

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : Mr. S. B. L. Penrose  
FROM : Charles S. Cheston  
SUBJECT: Field Report - Lois Lombard

DATE: 17 April 1945

Will you and Colonel Pfaff get together and discuss this report, and let me have your comments. Is the individual referred to by the writer in the last paragraph of the report one that we should question? Also what about the policy of continuing to use native personnel in that office?

CSC:R  
Attachment

*CSC*  
C.S.C.

P.S. - Please be sure to return attached report to me.

SECRET

Form 2202

FORM

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....  
 Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <i>Plaff</i>		4/18	APR 19 1945	SP	Roger: Will you read this + this letter with me. Note Kramer comments.
2. <i>Carton</i>		4/26	4/26/45	RP	Please see note on transmission memo
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

1. This comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 2. This should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 3. Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 4. Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 5. Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 6. This sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 7. Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

## Office Memorandum •

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Lois Lombard

*Field Report 16, 352*  
*x Lombard, Ohio*  
*x Integral x ST*  
 DATE: 11 April 1945

There is attached the field report on the activities of Miss Lois Lombard, dated 26 March 1945.

*S. B. L. Penrose*  
 S. B. L. Penrose  
 Acting Chief, SI

Attachment

*Discussed with X-2. They will investigate further the matter of office security + the use of native personnel. I believe the case of Mr. Wood is adequately covered by Mr. Ryan's covering memo.*

*Spec 4*  
*Penrose*  
*+ [initials]*  
*Page 2*

SECRET

*Lois Lombard, Spain  
not included*

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

**MEMORANDUM**

April 3, 1946

TO: Chief, SI  
Via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Lois Lombard - Field Report

Subject, approximately forty years old, unmarried, was recruited to become Taggart's secretary when he was assigned to Lisbon as deputy to Argus for Portugal. Among subject's qualifications are a thorough knowledge of French and Italian as well as usable Spanish, Portuguese and German.

In connection with her reference to Mr. Wood I wish to say that Mr. Wood is serving in the dual capacity of head of the SI branch as well as the Financial Attache, in which latter position he has considerable duties to perform on behalf of the Treasury Department which, rather than detracting from his utility to us, strengthens his status, particularly in matters pertaining to Safe Haven operations.

Reports that we have received in the past indicate that Mr. Wood's work has been recognized and highly commended by former Ambassadors, Fish and Norweb, as well as by the State Department and Treasury.

Subject has resigned from the organization as of April 12 to return to her former work of private language instructor in her home community of Riverside, Connecticut.

*FR*  
F. T. R.

Attachment

**SECRET**



*Lois Lombard, Spain  
not included*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

## MEMORANDUM

April 3, 1946

TO: Chief, SI  
Via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Lois Lombard - Field Report

Subject, approximately forty years old, unmarried, was recruited to become Taggart's secretary when he was assigned to Lisbon as deputy to Argus for Portugal. Among subject's qualifications are a thorough knowledge of French and Italian as well as usable Spanish, Portuguese and German.

In connection with her reference to Mr. Wood I wish to say that Mr. Wood is serving in the dual capacity of head of the SI branch as well as the Financial Attache, in which latter position he has considerable duties to perform on behalf of the Treasury Department which, rather than detracting from his utility to us, strengthens his status, particularly in matters pertaining to Safe Haven operations.

Reports that we have received in the past indicate that Mr. Wood's work has been recognized and highly commended by former Ambassadors, Fish and Norweb, as well as by the State Department and Treasury.

Subject has resigned from the organization as of April 12 to return to her former work of private language instructor in her home community of Riverside, Connecticut.

*FR*  
F. T. R.

Attachment

SECRET

16.002  
Field Report  
v. Lombard  
v. 10.10.44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

## MEMORANDUM

March 26, 1945

TO: Chief, SI  
via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Lois Lombard

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. Status: Secretary and general assistant. Stenography, typing, filing and code with SI in Lisbon, Portugal from June 1, 1944 to December 2, 1944. Then was sent to X-2 division to work on carding and German papers (mostly from German Propaganda Office, Lisbon) until my departure on the "Quense" February 15, 1945.
2. SI had numerous reports on enemy activities in general; purchase of war materials and food in Portugal; investments; bombing objectives in the Reich; Political situations (mostly in enemy occupied territory). The number and length of these reports began to dwindle sometime in November 1944 and at that time the "Safe Haven" project took their place.
3. SI had, until recently, more Portuguese than American office employees. They did not have access to the code nor to the safe in which code files and funds were kept, but they were telephone operators, translators and attended to the outgoing pouch. There were two among them: reception clerk named Westwood; and telephone operator Raoul Rodrigues - whom Miriam Forbes, Betty Robertson and myself suspected of disloyalty. We had no proof but Rodrigues listened in on telephone conversations and he and Westwood hobnobbed and had nothing in common as a basis for friendship. I believe both these men are still in our employ though Rodrigues has been given a three instead of an eight-hour telephone shift. The translators' knowledge of English was so poor that some of their translations (which I corrected) actually said the opposite of the original. This situation has been somewhat altered recently. William M. Wheeler, Security Officer, made objections and now the pouch is handled exclusively by Americans. I feel that Portuguese should never have been employed in our office but I also feel it is bad policy to get rid of them at this time.

SECRET

- 2 -

There is one SI officer in Lisbon for whom I worked who I found impossible to get along with - James E. Wood - head of the SI Lisbon branch. He had none of the qualifications that I have always seen manifest in an executive officer in any office. He was uncooperative and had a bad effect on the morale of the whole office staff (American and Portuguese alike). He displayed more interest in reports to the Treasury Department than in reports to OSS. During my stay in Lisbon I never met anyone who liked Mr. Wood.

I think it important that we maintain a post-war OSS organization at strategic points all over the world.

**SECRET**

April 8, 1948

TO: Chief, SI  
Vice Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Lois Lombard - Field Report

Subject, approximately forty years old, unmarried, was recruited to become Sigas's secretary when he was assigned to Lisbon as deputy to Argas for Portugal. Among subject's qualifications are a thorough knowledge of French and Italian as well as usable Spanish, Portuguese and German.

In connection with her reference to Mr. Wood I wish to say that Mr. Wood is serving in the dual capacity of head of the SI branch as well as the Financial Attache, in which latter position he has considerable duties to perform on behalf of the Treasury Department which, rather than detracting from his utility to us, strengthens his status, particularly in matters pertaining to Safe Haven operations.

Reports that we have received in the past indicate that Mr. Wood's work has been recognized and highly commended by former Ambassadors, Fish and Harbo, as well as by the State Department and Treasury.

Subject has resigned from the organization as of April 15 to return to her former work of private language instructor in her home community of Riverside, Connecticut.

F. T. R.

Attachment

FTM/

1002 VBB S2 J2 50

COLIAED-211

SECRET

March 24, 1946

TO: Chief, SI  
via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Lois Lombard

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. ~~Stating~~: Secretary and general assistant. Stenography, typing, filing and code with SI in Lisbon, Portugal from June 1, 1944 to December 8, 1944. Then was sent to I-2 division to work on coding and German papers (mostly from German Propaganda Office, Lisbon) until my departure on the "Queen" February 18, 1945.

2. SI had numerous reports on enemy activities in general; purchase of war materials and food in Portugal; incursions; bombing objectives in the Reich; Political situations (mostly in enemy occupied territory). The number and length of these reports began to dwindle sometime in November 1944 and at that time the "Safe Haven" project took their place.

3. SI had, until recently, more Portuguese than American office employees. They did not have access to the code nor to the safe in which code files and funds were kept, but they were telephone operators, translators and attended to the outgoing pouch. There were two among them: reception clerk named Westwood; and telephone operator Ansel Rodrigues - whom Miriam Forbes, Betty Robertson and myself suspected of disloyalty. We had no proof but Rodrigues listened in on telephone conversations and he and Westwood fraternized and had nothing in common as a basis for friendship. I believe both these men are still in our employ though Rodrigues has been given a three instead of an eight-hour telephone shift. The translator's knowledge of English was so poor that some of their translations (which I corrected) actually said the opposite of the original. This situation has been somewhat altered recently. William M. Wheeler, Security officer, made objections and now the pouch is handled exclusively by Americans. I feel that Portuguese should never have been employed in our office but I also feel it is bad policy to get rid of them at this time.

SECRET

- 2 -

There is one AI officer in Lisbon for whom I worked who I found impossible to get along with - James B. Wood - head of the AI Lisbon branch. He had none of the qualifications that I have always seen manifest in an executive officer in my service. He was uncooperative and had a bad effect on the morale of the whole office staff (American and Portuguese alike). He displayed more interest in reports to the Treasury Department than in reports to OSS. During my stay in Lisbon I never met anyone who liked Mr. Wood.

I think it important that we maintain a post-war OSS organization at strategic points all over the world.

M/W

JAN 19 1946

LCL/AED-21

SECRET

April 8, 1948

TO: Chief, CI  
 Vice Executive Officer, CI

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Lela Lambert - Field Report

Subject, approximately forty years old, unmarried, was recruited to become Tapan's secretary when he was assigned to Lisbon as Deputy to AG-10 for Portugal. Among subject's qualifications are a thorough knowledge of French and Italian as well as usable Spanish, Portuguese and German.

In connection with her reference to Mr. Wood I wish to say that Mr. Wood is serving in the dual capacity of head of the CI branch as well as the Financial Attache, in which latter position he has considerable duties to perform on behalf of the Treasury Department which, rather than detracting from his ability to us, strengthens his status, particularly in matters pertaining to Safe Haven operations.

Reports that we have received in the past indicate that Mr. Wood's work has been recognized and highly commended by former commanders, Visk and Harsh, as well as by the State Department and Treasury.

Subject has resigned from the organization as of April 12 to return to her former work of private language instructor in her home community of Riverside, Connecticut.

F. T. R.

Attachment

FRS/CP

ONE VLM S2 J2 10

RECEIVED-211

SECRET

March 26, 1946

TO: Chief, SI  
 via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Lois Lombard

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. **STATUS:** Secretary and general assistant. Geography, typing, filing and code with SI in Lisbon, Portugal from June 1, 1944 to December 2, 1944. Then was sent to I-2 division to work on carding and German papers (mostly from German Propaganda Office, Lisbon) until my departure on the "Quanao" February 18, 1945.

2. SI had numerous reports on enemy activities in general: purchase of war materials and food in Portugal; instructions; bombing objectives in the Reich; Political situations (mostly in enemy occupied territory). The number and length of these reports began to diminish sometime in November 1944 and at that time the "Safe Haven" project took their place.

3. SI had, until recently, more Portuguese than American office employees. They did not have access to the code nor to the safe in which code files and funds were kept, but they were telephone operators, translators and attended to the outgoing pouch. There were two among them: reception clerk named Westwood; and telephone operator Raul Rodrigues whom Miriam Forbes, Betty Robertson and myself suspected of disloyalty. We had no proof but Rodrigues listened in on telephone conversations and he and Westwood hatched and had nothing in common as a basis for friendship. I believe both these men are still in our employ though Rodrigues has been given a three instead of an eight-hour telephone shift. The transmission of knowledge of English was so poor that some of their translations (which I corrected) actually said the opposite of the original. This situation has been somewhat altered recently. William M. Wheeler, Security officer, made objections and now the pouch is handled exclusively by Americans. I feel that Portuguese should never have been employed in our office but I also feel it is bad policy to get rid of them at this time.

SECRET

SECRET



There is one SI officer in Lisbon for whom I  
 wished who I found impossible to get along with - James  
 M. Wood - head of the SI Lisbon branch. He had none of  
 the qualifications that I have always seen manifest in an  
 executive officer in any office. He was uncooperative and  
 had a bad effect on the morale of the whole office staff  
 (American and Portuguese alike). He displayed more interest  
 in reports to the Treasury Department than in reports to OSS.  
 During my stay in Lisbon I never met anyone who liked Mr. Wood.


I think it important that we maintain a post-war OSS  
 organization at strategic points all over the world.

W/S

102 VLB S2 J2 18

RECEIVED-211

SECRET



**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

FROM : Reports Office - Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. John W. SAVAGE  
(SI/ModB)

DATE: 15 June 1945

Supply Officer at OSS bases on Ismir and the Island of Rhodes from September 1943 to February 1945, Lt. Savage gives an account of the supply set-up and states that adequate supplies and the newest of equipment while available at Cairo headquarters were not sent on to the advanced bases where they were needed.

*S.K.*  
S.P.K.

