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House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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
Resource Management Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505

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Dear [Redacted]

Enclosed you will find five speeches that I delivered on the Floor of the House of Representatives, the last of which was last week. I thought you might be interested in reading them.

Yours truly,



IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress

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Enclosures

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Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1980

No. 55

House of Representatives

AMERICA, WORLD PEACE, AND THE THREAT OF SOVIET POWER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, 46 years ago—just 5 years before the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe—Winston Churchill rose in the House of Commons to deliver the first in a series of speeches warning against the weakness of British air defense. His was truly a voice crying in the wilderness, rejected or ignored by those who placed their faith in the pacific intentions of other nations. It was an era in which what was called "moral disarmament," the renunciation of force by nations, committed to the way of peace—This way of thinking enjoyed widespread appeal in the democracies, deeply wounded as they were by the impact of the First World War less than two decades before.

It was the mission of Winston Churchill to sound an alarm at a time when there were few in the West who wished to hear. It was the year, 1934, in which disarmament talks among the powers finally collapsed. Both Japan and Germany had already withdrawn from the League of Nations and were vigorously pursuing an extensive military buildup. Thus, coming events cast their shadows before.

This was the immediate background to Churchill's prophetic warning, a warning widely unpopular and ill received. He observed:

We are vulnerable as we have never been before.

(We) are left exposed to a mortal thrust, and are deprived of that sense of security and independence upon which the civilization of our island has been built.

The failure to heed these sober admonitions would eventually be reckoned in blood. Having retreated successively from every confrontation with Nazi expansion during the thirties, the Allied Powers were to find themselves unable to help Poland, to whose defense they had pledged themselves and for whose integrity they finally made their stand in 1939. How much Europe and the world might have been spared had Britain and the West generally responded to that call of Churchill.

Historical analogies are always inexact, yet it remains true that those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Today, we in the United States confront the growing power of the Soviet Union both in Europe and in Asia. I believe that we, too, in Churchill's words, may be vulnerable as we have not been before. We, too, are increasingly exposed to that imbalance of power which risks some mortal thrust. We, too, are increasingly deprived of "that sense of security and independence" upon which the survival of the West has depended.

In subsequent statements, Mr. Speaker, I hope to show the nature and extent of the Soviet build up in comparison with our American defense capability. I hope further to indicate what must be done—what we must do if the peace of the world is to be maintained, that peace which, in the final analysis, depends upon the deterrent power of this Nation.

Two fundamental points should be made clear from the beginning—first, my conviction that the study of history must lead to a realistic appraisal of human nature. One of our most eminent American theologians wrote eloquently of "moral man and immoral society," underlining the tendency of men in the aggregate, of nations, aggressively to pursue collective self-interest regardless of the moral sensitivity of individuals. Seen in this light, history is indeed a melancholy record of man's inhumanity to man. In his "Discourses," Machiavelli, reflecting on this grim symbolism, observed that the state is ultimately founded upon violence, albeit as a last resort. Similarly, in Genesis, human culture and civilization, the settled life of cities, are portrayed as established by Cain on the brutal slaying of his brother.

To draw again upon Churchill's words:

This truth may be unfashionable, unpalatable, unpopular. But it is the truth. The story of mankind shows that war was universal and unceasing for millions of years before armaments were invented, or armies organized. Indeed the lucid intervals of peace and order only occur in human history after armaments in the hands of strong governments have come into being. And civilization has been nursed only in cradles guarded by superior weapons and discipline. To remove the causes of war must go deeper than armaments, we must remove grievances and injustice, we must raise human thought to a higher plane and give a new inspiration to the world. Let moral disarmament come and physical disarmament will soon follow. But what sign of this is there now?

Indeed, Mr. Speaker, we may well ask in this year of 1980: What sign of this is there now?

Of course, to cite this trait of human nature need not lead to despair or gloom. Rather than submission, our rallying cry must be preparation, knowing that in strength of arms lies our best hope for peace. Such preparation, as Churchill noted, "involves statesmanship, expense, and exertion," but "neither submission nor preparation are free from suffering and danger."

My second fundamental point Mr. Speaker, has to do with the challenge facing the United States today—that is, the nature of the Soviet Union, past and present, and the threat it poses to the world community.

That threat is composed of two elements—the one, nationalist and, indeed, imperialist in its ambitions; the other, ideological, the Leninist-Stalinist brand of Marxism, all-embracing in its claims, a system of ideas sustained by isolation, indoctrination, and—in the end—gun and bayonet, the ultimate arbiters.

The history of the 19th century is one of steady Russian advance into Central Asia, the gradual subjugation of the Muslim khanates and other areas, until at last in the 1880's Russian arms reached Afghanistan itself where fierce clashes occurred between Russian and Afghan forces. Rising tension with Britain seemed likely for a time to result in war between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan, a war narrowly averted by negotiations securing Afghan independence.

Today, we see that similar expansionist impulses have again led Russia—in this case as the self-designated instrument of Marxian advance—to invade the territory of Afghanistan, an area of vital significance to the security and stability of India and Pakistan as well as of the Near East in general.

Thus, history seems to repeat herself. Apart from national expansion and ideological commitment, we may well ask what it is that motivates Russian policy, not only in Afghanistan, but throughout the extensive borders of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia alike. Many experts discern an obsessive concern with security, a concern which has shaped much of Russian history since the invasions of the Mongols in the Middle Ages, invasions whose impact has never been forgotten.

Security, like charity, may be said to cover a multitude of sins. Russia, still mindful of the German invasion in the Second World War—which itself recalled Napoleon's campaign over a century before—has responded to its own perception of how best to secure its territories by seeking to control, directly or indirectly, neighboring countries and geographical areas. The danger of this activist policy in the name of security is that it can be endless.

So with Soviet power today. In 1980, as in earlier years, it is power, or rather counterpower, which Russia respects and understands; it is that deterrent

power which alone will indicate to the Soviet leadership when and where the time has come to stop.

