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13.5.5  
+ Reports +

19 October 1943

Mr. Whitney Shepardson

Ulius L. AMOSS

## REPORTS

1. The following reports were written at the request of General Donovan and copies are enclosed for you:

A-Greece

A "quickie". Many of the facts briefly reported are documented in my earlier essays and cables. *orig filed Greece # 12,824*

B-Greece-Political

A few high spots of the present Greek political situation. I am much worried over the fact that the White House and the State Department are in apparent ignorance of some of the present (Greek) facts of life. *orig filed Greece # 12,824*

C-The Author of Geopolitics Tipped O.S.S.

A hitherto unreported explanation of how Professor Haushofer is the unsuspecting parent of the late Greek Irregular Project.

D-Yugoslavia

A pessimistic statement of our lack of awareness of present Yugoslav developments.

E-James E. Underwood

Following General Donovan's expressed opinion that Underwood be assigned to Operations this memorandum was written. But I still believe you can use him to more profit and, under Macfarland, guide him to the point where he can make a major contribution. *orig filed "Greece" # 12,852*

F-Notes to General Donovan

Curious incidents, samples of things that happened in the Middle East.

G-Special Intelligence Project

A further report on the late Greek Irregular Project and recommendations as to the future.

(cont'd)

RECEIVED  
21 OCT 1943  
State Dept

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2. Recommendation is here made to you that the Special Intelligence Project continues, reporting directly to you. Macfarland should head the enterprise with Edwards acting as his administrative assistant and Caskey as the Izmir secret deputy. Maddox should be the representative in London. Captain Melas would be invaluable if he reported only to Macfarland and Edwards. His men are still on the job in Greece; can communicate.

3. The existence of this enterprise should be hidden from all except the officers assigned to it. It should not be mixed with any other O.S.S. activity in the Middle East. Fruits of its activity should be reported through existing S.I. channels, but no other S.I. officers in the M.E. should be informed of the project.

If desired, I will attempt to turn over what can be turned over to Macfarland.

X ~~SECRET~~GREECE

A

Greece is in ferment. But as Greece always is in turmoil it is only necessary to pick up the strands of old prejudices and match them with new developments.

No one political nor one military figure appears or even threatens to be dominant. Greece is a land of antis; when a leader dares appear, unity is achieved when all opposition joins to tear him down.

Greece is united today against the occupying enemy--and against the King. Foreign attempts to line up all factions under George II merely solidify the opposition, rouse resentment against friendly foreigners and diminish operative action against the enemy.

Playing on this known Greek characteristic is the German on the one hand and the communist organizer on the other. Greeks are being told by the German propaganda machines that their King had made a deal with England for the cession of Greek territory and for the monopolistic control of air routes and communications. The Communist agents are saying that Britain proposes to re-enthronize George and perpetuate "the Fascist regime of Metaxas."

Until recently the valiant but quarrelsome resistance leaders were saying, "But America is in this war; the United States is disinterested in our local politics; Roosevelt will let us decide our own political fate and will see that we are permitted to choose our own leaders." A combination of circumstances has changed such belief into one of cynicism; Greeks have been told that the United States has joined England in a plot to force George on them. They are told that their choice lies between German dominion, and Anglo-



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American plan to reestablish national Fascism and a Communist-Democratic state "protected" by Russia.

The Greek distrusts all three and Greece is in a ferment.

Disposition of the Greek People

Following the shock of German occupation, the Greeks remained completely inactive for about six months.

The Greeks divide and sub-divide under the following leadership:

1. Middle class
2. Workers
3. Democratic Party
4. Anti-democrats
5. Remnants of old parties

1. Middle Class. The Middle Class remained generally inactive for more than six months. Many in this class, for a short period, attempted to collaborate with the Germans. Senior Army officers, amicably disposed toward the Tsolakoglou puppet government are included in this class. They, consciously or unconsciously, were of service to the forces of occupation. Later, many who had collaborated commercially with the forces of occupation and who had profitted thereby, attempted to join one or another of the national resistance groups.

The Chief Officers, belonging to this group, who did not collaborate with the enemy are those who had been retired by Metaxas after the 1935 insurrection, the failure of which had brought dictatorship to Greece.

2. Workers. The first organized and effective reaction against

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enemy occupation sprang from this class. It was from this class that the E.A.M. (National Liberation Party) was built.

The Communist Party was not slow to seize this organization. As early as mid-1942, four Russian agents arrived in Saloniki to organize the E.A.M. after the pattern of the Yugoslav Partisans. (This was reported by the Greek Irregular Project at that time.) The Russian organizers completely copied their successful program in Yugoslavia. Non-Communists were encouraged to join this "the only effective resistance group". Democratic, Liberal and Popular Front ideologies were preached; Communist propaganda was held to a minimum. At first, the E.A.M. took the lead in every Anti-German activity and it was the first to create operative guerrilla centers. Finally, the strength of the E.A.M. grew to such an extent and the non-Communist members were so many that it divorced itself (for a long period) from the Communist Party. At this point, leaders of the Middle Class and of the other political parties started negotiations with the E.A.M.

Workers and peasants of the E.A.M. were joined by Middle Class and wealthy patriots and continuous, though unplanned, sabotage was enthusiastically committed in factories, ships and on railroads and bridges. Parallel to the E.A.M., a number of democratic sub-parties joined forces in another resistance organization. Those sub-parties cooperate with the E.A.M., but wish to remain independent, as E.A.M., after vainly appealing to British and American sources for help, turned again to foreign Communist leadership. Until May 1942, Occupied Greece remained isolated from the Government-in-Exile and intense hatred of the Tsouderos Government grew. At this time British agents spirited

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Kanellopoulos from Greece to Cairo and Tsouderos was induced to make him Vice-Premier. Thus, Occupied Greece tacitly recognized the Government-in-Exile and accepted its leadership--but with reservations that have grown in volume.

3. Democratic Party. Under the several political subdivisions of the Democratic Party, resistance groups operate in Epirus, on the slopes of Mount Olympus, in Western Thrace and on the Island of Crete. There is no coordination between these groups and there is intense political rivalry. At this moment the great military leaders of the Democratic Parties are asking for central guidance from Venizelos. These groups will be directed by Venizelos after the arrival of Bodosakis in Cairo. This man is the power behind the Venizelos throne; his money finances Venizelos.

4. Anti-Democrats. The Anti-Democrats have concentrated on the creation of organizations whose aim is the preservation of their co-parties and the seizure of Army-Naval control after the war. These men fear a national general court martial in the event of an Allied victory, and very few have participated in action against the enemy. (A notable exception is Theotokis, son of the late Minister of War, who now has joined the democratic resistance forces.)

5. Remnants of Old Political Parties. Leaders of the remnants of old political parties have participated sporadically in action against the enemy and from time to time have cooperated with British agents. Until now, they have remained aloof from organized groups. Kafandaris, leader of a party of considerable

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strength has large potentials in organized resistance, but distrusts the E.A.M. and resents British support of the King whom he blames for the fascist dictatorship of Metaxas. His Chief lieutenant, Captain Alexander Melas, presently is in the United States. (Melas was a secret OSS agent in Greece until March of this year.)

Accomplishments of the Greeks.

Under their own initiative, the Greeks established secret radio sending-receiving stations and a caique ferry service between the mainland and Turkey. Both of these services have been taken over by combined secret services of the British-- much of this against the wishes of the Greeks. In the meantime, groups of patriots form, raid and break up. The most vigorous resistance groups are based on Crete and repeatedly have announced that they await American leadership before they take the field as an army.

Influence of Allied Powers.

Greeks are influenced variously by Russia, Britain and the United States.

1. Russia. A small percentage of Greek resistance "troops" are influenced and elated by Russian victories. The larger percentage fears Russian successes as bringing communist influence and Russian control into Greece.

2. British Influence. Immediately after invasion British Intelligence (S.I.S.) and British Sabotage (S.O.E.) tried to contact occupied Greece. In the beginning and middle of 1942 certain English officers commissioned a number of dubious Greeks and

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Levantines whose activities in Greece brought panic to the resistance groups. Until the middle of 1942 it is proper to say that English secret service activities in Greece yielded nothing but disaster. After the middle of 1942 the English services worked in closer harmony with the Greek Government-in-Exile and conditions improved, but not to a satisfactory degree. After March 1943, the British undertook the financial support of first one, then another Greek resistance group and, through their power to give or withhold funds, have managed to control many of the Greek patriotic groups but with rather poor results. Guerrillas and saboteurs acted without a counting of the cost and vast reprisals were visited on the people of Greece. At the same time, it was announced in Greece that the British would impose the King on the people. A reaction has set in and Greece, traditional admirer of England, is showing dangerous signs of distrust and even hatred.

3. The United States. From every corner of Greece and from every island, the people clamor for evidence of American participation in Greece. Almost every fugitive from Greece has been charged by those who stay behind to try to get the Americans to participate at least on equal terms with the British. The notable bombing of Saloniki and Athens airbases by the United States Ninth Air Force was greeted by the whole population of those cities running out to the streets to cheer "the Americans" while the German and Italian occupation troops took shelter.

In summary: Russia inspires fears of internal disturbance and England of exploitation. The joining American efforts in the

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liberation of Greece -- under American leadership -- will allay Greek fears of our two Allies and diminish the rising opposition to them.

Resistance Groups and Chief Leaders.

Greece presents no great movements such as those of Mihailovitch and "Tito". Nor has Greece any single leader whose sway is as great as either of the two Slav generals.

The most noted, Colonel Zervos, is a small-time leader compared to Tito. The E.A.M. has no outstanding general. A group of more than five hundred Cretans formed by Kapitanios "Y" call themselves "Donovan's Band", and three hundred Andarti in Epirus call themselves the "American Legion."

This is both an asset and a disadvantage. But its promise is great. A single American officer, trusted by Kapitanios "Y", and another endorsed by Captain Melas can raise a levy of thousands who will act--in discipline--under orders from the Middle East General Staff.

The operation can be repeated in every resistance center of Greece. It can be executed under combined Anglo-American Auxiliary Group Control. It will be dispersed, divided and one group will be set against another under present S.O.E. command. Cooperation and planning with the British Advanced "A" Force is indicated under the leadership and authority of the Director of OSS, the American Theater Command and the British Middle East Commanding General.

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GREECE: POLITICAL

B

The Tsouderos cabinet is now unanimous in opposition to immediate return of King George on invasion. Tsouderos deserted the King and signed the secret manifesto demanding plebiscite before restoration. The King had a "political illness" that keeps him out of Egypt and prevents him from countersigning the Cabinet manifesto.

British political interests are considering abandonment of George. A deal has been proposed to Venizelos who has not accepted it.

The power behind the political throne of Greece will be Bodosakis who, through the ministers, controls the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force. Venizelos, Admiral Voulgaris and Karapaniotis take his orders.

If Bodosakis is assassinated, a munity will break out. Communist agitators are assisting.

It would appear that the White House is not fully advised, else the President's telegram to Ambassador Kirk re the King's attitude toward the guerrilla chiefs might have been held back for further study. (It may be that the State Department is receiving edited intelligence from the Middle East.)

NOTE: Caution: A deal may have been made -- despite full intelligence--but steps should be taken to see that the State Department and White House do have complete information, unedited.

Amass Blues 12-5-57  
 & Report  
 THE AUTHOR OF "GEOPOLITICS" TIPPED O.S.S.

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German Staff and Nazi Party drew their blue-print for World conquest after the plans of Professor Carl Haushofer. His Geo-Politik profoundly affected every civilized man, woman and child in the World.

Professor Haushofer placed Greece highest among the Balkan States; Greeks throughout the World as important to German plans. These things he told me in 1922. These things I had in mind when the Director of Strategic Services (Then Coordinator of Information) took me into his service 16th December 1941. It may be interesting to note how this present ruler of German policy has influenced O.S.S. activity; how his somewhat indiscrete talks with me gave us an insight into future German activity and enabled us to use his ideas and forestall his plans.

In September, 1922, Greece had sustained an humiliating defeat; a million and a half Ionian Greeks had been forcibly ejected from Asia Minor, the land they had occupied since pre-history. The Turks were threatening the Greek mainland. The Prime Minister, Counaris, and the Minister of War, Theotokis, afraid of mutiny had discharged the entire army, and the Turks were massing for an invasion.

Revolt came anyway. Colonel Plastiris, who had fought his way through Turkish lines, refused to be demobilized. The Prime Minister, the Ministers of War, Interior and Foreign Affairs and the Generalissimo were caught and executed. Greece, badly wounded, was in the toils of bloody internecine warfare.



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It was against this background that the even then famed Professor Haushofer asked me to name the Balkan countries in the order of their importance and future promise. I listed them thus:

Yugoslavia  
Rumania  
Turkey  
Bulgaria  
Greece  
Albania

Haushofer said he expected me to list them in that order, but he disagreed. His list follows:

Greece  
Yugoslavia  
Turkey  
Bulgaria  
Rumania  
Albania

"The defeat of Greece is temporary" he said, "Greece is used to disaster and will turn this one into a blessing. The Asia Minor Greeks will bring new strength to the mainland; will introduce new skills and trades. Competing with them, the "Old Greeks" will have to step-up in enterprise. A wave of patriotism will sweep every Greek community in the World."

"Nature abhors a vacuum," Professor Haushofer continued, "Money from Greeks and friends of the Greeks will pour in from the corners of the Earth. Many Greeks from many lands will return to their ancient homeland. They will bring new points of view and will strengthen the ties between the Motherland and her sons formerly almost lost to Greece."

"Greece is important to the future plans of Germany," the Professor said. "I'll tell you why and something of how we will use them."

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From the Professor I learned that he and the policy shapers of Germany considered Greece to be the Key to Eastern Europe. At every crossroads of the World; in jungle, at the ports and in the teeming cities of every continent, Greece plays a role in commerce, in foreign trade; Greeks play a part in politics and in espionage.

Greece is the most important nation in the Balkans. The country of Greece provides the land bridge between Orient and Occident; its peninsula projects into the Mediterranean and like a policeman, rules traffic East and West. Greeks had lived for generations everywhere. They were "observers" par excellence. Their history, tradition and aptitudes made them ideal secret agents.

Professor Haushofer proposed to traduce certain leading Greeks in Greece and, through them, appoint agents throughout the World. Greece itself, in the coming war, would be forced in on Germany's side. One day there would be another revolution in Greece; this time it would be inspired and directed by German secret agents.

The Professor felt that in the last World War, Germany's Achilles heel had been Greece. In the new war, Germany would not repeat her mistake. The subject interested me; I talked with British agents, with American diplomats and with French officials. The Professor's ideas were laughed off. But I also talked with Baron Schenck, who in the First World War had directed Psychological Warfare from Athens; with Major Hoffman, German spy-master in Greece and with Dr. Fabricius who later became the Nazi Minister to Rumania and under whose tricky leadership Rumania deserted her old Allies.

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I also talked with Madame Hadilazarou, the former Countess von Stein, second cousin of the Kaiser.

I talked with Dr. Streit, the Bavarian-Greek who was King Constantine's advisor; with Queen Sophia and with many others. The Germans and the Germanophiles did not discount a new war, though they were vague as to the prospective line-up.

When Colonel Donovan called me, the old conversations came back to haunt me. Had what Professor Haushofer told me nineteen years before taken place? I considered it my first duty to investigate Greek officials and their history during that period. I discovered that a number of the Metaxas officials were still in places of power; that the dread, Himmler-appointed Chief of Secret Police, Maniatakis was in Buenos Aires, on the Greek Government's pay roll- openly consorting with German agents, conspiring with pro-German Argentinians.

The Black list I compiled is a matter of record and has influenced the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. But other Greeks were questionable. King George had been faithful to his battle pledge to the British. But the Liberals blamed him for the pro-German Metaxas dictatorship, a dictatorship established forty-eight hours after he had promised the Liberal Chiefs that he would not do so. With his father, he had been expelled as pro-German during the First World War. His mother, Queen Sophia, was the Kaiser's sister and she hated the Greeks, admired the Germans. George himself despised his own subjects. And, even in exile, he had kept in office a number of Germanophiles.

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Admiral Canaris, chief of the German Intelligence Service was a Greek. His third cousin was in the United States as a Greek official. Tsouderos, the Prime Minister, had had a peculiar political history. We had to discover where the German line into Greece led; to whom it was linked. And this we did; dozens of documented reports are on file over C.O.I. or O.S.S. signature in many Government departments.

We discovered that beautiful, red-headed Irene was not the wife of Prince Peter of Greece as the Prince pretended she was; that she was a White Russian adventuress who lured American and British officers into indiscretions; who had communications with Nazi "letter-drops."

When we had separated the evil tools of Canaris and Himmler, we were able to recruit Greeks safely. We reached behind German lines and appointed courageous patriots as our agent-correspondents. We used Haushofer's plan and appointed Greeks in several parts of the World without revealing to them that they were O.S.S. agents, and reports flowed in; reports that affected not only the Balkans, but also other parts of Europe.

We watched the suspects in many countries for German propaganda and we were able to counter much of it. But we had to do in haste and in war and in enemy countries what Haushofer's pupils had had long years to do in peace and in quiet. The task is not yet finished, but it is under way.

