position vis-a-vis Peking. The simmering crisis in the Middle East, while still a cause for concern, had yielded some notable gains for the Soviets in that area. On the home front, the economy had picked up and was performing at a pace sufficient to support the large military establishment, foreign aid programs, and prestige-building space spectaculars needed to achieve both the appearance and substance of genuine superpower status.

The emergence of Leonid Brezhnev as the leading figure in the Politburo also had a good deal to do with the changes that became noticeable in the Kremlin's international behavior during 1969. While high-level decisionmaking remained a collective process, Brezhnev's increasing influence strengthened those in the leadership who calculated that the Soviet Union's long-term interests could best be served by a marked reduction in East-West tensions. This course, involving diplomatic overtures from the United States and from West Germany, was a bold one for the Soviet Union to set, for it risked generating new ferment in Eastern Europe and further undermining the U.S.S.R.'s revolutionary credentials throughout the world. It also left its advocates vulnerable to charges of ideological deviation and of failure to take full advantage of their country's growing power.

Of necessity, then, Brezhnev's "peace offensive" was from the outset a complex affair—a changing blend of accommodation and old-fashioned power politics, of cold pragmatism and ideological revival,

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and of confidence and caution. For example, the early moves which helped bring about such significant developments as the Moscow-Bonn Treaty, the Berlin accords, the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) and agreements, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks were accompanied by further efforts to strengthen Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, an ideological crackdown at home, an increase in the delivery of weapons and other forms of assistance to the Arabs and North Vietnamese, and the dispatch of the first Soviet naval squadron to visit Cuba since the missile crisis of 1962. Similarly, Moscow's self-serving but outwardly peaceful proposal for the establishment of a collective security arrangement in Asia was launched against a background of unabashed sabre rattling designed to intimidate the Chinese and bring them to the negotiating table. Moreover, the initiatives were accompanied by the emergence of a broad range of new Soviet strategic weapons programs.

While at first overshadowed by other moves in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, efforts to improve bilateral relations with the United States gradually emerged as the key element in Moscow's new global strategy. Important Soviet objectives in reaching a limited accommodation with the United States have included reducing the development of U.S. strategic weapons programs rivalled by its own, reducing the chance that Russia and the United States might be drawn into war as the result of regional conflicts involving their client states, and checking the movement of China and the United States toward rapprochement. Also, the Soviets have tended to view some measure of cooperation with the United States as conducive to the process of negotiation in Europe, from which they hope to achieve stabilization of their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the gains in trade and technology needed to push them into the front ranks of the advanced industrial states, and, eventually, greater influence in Western Europe.



The Soviets were, of course, correct in concluding that the West was also ready for detente. All told, the easing of East-West tensions in Europe and the lower temperature and broader scope of Soviet-American relations since 1968 have been rather dramatic developments. And there is no question but that Moscow's shift in favor of detentist policies has indeed yielded it some tangible benefits. The Soviets' sympathetic response to West German Chancellor Brandt's conciliatory Ostpolitik—and their willingness to apply pressure to bring East Germany along—has paid off in widespread *de jure* recognition for their key client state and ally. Similarly, Soviet overtures to the West, including persistent efforts to organize a broad European security conference, have nurtured differences within NATO and have moved the Soviets close to their objective of securing formal Western acceptance of the political and territorial status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the summit meetings of 1972 and 1973, several sizable trade agreements, and numerous major and minor diplomatic accords which have highlighted the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years have brought Moscow increased international prestige, recognition as the military equal of the United States, and the possibility of large-scale Western economic cooperation and assistance.

But detente has brought the U.S.S.R. certain problems as well. Revolutionary rhetoric about continuing and intensifying the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism notwithstanding, the Brezhnev regime's growing stake in its policy of detente with the West has affected its behavior and complicated its position in many parts of the world.

In Eastern Europe—an area of vital national concern to the Soviet Union—Moscow is unhappy about Romania's wayward (and Western-applauded) course in foreign policy and is worried lest the dynamics of detente incline others toward independent action. Although the Soviets probably could not resort to harsh corrective measures without compromising their own overtures to the West, if it came to a choice between erosion of their position in Eastern Europe and detente in Europe, they would undoubtedly choose to let detente suffer.