In Berlin in 1948 and 1949, and in Cuba in 1962, the Soviet Union knew when to stop precisely because of American strength and our willingness to use it to set limits to Soviet expansion, and thereby to preserve the peace of the world.

Today we may well ask: Have we lost the credibility we had then? If so, what must we do to restore it? Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union—motivated by concern for security, the impulse to support and protect Marxist regimes, whatever the motives—has steadily increased the territories and peoples under her direct and indirect control. Where Soviet power has been halted, American power, counterpower, deterrent power, has been the effective and only barrier to that expansion.

If we are to heed the warning signs given by the Soviet move into Afghanistan, we must look at the unchanging Russian anxiety for security fused in recent years with the Soviet ideology of advance. And we must note the changing balance of power in the relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Speaker, as with Churchill in 1934, so we today face the growing power of an expansionist State whose interests are directly counter to ours. If we but rise to the occasion, we need fear neither war nor rumor of war. Rather, we will by our response to the Soviet challenge assure the peace of the world in this generation and, let us pray, for generations yet unborn.



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Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

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No. 58

House of Representatives

THE GREAT NEW FACT: THE EMERGING IMBALANCE IN POWER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, just 15 years after the triumph of Soviet communism in Russia, Winston Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, told of the emergence of Soviet power in the international scene with these prophetic words:

There is Russia. (She) has made herself an Ishmael among the nations, but she is one of the most titanic factors in the economy and in the diplomacy of the world (with) her enormous, rapidly increasing armaments, with her tremendous development of poison gas, aeroplanes, tanks, and every kind of forbidden fruit.

He went on to speak of her "limitless manpower and her corrosive hatreds"—all these, he concluded, "(weigh) heavily upon a whole line of countries, some small, some considerable, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all situated adjacent to Russian territory." He further noted that these nations, whose independence and nationhood were sacred to them, were carved, in whole or in part, out of the old Russian Empire.

It has been nearly 50 years since Churchill spoke those words to a largely unhearing House, to a largely indifferent world.

Looking back, surveying the past and then the present situation of those nations and peoples to whom Mr. Churchill alluded, we are startled to find that few can be said to enjoy that independent national life to which they had—and have—as much right as any. It is with a grim sense of the unfolding realities of Soviet power today and its steady expansion that we ask: Where are they now? Where are those countries, small and large, which extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea? Some have been literally swallowed up, absorbed into the Soviet imperial system, their

national identity snuffed out, their religious and cultural heritage trampled down and oppressed. Others—the stronger states—find themselves yoked to the Soviet as satellites, able at best to maintain a cautious national existence so long as they subordinate themselves to the interests of Moscow. Still others find themselves effectively "neutralized," existing at the sufferance of the Soviet leadership, whose overwhelming strength is willing to tolerate what need not be directly absorbed.

We may call the roll of nations and peoples upon whom the power of the Soviet Union weighs thus heavily in one way or another from the Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—and from Finland to the countries which, in varying degrees, continue to exist behind what Mr. Churchill would later describe as an Iron Curtain: Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-

By this time we are more or less resigned to the extension of Soviet influence and power from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Today, however, as we move into 1980, we have seen a new and more ominous development: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We see today that the threat of Russian expansion is not confined to Europe. Rather, as throughout modern Russian history, it extends along the length and breadth of her vast Asian frontier. It casts its shadow over the Near East and the Persian Gulf, over Indian and Pakistan, over China and Japan.

Only one unfamiliar with the story of her past would suppose that this expansion into Asia represents something unprecedented in Russian history.

What is new and unprecedented, at least since the beginning of the era called détente, is the naked brutality, the unveiled character, of this move, a direct, massive, and continuing intervention in an area in which Soviet influence had been clearly dominant in the previous regime—and vigorously repudiated by the people. It is an intervention which brings Soviet military power to the very borders of Pakistan and India, closer to the oil-fields of Iran and the Gulf and to the strategic Indian Ocean.

No doubt we do not now perceive the invasion of Afghanistan as a direct threat to this Nation, but I direct your consideration to a parallel situation some four decades ago—the German invasion of Poland in 1939. Neither France nor Britain then perceived that move as a direct threat. Both nations were reluctant to act. Poland was far away; it could not be effectively defended. Why, then, go to war over the "Polish Question?" In the end, only Mr. Chamberlain's outrage at Hitler's brazen deceit persuaded an unwilling France to abide by commitments made—too late—on the eve of Poland's disintegration.

My point is not, of course, that we should today turn to war over Afghanistan. To the contrary, no sensible person would so hold. Rather, I would ask you to consider the process of appeasement, of indifference and of whistling-in-the-dark by which the crisis in Europe was permitted to develop in ways which insured the inevitability of war. That consideration can be instructive.

The roots of the war which finally came in 1939 were not so much in Poland as in Czechoslovakia—in the Munich agreement, in Austria, and in the Rhineland. Had the Allied Powers acted decisively and in concert on those earlier occasions, we may well believe that there would never have been a major war. Hitler's bluffs—for such they were in the beginning—remained unchallenged, and resurgent German militarism found no effective barrier in London or in Paris to its steady expansion over Europe. Those in Germany who feared that Hitler would go too far were undermined by the absence of Allied resolve. Those who supported each dangerous venture in Hitler's calculated policy found themselves vindicated by Allied indecision and disinclination.

A crucial and often neglected element in the policy known as appeasement was the fact of Allied unpreparedness in the face of German rearmament. As early as 1934 Winston Churchill, standing virtually alone, warned eloquently, in a motion presented before Commons, that "in the present circumstances of the world, the strength of our national defenses, and especially of our air defenses, is no longer adequate to secure the peace, safety, and freedom of Your Majesty's faithful subjects." His was a voice largely unheard until almost too late.