In the midst of these activities, another influence showed itself. Early in 1942 we reported the arrival of Communist agents in Saloniki where they attempted to form a Greek Partisan Army,

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a carbon copy of the then not so important Yugoslav Partisans. The E.A.M. resulted and I am able to report that we have penetrated this organization and know its plans. The Greek Brigades in Syria, visited by Communist agitators uniformed as British and American soldiers and purporting to represent Soldiers' Soviets in the British Ninth Army and the U. S. Forces in North Africa spurred the two brigades to revolt against the Government. How the O.S.S. played a leading role in putting down the rebellion is a matter of history; and how O.S.S. thus stopped the disastrous German propaganda line into Greece, where the starved patriots were being told that British troops were murdering Greek soldiers is also a matter of happy record.

How the Greek Cabinet furnished us-exclusively-with minutes of its secret meetings; how Greek officials in all parts of the World sent their reports to us is also in the book.

Our painstaking investigative work was responsible for the tribute David Bruce, then Chief of S. I., payed the Southeastern European Section of O.S.S. when he said that our intelligence exceeded in volume and value all the production of all other sections combined.

Other Balkan countries were not neglected. We agreed with Professor Haushofer in that Yugoslavia was next in importance to Greece. But our large production of Yugoslav intelligence; our influence on Yugoslav secret activities is another story.

Professor Haushofer was right. By the careful selection of Greeks, a world-wide espionage network can be built quickly, securely. The Professor was right; Greece was the Achilles heel

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of Germany and the Professor's disciples were less than able-- for Greece is still the chink in the Nazi armor and O.S.S. has the right to claim much credit for the frustration of the Professor's plans.

As this is written, the Greek Government has resigned. Germany has not yielded the Greek arena. German influence again is playing Britain against America and Russia against the field. The Greek cannot be abandoned for his name is legion; he is everywhere and in every land he wields some influence. For the official of psychological warfare the Greek is an asset; he can be a threat.

Amars, 13.6.37  
X Report **SECRET**YUGOSLAVIA

Flaming Slav passions make the Yugoslav mess almost insoluble. General "Tito" and General Mihailovitch are irreconcilable. The Serb considers the Croat and Slovene past traitors and future dangers to a South Slav State. The Croat and the Slovene, discontents for a thousand years, bitter critics of their Government for the last twenty, are no nearer reconciliation now.

Into the dispute is introduced the Communist agitator who terms the Serb a Fascist; who claims that Mihailovitch plots a totalitarian state of old Serbia and Bulgaria with himself first as authoritarian president of council; later as king.

The Government-in-Exile, target of Communist and of Croat, is composed of mediocracies; is ruled by Dowager Queen Marie (Rumanian Marie's daughter by a Rumanian cavalry captain). Marie, stoutish, plain and ordinarily affable is still run by the Knejevitch brothers, the opportunist young men who, at one time, introduced the boy king to rather unattractive older prostitutes and to dope.

Older military men have been scuttled by the ambitious Knejevitch clan, leaving only unimportant officers and bewildered younger men and a scattering of others such as Lieutenant-Colonel Radoychich, now aide to the King and Colonel Savitch who, the Queen told me, is "loyal, but wacky; victim of numerous crack-ups in the air and on the ground and of numerous bumps on the head."

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Fotitch, Ambassador to the United States, is the cleverest of all Yugoslav statesmen, but his character is under gravest assault and his blood relationship to Yugoslav quislings adds fuel to the flames of criticism.

The most brilliant; perhaps the most serious of Serbs in exile is Colonel Popovitch, the trusted confidant of General Bonner Fellers; a man I have found honest, able and informed--perhaps the best of all intelligence operators in Eastern Europe. But, the Knejevitch brothers consider him a personal danger and Lord Glenconner lost no opportunity to isolate him.

More serious - from one point of view - than the above is the attitude and activity of British S.O.E. toward the Yugoslav mess. It is the opinion of many skilled observers that S.O.E. meddling and their misinforming of other British departments is largely responsible for the present chaotic condition of affairs in Yugoslavia. Up to my departure from the Middle East it is highly doubtful if S.O.E.'s Colonel Bailey had seen or contacted Mihailovitch for more than half a year; it is suspected that Mihailovitch's radio messages were forgeries.

Adding suspicion to doubt was the severe attempt on the part of S.O.E. to prevent O.S.S. direct and independent intelligence contact with Mihailovitch; their determination to block any American direct reporting of conditions in the Mihailovitch "area."

While I was on duty in the Middle East, I attempted to send two reporters who believed they could use their own means in making contact with the Mihailovitch Headquarters. One man



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is presumed lost; the other, after a rugged and dangerous trip from Turkey, through Thrace and Macedonia, was turned back at the Montenegrin frontier and eventually made his way through Greece proper across the Aegean to Turkey, finally arriving in Cairo. This agent met Mihailovitch's men who reported that their forces were on the run, seeking shelter; never able to stay long enough at one spot to establish headquarters. They claimed that Partisan sympathizers were reporting their movements to occupation troops. Asked if any British officers were attached to Mihailovitch's staff, they said there were none. The agent said the trip was dangerous; he would not repeat it because of his fears of being turned in by Partisan sympathizers or even by Chetniks.

It is doubted if we have the present means of giving original, factual and correct intelligence concerning conditions inside of Yugoslavia even though we now have men there.

*Amoss, Ullius 3057*  
*X Per. ent*

October 14 1943

TO: The Director  
FROM: Ullius L. Amoss  
SUBJECT: James B. Underwood

1. The subject has the respect of the Cretan Guerrillas. He was the companion, guide and mentor of "Kapitanios 'Y'", during that daring leader's visit to the Middle East.
2. It is recommended that Underwood's present "Greek Irregular Project" assignment be terminated and that he be designated to plan for and operate in Crete under O. G. direction.
3. It is recommended that Underwood have a thirty-minute appointment with the Director.

U.L.A.

13, 057  
X Report **SECRET**

NOTES TO GENERAL DONOVAN

1. Some of the most exciting stories of the war may be written about the experiences of our men who manned the caiques. For example -- a load of grenades, bombs and assorted side arms was taken directly to the Port of Pireaus, overloaded with "Black Market" produce. The Italian authorities took the cheese, butter, olives and other food and helped our men unload the munitions -- in broad daylight. Several trips were made, always with the same result. General Brereton gives me the time and if you wish me to, I will try to write a series of secret human interest stories that may serve you when lecturing to army groups.

2. Kapitanioa "Y", the great Cretan guerrilla chief, has taken much cloth back to Crete where he expects to have made a unique uniform for his guerrillas whom he calls "Donovan's Band". This group has been used outrageously by Huot who defaulted on commitments made to "Y" and to which he was a party. For further information see Major Beir, Captain Melas and consultant Macfarland, all of whom were brought in by me to assist in the organization of "Y"'s intelligence group. Huot maintains that "Y" had only local importance whereas he is, today, the dominant resistance figure on Crete. (See reports on "Y"'s activities by Venizelos, himself a Cretan, and by Prime Minister Tsouderos, also a Cretan.) Feeling between "Y" and British S.O.E. is not good. It is good between him and the Advanced "Y" Force.

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3. The Epirote guerrillas are controlled by our Captain Alex Melas; will take orders through him from you; will not subject themselves to S.O.E. command.

4. Eubean guerrillas are controlled by our Major Elias. now "on ice" in Cairo, awaiting our orders. They will not accept S.O.E. command. They would act under joint American-Advanced "A" Force command. Elias is a political lieutenant of Alex Melas. Elias is willing to act, temporarily, on an intelligence mission. (He is an old agent of the late Greek Irregular Project.)

5. Elias, "Y" and Melas trust Macfarland; like Edwards. They will not accept leadership of any other officer presently in OSS, Middle East, unless that officer works under the direction of myself or Macfarland. Elias dominates the island of Eubea politically.

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECT

Contention is made that Balkan intelligence presently flows from controlled sources; that original intelligence is scant.

It is further contended that no independent source of balkan information exists. (Exception: Macfarland, through a fragment of the old Greek Irregular Project plus several new sources, does receive some valuable intelligence which he channels through Cairo.)

It is submitted that a completely secret system under the direct orders of the Director or his Deputy is required for these purposes;

1. Check on authenticity of intelligence presently received from friendly foreign sources.
2. Maintain an independent reporting system.
3. Have a highly mobile organization ready at once to secure intelligence which, in emergency, may be required by the President, the Chiefs of Staff, or by ranking cabinet officers.

Such a system exists. It has performed and has been proven. A part of the system has been "blown". A major part is completely unknown either to our allies or even to OSS officers except the Director and his immediate lieutenants.

This system provided OSS with its first original intelligence from behind enemy lines and at a time when absence of a directive apparently "froze" operations. This system had contacts in

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Greece, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. All these points reported from time to time and these reports were disseminated through regular OSS sources without disclosure of their irregular source.

Types of intelligence reported were: Aerial target information; Morale of civilians and troops in Central Europe and in occupied countries; Political moves in Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

This system suffered the first OSS casualties when four of its agents were executed in Athens.

Though it is unknown to our British allies, it was by activities of agents of this system that the British caique-ferry service between Greece and Turkey was established, manned and operated -- and, until March 1943, controlled. (Captain Zangas, R.H.N. and his staff.) This caique service, operated at virtually no cost to the United States was then taken over by combined British agencies.

Russian intelligence was reported by this system through regular OSS channels.

Through this system, the Chief of the German intelligence system was contacted and (inadvertently) the British P.W.E. was enabled to frame him before Hitler.

Through this system Greek morale has been held high despite famine and pestilence by the uninterrupted preachings of its agents that the might of America was gathering and soon would be felt.

Through this system, the Commanding General of U. S. Army

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Forces in the Middle East received information that led him to bomb airfields in Saloniki and Athens for the dual purpose of inflicting military damage and raising Greek morale.

Through this system the Greek Brigades were penetrated at the request of the American Commanding General who received resulting intelligence as an emergency service of OSS. (These reports were also filed with OSS, Washington.)

Through agents of this system, OSS was able to stop a revolution, prevent further bloodshed between our allies (Greek and British) and to stop the damaging German propaganda line in Greece.

Through this system, the United States Anti-Submarine command received valuable intelligence.

The volume of intelligence was great. Dissemination was through regular OSS sources -- without exception.

It is submitted that this system should be preserved; its confidences protected; its operations executed in super-secrecy.

This system taps--and can control--five separate and completely independent chains of agents. This system has its own trained agents in the Balkan States waiting instructions.

There is only one OSS official presently in the Middle East even remotely capable of directing these activities and only one equipped by experience to assist him. And the writer is the only person able to turn over these activities.

Recommendation is made that the writer turn over to Mr. Lanning Macfarland as much of these operations as can be given him with the consent of the key aides.

SECRET

October 21 1949

General W. J. Donovan

Ulius L. Aross

Greek Politics

1. Attention is called to the changed tone of Ambassador Kirk's cables.
2. His original position was that George II could be returned to Greece by the British with American support and there was nothing any Greek could do about it.
3. My many reports carried the opposite intelligence and warned that British S.O.E. policies in Greece would create a disastrous situation.
4. Attention is called to the fact that my activities - under criticism to you by Major Huot - had maintained relative calm in Greek Government circles - and in Greece and Crete. Cessation of these activities have allowed the guerrilla and Government-in-Exile situations to get out of hand as I forecast to you on the eve of your departure for the Middle East.
5. It is submitted that during my tour of duty in the Middle East, my activities were reported to Washington in detail and a directive was asked for; not received.
6. Whether or not unofficial influence is desired to keep a fighting ally fighting it is here maintained that the Director requires positive information expertly given.



SECRET

-2-

7. It is submitted that present sources of Greek intelligence are inexpert, inadequate, sometimes fallacious and, therefore, dangerous.

SECRET

General W. J. Donovan

October 21 1944

Ullius L. Amoss

## Greek Politics

1. Attention is called to the changed tone of Ambassador Kirk's cables.

2. His original position was that George II could be returned to Greece by the British with American support and there was nothing any Greek could do about it.

3. My many reports carried the opposite intelligence and warned that British E.O.E. policies in Greece would create a disastrous situation.

4. Attention is called to the fact that my activities - under criticism to you by Major Huot - had maintained relative calm in Greek Government circles - and in Greece and Crete. Cessation of these activities have allowed the guerrilla and Government-in-Exile situations to get out of hand as I forecast to you on the eve of your departure for the Middle East.

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-2-

SECRET

7. It is submitted that present sources of Greek intelligence are inexperienced, inadequate, sometimes fallacious and, therefore, dangerous.

Date: 9/15/43

To: Mr. Shepardson

SECRET

Re: Re: Memo from Col. Amoss  
dated 9/14/43

In accordance with our telephone  
conversation today.

G. Edward Buxton

*Ben Donovan fill*

*of*

G. Edward Buxton  
Assistant Director

125781

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SECRET

- 12,700

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel BUXTON

DATE: 9/14/43


FROM: ULIUS L. AMOSS

SUBJECT: GENERAL LOUIS BRERETON

1. Today 14 September 1943, I had lunch with General BRERETON and his aide Colonel Hobbs.
2. General BRERETON and the entire general staff of the Ninth Air Force are en route to England where they will activate the new invasion air force, the tables of organization of which were drawn under the direction of General CANDEE and shown me there during my May visit to London. General CANDEE will be under General Brereton's command.
3. For the consideration of yourself and General DONOVAN I suggest the possibility that I might be of some service to the director of our European Theater Office if I were to be given a short tour of duty with General BRERETON in England.

9/14/43  
Mr. Sheperdson

ULIUS L. AMOSS



Col. Buxton

In accordance  
with telephone  
conversation today -  
General Buxton

On 9/14/43 I talked  
with General Amos, and  
stated our opinion that it  
was doubtful just how he could  
be of aid on such a mission, and  
that we felt that it was more important  
to clean up affairs here. He said that he agreed,  
but had felt it was to call his possibility to your attention. WMS

*Ulius Ulius*  
*x Theofanides*  
10/31/43

New York, N. Y., November 9, 1943

General W. J. Donovan, Director,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Administration Building,  
26th and E Streets,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Greek Maritime Minister Theofanides, under date of 18 October, 1943,  
wrote as follows:

1. "General Donovan arrived in Cairo the latter part of September while I was in Alexandria. I did not know of his intended arrival nor that he was in Egypt until after his departure.
2. "On my return, Colonel West called on me, and gave me a verbal message to the effect that the Greek Irregular Project was to be dissolved, but would be revived under another cover; that the General would detain you in Washington; that he expected to be in Cairo later when he would stay longer.
3. "I asked Colonel West to convey to the General my thanks for his message; to tell him I regretted not seeing him, and that I look forward to his forthcoming visit to Cairo. I ask you, Ulius, to convey to the General how much I really regret having missed him.
4. "General Donovan was the foremost American who with such deep conviction preached in the United States that moral forces would defeat the material, and pointed out Greece as an example. In the most critical period of our Albanian campaign, he held out hope for and confidence in Greece, when almost no one else in the war had but prophecies of doom.
5. "I have always felt that the ease with which the General can penetrate the psychologies of whole peoples and nations should give everyone the deepest confidence in the prudence of his judgment on great and vital issues. With such a complexity of conflicting interests and ideas with which the great as well as the small nations are beset, it gives persons like myself, ministers of the governments of allied nations, confidence that America's weight will be felt at the conference tables - and that weight for the good of all mankind; a greater hope that our abused world at last may expect a durable peace.

Ulius L. Amoss

- 2 -

General W. J. Donovan - November 9, 1943

6. "When the time comes, Greece again expects to hear the voice of General Donovan - and we, the people who did not fail his predictions and his trust, will be glad.
7. "We remembered that even during the evacuation, the General foretold the behind-the-lines role which Greece would play despite starvation and ruination; that that moral force in which the General placed such confidence eventually would turn the tide.
8. "I am inexpressibly glad and proud to have made his acquaintance, and am happy that, with you, I have never lost confidence in the greater roles the General would play, particularly in the Balkans, where his knowledge of us and our faith in him rides so high.
9. "I do hope to see the General soon in Cairo; it was almost a heartbreak to me that I missed him on his last trip.
10. "After your departure I saw almost nothing of Paul West. And the discontinuance of the Greek Irregular Project has saddened me, for you and I know the contribution it has made, and could have continued to make in ever expanding scope. I hope that some other "cover" soon will be given it so that its impartial and valuable services may continue to the benefit of all the United Nations. But there is no one here who can replace you and your knowledge and understanding of us.
11. "Your presence here created that confidence so necessary to full collaboration on the part of a people who, by historical compulsion, have such deep-rooted and general distrust of everybody and every plan. Your long service in and many kindnesses for Greece make it impossible for there to be any other substitute for you. And so, for this reason, and because I am your faithful friend of so many years standing, I can wish nothing better for us than seeing you among us soon at this period, the eve of so many important events for Greece.
12. "Please extend my kindest regards to General Donovan, and tell him for me that we need him to visit us again. Also, please give my best wishes to Colonel Buxton, whose sober and penetrating judgment is another and important reason why I have such faith in O.S.S. And, also, please remember me to Colonel Bruce, who, as I understand, is again in Washington. God bless you, your great leader and all your associates."
13. As you have recognized, Mr. Theofanides is an important person for O.S.S. It is suggested that you acknowledge his sentiments.
14. Besides Theofanides, Captain Alex Melas is important to us. As the tide of Greek politics flows, Melas assumes more and more national importance. The Epirote Guerillas still are subject to his control. He still exercises considerable influence on the Island of Eubia and some influence in Attica.



