

Panel Says Secret Advice to C.I.A.

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25— Senator Henry M. Jackson secretly advised the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973 on how to protect itself against an investigation by Senator Frank Church into the agency's relations with the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in Chile, according to the final report of a House committee.

The report, by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, quotes a C.I.A. memorandum of Feb. 23, 1973, that said, "Senator Jackson repeatedly made the comment that in his view the C.I.A. Oversight Committee [of which he was then a member] had the responsibility of protecting the agency in the type of situation that was inherent in the Church subcommittee."

"As a result of this conviction, Senator Jackson would work with the agency to see that we got this protection," the memorandum said. From the beginning of sweeping investigations of the intelligence community last year, one paramount criticism has been that Congressional oversight committees were protective of the C.I.A. and did not attempt to control truly the agency's functions.

The House report has not been made public, but this and other portions were made available to The New York Times today.

Reached by telephone, Senator Jackson said that the author of the C.I.A. memorandum had taken "literary license" in describing his position. He said, however, that he did recall advising C.I.A. officials on "procedural matters" in responding to Senator Church's investigation.

"This was no coverup," he said. "Nothing like that."

In the spring of 1973, the Multinational Corporation Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began an investigation of the Chilean activities of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and its relations with the covert activities of the C.I.A. The subcommittee was headed by Mr. Church, the Idaho Democrat

who now heads the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which last year conducted a subsequent investigation into intelligence agencies.

Mr. Jackson was the second Senator in two days to acknowledge that he had given private advice to C.I.A. officials worried about how to answer Congressional questions on operations in Chile.

Late Friday, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, said he had advised a former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, on how to respond to questions about the C.I.A.'s Chilean operations and other matters.

Mr. Helms faced questioning in 1973 Senate hearings before his confirmation as Ambassador to Iran, the position he now holds.

Until the multinational subcommittee began its investigation, the C.I.A. had never been scrutinized by any Congressional committees other than the principal oversight subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriation committees.

The C.I.A. memorandum, presumably prepared by William V. Broe, chief of the agency's Western Hemisphere division, who was a key figure in Chilean operations, purports to describe a meeting with Senator Jackson on Feb. 3, 1973.

The memo said that Senator Jackson had recommended that James R. Schlesinger Jr., then Director of Central Intelligence, should as a "first order of business discuss the problem with the White House," and suggested that Mr. Schlesinger talk only with President Nixon or H. R. Haldeman, his chief of staff.

"Senator Jackson felt that the ultimate solution to the problem facing the agency could be found in getting Senator McClellan, acting on behalf of Senator Stennis, to call a session of the C.I.A. oversight committee."

[Senators John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, and John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, headed different committees with some legal authority over the C.I.A.]

"This committee" the memo continued, "would then look into the nature and scope of C.I.A.'s activities in Chile in 1970. Once that was accomplished, the oversight committee would handle the Foreign Relations Committee."

"Senator Jackson repeatedly made the comment that in his view the C.I.A. oversight committee had the responsibility of protecting the agency in the type of situation that was inherent in the Church subcommittee," the memorandum said in part.

It went on to note that "once the oversight committee heard the details provided on the C.I.A.'s involvement, the agency would send a brief statement to the Church subcommittee staff members in response to the questions which they had previously posed to C.I.A."

Indeed, the memorandum said, Senator Jackson even agreed on text of a statement the C.I.A. could give the Church subcommittee.

Denial on I.T.T.

The testimony of Mr. Helms 5 and 7 February [1973] before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearly established that C.I.A. neither gave nor received from I.T.T. funds for use in Chile in 1970 for support of political parties," the proposed statement read.

In addition, Mr. Helms' testimony brought out the fact that there were no joint action programs established in the context of the 1970 political developments in Chile. C.I.A. regards Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate, thus, no further elaboration is planned," the memorandum would have said.

In fact, however, Mr. Helms' testimony has been sharply contradicted since then by evidence collected by the subcommittee on multinationals and by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The Department of Justice is investigating whether Mr. Helms committed perjury doing those hearings.

Mr. Jackson said he did not recall a specific meeting on Feb. 23, but he did recall discussing Mr. Church's investigation with John Maury, then the C.I.A.'s legislative officer on Capitol Hill, and possibly with other officials of the agency.

He said he told the agency men to take "their problem" to the chairman of the proper oversight committees. One chairman was Senator Stennis, head of the armed services committee's Central Intelligence subcommittee. But Mr. Stennis had been shot in a holdup attempt on Jan. 30, so, Mr. Jackson said, he suggested that the C.I.A. talk to Senator McClellan, head of the defense subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee which also has oversight of the C.I.A.

Church's Role Discussed

Mr. Jackson said he believed that he later told Senator Church about the C.I.A. approach. Mr. Church said in a telephone interview that he "couldn't recall Mr. Jackson discussing that with me."

Mr. Church said he believed that he first learned of the matter when the investigating committee obtained the same memorandum described in the House report.

Asked if he was surprised to learn that another Senator had tried to stymie his investigation, he said: "It doesn't surprise me. The C.I.A. had its friends up here [on Capitol Hill] and they often when to their friends."

Whether Mr. Jackson was the source of the advice, or not, the C.I.A. followed a plan very similar to the one described in the memorandum. Mr. Schlesinger went to see Senator McClellan and told him of his concern about discussing covert operations with the Church committee.

Mr. Schlesinger, senior intelligence officials confirmed, did not himself know at that time about C.I.A. involvement in an attempted military coup d'etat in Chile and was only trying to protect the political covert operations. At first, several Congressional sources confirmed, Mr. McClellan agreed to hold a closed hearing on the matter at which Mr. Church could be an "onlooker."

Mr. McClellan said in a telephone interview that he could not recall a specific meeting with Mr. Schlesinger but that he could generally remember the subjects involved.

Church says he Refused

Mr. Church said he refused to participate in the arrangement to sit in on a hearing of the other committee. "I told them our investigation would go ahead without the cooperation of C.I.A.," he said.

Later, Mr. Schlesinger agreed to permit Mr. Broe to testify before the multinational subcommittee in closed session on the narrow question of direct I.T.T.-C.I.A. relationships.

The multinational subcommittee investigations and the late Senate select committee inquiry into the C.I.A. has revealed that the United States attempted to manipulate internal Chilean policy for more than a decade.

It poured out money particularly to the opponents of Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist doctor who later became President. The C.I.A., however, apparently did not accept I.T.T. money for its operations.

When it appeared that Mr. Allende would become President in the fall of 1970, President Nixon ordered a massive covert effort to keep Mr. Allende from power. In the course of this the C.I.A. transferred three submachine guns and a quantity of tear gas bombs to a group plotting to kidnap General René Schneider, chief of the Chilean Army staff. In an related plot General Schneider was assassinated.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1976