Attachment

**SECRET**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Lt. John W. Savage

DATE: 11 April 1946

Lt. Savage worked under Major Caskey, whose report appropriately presents the same facts in greater detail.

*S. B. Purose, Jr.*  
S. B. Purose  
Acting Chief, SI

Attachment

ESC

**SECRET**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive Officer, SI

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions Submitted by Lt. Savage

DATE: 31 March 1948

There have been several reports of unsatisfactory supply to the Turkish bases. Most probably there were many and perhaps complex reasons for this deficiency. At the risk of over simplification I suggest that failure properly to supply these bases was largely due to lack of directly interested and responsible supply personnel in Cairo. SI could requisition repeatedly and insistently without avail if the supply officer was indifferent or willing to let procurement take its tortuous unimaginative course.

On page 4, paragraph 6, there is reference to divided authority and the difficulties resulting therefrom. There should certainly be no divided authority in the field. The CO or civilian head is responsible for operations under his control and hence the authority should be his. The various branches (referred to as departments in this report) must cooperate as directed by the CO. This principle appears to be basic.

In paragraphs b, page 5, and c, page 6, it is stated that the authority of the commanding officer over all personnel in his command or in his area either temporarily or permanently was not generally recognized. Obviously such a situation would be intolerable for the responsible person.

*D. DeB.*  
D. DeB.

**SECRET**

16, 6, 61

## REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

1st Lt. John W. Savage

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
1. Itinerary	1
2. Work in Ismir	1
3. The Island of Samos	2
4. Establishing "Poston" Base	3
5. Achievements of OSS, Ismir	3
6. Difficulties in the Field	4
a. Divided Authority	4
b. Responsibility without Control over Personnel	5
c. Confused Policy in Cairo	5
d. Supplies do not pass Headquarters	5
e. Unsuitable Personnel	6

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OSS  
Through Chief, SI

FROM : John W. Savage, 1st Lt., Ordnance

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 29 March 1945

**1. Itinerary**

19 September 1943: Placed on detached service with Office of Strategic Services, USAFIME, Cairo, Egypt.

19 September 1943: Departed from Cairo for Izmir, Turkey, via Cyprus.

3 October 1943: Arrived Izmir and was assigned duties of code clerk, supply officer, and supervisor of bases.

1 November 1943: Went to Samos to be in charge of operations there.

17 November 1943: Returned to Turkey.

23 May 1944: Placed in charge of "Boston" Base.

30 September 1944: Made reconnaissance trip to Tinos.

3 November 1944: Left "Key West" base for "Elba" base.

20 December 1944: Arrived Athens.

26 December 1944: Departed for Cairo.

31 January 1945: Departed for Washington.

11 February 1945: Arrived in Washington.

**2. Work in Izmir**

When the staff in Izmir consisted of only three Americans, it was necessary for each of us to do cryptography secretarial work and to act in one another's absence. My particular duties were to serve as supply officer and supervisor of the bases. Supplies of food and equipment for the bases were purchased locally or obtained by requisition from Cairo. Local purchases

**SECRET**

- 2 -

were difficult because of the scarcity of goods in Turkey and because of the inflation. On the other hand, many items were not obtainable in Cairo or were of the wrong type, and the long delays in transportation caused great inconvenience. An order for light sail cloth sent to Cairo in October 1943 was not filled until August 1944. The supplies to be procured were the gear for caiques, material for caique repair, food for base personnel, camouflage cargoes, and equipment for missions.

The distribution of the bases around Ismir made it necessary for an American officer to spend a great deal of time going from one to the other to coordinate their activities and to act as liaison between the Greek employees and the Turkish officials. The trip by auto to "Key West" was two and a half hours south, and to "Boston" was two hours north. These trips were made by car, motorcycle or a combination of train and bus.

### 3. The Island of Samos

When Samos was liberated in September 1943, it was decided to establish a base to supplement "Key West". A base on Allied territory avoided the troublesome customs and movement restrictions of the Turks and also provided better housing and anchorage facilities. I was sent to Samos to set up the base for our operations. We were just getting buildings and anchorages and establishing relations with the British and Greek authorities when the German attack was made and the Island evacuated.

SECRET



- 3 -

During the battle of Leros, our caiques helped embark reinforcements; and, when the order came to evacuate Samos, our caiques were able to carry British and Greek military personnel as well as hundreds of compromised Greek civilians to Turkey.

#### 4. Establishing "Boston" Base

The evacuation of Samos compromised "Key West" and made it necessary to obtain another base on the Turkish coast. The port of Reshadiye, two hours by car north of Izmir, was chosen and a large warehouse was hired for storage and living space. Through the Emniyet (Turkish Military Security) we were introduced to the local civil and military authorities. "Boston" was the main base of operations of the Izmir area and maintained the mission caiques and stored the supplies brought from Cyprus. Personnel quartered at Boston amounted to ten Americans and fifty Greeks. Most of the missions sent into Greece were maintained at "Boston" and departed from there. The base suffered from cramped quarters, lack of supplies, and lack of trained personnel. Ensign Spence of the Maritime Unit arrived at the end of August 1944 and closed the base about the first of November.

#### 5. Achievements of OSB, Izmir

About 75 men were sent into occupied Greece. Some of these were selected and trained in Izmir, the rest were sent by Cairo. These men were maintained and partially equipped in Izmir and arrangements made for their reception in Greece.

SECRET

- 4 -

After the missions were inside, they were supplied and their intelligence collected. In order to carry out these assignments we obtained and supported a fleet of small caiques. For each voyage a caïque had to have false navigation papers and a camouflage cargo. These caiques were also used in the evacuation of Samos. At the request of the American Military Attaché, a member of the German Embassy staff was sent to Cyprus to escape the Gestapo which was pursuing her. We also infiltrated an MO mission, maintained it, and evacuated it after its work was done. The MO also established a voice broadcasting station at "Boston".

6. Difficulties in the Field

a. Divided Authority

The jurisdictional disputes and the confusion caused by several separate departments operating in the same area caused difficulties in the field. The Maritime Unit was given the authority to organize and maintain the caïque service and to establish bases in Turkey. However, they did not have the personnel to operate the service, or an understanding of its purpose. As a result, the supply caiques, operating from Egypt, were improved and the mission caiques, which did the dangerous runs, were neglected. It was bad for the morale of all personnel when a 6-knot one-cylinder caïque had to make a 300-mile run through enemy waters and a powerful silent motor was installed in

SECRET

- 6 -

the most essential items such as pistols and Mills bombs. We never did receive any of the special gadgets. In Cairo, however, several of the enlisted men had one-shot pistols that were smaller than a fountain pen.

e. Unsuitable Personnel

The communications and maritime personnel sent to us were not interested in SI activities. They considered themselves responsible only to their chiefs in Cairo and could not be given duties outside their own field. Since there were only two SI officers in the area, it was impossible for either to go to Cairo headquarters. Sixteen is too long for an officer to remain away from his family.

*John W. Savage*  
John W. Savage  
1st Lieutenant, Ordnance

SECRET



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS  
 FROM : Chief, SI  
 SUBJECT: Field Report - Captain M. M. Pittard

DATE: 11 April 1945

There is attached the field report of Captain M. M. Pittard, on his assignment with Detachment 101.

*S. B. L. Penrose*  
 S. B. L. Penrose  
 Acting Chief

Attachment

*Read by [unclear]  
 April 12*

*file  
 C.S.E.*

**SECRET**

16, 667  
**SECRET**

16 March 1945

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Executive Officer, SI, OSS

**FROM:** Captain M. M. Pittard

**SUBJECT:** Report on Field Operations

**Assignment and Itinerary.**

I arrived in India in December 1943, and reported to Lt. Col. Hapner. After eight days in New Delhi I was assigned to temporary duty with Det. 101.

The first few days were spent in observing and assisting with SI work at Det. Headquarters. The majority of the work was concerning operations in Burma, and I brought Captain Chartrand's residence and experience in Burma to the attention of the Chief SI Officer. Then I exchanged places with Captain Chartrand and was transferred to School and Training Headquarters where I studied the courses and observed the teaching of these courses by the instructors.

After learning the location of the camps, I was given from 18 to 36 hours per week of instruction work in addition to other duties such as supervision of roads and camp maintenance, and the construction of new camps.

I also spent considerable time in the schools and training office assisting with records, censoring letters and other administrative duties.

Even though the greater part of my work was with schools and training we were well informed as to the progress of SI and operational activity. The morale of the officers and men at Det. 101 was very high. They lived up to their motto "The difficult can be done immediately. The impossible takes a little longer." We were doing a job and it was a pleasure to work with them.

In April 1944, I was recalled for duty with Det. 404, and arrived at Det. Headquarters on 8th May 1944. I was sent to Glodagh to assist with its preparation as a camp, and I served as conducting officer for Thai recruits.

During the month of June, I served as conducting officer for a Malay group of recruits at Camp Y. After the arrival of Captain Kentue, I returned to Camp "K" to continue with its preparation as a camp and serve as a conducting officer for Indo-Thai, Thai and Tamil recruits.

In August 1944, Dr. Lyman arrived and it was decided to use Camp "K"

**SECRET**

-2-

**SECRET**

as an assessment camp. I then became Commanding Officer, at the request of Dr. Lyman and served until the arrival of School and Training personnel in November 1944. Until this time most of our personnel were on loan from other branches including myself.

In November I asked for a transfer with a view to more active service either with SI or SO. In December I received orders to return to Washington and arrived in Washington 22nd February 1945.

#### Progress of work in the field.

Valuable information is being received from all areas in which we are interested. SI and SO work in general is making good progress from all reports.

Schools and training have received personnel who have had special training and the personnel from other branches are being replaced. Dr. Lyman has done an excellent job in the assessment field, all difficulties and handicaps being considered.

Conditions in the field which might be improved, - specific difficulties and suggestions:

The limited number of recruits who can qualify as native agents has handicapped the progress of Det. 404.

Individual recruiting is preferable to group recruiting whenever possible and when more recruiting can be done from within occupied countries our results should be proportionately better.

In my opinion the preliminary phase of assessment, consisting of interviews and tests, covering a period of from 4 to 7 days, should be placed near the recruiting center in order to eliminate the obvious rejects before they reach the training areas. This is especially important in group recruiting. The majority of recruits sent to Ceylon for assessment were recruited in India and elsewhere, and it was necessary to reject a large number and return them to civilian life from 3 to 10 weeks after being recruited.

Special efforts should be constantly exercised to coordinate the work of all branches, especially recruiting, assessment, training and security.

It would be of advantage to all branches for Schools and Training to have designated personnel to revise courses, and arrange the subjects progressively where students receive training in more than one camp, and make available selected information to instructors with a view to keeping the students interested and informed as to their respective countries during their period of training.

**SECRET**

-3-

*16-16-16*  
**SECRET**

The constructive side of an agent's work should be emphasized as well as the subversive. For example, a course on aircraft, pilot rescue work, and allied plane and part salvage (such as bomb sights, etc.) could be emphasized along with the essential courses of SI, such as reconnaissance and reporting, observation and description, selection of target and pin pointing locations, map reading and compass. SO courses such as selection of landing strips, signaling, airplane sabotage, etc. In connection with the rescue of pilots a liberal reward might be offered for each pilot rescued from enemy territory.

Such a course would serve as an excellent review for recruits nearing the completion of their training. And the pilot rescue work would give to the recruit a constructive approach which might help to discover the possibility and extent of support that can be expected from Government officials and others in occupied areas, who might not be readily inclined to participate in subversive activity.


The accomplishments of Det. 101 in the field has convinced me of the possibility and importance of a course of training that will emphasize the rescue of pilots and other aircraft personnel. Where our rescue work from within the occupied area can be coordinated with the work of G-2 and A-2 who are working from outside the occupied areas, it appears that we are in a position to render even greater service than we have in the past.

It was obvious before I left the field from recent changes in personnel and policy that other specific difficulties which might be mentioned here have already received attention and something is being done about them.

*Captain Murrell M. Pittard*

**SECRET**





STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report of CSP (P) Nelson Conrad McEdward

DATE: 16 April 1945

*for 682*  
*Travel Report*  
*W. B. Kantack*  
*Special Agent*  
*1270*  
*check 110*

*File*

1. CSP (P) McEdward participated in photographic missions in the British Isles during 1942 and 1943 and in Egypt during the winter and spring of 1944. From April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in Italy.
2. He found the food generally poor and suggests that a regular GI mess be set up with Army cooks.
3. Mr. McEdward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work in England and of OSS personnel in Egypt, but not in Caserta.
4. He notes that OSS naval men, even chiefs, are required to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Naples.

