



page three schaefer field report to chief me

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The operation of MO proper, as I observed it, could have been more successful had there been a common understanding between Washington and London on matters of policy and leadership. Much of the success of PWD can be traced to the efforts of MO men, army and civilian, who probably would have been wasted had they not have been contributed to Supreme Headquarters. I am afraid the MO Branch in London would have failed in its purpose had it not had the Psychological Warfare Division to lean on.

*Carl Schaefer*  
CARL SCHAEFER  
Civ. 0-267676

11 SA  
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page two schaefer field report to chief mo

was arranged.

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10. With my opposite number, a British major, planned German combat and occupational operations insofar as use of films for propaganda and education were concerned. It was originally planned that I would join combat team of 12th Army as Film Officer; later it was decided I should go direct to Berlin upon fall of the city.

11. When it appeared to me that Berlin would not be taken for six or more months, asked MO in London whether I could take my leave back in the United States and so visit my wife and child. This was arranged.

12. Arrived in Washington 27 November 1944 and was given choice of returning to the BTO, going to the CBI or teaching MO at WA for Schools and Training Branch. I chose the instruction assignment.

13. Colonel Robinson approved on 4 December to my joining S&T, which would necessitate my being transferred from MO. The following day I checked out of Washington.

14. Reported 2 January 1945, at completion of my leave, to Newport Beach, California, for transport to WA.

15. General Observations:

a) Of the British and Americans who passed through FWD, those from MO came best trained, those from OWI worst. The OWI Huntington School appeared to have been more of a country club than training center and/or the OWI was sloppy in its recruiting.

b) "S" reports were not available and MO was unwilling, rightly or wrongly, to send personnel to No. 4 WOEB for screening; consequently, MO men were not always considered for key jobs by many FWD section heads.

c) The FWD training program was generally less effective than the MO because the British and Americans could not always agree on policy; the majority of instructors were uninspired British officers, the training was too general in nature.

d) More training in white techniques might have been given MO personnel who, in London, found themselves assigned to work in white and/or wait six or seven weeks after D Day for the black directive to come through.

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16. Conclusion to Field Report: I wish to go on record as pleased to have had the opportunity of representing MO in the BTO

*Gen. Von ...*

*16/67*  
*T. ...*  
**SECRET**  
*Schaeffer*  
*1 MO*  
*x ETO*

22 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** European Theatre of Operations Field Report

**TO:** Colonel Kenneth Mann, Chief Morale Operations Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. Following recruiting by Lt. (s.j.) John Reinhardt and signing by Edward Cushing, on 2 February 1944, reported to OBS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1944. Between dates was confined under physician's care, suffering attack of serum poisoning.
2. Attended "B" 12-15 March. Trained for New York 17th, sailed for ETO 20th, arrived in Scotland 28th, reported to MO Office in London 29th.
3. While awaiting definite assignment developed and wrote "black" newspaper aimed at foreign slave workers in Germany. Also produced rumors and submitted several poster and radio project ideas.
4. Attended the two week Brondesbury Training School operated by the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
5. Asked for and received assignment to PWD-SHAEP. I could see that this would be the successful operation in psychological warfare.
6. Slotted by PWD to the Training Section. As senior training officer I was associated closely with No. 4 War Office Selection Board, which was the PWD equivalent of "G". At the area, where I spent much of my time, I officially represented SHAEP and unofficially the United States Army. With the exception of myself the staff of No. 4 WOSEB was British.
7. Additionally served in the administration of the other PWD training centers: Clevedon, field school located near Bristol; Brondesbury, basic lecture-leaflet-opinion survey-prisoner interrogation school near London; Rushton, field school located in the Midlands; the Garden, German prisoner of war cages near London.
8. Following liberation of France, by which time I was deputy chief of training, it was decided to close the Training Section until such time as policy toward occupied Germany were defined.
9. The Film Section of PWD-SHAEP requested I be assigned to that unit in view of my motion picture background. The training

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****SECRET**

TO : Director ✓  
 FROM : Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report from Carl Schaefer

DATE: 16 February 1945

1. Attached is a report from Mr. Carl Schaefer, who served with MO/ETO and was assigned to the PWD training Section. Mr. Schaefer makes the following general observations:

a. PWD training program was less effective than the MO because of disagreements on policy matters between the British and Americans and rather uninspired caliber of the British officers engaged in this training.

b. Because MO was unwilling to allow its personnel to be screened by PWD and the "S" reports were unavailable, MO personnel were not always considered for key jobs by many PWD section heads.

c. MO operations would have been considerably more effective had there been a common understanding between London and Washington on matters of policy and leadership.

✓  
 W B Kantack  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

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life at the base was uncomfortable and monotonous. Many facilities were lacking and the conditions of secret operation in a neutral country made even a simple American sort of camp impossible. Ismir and Cairo undoubtedly failed at times to do all they should have done for Boston. It is the writer's opinion that the discontent was due partly to weariness and boredom, partly to ignorance and immaturity in some of the officers of the base. (There were no complaints from the commander of Key West, who performed single-handed a more difficult and trying task than any of the men at Boston.) When there was a shortage of supplies, the writer tried consistently to carry out the policy of favoring the most forward unit -- missions taking precedence over base and base over headquarters -- irrespective of the nationality of personnel, provided only that base and headquarters were not stripped to the point of helplessness. It was argued by others that this was an American operation and that, therefore, American personnel should receive first consideration in all cases. The Chief of OSS Middle East supported the latter argument. After the closing of the Turkish bases, therefore, the writer, feeling that he was not well qualified to carry out the policy laid down by his commanding officer, requested transfer to another theater.

J.L.C.  
J. L. C.

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for lack of proper training among the agents. The writer has recently seen that great changes have been made in the training programs since 1942, and assumes that the deficiencies are being made up, but cannot emphasize too strongly the need of concentration on this aspect of preparation, for both agents and staff officers.

5. Specific difficulties in the field:

Note: Most of the difficulties encountered by the writer have been classified or set down as examples in the preceding section, and need not be repeated.

a. Internal discord -

The writer's chief disappointments, discouragement and exhaustion came not from the difficulty of opposing the enemy, but from profitless and wasteful antagonism and inefficiencies among Allies, between American agencies, and within OSS itself. Fortunately his own periods of depression did not last long, and his efforts could usually be directed toward eliminating rather than prolonging the conflicts.

b. Disagreement over policy -

It may be worth recording (without undue emphasis) that an unhappy atmosphere of discontent showed itself occasionally at Boston during the last few months of work at that base. Certain American members of the staff complained of the conditions of life there, of being given too little consideration from Cairo and Iqmir, and of favoritism being shown to Greek personnel of the missions. Irritability gave rise to thoughtless accusations and grudges. It is true that

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required. As the nature and scope of the Imir operations became evident, however, he did devise a system of bookkeeping; and made the accounts as detailed as time and circumstances allowed. Repeated requests were made for instructions in this matter, but none were received until the end of August 1944 when a representative of the Special Funds Branch came to Imir to examine the books and explain the proper system. (For full statement of the case, see letter of 16 August 1944 from Caskey to Bland). Errors and inadequacies in the financial records could have been eliminated by: (1) a clear statement of financial policy and instructions in the form of bookkeeping that was wanted; (2) sufficient clerical staff to keep the records and prepare the reports.

f. Training -

A number of officers and other members of the Imir staff were recruited overseas and, having no formal training, were obliged to pick up the necessary knowledge from day-to-day experience. Those who had gone through OSS schools in America or Middle East had been exposed to a good deal of theory on security and methods of undercover work, but knew painfully little about military and other technical fields of intelligence or about the correct organization and form of an intelligence report. In practice, common sense and native wit proved far more important than special training in the field of Security. The same qualities were drawn upon (with rather astonishing success in some cases) for the main job of reporting, but a very large amount of valuable information was overlooked or inadequately reported.

