

distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at Dulles Airport to receive the camera and film and develop them. The film was taken for development but the technicians began to question the use to which Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photograph Dr. Fielding's office, inside and outside, in order to prepare for the burglary. The photographs were reviewed by CIA technical supervisory personnel before they were delivered to Hunt. They revealed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" clearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the office and one CIA official speculated at the time they were "casing" photographs. Deputy Director Cushman's office was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt that no more requests for assistance would be honored. According to Gen. Cushman's aide, the CIA technical people thought the assistance given Hunt "appeared to involve the agency in domestic clandestine operations," a finding confirmed by the CIA general counsel's office. That same day, August 27, Cushman called Ehrlichman at the White House and told him aid to Hunt was being halted because of those concerns.

technician who had developed the pictures for Hunt was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the next day and wanted a complete briefing on what assistance Hunt had been given. The technician included in the briefing material xerox copies of the Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting (if it took place) between Hunt and Cushman, and why did the CIA deputy director at that time want to be brought up to date on Hunt's requests? Did the agency figure out that there was a relationship between the Ellsberg profile and the Hunt casing job of Fielding's office? Was any additional material supplied by CIA on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've asked that question several places and have no answer. It is known that the final CIA profile went to the White House on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note from Helms stating: "I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal." Though Helms was later to testify he meant the work might reflect adversely on the capabilities of the agency, the men who put the study together have said that their concern was that the "agency's involvement become known and particularly that it might come to light during any proceeding."

Walter Pincus

Candid but Mistaken about Chile

Where President Ford Is Wrong

by Tad Szulc

Gerald Ford's first public pronouncement on a controversial foreign policy question—secret intervention in Chilean politics prior to last year's bloody coup d'état—was as startling in its sweep as it was erroneous on virtually every point of fact. Probably the first American President to do so publicly, Mr. Ford last week delivered an extraordinary defense of covert intelligence operations abroad, claiming that in this particular case it was "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest," and that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security."

By thus advertising the subversion engineered on a continuing basis by the super-secret "40 Committee" of the National Security Council, the President handed the worldwide Communist propaganda mill some of the best grist it has had in years.

Now for the facts.

Mr. Ford stated that the US government "had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup *itself*." In the strictest sense, this is probably true: the Chilean army needed no further physical help from us to launch the September 11, 1973 revolution and the subsequent terror. Chile's armed forces are equipped mainly with US materiel, and our military advisers worked with the Chileans throughout the Allende period. Likewise between 1970 and 1974, when the US deprived Chile of commercial credit, including credit

TAD SZULC is a Washington-based writer on foreign policy.

00653

for vitally needed food imports, it supplied the Chilean armed forces with at least \$30 million worth of arms, primarily aircraft, on credit. A squadron of S-5 jet fighters was delivered a few weeks before the coup and more planes were in the pipeline. The regime fell after jet fighters bombed the presidential palace. For what it was worth psychologically, a US naval task force was off the shores of Chile the week of the coup in preparation for joint exercises with Chilean warships. Most loans to Allende's Chile were refused by the US on the grounds that Chile lacked credit worthiness, although this was no bar to military credit sales.

What of US assistance to anti-Allende forces before the coup and before Allende took office? Here is where the President was misinformed, perhaps by Secretary of State Kissinger who himself is caught in a credibility squeeze on Chile.

Until the surfacing of secret congressional testimony last April by CIA Director William E. Colby, the administration had insisted, as did Kissinger a month after the coup, that the US did virtually nothing to damage Allende. Colby testified, however, that the

CIA spent eight million dollars in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to prevent Allende, in effect, from governing efficiently. He also said that three million dollars had been expended in 1964 to keep Allende from winning in that election. This is how Mr. Ford explained these pre-coup activities: "In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy opposition political parties. And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest."

The President's statement is inconsistent with reality in these respects:

1) The US, through authorizations issued by the 40 Committee, embarked on undercover support of the anti-Allende press and opposition parties nearly four months before Allende took office. Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified last year that \$400,000 was approved for media support in Chile on June 27, 1970. After Allende won a plurality, but not a majority in the elections on September 4, 1970, the US, according to Colby's testimony, invested \$350,000 to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote against Allende in the runoff in the Congress on October 24. So there was no question of saving opposition parties and press at that time from persecution by Allende.