Ulius L. Amoss


- 3 -

General W. J. Donovan - November 9, 1943

Melas has not been well used by us. After having served O.S.S. behind enemy lines; after having been wounded in American service, both the Assistant Military Attache, Lt. Col. Rasbas, and our Lt. Col. Paul West fell into the political trap set by Melas' political enemies, and associated themselves with the Royalist campaign to discredit him. I respectfully point out possible unfortunate consequences of our disloyalty to a soldier so loyal to us. His resentment against us and things American would be a natural consequence of a continued anti-Melas attitude in O.S.S. in the Middle East. Melas certainly will be a member of the Liberation Parliament. He may be a member of the Liberation Cabinet. But, besides the future, it is important to have the benefit of Melas' continued cooperation now, since he controls an important intelligence net-work originally put together for the discontinued Greek "Irregular" Project. I have recommended to Mr. Shepardson that Melas report to Mr. Macfarland, since Macfarland has the confidence of Melas - and that the salvaged parts of the Greek "Irregular" Project be handled by Macfarland. In the interests of success for an independent O.S.S. operation, I respectfully, but strongly, urge favorable consideration of this proposal.

15. James Underwood, by his own motion, secured dismissal of the case pending against him, James Curley, Donald Wakefield Smith and three other former directors of the Engineers Group, Inc. He is, therefore, free to return to our service. I rate Underwood at the top of all O.S.S. operatives I know in personal courage coupled with physical ingenuity. He is a pilot and a great expert in firearms. He is the one man I would choose to be with me behind the lines, for his physical proficiency is superb, and his loyalty to yourself is unshakable. He can submit to torture without revealing anything. (Proved by his record in China.) He wants to be sent behind the lines in Crete or preferably Yugoslavia. It is recommended that he be notified now that his services are required. If you, at any time, need a personal party, Underwood would be a story-book aide.
16. On this, the eve of my departure for my new assignment with General Brereton, I wish to thank you for the opportunity I have had of serving you, and to state that, so far as will be consistent with my new duties, I stand ready to be of any assistance possible to you or your deputies.

Sincerely yours,






**SECRET**Date: 8/28/43

To: Major Doering

Re: Captain Alexander Melas

Please attach the enclosed letter from  
Col. Amoss re the above dated Aug. 27  
with the report which you are going to  
submit to General Donovan.

G. EDWARD BUXTON



*Plc.*  
To Col. Amoss  
You might  
leave at this time for D.C.  
G. Edward Buxton  
Assistant Director

126781

Exposure 15 / 25 010

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Edward G. Buxton

FROM: Ulius L. Amoss

SUBJECT: Captain Alexander Melas

DATE: 27 August 1943

1. The following cable was received. "We recommend that Captain Alexander Melas be retained in the United States and not returned to OSS in Cairo. We make this recommendation because of his generally poor standing with the Greeks here. Lieutenant-Colonel Richards will offer more detailed information on the subject."

2. Captain Melas was the first agent retained by the Greek Irregular Project back of enemy lines. He directed our operations there. He was wounded in our service. He escaped from Greece and reached Cairo early in March. He was employed by the Greek Irregular Project as our Liaison with the "Revolutionaries" and our "bird dog" bringing escapees for us for interviews. He later was appointed as Liaison Officer for the Greek Armed Forces with OSS in particular and the U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East in general.

3. Melas is a bitter enemy of the King and Prime Minister Tsouderos. We have other Greeks in our employ who are friends of the King and of the Prime Minister. It is not possible to get any one Greek to represent both sides. It is necessary to draw from both camps. The King himself fully understands this and told me he had no objections to our employment of Melas who rendered the King yeoman service in aiding me to stop the March Revolution against the King and his Government.

4. For 17 years Melas has been a member of Greek Parliaments. He is the confidant of Minister for Navy, Venizelos and Minister for Air, Admiral Voulgaris.

5. One of the chief reasons for bringing Melas here was the urgent request of the Prime Minister who has followed his usual pattern in attempting to cut the ground from under the feet of people that he dispatched abroad.

6. Melas a national hero and an OSS hero has won the right to expect support and applause from the Organisation he has

*9/28/43 Max Diering*  
*Please include this with the Amoss report which you are going to submit to Buxton.*  
*E. Buxton*

- 2 -

served so well. I will take the same stand toward representatives of the King who have served us if and when they are attacked by the Venezillists.

7. Colonel West has no personal experience in Greece. Greece is not a field for amateurs. I am able to command the respect and adherence to my requests by all sides in the Greek political arena because I have never run out on the support of my friends on any side and because I have fought with one group to save the lives of their condemned adversaries and have fought with these adversaries when they were in power to save the lives of the late governors. If we want to lose all hope of holding the most astonishing confidences of all Greek political leaders then we must run out on those who have served us loyally.

*U. L. A.*  
U. L. A.

**SECRET**ORGANIZATION OF THE GREEK HOME FRONT

1431413  
 \* Greek  
 \* Home Front  
 \* Organization

To expel the enemy it is necessary to organize the Greek Home Front as a secret army. To succeed it is necessary to analyze the following factors: task, enemy, battlefield, and means.

Task:

The task is the continuation of the struggle of the Greek people to battle by the side of his Allies. The task requires the organization of an army, but, since it is impossible to mobilize and sustain an orthodox military force, it is therefore necessary to use the people of Greece to destroy communications, bases, air-fields, dumps, and factories. Such destruction must be undertaken only after coordination with the plans of the Allied planners. Such activity is an instrument of war and these operations must be viewed as a part of the grand strategy of the war. The following actions can be organized and can spread throughout Greece and can operate according to a plan. The forces of the Greek people have the following capabilities:

- A. To strike hard; to strike with all the elements of surprise; quick withdrawal. These forces must be highly mobile.
- B. The volunteer Irregular Forces of the Greek people must be provided with special armament allowing them to move freely but powerfully enough to inflict heavy loss.
- C. These forces must be enabled to act simultaneously in various parts of the country.
- D. Supplies must include specially prepared explosives to be utilized for mines and demolition charges effective in a wide variety of sabotage.
- E. All forces must have constant contact with each other.
- F. They must have the means of supply without draining the communities from which they stem.
- G. Materiel of war must be supplied continuously and regularly.
- H. General direction of the campaign must come under the control of the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces in the Middle East.

The Enemy:

The enemy is the organized force of the Axis. It is equipped with the most modern equipment; it has at its disposal all the resources of the country. The destruction of such forces is possible only by the opposition of an equal and similarly equipped force, but it is always possible to maintain harassing operations. Such action will contain many units of the

**SECRET**

- 2 -

**SECRET****Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)**

enemy; will require their disposition of serious forces to restrain the activities of the Irregulars. An example is the occupation of three Italian divisions which were required to deal with three Guerrilla Detachments whose total strength was not more than 100 men and who operated in the following mountains: Parnassos, Chiona, and Oete. Such operations not only obstruct communications and render supply difficult but combined with a withdrawal of the enemy such guerrilla activity will inflict serious losses on him.

**The Battlefield:**

The battlefield for the people of Greece is the whole of Greece. The terrain is distinguished by its broken ground, high mountains and forests and rivers and streams. Communications are precarious and there is an abundance of highland villages inhabited by Greek patriots; its fishing towns and its innumerable coast and island groups. It is on this ground that the Irregular Forces of the people of Greece will be called to operate.

Greece from a general strategic aspect is a point of land projecting at considerable length into the Mediterranean. It is the second communication land route from Europe to Africa, the first being Italy.

For an enemy operating from north to south, i.e., from Europe to Africa, who has not mastered the Mediterranean and who has not adequate naval means, this peninsular communication toward Africa diminishes the sea distance and enables him to effect surprise. Being near Africa, enemy air forces are strengthened by these near air bases. The groups of islands and the multi-shaped coasts provide cover and concealment for naval transport. Besides all this, Greece is the main arch of the great artery which flows from the Mediterranean to Central Europe through the Vardar Valley to the Danube and to the doors of other secondary roads which leave through the Struma Valley and the Maritza to the Sofia area and thence to Central Europe. On the other hand, the Greek peninsula, bordering on Turkey, may serve as a basis for operations from west to east against Turkey.

The enemy in operating against Africa makes use of Greek soil, of Greek communications, harbors and coasts for the transport of troops to Africa. The enemy, in the event of action directed at him from the south, will secure the doors leading to his interior. If operating against Turkey he will make full use of Greece as a starting point. For the enemy Greek territory is enemy territory. For this reason he has to maintain serious forces for his security.

It is necessary to study this territory first from the point of view of communications and, second, as a center of supply bases. From the first point of view Greece has not a thick web of communications. It has one main artery and several secondary arteries:

**SECRET**

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## Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)

**SECRET**From north to south:

- (1) The main railway line from north, i.e., from Central Europe through the Vardar Valley leading to Salonika, Larissa, Lamia, Athens and therefrom another one to Pelopponese, Calamas. This is the main rail line used by the enemy.
- (2) The road from Salonika to Kozani, Florina, Monastiri, or Salonika, Edessa, Florina, to the Vardar Valley, Scopia, Danube or Korani, Larissa, Athens.
- (3) The rail line through Maritza Valley and nearby the road from Dedeaqatz (Alexandroupolis), Dhidhimolikhon, Mustapha Pacha, Philippopolis (Plondir) to Sofia. This line is bound to play a considerable role in case of operations against Turkey.
- (4) The road line through the Struma Valley from Serres, Koula to Sofia.
- (5) The road line from Komotini, Koussouk, Kavak to Philippopolis.

From east to west:

- (6) The rail line from east to west, which from Salonika leads to Alexandroupolis. This is the main line which the enemy, in case of operations directed eastwards to Thrace, is bound to employ on the Greek soil.
- (7) The road line from Salonika to Serres, Drama, Komotini, Alexandroupolis near the railway line.
- (8) The road line Volos, Larissa, Trikkala, Kalambaka, Metsovo, Yanina to Prevega, Aeta or Valona. This road is used by the Italians transporting their forces from Italy through Adriatica.

The most important of these communications is that which runs through Yugoslavia and the Vardar Valley to Salonika, Larissa and Athens; the unique artery from Central Europe to continental Greece and the Pelopponese.

These communications are vulnerable and a proper subject for destruction. They extend over high mountains, on broken country, passing across rivers and streams, over and through bridges and tunnels and other features easily destroyed. Under the menace of destruction, the enemy will be compelled to guard these works with considerable force. These guards are those which the irregulars will have to strike by surprise.

The enemy uses Greek ports as his bases; his administration, stores, dumps and factories are to be found in Piraeus and Salonika. Volos, Patros, Prevega and Larissa are of secondary importance.

In the two large cities, Athens and Salonika, he has naval bases and headquarters, and his stores and factories as well.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)

These must be destroyed. While disruption of communications in the open country has to be carried on by Irregulars, demolition in the cities must be performed by saboteurs.

Examining the terrain from one point of view, we see that, as it is covered with forests and broken ground, it favors concealment of movement and action by surprise. The inhabitants and Greek patriots will help and contribute with their knowledge of the terrain, its paths and hiding places. The highland villages can always be centers of supply and signal.

Examining the ground from the point of view of the distribution of tasks, it can be seen that it provides the possibility of dispersing tasks over large areas so that in every area the control of detachments could be exercised easily, as well as liaison between the detachments. The areas could be divided as follows:

- (1) The area surrounded by the mountains of Orthrys, Jote, Giona, Parnassos, Elikon, Chlomos.
- (2) The area surrounded by the mountains of Olympus, Pieria, Kervounia, east slopes of Pindos, Chasia, Orthrys.
- (3) The area including Epirus and the Aeta and Carpenisei area.
- (4) The area including Western Macedonia.
- (5) The area including Central Macedonia.
- (6) The area including Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, with Peggaiion and the south slopes of Rhodopi as a basis.
- (7) The Peloponnese area.

The guerrillas operating in each of these compartments should be under the same command and these commands should be directed from the center in Athens. The territorial independence of these areas will easily allow the command the supplying of its detachments.

The restrictive measures taken by the enemy for the use of communications, and the scarcity of the means of communications themselves, present a great difficulty in supplying the detachments with war materiel from the center. Only the dispatch of money and other similar material could be carried out from the center to these areas. In this case, the means of supplying the detachments through another method should be considered. This method should be either from the air or from the sea.

Supply from the air should be carried out by aircraft dropping war materiel on spots previously appointed by commanders of the guerrillas the center to be informed. Besides this Western Macedonian area, all the other areas are surrounded by the sea and therefore provided with coasts and shores, so that it is always possible to establish secret beach operations for various craft or submarines coming directly from Egypt or Syria through Turkey, carrying necessary equipment and war materiel, to unload it on these beaches and therefrom, through covered approaches, transport it to the interior. The Western Macedonian area supply should only be maintained by air, but the possibility of supplying this area through the Olympus and Central Macedonian areas by sea should also be considered.

**SECRET**

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## Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)

**SECRET**Means:

For action we need manpower and more materiel. The means available in Greece is both physical and spiritual; of these two the latter is most important. The Greek people are faithful to their history. They have fought through the ages to maintain their freedom. Enslaved more than once, they have a tradition of breaking their bonds. Neither persecution, imprisonment nor execution - not even torture - has ever stopped the Greek struggle for liberty. This powerful impulse, bred in the very fibre of the Greek, offers assurance that there is no Greek who is not ready to offer himself as a sacrifice for his country.

Besides the will and the courage to fight, the Greek has manpower. The extraordinary task ahead requires men highly endowed with special military, physical, and mental and moral ability so that (a) No one will hesitate to face any danger but will look forward with eagerness to hazardous assignments; (b) Everyone must have such initiative and intelligence so that each will be able to operate alone, making the best decision under every circumstance; and (c) Physical toughness will allow them to stand the hardships they must face. They must be able to march through mountain passes, ravines, forests; to lose sleep and be without food for days.

The officers and men who will form these Irregular Nuclei will be selected beforehand. Native Greek ingenuity and intelligence are found in both city and country. The rural Greek is tough and frugal and is able to cover great distances on foot with poor rations. He has been inured from boyhood to hardship and privation. The high and tough qualities required for these dangerous operations are common in Greece.

Mobilization of this manpower should be carried out in the areas of operation so that participants are familiar with the terrain in which they will function, but though the highly fitted manpower is available in quantity, war materiel is scarce.

Armament: Following the destruction and surrender of Greek arms by certain quislings and the enemy's energetic search for hidden weapons, there is a dearth of suitable arms. Many rifles have been hidden by patriots but the concentration of these arms is difficult. The actual guns available lack ammunition. The rifles vary in type and pattern and render ammunition supply a difficult problem. There are a very few automatic weapons such as Hotchkiss light machine guns but, again, very little ammunition. A few pistols of various makes and calibre are found but are also without ammunition. There are no grenades. Ammunition which has been dropped lately from the air was not deposited in the areas agreed on due to inefficiency of liaison and signals.

Clothing: Clothes and shoes are scarce. The price for such materials as can be found is exorbitant. The present Irregular organizations have no funds. Small and sporadic purchases of shoes and trousers have not been serious enough to be of any use.

**SECRET**



**SECRET****Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)**

**Food:** Food is supplied locally. The people of the country have fed and will feed the Irregulars, but the lamentable condition of Greece prevents really adequate food supply since vast areas face starvation conditions. While the peasant supplies what food he has, it is a hardship and Irregulars have no funds for the purchase of food. This could lead to eventual problems and some dissatisfaction on the part of the supplying peasants.

**Liaison and Signals:** The present liaison between the field Irregular detachments is inadequate - so sketchy that it cannot be taken into account seriously. The same deficiency applies to signals.

**CONCLUSIONS**

After the above examination the following conclusions are drawn:

1. **Organization.** The fighting forces to be employed to continue the battle of the Greek people against its enemy, thereby contributing to the united effort of free nations, should be divided into two forms:
  - A. Organized forces for operation in open country to engage and strike the enemy and to effect destruction of the enemy's communications and supply columns.
  2. Organized forces of sabotage for operation in the cities for the purpose of destroying headquarters, harbor installations, stores, dumps, factories, etc.

To distinguish between these two forces we refer to them as "Irregulars" and "Sabotage Parties".

2. **Irregulars.** War establishment, organization and control. As has been pointed out, Irregulars should operate all over Greece in liaison and collaboration with each other under the direction of a central general staff. The general staff must have at its disposal all of the necessary means of communication and signals. It should be situated in Athens or wherever conditions indicate, and should direct and control the entire Home Front, maintaining closest possible touch with Allied GHQ in the Middle East. The Greek general staff will receive all its orders and directions from Allied GHQ.

In each area Irregular chiefs will order the operations of their men and will provide for liaison with the general staff and for supply.

In each area there should be more than one detachment according to existing possibilities. The strength of each detachment should not exceed 30 or 40 men. When larger forces are needed the area chief should have the possibility of concentrating as many detachments as are necessary.

**SECRET**

- 7 -

## Organization of the Greek Home Front (continued)

**SECRET**

Armament. The Irregulars must have adequate firepower so as to be able to inflict as much loss on the enemy as possible and so as to have the means of defense. At all times they must be light and mobile. They should be equipped with small and shoulder arms and with grenades and explosives. There should be a number of automatic small arms including sub-machine guns and light machine guns. Each detachment of from 30 to 40 men should have three sub-machine or light machine guns. All other men must be supplied with rifles, all of the same calibre, and a pistol and grenades. For possible major operations undertaken by the area chief, there must be at his disposal a number of medium machine guns, light artillery and mortars.

Clothing. Only as a last expedient should Greece be depended upon for the supply of clothing and shoes.