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that were impossible to carry out. As a result, unnecessary friction developed between Cairo and the advanced bases; Immir gained an exaggerated reputation for obstructiveness, and much time and energy were wasted. These difficulties would have been largely eliminated by: (1) placing each operation in the Aegean unconditionally under the command of Immir from the start; (2) restraining the branches in Cairo from making plans for that area without previously consulting Immir; (3) frequent personal conferences between officers of the forward and rear headquarters.

d. Supply -

Until mid-summer of 1944 the bases were poorly equipped and supplied. They often lacked items of basic necessity for their operations, to say nothing of those that would contribute to the comfort and well being of the men. This was owing partly to a general lack of experience and partly to inefficient ordering in Immir; but the major responsibility rests with the ordering and procurement departments in Middle East and with those who failed to provide adequate transport and to see that the goods moved forward promptly.

e. Finance -

Immir was generally well supplied with funds, the expenditure of which was properly left to the discretion of the officer in charge. Pinches were felt only occasionally when funds were not delivered on schedule. The procedure of accounting, however, was not well worked out. The writer was told before he left Washington that, for reasons of security, no records of the expenditure of special funds would be

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c. Jurisdiction - command -

As stated in Section 2, above, the chief officer of OSS in Imir was held responsible by the Turks for all OSS activities in the area, and it was therefore necessary that he be in absolute command of all personnel and operations there. For example, wireless could not be set up or used without the sanction of the Emniyet; caiques on secret mission could not touch at unauthorized ports except under the cover of the Emniyet; supplies could not be moved, nor could men land and travel without passports and visas except as elements of the Emniyet. (Note: An Italian resident of Imir was summarily tried and hanged in 1944 because a small wireless transmitter, belonging to someone else, was found buried on his land; whereas OSS wireless, arms, explosives, etc., were handled with considerable freedom and hundreds of tons of supplies were moved without the customs control which was normally imposed even on the British secret services.) Under these conditions, the independent direction of communications men, maritime operations, SO, SI, etc., by different branch heads in Cairo was an unthinkable anomaly. And yet the various branches, being responsible each for its own type of operation and feeling an understandable jealousy of its own activities, often initiated actions which could not be reconciled with the realities of the situation. This was particularly true with various officers of MU, who, apparently with little knowledge of the ways of caiques and their crews, or of Aegean weather as it affects small craft, or of the immediate requirements governing our operations from day to day, frequently made plans and gave orders

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and obliged to spend most of their time at clerical jobs for which they had not been trained. The office never had a secretary, though requests were repeatedly made for one, from June 1943. This secretary should have been an intelligent, reliable American (man or woman) knowing typing, stenography and filing. A full-time code clerk was needed from the fall of 1943; he arrived at the end of June 1944; up to that time, the work was shared among the officers of the staff or done by a highly trained wireless technician who was thus kept from his own tasks. From the beginning of 1944 onward the duties of cashier and bookkeeper became increasingly burdensome and complex; they were performed first by the writer and later by one of his unfortunate assistants who could have used her time more profitably in other work. Security investigations could not be conducted as thoroughly as was desired, and records were never adequately maintained. This was a part-time job, calling for a man of good common sense rather than specialized training. A sound knowledge of Greek would have been especially valuable in his case, though not essential. In fact the writer would gladly have undertaken to train an able and willing NGO in financial and security duties, continuing thereafter to supervise and be responsible for the conduct of both. Finally, the function of Supply Officer, most important and exacting, was never quite satisfactorily performed. It was undertaken by various men, in turn and in combination. One officer, familiar with ordering, handling, and shipping supplies, and with keeping inventory, would have added greatly to the efficiency of the organization.

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#### 4. Conditions which might be improved:

Note: Since the operation under discussion has been terminated, no changes in it can now be made. The following remarks can, therefore, be of interest only as guides in other similar enterprises, present or future. The writer would also state that he is fully aware of the extreme difficulty of meeting even the basic requirements in men and supplies, as well as organization, of an operation so complex and delicate as that conducted in Izmir.

##### a. Staff - general qualifications -

In an operation dependent, like ours, on the services of Greeks, it is important that many of the staff should have at least a working knowledge of the language, and almost indispensable that they should have some familiarity with the Greek character and mentality. Working, furthermore, in neutral Turkey, and being dependent on the good will of the Turks, it was most desirable that the staff should know something of that country too, and be able to behave with tolerance and tact in order to avoid friction and to remain inconspicuous. Most of the members of the Izmir staff who had not lived in the Near East before made up in good humor for what they lacked in experience. A few, however, allowed their immature judgment to be warped by ignorance and personal prejudice, to the detriment of the operations in hand and to the danger of security.

##### b. Staff - specific needs -

The Izmir base was undermanned. As a result, several officers were drawn from the intelligence work for which they were qualified

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Greek Section (all branches) could be forwarded, maintained, and kept in contact with Cairo. In addition, certain separate operations were successfully carried out: during the evacuation of Samos (17-20 November 1943) OSS caiques brought out British troops, Greek troops and civilians, and several hundred Italians of the hapless Cuneo Division (letters of commendation from Major General A. C. Arnold, British M.A., and General Sir Henry Wilson); Lt. Savage of the Imir staff won the Silver Star and Purple Heart for his part in the action in Samos; the escape of a German woman, who had been secretly working for the American Embassy and had fallen under suspicion of the Germans and was sought by the S.D., was successfully engineered by OSS Imir, somewhat to the surprise and greatly to the satisfaction of Brigadier General Findall, American Military Attache' in Ankara (see report of Operation "Honey-moon"); numerous smaller day-to-day services, such as transporting men and equipment, relaying messages over our network, and supplying information, were performed for American, British, Greek, and Turkish agencies when occasion permitted. The writer was particularly gratified that genuine friendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence and respect, was developed (sometimes in the face of considerable opposition and prejudice) with the State Department and G-2, British military and secret services, and Turkish intelligence. At the closing of the Imir base in November 1944, several American and British officers of AML and of the British operational command in the Aegean (Force 142) expressed genuine regret that our services and facilities would no longer be available.