It is my conviction that this Nation today confronts a crisis with the Soviet Union not unlike that which Britain faced with Germany in the decade of the thirties. It is a crisis to secure the peace, safety, and freedom of our people and of those peoples everywhere who seek the fulfillment of their legitimate national aspirations for political, cultural, and religious independence. It is for them and for us that I urge the upbuilding of American strength, an upbuilding based upon a realistic assessment of Soviet power now and in the years to come.

To urge the preparation of defense is not to assert the imminence of war.

So Churchill spoke in 1934. I assert the same today.

"I do not," he went on, "I do not believe that war is imminent or that war is inevitable, but it seems very difficult to resist the conclusion that, if we do not begin forthwith to put ourselves in a position of security, it will soon be beyond our power to do so."

So it was in 1934. So it is in 1980. Then, for Churchill and his contemporaries, "the great new fact," as he said, was that "Germany is rearming." That was the fact which, as he rightly perceived in that day, "rivets the attention of every country in Europe, indeed in all the world, and which throws almost all other issues into the background."

Now, for us, the "great new fact" is the alarming imbalance of power by which daily the Soviet Union grows ever stronger and stronger and, in consequence, more determinedly aggressive in its policies.

Over the past 15 years or more there has been a decided shift in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, as we have failed to

adopt our military programs to counter similar Soviet efforts.

Let us look for a moment at the buildup of Soviet armament which has led to this situation.

The military imbalance at the heart of the present crisis is dramatically evident in the fact that today the Soviets, through their SS-20 missiles deployed against Western Europe—have a decisive advantage which will remain in effect even after the Pershing II missiles strengthen NATO 3 years from now. Unlike the Pershing II, the SS-20 possesses multiple warheads or MIRV capability. In the larger context, the Soviets have deployed nine land-based ballistic missile systems since 1962 as well as counter-force weapons which can eliminate our missile silos. Further, they have deployed six SLBM systems since 1961. Moreover, the Soviets have a "reloading" missile capability which we presently lack. The Soviet SS-17 and SS-18 both have a "colaunch" capability for reloading silos.

This has drastically altered the former situation of "mutually assured destruction" on both sides.

To be sure, we do have the capability of a retaliatory strike both by air and by sea. However, it is estimated that by 1985 the Soviets will be able to knock out some 90 percent of our land-based force. Secretary Brown has warned that they may even have this capability by 1982. Their "search-type" submarines must also be taken into account.

American nuclear strategy has been built upon the concept of a second-strike. We have relied upon our ability effectively to retaliate against the Soviets rather than to defend the American homeland, people and production-base alike. It may be that we are the first and only great power in history to repudiate defense of its homeland in the belief that its retaliatory capability will be an effective deterrent to any first strike. But it is precisely that retaliatory capability which is being steadily eroded.

The proposed MX missile system would give us—at vast expense—a counter-silo capability which will not be equal to Soviet striking power; yet we would continue to rely upon a second-strike, retaliatory strategy. In effect, we are inviting a second wave against us in the event of nuclear conflict.

Today the Soviet Union has 173 divisions as against our total, including both Active and Reserve, of 28. They are literally swamping us in quantity. Their massive conventional superiority gives them immense flexibility, a flexibility with which we are unable to cope.

I shall speak more fully of these and related concerns at another time and in terms of a comparison between Soviet and American arms programs and expenditures. Suffice to say here that we are overwhelmed by the quantitative superiority of the Soviets and we are in danger of losing our qualitative edge in technology and hardware. And this at a time in which we are not able to provide a nuclear umbrella for our allies since our deterrent power lacks credibility, given the Soviet first-strike advantage.

What is especially distressing is that all this has occurred at the very time in which Soviet-supported moves in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—in 1978, before the present invasion—have encountered irresolute and vacillating American response. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not happen in a vacuum. It did not spring out of nowhere. It reflected a careful calculation of interest and risk—and the expectation, well-founded in recent years, that our response would be minimal and ineffective.

It may be the case that we can do relatively little at present. But if the invasion serves to alert Americans to the larger crisis which has been gathering for years past, then some lasting good will have come from the suffering and the courage of the Afghan people.

The parallels, with the decade of the thirties are disturbing and enlightening. Even the use of poison-gas, to which Churchill alluded in his speeches, has found its present-day counterpart, according to international reports of the atrocities which have characterized Soviet tactics against the Afghan guerrilla forces. The long-range consequences of Soviet intervention, brutal and cynical in its methods, can hardly be predicted—consequences throughout the Islamic world and perhaps among the Islamic peoples in Soviet Asia.

Churchill said:
We all speak under the uncertainty of the future which has so often baffled human foresight.

He continued, in words strangely pertinent now:

I believe that if we maintain at all times in the future an air power sufficient to enable us to inflict as much damage upon the most probable assailant, upon the most likely potential aggressor, as he can inflict upon us, we may shield our people effectively in our own time from all those horrors which I have ventured to describe.

It is with some humility but with a deep sense of urgency that I reiterate that sentiment in today's world: only an effective and credible defense can provide this Nation and all who look to us in hope with the assurance of peace, safety, and freedom for ourselves and for generations unborn. An adequate and strong defense is the best—and given the realities of the world about us, the only security for peace.



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WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1980

No. 62

House of Representatives

THE LESSONS OF AFGHANISTAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. SKELTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, this is an historic day—the day the House took a courageous first step in the defense of our country; the passage of registration for a draft. In light of this it is fitting that we look back to a page in history and remind ourselves of the importance of national security.

On the first day of October 1938 the Right Honorable Neville Chamberlain returned to London from Munich where he had met with the German Chancellor, Adolph Hitler, the French Premier Daladier, and the Italian dictator Mussolini. The Munich agreement had been signed just after midnight on September 29. As a result, Hitler secured everything he had demanded, while Britain and France, having acquiesced in the first stage of Czechoslovakian dismemberment, gave empty guarantees to what was left of the Czechoslovak nation—guarantees which were ignored and derided when, in 5 months time, German forces occupied the rest of that country.

