
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THE LICENCY OF SECONDS	Intelligence	Information Sp	pecial Report Page 3 of 8 Pages	
COUNTRY USSR			DATE	
		SUBJECT	23 February 1076 50X1-HUM	
MILITARY THO		ployment of Rocket in Mountainous Area	S 50X1-HUM	

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## The Employment of Rocket Troops in Mountainous Areas by General-Leytenant A. Mayorov


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During the past training year our army conducted an exercise with rocket troops, the basic purpose of which was to acquire experience in actions of the rocket troops of an army in an offensive operation involving the negotiation of a large mountain mass as well as to investigate the special features of combat actions of the rocket troops of an army in the mountains. To the exercise were assigned the missile brigade of an army, the mobile missile technical base of an army and separate missile battalions of large units, and operations groups of the staffs of divisions and regiments.

We would like to share some results of these exercises in this article.

First of all we would like to mention that the experience acquired corroborated the desirability of conducting a tactical exercise with the rocket troops of an army against a broad operational background, under the immediate direction of the army commander, and with the participation of the field headquarters and operations groups of the divisions and regiments. It made it possible to improve the training and coordination of rocket troops, staffs and control means in an integrated whole, from the subunits up to the staff of the army. Conducting field missile launches raised the responsibility of personnel and officers of all ranks for their actions, brought the conditions of carrying out tasks close to those of combat, and necessitated thorough practical organization of troop cooperation and the working out of combat support measures.

The exercise showed that missile units with appropriate support can operate successfully in mountainous and wooded terrain, and maintain close cooperation with tank and motorized rifle large units. During redeployment in a mountainous region, such as the Eastern Carpathians, their average march speed while transporting operational-tactical missile launchers on large-load trailers in night conditions could amount to 20 kilometers per hour, and, while negotiating passes, about eight to ten kilometers per hour; average march speeds of tactical missile units were 12 to 18 kilometers per hour and nine to 13 kilometers per hour, respectively. Operational-tactical missile launchers were transported by MAZ-537 prime



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MI-4 and reco sele desi doze	cles. To speed up their work it is desirable to include in a group and helicopter to fly over the planned deployment areas of the battalion draw up a battle formation plan. Working according to this plan, a mnaissance group spends two to two and one-half times less time on the ection and survey of launch sites. The exercise also corroborated the rability of including in reconnaissance groups artillery prime mover are to grade and widen roads and launch site pads, and prepare descent roads and to fords of mountain rivers.
and Abru weat site dist the seco 500 wind 15 d inte	Meteorological support of missile units during the exercise was ried out by the forces of the meteorological batteries of the missile ade and the separate artillery reconnaissance battalions of the army, was planned by axes by the staff of the rocket troops and artillery. Putly changing weather in the mountains and the complexity of selecting her station locations necessitate bringing them as close to the launch as as possible. Therefore two weather stations were set up at a slight ance from each other. One almost on the same level as the launch sit other 200 meters higher. The first produced ground measurements, the number of the closest mountain range. The clearance angle at surfaction welcoity of no more than 15 meters per second should not exceed ten egrees. Otherwise, as experience shows, there will be frequent reference in radiosonde tracking, due to the screening action of the tains. Sounding altitudes reached 20.4 to 38.4 kilometers during the cise.
meth aimi inde orie to a corr to a perc moun	The coordinates of the launch site were determined on a map with the of topographic survey personnel. The tie-in was also checked by this od, but in some instances also by theodolite traverse. The bearings are point were determined by means of an artillery gyrocompass with two pendent starts, and, in favorable weather conditions, by celestial intation. The separate missile battalions determined the grid bearing iming point also with a PAB-2 artillery director compass. The ection for the tie-line of the topographic surveyors in the mountains account for damp road and ground surfaces in the mountains averaged 3. Lent of the traverse line. The density of the geodetic network in the tains is extremely limited. Topographic-geodetic preparation of ile launching areas in mountainous terrain took on the average about is.
batt moun	Great difficulties in missile delivery, especially to a missile alion operating on an independent route, were experienced in the tains. It is desirable to use MI-6 helicopters to deliver missiles

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under these conditions. Furthermore, increased reserves of missiles should be set up in the units while they are still conducting combat actions in the foothills. The control of the transports delivering missiles can only be accomplished by using R-125 radios to transmit established signals for each movement phase control line.

In order to speed up the delivery of missiles to missile brigades and separate missile battalions, it is necessary to assign additional tasks to reconnaissance groups of selecting helicopter landing sites and access roads in the mobile missile technical base deployment area and in the brigade and separate missile battalion missile launching areas.

Missile delivery to launch batteries by mobile technical support posts was examined during the exercise. By this method a missile from the technical battery of the brigade was delivered to the area of a battery launch site. The crane, compressor and charging station of a battalion were also delivered there. This experiment justified itself. Delivering missiles directly from a technical battery to the launch site took significantly less time. However, this should be considered only an exception to the general rule for missile delivery to a battery launch site, since the forces of the mobile missile technical base and the technical battery of the brigade are limited and their efforts should not be dispersed. The striving to speed up missile delivery to individual launch batteries by allocating mobile posts of the mobile missile technical base and of the technical battery of the brigade may lead to the opposite result -- the breakdown of planned and organized missile delivery to all the other missile battalions.

As a whole, the preparation of missiles (mating and fueling) by the forces of the missile technical platoons and launch batteries during the exercise deserves attention. Use of such a variant to speed up missile preparation, especially for the first grouped strike, and increase the missile preparation capabilities of the mobile missile technical base, is highly promising.

The brigade, mobile missile technical base and combined-arms large units were controlled from the command post and forward command post of the army, and the operations groups of the regiments and the missile battalions of the divisions were controlled from the command posts of the divisions, using radio and radio-relay communications. In controlling rocket troop combat actions the commander of the army assigned tasks of preparing and carrying out missile strikes through the chief of rocket troops and artillery to the missile brigade commander, as well as directly to missile

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