Rations. As has been pointed out, food conditions in Greece are lamentable. The enemy seizes all food supplies it can. There remains only the little the villagers can hide. Supplying the Irregulars with food is not an easy task. Each detachment should be supplied with some money for the purchase of food, but they should also be furnished with tinned food.

Liaison and Signals. Closest liaison between the Irregulars and GHQ Middle East must be maintained at all times. It is not necessary to be greatly concerned with morale, since morale is high and loyalty toward Great Britain and the United States is unshakable. Owing to certain conditions in Greece, communications must be carried out by radio and couriers. Between Greek headquarters and GHQ Middle East, messages will be sent by radio and couriers, and also between Greek headquarters and area chiefs. Two radio installations of large power are required; one for immediate use and the other to be held in reserve. A number of smaller sets are required for liaison between Greek headquarters and area chiefs and between the chiefs themselves. For proper efficiency each detachment should have a small wireless set.

Supply Bases. In each area there should be several sea bases at which material can be unloaded and dispatched through covered approaches to the interior. There must be also several pre-selected places in each area where supplies can be dropped from the air.

Sabotage Parties. Sabotage Parties should be formed by Greek patriots residing in the cities and the parties will vary in number according to the task assigned to each. Those in Athens and Piraeus should be under the control of the center in Athens but those in Salonika should be directed by a representative of the center. Representatives of the center therefore should be supplied not only with the necessary material but also with necessary wireless communications. The Parties must be well trained in the use of explosives and sabotage materiel, and each member should be armed with sidearms.

NOTE BY THE AUTHOR. (The writer of the above is the Operations Officer of a Coordinating Committee in Athens.) I have only one wish - that the Greek Home Front should be organized immediately. Organization and supply will take time. Greek patriots are impatient to operate against their hated enemy. Trusting their Allies with complete confidence, they still crave assurance that the fight goes on so that they can offer themselves for their country and the common ideal of liberty.

**SECRET**

*File*  
**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST****CCPY***x Greece*  
*x Greek Irregular Project*

22 April, 1943.

Colonel Ellery C. Huntington,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.*original net. to  
Huntington 5/27*

Dear Ellery:

Herewith are six photographs of the Headquarters Staff of the Cretan Irregulars, all but two here in Cairo; all re-equipped by OSS. The blurred photograph is a picture of "Kapitanios" Y, the C. in C. of Cretan resistance. The photographs are sent through you to General Donovan with the respectful compliment of Kapitanios Y. I would be pleased if you showed the photos to Dave Halliwell, Watts Hill, Lane Rehm, Wes Howland and to the members of my old section staff. (Due to the orders of Mr. Shepardson I cannot write of Irregular Activity except through you without having the possibility of many eyes seeing very dangerous material. I am sure that you will agree that true security is had when only those concerned know secret matters - with no exceptions made.)

You will be interested to know that we have re-equipped these men and that by the time you receive this letter they will be back in their caves in Crete - where I expect to join them for a brief morale visit at a little later date.

Without exception, every man pictured has lost every female young and aged relative by execution or torture. They are tough. My most difficult job is to prevent their ordering an immediate massacre. They say that life is not worth living and that they won't wait much longer before "killing the bastards."

Sincerely

(sgd) Ulius

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

22 April, 1943

Colonel Ellery C. Huntington  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ellery:

The following are activities we have under way.

INTELLIGENCE

Reports from three of our agents now in Greece. Reports from Acting Chief of Caique Operations, Izmir.

OPERATIONS.

Organizing of maintenance gang and crews for caique operation from Izmir to Eubia; later operation to mainland to Greece. Dispatch of agent to Yugoslavia. Organizing of P.T. service from Cyrenaica to Crete. Arrangements with Ninth Air Force for dropping bodies into Yugoslavia.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Arrangements with A.T.C. signal system to receive and send messages for occupied territories and for any other points. (Macfarland and Edwards). This arrangement is sensationally important, secure.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Dissemination of rumors to Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Asmara, Crete and Athens. Broadcasts by our officers in cooperation with P.W.E. Leete performed before leaving, Mocarski is performing and other officers not with OSS are speaking.

S.O.

Preparations are made for dropping of ten thousand T.N.T. charges in the vicinity of Athens. Otherwise no immediate plans are made pending authorization of JCS, but surveys are being undertaken so that the S.O. program can proceed without delay.

-2-

MILITARY OPERATIONAL GROUPS.

We have discussed plans with the "Kapitanio" or Chief of Cretan Guerrillas and his headquarters staff. We have equipped these seventeen men for their return to Crete and we have trained and are sending back with them a competent radio operator. This group has sixteen thousand skilled fighters partially armed with German guns captured from the enemy. Larger numbers can be mobilized if equipment is provided. If and when coordinated with theatre strategy an airfield can be seized and the greater part of the occupying troops can be massacred. (I write the above in chunks, detailed plans are in hand.).

We have traded out an arrangement with the former Chief Operations Officer of the E.A.M. now Chief Operations Officer of the new E.D.E.M. which has split off from the Communists. The E.D.E.M. is composed of the Socialist Party, the Plastiris Party and three small parties. (It is believed that the strong Cafandaris Party will join). The officer is ready to return to Athens and to communicate with us. We will send with him our trusted major E. who has just recently escaped for the purpose of coordinating his plan with us. I enclose a free and hastily made report made by this Major which at least gives the spirit of the wishes of himself and his organization. We are making arrangements for the Major to return to Athens.

ARMY COOPERATION

The fine support of the Army continues. Hank Wild, Adjutant General of USAFIME and I are almost inseparable friends and on more than one occasion he has told officers - "It's the General's wishes, whatever OSS wants they're to have without argument." Day before yesterday I had a little lunch ~~xi~~ for King George at my flat with General Strahm, Gus Guenther and Pack Macfarland attending. Strahm is still glowing - especially since the King signed his Short Snorter note. I'm continuing these little luncheons - Prime Ministers, Ministers of War, etc. and good will is a building.

But we would like to see you again - and soon.

With the regards and affections of all.

Sincerely,

(sgd) Ulius

*Amoss, H. Lins 10,314-H*  
*Greece*  
*^ Greek Irregular Project*  
 Cairo - March 25, 1943

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Dear Mrs. Sieber:

This is being dashed off in a very great hurry as the pouch closes and the Commanding General wants to see me (lucky fellow) both at the same time.

Enclosed you will find a paraphrase of a telegram which I wish you would show in secret to Duke - Shepardon - and, if thought desirable, to Colonel Donovan. I send it as a first hand exhibition of what we are doing in the Irregular Project with the help of the Greek Navy, (unofficially) and General Brereton. This business probably will be handled by Theofanides and we will not appear in it. Here, only Generals Strahm and Brereton know what's going on, and Colonel Guenther, of course. This means that we will have a full blown caique service between Turkey and Greece just as the British do - and we will take over the former Greek service and direct it completely. This does not preclude regular activity. It does not come under the British - since it works out from Turkey and it is not an S.C. activity. It is not even O.S.S. - it is Greek government - which explains why I have worked so hard to keep the Greek revolutionists and the Government together and to have Theofanides kept in office as a request - or rather a demand by both sides. It looks now as if I have succeeded. The King will probably accept some modified terms of the revolutionists and the new government will be made up 100% of close friends of ours from both sides.

This should all be communicated to those in Washington and New York who are interested. But caution every one that the Irregular Project HAS to stay incognito or it will run into trouble instead of success as it is now having.

With regards to all.

Sincerely,

(Signed) U. L. A.

*Fate*

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SECRET

Paraphrase

(From: Zangas, For: Boyotas)

This must not be repeated to any Greek or other officer as it is personal and secret. All our files, especially those of personal letters and information, orders to the centers and bulletins of information, must be discreetly removed to the American Consulate from the office in the British Consulate at SMYRNA. Until my return Blasa, PANAYOTOU and all my Petty Officers must remain at their posts. Even though British have proposed dissolution of our service, retention of contact with occupied Greece is my general purpose. Even if DIAMANTOPOULOS is not at TSESME, arrange possibility to pass to all personnel secret orders. Full contact with KAIKS and all our personnel must urgently be insured by DIAMANTOPOULOS through PAPASTEFANOU and MINOTIS Brothers. Must be advised of all departures and arrival of KAIKS at once. Agents money is forthcoming. Also in order that we may communicate by phone, liaison with TSESME should be arranged. Above message will please be urgently communicated through IZMIR Naval Undercover Observer, Williams.

(Signed) Brereton





*Amos S. ...  
Greece*

Cairo March 16, 1943

Dear Duke:

We now have more agents in Greece and one each touring Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Greek political pot boils so furiously that I haven't time to set down events as they happen. At the moment of this writing it looks as if things might be patched up. I am in touch with leaders of both sides and have spent many hours with them and if this thing blows over, the O.S.S. will have been responsible in that its local half colonel has

1. Tamed the King.
2. Quieted the Prime Minister
3. Had the Liberal Leaders pull in their horns temporarily
4. Induced military commanders to return to their posts.
5. Kept the Greek S.I. operatives at their jobs and kept that service from splitting into groups working against each other.

On the Irregular side, I will have a report to make as soon as a few more pieces are fitted together.

I have the full support of British P.W.E. and of all its branch and department heads. I have not been in recent touch with S.O.E. Glenconner is always ill or out of the country and it seems to me that he is purposely delaying coming to grips with our matters. I have been warned by ranking British officers that all British sections complain that Glenconner refuses to be pinned down and that by these tactics he finally manages to write his own ticket - meetings being called finally when other interested parties are unavailable. He has a very bad name for this sort of thing in S.I.S. and P.W.E. and requests have been forwarded to London asking that he be recalled. But we'll see - at least on the surface our relationships are extremely friendly - but I judge relationships by results - and there have been no results.

We need a strong counter-intelligence section here - and quickly. Our enemies are extremely active and in most subtle ways. Their present method is framing and black mail and undermining of confidence. Unfortunately, they work through officers and secretaries who are either all - or in part gullible or traitorous. Whispers are started and stories circulated involving the character and deportment of important officers. They have been so successful that one or two very important links from here to the Balkans are under serious question by their chiefs. Fortunately their is not enough impetus to do more than annoyance - because when the charges were investigated, no substantiation was found - but it has had the effect of arousing resentment in the part of really heroic agents that they should have been doubted for a moment. One Chief British agent went so far as to return his decorations and refuse to accept them even though an apology was forthcoming in most abject terms.



- 2 -

This thing will catch up with us sooner or later depending on how good are our results and I want to prevent it long before it happens and, selfishly, I don't want it to happen to me. I am extremely careful. I go nowhere at night unless in company with another officer. But here is one weak spot that I would play on if I were working on em.

As I have written. I have been at least partially successful in having many of the Greek Liberals call off their dogs from attacking the King. They understand my motives and agree - BUT - what a perfect set-up for a rumor to circulate that I am supporting the King and am trying to help him retain his throne. I am watching for this type of attack - and have warned my Liberal friends of the possibility. But while I have anticipated (adequately, I hope,) this attack - there must be many other innocent and useful activities - (and there will be more) that could be twisted.

I am particularly careful in my relationships with the British. When I hear criticisms about them, I present the British side of the picture and at all odds refuse to allow myself to be jockeyed into a position where I could be quoted - though just a listener. And I am very careful when I talk to the British because I have reason not to trust their security. (As a matter of fact every one out here is too casual about his gossip and far too much is bandied about - and the enemy has no trouble in hearing of the most secret discussions. So I insist that we need a strong C.I. section FAST.

Then - I have a very strong suspicion that we are not in touch with the real British secret intelligence. I doubt if it works through S.I.S. I am almost morally certain that they have their own irregular activity; that S.I.S. is merely out in front and can afford to be generous with information. The other evening I was invited by a lady with high connections in Greece to meet the "President" of the International Red Cross. The Swiss Colonel was conveniently late and three British officers, also guests cornered me and in a delightfully clever way tried to get me talking about many things. I have tried to investigate, quietly, the role played by these officers in the British scheme of things. One is nominally attached to the Aga Khan - but no one has an assignment at which he works - so there must be assignments that do not appear at which they work. They do not play in British Security or C.I. precincts - and I am guessing that they are a secret C.I. crowd. I've noticed other things that don't quite fit together - and I believe we should know what we are facing - and if it is harmless, okay - but let's know.

We need FAST - an AIRGRAPH RECORDER - MODEL C with reproducer and all equipment. It is manufactured by KODAK and is used for V Mail. We need it for reproduction of documents I am "borrowing" and which have to be returned to files and for a flood of reports now starting to come in from our own channels.


It is probably expensive but it is very necessary if we are to function properly.

- 3 -

This is inside dope on the personal set up here. I think you should make this available to Mr. Shepardson, and Mr. Halliwell - and let Jimmie Murphy know that it is available in case Colonel Donovan is interested:

G2

USAFIME is staffed largely with men from SOS and partly by Ninth Air Force. The picture resembles this -



The arrows stem from the organization to which an officer belongs and point to another post he also holds. It will be seen from the chart that the Headquarters of all Our Forces is intermingled with the headquarters of the subordinate bodies. The Air Force C. G. is Main HQ C. G. The Air Force C of S is Main HQ C of S. The S.O.S. G3 is main Hq G 3. Through this curious bastardy S.O.S. partly controls the Air and the Air partly controls S.O.S. and main H.Q. controls nobody. Many S.O.S. Chiefs are subordinate (presently) in rank to their Air opposites whom they control

- 4 -

as Chiefs of main H.Q. sections.

It does not take a further diagram to indicate the possible jealousies, some of which affect us because we deal with all the G's and much else. Some of the serious (for us) jealousies are

SOS G2            M A            A2THQG2  
Macclanahan vs. Moore and Crom

Macclanahan, so far as I can make out has no personal ambitions. He wants to work with us and we have to work with him. But he is on Moore's blacklist and Crom rather favors Moore. We have and want to play with Moore - who is also a very good egg and is our friend. We must play with Crom. No one of them cares for us to see the other too much.

Sibley is G4 of S.O.S. and of main H.Q. Air hates him. Most of S.O.S. dislike him. We need him. The engineers fight each other - so do the Signals.

Much of this stems - not only from the unwise set-up - but also - from the debris left by General Maxwell. He left not of his own volition and his "boys" are not popular. Poor old Colonel Chickering should be a B.G. He is on the level. He is sound and competent. But he is to be relieved as S.O.S. C of S because Maxwell liked him - even if he didn't care for Maxwell. And so on.

Now - the British have their quarrels too. They have personal feuds and are divided into personal camps. But most serious with them are their inter-departmental fights. SIS doesn't like SOE. S.O.E. sneers at S.I.S. P.W.E. distrusts SOE profoundly and openly charge Glenconner with being a personal opportunist who cannot see the war for his own ambitions.

Now - I do not put forth the above example as an unusual phenomenon of war - it is usual as we know from the organization history of other wars. But it may help clarify the thinking of you fellows back home if and when we run into difficulties. It is but a repetition of the Yugoslav and Greek fights except that we fight within our ranks and do not start revolutions when we're licked.

\*\*\*\*\*

I hope to have an interesting translation for you before the pouch closes - the proclamation of Admiral Sakellariou of which I will have advised by cable.

Also I am now getting direct reports from Greece. Our translating department does not exist and for a time I'll be slow getting this hot stuff to you - but I'm giving it at once to G2 and the M.A.

I am enclosing the small and unimportant report of the Egyptian police on Kenos. They do not like Kenos here at all - none of the Greeks and not any of the Egyptians who know about him. He would be up against amazing

- 5 -

opposition here - and I am not sure it would be wise for him to come here - but I'll still keep on the track of the proposition here. (It's damned hard to write here - our few offices are piled up with people - two-three-four in each one and one office half the size of Mrs. Sieber's has seven - two pretty girls - one American civilian code clerk, one Greek civilian bird dog and three sergeants - with four other sergeants who drop in for instructions.) Every minute or so some one sticks his or her head in the door and shouts "Hey Colonel," So, forgive the disconnected stuff.

\*\*\*\*\*

I am also enclosing a copy of the vicious proclamation of Admiral Sakellariou. I was able to hand it to the British P.W.E. - They haven't received it yet and are very pleased with us for being on the job. The Greek Prime Minister has called and I am having lunch with him privately today - British P.W.E. and I have struck the only formula that can save the King his throne even temporarily and I am charged by the British to discuss it with the PM and the King - privately and personally as the only old Anglo-Saxon friend they trust with some confidence as to the wisdom of recommendation regarding their own internal affairs. (We are not concerned about the regime in Greece now or later - except as we stop short any disturbance that hurts the war effort. As you know the Germans are making very effective propaganda here - and some communist propaganda has appeared)

The pouch is closing - and I must call a halt. As soon as it does I go over to General Brereton for a general discussion of our program.

All the best to all of you.

Ulius

P. S. Please note attached slip from Edwards. Please try to get this for us in a hurry.

U. L. A.

## GREEK PEOPLE OF EGYPT

A great, a terrible, an indescribable calamity has struck our beloved Fatherland. A band of anarchist leaders of our Army, seeing their approaching end, owing to the firm decision of His Majesty the King to replace some of them as being responsible for the wretched state of the army and for the new national split created out of nothing, has REVOLTED against our HEROIC KING, the Tsouderos Government and the law-abiding officers.

The two Brigades which our new officers, the law-abiding and industrious, created with so much sweat, have been completely DISSOLVED. The heroic Greek Army of Alamein NO LONGER EXISTS. The anarchist Colonel Hadjistavris who was, owing to the many scenes he created against law-abiding officers, ordered to hand over his Battalion to Major Athanassiou REFUSES TO DO SO.