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f. Missions -

Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and trained in Middle East. Izmir was occasionally able to help in the recruiting of agents by spotting promising candidates as they first came out of Greece and directing them to OSS Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators, and guides were recruited locally or brought specially from Greece, and were trained by the Izmir staff and attached to missions going in. A few missions, notably those to the Samos area and the Dodekanese, were formed, trained and entirely directed by Izmir. (See histories of missions Emerald, Dago and Lucian.)

g. Interrogation and reporting -

Refugees, enemy deserters, and special agents coming to Izmir from Greece were interviewed by OSS officers whenever it was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox, the Reports Officer, who was able from these sources to add an important body of supplementary intelligence to the regular reports of our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed a few opportunities of interrogating and of preparing reports, especially on military subjects.

h. Achievements -

The major achievement of the Izmir staff was the successful founding and operating of bases through which the missions of the

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there were only 5 to 10 arrivals and sailings per month at Key West. In September 1944, 39 were recorded at Boston and 55 at Key West.

d. Supplying of bases and field -

One of the chief responsibilities of the Imbir base was supplying food, clothing, and special equipment to missions in the field. Most of these materials were procured in Middle East and sent by sea to Key West and Boston where they were trans-shipped into small caiques for delivery to the field. The supply route from Alexandria and Cyprus was not properly established, however, until the summer of 1944, and before that the Imbir staff was obliged to buy many items locally, both for the equipment of the bases and for secret (and illegal) export to the field.

e. Wireless -

Wireless stations were set up in Imbir, Key West, and Samos in August-September 1943 and at Boston in January 1944. Contact was maintained among the bases and with Cairo, Cyprus and Istanbul. Later, as the necessary communications staff and proper equipment was supplied, contacts were made and maintained on an increasing scale with agents in occupied territory and even with our own caiques at sea. At the end of August 1944 a small broadcasting station was set up at Boston for the use of MO in addressing subversive propaganda to enemy forces in Greece.

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orders to his representative in Imir to furnish the necessary assistance and cover for the operations. The British services helped with advice and occasionally with ~~the~~ men and supplies, at first hesitantly and with signs of jealousy, but later with a spirit of good will and cooperation when their respect and cooperation had been won.

b. Key West, Samos, Boston -

The first OSS base, "Key West" was assigned in June 1943 at a small port fifty miles south of Imir. Owing to lack of caiques and supplies, however, it did not begin to function until September. In that month, immediately after the surrender of Italy, a subsidiary base was set up in Samos. After the evacuation of that island by the Allies (17 November 1943), considerations of security and efficiency demanded the opening of an altogether new base, which was done at "Boston", some forty miles north of Imir, in December 1943. Boston was gradually developed into an active center of operations and the more important missions were dispatched from there, though Key West was always maintained as a valuable secondary base and port of call.

c. Growth of caique fleet -

A fleet of caiques was built up slowly and painfully. The first craft were acquired in September 1943; others were taken on in Samos in October and November; but it was not until the summer of 1944 that adequate vessels were provided from Cyprus and through rebuilding and refitting at Boston. In the fall and winter of 1943-44

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## h. Supply:

Procurement and forwarding to the field.

Maintaining records.

## i. Finance:

Payment of staffs.

Forwarding gold to the field.

Maintaining records.

3. Progress and Achievements:a. Founding of Isair bases; assistance of Turks and British -

Everything accomplished by the writer and his staff in Isair constituted progress, since no previous work had been done there by OSS. (Miss Dorothy H. Cox, who arrived in January 1948, made valuable observations and contacts during her first few months in Isair, but was prevented from getting on with the main job by lack of directions, authority, supplies, and means of communication.) The writer's assignment was to put agents into occupied Greece and to get their reports out. Under the conditions prevailing, the best means was a fleet of caiques working from the Turkish coast, such as the British Services had already been operating for some eighteen months. Such a caique service could not exist without the approval, assistance, and protection of the Turkish government. Approach was therefore made through the Chief of ISLD Istanbul, to the Chief of General Staff Intelligence (a service known as the Marniyet, comprising security and secret police functions) in Ankara. This officer gave permission and approval of the project and cont

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Greek Consulate General, Ismir  
Greek Intelligence Service, Ismir  
Italian Intelligence Service, Ismir  
Turkish General Staff Intelligence (Haniyet), Ismir

(Chief contacts underlined)

b. Maritime operations:

Founding\*, directing\* and maintaining caique bases  
("Key West", Samos, "Boston").

Acquiring\*, equipping and directing\* caique fleet  
and personnel.

Maintaining records\*.

c. Intelligence:

Receiving and forwarding agents and forwarding  
their reports (by mail and wireless)\*.

Recruiting and training agents.

Interrogation and reporting.

d. SO:

Forwarding missions, supplies and reports.

e. MO:

Forwarding missions, supplies and reports. Providing  
facilities for secret broadcasting station.

f. Labor Desk:

Forwarding mission and reports.

g. Communications:

Establishing wireless stations at Ismir and the  
operational bases\*.

Providing signal plans and ciphers\*.

Ciphering\*.

Maintaining records.

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that country and direct operations of penetration. He was originally assigned to the SI Branch, and intelligence was always the major concern of the Ismir base. But Ismir developed chiefly as an operational center, obtaining and operating a fleet of caiques; receiving and forwarding men, documents and supplies, to and from Greece and the Middle East; serving SI, SO, MO and the Labor Desk Missions, and employing the facilities of those Branches as well as MU and Communications. Owing to lack of staff for these duties, and to our position vis-a-vis Turkish General Staff Intelligence which recognized only one officer as responsible for OSS activity in the area, the writer was de facto commander of all branches and was obliged to manage many of the activities himself. (He was officially appointed representative of MU in May 1944; a written order confirming his position as Chief of OSS Ismir was not published until September 1944). Duties performed, in whole or in part, by the writer (marked \*) and those carried out under his direct supervision were the following:

a. Liaison with:

US Department of State (Embassy, Ankara; Consulate, Ismir)  
 US Military Attache', Ankara, and Assistant Military Attache', Ismir  
 US Naval Attache', Istanbul, and representatives  
 US OWI, Istanbul  
 US FRA, Ankara  
 British ISLD, Ismir  
 British Force ISS, Ismir  
 British YFB (A Force), Ismir  
 British Army (DACMO), Ismir  
 British Navy (SO A), Ismir

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO :** Chief, SI

**FROM :** John L. Caskey, Major AUS, Greek Desk, SE European Section

**SUBJECT:** Report on Field Conditions -- OSS Imair

**DATE:** January 23, 1945

Note: The following report deals with conditions in the Imair area from early in 1943 to the end of November 1944, the period during which penetration of occupied Greece was carried out by OSS from and through the Imair base. This particular operation was closed with the writer's departure from Turkey. Local conditions and specific problems encountered and methods employed are, therefore, chiefly of historical interest. Certain general comments and criticisms, however, may have a wider and more immediate importance.