*W. B. Kantack*

W. B. Kantack  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

**SECRET**

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report of CSp (P) Nelson Conrad McEdward

DATE: 16 April 1945

*Field Report  
 to [illegible]  
 [illegible]  
 1270  
 checked*

*file*

1. CSp (P) McEdward participated in photographic missions in the British Isles during 1942 and 1943 and in Egypt during winter and spring of 1944. From April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in Italy.
2. He found the food generally poor and suggests that a regular GI mess be set up with Army cooks.
3. Mr. McEdward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work in England and of OSS personnel in Egypt, but not in Caserta.
4. He notes that OSS naval men, even chiefs, are required to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Naples.

*C/S*

W. B. Kantack  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

*SECRET*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report of CSp (P) Nelson Conrad McEdward

DATE: 16 April 1945

4, 188

*Field Report*  
*W. B. Kantack*  
*16 April 1945*  
*(178)*  
*(Kantack)*

*File*

1. CSp (P) McEdward participated in photographic missions in the British Isles during 1942 and 1943 and in Egypt during the winter and spring of 1944. From April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in Italy.
2. He found the food generally poor and suggests that a regular GI mess be set up with Army cooks.
3. Mr. McEdward has praise for cooperation of the British in his work in England and of OSS personnel in Egypt, but not in Caserta.
4. He notes that OSS naval men, even chiefs, are required to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship at Naples.

*W. B. Kantack*

W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO :** Director, OHS, Administration Building  
Via: Secretariat, Administration Building  
**FROM :** Chief, Field Photographic Branch  
**SUBJECT:** Reports from Personnel Returning from Field

**DATE:** 28 March 1945

Forwarded for your information and file.

1 Encl.-Report of CSp (P) McEdward

*John W. English*  
**JOHN W. ENGLISH**  
Lieut., USNR  
By Direction

**SECRET**

**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****WASHINGTON, D. C.**

**TO:** Director, OSS, Administration Building 28 March 1945

**VIA:** Secretariat, Administration Building  
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

**FROM:** CSp (P) Nelson Conrad McEdward, USNR

**SUBJECT:** Reports from Personnel Returning from Field

Arrived in England 1 September 1942. Went to Roseneath, Scotland on first assignment. Photographed U. S. Army and Marines during training. This assignment lasted approximately six weeks and consisted of motion picture work.

Returned to London 11 November 1942 and assembled gear and equipment for new assignment. On 12 January 1943 reported to Lt. Col. Jeffery Courtney, in charge of Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, located at Westward Ho, North Devon, England. This assignment consisted of photographing all secret operations held in this area, with still photographs included. Photography was made of all tank wade operations, waterproofing of vehicles, landing craft operations, mine laying devices, mortar firing, track laying devices, stretcher devices, cable laying devices at Minehead, firing of bangalore, eggs, blowing up of underwater piping - then photographing results at low tide. The foregoing operations were photographed under fire. At Portland photographed operations of Vehicle Landing Ramps tied on Port and Starboard deck, wired with Hexite, and when fired Landing Ramps were blown off, tied to Bow of LST, then all vehicles were driven to shore; total time of operation 16 Minutes. Major Pillar was in charge of operations. All still work at Westward Ho was done by Field Photographic Branch. All supplies and equipment used at Westward Ho were furnished by Field Photographic Branch. Upon completion of this assignment, entire darkroom supplies were retained at Westward Ho, with the exception of motion picture cameras and still equipment, in accordance with instructions from Lt. M. E. Arvistead of the London Branch. During this assignment 137,000 feet of raw negative was exposed; 3,000, 4 x 5 stills were made, from which 30,000 prints were made, not including enlargements. All British Army personnel on this assignment were very cooperative. Transportation difficulties were encountered due to the fact that facilities were limited. The food problem was our worst difficulty due to the fact that no GI Mess was available in this area. These operations were conducted in preparation for D-Day Invasion. Assignment was completed 28 November 1943.

Returned to London 28 November 1943 to assemble gear and equipment for new assignment. On 12 January 1944 was assigned to USAFIME in Cairo, Egypt.

**SECRET**

# SECRET

Director, OSS-2

28 March 1945

Photographed Secret Agent School near Cairo for Major Vassos of OSS. Excellent cooperation was received by OSS men there, all officers being very cooperative. After completion of foregoing assignment, PWE School near the Pyramids was photographed for British Army.

On 25 April 1944, left Cairo by plane for Bari, Italy, arriving in Bari on 26 April 1944. A complete darkroom was established there for us to develop and print any operations taken by OSS officers who photographed operations in Yugoslavia and Albania. Our principal job there was to go in the field to photograph these operations, come back to Bari and print and develop these photographs to be turned in to Major Ross, Head of Operations. Due to the loss of Chief G. P. Fowler, taken prisoner in Yugoslavia, we were not permitted to leave, but Spl/c J. B. Allin left for two missions in Yugoslavia for Marshal Tito and to photograph General Mihailovitch. While assigned here I completed darkroom work, mapping, and reproduction work for the Operations Office. All OSS men stationed here were very cooperative and excellent results were obtained. I feel sure that these OSS men did their job in an excellent manner and it was a pleasure to work for them. Food conditions in Bari were mediocre, but the food in Caserta is terrible due to the fact that no GI Mess is established and all food is cooked by Italians. Not much cooperation was given us by OSS men stationed in Caserta, living conditions were difficult, and there was much resentment by officers stationed there. Dispensaries in Bari and Caserta are stranded for supplies such as bottles and various articles. All pharmacists mates there are excellent workers and very cooperative.

Left Caserta for Naples 6 November 1944, arriving at Receiving Ship in Naples where all OSS men leaving for the United States scrub floors, paint walls, and move furniture. Chiefs are expected to do likewise. The food was excellent on the Receiving Ship. Left Casablanca 11 November 1944, arriving in New York 1 December 1944.

In conclusion, will state that all OSS men in the field do their work very well and the only complaint I have to make is that the food is poor and the only solution I see would be to have a regular established GI Mess, with Army cooks.

*Nelson Conrad McEdward*

NELSON CONRAD McEDWARD  
CSp (P), USNR

# SECRET

1

2

3



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Capt. Arthur S. Bates (Communications/ETO.)

16.689  
 Field Report  
 DATE: 16 April 1945  
 Communications  
 VAVO

Attached is a report from Capt. Arthur S. Bates who was in charge of the London Message Center. Capt. Bates says that the principal difficulty he encountered was that not enough time was allowed to train and brief agents in ciphers, which resulted in decipherment difficulties once the agent was in the field. He suggests that any branch contemplating the use of agents make every effort to inform the Cipher Section of Communications as soon as possible as to how many require cipher training. For security reasons this information must be definitive.

*W. B. Kantack*  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

*CSE*  
 Attachment

16. 684  
Field Rec.  
**CONFIDENTIAL****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director, OSS, through (1) Chief, Communications Branch, (2) Secretariat  
 FROM : Capt. Arthur S. Bates  
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions. DATE: 29 March, 1945.

1. Description of duties. Officer in Charge of London Message Center, 6 April, 1943 to 31 January, 1945, duties involving the supervision of cryptographing and decryptographing of classified messages, assuring the proper handling of OSS cryptographic systems, the accounting for cryptographic material received from Washington and other OSS offices, the issuing of such material to field detachments and to agents, the cryptographic training of agents, and the training of Message Center personnel recruited in the ETO.

2. Difficulties and recommendations. The only difficulty worthy of particular mention has to do with the question of agent training in ciphers. On a number of occasions the Communications Branch in the ETO was not allowed adequate time to train and brief agents in this subject, with the result that decipherment difficulties arose once the agent was operating in the field. This difficulty has been removed to a certain degree by re-vamping the agent training program, but agents are still being brought to the Communications Branch for cipher training as late as a week or ten days before their departure for the field.

I would recommend that branches contemplating the use of agents be urged to make every effort to inform the cipher section of the Communications Branch as soon as possible as to how many require cipher training and as to the type of work the agents will be expected to do.

It is also important that the cipher training section know as soon as possible which men are definitely going on missions because of the insecurity attached to teaching specific top secret details to men who may not be required to use them.

*A. S. Bates*  
 A.S. Bates  
 Capt., AUS  
 Communications Branch

**CONFIDENTIAL**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : The Director, OSS, through (1) Chief, Communications Branch, (2) Secretariat  
 FROM : Capt. Arthur S. Bates  
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions.

DATE: 29 March, 1945.

1. Description of duties. Officer in Charge of London Message Center, 6 April, 1943 to 31 January, 1945, duties involving the supervision of cryptographing and decryptographing of classified messages; assuring the proper handling of OSS cryptographic systems, the accounting for cryptographic material received from Washington and other OSS offices, the issuing of such material to field attachments and to agents, the cryptographic training of agents, and the training of Message Center personnel recruited in the ETO.

2. Difficulties and recommendations. The only difficulty worthy of particular mention has to do with the question of agent training in cipher. On a number of occasions the Communications Branch in the ETO was not allowed adequate time to train and brief agents in this subject, with the result that decipherment difficulties arose once the agent was operating in the field. This difficulty has been removed to a certain degree by re-vamping the agent training program, but agents are still being brought to the Communications Branch for cipher training as late as a week or ten days before their departure for the field.


I would recommend that branches contemplating the use of agents be urged to make every effort to inform the cipher section of the Communications Branch as soon as possible as to how many require cipher training and as to the type of work the agents will be expected to do.

It is also important that the cipher training section know as soon as possible which men are definitely going on missions because of the insecurity attached to teaching specific top secret details to men who may not be required to use them.

A. S. Bates

A. S. Bates  
 Capt., AUS  
 Communications Branch

CONFIDENTIAL



## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report of John Waldron (X-2/ETO)

DATE: 16 April 1945

100-635  
 Field Report  
 Location  
 X  
 2  
 280

1. Attached is a report from Mr. John Waldron, who was attached to the X-2 War Room in Paris and returned to Washington to participate in discussion relative to the establishment of the new German War Room in London.
2. This report explains in some detail the functions and administration of the War Room, the difference in the duties of and relations between the British and American staffs, and the relation between the forward unit in Paris and the rear echelon in London.
3. Mr. Waldron points out that since the British unit was attached to SHAER while the American SCI units were attached to Communications Zone, there was a certain divergence in the functions of the two units. Moreover there was a duplication of work and personnel as a result of the division of the French Desk between London and Paris. Mr. Waldron further notes that American SCI units were forced to do more C.I.C. work than should be expected of carefully trained SCI officers.
4. In conclusion Mr. Waldron points out that many of the criticisms leveled against the French War Room were due to "feuds" between MB and MI6.

Attachment

W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

16 685  
T. J. K. K. K.

6 March 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: General William Donovan  
Attention: Captain W. B. Kuntack  
FROM: Lt. Col. Roger A. Praff, *RAP*  
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

Attached is a report prepared by Mr. John Waldron  
covering the period 17 March 1944 to 1 January 1946.

**SECRET**

# Office Memorandum **SECRET** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. Col. Roger A. Pfaff

FROM : John Waldron J.W.

DATE: 12 January 1945

SUBJECT: Tour of Duty - 17 March 1944 through 1 January 1945

## Travel Dates

I left Washington on 17 March 1944 and New York on 20 March. Arrived in the U. K. on 28 March.

Returning, I left London on 1 January 1945 and the U. K. on 3 January. Arrived in Washington on 4 January.

Late in October I visited the Paris office for a week, returning to London by way of Brussels for some chats with the X-2 Officer there.

## London Assignments

After a few weeks of indoctrination and study with the X-2 - X-3 Officers, which is usual with newly arrived personnel in London, I was detailed to MHS for training in the handling of Special Agent cases. The intention was that I should take care of the London end of all such cases as we might run either from the U. K. or in France or the Lowlands. To this end I shared the office of the Chief of the section of MHS that managed such cases.

However, changes in the London "War Room" consequent on Mr. Murphy's decision to establish a forward detachment in Paris after the liberation of that city, led to my being asked to head the American side of the joint British-American War Room. Most reluctantly, I agreed to take over and run the show jointly with my British opposite number until I returned to Washington for temporary duty.

## Present Mission to Washington

I was asked to come to Washington to report on the preliminary discussions of the new London "German War Room" discussions - discussions which I shared with the MHS Officers from the beginning of their planning for the establishment of such an organization. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Pearson felt, too, that I could be of use here in the interpretation of London reports on the decisions made with respect to the new arrangement.