At his instigation the hapless Major is MURDERED. The Divisional Commander, General Zigouris, who tried to go to the mutinous camp, is arrested by the anarchists and THROWN OUT. Our much advertised Vice-President, Canellopoulos, who summoned Hadjistavris to Beirut, instead of having him shot on the spot began to implore him on his knees to stop the revolt. But he, on being allowed to go free and to return to his camp, officially proclaimed a revolt and is followed by the Commanding Officers of the other Battalions, Kallioris, Stavroulakis and Konstas.

The unfortunate law-abiding officers, who composed almost the totality of officers, faced with this lamentable situation are handing in their resignations en masse. Meantime and in a similar manner, the I Brigade also revolts. The Brigadiers who are apparently indifferent FORMENT THE REVOLUTION.

The anarchist revolutionaries demand:

That the Government should be reconstituted and comprise Boudares, Katsotas, Bakirdjis, Sophoukis and the dishonourable Alexandrian, G. Roussos, who is the instigator of all this revolt.

Meantime BRITISH soldiers who have been sent for service reasons to the mutinous camp are killed.

Thus the Commanding Officer of the IX Army, in view of the inability of Canellopoulos to impose order, assumes command and orders:

"The mutinous must lay down their arms before the morning of the 7th of March, 1943, otherwise the Brigade will be bombarded by the R.A.F."

And now Greek people, look with admiration on your Vice-President and the leaders of the Army who are so skillfully chosen by him in order to start against a revolt and not WAR. Look with admiration at your unfortunate children bombarded by the R.A.F. like common criminals. Look with admiration at your heroic Greek Army, the creator of the Albanian miracle, admire it now as the author of the disgraceful deed, of a new ASIA MINOR DISGRACE.

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Greek people, you are GUILTY. You are the murderers of your children because although you knew that events were coming to this pass, you did not seek to prevent the dishonourable creators of this material calamity.

AND NOW TAKE HEED: Put to death the dishonourable Roussos who, although he is half in the grave, does not forget to soak Hellenism in blood even as he did in the past. MAY GOD DAMN THIS DISHONOURABLE MAN and demand an immediate reconstitution of the Government and the removal of those responsible for the disaster. THE GREEK ARMY MUST BE REMADE AND MUST FIGHT AGAIN JUST AS OUR NAVY IS FIGHTING UNDER GLORIOUS ADMIRAL SAKELLARIOU.

GREEK PEOPLE SAVE YOUR FATHERLAND

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

10 March, 1943.

*Copy to Burton*

Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services,  
"Q" Building,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I suppose you have been getting my reports, especially those regarding alleged Russian activity in Southeastern Europe. I am aware that the line taken in these reports is consistent with what Nazi propagandists wish to sow. But I believe they are worth further examination. I summarize the intelligence as reported together with questions and comments and secret reference to authorities quoted.

1. Bulgaria.

Proposition: If and when Russian troops reach the Rumanian frontier, the Bulgarian Agrarian and Communist Parties will expel King Boris and declare Bulgaria a republic within the framework of the U.S.S.R.

Authorities: Greek Irregular Agents "D" and "S".  
Colonel Popovitch, reporting intelligence sent to him from Serbia. British P.W.E. Major. Dr. Dimitroff, Agrarian leader - but with the exception that this will happen only if the United Nations refuse to guarantee Bulgaria's present frontiers including Greek Thrace and Macedonia.

2. Greek Army "Revolt" in Syria.

Proposition: The recent riots were fomented by Communist agents.

Authorities: Greek Irregular Agent "M". Greek Agent "P".

Question: Is the "communist" charge an attempt of the present Greek Government to discredit the movement?

Comment: A revolt in an army at war is a mutiny. The intelligence received plus rumor plus deduction drawn from facts known make the charges seem justified.

3. Yugoslav Partisans.

Proposition: (A) Communists have taken over, or will take over, in Yugoslavia and are responsible for exploiting the personal ambitions of certain Yugoslav "leaders" in order to discredit the existing regime; (B) Mihailovich has only 300 effectives, the balance having

**SECRET**

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SECRET

To Col. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943.

gone over to the Partisans; (C) No British agent is in touch with Mihailovich.

Authorities: (A) Reports I filed earlier in Washington. O.S.S. Weekly Survey, February 4-11, 1943.  
(B) Greek Secret Service report shown me, but not filed with the British.  
(C) Colonel Popovitch. Greek Irregular Agents "M" and "S".

Question: Are these reports inspired by Nazi propaganda? Or by Greek and/or Serb jealousy?

Comment: I have sent a Greek Irregular Agent into Serbia to bring back evidence or refutation; unless caught he should be back in Cairo by the end of March.

4. British S.O.E.

Proposition: (1) S.O.E. in the Middle East is badly managed and uses questionable agents. (2) One agent, a British officer, in Greece recently gave away the entire show, turning in 21 chief agents to the occupation authorities in exchange for his own life. (They were shot.) The Greek head, Captain Alexander Melas, managed to escape and has reached Cairo. (Melas is in my employ, without salary, as an Irregular Agent and is a cousin of L.C.M. whom you know as one of our men in New York.) (3) Lord Glenconner, personally ambitious, will attempt to dominate O.S.S. in the Middle East and also gain control of I.S.L.D. (S.I.S.) and P.W.E.; he is some improvement over Mr. Maxwell - but not much. (4) Because of all of the above, Communist group leaders are telling resistance groups that they can have no confidence in British subversive leadership; that the British support and handsomely pay former Fascists and that they can have no hope of assistance. Many Liberal groups in Greece have joined the Communists, as they have in Serbia.

Authorities: (1) Colonel Xenos. A British Major, former S.O.E. in Greece, now a member of the W.O. Armistice Committee. Prime Minister Tsouderos. Colonel Putnik, C-in-C of Free Yugoslavian Forces. Captain Melas. Major Saunders, P.W.E. Colonel Quilliam, former D.M.I. of G.H.Q., now P.W.E. Greek Irregular Agent "S". (2) Captain Melas. (3) Colonel Quilliam. Major Saunders. (4) Captain Melas. Greek Irregular Agent "S". British P.W.E. Major "J".

Question: Should we accept Glenconner's proposition that all our enterprises should be joint operations; our operational groups mixed and Glenconner and his Chief Operations Officer, Colonel Keeble, directors of our operations?

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SECRET

To Col. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943.

Comment: To confound German propaganda, and to withstand Communist sniping and to win the war - and the peace - we must maintain a united front. But it will be better for the British as well as for ourselves if the embittered enslaved peoples see a show of American interest at least parallel to, though coordinated with, the British.  
(Note: We get along excellently with Glenconner - but no matter what the discussion, his minutes always reflect his own wishes.)

5. Admiral Canaris.

Proposition: Admiral Canaris, expatriate Greek, supreme head of German Secret Intelligence, now convinced that Germany has lost the war and that he is in personal jeopardy at the hands of Himmler, has joined the Vaterland Movement, has moved his H.Q. to Berne and is willing to make a "deal" with O.S.S.; invites us to meet him in Turkey; invites me to meet him in Dresden or Switzerland (under pledge of secrecy and safe conduct) to meet with other Vaterland leaders.

Authorities: Duke of Wurtemberg (Father Odo). Greek Irregular Agents in the U.S. and in the Middle East. (Colonel Duke in Washington, and Major Pearce in New York, are following this.) A Near Eastern Secret Police Chief.

Question: Is this an attempt similar to that of Hess to split the Allies from Russia? Could it be an attempt to burrow in the O.S.S.? Is it possible that they would try this expedient in order to lay hands on an O.S.S. officer? Is this a chance to aid a secret uprising in Germany? What guarantees would be required if, as suggested, Canaris would order his men to massacre a large number of Nazi party leaders and hand over the Military Government to General Beck?

Comment: We can only discover these answers by having the first meeting in neutral territory.

Over-all Questions.

Does Russian insistence on placing the Second Front in the West mean that she intends to reserve Eastern Europe to herself? (See my old memorandum reporting my conversations with Major General Chu and with officers of the Soviet Naval Mission which stated that the secret Soviet view at that time was:

1. After the war three great world powers would be left: the U.S., Russia and China.
2. Within the next five decades China would fight Russia with the U.S. helping China.

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S E C R E T

To Col. Donovan from Lt. Col. Amoss - 10 March, 1943.

3. For the above reasons, Russia looks on us as a potential future enemy and therefore wants us to defeat Japan - but not to hurt her too badly.)


What is our Government's policy regarding the Middle East and Eastern Europe? Have we agreed to leave the Eastern European field to Russia? Are we interested in getting intelligence regarding Russian operations in Eastern Europe and the intent of Russia in this sphere?

Comment: If we have decided to allow Russia to inspire a series of new Soviet states in Southeastern Europe we are deluding and harming the Little Peoples by stimulating their suicidal resistance to the Axis occupation. We are fooling ourselves if we allow our subversive efforts in this field to be check-mated by Communist tampering with our groups, being blind to our Government's ultimate policy. If we intend to leave the field to Soviet Russia, had we not better turn over our supplies to Soviet subversive agents and retire to theaters where we are not in conflict? And if we are to retire in Soviet favor after the war, should we not leave behind a most secret network so that we will know and not guess (as we now do) what is going on in Russia? Do you and the Government want full reports of Communist activities in Occupied Europe, or should we ignore them as being improperly suspicious of an ally?

(Incidental Note: In either event - abandonment or not - we have in our hands a ready-made network - the "Greek" Irregular Mission - a system that cannot be traced to us but which can and will provide us with absolute coverage of political, psychological, economic and military intelligence. For further information on the Greek Irregular subject, consult Colonel Duke and Major Pearce.)

I put these points before you for policy consideration. If you so order, I will launch an exhaustive secret investigation throughout enemy occupied and friendly territory. (This could be handled within the framework of the Greek Irregular Project as it now exists and with no further budget.) Colonel Guenther has read and approved this letter.

Respectfully,



U. L. Amoss,  
Lt. Col., AUS.

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February 1, 1943

Lt. Col. F. Duke,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

**SECRET**

Dear Duke:

The following is for Colonel Donovan, and a copy for Mr. Halliwell.

After a number of talks with the Greek King, Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, Theofanides, Colonel Xenos, and the British Major Berbrook, the following are the broad outlines of what is expected of us in Greece.

Apparently the desired primary action would be an invasion from Turkey across Thrace, then attacking Bulgaria and Roumania. Secondary action would be an Italian attack. Tertiary operations would be through Greece. At all events, it is desired that the Greek people should be organized and disciplined for action on a date to be determined.

It is believed that small action against Crete will be successful if geared together with the properly organized uprising in Crete. Cretans claim to be able to cover every single German now occupying their island. They claim to be able to wipe out forces and destroy installations. They need organization, training and materiel. They claim that they can provide several places for training in Crete.

On the Greek mainland, former Greek officers with nuclei of their men can be readied for striking. They point out the absolute necessity of discipline - not only amongst themselves and supporting semi-military bodies, but also amongst public service personnel. They say that effective action, timed to coincide with an invasion of Greece or of Thrace and Bulgaria, requires safe protection of communications and other public services. A grand plan of action must be drawn showing what lines should be destroyed and what should be preserved for our own use. This envisages sabotage on the one hand, and the seizure and defense of certain telegraph, telephone and public utility properties on the other.

The Greeks expect us to draw up this plan in conjunction with themselves and the British, and they want us to train selected members of their personnel both outside of Greece and inside the country. Details will be supplied and discussed in Cairo.

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We have been warned by both Greeks and Englishmen that the early operations of SOE were imperfect and dangerous and that, under Lord Glenconner, matters have not yet been repaired sufficiently. However, two of the most questionable SOE agents have been retired to London, and it is believed that cooperation will be easier and that we can avoid some of the disastrous mistakes earlier made by SOE.

Best wishes to all.

Sincerely,

U. L. AMOSS

**SECRET**

Top ↑

to: General Magruder

These individuals should  
be noted, and then I wish you  
would return the paper to me.

W.J.D.

*Held*

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY AIR POUCH

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
 LONDON

January 25, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D. C.

Subject: GREEK VIEWS

SIR:

The following is a digest of the views of:

The Greek King  
 Prime Minister Tsouderos  
 Vice Prime Minister Ganiotopoulos  
 Mercantile Marine Minister Theofanides  
 Shipowner Fabricios  
 Newly-appointed Washington Military Attache, Colonel Xenos

I. PROGRESS OF THE WAR

There is complete confidence in the American future in the North African campaign; pleasure mingled with fear over Russian successes.

II. FUTURE MOVES IN THE WAR

All expect early Allied action in the Balkans; all hope American arms will participate. All expect Turkey to get off the fence when certain conditions should have been fulfilled.

III. THE ALBANIAN DECLARATION

All agree (including Ganiotopoulos) that the declaration is rather meaningless but argue that since that is so only harm has been done by its announcement. Greek Intelligence reports say that the reaction in Albania has been bad and that instead of inciting Albanian resistance, a force of thousands has now joined the Axis. Colonel Xenos says that both psychological and practical aspects were overlooked. Axis propaganda seized upon the statement and has used the credulities of many in Greece who are not physically or mentally able to discriminate between logical or illogical reports. On the other hand, the Albanian population is so illiterate and so uneducated that even a favorable pronouncement could not have reached even a third of it. Axis propaganda, on the other hand, were able to spread the pronouncement (with unfavorable commentary) throughout the country by means of Albania.

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January 25, 1945

Colonel Donovan

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IV. BRITISH S.O.E.

According to the King and Prime Minister, British S.O.E. has badly mismanaged its work in Greece since before the collapse. S.O.E. recruited professional revolutionists and "gangsters" because during the campaigns against Italy and Germany they had to work in secret even from their own friends. British S.I.S. required Prime Minister Metaxas to put certain secret Services under the control of Colonel Xenos. There was constant conflict between S.I.S. and S.O.E. in which Xenos (perhaps naturally) sided with S.O.E. S.I.S. worked with the Greek Government; S.O.E. in spite of it. Consequently, S.I.S. has been using pro-King agents; S.O.E. has used until a matter of weeks ago only opponents of the Government. Today, happily, S.O.E. is benefitting from the movement of Greek reserve officers who are organizing regardless of politics.

V. BULGARIA.

Greek intelligence states that Bulgaria is to furnish the bulk of occupation troops as many German troops are being moved elsewhere. Greeks fear Bulgaria now and after the war more than Germany.

The following is a composite of the views of the officials listed above on Greek leaders:

VI. THE KING

So long as he remains a symbol of the Greek nation, King George is useful. He is not likely to interfere in politics.

(AMOSS' COMMENT - George is democrat 90% of the time. The rest of the time he is a violent absolute monarch, apt to reverse the Government's and his own prior conclusions. He is patriotic about the Kingdom of King George, but sarcastic about Greeks and cleverly caustic about every Greek public figure.)

PRIME MINISTER TSOUDELOS

All agree that he is the best the Government can do under present circumstances.

(AMOSS' COMMENT - Tsouderos is a very suspicious man. The instant he believes a minister or other leader is getting too much confidence from anyone, he interjects little hints of "be wary", "The man may not be all you think." He trusts no one and communicates his mistrust to others so that official confidence is shaken in all Greek officials, and in Tsouderos, too. This, however, is consistent with Greek character which accepts no success in another Greek but defends the failure until he recovers.)

VICE PRIME MINISTER CANELLIOPOULOS

The King and Prime Minister, on the whole, are glad of Canellioopoulos' adherence to the Government. The Prime Minister believes him to be too

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January 25, 1943.

Colonel Donovan

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ambitious. The King is sarcastic. He said, "Canellopoulos does all sorts of unconstitutional things (which the King detailed)." When it was pointed out that he had assumed royal prerogative, he said, "But I represent the heart and soul of Greece." The King makes quite a burlesque of Canellopoulos being "The heart and soul of Greece."

(AMOSS' COMMENT - Canellopoulos is sincere and able - but a little callow. He can't play in the same political league with those he wishes to unseat. The King sent Information Minister Michalopoulos to Cairo to check on the disloyalty of the Commanders of Greek Armed Forces. Michalopoulos responded by joining the cabal. Tsouderos sent another messenger (name undisclosed). The Commanders and Michalopoulos telegraphed that they adhered to the King and repudiated any statement of Canellopoulos that they would join him in resigning. Canellopoulos, a little bewildered was happy to stay put, too.

#### COLONEL XENOS

Theofanides says he is tricky but skillful and useful. The King and Prime Minister support Xenos and Canellopoulos has reversed his previous position and wants Xenos to come to Cairo.

(AMOSS' COMMENT - If British S.O.E. withdraw their objections, we should use Xenos in Cairo; but let him go first to Washington as Military Attache where Duke can condition him properly. He has to be watched - but what Greek official doesn't?)

#### EX-COLONEL VIKIZILOS

He has a thumbs-down from everyone. Theofanides says he can be counted on to do the wrong thing at the right time, or the right thing at the wrong time - all the time. The King says he is a fool, the Prime Minister says he is an ass, Xenos says he is a weakling with good motives, but always exploited by baser persons.

(AMOSS' COMMENT - We cannot use him in our service; at some time or other he is bound to be the front for a revolution. I have proposed, and believe the King will accept, to send him to North Africa. He gets on well with the French who have vast respect for his name, and the Greeks in North Africa are not politically difficult - being pure (and) business men.)