As a result of the Munich settlement, German hegemony was established in central Europe, Allied prestige and influence steadily diminished. The Franco-Russian alliance of 1935 was effectively undermined, and the Soviet leadership turned toward the new Germany, preparing the way for the Russo-German pact the following August, that pact which sealed the fate of Poland.

There was many factors behind Chamberlain's decision to yield to Hitler's so-called last territorial demand in Europe. Both Britain and France were unprepared for a major war militarily and, perhaps more important, psychologically. The will to resist had been impaired. In both nations most people longed for peace, dreading the prospect of another terrible conflict. The memory of the Great War was all too vivid, casting its shadow over public policy and private concern alike.

Surely these factors help to explain the delirium of joy with which the Munich agreement was greeted throughout the world. Chamberlain himself returned to a city and a nation elated. He was greeted with a tremendous ovation for having, as he himself said, brought "peace in our time."

Virtually alone in his dissent, Winston Churchill rose in Commons barely 5 days after Chamberlain's triumphant return to sound a different and generally unwelcome note. Speaking of those who have "control of our political affairs," he observed that—

They (have) left us in the hour of trial without adequate national defense or effective international security.

He went on to make a comparison drawn from British history—the unhappy reign of Ethelred II, King of the Anglo-Saxons, known as the Unready. Under Ethelred, the country lost "the strong position" it had gained through Alfred the Great almost a century before and "fell very swiftly into chaos." Viking raids increased in fury, and the tribute with which they were bought off, the Danegeld, grew so oppressive that freeholders were reduced to paupers.

The words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, quoted by Churchill, struck a disturbing parallel between conditions under Ethelred and under Chamberlain so many centuries later:

All these calamities fell upon us because of evil counsel, because tribute was not offered to (the enemy) at the right time nor yet were they resisted; but when they had done the most evil, then was peace made with them.

To this eloquent passage Churchill added:

I have always held the view that the maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances.

Looking back to 1933 when Hitler first came into office, Churchill commented on:

All the opportunities of arresting the growth of the Nazi power which have been thrown away . . . The immense combinations and resources which have been neglected or squandered.

He concluded:
I cannot believe that a parallel exists in the whole course of history.



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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1980

No. 67

House of Representatives

DETERRENCE AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE PEACE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GONZALEZ). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, in January of 1934, Adolf Hitler effected the first significant breach in the alliance system which France had built up in Europe after the Great War to guard against any future threat by Germany. The German treaty with Poland, signed that month, was a setback for the League of Nations, from which a re-armed Germany had withdrawn 2 months before. It was also a defeat for France and her defensive alliance with Poland, dating to 1921. In retrospect, we can see that it was a move in Hitler's long-term program of territorial expansion, a program whose success rested upon the use of deception as well as intimidation.

This, then, and the collapse of the disarmament talks among the powers, was the background to the call for "parity" by Winston Churchill, speaking in Commons on March 8, 1934. Parity, defined as equivalence, the quality or condition of being equal, was urged by Churchill as the basis for any international agreement to limit or control armaments. He stressed:

This is the key to any convention which may be negotiated.

What is Mr. Churchill's parity but "mutually assured deterrence"—that is, in his own words, a means "making it certain that there will be no advantage to either side in departing from what has been agreed."

Although Mr. Churchill was speaking chiefly of air defense, his concept of parity has special significance for us today as we confront the threat of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Something very much like parity has been the foundation of our strategic nuclear deterrent policy. Now it appears that the balance is tilting against us. The consequences of that shift are evident throughout the globe.

I have had occasion, in speaking of this shift in the strategic nuclear balance, to cite various aspects of the Soviet buildup

in arms, conventional and other, and our own growing inadequacies. It may be useful to note the steady upward curve of Soviet defense expenditures over the past decade. It has been estimated that the share absorbed by the defense sector of the Soviet gross national product has grown from some 12 to 13 percent in 1970 to perhaps as much as 18 percent in 1980. Of course, since the Soviet GNP has also grown during this decade, the absolute amounts given to military spending have increased even more strikingly. Let me add that for that same period, 1970-78, U.S. defense expenditures as a share of our GNP have declined from 7.5 to 4.6 percent or, in constant 1972 dollars, from \$85.1 to \$65 billions.

How is it possible that this could happen? Surely one important factor is to be found in American history and in our experience of warfare. Whereas the Soviet Union—and imperial Russia before it—has had to contend with major invasions of its territory in almost every century of its long history, we in the United States have known no such foreign incursion since the War of 1812. Whereas the Russians have experienced the threat of direct invasion as a constant preoccupation—and more often than not, a grim reality, from the Mongols to Hitler—we have hardly ever found ourselves thus vulnerable. Most of our experience of war has been overseas. It is sobering to reflect, for example, that we are the only great power in the world which has never been bombed, never subject, at least in modern times, to any major assault upon our cities. That aspect of our experience, or lack of it, can easily encourage a kind of "it can't happen here" complacency. This complacency has caused us to think of war in terms of Flanders Field or Iwo Jima or Saigon. Unfortunately, warfare in the modern world is no respecter of persons, no respecter of distances.

The current Soviet offensive in Afghanistan has been an unexpected revelation to the West regarding Soviet terror tactics against Afghan civilians. The razing of villages, the use of incapacitating gas, the commitment of as many as 115,000 soldiers and airmen to the operation—all these are signs of the Kremlin's determination to dominate in that unhappy land.

David Willis, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Moscow writes:

The Kremlin sees a historic shift in the world's strategic balance—and demands that the United States acknowledge it.

The Kremlin is not alone in seeing that historic shift. Whether we in America shall acknowledge it—and accept its consequences—is another matter. The hour is late, but I believe we have begun to respond as we should. The vote by this House in favor of registration is surely, in part, the result of the new awareness here and throughout the free world of the price we must pay to preserve our security.