## The German War Room

Late in the spring of 1944, as D-Day came into nearer prospect, MHS (Section V), X-2 and MHS set up a section for the handling of the business

**SECRET**

# SECRET

that our military operations in France and the Lowlands would pour - through the activities of the SOI Units - onto the French Desk in London. The French 'War Room' was, in short, the French Desk geared to handle the multitudinous problems connected with our exploitation of the intelligence opportunities in the areas behind the armies and to serve, through our SOI Units, the various Allied Intelligence agencies in getting the job well done.

## Functions of the War Room

The work of the War Room was to assist the units in the field by such services as:

- (a) The preparation of sets of NAME cards on all the persons - allies in any of the German services who were known to have any connections with the areas in which the Allied armies would operate. These cards were distributed to the various SOI teams, British and American, that went to the field. The information thus carded was drawn from all the sources available to MIO, I-S, and MIB. For security reasons, the information thus provided was to be made available to other agencies in the field through discreet distribution by trained I-S - I-S Officers.
- (b) The preparation of target material for cities, towns, and country areas. This involved the listing of addresses of the headquarters of enemy intelligence organizations, training schools, known or suspect agents and the like, in a portable form for the use of SOI men with task forces. Field results and the reports of field officers indicate that these lists were of the greatest value.
- (c) The preparation of a special list of enemy R/T agents known to have been active in France and the Lowlands for the purpose of reporting to the Germans from the territory occupied by our armies. Daily cabled notes on all new intelligence at hand supplemented the information set out in this list. This part of the Allied Intelligence campaign has been brilliantly successful; fewer than ten of these agents are still transmitting.
- (d) The handling of information services to the field through our system of communications. These services make up the mass of each day's work. Thus, the London office not only recorded arrests - some 800 up to December 31 - but traced all information on the arrested agents and sent out, by cable or bag, all information available to help in, say, checking the agent's story and in other ways assisting the officers conducting the preliminary interrogations.

-4-

# SECRET



# SECRET

All information from the field - interrogation reports, memoranda from informants, etc. - is carefully processed in the War Room and carded for quick reference. This material is thus available - as is that in the MIS and in the wonderfully rich MIS registries - for all tracing and vetting jobs for the field. Studies made from these sources are sent to the SOI Units in the form of letters. Daily cables - that is, a number of cables each day - go to the units with the latest intelligence from our most secret sources; these cables carry comment which interprets and coordinates the information they carry.

- (e) The vetting of all agents that were then in the employment of other branches of OSS or were to be taken on by them. This work occupied a good deal of our time from June onwards. The dangers of taking on agents without vetting by the security branch soon became obvious as operations progressed on the Continent and I-2 took on this vetting job in accordance with the terms of its brief. At first, this work was done by the War Room; within the last three weeks, however, all vetting has been placed in the care of one special independent desk which will handle all such business for all European areas.
- (f) The training of officers and men for the field. All American SOI personnel going to France spend some days or weeks in the War Room in order to study the procedures followed at the London or Paris end of our operations. It has been found that this experience is all important as preparation for dealing with the home bases - for which, after all, they are working.
- (g) The handling of new administrative matters intimately connected with the cases of agents being dealt with by the War Room officers. The intricate business, for instance, of arranging for an agent's entry into the U. K. - for, say, interrogation - or for his return to France, is one that involves no little time and work. Many difficulties arose during the first months of the American advance across France because our field officers seemed not to know or care about the rigidly enforced procedures of the British authorities with regard to such matters.

The small and relatively inexperienced American Staff in the War Room received an intensive training during the months from July to November when they had to carry their end of these services while each week brought its share of cases, many of which involved procedures of considerable complexity. They did not stay nervous long.

# SECRET

# SECRET

## Summary

The British side of the War Room has been manned by an average of some dozen case officers, each of whom had the services of a secretary; the American side, by some ten officers, none of whom had a secretary. The American staff has had no American secretarial assistants. Two of our young women typists were assigned to the Room, but they were very fully occupied with the copying and distribution (to British and American officers in the War Room) of American and British cables, reports, etc., and in the logging and filing of documents. It is now clear to the Recruiting Office in Washington that what we need in the field are intelligent young women who can and are willing to do typing and other secretarial work.

The core of the British group in the War Room is a trio of brilliantly good - highly intelligent, well trained, experienced - officers. For the rest, the MI6 officers and their secretaries have, as the whole, been allowed to stay long enough at their special tasks to develop into efficient assistants in the work.

The American group, on the other hand, was rather badly disrupted at the time of the establishment of the Paris office. With the exception of one, Miss Delowitz, all officers and secretaries who had had any training and experience for the job that was to be done in London were taken for the new office. All of us - including the two typist assistants - had to learn as we did each day's work, which by this time (our drives across France was in full swing) went with a dizzying rush of always new problems. Our British colleagues were extremely tolerant and helpful during those early weeks. For the most part our people responded generously and latterly we have been holding up our end very decently well. Some things that we saw needed doing badly or that we wanted to do for the fuller support of the Paris and the field offices had to go undone. However, we made no major mistakes - when we might in the course of any one of those days have made many - and we earned the respect and the solid friendship of our colleagues by the work we, so recently novices, managed to get done.

Among the Americans in the War Room who should be mentioned for notably good work are:

1. Miss Grace Delowitz: by far the most experienced and well trained officer on the French Desk. She had acted as secretary to Mr. Robert Blum for more than a year. Her generous and brilliantly intelligent study of not only the French but the general Western European C. E. situation made her an invaluable officer in the War Room. Her work, which had chiefly to do with the interpretation of most secret sources, earned her the highest respect from the MI6 people.

# SECRET

# SECRET

2. Mr. Calvin Tenny: very recently arrived from Washington after no more than the usual training there, he gave his first rate intelligence with enormous generosity to the business of learning his job and getting it done. He has not had - except for a few Sundays - any holiday in four months and rarely leaves the office until late at night. He is not only liked but admired by our own people and by the British officers who have worked with him. A selfless, devoted, careful, well trained scholar and linguist, he is the best "desk" officer I have seen in the Branch. He is not the stuff for work in, say, an SOI unit with an army, but he will be invaluable at any brain centre of our work. Our intelligence people would, it seems to me, do well to keep him marked for a post in the service in the period between wars.
3. Lt. John Martin, D.S.M.E., and PFC Timothy Burke have developed into very good case officers, capable of doing a large volume of work. Miss Helen Ocum, with her long Washington - North Africa experience as preparation, has been most helpful since her arrival in London. She will, however, probably move on to Paris later.

## London and Paris Offices

Though the French War Room was a joint American British "Desk", the arrangement under which the American Group made its contribution was not quite parallel with that under which the British Group worked.

The British officers in Paris were under the direction of their London office; the American officers there tended to work as an independent group that reported its activities to London, much, say, as London has done, and does, to Washington. Complete independence was, of course, not possible and Paris had constantly to have reference to London for help of one kind or another. This physical separation of the two parts of the French Desk - for that was the essential fact of the situation - called for not only a duplication of personnel, but a duplication of work also. Each, for instance, has kept up to date its own set of cards. Doubtless this situation has been very fully discussed by Mr. Murphy on his recent visit to Paris and some determinations will by now have been made as to the relations and responsibilities of the two offices.

The British officers in Paris were, to repeat, under the direction of London. They were, also, to note another point of divergence from the American arrangement, attached to SHAWF, whereas our people were attached to Communications Room. This difference in attachment should be understood as indicating differences in the kind of work to be done by each group.

The work of the SOI units was to have been advisory: to pass on to other Allied G. E. agencies the information made available by the resources

-

# SECRET

# SECRET

of OSS, WFO, WIS, and to advise and direct such agencies in the use of that information. The British in France and the Lowlands kept, especially in France, strictly to the role of advisors to such American, English, French and other G. E. agencies with which they had dealings. They did so under directives from CHAIR. That left them, in Paris, in the happy position of being, on the whole, close of actual "police" operations, and free to gather the fruits of American activity as it developed from day by day investigations, interrogations, etc. conducted by our officers.

The attachment of our SOI Units to Communications Zone forced us to do rather more "C.I.C." work than our carefully trained SOI officers should, perhaps, have been asked to do. However, we had to do it for the reason that the American C.I.C. was not so well chosen, or trained, or experienced for its job, as say, the British F.S.P. were for theirs. We had, therefore, to help not only by providing the kind of information available to us and with advice and direction, but had to jump in and do no small amount of "C.I.C." work as well. The disadvantages of this position were clearly recognized by the heads of our Branch, but the disadvantages of not doing what we did were equally apparent and of considerable weight. One large result of our generosity was that our officers won everywhere the respect and good will of the Army people - an asset that will stand them in good stead for the long run.

It must be said that the British SOI Units in the 21 A. G. area had to do more field and ordinary case work than they wished to do. It is, however, a fixed principle of policy with them to avoid such operations and they are planning, under directions from London, to turn over most of them to the French, Belgian, and Dutch security services in the near future. Their aim is to get from these services full reports for their files on all such cases in return for such information and advice as they pass on. They feel that they should now be giving their thought and energy to realizing their long range plans - and are doing so. They have concentrated their SOI Units in Brussels. One of these is a fairly large unit of carefully chosen young officers who were trained at WIS in the handling of Special Agent cases.

## Conclusions

The main job of the small Joint French War Room in London would seem now to have been done: it can and probably will continue for a bit to serve the joint British, American, and French-Lowlands operations in the field, but the several Decks within it will doubtless come more and more to serve the long-range operations of the several of the interested governments.

One important value of the War Room has been its use as a laboratory for those planning the German War Room: the weaknesses in the present set-up and its inadequacies for getting a satisfactory job done have become very clearly apparent as the weeks went by. The remedies for these that we had to improvise and revise as we went along can now be incorporated in fairly

# SECRET

**SECRET**

well tested arrangements that still allow more effective work to get itself done from the beginning.

The main failure of the War Room - according to reports of British officers, be it noted - was in respect of its advice and direction to officers in the field. It has, however, been noted above that London was the Head Office for their operations and their London people kept a firm hand on their units in the field. Our people, on the other hand, were inclined to get things done and to tell us about them afterward - calling in the meantime for every possible service we could give them.


The British arrangement was based on two important considerations: the fact that London had in the MIB and MIB registries and in the files of most secret sources, a mass of detailed intelligence that could not be available to officers in the field; and to the fact that it had also a pool - in MIB, but especially in MIB - of intelligence officers who had long and full experience of intelligence work in the field. On the whole, the American officers who had had such experience - that with the units after D-Day - were themselves in Paris and with the armies. The relatively green American case officers in London were not likely to have much of value to say to the people in the field and were not likely to be listened to when they did. Our London people did, however, learn the job of processing the material available in London and of correlating it with messages and reports from the front and did a yeoman job of providing information that served valuably as a basis for the conduct of the business at the front. This service was often of the first importance. They did, too, forward suggestions that turned out to be most useful.

It is known in Washington, of course, that the criticisms of the French War Room are, in no small part, the result of the long "feud" between MIB and MIB.

The French War Room was organized under the auspices of MIB - which is in charge of security outside the U. K. and is custodian of Circle information. On the other hand, the MIB Registry is the richest and most useful in England and very many of the MIB officers here have been trained by MIB. It is true that much of the advisory material sent to the field has been prepared by MIB, as are all the CMO Reports. MIB is, therefore, moving to take a greater share in the German operations, because they believe that since they have been contributing so heavily in what has been done, they ought to have a proper share of representation and of control in the New War Room.

Final discussions of these matters are now going forward in London and reports on changes in MIB and decisions respecting the German War Room will soon be available here. Strong as our loyalties to MIB are, we will doubtless find an adjustment to new relations between something like a joint MIB - MIB - in the German War Room - not only possible but advantageous. The MIB War record has been brilliant. A fairly large number of X-2 officers have had training under MIB. They have liked our people and we have a high admiration not only for their skill as intelligence officers, but as men of great generosity and honesty of dealing.

**SECRET**



*John D. Wilson*  
 ORR EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Date

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	
	R. M. Harnes	
	R. van B. Cleveland	
	R. W. Harnes	
	J. J. Monigan	
	R. J. Patzall, Jr.	
	R. Thron	
✓	Edward O. Wilson	EX
	John D. Wilson	
✓	CHIEF, SECRETARIAT	
	GENERAL COUNSEL	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. O. U. Files	

For action  
*Arthur T. ...*  
*E. J. ...*

Use form 41b

(64420)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

17 April 1945

TO: Director, OSB  
FROM: Acting Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Field Report by James M. Henry with  
Comments by Major Duncan G. Lee

Attached is Field Report of James M. Henry, June 30,  
1944 - January 22, 1945, with comments thereon by Major Duncan G. Lee.