#### GENERAL GICATAS

He is too old to be brought out of Greece and to return. The Prime Minister respects and fears him; the King won't forgive him for the part he played in the 1922 execution of the Ministers. The King claims that, on his return to the throne, he told this to the General who replied, "Greece would have been a poorer state if I had executed 700 instead of seven." The King asks, "How can I take him into my Government?"

(AMOSS' COMMENT - Gicatas is pure patriot, powerful, and must be considered.)

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Page 4.

TSIGANTES

The above was a chief aide of British S.O.E. King and Prime Minister say he was a thief and stole 50,000 pounds. (Actually, news came last week that on his death the entire sum was recovered.) Some say he was killed resisting arrest by the Italians; others that he was executed by Greek Patriots. Theofanides says that he was a real patriot and was an honest custodian of funds intrusted to him by the British.

(AMOSS' COMMENT - I cite Tsigantes as an example of Greek criticism and confusion of British S.O.E. Actually they may have been less than expert in the complex of Greece and actually they did employ some unworthy agents, some of them British. But I believe S.O.E. has recovered, and is doing a somewhat better job, though one that still is one-sided.)

Respectfully,



U. L. AMOSS.

Copy: Lt. Col. F. Duke.

WPM

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

April 10, 1943.

Lt. Col. Florimond Duke,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Que Building,  
Washington, D.C.

**SECRET**

Dear Duke:

We now have on hand Caskey and Major Beir, as well as Macfarland and Jerry Bailey. Macfarland has pitched in and is doing a magnificent job of sensational importance. He has traded out an arrangement with the Air Transport Command for secret wireless communication in our own codes through their various stations that is nothing short of marvelous. He had them arrange for us to use certain frequencies for communications with our agents behind enemy lines. He has also arranged that we can send cables in our own code to Washington. Other points we can reach through them are Tripoli, Algiers and London. They will also send for us to Istanbul, and Packy hopes to make arrangements there to have messages come out of Turkey to A.T.C. here. A.T.C. have expressed no interest in the text of our messages and do not require that we furnish them even with a paraphrase.

Besides the above, Packy has given me extraordinary assistance in dealing with our Greek groups presently in Cairo for provisioning and return to Greece.

Caskey looks good out here. Beneath his appearance of shyness he has a reserve of initiative and clear thinking. He is exactly the right man to be stationed in Smyrna to handle that end of our cable service to Greece.

We are about to establish a base in Cyrenaica for regular communications with Crete. We are sending into Crete next week, by Cretan secret transport a quantity of pistols, ammunition and other weapons and provisions, all supplied to us by the Army.

Also here on a temporary visit is the Chief Operations Officer of the E. A.M. Though the E.A.M. is more than tinged with Communism, I am coming to the belief that our cooperation with them will change this situation, though of course we are not doing anything actively about Communist undermining in Greece. The majority of the members of the organization which, combined, make up E.A.M., are not Communist at heart but belong because it is the most active and aggressive resistance federation in Greece. Apparently Soviet financial support has dropped and if we decide that it is a good policy to cooperate with them we believe that they will form just one more corps loyal to their own country and to the united cause which we all serve.

Another situation here of which I have spoken before but which will take further comment is the cooperation we receive from the Army. As an example: I asked the Chief of Staff for priority for Pvt. Georgiades. The Army wrote two strong telegrams to send to Washington and told us to select the one we liked the most - or to write our own. As you know, we have the question of our large I/C. We also requested the Commanding General to give us an

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emergency allotment which should have been cabled to the War Department in Washington. The General felt that he did not want to subject us to the delays of War Department approval and has decreed that the Ninth Air Force shall absorb our emergency allotment until our T/O is approved. As a matter of fact, everyone in the Army has gone far out his way to assist us and has accepted us as a part of their show and a part which they must aid with all means at their disposal and with all possible speed.

I would be very glad to hear from you as to the impression in OSS about our activities. We have no indication as to whether or not you fellows think we are doing the job we were sent out to do or whether our activities have your general approval. I would be very glad to know what General Donovan, Col. Huntington, Mr. Shepardson and General Magruder think of this show. We seem so completely cut off from home base and, remembering my own days in Washington, I get the impression that everyone is far too busy to give very much thought to those of us who are out here. One thing that I can promise you is that there is a lot of activity and a certain amount of results. I would like to feel that you people back there think so as well.

I cabled rather strongly yesterday regarding the dispatch of personnel to this theater without clearance with us. I am quoting the cable below because we do not know how the paraphrase which will come to you will read:

REQUEST DONOVAN, HUNTINGTON AND SHEPARDSON TO CONSULT GUENTHER BEFORE SENDING FURTHER PERSONNEL. THE EXECUTION OF PROJECTS LOOKS DIFFERENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST THAN IT DOES IN WASHINGTON. OUR PRESENT STAFF, FUNCTIONING AS A TIGHT ENTHUSIASTIC TEAM, SHOULD BE INCREASED ONLY AS NEED ARISES. THIS WILL AVOID DUPLICATION; PREVENT MORALE DETERIORATION. FAR BETTER TO HAVE OVERWORKED LOYAL GANG THAN UNDERWORKED STARS LOOKING FOR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN. MANY NATIONALS FROM BALKANS BETTER EQUIPPED FOR PENETRATION THAN THOSE RECRUITED AT HOME AND BRITTON WILLINGLY ALLOWS US TO COOPT SPLENDID OFFICERS FROM U.S. FORCES.....

So far we are a team and have a team spirit. There is no stuffiness about anyone here up to now, and everyone here has a job to do. To send people who do not fit into this pattern, or for jobs not yet ready for them, would be to defeat the whole purpose of the recruiting program.

Inclosed please find copy of a letter I have written to Ellery and an extra copy of a report written by the Chief Operations Officer of E.A.M. This officer is now in Cairo and would like very much for his organization to come into active relationship with us. As I have suggested to Ellery, it may be that this is an opportunity to prevent a Partisan split such as has almost ruined the Yugoslav resistance picture. It might be our wedge between the Third Internationale agitators and the people of Greece. But this is such a hazardous situation that we must proceed with great care. Obviously we must prevent any semblance of discord among the so-called United Nations.

**SECRET**

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McBaine and Mocarski arrived yesterday afternoon late while all of us were out on our various duties and have not reported in person yet. They are due in momentarily this morning.

Due to the enormous drive of Packy and the arrival of several of our people, there has been no time for much paper work. I will try in the next writing to give further details of our activities here.

With best wishes to you and all:

Sincerely,

U. I. Amoss  
Lt. Col., AUS.

**SECRET**

COPY

BACK HOME AGAIN ON THE ISLE OF ZAMALEK - SATURDAY, MARCH 27, 1943, 9 P.M.

Dear Duke and All:

It was only this morning that I put another letter for you and the gang in the Pouch. Kangaroo letters I call 'em. It was a great treat to get the letters that Packy MacFarland brought me from some of you; thank those of you who remembered me.

Here, in our billet, we are in the midst of a Crisis. The Greeks had their revolt; the Yugoslavs, their schism and the French their free-for-all. But trouble also has descended on this once serene habitat.

The American Revolution flared over tea; the hordes of Asia descended on the fat lands of Europe to get more food; Serbia started the late World War because Austro-Hungary stopped importing her pigs - and the founder of the dynasty had been a swine-herd.

Our house had been happy. American officers and Nubian servants lived in an atmosphere of mutual trust; in perfect bliss - until - until Sugar reared its ugly head. Sugar was the cause of it all. How it will all end, no one living knows. What heads will hang; what noble spirits fall is beyond the ken of man to know.

Some folk wake with the milk man, especially Mrs. Milk-man. Some automatically awake. Others are stirred by an alarm clock. The three half colonels in this abode are awakened by tea; by tea and sugar. At six-thirty, the mountains of manhood not coming to Mahommed, Mahommed comes to the half-colonels bearing their tea; their tea and sugar. Each gallant officer in his own spartan room slightly rises, peeks through blood-shot eyes - sees tea; shudders. Army discipline seizes control; manly virtues surge to the fore. Each future general raises a cup to swollen lip; gulps; twitches - rolls over and goes to sleep.

Tea; tea and sugar has softened 'em up. It is now time for the ebony Abdul to do his work. On padded foot he creeps, glancing quickly from side to side. Quicker than you can say Office of Strategic Services, and more firmly, he leaps to bedside. Then - WHAM! a military shoe is slammed on the floor. Abdul streaks for the door, one hundred and eighty pounds and seven-eighths of outraged military genius after him. What tea; tea and sugar has started, shoe leather finishes.

After a quick and immaculate toilet, three grim field commanders meet at the break-fast board. A frugal meal is set before them. Grapefruit, crusted with sugar; coffee with lump and lump of pure white sugar slowly disintegrating in its steamy liquid body like memoranda on office procedure; then crepes susette dusted with virginally white sugar.

\*\*\*\*\*denote the passage of Time, Life and Fortune\*\*\*\*\*Pot bellied cook appears. "Kernel"-he says respectfully, "Store, he no sell kernel sugar." So, kernel, he go to Black Market, bring back three pound sugar.

- 2 -

Next day, Cook, he come (how come) - "Kernel," pliz you go Black Market you gettum sugar." Kernel, he wuz not amused. He say - "You go to hell." Cook, he pained, but cook want sugar. (Hi, Sugar,) Cook say, "Yuss, and kernel bringum sugar." Kernel finish discussion; he say "Nuts!" "Cook say, Shure - pea, or wall."

And thus came the crisis. The Masters of Strategy if not Tactic drank their coffee bitter. Worse - they drank their tea bitter. Without sugar they shivered twice as much as before: couldn't turn over and go to sleep. Abdul got chased before he could slug the shoe on the floor. Abdul sulked. Crepes suzette had to be eaten with honey or strawberry jam. And still the war toughened warriors held their (coffee) grounds.

First to yield were Mohammed, Abdul and the Cook. The three followers of the Prophet admitted they could not work without sugar to eat while the colonels were waging war in Old Karo. Relentin, the Store-keeper was appealed to. "But, NO," he said, "You gentlemen have exceeded your quota by nineteen pounds." There was nothing else to do; the three Saracen Gents had to make a pilgrimage to a Sugar Refinery. They had a measure of success - ten pounds of sugar in one lump - out a lump that looked more like saltpetre than so-sweet sugar.

The Arabian Knights are happy - they munch on the dubious "sugar;" the defenders of the nation drink their coffee bitter. W a r i s H E L L!

(Signed) Ulius ben el Amoss Sheik

Cairo  
March 30, 1943

Dear Duke:

Things are moving so rapidly that I haven't time to write properly. Packy MacFarland is giving me a most needed hand and is helping a lot - though I have to take some valuatie time out. Caskey blew in today - and I have been taking him around today a bit. I have had, also, to meet with Vice P M Roussos, the Minister of War - the great Kapitanios Y - about whom I've been cabling and two officers just arrived from the Greek mainland. All of these meetings were separate. Also I had to have two different meetings with General Stroh, two separate meetings with G2 - one with the AG - one with the Chief of Police - and so on - God knows that leaves little enough time for correspondence. I now wish I had started this letter yesterday instead of waiting for today for latest news. The things I have been cabling about could consume reams of paper, but I have already given you the high spots in the cables.

Right now - we have five people trying to use two desks - and other wild men bust in the door from minute to minute. If you have gotten the idea that this place is a shambles - you are right.

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So - unless I get a minute tomorrow just before the Pouch closes - this is so-long until the next Pouch.

Incidentally - General Strahm said he would approve the five "female help" if we used them for more than ordinary stenographic work - if they were needed because of the nature of our work.

With best wishes to you and all my Pals - and thanks for the grand way you are supporting us back home.

Affectionately,

(Signed) Julius

Cairo  
April 2, 1943

Dear Duke:

Judas priest but this is a humming buzzing place. LeCaire is taking on signs of becoming an interesting place again. Strategic Services is busting at the seams with activity - and personnel - and ideas - and I BELIEVE - with activity of value and importance.

We've tapped useful leaks in highest circles - friendly and more or less friendly. We're getting tips on what's to come from 10 Downing Street - from Foreign Office - from War Office; from the Greeks, the Yugoslavs - and from our own sources.

News from behind enemy lines is beginning to flow; we've new fellows enroute their posts of danger. We are consulted by heads of States - and have helped patch up quarrels in armies and navies; are now working on an Air force that's restive.

We were requested by General Strahm, acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East to get news of a man in Athens. In four hours we were able to give him what he asked for. (It was a miraculous coincidence - but the General thinks we're pretty hot.)

We ironed out serious obstacles to our operation of seizures from Turkey to Greece; we got news that the invaluable and indomitable Captain Zengas will recover.

We notice a flow of men and machines that indicates possible action in the Middle East - and we've heard the hum of Jerry observers overhead after a long absence.

The pulse is beating again; blood is flowing through the veins and muscles are flexed & ready for more direct action.



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All of us are grateful and impressed at the way you're backing us up; we have a feeling of complete security because in the difficult Washington arena you're carrying the ball for the Balkans.

Others may be concerned that their reports do not reach all of those who should see them but we've got Duke whom we know is getting our stuff to the attention of General Donovan, Shepardson, Ellery Huntington and to those who should be kept informed and in touch and in sympathy with us out here.

Packy MacFarland is doing a remarkable job - and is bringing in the bacon. {Please tell this to General Donovan, Ellery, Shepardson} Caskey looks good out here and already is helpful. {Please get that around}

One thing: we will not need the huge staff presently planned for. So many of the most effective foreign nationals - and American officer personnel can be had here as needed. It takes so much time to try to lay on a job for a guy who isn't a self-starter. Every one of us would rather work like fools than be jammed up with guys who may be more brilliant than we but who have to have "guidance". We want no prima donnas. We want ONLY honest laboring men. We want pick - alert - two fisted tough babies. The elegant guys among the British have respect for 'em. Its the pseudo British accent that draws their contempt - and its the guy like that who get pushed around.

But what a lousy trick has been pulled on me! Our quiet, respectable, attractive billet. Remember? And me - a God fearing, clean living Christian gentleman who has harmed no man (or woman), and Hank Wild - a good guy even if he is the Adjutant General. And poor fed-up, moping Mo Menard. To this harmless and worthy menage they sent - you'll never guess, you'll never believe it - the new Inspector-General. Jeeze! He has false teeth and a grouch. He's been in the Army thirty years and is still a policeman at heart. He chases nurses and writes reports about their loose conduct. I ask you.

Mo Menard moved out. He has gotten very pimpy - and when Hank Wild pushed a breakfast plate of cold greasy fried eggs aside, saying, "Damn these eggs," Mo leaped up and said, "That ties it. I won't stay here another night!" Later Menard called at my office and apologized - said he felt badly leaving me in the lurch but if he had to have added to an Inspector General, an Adjutant General who cursed a poor unoffending egg - life - simply - was - not - worth - living. And besides he didn't like the cook. Yep - war has its hardships.

Caskey will write you a news letter about his trip - I suggest that you give it the same circulation mine have had.

With all the best to you and all.

Your pal,

(Signed) Ulius



Sunday - February 28, 1940, 314

SECRET

Dear Duke:

This is another chat with you and the rest of my friends back home. And, incidentally, that word HOME is commencing to have a magic sound. If, in these Ramblings I describe things you know better than I, forgive me and consider that I am writing for those who have neither seen, heard or smelt Old Cairo - and my impressions may amuse you, who may have gotten clearer impressions than I.

Sunday is no day of rest, but I decided to take the afternoon off - and here I am at a typewriter - an Army Underwood portable that sounds like a machine-gun batting away in a garbage can. (There are no garbage cans here; it would be unfriendly to use one. The approved practice is to throw your trash out on the sidewalk; then the hungry natives can scavenge some sustenance out of it if they can beat the dogs to the pile - while overhead, huge hawks hover waiting their chance at either the refuse or the death of a native scavenger.)

One chap tells me that a friend of his was billeted in a native village elsewhere in Africa in a particularly filthy hut. During his first meal there he was served bread that he had to snatch before it walked off under its own motive power and butter that had melted and was serving as a bath for happy insects. When the soup was served him the stench nearly overpowered him; he grabbed his spoon, closed his eyes so that he couldn't see what he was eating - and tried to ladle off a spoon full. He missed as something rested on his shoulder; opening his eyes he saw a vulture perched on the window-sill, leaning over his shoulder, drinking his soup.

Zamalek is an island in the Nile, reached by bridges from Cairo proper - if, indeed it is proper to speak of Cairo as proper. It is most attractively situated and boasts many impressive looking apartment houses. It is in one of these that I am billeted. Our "flat" (I'm not going British on you,) is on the third and fourth floors, rather scantily furnished. It had been occupied by a member of the American Legation staff. On the first floor of our apartment we have servants quarters, two bedrooms and a bath and lavatory, a sitting room, an extra room that was probably used as a library but which we use as an emergency bedroom, and a small foyer. A very pleasant balcony is in front. On the second floor there is another bedroom and bath and a second very small emergency bedroom. A store-room completes the inside - but outside there is a spacious private terrace.

When first I came here I was assigned to the little top floor bedroom while a Q.M. Colonel had the big room. He moved on to Tripoli and the others decided that I could have the big bedroom instead of another officer who had spoken for it - and at the same time promoted me to the head of the table - which was down right generous because here the head of the table is served first. So I have a penthouse away over here in Egypt.