2) After Allende became President, his minority Marxist regime, the *Unidad Popular*, did precious little to "destroy opposition news media." *El Mercurio*, the principal anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago, was closed down only once for several days, after publishing an editorial calling, in effect, for insurrection. When its owner, Augustin Edwards, fled Chile immediately after Allende took office (Edwards came to the US and became a member of the board of directors of the Pepsi-Cola company, which is headed by Richard Nixon's close friend, Donald Kimball) the new government began tax and antitrust litigation against the Edwards empire. While *El Mercurio* remained the voice of the opposition (it could be read in the waiting room of the Chilean embassy in Washington, along with pro-regime leftist publications), the Edwards family was divested of its bank and other nonpress holdings. A right-wing newspaper, *La Tribuna*, ran into some trouble after charging in print that Allende had been expelled from medical school for raping a 14-year-old girl.

The Allende regime did refuse to authorize the Catholic university in Concepcion to go on the air with a new radio station. The university thereupon set up a relay from the Catholic university's station in Santiago. After the regime began jamming these broadcasts, persons believed to be linked to rightist militant groups blew up the jamming facility.

Ford and Frankfurter

Q. Mr. President, under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country? And does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to destabilize the government of Canada, for example, or the United States?

A. I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved.

Presidential press conference, Sept. 16, 1974

I remember shocking him [the Judge Advocate General] . . . when he came into my room and said, "Frankfurter, I want you to help me. I've just been over to the White House" — this was just after we had seized the customs house at Vera Cruz [April 1914] "and I'm asked to write a memorandum whether that seizure should be treated as an act of war and what its status is in international law. Will you work with me on that?"

I said, "General, I'm going to ask to be excused. I don't have to work on that. I know the answer to that."

"You do?"

"Yes, I do."

"What is the answer?"

"It would be an act of war against a great nation; it isn't against a small nation."

"I can't give him that."

"I know you can't, but that's the answer."

from Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences
Reynal & Company, © 1960 by Harlan B. Phillips

00654

SEPTEMBER 28, 1974

3) There is no evidence that Allende was out to "destroy opposition political parties," unless we are willing to say that the Nixon administration was out to destroy the Democrats here. The Chilean Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, both with anti-Allende majorities, functioned until the day of the coup. Allende resisted pressure from the extreme left of his coalition to call a plebiscite to abolish the existing Congress and replace it with a hand-picked unicameral parliament. There were few political prisoners in Chile under Allende. Today there are over 20,000.

If the opposition was not in that much trouble (Allende failed to win a majority in the Congress in the 1972 parliamentary elections), the question arises why the CIA needed eight million dollars to preserve the "best interest" of the Chilean people. Colby, who is more precise in his statements, told a conference on the CIA and Covert Actions in Washington, DC earlier this month that all that money went to Chile to help "our democratic friends" to survive until 1976, so that they could then vote the Marxists out of office. Addressing specialists, Colby knew better than to argue that the CIA was saving the opposition from destruction by Allende.

4) Mr. Ford asserted that the 40 Committee keeps the appropriate congressional committees informed of its plans for covert intrigue. This is not so. The 40 Committee as such has never briefed the Congress and, as far as it is known, Kissinger, who runs the secret group, never confided in congressmen on its behalf. There is an oversight authority in four subcommittees over the CIA's activities, but these bodies meet seldom and their members rarely ask searching ques-

tions. Colby has acknowledged that the congressional subcommittees are told of CIA activities *post facto* rather than before the fact as Mr. Ford claimed.

The day after the President spoke, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to reopen its investigation of the US role in the Chilean events. Its staff recommended that perjury or contempt citations be considered against former CIA Director Richard Helms and former senior CIA and State Department officials for misleading the Senate in earlier testimony. And the senators want to hear again from Kissinger, who heads the 40 Committee.

The question I find so puzzling is why Mr. Ford is so misinformed about the history of our involvement in Chile—and about the Chilean situation in 1970-1973—and why the 40 Committee approved the eight million dollars for covert operations, a rather large sum to keep Chilean newspapers going and "our democratic friends" in pocket money. If, in the name of democracy, the US was aiding the opposition in Chile against an elected government, was it also aiding the press and the opposition under dictatorships in Brazil, Greece and Spain or the Soviet Union? It would be interesting to know. Is it helping the new opposition in Chile, where a police state has been constructed by the military junta? Kissinger claims that the US must not interfere in the internal affairs of others—even to encourage Soviet dissidents.

If the issue was the nationalization by Chile of US foreign investments with inadequate indemnification or none, why not admit it instead of sermonizing about the opposition press and parties? Why doesn't this "open administration" come clean?



... And, being a non-Communist junta, we can count on automatic US support."

00655