*S. B. L. Penrose, Jr.*  
S. B. L. Penrose

Attachments - 2

*Hold [unclear]  
Duncan  
ec*

*RI  
Have you seen  
this? This is  
examined by  
those who  
stared me  
down.*

**SECRET**



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 6-12  
**SECRET**

18 April 1945

TO: Chief, SI  
FROM: Far East Division, SI  
SUBJECT: Field Report of Dr. James M. Henry

1. Dr. Henry's field report dated 16 April is forwarded herewith. It is believed that you will find this report unusually interesting. Sections 5, 6, 8 and 9 will be of interest to all Branches and to all OCS personnel proceeding to China. Section 8 will be of particular interest to MO.

2. There are attached herewith for your signature notes of transmittal covering copies of this report to be sent to the Director and to the Chief of MO.

*Duncan C. Lee*  
Duncan C. Lee, Maj. AUS  
Chief, Japan-China Sec.  
Far East Division, SI

Attachments - 2.

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

16,692  
r u d i p o t  
**SECRET**

16 April 1945

**TO:** Chief, SI  
**FROM:** Far East Division, SI  
**SUBJECT:** Report of Technical Representative James M. Henry  
June 30, 1944 - January 22, 1945

1. Resume of work.
2. Central Government and General Political Situation.
3. Seventh War Zone.
4. Kwangtung Civil Government.
5. Enemy Agents.
6. American Fliers Who Have to Bail out in Occupied Territory.
7. M. O. Work .
8. Type of American Personnel Needed.
9. Conduct of Personnel.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

SECRET

1. Resume of Work. Left Miami June 30, 1944, and arrived in Kunming July 17th, was finally assigned to AGFRTS and August 22nd went to Kweilin. From there I was assigned to Detachment 6 in Kwangtung. Reached KuKong September 1st. Helped organize and run radio school for selected men from 7th and 9th War Zones. From end of October until I left January 22nd, 1945, was in charge of the liaison with the 7th War Zone Headquarters. Had also one (SI) operating in Hongkong and reporting to Capt. Lynn at Detachment 6 HQ in Hing Ming.

2. The Central Government and General Political Situation. From talks with some of the political leaders, including Sun Fo, Wu Te-chen, Madame Sun Yat Sen, Kan Maikwong, former Kwang-si war-lord Li Chai-Sam, bankers, merchants, professors, the whole civil and military group in Kwang-tung, I received the distinct impression that the popularity and prestige of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in 1945 was less than in 1944, and that vis-a-vis his own political entourage he was weaker.

Sun Fo seems to be generally regarded as an ardent advocate for drastic reforms within the Kuomintang. In conversation with me he was emphatic as to the necessity of coming to terms with the Communists. He seemed worried over the results in case nothing was done. He believes Russia will enter the war.

There is continual political maneuvering between the Central Government and the various provinces. A definite struggle is now on in Yunnan. Former Minister of War Ho Ying-yin now holds an important Central Government post in that province and is definitely trying to undermine the power of Governor Lung.

Generally, the Chinese regard the present Chungking trend as fascist. Freedom of movement, and of speech, is certainly in many quarters being interfered with.

Practically every intelligent Chinese with whom I talked, outside of purely government or military circles, was pessimistic as to post war China, envisaging a prolonged period of internal struggle.

3. Seventh War Zone. This takes in the Kwangtung Province. The Commander-in-Chief, Yu Han Mao / 3 star general of whom there are eighteen in China / is the man primarily responsible for swinging the Kwang-tung Province into line with the Central Government in 1936.

General Yu and his group are very friendly with General Hsiao-Yu, Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth War Zone, which takes in Hunan and the Southwest Section of Kiang-si. The troops in this war zone are to a large extent Cantonese, Gen. Hsiao being a native of the Kwang-tung Province.

SECRET

- 3 -

**SECRET**

Both the 7th and 9th War Zones are very bitter over the Changsha and Hengyang defeats which they attribute to the mishandling of the defense by Chungking. Some go so far as to claim that this was deliberate and that the loss of Cantonese troops, estimated at 100,000 was part of a settled policy to weaken the war strength of those two peripheral zones.

The comparative lack of resistance to the recent enemy drive in Hunan and Kwangtung, is in part at least due to the present weakness of these two war zones. It may also be in part due to the desire to husband their strength for the final struggle with the Japanese.

The Seventh War Zone appears to have some excellent men on its general staff. The second in command, General Chiang Kwong Nai, was formerly number two in the famous 19th Route Army, and is also a three star general. The dozen or so two star generals, one comes from the Virginia Military Institute, one from Stanford, and one was trained in France. One is the highest ranking Chinese General to have studied in Ramgar, India. The Colonel of a special training regiment is himself English trained, a graduate of Woolwich. To a man they are all pro-American and can be relied upon for active co-operation and valuable assistance, should opportunity or occasion arise.

4. Kwangtung Civil Government. This has been headed since 1939 by a General Lee Han-wen / Two star general / who had a considerable military reputation some years ago. This man while pro-American is surrounded by a number of poor assistants, of whom some are considered as very corrupt. A good many financial scandals are attributed to his regime. He is very ambitious and his underlings and the 7th War Zone underlings have created a very unco-operative situation as between the civil and military authorities. Governor Lee's strength derives from his friendship with the Chen brothers in Chungking. Many unsuccessful efforts have been made to unseat him.

The writer has had many conferences with him and credits him with being sincerely anxious and really prepared to co-operate with American forces if and as an opportunity arises.

Should there be a landing in the Kwangtung area by American troops, there will be 100% cordial co-operation upon the part of the Civil Government as well as of the Military Government.

5. Enemy Agents. These are innumerable and everywhere. Presumably the various Chinese secret services know many of them, but the greater number are not known.

**SECRET**

- 4 -

**SECRET**

Our airfields are policed by Chinese soldiers. The Hostels are staffed by Chinese. Undoubtedly a percentage, particularly of the soldiers, are enemy agents.

The writer would seriously urge that even greater measures of security be taken in respect to both these classes than seem to be taken.

Boot-blacks, newsboys, professional people, attractive young women, have all figured in "spy arrests" from time to time. In each large city there is a big list of suspects, many of whom, of course, are innocent.

There can be little doubt, however, that every section of society in "free China" is saturated with enemy agents.

Poverty is perhaps the greatest cause for these. Resentment over previous unfair treatment is another cause. The mercenary motive is another and important factor.

In the writer's opinion there are no pro-Japanese Chinese. The enemy agents probably hate the Japanese worse than anyone else, and none of these are pro-Japanese, unless it be that group concerning whose existence the Chinese are most insistent, a group of real Chinese adopted in their childhood by Japanese and educated for this purpose.

6. American Fliers Who Have to Bail Out in Occupied Territory.  
I have had some experience receiving these men from the guerrillas who brought them in and have talked with others. I have discussed this with OSS authorities in Kunming and with the appropriate organization for dealing with this question. I feel I should stress the importance of making sure that the guerrillas or farmers, or troops, who rescue our fliers should never be in the least out of pocket. When rewards as high as \$1,000,000.00 Chinese currency are offered by the Japanese, it seems to me it should be our duty to make sure that all OSS men at least, should be instructed that there should be no withholding or hesitancy upon their part if any occasion should arise when some payment or reimbursement in this connection should seem either necessary or desirable. I do not know how to emphasize this as much as it should be emphasized.

I have heard the statement made that 95% of our men who have had to bail out behind the lines have been rescued. I have also heard the statement that a large percentage of these rescued have been in AQFRTS areas and have in this last analysis passed through AQFRTS hands. If so, then it should be all the more important that our people should have specific instructions in this matter.

**SECRET**

- 5 -

**SECRET**

7. M. O. Work. From conversation with people who have come out of Occupied South China, workmen, business men and guerrillas, it is evident that in this section of China at least the Japanese soldier is a tired and pessimistic person. In spite of widespread reports of better treatment of the people, one gets the same story. Billeted soldiers prefer to burn furniture to firewood and consistently defile the houses when they are billeted in preference to going outside to the toilet. They are consistent in "paying" for what they use, on the basis of 5 or 10 cents - to the dollar. They reproach the people for feeding them false news, indicating that they have a very fair idea as to what is happening and after leaving a place, walls and blackboards when they happen to remain, are covered with pessimistic writings indicating that for these soldiers the future holds nothing but death and unhappiness.

The situation would seem to be ready for a big increase of MO work.

8. Type of American Personnel Needed. The greatest care should be exercised in the choice of personnel for the China Theater.

Certainly no one with race prejudice, and no one consciously contemptuous of the Chinese, should be sent out.

In view of the evident increase in MO and Commando work, it would be of great value if a few more mature men of the right attitude and qualifications, who know China, particularly who might happen to speak Chinese, were added to the OSS groups in China. Such men, if nothing else, could serve as advisors, as liaison men between our Commando, SO, and MO groups. The better the co-ordination and mutual understanding the more successful will be the resultant work.

9. Conduct of American Personnel. A war is being fought. Men are in a foreign country, often poorly fed, uncomfortably quartered, deprived of companionship of their kind, and cut off from normal diversion, often starved for reading matter. Drink and women are the common and perhaps natural recourse under such circumstances. Moderation in the one and discretion and common-sense in the other, will win commendation from the local people.

Intemperance will only win thorough contempt, while flouting the conventions has brought on definite dislike and indignation in many cases.

OSS being what it is, and particularly OSS in China being in a manner tied up with the Tai Lee organization - a secret service organization with an incredibly large force and the ability and determination to know everything about OSS and its members - should stress with all its members the importance of each member's behavior and comportment in China.

**SECRET**



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS  
 FROM : Chief, SI  
 SUBJECT: Field Report - John C. Hulley

DATE: 19 April 1945

*Field Report*  
*21.*  
*x mead to*

✓ 9

Mr. John C. Hulley's report on field conditions is submitted herewith. You will no doubt be particularly interested in the comments made by Dr. Lester Houck, Chairman of the Reporting Board, SI, and Mr. D. DeBardleben, Chief, Southeast Europe Section, SI.

*S. B. L. Penrose, Jr.*  
 S. B. L. Penrose  
 Acting Chief

Attachment

*How*  
*for Direct*  
*ooc*

SECRET

022

408 51 15 33 6H 12

DIBED 11 OFFICE

128



**SECRET**

16,694

**MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO: Mr. Clegg, SI

DATE:

FROM: Mr. G. B. Smith (SI)

12 April 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report of John Malley

1. **General Intelligence:** Good point. Captain DeBardleben has shown no essential limitations.

2. **General Intelligence Administration:** First part has no reference to Bern, since the plan exists because information is given to several Allied intelligence; General DeBardleben's plan presently is only for unified American intelligence.

The redistribution of reports is a strict reports system and this has been solved. Material from Bern is sent simultaneously to Paris, Caserta, Washington; each office simultaneously distributes within its own theater. All reports must be distributed not to distribute Bern reports of collection can occur only when a receiving agency is in Bern theater or when this agency violates the third party rule. These points are beyond our control. Background technical reports is furnished by the Technical Section in Washington and ETO. I understand ETO, in these reports, services MDDFO on hot material. In any event, if the material goes to the right customer in MDDFO a straight forward avoids any serious difficulties.

3. **General Staff:** This is true and is the lot.

4. **Chiefly agree.**

Report comments on Field Report - Roger Lay DeBard, ETO, sent back by Captain DeBardleben's section.

**SECRET**

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive Officer, SI

DATE: April 18, 1945

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Comments on Field Report of John Hulley

1. Concerning the subjects discussed in the several paragraphs of Mr. Hulley's report on the activities of the Yugoslav desk, I offer the following comments:

Paragraph 1: Reports previously received from informed observers indicate that the supply of SI personnel in Yugoslavia has been, on the whole, unsatisfactory. I am not prepared to state the reasons for this state of affairs, but I do feel that it is most unfortunate because supply is a most essential requirement of our activities there. I do not know what section in Caserta or Bari was directly charged with the supply of activities in Yugoslavia. I do know that Colonel Glavin arranged his staff according to the usual four-section design with section four charged generally with supply. It is reasonable to presume that the supply section was responsible for over all supply in Yugoslavia. However, it seems illogical to me to hold the Yugoslav Desk, SI, entirely unaccountable for the supply and equipment of personnel working under its direction in Yugoslavia. It just does not seem possible to me that a desk head, aware of conditions described in such general terms as those used by Mr. Hulley, would be unable to do something about a situation so injurious to our operations.