The things we must face are far from reassuring. They will shake our complacency, as they should. Consider our dilemma at sea, often described as "a three-ocean commitment with a one-and-a-half ocean Navy"—too few ships

and a scarcity of trained manpower stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific and now out over the Indian Ocean as well. The much-publicized rapid-deployment force cannot safely be dispatched to the Persian Gulf area without seriously endangering our commitments to NATO, and in Korea, and wherever our strategic interests are at stake. We have an inadequate amphibious lift for our present three Marine divisions. In the vital areas of airlift and sealift alike, our ability to sustain our commitments is impaired.

In the meantime, there may be evidence that the Soviets have been not dismantling but actually expanding their germ warfare facilities. We await the full story of the "anthrax affair" at Sverdlovsk with skepticism and deep concern. To add to this concern there is the claim by Soviet emigré scientists of a disastrous nuclear accident in the Urals during the winter of 1957-58, requiring the evacuation and resettlement of an area covering 40 to 400 square miles. How much has been suppressed by the Soviet regime? How much is being suppressed? Deception and intimidation, the alternating policies of Hitler in the thirties, are not unknown in today's world. Mr. Churchill's words in 1934, speaking of Britain then, apply as well to our own Nation today:

No nation playing the part we play in the world, and aspire to play, has a right to be in a position where it can be blackmailed.

Without the equivalent of what Mr. Churchill called parity, an effective and credible nuclear deterrent, we will be increasingly subject to a kind of blackmail.

These are somber thoughts—and they are meant to be. Yet they may also be bracing, calling forth great resources of courage and resolve from the hearts of our people. At a similar time, as Britain and France conferred belatedly in February of 1935 to counter the threat of German rearmament, good counsel from Winston Churchill began to be heard, began to be heeded:

Have a strong defense, and then be animated by a sincere love of peace. In that way you may escape the perils that still loom upon us in the future.

Mr. Speaker, so may we, while there is yet time.



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United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1980 No. 79

House of Representatives

OUR WATCHWORD IS SECURITY. SPEECH ON THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, recent events in Iran have diverted our attention from the continuing warfare in Afghanistan. Without for a moment minimizing the situation in Iran, I suggest that it is Afghanistan which should be in the forefront of our concern.

The Soviet invasion of that land has rendered unexpected service to this Nation. It has sensitized the Persian Gulf countries once again to the Soviet threat and enraged Moslems about the treatment their Afghan brothers are receiving at the hands of the Soviets. Further the NATO countries have been forced to recognize where the defensive line must be drawn in the Persian Gulf.

Soviet actions will undoubtedly be aimed at destabilizing the Middle East, fomenting unrest here, supporting dissident activities there, always taking advantage of existing tensions. The situation will call for American leadership—patience and restraint, yes and also firmness and resolution: qualities which must be rooted in strength.

Truly, the Afghan crisis marks a historic watershed in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Historical analogies are always inexact and may therefore be misleading. Yet only the most foolish would conceive and execute foreign policy unmindful and heedless of the lessons which the past affords. For this reason I have been drawn to those words of warning spoken by Winston Churchill in the decade of the thirties, words whose prophetic character would be vindicated in history's most terrible war.

In March of 1939—a few days after the Munich agreement, had occupied the Germany, in flagrant violation of the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia—Churchill rose in Commons and spoke of the great peril which, long foreseen, was now an ominous reality: Germany, rearmed, aggressive, and confident of success. Within 6 months time, the Nazi armies would strike and overwhelm Poland. On the eve of the Second World War, then, with Britain and France humiliated and unable to act, Churchill recalled the words of General Weygand in France, spoken the week before at the 21st anniversary of the last great German assault in 1918.

Speaking of Marshall Foch, named Supreme Allied Commander in the midst of that terrible battle, Weygand said:

If Foch had been with us today, he would not have spent his time deploring what had been lost. He would have said, "Do not yield another yard."

To which Churchill added that those words:

May well be our guide... at this stage in our journey which, though encompassed by unmeasured perils, is sustained by solid confidence and not uncheered by hope.

True in 1918, true in 1939, and true today in 1980 as our country finds itself also encompassed by unmeasured perils whose nuclear dimensions far exceed the destructive warfare of the past.

"Do not yield another yard." It is the counsel, not of despair, but of clear-eyed, resolute will. Let us develop that will so we may preserve the peace—that peace which, in the final analysis, will only be as secure as American strength.

Throughout these speeches, I have emphasized the nature of the threat which Soviet power and Soviet purpose hold for the United States. I have called attention to the growing imbalance in our respective military defenses and the consequences thereof. We need to evaluate our total strategy, first making better use of what we now have and then increasing our armaments wherever necessary. "Put not your trust in princes," is the advice of the Psalmist who reminds us not to rely on any foreign policy or national defense based upon simple trust. In 1946, George F. Kennan, in a telegram sent from Moscow to Washington, made this observation:

[The Soviet Union] is highly sensitive to the logic of force... For this reason, it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point.

He added: If the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.

The world has changed in the past three decades. The balance of power is less clearly in our favor. Little wonder the Soviet leadership has chosen to take a hard-line move into Afghanistan—a blatant and increasingly brutal violation of the right of peoples to self-determination—while the West, specifically the United States, has been preoccupied with other matters—the Iranian crisis, the problems centered in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the heightened sensitivity of Islamic nations to the need for oil by industrialized states.

The peril is evident. We have at least begun to address ourselves to our areas of weakness in military defense. We have at last begun to rally the will of our leadership in behalf of our interests abroad. Sufficient force and the readiness to use it—our assurance of confidence and some measure of hope for the peace.

The United States is the first world power in history to maintain large-scale armed forces without some form of conscription. We must ask whether that extraordinary policy is proving to be successful. Is our readiness sufficient to meet the possible crises we may have to face? Whether or not the draft should be restored, we must encourage the upbuilding of our defenses. Our immediate need is to develop trained forces. Registration is a vital step in that direction.