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The issue is unlikely to be joined in the near future, however, for Moscow has been demonstrating increased deftness in dealing with its problems in the area. This has been evident in its flexible response, for instance, to leadership shuffles in Poland, Hungarian political and economic reforms, and Yugoslavia's continued apostasy. To be sure, Romanian Prime Minister Ceausescu's maverick behavior in the international arena (particularly his flirtation with China) has from time to time brought threats of dire retribution down upon his head. But most East European Communist parties now enjoy substantial organizational independence and—within the "socialist limits" so dramatically reasserted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968—considerable freedom to formulate domestic policies. For the time being at least, the Soviets seem to be reasonably comfortable with a new generation of East European leaders who, while inclined to accord first loyalty to their own countries or their own brand of communism, are still generally willing to defer to Soviet sensitivities.

Another essential facet of Soviet foreign policy which has both affected and been affected by movement toward East-West detente is the problem of China. Indeed, a major reason for the Russians' decision to seek a marked improvement in their relations with the United States was their anxiety about the growing threat they perceived from Peking. Moscow's fears have been manifested most dramatically in the massive buildup of Soviet forces along the forbidding frontier with China, but are equally evident in the Kremlin's uneasiness about the possibility that a Sino-American alliance against Moscow might materialize. Yet the Kremlin's current emphasis on negotiated settlement of disputes and the unique nature of the triangular relationship which has developed between the Soviet Union, the United States, and China have affected Soviet behavior in Asia and have made it harder for the Soviets to strengthen their position in some of the smaller countries—both Communist and non-Communist—lying on or near China's borders.

If, for example, the Kremlin ever seriously considered a military solution to the Sino-Soviet conflict, the idea must now appear even less attractive than it did originally. And such bows to U.S. sensitivities as Moscow's relatively balanced pronouncements on the need to halt cease-fire violations in South Vietnam have done nothing to help the Soviets in their competition with China for influence in North Vietnam and North Korea. At the same time, the overall aura of detente (including Peking's more friendly posture) has prompted many non-Communist Asian nations to seek a more even balance in their relations with the United States, China, and the U.S.S.R. and to exhibit a notable lack of enthusiasm for the Asian collective security system proposed by the Soviets in 1969. Even outside Asia—in Warsaw Pact councils and broader Communist forums—Moscow seems to have more and more difficulty lining up support for political, economic, and ideological attacks on Peking.

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In keeping with their increased confidence and their growing capability to project their power into distant areas, the Soviets have met the ever more complex challenges to their position in Asia and elsewhere in the Third World with a new activism in bilateral diplomacy and a new willingness to accept deeper involvement in regional affairs. The treaties of friendship they signed with Egypt, India, and Iraq and the speed with which they moved to establish themselves in Bangladesh in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war are cases in point. But while more energetic and no less opportunistic than in the past, the Kremlin's approach to the Third World as a whole is now somewhat more sober and more regionally differentiated. Retention, consolidation, and if possible, expansion of the U.S.S.R.'s position in the Middle East and South Asia are regarded as priority objectives. On the other hand, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (except Cuba, of course) are considered to be areas of peripheral interest where political and economic risk should be held to a minimum.

So far the Brezhnev regime seems undeterred by the difficulties it has encountered in pursuing its new global strategy. There are sensitive arenas of potential Soviet-U.S. conflict, such as the Middle East, in which events can put the new strategy to the test. But in 1973 the Soviet-American detente survived and helped curtail another round of war between the Arabs and Israel, a burst of hostilities from which Moscow seemed to gain more than it lost. The Soviets acquiesced in helping transform the combat begun by their Arab clients into an uneasy truce—one which saw Moscow's Middle East ties strengthened and America's energy crisis sharpened.

The long-term benefits of detente still are more potential than real for the Soviets, but the Kremlin has a major stake in maintaining its American connection and an accommodation with the West. The detente that tends to be looked on in the West and elsewhere as an end in itself, as a goal worth achieving for its own sake, represents to Moscow the means for realizing its hopes to contain China, disrupt the Western military alliance, and close the East-West technological gap. With these objectives in mind, Moscow is now more willing to negotiate with Washington and other Western capitals on the basis of traditional concepts of national interest. It is more able to do so, too; the Soviets' more sophisticated approach to foreign relations reflects the new confidence born of their sense of political and military parity with the United States. Soviet readiness to take this tack also is related to the enduring quarrel with China, which has confronted the Soviet Union with a new and major enemy, and demonstrated to the Kremlin that a shared ideology is an insufficient basis for a lasting alliance.