Our mess is adequate, though the menus are without imagination. We candle the bread before eating it; once in a while we find small ex-live stock inside, so we chuck that piece aside and grab another. The other two permanent guests here are lieutenant colonels. Menard, a West Pointer, is G3 of both S.O.S. and U.S.A.F.I.M.E. Wild is Adjutant General of both headquarters. Other chaps are house or mess guests here - Riggs, C.O. of the Eretrian Service Command and others from the Persian Gulf, Levant Command; the G.H.Q. G1, etc. So staying here, I meet the various lads and I hope that the friendships being developed will benefit OSS.

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**SECRET**

Joe Leete also lives on this island; he shares an apartment with a medical major and a very nice English civilian who has something to do with sea transport. Also on the island are a number of the other officers useful to see in our business; Moore, the M.A., Macclanahan, G 2, and so on. I see the two I've just mentioned a great deal, and I can say that the whole works here go out of their way to be helpful. They all seem to want us to get going and are willing to do all they can to help. They act as if they were our partners; we can have whatever we want in Army equipment and personnel, both commissioned and enlisted.

I haven't gone all out on my foreign associations yet, though I have met and talked to the Greek Minister of War and all of the Greek generals, and with some of the Yugoslavs; and, of course, I have been in close touch with Lord Glenconner and others of S.O.E. I met General Wilson at Prince Peter's (Greece,) and had a little talk with him and he was kind enough to invite me around to see him. General Jumbo thinks the world of General Bonner Fellers, as does Minister Kirk. Both say that Bonner Fellers is the greatest Military Attache of any nation they have ever met anywhere and both want him back here. Kirk says he will do anything he knows how to do to get him back.

You, Duke, have left many friends here who also want to see you come back here. I know you'd like to be here, and I certainly would like to have you here.

I haven't had much to do with the British S.I.S. crowd here because I don't want to have to answer questions about our S.I. plans until McBain arrives with them. But I have called and met the Chief of the I.S.L.D. as S.I.S. calls itself. Incidentally some rather attractive girls there were insistent on knowing when Mac would return from America.

We get a lot of bad news here. Planes are lost and with them very swell people we knew and liked. And there are deaths from other causes too - to say nothing of the battles going on - now - a long way from here. So please have a lot of good news to send us from back home; we can use it. I don't know how you all like these occasional personal chats that I've been sending back, but if you could send us some about Que, Administration and things that are going on in Washington it would be a great morale builder. Gossip from the field probably doesn't mean much to you in Washington, but to those of us who have no outside interests here, little notes and news-letters would be a swell boost.

We are going to open seriously large bases in far-away spots - and there your friendly notes will be more than important. As soon as Colonel Guenther gets back from the Tunisian Front, I am going to have to push out into the desert for a little while - and - I hope eventually to push out into even more interesting places. If, as I hope, some invasion starts out from this theatre, OSS will have a chance to play an important role.

I have attended only one completely social party here - one Joe Leete threw. The one given by Prince Peter of Greece was a duty affair and I spent hours there talking to Allied military gents. I plan to concentrate entirely on business that will get me home soonest and I can have as much fun as if I was attending purely pleasure parties. Please get me right - I'm claiming no virtue; I'll enjoy the work more than anything else. And, after all, aren't all of my good old friends back home - and we didn't do a hell of a lot of playing there, did we?

Some of you know how foolish I am about dogs. That being one of my weak points, I have always formed ideas about peoples by the way they treat domestic animals. For example - once you crossed the frontier into Greece from other Balkan countries, you noticed that

- 3 -

**SECRET**

the dog's tails were up - where they had all been down. The way the average Greek treated his animals was a big point in his favor so far as I was concerned. Well, here animals don't do so well. Perhaps it's to be expected that in a country where human life is cheap that camels that snarl and bite should be beaten. But it's pretty hard for an Occidental to take, seeing those poor beasts having the tar walloped out of them. They're a pretty mangy lot, well on the under-fed side. They say that most of them are diseased; that a camel bite is quite apt to give a venereal disease. But, as I said, human life is cheap. It is a common saying among taxi-drivers that if you hit a man, you'd better kill him - it's cheaper.

I'd like to find out about this name Wog. You hear it all over Africa. Here they say that it comes from the initials of Willy Oriental Gentleman - but I believe that there is a Wog language in the heart of Africa. Our troops, including our negro soliders I don't think much of Wogs.

My business doesn't call for me to learn very much about the Egyptian at present - or perhaps I should say that the first call on my time are the Greeks, the Yugos, Bulgars, Rumanians, etc. Perhaps when and if I get around to meeting local gentlemen of color I may find the same charm that some other Americans profess to find in them. But I believe the Egyptian is quite another proposition than the Arab of the desert. At Prince Peter's party I did meet some charming Egyptian ladies, brunettes, but not too deep - who were as gracious and attractive as any one would wish to see anywhere. But they're not seen on the streets of this hybrid but Moslem city. Outside you see the men in their flowing robes and turbaned heads, very possibly beating a donkey or camel.

The streets are a kaleidoscope of color. Tall proud-carriaged Indian troops, little cunning Malaysians, black East Africans; Greeks, Yugoslavs; Australians, New Zealanders; husky South Africans and hardy Scots in their kilts; the colorful special regiments of Great Britain and our own Americans - all mingling with the Coptic priests, the veiled women, the Nubian servants and the costumes of Arabian Nights.

It is an interesting place, but one either is fascinated or he wants to getaway in a hurry. For my part, I am interested - but I haven't time. There's too much to be done and too little time in which to do it; and I came over here to help get action; when one has a goal, nothing else seems to matter very much. There will be time enough when the war is won to see the pyramids - except that there are American scenes on which I'd like to gaze first.

I sound as if I'd be here a long time. Well, I don't know - one of the jobs I seem to have is Chief Operations Officer. Colonel Menard, presently G 3 would be a swell Chief Operations Officer and I believe he would like the assignment. It may be that I will recommend him. I want to have a part in the push I hope is coming off, but I am willing to try to work myself out of a job if I can get into that assignment a man who can handle it better than I can. Menard is West Point, very serious and energetic and aching to do something against the enemy. So you may be hearing from me that this guy should be appointed to my post. That will still leave me with other responsibilities here, unless the Hill and others think that these too should be assumed by others. Anyway, let's see.

As I was writing, Menard came in, there is Canadian whiskey on the colorful great carved brass tray and so I will call this off for today. Then, too, in a little while I go off to a business dinner with Major Moore. S'long

(Signed) U.L.A.

**SECRET**Cairo  
March 8, 1943

Dear Duke:

There isn't much to report that makes interesting reading. What I have done since last writing is to keep up contacts - make new ones - and organize. One very good thing happened which I'll outline later below.

Guenther got in yesterday physically very tired. He had gotten up to the front where he watched our O.S.S. boys in action. His report is not encouraging. But, in my opinion, they are being used for tasks for which they are not trained - scouting and patrol. Sage and a sergeant got themselves captured day before yesterday, the sergeant being terribly wounded. In my opinion, our lad should not be used in actual military combat until and unless they have had the full thirteen weeks of basic military training. They can handle themselves in personal combat - can blow up bridges and do plenty of damage - but how can we expect them to know the principles of military-combat scouting and patrol unless they are trained for that purpose.

Another thing - they arrived unequipped and we had to beg, borrow and draw from the forces there - leaving some of their combat teams improperly equipped. We should certainly stick to what we know how to do. Huntington will have a lot to say when he gets back - and I hope he thinks as I have commented above.

I have found John Saunders here. He was a British Major in the last war and later League of Nations delegate for the exchange of Bulgar-Greek population. Saunders, Morris (later our Charge at Berlin and now Minister to Iceland), and a number of British officers and the British Consul General and I formed a tight little fraternity for years - standing against or apart from other British whom we considered stuffed-shirts and even some of our own fellows. We practically ran Macedonia.

Well - Saunders heads the Greek-Bulgarian section for British Psychological Warfare - and each of the others (except Morris, of course) is in S.I.S. or S.O.E. - and that tight little fraternity is still a tight little fraternity. They do not trust the security - or operational judgment of their own organizations and are powerful enough to run an inner circle in S.I.S. - S.O.E. and P.W.E. without the knowledge of most of the executives and only of the top fellows in London. This circle unites all their functions as we are now united, while the S.I.S., S.O.E. and P.W.E. fight all over the lot. They are sort of an Irregular Project, enjoying the highest sanction. We have not been in touch with these men until now. They won't allow me to introduce any of our people to them as a group - except for one or two if I endorse them as secure and regular. I've cleared Guenther with them. They have an idea of several of our fellows and will not deal with them. But they will play ball with me and Guenther and one or two others if we certify them. They're a powerful group - and they're the ones who are doing things - but so secretly and quietly that much of their activities are not known to either Glensmorr or Bowly, neither of whose security they trust!

I consider it a good sign that I came out here and have found this group again installed as the Inner Circle. And, they will have something to say about the terms of South-eastern European peace from the British point of view. Incidentally, the same gang is partly installed in Turkey to work on that country and to give themselves some measure of freedom of action.

- 2 -

**SECRET**

If I did nothing else here than liaison with their group - my trip here would be justified.

Won't you report - in your own way - these things that I report to you - to those in O.S.S. who should know them?

I must close, in order to catch the pouch.

With best regards to all and of course to you.

Sincerely,

(Signed)

ULIUS

*Amoss, U.S. 10, 314*  
*x 14/10/14*  
 Cairo  
 March 6, 1943

Dear Duke:

These are busy days - as new lads report in - as our activities grow - as our contacts increase. After having been inundated by my gargantuan correspondence you must be relieved to see it diminish.

Let's see what has happened since the last pouch.

SATURDAY - April 3.

We conferred with caïque captains.

I spent a long time with King George who again reproached me for having ignored him; accused me of being afraid that "my friends, his enemies" wouldn't love me if they knew I had been seeing him. I asked him if he didn't think it a good idea to avoid being called a royalist. He laughed and said that I didn't have to call on him often - he'd call at my apartment incognito - but "For God's sake, have a hostess there, I'd get tired of looking at your mug". I told him I'd provide a hostess, that he could look but musn't touch. "Okay", said the monarch, "I'll look. When's our first clandestine meeting?"

The King is very annoyed at the British. As for Casey - well here's what the King said, verbatim:  
 "Casey! An elegant gent - who isn't there. An English Minister who isn't English. An Australian the Australians refuse to acknowledge. Mister Casey is non-existent." And, Duke - listen to this - "Casey has come to the bat and Casey has struck out!" How's that for a King?

On Kirk: "Your Minister is beautiful and friendly and graceful. He is a success. He has one house where he serves luncheons. Another he has for dinners. He sleeps in a third. You can't pin a man down when he flits from house to house. But- he's the parfait diplomat".

On General Donovan: "So he's a general. I told him he was better off as a civilian. As a civilian he had cabinet rank. As a general he's got to pay attention to a lot of chap: who are better ignored. I don't like to see General Donovan hampered by rank." I told the King that our boss wouldn't be hampered by rank or by anything else. "Oh yes, I know," he said, "but why should he have to salute a bunch of his inferiors." I told him that American generals are in a class by themselves. "Don't be so damned loyal," the King replied, "you talk like a professional soldier. A general is a general in any army. I'm going to tell General Donovan all this when he gets out here - if the British haven't deposed me by that time."

We're still talking about Saturday - In the afternoon - after a conference luncheon, we all piled out to the military hospital to go over plans for action from Smyrna with Captain Zangas. The doughty little naval captain was still in great pain - but is thinking clearly. The rest of the day and evening was consumed in other planning meetings - with other Greek officers - with the A.G., the I.G. and so on.



- 2 -

SUNDAY - April 4.

Sunday I went to Alexandria through the desert and a sand storm. The road was solid with convoys, some of them American. I transacted a little business - but I must admit that the trip there - and back - and the luncheon at the Union Bar was a pleasure. I instructed the chef in the mysteries of making chocolate sauce (knowing nothing about the matter myself) and had ice-cream and chocolate sauce which delighted me and pleased my guest. Arrived back in Cairo at 10:30 and dined happily at the Ermitage whose Greek proprietor turns things inside out for me.

Monday - April 5.

This was a day! Old Packy MacFarland has taken the bit in his teeth and is making things hum. He hasn't allowed an attack of gipple tummy to slow him down a bit. The main show was a luncheon we had with the Liberal Section of the Greek cabinet. They had just returned from a meeting with Minister of State Casey who would not permit them to name Admiral Voulgaris as Minister of the Navy - but agreed to let him assume the Ministry of Aviation, Venizelos to assume the Navy portfolio. The Greeks were incensed and were going to resign. After a long and heated argument, I persuaded them to stand by - and only hope that some new British inadvertence does not blow the lid. I must say that I agree that Voulgaris is not the best man under present circumstances - but the British attacked the problem in a way certain to affront the Greeks. I think I could persuade them to withdraw the Admiral's name and may still do so - but I don't like to butt in too much on matters that do not concern us directly.

The Vice P.M. asked me if I had any objection to Bodosakis' presence in the Middle East - he had cabled for Greek permission. I told him "no", that I had no objection, that it was not my affair to object to the travel of Greeks especially if they were in the good graces of the Government.

Major Bier is here - with ants in his pants - all ready to go. Caskey looks good. He'll do well. Edwards is turning out to be a good, tough, effective Administrative Officer, Transportation Officer, Signal officer and so on.

Monday, afternoon I took over a request to the C.G. for Private Georgiades to come by air, first priority. He said, "Want 'im in a hurry." When I said, "sure," he signed - "Ok, Commanding General," and told me to tell the A.G. to step on it. The A. G. wrote two cables - told me to take my choice - or write my own over the General's signature. But his cable was strong enough - among other things he said that he is needed urgently on a mission involving personal danger, of great importance to the U. S. Forces in the Middle East and that he must be here within two weeks. Damn if these boys don't cooperate! They let us write our own cables over the General's signature.

The Cretan guerrillas want supplies - ammunition, guns, etc., G3 and G4 get 'em for us and in a week a brave little ship sails for Crete with intrepid men carrying American arms - British concurring.

- 3 -

Major Bier who has been both in London and Algiers, still has his eyes popping, says it's a dream here - OSS being a favored part of this Army - and activities going on in feverish speed.

Now - if only we are not slowed down by the arrival of other officers not geared to our frantic tempo. We have no room for prima donnas, but only for more comrades-in-arms who'll get in and pitch. There is no pride of rank or position here - no one is bossing anyone - everyone here up to now is a self starter and so far there is a happy "let's get 'em men" attitude that is mowing down all obstacles. Its a swell nucleus we have - but we're all worried that the team spirit may be hurt unless those sent out are of the same calibre.

Actually - I've never worked in a happier atmosphere where its so absolutely all for one and one for all - with the regular army taking the same attitude. We're the regular army's boys - and goddamn any one who tries to push us around! We are one team - happy and proud - and we know that back home you and Shepardson and Huntington and General Donovan and others are charter members playing your positions for us. That's why its so all-fired important to give us men who'll "belong" - and not any self-preening, self centered fellows who will want to change the time, whose personal ambitions will mar this harmony, who will talk and talk, mostly pontifically; the scintillation of whose brain will shine and glitter while action atrophies. THIS IS A HIGH PRESSURE, FAST-ACTING AREA - TOUGH, ROUGH AND NASTY - BUT HELL DOING THINGS, NOT TALKING ABOUT THEM.

Tuesday, April 6

I haven't mentioned Jerry Bailey who is here under another name. The lad belongs to our show! He is doing things. His radio men, picked up here - trained by him - here - (in Charlie Edwards apartment!) are now ready to sail for Greece and Crete. Jerry is a man.

How do I get dope from the British - before S.I.S. and S.F.E. know about it? How do I get the new policies before they are announced even secretly? Don't ask. But advance knowledge has made us strong, has helped us to avoid mistakes.

A new sensational achievement should be ready for me to announce in a day or so.

Perhaps this is enough for one letter. Please, Duke, let Shepardson, Huntington and others concerned (including Howland and Rehm) see this letter of mine. I want them to get the feel of things here - to know what we are doing and what we are not doing - and I believe that if you can get them to read even the sloppy reports I write thatacky, Charlie, Jack, Jerry and Ullus and the others will seem more real, will not gradually fade as persons - but will remain in your minds as your boys out here working like hell in the common cause.

All the best to you and all

(Signed) Ullus



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: Feb. 11, 1943

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan  
FROM: Lt. Colonel Florimond Duke  
SUBJECT:

Enclosed herewith are copies of two letters from Colonel Amoss.

Also enclosed is a copy of a letter from him to David Bruce about Ensign Reed.

If it should work out later that the exiled Yugoslav Government should also move its headquarters to Cairo, it would be very much to our advantage to have Ensign Reed transferred to OSS. In fact it would be most valuable to us immediately even though the Yugoslav Government remains in London.

Knowing the feeling about OSS on the part of Captain Callan, I am wondering if you care to do anything about this.

*F. D. D.*  
F. D. D.

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SECRET

January 30, 1943

Lt. Col. F. Duke,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Duke:

The following are threads I want to Pick up before leaving for Cairo - which may be at any moment. It seems that I will go by British Military plane via Gibraltar and Malta instead of American plane by way of Algiers with General Larson.

There is some sentiment against us here, too. Colonel Myers of the A.G.O. doesn't care for us according to a statement he made to General Larson's aide - said that he was fed up with OSS sightseeing jaunts and that he would not include me as a member of the General's party unless General Eisenhower telegraphed permission, and that he wouldn't telegraph for that permission unless General Larson and I declared that my presence in North Africa was vital to the campaign there. So that stymied me. But I must get to Cairo before General Larson does; he is taking that trip at my request in order to help us out with General Andrews. On the trip over here, I made the deal with General Larson that you saw - and had hoped to extend and revise it on the balance of the journey. I think that Jimmie Murphy and, perhaps, General Magruder should know the above because it does us no good with other branches of the service when the A.G.'s deputy gives us bad advertising. And we do require cooperation from many a branch.

