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Five men sabotaged Allende

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Washington—On a warm Saturday morning, June 27, 1970, Henry A. Kissinger, addressing the most secret committee of the United States government, laid down in highly personal terms what was to become official U.S. policy toward Chile.

"I don't see why we should have to stand by and let a

country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people," he reportedly declared.

That statement, according

to government intelligence sources, was made to the 40 Committee, a five-member group so secret that its existence was unknown at the time to the vast majority of Congress, the press, and even the White House staff.

Dr. Kissinger, through a State Department spokesman, said he could not recall making the statement but, in any case, could not comment on 40 Committee activities.

The 40 Committee is elected by no one and responsible to no one except the

President, who appoints its members.

Serious students of foreign-policy making have questioned whether, in a democracy, such a five-person directorate should have this kind of unbridled power, whether the five are really in touch with American public opinion, and whether Congress should not have tighter reins on their covert programs.

As a consequence of the 40 committee's action, however, large sums of Central Intelligence Agency money were poured vainly into Chile to avert the election of leftist Salvador Allende. That money was followed in later years by even larger sums to "destabilize" the Chilean economy and topple the Allende regime.

With the Chilean military uprising in 1973 and Dr. Allende's violent death, the policy ultimately succeeded.

But it has produced in recent days several developments certain to provoke a new national debate on the role of the CIA and even of Dr. Kissinger himself.

It has:

- Focused attention, at last, on the 40 Committee, dominated by military and intelligence professionals of the World War II-cold war vintage, as the real overseer, even operator, of the CIA's covert activities and responsible only to the President.

- Made clear the emergence of Dr. Kissinger as the most powerful nonelected official in the nation's history, standing astride the intelligence, covert operations and foreign policy apparatus as secretary of state, chairman of the National Security Council, national security adviser to the President and chairman of the 40 Committee.

- Destroyed what was left of the belief that at least a few members of Congress have knowledge of and a veto over the Cloak-and-dagger aspects of the CIA.

"The CIA is the tool of the President and it works today for Kissinger," according to one government source.

The history of the U.S. government's Chilean adventure dates to 1964 when Dr. Allende, a proclaimed Marxist, first sought the presidency. CIA funds helped his Christian Democratic opponent,

Eduardo Frei, capture the presidency that year.

But Mr. Frei could not succeed himself and the Allende threat was seen by Washington as greater than ever. This time even more money was funneled by CIA into anti-Allende efforts.

In all, according to secret testimony April 22 by the CIA director, William E. Colby, as revealed by Representative Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.) the agency pumped \$11 million into anti-Allende efforts in Chile

between 1964 and 1973. It was spent as follows:

- About \$500,000 was advanced in 1963 to help Chilean individuals and organizations gear up to oppose Dr. Allende the next year.

- Another \$500,000 went to opposition party personnel during the 1970 campaign.

- Following Dr. Allende's election, \$5 million was authorized to disrupt the Chilean economy from 1971 to 1973, and \$1.5 million more was spent to influence Chilean municipal elections in 1973. Some of these funds helped finance an influential Chilean newspaper.

- Finally, in August, 1973, just one month before President Allende's downfall, another \$1 million was authorized to press home the effort to wreck the Chilean economy, already in trouble because of Dr. Allende's own misguided policies.

In each case, the effort and the expenditure were approved by the 40 Committee, or by the same committee operating under an alias.

"No more mysterious group exists within the government than the 40 Committee," David Wise, a journalist who has long been a student of the U.S. intelligence community, said.

"Its operations are so secret that in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director Colby was even reluctant to identify the chairman."

Covert CIA actions

The Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala—each of these was a CIA covert operation approved by the 40 Committee, or its predecessors.

In most cases, it appears, Congress was kept in the dark, at least until after the operations were completed, and sometimes beyond that.

The Chilean intervention is an example of how this blindfolding of Congress works.

On March 29 this year, Charles A. Meyers, the former assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, told a Senate subcommittee that "the policy of the government . . . was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile . . . We financed no candidates, no political parties . . ."

As late as June 12—two months after Mr. Colby's secret admission—Harry Schlaudeman, No. 2 person in the American Embassy in Chile from 1969 to 1973, denied that any such U.S. effort was made.

"There was no funding, of that I am quite sure," Mr. Schlaudeman told a closed hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Colby emphasizes when questioned that the agency makes full secret reports to the "appropriate" congressional committees, the so-called CIA "oversight" subcommittees of the House and Senate.