In foreign policy goals as in so much of Soviet society, there is continuity as well as change. There is evidence that the Kremlin intends detente to be a long-term feature of Soviet foreign policy. One can expect the Kremlin to keep intact, however, the enduring cornerstones of that policy, which include maximizing Soviet power and influence in relation to its rivals, maintaining a buffer zone of dependent Communist states in Eastern Europe, and shielding its own people from Western individualist thought and culture. Whether and to what extent detente continues to be a determining factor in Soviet foreign policy decisions depends, of course, on the interaction of many variables. Crucial among these will be the U.S.S.R.'s internal evolution, as well as Moscow's appraisal of Washington's intentions and its assessment of developments in the triangular relationship involving the United States, China, and itself.

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Chronology

400–700

Territory of present day European Russia is settled by Eastern Slavs.

700–800

Prosperous mercantile state with Khazar hegemony over Slavs is established between lower Volga and Dnepr rivers.

800–912

Vikings under Rurik use river routes to penetrate Russia; Kiyev becomes center of their dominion.

990

Christianity is introduced by Vladimir the Saint.

1237–1240

European Russia is conquered by the Mongol Golden Horde, beginning two centuries of Tatar rule.

1380

Prince Dmitry of Muscovy inflicts first defeat on Tatars in Battle of Kulikovo Field, laying basis for rise of Muscovy in 15th century.

1533–1584

Ivan the Terrible reigns, proclaiming self tsar of the "third Rome," Muscovy, and beginning settlement east of Urals.

1637

Russian pioneers reach Pacific coast of Siberia.

1689–1725

Peter the Great reigns, embarking on far-reaching reforms to "Westernize" Russia and founding Saint Petersburg (now Leningrad).

1762–1796

Catherine the Great continues "Westernization" of Russia, partitions Poland to increase European Russian territory, inaugurates Russian drive for warm-water ports by acquiring Crimea.

1801–1825

Alexander I reigns, withstanding Napoleonic invasion which reaches Moscow and in the wake of which the Russian army penetrates France.

1825

Revolt of Decembrists, a small group of noblemen favoring social reform, fails.

1825–1855

Nicholas I institutes reactionary regime based on autocracy and Russification, inaugurating systematic use of secret police against the people.

1857–1861

Alexander Herzen's revolutionary thought in the weekly *Kolokol* (The Bell) is published abroad with profound impact on Russian intellectuals.

1861

Serfs are emancipated and commune-type system of peasant social organization is established.

1876

First Russian revolutionary party, called Land and Liberty (later People's Will), is formed by Populists.

1881

Mounting revolutionary activity of Populists culminates in assassination of Alexander II.

1881–1894

Alexander III initiates severe repressions of revolutionaries and fosters pan-Slavism.

1898
March

First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), identified by Soviet Communist Party as its first congress, is held in Minsk.

1903
August

Second Congress of the RSDLP is held in Brussels and London, ending in split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions.

1905
October–December

First Russian Revolution results in a constitutional reform.

1914
August

Germany declares war on Russia.

1917
March

February Revolution results in abdication of tsar and formation of Provisional Government.

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November

Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution and Lenin becomes Premier.

1918
March

Signing of Treaty of Brest Litovsk removes Russia from war. Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party renames itself the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

1918–1921

Bolsheviks ultimately prevail over foreign intervention and civil war.

1921
August

New Economic Policy (NEP) is introduced.

1922
April

Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

December

Founding congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) is held.

1924
January

Lenin dies.

1928
October

NEP is abandoned. First Five-Year Economic Plan (1929–33) goes into effect.

1929
January

Trotsky is exiled from U.S.S.R.

1930
January

Forced collectivization of peasantry begins.

1932–1933

Millions die during serious famine.

1934
December

Kirov, Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, is assassinated; Stalin starts "great purge" and resign of terror.

1936
December

"Stalin Constitution," which with minor modifications is still in effect, is adopted.

1939
March

18th Congress of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is held.

August

Stalin-Hitler pact is signed.

September

Soviet troops occupy eastern Poland.

November

U.S.S.R. invades Finland.

1940
March

Finns cede territory to U.S.S.R.

August

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are incorporated into U.S.S.R.

1941
April

Nonagression pact is signed with Japan.

June

Germany invades U.S.S.R.

1945
February

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin attend Yalta Conference.