If the Yugoslav Desk was dissatisfied with the state of supply, and upon investigation had specific criticisms and protests to make, certainly somewhere along the line between that desk and the Strategic Services Officer something could be done to remedy the situation. However, if it could not be accomplished in the field, then it seems to me that the Yugoslav Desk through the prescribed channels, Chief SI, Strategic Services Officer, would be duty bound to present the facts to the Chief SI, Washington, and the Director for appropriate corrective action. On the whole, it seems to me entirely inappropriate that an individual assigned to a desk, charged with SI administration in a certain area, should criticize an activity so vital as supply and disclaim all discredit for the unsatisfactory and inexcusable conditions reported upon.

Paragraph 2: When an independent United States intelligence system was established in Yugoslavia, it was well known by those concerned that the activities of this system would frequently duplicate the efforts of our British allies. However, this duplication was considered of no great importance compared to the profit to be derived from receipt of information provided by our own people over our own communications and to our own interested agencies. It is true that because of certain

- 2 -

controls exerted by the Partisans, SI has not been able in many cases to collect intelligence on its own, but certainly the principle of establishing and maintaining our own intelligence organization is not to be criticized as unnecessary merely because it duplicates the efforts of our Allies who might very well further complicate matters by providing us with that intelligence which they considered appropriate for us to see.

2. Concerning the subjects discussed in the several paragraphs of Mr. Hulley's report on the activities of the Caserta Reports Office, I offer the following comments:

Paragraph 1: There is much interest at the present time in the subject of directed intelligence and detailed intelligence objectives. It is obvious that directed intelligence is the most valuable and the most efficient from every point of view. There are, however, certain limitations under existing circumstances to the amount of direction that can be reasonably expected from our customers.

An ideal situation, it seems to me, from the point of view of intelligence collection, would be for a given customer to have such a complete picture of the situation in an area that he could spot at once the missing parts. Then this customer would simply say to SI, "This or that is what we want to know", and SI would then go out and get the information for them. It is unfortunate but true that our customers generally have no such complete and clear picture of a situation and hence to extract from them directives and orders for intelligence is a difficult undertaking. I do not believe that it is practical for SI, without the cooperation of its customers, to undertake the creation of objectives or the issuance of directives. The SI representatives in the field are better able to determine these than is SI, Washington. Once we have gotten a report from the field, and from it a suggested extension or follow-up, it is well that we should then take the necessary steps to collect further information on the subject.

SI activities in Yugoslavia, for example, have been confined in no sense to secret intelligence. This fact is perhaps unfortunate in a way and yet unavoidable because OSS has been the only representation of this Government in Yugoslavia for a considerable period of time. Hence it was reasonable and right and helpful that SI should report all information of use to our Government regardless of whether it was secret or open, but unknown to us. Therefore, we have collected and furnished vast quantities of information of comparatively little value and certainly of no secret nature simply because it was interesting and did help in keeping our Government informed as to what was going on in Yugoslavia.

If and when SI is restricted to the handling of clandestine intelligence, the subject of direction can be more accurately considered. See-

- 3 -

cret intelligence is not mass produced, it is certainly a custom job, and hence it is reasonable to suppose that individuals will be required to work long and strenuously in order to produce valuable results. Most secret intelligence, it seems to me, is opportunistic in nature. Certainly our Government would hardly be able to direct SI to look for something, the existence of which no one had ever contemplated. This does not mean that all direction of secret intelligence is impossible, but it does mean that it is limited. If, as an illustration, our Government was aware of the existence of a new weapon in a foreign arsenal, it would be very reasonable for SI to be assigned the job of obtaining specifications, capabilities, limitations, etc. However, the existence of such a weapon would most probably be learned by the SI representative operating on his own initiative and perhaps under some such general directive or reminder as "Report on any new weapons". Again SI must rely for the most part upon its customers for direction; and as our activities are more and more restricted to the secret, it seems likely that we will be called upon to furnish bits of information not otherwise obtainable.

At the risk of being much too wordy, I want finally to offer one further observation. In the realm of secret intelligence our most important customer is unquestionably the Department of State. I do not believe that SI will ever be in a position where it can expect to receive from the State Department directives and objectives for intelligence activities. It seems most probable that if the State Department wants information on a particular subject it will communicate its demands to its representative in the country concerned -- to the Ambassador or the Minister or the Consul. Then this State Department representative will attempt to obtain the information desired by overt means available to him or by calling upon the SI representative, who it is hoped will be available to him and in a position to extend our efforts by unusual methods. For this reason, the future of SI depends for the most part upon the support of the Department of State.

*D. DeB.*  
D. DeB.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****TO : Executive Officer, for Chief SI****DATE: 11 April 1945****FROM : John C. Hulley****SUBJECT: Field Report - Yugoslav Desk, Bari**

1. I worked on the Yugoslav Desk in Bari from September through November 1944, arranging for supplies to men in the field. This occupation was for the most part a waste of time because most of the supplies never got there. Although there were large outfits and groups of personnel, planes, trucks and a boat, many men returning from the field stated they had not received anything from us during their whole mission, while others had gone without for many months. The Partisans fed them. The best supplies were of course stolen by Yugoslav, British, Italian and American workers in the warehouses, where shipments would often wait many months. British and American planes could fly under only the best conditions, while Russians were flying into the Partisans in all weather.

2. The Yugoslav Desk as a whole could have served any of the following three purposes:

- a) Intelligence: U.S. teams in Yugoslavia were by the end of 1944 all located at various Partisan headquarters (with the exception of the McDowell team), receiving the daily or weekly intelligence handouts from the Partisans. British teams likewise were located at Partisan headquarters, with the result that nearly all of our intelligence was duplicated. We did not duplicate all British intelligence because the British had many more teams in Yugoslavia. They also developed a more efficient communications system, opened up some form of direct communication with the Balkan Air Force, and were able to beat us on all hot intelligence; they also forwarded to OSS all their military and most of their political intelligence.
- b) Diplomacy: Although Marshal Tito must bear a large part of the responsibility for poor U.S.-Yugoslav relations, we played a fairly uniformly unsuccessful diplomatic game.
- c) Evacuation of Airmen: This job was highly successful and many of our men did an excellent job under very exacting conditions.

**SECRET**

J.C.H.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Executive Officer, SI

FROM : John Bulley

SUBJECT: Field Report

DATE: 11 April 1945

The following are observations drawn from difficulties encountered in the Caserta Reports Office:

1. Directed Intelligence: Directed Intelligence in the form of questions to the field from desk and reports office is now common practice; I think, however, that considerably more emphasis on this side of intelligence collecting is necessary, a) in the training schools and b) in a reorganization of the various reports offices in the field and at Washington. (At one time there was some possibility in Caserta Reports Office of a directed intelligence unit being added, to consist of a lieutenant, two sergeants and a secretary, whose job it would be to keep in touch with customers in MEDTO and keep a stream of questions going to the field. The proposed reorganization was not effected.)

We have a complete SI system of agents in the field and we have a working system of fast distribution to all interested customers. Yet we fail to make full use of these facilities, preferring to allow our agents to waste lives, time, brains and money to acquire miscellaneous information. We disseminate this miscellaneous intelligence to all customers, in the long run flooding them with such a conglomeration of information, 80% valueless as far as they are concerned, that many have little time to thumb through for what of value we can offer. Directed intelligence, making a planned methodical use of the facilities afforded by SI and Communications, will add immeasurably to the worth for the customer of our information.

2. General Intelligence Reorganization: Too much cannot be said in favor of General Donovan's plan for centralizing and reorganizing the whole United States intelligence system, divided as it is into numerous duplicating and flimsily coordinated agencies; typical of this "system" are the travels of a report emanating from Bern, describing a new capsule for German gas masks. This report will come to Caserta first direct from Bern as a U.S. report, subsequently as a joint U.S./French

**SECRET**

- 2 -


Intelligence report, then from London as a "Unison" report, later from Paris as a French Intelligence report, probably from London as a Polish report and finally possibly as a Czech Intelligence report. Caserta Reports Office, after checking some time for the various duplications, will (knowing very little about chemical warfare) attempt to evaluate, edit and determine the value of the report to any or all customers and then either cable or push it out. Paris Reports Office (knowing little about chemical warfare) will re-edit and re-disseminate from the Caserta report, or will simultaneously be evaluating, editing and determining its value from their direct Bern link; and London and Washington will be doing the same. A chemical warfare expert in the central agency of General Donovan's plan should receive this information when it first appears and should distribute to all interested customers.

3. Source Name: It would appear obvious that use of source name (e.g. "X Oyster") would provide an extra check for customers evaluating information where two similar reports might or might not come from the same source.

4. The Caserta Reports Office is an extraordinarily able team.

J.C.H.

SECRET





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


16, 295  
Field Report  
**SECRET**  
Callanan  
X 21

MEMORANDUM

10 May 1945

TO: General Donovan  
FROM: Japan-China Sec., FESI  
SUBJECT: Captain Callanan's Field Report

We have read Captain Callanan's report with great interest and have made notes of a number of his suggestions. We find that we have already adopted a number of his recommendations.

  
Duncan C. Lee, Maj. AUS  
Chief, Japan-China Sec.,  
Far East Division, SI

Attachment 

627  
6415 6416 6417  
**SECRET**  
131

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 16695

Date Rec'd SA

No.	Route No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	For'd		
1	See				
2	1050			W. Rk	interesting report. Also making the post-war reaction of officers in that test is already carrying through on many of the suggestion.
3	See		10		
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

To: Major Duncan Lee

W.J.D.

Director's Office

(9900)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO :** Director, OSS  
**FROM :** Chief, SI  
**SUBJECT:** Field Report - Captain Malcolm W. Callanan

**DATE:** 19 April 1946

There is submitted herewith Captain Callanan's  
report on field conditions.

*S. B. Pearson, Jr.*  
S. B. L. Pearson  
Acting Chief

Attachment

*To James Lee*  
*D*

100-100000

1000

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

DATE: March 21, 1945

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report on field conditions submitted by  
Captain Malcolm W. Callanan.

1. This report deviates somewhat from the prescribed form. On Pages 4 and 5, Captain Callanan refers to various reports previously submitted which contain information as to his field activities. Apparently confident that such reports satisfactorily record the details of his field experiences, Callanan proceeds without delay into a discussion of the sins and virtues of OSS in general and SI in particular.

2. Paragraph 3b comprises an abbreviated Handbook for the Intelligence Officer. Callanan's principles are general, rather inflexible and in spots obvious. Certainly this attempt is in the right direction -- toward a determination of what an Intelligence Officer is supposed to do.

3. Paragraph 3c, Page 9. The rules and principles enumerated herein represent Captain Callanan's ideas. There is no criticism of them except that they are too rigid. His conclusions in subparagraph (2), Page 10, appear to be sound.

4. This report from Paragraph 4, Page 12 onward contains general statements and charges which, as is usually the case, may well be exaggerated in an attempt to emphasize a point or principle. For example, at top of Page 13, sentence beginning, "OSS in the Mediterranean . . .".

5. Paragraph 4a defines in part the function of a field commander. Although it is certainly a generally accepted principle that any commander must have the greatest possible authority in his command, rarely in practice is the commander absolute monarch of all he surveys. Certain controls from above are essential. Most everyone must have a boss and it is usually just as well that such is the case.

6. Paragraph 4b, Page 14, concerns liaison. This constantly abused word actually defines a very necessary function. It is difficult to determine a happy balance so far as visits are concerned, but too much liaison can be a most annoying and disrupting practice.

SECRET

- 7 -

7. Page 16. I presume Captain Callahan is prepared to support by specific examples the general statements recorded here. The suggestion made at the bottom of page and top of page 17 is now, I believe, actually in process.

8. The material contained in the report from Page 17 onward is no doubt presented as a gratuity. It contains useful facts and helpful suggestions -- all of which may well be edited with a view to inclusion in Volume N, Post-War Intelligence.

*DDRB.*  
D. Deb.