**1. Chronological outline of the writer's activity:**

20 July 1942	Joined OSS
18 August 1942	Commissioned Captain AUS
August-September 1942	SI and SO schools and training
October-November 1942	Adjutant to Chief SE European Section
Dec. 1942-January 1943	Preparation for field with Office of Lend-Lease Administration
February-March 1943	Travel, Washington to Middle East
1-15 April 1943	OSS Cairo
24 April 1943	Arrived American Embassy, Ankara
May 1943-November 1944	Chief, OSS, Imair
20 November -7 Dec. 1944	Aegean Islands and Athens, closing Imair operations
7-19 December 1944	OSS Cairo
19-26 December 1944	Travel Cairo-Washington

**2. Duties:**

The writer was recruited to be one of the officers working on the periphery of occupied Greece, to gather information about

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REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS -- OSS IZMIR  
by  
Major John L. Caskey  
(Greek Desk)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

DATE: January 26, 1945

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Major John L. Caskey

1. This report covers an operation which, beginning at scratch and beset by numerous and sundry difficulties, nevertheless accomplished a job which made SI activities in Greece possible.

2. In paragraph 4, page 9, Major Caskey discusses certain conditions which might be improved. In enumerating these conditions, Caskey quite properly places the selection and assignment of personnel first. I consider his observations sound -- stressing as they do the necessity for the most careful choice and utilization of SI representatives. While Caskey was greatly in need of qualified people (sub-paragraph b, page 9) in Turkey, there were OSS people in Cairo and elsewhere with no profitable work to do. It is believed that the establishment of personnel officers and their staffs in the various theaters will do much to correct such situations and to provide suitable people where they are needed.

3. Caskey's comments on command, supply, finance and training (pages 11, 12 and 13) are pertinent. Difficulties in these various functions were due for the most part, I believe, to inexperience and the necessity for improvising and short cutting because of our late start. Corrective measures have been taken as lessons have been learned.

*DDB.*  
D. Deb.

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e.) It is certainly true that men who went to the field in the early days were told that for security reasons no records of the expenditure of Special Units would be required. This was due to the lack of appreciation of the extent to which such expenditures would reach and it had to be corrected in all cases. Certainly the operation of the Izmir Base required careful accounting. Having a full time Finance Officer would have been desirable.

f.) Major Caskey's comments on training have been repeated a number of times by others who have had to do with SI operation in the Middle East. Probably the major failure in SI training was the complete lack of emphasis upon reporting. This greatly handicapped the work until slow and careful briefing could be given to agents who by that time had become difficult of access.

g. Concerning Major Caskey's comments in Section five of his memorandum, his comments on internal discord represent nothing new in principle, but the conditions were perhaps intensified in the Turkish area. Concerning the disagreement between Major Caskey and Cairo on matters of policy, it is my belief that Major Caskey is mistaken in his interpretation of the attitude of Colonel Aldrich. The latter's insistence was not so much that American personnel deserved first consideration because they were Americans, as that the very deep concern which the Greek Section personnel felt for the welfare of Greece and Greeks had caused them to lose sight of the main goal of OSS operations. It has been my opinion, which I have expressed to Colonel Aldrich, that he was mistaken in regard to this seeming loss of balance on the part of the Greek Section personnel. In any event it was unfortunate that misunderstandings arose to create a condition of discomfort on the part of advance base personnel.

S.B.H.  
S. B. H.

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it existed. The Izmir Base was established primarily as a forwarding point for the Greek Section, SI, and the Commanding Officer usually reported to Mr. Young, Chief of the Greek Section in Cairo. When other functions were loaded on Izmir some question arose in Cairo concerning the cannelling of such functions. It was not until the Summer of 1944 that Major Caskey was made Chief of OSS in Izmir and was understood to be in charge of all operations, SI, SO, MO and MU which were operated from that base. Prior to that time he had to perform the function of a Commander without the real authority and herein lies the root of many of the difficulties that developed between branches. Had the organization been clarified at an earlier time there would have been little question as to the propriety of branches in Cairo attempting to control separate operations.

The relations with MU were partly difficult for reasons which could not be avoided under the circumstances. SI had perforce established its own cadre service for the transportation of its own teams before the Maritime Unit was actually established. The SI operation was developed by men who had no knowledge of boats or shipping and it involved many practices that were doubtless improper. These errors were pointed out when the Maritime Unit was established but almost no personnel was provided to take over the shipping work and the same SI officers had to continue their functions under new management while at the same time they were responsible to SI. This developed a considerable amount of friction which could only have been avoided by the establishment of a real Maritime Unit which was capable of handling all the shipping operations without the necessity of calling upon untrained SI officers to follow procedures with which they were totally unfamiliar.

Major Caskey's comment that frequent personnel conferences of the forward and rear headquarters would have been desirable is exceedingly apt and should have been followed. However, the shortage of personnel in Izmir and the difficulties of transportation in and out of Turkey made such conferences difficult although much more serious efforts should have been made to arrange them.

1.) The failure of supply was probably due in part to lack of cooperation in the Greek section in Cairo and the Services Branch there because in the beginning of the Cairo operations the Greek section had to be its own supply section. It failed until recently completely to surrender the functional to depend upon the OSS Supply Officers. As a result, one or the other thought that supplies were being provided to Izmir when actually the supplying was done by neither.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Chief, SI *M*  
FROM: S. B. L. Penrose, Jr.  
DATE: 2 February 1946  
SUBJECT: Report on field conditions transmitted by Major John L. Caskey

1. Comment is unnecessary on the first three sections of Major Caskey's report. So far as I am aware his statements are correct and I hope that they will be expanded into a more extensive history of the Izmir Base.

2. With regard to Major Caskey's comments in section four the following remarks might be in order:

a.) The lack of proper qualification on the part of many members of the Izmir staff is undoubtedly a fact and it is without question true of practically every field base which OSS has established. The number of language qualified officers who would be made available for base staff work has always been exceedingly limited, largely because men with language qualifications were immediately seized upon for field operations.

b.) The undermanning of the Izmir Base was typical of other OSS bases with regard to the lack of secretaries. It might be pointed out that the first women secretaries arrived in Cairo as late as December 1943 and requests for additional secretarial personnel for the Cairo office itself were continually made until the Summer of 1944. A number of secretaries were provided by Cairo for the Izmir Base and for Istanbul. There was never a sufficient number of women on hand in Cairo to fill the needs which were expressed by the advance bases.

The delays in the arrival of code clerks and other personnel were unfortunate but again they represent the experience of other field bases. The work in Izmir was undoubtedly handicapped by the lack of a Finance Officer and a part-time Security Officer. These might have been obtained had sufficient pressure been brought to bear but it is probable that the crying need of Izmir for sufficient personnel was not made sufficiently apparent in Cairo.

a.) The comments of Major Caskey on command are interesting but fail in part to take into consideration the situation as

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

*16.162  
Field Report  
x Caskey  
x 27  
Lymex Base*

DATE: 27 January 1948

TO : Director, OSS  
FROM : Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Field Report - Major John L. Caskey

There is attached the field report of Major John L. Caskey.