July–August

Truman, Attlee, and Stalin attend Potsdam Conference to draft World War II peace settlements.

U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan.

1947
September

Zhdanov's "two camps" speech intensifies opposition to West and leads to establishment of Cominform.

1948
March

Allied Control Commission ceases to function in Berlin.

June

Cominform announces expulsion of Yugoslavia.

August

Soviet blockade of land access to Berlin by French, U.S., and U.K. occupation forces becomes total.

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1949
January

Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is created to promote intrabloc cooperation and to counteract Marshall Plan.

February

Anti-Jewish campaign results in arrest and execution of numerous authors.

May

Moscow agrees to lift Berlin blockade.

September

First nuclear explosion takes place in U.S.S.R.

October

Communist regime is recognized by U.S.S.R. as sole government of China.

1950
February

Thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance is concluded.

1952
October

19th Party Congress (first since 1939) renames party "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (CPSU), revises party rules, and renames Politburo "Presidium."

1953
January

Soviet doctors, mostly Jewish, are charged with plot to kill Soviet leaders on orders of Western intelligence.

March

Stalin dies; Malenkov is named chairman of Council of Ministers and dropped from Party Secretariat, leaving Khrushchev the senior secretary.

April

Doctors' Plot is reversed.

June

Police chief Beriya is arrested for plotting to seize power.

July

Korean armistice is signed.

August

First thermonuclear device is detonated in U.S.S.R.

September

Khrushchev is named First Secretary of CPSU.

December

Execution of Beriya and top associates is announced.

1954
March

Central Committee approves increased grain production by "opening up virgin lands." Committee for State Security (KGB) is established.

April–July

U.S.S.R. participates in Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference on Korea and Indochina, which concludes agreements on Vietnam and Laos.

1955
February

Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Chairman of Council of Ministers.

May

Warsaw Pact establishes joint command over most Soviet bloc armed forces.

Austrian State Treaty is signed 15 May, ending Allied occupation.

Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade to patch up Yugoslav-Soviet feud.

July

Big Four Summit conference at Geneva attempts to facilitate solution of East-West problems in Europe.

1956
February

20th Party Congress convenes. Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech.

April

Dissolution of Cominform is announced.

October

Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov visit Poland in effort to reverse Gomulka's liberalization measures; Soviet leaders accept Gomulka measures upon being made aware of their need to prevent revolt and when assured of Poland's continued loyalty to U.S.S.R.

October–November

Hungarian revolt is crushed by Soviet troops.

1957
February

Khrushchev's scheme for reorganization of industrial management is accepted by Party Central Committee.

June

Majority in Party Presidium votes to oust Khrushchev, who turns the tables by appealing to Central Committee. So-called antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov is then expelled from Party Presidium and Central Committee.

October

Soviet Union launches first earth satellite.

Central Committee expels Marshal Zhukov from Party Presidium and calls for tightening of party controls over armed forces.

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1958
March

Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Chairman of Council of Ministers while remaining Party First Secretary.

September

Khrushchev proposes reform to improve Soviet educational system by increasing vocational training.

November

Khrushchev demands termination of Western occupation rights in West Berlin.

1959
January

U.S.S.R. launches "cosmic rocket."

January–February

21st Congress of CPSU approves Seven-Year Plan and attacks "antiparty" group.

September

Soviet moon rocket is successfully launched. Khrushchev pays official visit to United States.

September–October

Khrushchev visits Mao Tse-tung in Peking during festivities marking 10th anniversary of Chinese People's Republic.

1960
January

U.S.S.R. announces plan to cut armed forces by 1.2 million.

May

Khrushchev announces downing of U.S. U–2 plane. Big Four Summit meeting on Germany, Berlin, and disarmament canceled.

June

Sino-Soviet dispute flares at Bucharest blocwide conference and World Federation of Trade Unions General Council session, Peking.

July

Soviet fighter shoots down U.S. RB–47 plane over international waters; surviving crew is imprisoned.

September–October

Khrushchev attends U.N. General Assembly in New York, caters to African nations, and demands U.N. reorganization.

November–December

Moscow conference of Communist parties attempts to resolve Sino-Soviet dispute.

1961
April

First manned space vehicle is orbited.

June

Khrushchev meets in Vienna with President Kennedy on East-West issues.

August

Berlin wall is built, stopping refugee flow from East Germany.

October

22d Party Congress adopts new party program to replace one adopted in 1919 and revises party rules.