**SECRET**

16,695

**REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS**  
by  
**Captain Malcolm W. Callanan**

**Table of Contents**

	<u><b>PAGE</b></u>
<b>1. Chronological Outline of Experience</b>	<b>2</b>
a. Service Prior to OSS	2
b. Service with OSS in United States	2
c. Service with OSS Overseas	2
<b>2. Outline of Progress in Particular Activities with Reference to Reports and Memoranda not included in this Report</b>	<b>4</b>
a. North Africa; General	4
b. Italy; Intelligence Officer	4
c. Yugoslavia; SI	5
<b>3. Observations on Particular Activity: SI and Intelligence</b>	<b>6</b>
a. Definition	6
b. The Functions of a Field Intelligence Officer	6
(1) Responsibilities	6
(a) Coordination	6
(b) Liaison and Directives	6
(c) Non-Operational Administration	6
(2) Authority	7
(a) Directives	8
(b) Personnel	8
c. Organization of SI Field Branch	8
(1) Authority of Field Branch Chief	9
(a) Selection of "Target"	9
(b) Freedom from Interference	9
(2) General Conclusions on Field SI Branch	9
(a) Division of Military from Political-Economic Intelligence	10
(b) Training of American Agents	10
(c) Elimination of Non-Secret Information	11
(d) Restraint on Bias in Reporting	11
<b>4. Observations on Military and Semi-Military Organizations in the Field</b>	<b>12</b>
a. The Function of a Field Commander	12
(1) Authority	12
(a) Definition	12
(b) Branch Activity	12
	13

**SECRET**

	<u>PAGE</u>
(a) Personnel	13
(2) Limits on Authority of Field Commander	14
b. Field-Base Liaison	14
c. Field Services	15
d. General Conclusions	15
5. Conclusions Relative to Post-Military Field Organization	17
a. Administrative Changes	17
(1) Elimination of Non-Intelligence Branches	17
(2) Post-War Services	17
(3) Post-War Security	18
b. Intelligence Organization	19
(1) Directives	19
(2) Training of Agents	19
(3) Field Desk Officer	20
c. Proposals for Expanding Intelligence Sources	20
(1) American	20
(2) Foreign	21
d. Character of Post-Military Secret Intelligence	21
(1) Division of SI from Secret Diplomacy	22
(2) Closer Supervision of SI Reports	22
(3) SI Separate from Reporting and Analysis	22
(4) Ethics of Intelligence Organizations	23

**SECRET**



- 2 -

1. Chronological Outline of Experience

DATE	RANK	PLACE	COMMANDING OFFICER	ASSIGNMENT
<u>2. Service Prior to OSS</u>				
(1) Feb. - March '42	Private	Ft. Knox, Ky.		Armored Force Basic Training.
<u>3. Service with OSS in United States</u>				
(1) April - July '42	7/5			
(2) Aug. - Oct. '42	Sgt.	Area A & B	Lt. Col. Philip Strong	Clerk to Chief Inspector.
(3) November '42	Sgt.	Q Building	Commander Woolley	In charge of SSU Training Library.
(4) December '42	Sgt.	Q Building	Lt. Col. Harold Bookins	Expedition '40's.
<u>4. Service with OSS Overseas</u>				
(1) Jan. - April '43	Sgt.	Algiers	Col. William Baly	North Africa Mission 1 SO.
(2) May '43	2nd Lt.	Algiers	Col. William Baly (unofficially) Mr. Gerald Van Arman	
(3) June - Aug. '43	2nd Lt.	Marocco	Mr. Donald Boman	
(4) Sept. - Nov. '43	2nd Lt.	Italy	Col. Elmer Huntington	
(5) Dec. - Dec. '43	2nd Lt.	Italy	Col. John Marshall	

SECRET

- 3 -

DATE	RANK	PLACE	COMMANDING OFFICER	ASSIGNMENT
(6) Jan. - April '45	1st Lt.	Italy	Col. A. C. Reuterhan	Intell. Off. OSS 5th Army & 15th Army Group.
(7) May - June '45	1st Lt.	Italy	Col. C. C. Carter	Asst. Intell. Off. OSS AAI
(8) July - Aug. '45	1st Lt.	Rome	Lt. Col. A. J. Torrielli	Asst. Int. Off. HQ Det. 2677 Regt.
(9) Sept. - Jan. '45 - '44	1st Lt. - Captain	Yugoslavia	Colonel Huntington	Asst. SI

**SECRET**

- 4 -

2. Outline of Progress in Particular Activities with Reference to Reports and Memoranda not included in this Report

a. North Africa; General:

- (1) Service as Communication Clerk and Mess Officer were not personally reported. Reference to monthly reports CO, Exp. Det. G-3, AFHQ (OSS).
- (2) Service with Labor Desk unofficial and part-time.
- (3) Service in Morocco under Mr. Donald Downes. First period alone in Fes in X-2/SI work. Second period in administrative charge unit in Oujda for X-2 and SO work into Spanish Morocco.  
Reference: Intelligence and administrative reports to Mr. Downes, G-2 5th Army, OSS Casablanca, and American Consul General, Casa.

b. Italy; Intelligence Officer:

- (1) Served as Intelligence Officer under Mr. Downes, Colonel Ellery Huntington, Colonel John Haskell and Colonel Reutershan of OSS Detachment 5th Army. Served as Assistant Intelligence Officer under Colonel C. G. Carter and Lt. Colonel A. J. Terrielli for OSS AAI and HQ Detachment (Rome) 2677th Regiment.  
Reference: Intelligence reports and memos now with Reports Officer Co. "D", 2677th Regiment and monthly reports with Adjutant, HQ 2677th Regiment. Also monthly reports to Washington of Commanding Officers.
- (2) In addition two special reports on the Italian situation were submitted by Undersigned to Director, OSS, dated 21 February 1944 and 16 March 1944. Final reports on intelligence

**SECRET**

- 5 -

situation and administrative commitments were submitted by  
Undersigned to Colonel Joseph Rodrigo in August 1944.

c. Yugoslavia; SI:

- (1) Served as Assistant SI under Lt. Colonel Stafford Reid for Colonel Huntington. Assigned to Military Intelligence. Spent first period on VIS Island organizing order of battle section and developing liaison with partisan and Allied intelligence officers. Weekly reports by this Section to Colonel Huntington through Lt. Colonel Reid.
- (2) Second period accompanied Colonel Huntington on his second and third trips through Yugoslavia (to Serbia and later to Croatia, Dalmatia and Montenegro). Attempted to improve quality and speed of information reported by OSS personnel stationed with partisan armies. Acted as military intelligence adviser to Colonel Huntington on these trips and for final reports.
- (3) Reference: Intelligence pouch and cable files with "Y" Desk 2677th Regiment and Reports Officer 2677th Regiment. In addition Undersigned prepared for Colonel Huntington:
  - (a) For Colonel Huntington's Report to Major General Moore, AFHQ, copy to OSS, Washington, 15 December 1944; attached Exhibits A to E.
  - (b) For Colonel Huntington's final report to Major General Donovan, 27 December 1944; attached Schedules B and C.
  - (c) For Reports Officer 2677th Regiment, 2 January 1945; Supplementary Reports 1 and 2 and situation maps.

**SECRET**

- 6 -

**2. Observations on Particular Activity: SI and Intelligence****a. Definition**

The association of Undersigned with OSS branches other than Intelligence and SI was not of sufficient duration or continuity to justify personal observations on the problems of or suggestions for the field activity of these branches. Sufficient accounting of service with X-2, SO, Communications, Labor Desk and Services has been included in paragraphs 1 and 2. General comments, when warranted, will be included in paragraph 4.

**b. The Functions of a Field Intelligence Officer****(1) Responsibilities****(a) Coordination**

The first responsibility of the Intelligence Officer is that of coordinating the activities of the branches engaged in intelligence work. While this function is theoretically assigned in OSS, in some instances it is not sufficiently stressed. The submission of several different reports from the various intelligence branches on the same subject only confuse the eventual customer. Case after case occurred where OSS operational branches, a military army or civil agency, needed reports prepared which needed the coordinated efforts of SI, R & A, X-2 and such cooperation was not achieved.

**(b) Liaison and Directives****SECRET**

- 7 -

The general problem of intelligence directives for the coordinated field intelligence unit belongs to the Intelligence Officer. He should actively promote sufficient liaison with such agencies as might have need of OSS information to the end that all branches work together to answer such legitimate needs. In addition the Intelligence Officer should be responsible for liaison with other U. S. or foreign information services. Sometimes this function is claimed by SI or R & A or simply handled mechanically and without much benefit by Registry. Liaison with other intelligence agencies is not only valuable in the mutual profit derived from exchange of information, but will keep the OSS informed as to the extent and type of activity already existing in any given field of information. If this liaison is handled by one of the branches there is additional security risk, particularly for SI, and a tendency to be influenced, sympathetically or antipathetically, by the trend taken by an outside agency.

(e) Non-Operational Administration

Finally, the Intelligence Officer should attempt to relieve the subordinate branches of much of the unnecessary administration with which they frequently become burdened. Servicing (mess, transport, and housing problems) and the purely administrative details

**SECRET**

- 8 -

of personnel and organizational record-keeping should be assumed, consistent with the autonomy of each branch, by the Intelligence Officer. This would be performed in liaison, not only with the local field Services officer, but also with rear bases.

(2) Authority

(a) Directives

The Intelligence Officer must have sufficient authority to issue effective directives to each intelligence branch. Too often separate branches spend all of their time on special reports or assignments for which no legitimate need outside of their branch exists. The Intelligence Officer should always be consulted by Washington before directives as to "what" information to obtain are issued. This prerogative should in no way include the right of the Intelligence Officer to interfere in the "way" in which the information is obtained. Branch techniques are characteristic of the particular branch and should not be subject to revision by the local commanders.

(b) Personnel

The Intelligence Officer should be able to approve or disapprove the appointment in his theatre of each of the branch chiefs. The violation of this procedure has provoked most of the inefficiencies which resulted

**SECRET**

- 9 -

in the field from improper coordination of the branches. However, the Intelligence Officer should never interfere in the personnel choices of the field branch chief.

c. Organisation of SI Field Branch

(1) Authority of Field Branch Chief

(a) Selection of "Target"

The Field SI Chief should be discouraged from selecting his own intelligence targets. He should receive his directives from local government agencies, other operating branches of OSS, or SI Washington through the Intelligence Officer. The field chief has neither the time nor the familiarity with the problems to develop his own directives. Only when the field chief becomes aware of an important trend, which he feels has been overlooked, should he report information on his own initiative.

(b) Freedom from Interference

The Field Branch Chief should be sufficiently experienced in intelligence organization to establish a smooth-working machine which can quickly and accurately respond to legitimate requests for information. Once established, the Field Chief should not be subjected to constant interference or investigation. Control can be effectively exercised by the Intelligence Officer and SI Washington by judging the results over a period of time. Perhaps

**SECRET**



- 10 -

the reason why so many Field SI Chiefs are constantly hampered by repetitious inquiries and investigations is that the base has not a sufficiently compact organization for supervision of the total production of the field branch. Often when it was suspected that a field branch chief was reporting inaccurately or inefficiently, a local investigation was made. These investigations restrained for a while SI activity but were seldom effective. A close comparison of the information sent back by that field chief should have been made against past or current trends in his field, or against information coming from other sources. In specific instances such a comparison would have been much more revealing of the efficiency or deficiency of the field chief's activity.

(2) General Conclusions on Field SI Branch

(a) Division of Military from Political-Economic Intelligence

Military and political-economic intelligence should be sharply divided. In both Yugoslavia and Italy agents, whether American liaison officers or natives, would confuse their military reporting with political connotations. This fact will be true even in post-war military reporting. The size and efficiency of Tito's army should have been carefully tabulated apart from the atmosphere of sympathy or hostility for his movement. With rare exceptions such tabulation was not attempted.

**SECRET**

- 11 -

(b) Training of American Agents

There has been too much emphasis on training an agent how to be an agent, rather than what information is required. Many liaison officers with partisan forces received relatively intensive training on techniques of conduct and apparently none on the organization of the German army. Many civilian under-cover operators spent a great deal of time learning such esoteric techniques as ju-jitsu, clandestine organization, lock picking, codes and ciphers, and were never instructed as to precisely what type of political or economic intelligence was needed. It is generally true that an agent can receive no other training in method than real experience. The situations which, in fact, finally confront both the military liaison officer and the under-cover agent, are so multiple as to be unpredictable.

(c) Elimination of Non-Secret Information

SI should concentrate only on Secret intelligence, not generalized information. This was perhaps the greatest defect of SI in the Mediterranean and was due, in a measure, to unforeseen exigencies of the war and the urgent requests of other war agencies in the field. To a degree this fault was also due to the atmosphere of "policy making" which still seems to exist to an unreasonable extent in OSS.