Your attention is called to the covering memorandum by Capt. DeBardleben, Chief of the South East Europe Section.

*Quoted by S. M. Purina jr. how background, primary  
Camp S. L. Lewis*

Whitney H. Shepardson

Form 2202

**SECRET**

FROM: D. DeBardleben

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mr. Andrews				HA	
2. Lt. Seale				WTR	
3. Chief, SI		FEB 1 1945	FEB 2 1945	HW	
4. <del>Spence</del>		2/2	2/3	SP	<del>Refer his file to Director - Os</del>
5. Mail Room					add a file of
6.					Content of your
7.					on in top of
8.					DeBardleben
9.					
10.					done B

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

**SECRET**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : The Director  
 FROM : Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report by Maj. John L. Caskey

DATE: 17 February 1945

1. Attached is a report by Maj. John L. Caskey who was connected with Greek operations as chief of the OSS mission at Izmir. Many of the difficulties which this officer reports are, according to Mr. Penrose, due to the confusion which existed at all bases in the early days of OSS.

2. Maj. Caskey makes the following comments and criticisms:

a. Personnel should have had a knowledge of the language, mentality and character of the Greeks, and operating in such an area as Turkey, should have had some knowledge of that country.

b. This base suffered a shortage of personnel. Mr. Penrose notes that while this shortage existed at Izmir many persons at Cairo were idle. Maj. Caskey's suggestion that frequent personnel conferences be held between forward and rear headquarters is endorsed by Mr. Penrose.

c. A clear-cut directive should have been issued to some one person to act as commander of all branches in that area. Because no one held such authority for many months, friction arose between the Izmir base and Cairo, with the branch chiefs in Cairo trying to direct branch operations at Izmir without full knowledge of conditions at that outpost.

d. Izmir was poorly equipped and supplied, particularly in the early days.

e. Because no clear policy was laid down in financial matters for this base, accounting procedures were somewhat haphazard, and unnecessary confusion arose.

*W. B. Kantack*  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

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for Corfu. Asking a sailor what time the boat would depart, I learned that the motor was under repairs in another port and that there was no possibility of leaving. A few days later I went aboard again and learned that this schooner, on which there were no quarters for me, was going to spend several days in other Italian ports, where I should have slept on deck. I asked the British to let me go aboard at Brindisi. We checked as to the time of sailing. The boat left three hours ahead of time and I caught it when the Italian skipper turned back because of weather. The British did not authorize a visit to Santi Quaranta, although because of minefields the boat almost had to enter there in order to sail to Corfu. When the storm delayed us, the Italian skipper elected to wait for morning before passing the minefields, and I persuaded him to drop anchor at Santi Quaranta. Later at Corfu I noticed that it would have been practically impossible for me to get to Santi Quaranta from there.

*James H. Oliver*  
James H. Oliver, Major, AUS

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Greece, and as the end of the German Occupation approached, the American Intelligence Service became an embarrassment for two reasons: first, it did not regard the interests of the British Empire as the criterion and hence it would represent certain things in an unfavorable light. Second, in many cases the presence of Americans or of supplies from an American source tended to encourage the Greeks to assume an attitude of less dependence upon the British. A remarkable series of accidents befell the late operations which the British agreed to carry out in support of our missions. They may all have been real accidents, but they recalled vividly accounts of British instruction in simple sabotage. I had numerous unhappy experiences with requests for supplies to teams from Cairo, but I will use only the example of Bari's Molossos Mission in Epirus. We had requested a Lysander operation for 7 September. The operation was arranged for the 7th but was postponed on a purely daily basis for well over a month. Then I asked if we could substitute a boat trip to Santi Quaranta. The British agreed and the agents set out for Santi Quaranta. On the day appointed by the British, I myself went down to Brindisi with supplies to take the daily boat, and after waiting around, I learned that the boat would no longer make the run. No other boat would go to Santi Quaranta. Finally in November they agreed to take me to Corfu, whence allegedly I could make my way to Santi Quaranta. I went aboard a schooner

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exists so that it becomes impossible to fulfill all legitimate claims, it is natural that in at least dubious cases British needs are more often favored over American needs, which ordinarily do not appear to the British as serious as the British needs. They have more confidence in themselves. Where the British control transportation, a priority can be effectively exercised only when there is complete supervision. As the war, moreover, nears an end, the British may subordinate the common interest of defeating the Germans to what they consider the interest of the post-war British Empire. The British upper class is convinced that what is to the interest of the British Empire is to the interest of the world. Since the end justifies the means, the British, while individually honorable, may resort, where the Empire is concerned, to the most dishonest and ruthless behavior on the highest moral principle. In Greece the ELAS may be misguided, but when the British who know better suggest that the ELAS are working in deliberate conspiracy with the Germans it is an insincere slander, contemptible in the eyes of an unprejudiced American. During a conversation last July Major Rice, chief of SILO, said to me, "I am a great liberal except where the British Empire is concerned. I believe in the necessity of the British Empire. To safeguard the British Empire we must control the Mediterranean, and to control the Mediterranean we must control (1) Italy, (2) Greece." He knew that I would understand and he thought that I would sympathize. The British did try to control

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scandalous amount of time and cerebration was wasted by the Reports Office in an attempt to improve the translations of articles from one foreign newspaper, and when the distasteful work was done, the result was still awkward and unworthy of the Organization which produced it.

4. Specific Difficulties in the Field.

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Members of the Allied Military Mission to Greece viewed SI agents in their areas with disapproval as potential enemies who might file unfavorable reports about them. Furthermore, they considered the existence of an Intelligence System, extending into their area but independent of their control, as superfluous and invidious, because every Liaison Officer liked to think that despite his lack of training in Intelligence some natural talent gave him all the equipment necessary and that what he did not know was not worth knowing. They tended to regard any information gathered in or traversing their territory, as theirs to appropriate and to pass on as they saw fit.

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Whether or not orders from above indicate to the British personnel in a British Theatre that they are to give equal attention or even priority to the needs of OSS, the local British feel that the Americans are there merely on sufferance and that they (the British) are being generous in fulfilling obligations undertaken by their distant superiors. When an acute shortage of transportation

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The main task, however, to which all the other work led up or from which it resulted, was the guidance and support of missions in the field. In a previous section I have tried to convey incidentally the atmosphere in which the missions were conceived and grew to a prolific maturity. It remains to emphasize that between us at the Desk and those agents in the field there existed a very natural bond, compounded of trust, sympathy and mutual respect. It was a very powerful bond, or in the turmoil other forces would have carried us away.