YUGOSLAVIA. King Peter has a mind of his own on certain things. One of these is Mihailovich. He trusts the General as you will see reflected in the copies of General Mihailovich's telegrams to the London Yugoslav Government. He wants us to get a real mission into Yugoslavia and does not put any strings on our independence of judgment or operation.

He is worried about the Partisans, but believes cooperation between Partisans and Chetniks could be effected unless Moscow is trying to control post-war Yugoslavia by the expedient of "owning the Yugoslav army." However, he doubts the stories of Partisan strength and says we will have to find that out for ourselves. The King rather believes that there is loose or even no real organization in parts of Yugoslavia, and that patriotic

Yugoslavs join whatever band happens to have a mission on.

As I have reported, the King has small respect for his Cabinet, and has no personal allegiances. However, his mind has been turned against General Simovich, who must have run foul of the Queen Mother. The King told me many stories about Simovich's career beginning with the last war and up to today. Some of them had the earmarks of malicious gossip and, unless I hear other implementing evidence I will believe that the character-assassins have their knives in the old General. But it is not our role to interfere with foreign politics except where a kind word might avert dissension harmful to the war effort. Happily, the King likes Popovich.

The Queen Mother told me that she liked Savitch - but said, "The poor fellow is wacky - he has had too many crack-ups and too many automobile accidents." The kid King broke in, "Colonel, she means that he is slaphappy." The Queen beamed on her boy and said, "Don't forget, Colonel, that after the war, Yugoslavia will be ruled by two American kids." Then she said that Savitch had been in an asylum twice, that his only useful role would be that of palace guard or commando. "He knows no fear," she said, "And he has the loyalty of the very pure or the fanatic."

GREECE. Tsouderos and Canellopoulos are reconciled. But Tsouderos does not trust Canellopoulos completely but does credit his honesty. He feels that Canellopoulos has a bit of the fanatic in him, the fruit of starvation and the waging of guerrilla warfare under impossible conditions. As a matter of fact, the Vice Premier does have eyes that stare rather wildly at times - as any fugitive's might.

On the other hand, Canellopoulos rather likes Tsouderos. He is willing to play ball with the King if the King "will mind his own business and be the highly-paid and vastly ornamental rubber-stamp that he is supposed to be - a symbol of the unity of the people and not the pawn of this or that party." Canellopoulos says of Xenos, "I trust him 99%. I think he will make a good Military Attache in your country - but watch him a little and see if he gets into any intrigues." The Vice Prime Minister says that Xenos should not be criticized too much for working under Maniadakis. He says that he never was (the "a Maniadakis man." He also said, "Neither is he my man, Tsouderos' man, nor King's. He is a career officer working for Greece and a pension."

The Prime Minister announced to me yesterday that the Government would move to Cairo in from 30 to 60 days. The British agreed yesterday - but do not want any other Government (including ours) informed just yet. The Prime Minister said frankly that the reasons - each one of them strong enough to justify the move, and

taken together, irresistible, are these:

1. They can accomplish nothing more by remaining in London.
2. They are losing caste in Greece and with Greeks in foreign countries by being so far away from Greece.
3. A Vice Prime Minister in Cairo, and a Prime Minister in London tends to create two Governments, mutually competitive.
4. The King should be with his Army, especially as it is being prepared for action Greece.
5. In Egypt, quick communication can be maintained with Greece and officers brought out and returned.
6. The British War Office accepts that an early campaign may be waged against Crete. The Prime Minister undertakes to raise the entire Cretan population, and promises to massacre the occupying garrisons. (He asks us to send men into Crete to help coordinate such a rebellion; to train Cretans to sabotage and murder their unwelcome guests, and to be disciplined so that their uprisings will be coordinated with and aerial and surface assault.) The Government proposes to move in with a coordinated invasion.
7. Theofanides will assume practical control of Secret Operations under Canellopoulos. Theofanides will visit America for two weeks - then proceed to Cairo.

Naturally, I have made no commitments, but will confer with Ellery Huntington in Cairo and will hope to get up a "mission" that will have approval of General Andrews, the British J.C.S. and, of course, ours.

There are, of course, many other loose ends to report, but continued and continual conferences leave me little time for paper work. I hope I can report more freely from Cairo. Though it may be immodest, I think I should say that the idea of moving to Cairo was mine and was proposed by me unofficially and secretly to Theofanides. As a result of his talks with the Prime Minister, the Vice Prime Minister, and the King the above has resulted and, as I have said, the British agree but are not ready for us to know about it yet. The Egyptians are said to interpose no objection to the consolidation of the Greek Government in Egypt. If they should become too difficult, the British offer Palestine as the Greek Government's base.

With all the best to all of you -

Sincerely,

(sign: 1) Ulius  
U. L. Amoss

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P  
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January 28, 1943

Lt. Col. F. Duke,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

Dear Duke:

I have had repeated private meetings with King Peter, and one with Queen Marie, his Mother. His Mother runs the show, more or less, with the young King showing signs of taking more and more matters into his own hands.

Peter does not like his cabinet. He believes that the best in it are second-rate and that there are some who are worse. He says that many behaved very badly on their evacuation and brought along friends and family against military best interests. He doubts if many of his Government could return to Yugoslavia safely.

The King thinks well of Popovich but states that some of his ministers hate him. He believes British SOE does not like Popovich but states that he would have no objection to our using him if the British agreed.

He stated that his secret service had picked up some correspondence between Colonel Donovan and General Simovich. He does not believe that we know the real truth about the General, and said that some of the criticisms against himself arose over an order to the Yugoslav Navy written by Simovich and signed by the King in ignorance of the true facts. He said Simovich, four days before, had ordered the capitulation of the Navy, and then prepared the order for it to leave Yugoslav waters when he knew full well that it had already surrendered. This, says the King, made it appear that he was young and weak and did not know what was going on. "I had only had power for ten days," said the King, "and I did not know what was going on." He gave me (orally) a long list of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance charged against Simovich.

I do not get the impression that the Yugoslav Secret Service has indeed intercepted any letter from Colonel Donovan. I believe they may have gotten a letter by Simovich addressed to Colonel Donovan.

"Colonel Donovan is my friend," said Peter, "and I hope he will realize that, at best, Simovich's record is questionable." It is possible that one of the Court clique "got to" Queen Marie, who then warned her boy against the old General.

- 2 -

Peter is not only young, but eager. He is honest and sincere, and is aware of the self-seeking of his politicians. But as yet he has no clear idea of all of them. He is bewildered by the Chetnik-Partisan fight; believes that the Communists have built on the crumbling ruins of the old and small Communist party. He does not believe the publicly published strength of the Partisans. He believes that many loyal Yugoslavs have adhered to the Partisans, because the Chetniks were not operating in a particular district, and because the "Yugoslav wants to fight the invader under whatever leadership appears." He believes that the bulk of the Partisans are simple people and should be helped, though he hopes that through our good offices the main forces may be joined.

The King loaned me two volumes of telegrams received by him through British SOE. Many of these wires were given Captain Callan, Mr. Biddle's Naval Attache, through Reed, but our belief is that they have lodged with ONI without much dissemination. The wires are being copied and will be forwarded to you - and others will be given us. (As I reported earlier, Captain Callan does not like OSS, and through Reed he has the best pipe-line to the Yugoslav King.)

Peter proposes to take the trip to Cairo when we send for him. When and if we have an American mission to send to Mihailovich, he would like to be on hand for their departure. He is ready to "do anything, risk anything that you require," and is, "subject to your orders."

You can see from the above that my impressions of the young King are good. He is trying to do his duty. Definitely he is not a Serb-Chauvinist. He is for a united Yugoslavia. He fears Bulgaria, and he trusts Mihailovich; he likes Pribichevich (Gazima).

With best wishes -

Sincerely,

ULIUS

U. L. Amoss

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P  
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SECRET

January 25, 1943

Lt. Col. David Bruce,  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dave:

You will have seen my cable in which reference is made to Arthur Reed. You will remember that we were told that he was too young to be an Assistant Naval Attache; that Dr. Baker rather indicated that he was not good material for our work - an appraisal of which Reed was made aware by Dr. Baker.

Well, Reed is still an Ensign, not much older than he was when we lost him as Assistant Naval Attache. He is the one confidant of King Peter and of the King's fiancée. Except for the Queen Mother, no one person in the world has so much influence. It is true that Reed has the drawbacks of extreme youth, but he also has the virtues.

Reed is not at all sour about OSS, though he remains hurt by criticism of him at the school and doubtful about our aggressiveness since we told him he was too young to be an Assistant Naval Attache, and yet he was sent to the same post to which we were unable to send him.

His chief, the Naval Attache, Captain Callan is very bitterly against OSS. Reed believes he was prejudiced by some experiences (the nature of which he is not aware) in Lisbon.

Reed can be useful in getting points of view to Peter.

With best wishes, -

Sincerely,

Ulius

(Signed) U. L. Amoss



AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDON

**LONDON**

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to the fact that the Government is not in a position to supply the necessary equipment for the construction of the proposed canal. The Government is not in a position to supply the necessary equipment for the construction of the proposed canal. The Government is not in a position to supply the necessary equipment for the construction of the proposed canal.

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SECRET



JANUARY 20, 1943

**SECRET**

Colonel Demoyan

Page 2.

**2. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.**

I am convinced that we can give a good account of ourselves in this field. I believe that vast territories in Europe need this activity. Conquered peoples need the boost, and enemy forces are hampered by withering hate. Negative advertising can devastate, as Mr. Hoover discovered in subway whispering campaigns.

Our Southeastern European Section personnel offers a good nucleus in such officers as Sperling, Cankey, Oliver, Daniel, Young, etc. - men who are super-trained formally and by experience to influence people to win (or lose) friends.

On this subject I plan to send occasional reports and, eventually, a plan.

**3. ELLERY SMITHINGTON**

I have had a chance to observe Ellery at work. He is a positive demon at getting things done. He gets along with anyone, anybody. I feel that he needs more rank - and yet Ellery would be treated as a trusted friend by Lori Whoozie or Sergeant Whatsis even if he had no rank.

I think his demeanor should be pointed out to all our officers as an example. Friendly, dynamic, he is the type of American foreigners love. No aping of his English for Ellery - and yet they are crazy about him. What a contrast from Ellery, who is just plain Yank, to other officers whose imitation of English-British is a sour burlesque. It may be "clipped" English with the English, but from an American it is merely circumscribed. Ellery just barges in, grins, discusses and never argues, and gets what he wants - and he talks like home folks.

**4. MY ARRIVAL**

As you may know, I had no sooner got here than the English threw up their noisiest A/A barrage of the war. At the station I was met by Maddox and Pratt, who did everything to make me feel welcome.

While I know that Headquarters scarcely can spare you for a minute, your occasional presence here and at our outposts would be inspiring to everyone.

Other more specific reports are to be written, but through Duke - as I stated earlier. These reports cover or will cover:

1. Greek governmental crisis avoided.
2. Great "Irregular" activity (through Mrs. Sieber).
3. Approach to Admiral Canaris - who is in Bern.
4. Colonel Xenos.
5. Greek Guerrilla leaders. To be met personally, and implementation of their activities with personnel and material.

**SECRET**

January 20, 1943.

**SECRET**

Page 3.

Colonel Donovan

6. Yugoslav Guerrilla contact and implementation.
  7. Views of King Peter, and report on methods of reaching the Serbs despite Court obstacles.
  8. Rumanian disaffection and its implementation.
  9. Czech plans.
  10. Hungarian disaffection and its implementation.
  11. Bulgarian disaffection and its implementation.
- Other subjects will be developed here and in Cairo.

Respectfully,



Julius L. Amoss

Copy: 14. Col. Duke

Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

**SECRET**

S E C R E TOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

26 February, 1943.

Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services,  
"Q" Building,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

This morning I was informed that General Brereton yesterday cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that he and the British had approved O.S.S. plans for this Theatre. I cabled you accordingly.

I have also cabled several reports which I assume have been brought to your attention:

1. Bulgaria has agreed that when and if Russian troops reach the Rumanian frontiers, Boris will be expelled and a Soviet Republic proclaimed as a member of the U.S.S.R.
2. There is grave doubt as to the authenticity of the telegrams handed me by King Peter from General Mihailovich. It is believed (and I have examined reasonably convincing arguments) that the several agents reporting messages supposed to originate from Mihailovich's Headquarters to the British are fabrications and that the General is unaware of them. It may be, however, that the last several messages are genuine; they came through new channels.
3. Three executions took place last week in Athens; a fourth agent is condemned and a fifth escaped and should reach Cairo in a few days. These men had been appointed for work in our Greek Irregular network. One of the agents was a cousin of the Skouras brothers and was the only one of the five from whom we had received reports. I am informed that substitutes have been left behind, but communication has not been established as yet. (Please note that Greek Irregular activities are handled by Minister Theofanides and are not reported to anyone except the King, Prime Minister Tsouderos and Vice Prime Minister Canellopoulos, Major Pearce and myself. They are quite separate and apart from any regular activities of the Greeks, British or ourselves.


These, and the other reports I cabled and wrote from London and Cairo, are drawn from our own sources and are not mimeographed handouts from the British.

from Col. Amoss - 26 Feb. 1943.

Instead of Colonel Guenther who is still at the  
 could it be but a coincidence that the tide  
 Gus turned up!)

I hope that you will be glad to know that all responsible  
 in this Command have become good friends of ours. Both  
 G-3's; both Chiefs of Staff, the joint Adjutant  
 Military Attache and others are going out of their  
 way to be cooperative. Some of these gentlemen are kind enough  
 to even consult with me on every development regard-  
 ing intelligence activities in this Theatre.  
 I have found it wise to be quartered in a billet with some of  
 these men where almost every responsible visiting officer calls.

Respectfully,



ULIUS L. AMOSS,  
 Lt. Colonel, AUS,  
 Acting Director of  
 Strategic Services,  
 Middle East.

*(Amoss) 12-048-5913*  
*X War*  
*X Commission*

8 October 1945

**SUBJECT:** Release for Assignment to Army Air Forces

**TO :** Commanding General,  
Army Air Forces,  
Washington, D. C.

**Attention:** Military Personnel Division

1. The request of the Army Air Forces for the release from the Office of Strategic Services for assignment to the Army Air Forces of Colonel Ulius L. Amoss, O-905149, A.C., is hereby approved.

2. While assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, Colonel Amoss has been performing important duties for this office overseas. The approval for his release is given upon the understanding that the duties for which the release is requested require the particular qualifications of this officer.

**WILLIAM J. DONOVAN**  
Director

Am. S. J. Hous. 7/13  
x War  
x Commission

**SECRET**

(25)

10 September 1945

SUBJECT: Colonel W. L. Anson, AG, 0905140 -- Orders

TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, NSA Theater, Room 3412, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia

1. It is hereby requested that you arrange for transmission of the following cable to General Anson, USAF:

"Colonel W. L. Anson, A.C., had USAFME orders dated 4 August 1945 directing him to proceed to Washington for duty for USAFME and remain for approximately one month."

"By direction of Brigadier General William F. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, request is made to extend this duty approximately 30 days more in connection with completion of that agency."

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

J. A. Hous  
Colonel, P. A.  
Communications, Hq. & Hq. Det., GCS

COMM: 12000

**SECRET**



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Amoss*  
*5/12/42*  
*U. L. Amoss*  
*U. L.*

May 12, 1942

Mr. James R. Murphy  
Coordinator of Information  
Administration Building

Dear Jim,

Yesterday I was sworn in as Lieutenant Colonel,  
assigned to the Office of the Coordinator. I want  
to thank you for what you have arranged and, if it  
is in order, I would like you to tell the Colonel  
how much I appreciate his approval.

With deepest appreciation.

Sincerely,

*U. L. Amoss*  
Ulius L. Amoss



*Wick*  
*X War*  
*X Commission*

April 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL GOODFELLOW

From: J. R. Murphy

I am sending you the attached papers covering the application of Mr. Amoss for a commission. I would greatly appreciate it if you could have the matter handled in such a way that it will receive prompt attention and action in the War Department.



*Wick*  
*X War*  
*X Commission*

April 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL GOODFELLOW

From: J. R. Murphy

I am sending you the attached papers covering the application of Mr. Amoss for a commission. I would greatly appreciate it if you could have the matter handled in such a way that it will receive prompt attention and action in the War Department.

April 28, 1942

Brig. General James A. Ulio  
The Adjutant General  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Ulio:

I am forwarding herewith the necessary forms for Mr. Ulius Louis Amoss in connection with his application for a commission in the Army.

We are anxious that if Mr. Amoss meets the requirements, he be commissioned at the earliest possible date, and when commissioned that he be assigned to this office for duty. He is employed here now in connection with special secret activities and his present duties, as well as other duties which we have planned for him to undertake, require a commission status of the rank of Lieut. Colonel, Res.

In addition to the above, it is desired to assign Mr. Amoss to special service duty which will commence on or about May 9 and it would therefore be greatly appreciated if action in this case could be taken prior to that date.

Sincerely,

JWD:gn

William J. Donovan

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Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

DIRECTOR'S COPIES OF ACTION CABLES  
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1944

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the camera field

Even No. rolls

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