1962
March

U.S.S.R. participates in 18-nation disarmament talks which open in Geneva.

October

Soviet missiles in Cuba create crisis.

November

Party is reorganized into virtually separate organizations for agricultural and industrial affairs.

1963
March

Government is reorganized; Supreme Council of National Economy is formed.

June

Brezhnev and Podgorny are added to Party Secretariat.

U.S.S.R. and United States agree to establish direct teletype communication link ("hot line") between Moscow and Washington.

August

U.S.S.R. and United States agree to ban all nuclear testing except underground explosions.

September

U.S.S.R. begins purchase of an ultimate 12.5 million tons of wheat from abroad after disastrous year in grain and fodder production.

October

Khrushchev launches major chemical industry program with strong accent on chemical support for agriculture.

1964
April

U.S.S.R. announces agreement to reduce production of fissionable materials for weapons.

October

Three-man vehicle carries pilot, engineer, and medical doctor into space.

Khrushchev is ousted from party and government jobs, being replaced as Party First Secretary by Brezhnev and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Kosygin.

November

November 1962 party reorganization is reversed.

December

New U.S.S.R. regime postpones—until March 1965—meeting of 26 Communist parties called for December by Khrushchev to prepare for convocation of world Communist meeting on Sino-Soviet dispute.

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1965
February

Premier Kosygin visits Hanoi, Peking, and Pyongyang in effort to heal disunity in Communist movement.

March

Nineteen Communist parties attending "consultative" meeting disband without agreement on date for world meeting.

Brezhnev launches massive new program promising government support to agriculture on a scale unprecedented in Soviet history.

Soviet cosmonaut accomplishes first "walk in space."

September–October

Government is reorganized; national and regional councils of national economy (*sovnarkhozy*) are abolished and pre-1957 ministerial system is reestablished; role of profit as measure of economic success is recognized.

December

Brezhnev announces separation of party-state control functions; Nikolay Podgorny replaces retiring Anastas Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

1966
February

Soviet dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel are imprisoned for antistate activities in first such political trial of intellectuals since Stalin's death.

Unmanned spaceship makes "soft landing" on moon.

March

U.S.S.R. achieves first landing of probe on Venus.

April

23d Party Congress approves directives of 1966–70 economic plan; Party Presidium is renamed Politburo; Brezhnev receives Stalin's old title of General Secretary.

December

Brezhnev reports to Central Committee on deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution; he receives mandate to proceed with plans for an international Communist conference.

1967
March

Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West.

April

Brezhnev endorses broad united front tactics for Europe at Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties.

June

Premier Kosygin seeks political settlement of Israeli-Egyptian military clash in U.N. General Assembly and in talks with President Johnson at Glassboro, N.J.

October

Soviet Government reveals cutback of agricultural investment goals approved in March 1965; Deputy Premier Polyansky publicly dissents.

November

Brezhnev presides over Moscow celebrations on 50th anniversary of Russian revolution.

1968
January

Leading members of intellectual community protest trials of young dissidents for "anti-Soviet" activities.

February

Budapest consultative meeting of some 60 Communist parties, without Far Eastern, Albanian, or Cuban representation, endorses Soviet call for late 1968 international conference; Romanian delegation walks out, charging Soviet use of pressure tactics.

August

Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops (except Romanian) occupy Czechoslovakia.

1969
January

Attempt to assassinate Soviet leaders at Kremlin fails.

March

Soviet and Chinese border troops clash on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River.

June

International Conference of Communist Parties meets in Moscow.

October

Sino-Soviet border talks open in Peking.

November

U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations open in Helsinki.

December

Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is deposited at United Nations.

1970
January

Moscow moves to provide air defense for United Arab Republic.

March

Second essay by physicist Andrei Sakharov details the need for economic and political reform in the U.S.S.R. if the Soviets are to keep pace with the West.

April

One hundredth anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth is celebrated.

August

Soviet-West German Renunciation of Force agreement is signed in Moscow.

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1971
March–April

24th Party Congress is held in Moscow. Kunayev, Kulakov, Shcherbitsky, and Grishin added to the Politburo.

May

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Egypt.

July

Politburo member Voronov demoted from post of Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. to Chairman of the People's Control Committee.

August

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with India.

September

Moscow signs Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

October

Brezhnev travels to France for summit talks with Pompidou, his first trip to the West as party chief.