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It is obvious from the preceding remarks that I was aware of very great imperfections in services and in training. I might also criticize the behavior of administrators who avoided decisions. Yet it would be idle to denounce the frauds and the deficiencies of those who fall short of generally recognized ideals, and if I must become a reformer, I shall limit myself to the solid ground of a suggestion for the correction of a principle in regard to the translation of material in a foreign language. I depone that formal translations should always be made into, not out of, the mother tongue. It takes far less time to make any translation than to correct a translation done into poor English. In Bari a

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exists so that it becomes impossible to fulfill all legitimate claims, it is natural that in at least dubious cases British needs are more often favored over American needs, which ordinarily do not appear to the British as serious as the British needs. They have more confidence in themselves. Where the British control transportation, a priority can be effectively exercised only when there is complete supervision. As the war, moreover, nears an end, the British may subordinate the common interest of defeating the Germans to what they consider the interest of the post-war British Empire. The British upper class is convinced that what is to the interest of the British Empire is to the interest of the world. Since the end justifies the means, the British, while individually honorable, may resort, where the Empire is concerned, to the most dishonest and ruthless behavior on the highest moral principle. In Greece the ELAS may be misguided, but when the British who know better suggest that the ELAS are working in deliberate conspiracy with the Germans it is an insincere slander, contemptible in the eyes of an unprejudiced American. During a conversation last July Major Rice, chief of SILO, said to me, "I am a great liberal except where the British Empire is concerned. I believe in the necessity of the British Empire. To safeguard the British Empire we must control the Mediterranean, and to control the Mediterranean we must control (1) Italy, (2) Greece." He knew that I would understand and he thought that I would sympathize. The British did try to control

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Greece, and as the end of the German Occupation approached, the American Intelligence Service became an embarrassment for two reasons: first, it did not regard the interests of the British Empire as the criterion and hence it would represent certain things in an unfavorable light. Second, in many cases the presence of Americans or of supplies from an American source tended to encourage the Greeks to assume an attitude of less dependence upon the British. A remarkable series of accidents befell the late operations which the British agreed to carry out in support of our missions. They may all have been real accidents, but they recalled vividly accounts of British instruction in simple sabotage. I had numerous unhappy experiences with requests for supplies to teams from Cairo, but I will use only the example of Bari's Molossos Mission in Epirus. We had requested a Lysander operation for 7 September. The operation was arranged for the 7th but was postponed on a purely daily basis for well over a month. Then I asked if we could substitute a boat trip to Santi Quaranta. The British agreed and the agents set out for Santi Quaranta. On the day appointed by the British, I myself went down to Brindisi with supplies to take the daily boat, and after waiting around, I learned that the boat would no longer make the run. No other boat would go to Santi Quaranta. Finally in November they agreed to take me to Corfu, whence allegedly I could make my way to Santi Quaranta. I went aboard a schooner

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for Corfu. Asking a sailor what time the boat would depart, I learned that the motor was under repairs in another port and that there was no possibility of leaving. A few days later I went aboard again and learned that this schooner, on which there were no quarters for me, was going to spend several days in other Italian ports, where I should have slept on deck. I asked the British to let me go aboard at Brindisi. We checked as to the time of sailing. The boat left three hours ahead of time and I caught it when the Italian skipper turned back because of weather. The British did not authorize a visit to Santi Quaranta, although because of minefields the boat almost had to enter there in order to sail to Corfu. When the storm delayed us, the Italian skipper elected to wait for morning before passing the minefields, and I persuaded him to drop anchor at Santi Quaranta. Later at Corfu I noticed that it would have been practically impossible for me to get to Santi Quaranta from there.

*James H. Oliver*

James H. Oliver, Major, AUS

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( )



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : The Director  
 FROM : Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Field Report by Maj. John L. Caskey

DATE: 17 February 1945

1. Attached is a report by Maj. John L. Caskey who was connected with Greek operations as chief of the OSS mission at Izmir. Many of the difficulties which this officer reports are, according to Mr. Penrose, due to the confusion which existed at all bases in the early days of OSS.

2. Maj. Caskey makes the following comments and criticisms:

a. Personnel should have had a knowledge of the language, mentality and character of the Greeks, and operating in such an area as Turkey, should have had some knowledge of that country.

b. This base suffered a shortage of personnel. Mr. Penrose notes that while this shortage existed at Izmir many persons at Cairo were idle. Maj. Caskey's suggestion that frequent personnel conferences be held between forward and rear headquarters is endorsed by Mr. Penrose.

c. A clear-cut directive should have been issued to some one person to act as commander of all branches in that area. Because no one held such authority for many months, friction arose between the Izmir base and Cairo, with the branch chiefs in Cairo trying to direct branch operations at Izmir without full knowledge of conditions at that outpost.

d. Izmir was poorly equipped and supplied, particularly in the early days.

e. Because no clear policy was laid down in financial matters for this base, accounting procedures were somewhat haphazard, and unnecessary confusion arose.

*W. B. Kantack*  
 W. B. Kantack  
 Capt., A.C.  
 Reports Officer

Attachment

**SECRET**

Form 2202

SECRET

FROM: D. DeBardleben

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mr. Andrews				HA	
2. Lt. Seale				WTR	
3. Chief, SI		FEB 1 1945	FEB 2 1945	HW	
4. <del>Spence</del>		2/2	2/3	SP	<del>Refer his file to Director - Os</del>
5. Mail Room					add a file of
6.					Content of your
7.					on in top of
8.					DeBardleben
9.					
10.					done B

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

*16.162  
Field Report  
x Caskey  
x 27  
Lymex Base*

DATE: 27 January 1948

TO : Director, OSS  
FROM : Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Field Report - Major John L. Caskey

There is attached the field report of Major John L. Caskey.

Your attention is called to the covering memorandum by Capt. DeBardleben, Chief of the South East Europe Section.

*Quoted by S. M. Purns jr. how to handle, finally  
Camp S. L. Lewis*

Whitney H. Shepardson



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Chief, SI *M*  
FROM: S. B. L. Penrose, Jr.  
DATE: 2 February 1946  
SUBJECT: Report on field conditions transmitted by Major John L. Caskey

1. Comment is unnecessary on the first three sections of Major Caskey's report. So far as I am aware his statements are correct and I hope that they will be expanded into a more extensive history of the Izmir Base.

2. With regard to Major Caskey's comments in section four the following remarks might be in order:

a.) The lack of proper qualification on the part of many members of the Izmir staff is undoubtedly a fact and it is without question true of practically every field base which OSS has established. The number of language qualified officers who would be made available for base staff work has always been exceedingly limited, largely because men with language qualifications were immediately seized upon for field operations.

b.) The undermanning of the Izmir Base was typical of other OSS bases with regard to the lack of secretaries. It might be pointed out that the first women secretaries arrived in Cairo as late as December 1943 and requests for additional secretarial personnel for the Cairo office itself were continually made until the Summer of 1944. A number of secretaries were provided by Cairo for the Izmir Base and for Istanbul. There was never a sufficient number of women on hand in Cairo to fill the needs which were expressed by the advance bases.