For one thing, our Reserves are well below strength—185,000 short of our goal. Yet our Reserves are, as Major General DeWitt Smith has said, "the alternative to nuclear war." They will determine if we are to avoid the choice of surrendering or resorting to nuclear war in the first hours of a major conflict.

Our Active Army has also fallen short of its recruiting goals—some 10,000 short at present. Some have estimated that if both Reserves and active troops were all called up we would be short by 270,000. There is little doubt that the deterrent impact of our Army has been greatly impaired.

Moreover, enlisted ranks are no longer broadly representative of our society. The loosening of standards has created internal problems—too much turbulence, too few men, too little equipment.

Last month, during a demonstration against conscription, the slogan "there

is nothing worth dying for" was widely acclaimed. To which we can only observe that where there is nothing worth dying for, there is likely to be little or nothing worth living for. The "me" era of our recent past must give way to a new sense of patriotism, a concern for the survival of America. We in America have much that is worth living for—and we want to maintain it both for ourselves and for our posterity. Indeed, this Nation remains the last best hope of freedom—as witness the influx of refugees each day from lands that have fallen under brutal tyrannies. That exodus of refugees—Afghans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Cubans—tells us much about the nature of communism in practice. It is no accident that the Soviets have increased their pressure upon the dissidents in their midst even as they are dispatching their troops to Afghanistan.

I have quoted repeatedly from Winston Churchill's speeches in the thirties because they seem to me remarkably pertinent for our day. Far-seeing then, they are no less so now; though the nations are changed, the principles endure. The Great War of 1914-18 came about because of an imbalance of power. So with the second war, it need not be the case with a possible third, provided we are determined to preserve our strength and to use it with restraint and with intelligence.

Let me close with Mr. Churchill's somber peroration to his speech in October 1938, that speech which struck an unwelcome note in the midst of then popular enthusiasm for Munich:

The people should know that there has been gross neglect and deficiency in our defenses; they should know that we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road; they should know that we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies. "Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting." And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.

For America in 1980, this is not—or need not be—"the beginning of the reckoning." May we come to see this critical time as the beginning of our awakening, painful and unpleasant in many respects yet also bracing and renewing. The late Bishop Sheen once suggested that we ought to raise a statue of duty, perhaps on the west coast, to match the familiar Statue of Liberty in the East and to serve as a reminder that true liberty depends upon the commitment of our people to the duties of responsible citizenship. For liberty to flourish, there must be security for the individual and for the Nation.

In the great phrase of William Pitt the Elder, "our watchword must be security." Only then may we hope to keep the peace in a troubled world.

Truman's background—he never represented the district in the House, but served in the Senate from 1935 to 1945—tells a lot about the district, even today. Truman was born in the town of Lamar, in the southern end of the 4th, near the Oklahoma and Arkansas borders. His family was Democratic, which means that in his mother's case at least it cherished a lifelong sympathy for the cause of the Confederacy. The largest city in the 4th district, way at its other end, is Independence. It is an old courthouse town, where Truman lived on what now is Truman Road in a nineteenth century Victorian house belonging to his wife's family. Just a few blocks away is the Jackson County Courthouse where Truman was once County Judge (an administrative position) before his election to the Senate. In those days Independence was a small town, the incongruous seat of a county which included bustling Kansas City. Today the suburban growth emanating from Kansas City has so ballooned the population of Independence that Truman's old Victorian town has nearly been engulfed.

The 4th district is a combination of rural Missouri counties, like the one Truman grew up in, and part of the Kansas City metropolitan area, where he began his political career. Its political history is almost totally Democratic. The rural counties, though to a diminished extent in recent years, have clung to the party more sympathetic to slavery (or most unsympathetic to abolition). Kansas City has been Democratic since the days of Tom Prendergast, the political boss who gave Truman his start and later ended up in jail. Truman himself had no part in Prendergast's graft but he was certainly a beneficiary of the fraudulently high number of votes the machine piled up. Jackson County was reported to have cast 295,000 votes in the 1936 election—more than it has ever since, despite considerable growth. (The 1976 total was 235,000.)

The 4th district's representation in Congress has alternated between the rural area and Jackson County. For 17 years, from 1959 to 1976, the Congressman was William Randall, an Independence Democrat who before his election had held Truman's old job of County Judge for 13 years. A cautious man of conservative habits, Randall was a member of the Armed Services

Committee; he made few waves there or in the House, and decided to retire in 1976 at age 67. Nine Democrats and two Republicans filed for the seat, but there were only five serious contestants. In the Democratic primary two candidates from Jackson County split 45% of the vote; the winner was Ike Skelton, a state Senator from rural Lexington, who won with 40%. The Republican nominee was Richard King, the Mayor of Independence and a young (32) protege of Governor Christopher Bond.

Perhaps unwisely, King tied his general election campaign to that of the Governor and Senate candidate John Danforth. Danforth won but Bond, in a surprise, didn't, and neither did King. He failed to carry Jackson County, although he came very close, and carried only five small rural counties; Skelton had an unexciting, but sufficient, 56%. Skelton had pitched his campaign to the rural areas and, as he had promised, won a seat on the House Agriculture Committee. This is a seat Republicans would dearly love to have won—it has gone Republican in many statewide elections, though it did deliver a small margin for Jimmy Carter. Probably the last chance they will have to retrieve it for some time will come in 1978, and Skelton can hardly fail to be aware of the advantages of incumbency which have made so many freshmen in recent years politically invulnerable.

Census Data: Pop. 466,940. Central city, 2%; suburban, 47%. Median family income, \$8,740; families above \$15,000: 15%; families below \$3,000: 12%. Median years education, 12.1.

The Voters

Median voting age 44.

Employment profile White collar, 42%. Blue collar, 38%. Service, 12%. Farm, 8%.