December

KGB opens "Case 24," a campaign to suppress the leading *samizdat* journal, the *Chronicle of Current Events.*

1972
April

U.S.S.R. signs friendship treaty with Iraq.

May

Politburo member Shelest demoted from post as head of Ukrainian party and named Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R.

Brezhnev receives President Nixon for summit talks in Moscow. The accords signed include an ABM agreement and an interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons.

July

U.S.S.R. begins massive grain imports to compensate for harvest failures.

Soviet military advisers ousted from Egypt.

Castro visit to Moscow results in the admission of Cuba to CEMA.

September

Candidate Politburo member Mzhavanadze loses his seat after expose of corruption in the Georgian republic; the first member to lose his post since 1966.

1973
February

Politburo member Polyansky demoted from post of First Deputy Premier to Minister of Agriculture. Incumbent minister, Matskevich, is fired in the aftermath of the harvest failures.

March

Party card exchange, aimed at weeding out marginal members, begins.

April

Central Committee plenum announces "retirement" of Politburo members Voronov and Shelest, and the addition of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB chief Andropov to the Politburo.

May

Brezhnev travels to West Germany for summit talks with Brandt.

June

Brezhnev makes official visit to United States 18–25 June.

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POPULATION

DENSITY OF RURAL POPULATION

Persons per square mile

URBAN POPULATION

- Over 3,000,000
- 1,000,000 to 3,000,000
- 300,000 to 1,000,000
- 100,000 to 300,000

ETHNIC GROUPS

SLAVIC PEOPLES

- Russians
- Ukrainians
- Belorussians

TURKIC PEOPLES

- Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
- Uzbeks
- Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani
- Other Turkic peoples

CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

- Georgians, Chechens, Ingush, peoples of Dagestan

PALEO-SIBERIAN PEOPLES

- Chukchi, Koryaks, Nivkhi
- ESKIMOS
- KETS

OTHER INDO-EUROPEAN PEOPLES

- Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians, Moldavians, Tadzhiks, Ossetians
- X Germans
- Δ Jews

OTHER URALIC AND ALTAIC PEOPLES

- Estonians, Karelians, Mari, Komi, Mordvins, Udmurts, Mansi, Khanty, Nentsy, Buryats, Kalmyks, Evenki, Eveny, Nganasany

Uninhabited or sparsely settled

LAND USE

PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES

- Grain
- Livestock, grain, and other crops
- Livestock, grain, other crops, and woodland
- Dairy farming
- Irrigated cotton
- Fruit, vineyards

NONCULTIVATED AREAS

- Forest and mountain area
- Desert or semidesert
- Tundra
- Extensive swamp

Noncultivated areas include nomadic herding

METALLURGY

- Ferrous
- Copper
- Aluminum
- Other nonferrous

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.

ELECTRIC POWER

MAIN POWERLINES

- In operation
- Under construction

POWERPLANTS (Hydro, Thermal)

- Over 2,000,000 kilowatts
- 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 kw.
- 100,000 to 1,000,000 kw.
- Nuclear plant
- Nuclear plant, under construction

PETROLEUM REFINING AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

- Petroleum refining
- Synthetic rubber
- Mineral fertilizers
- Various chemicals

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.

MACHINE BUILDING AND METALWORKING

- Tractors, farm equipment
- Automobiles and trucks
- Other transport equipment
- Other machine building and metalworking

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.

FUELS AND METALLIC MINERALS

- Coal
- Brown coal
- Crude oil
- Natural gas
- Iron
- Manganese
- Chromite
- Nickel
- Copper
- Lead and zinc
- Aluminum
- Tin
- Gold

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.

ARCTIC OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

ATLANTIC OCEAN

ASIA

Nautical Miles

COMPARATIVE AREA AND LATITUDE

MAJOR TERRAIN FEATURES

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

BOUNDARY		CENTER
	Union Republic (S.S.R.)	
	Oblast, Kray, or Autonomous Republic (ASSR)	
	Autonomous Oblast (AO) or National Okrug (NO)	

AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS

1. Adigeyskaya AO
2. Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya AO
3. Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR
4. Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR
5. Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR
6. Yugo-Osetinskaya AO
7. Adzharskaya ASSR
8. Nagorno-Karabakhskaya AO
9. Nakhichevanskaya ASSR (to Azerbaijan S.S.R.)

U.S.S.R. SUMMARY MAP

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