But what they are told, according to a former top official of the CIA, depends on what questions they ask—and frequently they do not ask the right questions.

"The CIA deals with Congress in the way that Congress requests it to," the official, who requested anonymity, said "Often they don't know enough to ask the right questions. But it's their fault."

Among the subjects that have escaped close congressional questioning has been the operations of the 40 Committee.

Despite its anonymity, the committee appears to have existed since before 1954, under several different names.

The names have been deliberately designed to provide no clue as to its function. Its members communicate mostly by word of mouth, with little paperwork and a staff of one man, believed to be a CIA employee.

"You can look all you want but you won't find any docu-

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ment with the title '40 Committee' on it," a former intelligence officer said. "It's like, officially at least, it didn't exist."

From its pre-1954 origins as a loose group of top State and Defense department officials, the group has evolved a fixed membership based on title and formalized in a directive of the National Security Council. The name 40 Committee is believed to refer to a National Security Council directive No. 40.

Dr. Kissinger, as national security adviser, took charge of the 40 Committee under President Nixon and retains the chairmanship today.

The other members are Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; William P. Clements, Jr., deputy secretary of defense; Joseph J. Sisco, under secretary of state for political affairs and Mr. Colby, the CIA director.

They are men in their 50's, veterans of the World War II and cold war periods.

Mr. Colby's membership, according to critics, is the classic story of the "fox in the chicken coop"—the CIA director, in effect sitting in judgment on plans and proposals of his own agency.

At times, other officials have sat in; John N. Mitchell, as Mr. Nixon's attorney general, was a 40 Committee member, and there is some dispute over whether the late Robert F. Kennedy, in his turn as attorney general, also was a member.

It is believed that Mr. Nixon's controversial assistants, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, also attended meetings, but evidently not as members.

Each 40 Committee, according to past and present intelligence officers, has tended to become an extension of the chairman chiefly because he alone has access directly to the President.

Dr. Kissinger has come to dominate the 40 Committee and to an extent some intelligence specialists here believe is dangerous.

In the past, for example, the 40 Committee met weekly, but as Dr. Kissinger's own responsibilities have expanded, he has convened the committee less frequently, intelligence specialists here say.

Much of the time, according to several sources, Dr. Kissinger merely confers with the other members by telephone, dealing with them individually rather than as a group, and passing on to the President the consensus that he alone has had a real—and in fashioning.

The result, according to specialists who have served in both the CIA and State Department, has been to

concentrate decision-making in fewer hands, mostly Dr. Kissinger's hands.

"A lot of the consultation and argument that went on is missing now," one official said.

The controversy over Dr. Kissinger's role extends to the Chilean adventure and who really initiated it.

The CIA clearly has taken most of the heat to date, but at least one official highly placed in the State Department from 1970 to 1973, the years of the most ambitious anti-Allende effort, believes the "CIA may be getting a bum rap."

The idea for intervention, he said, appears to have come from the White House—"from Nixon to Kissinger."

Kissinger's plan

It was then farmed out to the CIA to develop a plan and provide funds and routed routinely back to the 40 Committee, where Dr. Kissinger, as chairman, approved what may have been his own plan, this source said.

The agenda of the 40 Committee includes some of the most delicate foreign policy decisions of the government. Besides the CIA's covert projects, it also reviews and approves monthly a joint reconnaissance schedule that involves, among other things, the use of spy satellites around the world.

Outside the intelligence community there is criticism of the secrecy that shrouds the CIA and hands over its operations to a non-elected elite such as the 40 Committee.

But within the intelligence community here—people sympathetic to the need for clandestine policy alternatives in a divided world—the concern is that there is not enough control of the CIA by institutions such as the 40 Committee.

For example, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, former U.S. intelligence officers and authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," maintain that covert operations account for only \$440 million of CIA's estimated budget of more than \$750 million a year. The actual figures are a closely held secret.

By far the larger, more important operation—worldwide espionage—is subject to no review by the 40 Committee.

This is true even if the espionage involves an operation as sensitive as hiring a key official of a foreign government—as has been done in Latin America, at the risk of a serious diplomatic incident.

Even covert operations approved by the 40 Committee have some history of generating capers never envisioned by the 40 Committee. The Soviet sugar case is an example.

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