**SECRET**

- 12 -

(4) Restraint on Bias in Reporting

Biased information, honestly or dishonestly intended to influence governmental military and political policy, is to a certain extent unavoidable in intelligence agencies. The quantity of prejudiced, and therefore useless, information which came from Morocco, Italy and Jugoslavia, was, however, excessive. Part of the fault lies, again, in the atmosphere of the whole organisation, an atmosphere which, unless dispelled, will prevent any large amount of objective reporting. Part of the fault lay with the local field staff, who through timidity or laziness, were unwilling to take preventative action. Suggested steps for restraining bias in reporting will be discussed in Paragraph 5.

4. Observations on Military and Semi-Military Organisations in the Fielda. The Function of a Field Commander(1) Authority(a) Definition

Any field commander must have complete authority in his field. This is true in both military and civilian organisations. So often the base, feeling that it knows more about a given local situation than the field commander, attempts to interfere in his decisions, occasionally in very small details. As a rule a field commander will resign rather than permit such interference, and certainly, if the base feels he can no longer be trusted completely, he should be removed if he does not resign. Men who do

**SECRET**

- 13 -

retain their positions despite interference generally are anxious only to "hold a job", and eventually fall into the practice of permitting much incompetence or waste within their command, rather than protest. OSS in the Mediterranean has had many resignations in the past two years, and, worse, has seen many field commanders retain their positions despite malpractices of which they are aware.

(b) Branch Activity

A field commander must have the right to refuse to accept any given branch in his area or command. The OSS is sufficiently old and well-known to its members that a field commander, well-selected, can be competent to judge the local utility of any branch. Often Army or other authorities are too strongly opposed to a particular type of OSS activity, or local conditions make such activity impractical. If the branch is nevertheless sent to that area, the result is inactivity on the part of the personnel involved and, unavoidably, interference with branches already established and reduction of their efficiency.

(c) Personnel

The field commander must also have the right to select and use his personnel as he sees fit. The present principle that a field commander may temporarily assign any officer from one branch to another with the simple concurrence of

**SECRET**

- 14 -

field branch chiefs is practical and necessary. Unfortunately, it is not followed as frequently as it should be, partly due to unreasonable interference on the part of base branch chiefs. Personnel not requested by the field commander should not be sent to the field. Personnel requested should be sent as quickly as possible.

(2) Limits on Authority of Field Commander

The field commander should be well briefed on, if not already familiar with, the special techniques and over-all interests of each branch. Once a field branch chief has been appointed, the commander and his staff should not, in their turn, interfere in the personnel and technique decisions of the field branch chiefs.

b. Field-Base Liaison

One of the most satisfactory ways of eliminating the misunderstandings so frequent in the past is by a more constant liaison between the field commander and the base. The field commander should, for his own profit, encourage the visit of base branch and section chiefs to his area. These trips should be carefully controlled, and only made with the prior consent of the field commander. They should not include the hundreds of usual "visiting firemen."

This type of liaison should also exist between the field rear and forward stations. City team or field army OSS units should be encouraged to return to the base at least once every month. In turn the staff of the base field commander should visit the forward areas, where

**SECRET**

- 15 -

practical and acceptable to the forward area commander, as often as possible. This planned, constant liaison did not exist in most areas.

c. Field Services

The Services Branch has generally performed the duties assigned to it with great efficiency. Unfortunately, the over-staffed headquarters and insistent requirements for luxury necessitate such large servicing staffs that additional personnel are required to service them and keep the records. Apart from those essential to security, too many separate establishments are maintained, often for reasons of comfort, rather than for efficiency. Intelligence services of other nations do not, as a rule, have such large administrative staffs. The Intelligence Service (Br.) carry sufficient authority to requisition services from diplomatic or military units, services which include everything from extravagant villas for special occasions to guards. This practice consequently leaves the field commander with more time for operational problems.

Since the tremendous servicing branches of OSS are in a great measure due to the early reluctance of American Army or civilian servicing agencies to cooperate with OSS, this servicing requirement may diminish today. Along with so many other branches, whose existence is justified, if at all, by the war, this branch may be eliminated or reduced if OSS continues to function in post-war activities.

d. General Conclusions

Generally speaking, the waste of time, personnel and materiel which occurred in field commands was justified by war-time urgency and

**SECRET**

- 16 -

necessity. However, the present confusion and inefficiency which exists in many areas must be eliminated. That its elimination is possible can be seen in the success of some of the small detached military units or city teams at present in the field. Such success makes the over-staffing and branch over-lapping of other commands appear comparatively worse. Undoubtedly, the Washington headquarters is aware of the many persons in the field who have not been productive and are still being retained. In fact, whole sections and branches have existed in certain areas for many months without the justification of need or accomplishment. In some commands many officer and enlisted personnel have had no active jobs for long periods of time and admit it, somewhat bitterly. There are also many officers or even entire sections who, cynical through constant frustration, send detailed monthly reports designed only to cover their total inactivity and preserve their positions for the duration of the war.

It is now time honestly to review all areas and select those sections and officers who are genuinely contributing. The validity of a branch or person's activity should be measured not against what is said, or what future ideas are projected, but against what legitimate need exists. It would be also best to establish the legitimacy of a need for OSS activity on a specific request from an agency authorized to be served by OSS as balanced against local OSS capabilities.

Such a review could be made quickly and conclusively, and in such a manner as to not interfere with existing activities which are producing. When final decisions on personnel, scope of activity, exact

**SECRET**

- 17 -

area and specific directives have been reached, they should be forcefully and irrevocably enforced. Too frequently, the loose and contradicting administration of OSS return men or branches to areas in which, it had previously been established, they had no proper function.

When such a review is completed, the field commander, even the same commander as before the review, could be appointed. In an atmosphere of clarity he should be allowed to proceed without interference, judged on the long-term results of his command.

These conclusions, are, of course, relative to military or semi-military field units.

## 5. Conclusions Relative to Post-Military Field Organization

### a. Administrative Changes

#### (1) Elimination of Non-Intelligence Branches

With the gradual diminishing of certain war-time demands on OSS, many of the operational branches, such as SO, MO, MU, OG, R & D, C & D, can be totally or partially eliminated. All of these branches should be retained in a theoretical capacity.

Further, a research program, in conjunction with other agencies of the U. S. Government, should be instituted and actively supported. Those parts of C & D and R & D which service SI should be retained as part of post-war OSS servicing sections.

#### (2) Post-War Services

Large-scale physical servicing will be unnecessary in a post-war intelligence organization. Only in Washington will any degree of non-secret servicing demands be found, and many of these can be

**SECRET**



- 18 -

not by Army or civil government servicing sections. Services in OSS should be restricted to secret servicing. This function would be highly specialized and should include top-secret personnel records, special funds, secret communications, and personnel security. This staff should be kept as small as efficiently possible and its activities should be kept quite separate from the intelligence operations branches.

(3) Post-War Security

A note is necessary on the inclusion of personnel security into a secret servicing branch. In the reduction of OSS present size many of the needs for a separate security branch will disappear.

Physical security in Washington (of personnel, papers and buildings) should be given to a regularly established security organization of the army or the government. As in other countries, the identity of Washington office personnel, the location of buildings and entry into those buildings would not be secret factors of themselves. Such secrecy is impossible to maintain in the first place, and, secondly, a false sense of security exists when physical counter-espionage devices are employed. The "leaks" which occur in secret organization come from verbal dissemination among many supposedly reliable officials of information which was necessary to, perhaps, only one or two.

Top-secret personnel files should be available only to a few members of the secret servicing branch. Security checks or special investigations could be made by these officers by

**SECRET**

- 19 -

consultation with X-2, CI, G-2 and FBI, if they could obtain free access to files without having to reveal any information. These officers should have no connection with the intelligence branches. Too often in the field a knowledge of the local political trends, branch intrigues, and personality issues influenced security officers.

b. Intelligence Organization

(1) Directives

The OSS, or its post-war successor, must function for the benefit of existing agencies of the Government. It succeeds to a large measure in its ability to answer the important requests for secret information which are given to it.

A liaison section should be established, not as a social function, but actively to forward legitimate demands from the State Department, Army and Navy Departments to SI chiefs. The research section should be given sufficient authority to order specific directives, which will complete intelligence programs being prepared by the organization. It is most important to stop the practice of untrained SI leaders inventing their own directives with insufficient knowledge of political, and particularly, economic local situations.

(2) Training of Agents

Post-war American agents and organizers should be trained particularly in the type of information needed by the U. S. Government, rather than in techniques of espionage. Nor can

**SECRET**

- 20 -

It be assumed that an agent for economic intelligence can acquire sufficient knowledge to be familiar with all the many areas of activity he will undoubtedly investigate. The intelligence research staff should be responsible for directing the agent to a specific area or group for information, and for assessing the value of that information. An agent can as easily report on the movements and acquaintances of an oil executive as on a priest, without becoming completely familiar with the technical activity of either.

(5) Field Desk Officer

The field desk officer must be willing to carry out any information directives he is given, provided he feels that his staff are adequate to handle them. On the other hand, he should be permitted as much freedom from interference as possible in the execution of such directives, basing his right to his position on results alone.

c. Proposals for Expanding Intelligence Sources

(1) American

Presumably attention is being given to a post-war exploitation of intelligence sources, similar to that used by English and German agencies.

It can be expected that Americans will have developed enough consciousness of their position in foreign affairs to cooperate. Business information services, banks and insurance companies, in particular, are among the many non-governmental

**SECRET**

- 21 -

organisations for intelligence. Tourist interrogation and cooperation of tourist agencies and cultural organisations could also be exploited, if discreetly handled. Finally, the original and most exclusive copy of foreign correspondents would be of value and obtainable, if a guarantee of its security from rival newspapers could be made and followed.

(2) Foreign

There could be in addition, a special branch of SI to maintain and develop liaison with foreign information services. SI would be guided by information from X-2, although X-2 would maintain a separate organisation for infiltration of foreign agencies, and SI would maintain overt, informal contact. Such contact would become more or less fruitful as diplomatic relations with various countries were good or bad. It is probable, however, that this contact would provide many additional items of information. Italian S.I.M. will often, in order to have American support, give very detailed information on foreign governments or even Italian political parties. The Spanish Republicans will, in their turn, give the Americans information on S.I.M. Such information, naturally, would have to be carefully edited.

d. Character of Post-Military Secret Intelligence

Post-Military SI must eradicate many of the defects at present existing in OSS. The following are not proposals for the organisation of post-military SI, but suggestions as to lines of organisation which,

**SECRET**

- 22 -

it is believed, should prevail. It is again emphasized that the most important steps to be taken are the elimination of, first, the current vast quantities of non-secret information being processed, and, secondly, the reduction of bias in reporting.

(1) Division of SI from Secret Diplomacy

If an intelligence organisation must engage in secret diplomacy, as both OSS and IS (Br.) have done, a branch entirely separate from the SI Branch should be formed. It has been proven impossible at once to engage in local political activity and to report accurately and impartially.

(2) Closer Supervision of SI Reports

The Washington Base must be so organized that a close supervision of the reports from the field can be made. The field reports, viewed against field expenditures and the accuracy of the information, would give a precise idea of the value of the field SI chief. Great care must be taken that so-called "operational security" does not disguise inefficiency or politically colored reporting.

(3) SI Separate from Reporting and Analysis

Not only in theory, but in practice, SI field chiefs and agents should be prevented from controlling the reporting of the information from a certain area and from analysing trends in that area. The conscious processes involved in making an analysis tend to crystallise a person's ideas. The analyst becomes reluctant to accept subsequent information which refutes his analysis.

**SECRET**

- 23 -

(4) Ethics of Intelligence Organizations

In both the training of agents and the total atmosphere prevalent in an organization, integrity as an intelligence agent should be stressed. This might tend to minimize the bias in reporting which is so natural to any agent. Field officers should be trained never to suppress information with which they do not agree, but rather to forward it with an added comment. Officers should never go to other American agencies, or, particularly, to foreign agencies with problems of their own organization. These last two violations were much more frequently found in OSS than in the agencies of other governments.

In addition to stressing the ethics of intelligence work in training and in daily administration, the example of penalties would, as in civil law, be effective. In the past OSS officers have resigned of their own accord, have been fired for alleged security breaches, lasciviousness, and temperamental failings, but rarely, if ever, has an officer been openly removed for "prejudicing information" or involving outsiders in the problems of the organization. It is very difficult to define or prescribe for such an intangible quality as organizational integrity. There is such a quality, however, and it does not exist in most of OSS. Perhaps the suggestions stated above may be concrete enough to supplement action which is already pending. Some action, soon, is essential.

*William W. Callahan*  
William W. Callahan  
Captain, AUS

**SECRET**

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5

Board of Review  
13497 Thru 15424

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5

Board of Review  
13497 Thru 15429

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5