Ethnic groups Black, 2%. Total foreign stock, 4%. Germany, 1%.

Presidential vote

1976	Ford (R)	100,517	(48%)
	Carter (D)	108,477	(52%)
1972	Nixon (R)	131,874	(69%)
	McGovern (D)	60,472	(31%)



Rep. Ike Skelton (D) Elected 1976; b. Dec. 20, 1931, Lexington; home, Lexington; Wentworth Mil. Acad., U. of Mo., B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1956, U. of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1956; Christian Church.

Career Lafayette Co. Prosecuting Atty., 1957-60; Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen. of Mo., 1961-63; Practicing atty., 1964-71; Mo. Senate, 1971-76.

Offices 1404 LHOB, 202-225-2876. Also 219 Fed. Bldg., 301 W. Lexington, Independence 64050, 816-252-2560.

Committees Agriculture (25th). Subcommittees: Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research; Forests; Livestock and Grains.

Small Business (24th). Subcommittees: Energy, Environment, Safety and Research; Special Small Business Problems.

Group Ratings: Newly Elected

Key Votes

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|
| 1) Cut Defense \$ | NE | 6) Delay B-1 Bomber | NE | 11) S Korea Mil \$ Cut | NE |
| 2) Dereg Nat Gas | NE | 7) Chile Arms Sales | NE | 12) Common Situs Picket | AGN |
| 3) Gov Abortion \$ | NE | 8) Consumer Prot. Ag. | NE | 13) Prvt Uranium Prod | NE |
| 4) Rhod Chrome Ban | FOR | 9) Nuclear Carriers | AGN | 14) Delay Pollution Stnds | NE |
| 5) Hatch Act Repeal | NE | 10) Assassination Invest | AGN | 15) Curb Bill Collectors | AGN |

THIRD DISTRICT

Missouri's 3d congressional district consists of the south side of the city of St. Louis and an adjacent portion of suburban St. Louis County. The line drawn through the middle of St. Louis to separate the 3d from the 1st district also neatly separates the predominantly black part of the city from the part in the 3d district which remains overwhelmingly (92% in 1970, and about that today) white. Here on the south side there are still signs of the German immigrants who made St. Louis one of the nation's gemutlichkeit cities of the nineteenth century; today, symbolically, an Altemheim (old people's home) still sits on the banks of the Mississippi. The most famous of the St. Louis Germans was Carl Schurz, a friend of Lincoln, a northern officer in the Civil War, a Secretary of the Interior, and United States Senator from Missouri.

Today in the ethnic and elderly neighborhoods of the south side of St. Louis (median voting age in the district is 50), people have stayed with a New Deal Democratic preference or, in the slightly better off edges of the city, have remained Republican. The suburban portion is a natural extension of the city. Most of the people living there now moved out along the radial avenues extending from the middle of St. Louis. The suburban voters tend to be somewhat more conservative and Republican than their counterparts in the city; although their parents voted for Roosevelt and Truman, the suburbanites were inclined toward Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew.

For more than 20 years, from 1952 to 1976, the Representative from the 3d district was Leonor K. Sullivan. Like many women elected to Congress, she won her seat following the death of a congressman-husband; in Mrs. Sullivan's case, she served far longer and with greater distinction. Her major achievement was passage in the House of the truth-in-lending law, opposed for years by major banks and retailers; she would have ended her career as Chairman of the Banking Committee had that post not been won in the Democratic Caucus by the less senior Henry Reuss. Instead, she spent her last two terms as Chairman of Merchant Marine and Fisheries, the body which maintains heavy government subsidies to the American shipping and shipbuilding industries and to members of the various maritime unions.

This is basically a Democratic district, and the struggle for Mrs. Sullivan's seat, despite some expectations to the contrary, was fought essentially in the Democratic primary. The main contestants were Richard Gephardt, a 35-year-old St. Louis City Alderman, and Donald Gralike, a union leader with support in the suburbs. With a 2-1 margin in the city and only a narrow loss in the suburbs, Gephardt won. His general election opponent was a former president of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen, Joseph Badaracco. But there are few Republicans left here; and Badaracco had little money to spend, while Gephardt ran television commercials aplenty. At 59, Badaracco was a little old for heavy personal campaigning. He figured he had to carry the city portion of the district to prevail; he got only 33% there. Gephardt won what appears to be a pretty safe seat.

Census Data Pop. 467,544. Central city, 67%; suburban, 33%. Median family income, \$10,199; families above \$15,000: 20%; families below \$3,000: 8%. Median years education, 10.6.

The Voters

Median voting age 47.
Employment profile White collar, 52%. Blue collar, 36%. Service, 12%. Farm, -%.
Ethnic groups Black, 6%. Spanish, 1%. Total foreign stock, 15%. Germany, 4%. Italy, 2%.

Presidential vote

1976	Ford (R)	90,574	(51%)
	Carter (D)	85,741	(49%)
1972	Nixon (R)	102,959	(58%)
	McGovern (D)	73,362	(42%)

MISSOURI



Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (D) Elected 1976; b. Jan. 31, 1941, St. Louis; home, St. Louis; Northwestern U., B.S. 1962; U. of Mich., J.D. 1965; Baptist.

Career Practicing atty., 1965-76; St. Louis City Alderman, 1971-76.
Offices 509 CHOB, 202-225-2671. Also 3470 Hampton, St. Louis 63109, 314-351-5100.

Committees Ways and Means (23d). Subcommittees: Oversight; Social Security.

Group Ratings: Newly Elected

Key Votes

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|
| 1) Cut Defense \$ | NE | 6) Delay B-1 Bomber | NE | 11) S Korea Mil \$ Cut | NE |
| 2) Dereg Nat Gas | NE | 7) Chile Arms Sales | NE | 12) Common Situs Picket | FOR |
| 3) Gov Abortion \$ | NE | 8) Consumer Prot Agy | NE | 13) Prvt Uranium Prod | NE |
| 4) Rhod Chrome Ban | AGN | 9) Nuclear Carriers | AGN | 14) Delay Pollution Stnds | NE |
| 5) Hatch Act Repeat | NE | 10) Assassination Invest | AGN | 15) Curb Bill Collectors | AGN |

Election Results

1976 general	Richard A. Gephardt (D)	115,109	(64%)	
	Joseph L. Badaracco (R)	65,623	(36%)	
1976 primary	Richard A. Gephardt (D)	48,874	(56%)	
	Donald J. Gralike (D)	32,791	(38%)	
	Two others (D)	5,640	(6%)	
1974 general	Leonor K. (Mrs. John B.) Sullivan (D)	96,201	(75%)	(\$27,800)
				(\$2,254)

s the northwest and north central parts of the state. It includes the thin panhandle that goes west to touch the borders of Colorado and New Mexico. Aside from a small portion of Oklahoma City and its suburbs, the 6th is almost entirely small town and rural. Around the turn of the century, the plains west of Tulsa and Oklahoma City attracted thousands of migrants—probably a majority of them from nearby Kansas. Like so many settlers of the Great Plains, these people mistakenly assumed that the land was more fertile and the rainfall more reliable than was actually the case. The Dust Bowl of the 1930s hit already arid northwest Oklahoma hard, and in many ways it has yet to recover. In 1907, when Oklahoma was admitted to the Union, there were 401,000 people living in the counties now wholly contained in the 6th district. By 1970 that number was down to 390,000.

Due probably to the Kansas origin of its first settlers, the 6th has always been the most Republican part of nonurban Oklahoma. In the late sixties and early seventies, when the conservative trend in the state was shifting ancestral Democrats to the party of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, the 6th became one of the most Republican parts of the nation. In 1972 Richard Nixon won a larger share of the vote in the 6th district (79%) than in any other congressional district outside the Deep South.

But such trends can be short lived, and the Watergate scandal had its fallout here in Middle America as much as anywhere else. Not only did the traditionally Democratic counties in the southern part of the district switch back to the Democrats in statewide races; so too, to a considerable extent, did the traditionally Republican counties of the north central region around Enid and Ponca City. Republican Senator Henry Bellmon, a native of the 6th, did carry the district on the way to a narrow reelection victory in 1974, but Democrat David Boren carried all the counties but one here in his successful race for the Governorship the same year. Two years later, Republicans seemed a little stronger. Nevertheless, the Republican percentage for President declined from Richard Nixon's 79% to Gerald Ford's 54%.

The 6th was also the scene of one of the nation's biggest upsets in House races in 1974. The incumbent was a 66-year-old Republican with the agreeable name of John N. Happy Camp, a solid conservative who had served 20 years in the state Senate and had first been elected to Congress in 1968. Reelected in 1972 with 73% of the vote, he did not seem to be in any conceivable political trouble. But Glenn English, the 33-year-old director of the state Democratic Party, ran a vigorous campaign which by its very nature contrasted his youth to Camp's age. English ended up carrying not only the traditionally Democratic counties near his home town in the southwest corner of the district, he even carried the only two counties in the state (Alfalfa and Major) which have Republican registration edges. The result was a solid 53%-44% victory.

Like so many other freshmen from 1974, English had shown his political acumen by winning in the first place; given the advantages of incumbency as well, he overwhelmed his opposition in 1976 with 71%. He seems likely to remain a Congressman for many years to come, unless he decides to seek statewide office.

Census Data Pop. 427,445. Central city, 5%; suburban, 10%. Median family income, \$9,305; families above \$15,000: 19%; families below \$3,000: 15%. Median years education, 12.3.

The Voters

Median voting age 45.
Employment profile White collar, 45%. Blue collar, 29%. Service, 15%. Farm, 11%.
Ethnic groups Black, 2%. Indian, 2%. Spanish, 1%. Total foreign stock, 5%.

Presidential vote

1976	Ford (R)	NA	
	Carter (D)	NA	
1972	Nixon (R)	150,998	(79%)
	McGovern (D)	39,712	(21%)



Rep. Glenn English (D) Elected 1974; b. Nov. 30, 1940, Cordell; home, Cordell; Southwestern St. Col., B.A. 1964.

Career Chf. Asst. to Majority Caucus, Cal. State Assembly; Exec. Dir., Okla. Dem. Party, 1969-73; Petroleum leasing business.

Offices 109 CHOB, 202-225-5565. Also 800 W. Main St., Yukon 73099, 405-231-5511.

Committees *Agriculture* (20th). Subcommittees: Conservation and Credit; Department Investigations, Oversight and Research; Livestock and Grains.

Government Operations (17th). Subcommittees: Government Activities and Transportation; Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources.

Group Ratings

	ADA	COPE	PC	RPN	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA	NTU
1976	25	39	23	33	33	20	27	50	-	79	56
1975	16	30	-	-	73	18	15	-	90	79	60

Key Votes

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|
| 1) Cut Defense \$ | AGN | 6) Delay B-1 Bomber | AGN | 11) S Korea Mil \$ Cut | AGN |
| 2) Dereg Nat Gas | FOR | 7) Chile Arms Sales | FOR | 12) Common Situs Picket | AGN |
| 3) Gov Abortion \$ | AGN | 8) Consumer Prot Agy | AGN | 13) Prvt Uranium Prod | FOR |
| 4) Rhod Chrome Ban | AGN | 9) Nuclear Carriers | FOR | 14) Delay Pollution Stnds | FOR |
| 5) Hatch Act Repeal | AGN | 10) Assassination Invest | AGN | 15) Curb Bill Collectors | AGN |

Election Results

1976 general	Glenn English (D)	137,498	(71%)
	Carol McCurley (R)	55,953	(29%)
1976 primary	Glenn English (D), unopposed			
1974 general	Glenn English (D)	76,392	(53%)
				(\$78,411)