The delays in the arrival of code clerks and other personnel were unfortunate but again they represent the experience of other field bases. The work in Izmir was undoubtedly handicapped by the lack of a Finance Officer and a part-time Security Officer. These might have been obtained had sufficient pressure been brought to bear but it is probable that the crying need of Izmir for sufficient personnel was not made sufficiently apparent in Cairo.

a.) The comments of Major Caskey on command are interesting but fall in part to take into consideration the situation as

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it existed. The Izmir Base was established primarily as a forwarding point for the Greek Section, SI, and the Commanding Officer usually reported to Mr. Young, Chief of the Greek Section in Cairo. When other functions were loaded on Izmir some question arose in Cairo concerning the cannelling of such functions. It was not until the Summer of 1944 that Major Caskey was made Chief of OSS in Izmir and was understood to be in charge of all operations, SI, SO, MO and MU which were operated from that base. Prior to that time he had to perform the function of a Commander without the real authority and herein lies the root of many of the difficulties that developed between branches. Had the organization been clarified at an earlier time there would have been little question as to the propriety of branches in Cairo attempting to control separate operations.

The relations with MU were partly difficult for reasons which could not be avoided under the circumstances. SI had perforce established its own cadre service for the transportation of its own teams before the Maritime Unit was actually established. The SI operation was developed by men who had no knowledge of boats or shipping and it involved many practices that were doubtless improper. These errors were pointed out when the Maritime Unit was established but almost no personnel was provided to take over the shipping work and the same SI officers had to continue their functions under new management while at the same time they were responsible to SI. This developed a considerable amount of friction which could only have been avoided by the establishment of a real Maritime Unit which was capable of handling all the shipping operations without the necessity of calling upon untrained SI officers to follow procedures with which they were totally unfamiliar.

Major Caskey's comment that frequent personnel conferences of the forward and rear headquarters would have been desirable is exceedingly apt and should have been followed. However, the shortage of personnel in Izmir and the difficulties of transportation in and out of Turkey made such conferences difficult although much more serious efforts should have been made to arrange them.

1.) The failure of supply was probably due in part to lack of cooperation in the Greek section in Cairo and the Services Branch there because in the beginning of the Cairo operations the Greek section had to be its own supply section. It failed until recently completely to surrender the functional to depend upon the OSS Supply Officers. As a result, one or the other thought that supplies were being provided to Izmir when actually the supplying was done by neither.

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e.) It is certainly true that men who went to the field in the early days were told that for security reasons no records of the expenditure of Special Units would be required. This was due to the lack of appreciation of the extent to which such expenditures would reach and it had to be corrected in all cases. Certainly the operation of the Izmir Base required careful accounting. Having a full time Finance Officer would have been desirable.

f.) Major Caskey's comments on training have been repeated a number of times by others who have had to do with SI operation in the Middle East. Probably the major failure in SI training was the complete lack of emphasis upon reporting. This greatly handicapped the work until slow and careful briefing could be given to agents who by that time had become difficult of access.

g. Concerning Major Caskey's comments in Section five of his memorandum, his comments on internal discord represent nothing new in principle, but the conditions were perhaps intensified in the Turkish area. Concerning the disagreement between Major Caskey and Cairo on matters of policy, it is my belief that Major Caskey is mistaken in his interpretation of the attitude of Colonel Aldrich. The latter's insistence was not so much that American personnel deserved first consideration because they were Americans, as that the very deep concern which the Greek Section personnel felt for the welfare of Greece and Greeks had caused them to lose sight of the main goal of OSS operations. It has been my opinion, which I have expressed to Colonel Aldrich, that he was mistaken in regard to this seeming loss of balance on the part of the Greek Section personnel. In any event it was unfortunate that misunderstandings arose to create a condition of discomfort on the part of advance base personnel.

S.B.H.  
S. B. H.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

DATE: January 26, 1945

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Major John L. Caskey

1. This report covers an operation which, beginning at scratch and beset by numerous and sundry difficulties, nevertheless accomplished a job which made SI activities in Greece possible.

2. In paragraph 4, page 9, Major Caskey discusses certain conditions which might be improved. In enumerating these conditions, Caskey quite properly places the selection and assignment of personnel first. I consider his observations sound -- stressing as they do the necessity for the most careful choice and utilization of SI representatives. While Caskey was greatly in need of qualified people (sub-paragraph b, page 9) in Turkey, there were OSS people in Cairo and elsewhere with no profitable work to do. It is believed that the establishment of personnel officers and their staffs in the various theaters will do much to correct such situations and to provide suitable people where they are needed.

3. Caskey's comments on command, supply, finance and training (pages 11, 12 and 13) are pertinent. Difficulties in these various functions were due for the most part, I believe, to inexperience and the necessity for improvising and short cutting because of our late start. Corrective measures have been taken as lessons have been learned.

*DDB.*  
D. Deb.

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REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS -- OSS IZMIR  
by  
Major John L. Caskey  
(Greek Desk)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO :** Chief, SI

**FROM :** John L. Caskey, Major AUS, Greek Desk, SE European Section

**SUBJECT:** Report on Field Conditions -- OSS Imair

**DATE:** January 23, 1945

Note: The following report deals with conditions in the Imair area from early in 1943 to the end of November 1944, the period during which penetration of occupied Greece was carried out by OSS from and through the Imair base. This particular operation was closed with the writer's departure from Turkey. Local conditions and specific problems encountered and methods employed are, therefore, chiefly of historical interest. Certain general comments and criticisms, however, may have a wider and more immediate importance.

**1. Chronological outline of the writer's activity:**

20 July 1942	Joined OSS
18 August 1942	Commissioned Captain AUS
August-September 1942	SI and SO schools and training
October-November 1942	Adjutant to Chief SE European Section
Dec. 1942-January 1943	Preparation for field with Office of Lend-Lease Administration
February-March 1943	Travel, Washington to Middle East
1-15 April 1943	OSS Cairo
24 April 1943	Arrived American Embassy, Ankara
May 1943-November 1944	Chief, OSS, Imair
20 November -7 Dec. 1944	Aegean Islands and Athens, closing Imair operations
7-19 December 1944	OSS Cairo
19-26 December 1944	Travel Cairo-Washington

**2. Duties:**

The writer was recruited to be one of the officers working on the periphery of occupied Greece, to gather information about

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that country and direct operations of penetration. He was originally assigned to the SI Branch, and intelligence was always the major concern of the Ismir base. But Ismir developed chiefly as an operational center, obtaining and operating a fleet of caiques; receiving and forwarding men, documents and supplies, to and from Greece and the Middle East; serving SI, SO, MO and the Labor Desk Missions, and employing the facilities of those Branches as well as MU and Communications. Owing to lack of staff for these duties, and to our position vis-a-vis Turkish General Staff Intelligence which recognized only one officer as responsible for OSS activity in the area, the writer was de facto commander of all branches and was obliged to manage many of the activities himself. (He was officially appointed representative of MU in May 1944; a written order confirming his position as Chief of OSS Ismir was not published until September 1944). Duties performed, in whole or in part, by the writer (marked \*) and those carried out under his direct supervision were the following:

a. Liaison with:

US Department of State (Embassy, Ankara; Consulate, Ismir)  
 US Military Attache', Ankara, and Assistant Military Attache', Ismir  
 US Naval Attache', Istanbul, and representatives  
 US OWI, Istanbul  
 US FRA, Ankara  
 British ISLD, Ismir  
 British Force ISS, Ismir  
 British YFB (A Force), Ismir  
 British Army (DACMO), Ismir  
 British Navy (SO A), Ismir

Greek Consulate General, Ismir  
Greek Intelligence Service, Ismir  
Italian Intelligence Service, Ismir  
Turkish General Staff Intelligence (Haniyet), Ismir

(Chief contacts underlined)

b. Maritime operations:

Founding\*, directing\* and maintaining caique bases  
("Key West", Samos, "Boston").

Acquiring\*, equipping and directing\* caique fleet  
and personnel.

Maintaining records\*.

c. Intelligence:

Receiving and forwarding agents and forwarding  
their reports (by mail and wireless)\*.

Recruiting and training agents.

Interrogation and reporting.

d. SO:

Forwarding missions, supplies and reports.

e. MO:

Forwarding missions, supplies and reports. Providing  
facilities for secret broadcasting station.

f. Labor Desk:

Forwarding mission and reports.

g. Communications:

Establishing wireless stations at Ismir and the  
operational bases\*.

Providing signal plans and ciphers\*.

Ciphering\*.

Maintaining records.

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## h. Supply:

Procurement and forwarding to the field.

Maintaining records.

## i. Finance:

Payment of staffs.

Forwarding gold to the field.

Maintaining records.

3. Progress and Achievements:a. Founding of Isair bases; assistance of Turks and British -

Everything accomplished by the writer and his staff in Isair constituted progress, since no previous work had been done there by OSS. (Miss Dorothy H. Cox, who arrived in January 1948, made valuable observations and contacts during her first few months in Isair, but was prevented from getting on with the main job by lack of directions, authority, supplies, and means of communication.) The writer's assignment was to put agents into occupied Greece and to get their reports out. Under the conditions prevailing, the best means was a fleet of caiques working from the Turkish coast, such as the British Services had already been operating for some eighteen months. Such a caique service could not exist without the approval, assistance, and protection of the Turkish government. Approach was therefore made through the Chief of ISLD Istanbul, to the Chief of General Staff Intelligence (a service known as the Muniyet, comprising security and secret police functions) in Ankara. This officer gave permission and approval of the project and cont

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orders to his representative in Imir to furnish the necessary assistance and cover for the operations. The British services helped with advice and occasionally with ~~the~~ men and supplies, at first hesitantly and with signs of jealousy, but later with a spirit of good will and cooperation when their respect and cooperation had been won.

b. Key West, Samos, Boston -

The first OSS base, "Key West" was assigned in June 1943 at a small port fifty miles south of Imir. Owing to lack of caiques and supplies, however, it did not begin to function until September. In that month, immediately after the surrender of Italy, a subsidiary base was set up in Samos. After the evacuation of that island by the Allies (17 November 1943), considerations of security and efficiency demanded the opening of an altogether new base, which was done at "Boston", some forty miles north of Imir, in December 1943. Boston was gradually developed into an active center of operations and the more important missions were dispatched from there, though Key West was always maintained as a valuable secondary base and port of call.

c. Growth of caique fleet -

A fleet of caiques was built up slowly and painfully. The first craft were acquired in September 1943; others were taken on in Samos in October and November; but it was not until the summer of 1944 that adequate vessels were provided from Cyprus and through rebuilding and refitting at Boston. In the fall and winter of 1943-44

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there were only 5 to 10 arrivals and sailings per month at Key West. In September 1944, 39 were recorded at Boston and 55 at Key West.

d. Supplying of bases and field -

One of the chief responsibilities of the Imbir base was supplying food, clothing, and special equipment to missions in the field. Most of these materials were procured in Middle East and sent by sea to Key West and Boston where they were trans-shipped into small caiques for delivery to the field. The supply route from Alexandria and Cyprus was not properly established, however, until the summer of 1944, and before that the Imbir staff was obliged to buy many items locally, both for the equipment of the bases and for secret (and illegal) export to the field.

e. Wireless -

Wireless stations were set up in Imbir, Key West, and Samos in August-September 1943 and at Boston in January 1944. Contact was maintained among the bases and with Cairo, Cyprus and Istanbul. Later, as the necessary communications staff and proper equipment was supplied, contacts were made and maintained on an increasing scale with agents in occupied territory and even with our own caiques at sea. At the end of August 1944 a small broadcasting station was set up at Boston for the use of MO in addressing subversive propaganda to enemy forces in Greece.

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f. Missions -

Most of the missions put into Greece were prepared and trained in Middle East. Izmir was occasionally able to help in the recruiting of agents by spotting promising candidates as they first came out of Greece and directing them to OSS Cairo. Several agents, wireless operators, and guides were recruited locally or brought specially from Greece, and were trained by the Izmir staff and attached to missions going in. A few missions, notably those to the Samos area and the Dodekanese, were formed, trained and entirely directed by Izmir. (See histories of missions Emerald, Dago and Lucian.)

g. Interrogation and reporting -

Refugees, enemy deserters, and special agents coming to Izmir from Greece were interviewed by OSS officers whenever it was possible. Most of this work fell to Miss Cox, the Reports Officer, who was able from these sources to add an important body of supplementary intelligence to the regular reports of our own agents. The writer was prevented by his administrative duties from engaging personally in much of this work, but enjoyed a few opportunities of interrogating and of preparing reports, especially on military subjects.

h. Achievements -

The major achievement of the Izmir staff was the successful founding and operating of bases through which the missions of the

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h. Achievements -

The major achievement of the Ismir staff was the successful founding and operating of bases through which the missions of the

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Greek Section (all branches) could be forwarded, maintained, and kept in contact with Cairo. In addition, certain separate operations were successfully carried out: during the evacuation of Samos (17-20 November 1943) OSS caiques brought out British troops, Greek troops and civilians, and several hundred Italians of the hapless Cuneo Division (letters of commendation from Major General A. C. Arnold, British M.A., and General Sir Henry Wilson); Lt. Savage of the Imir staff won the Silver Star and Purple Heart for his part in the action in Samos; the escape of a German woman, who had been secretly working for the American Embassy and had fallen under suspicion of the Germans and was sought by the S.D., was successfully engineered by OSS Imir, somewhat to the surprise and greatly to the satisfaction of Brigadier General Findall, American Military Attache' in Ankara (see report of Operation "Honey-moon"); numerous smaller day-to-day services, such as transporting men and equipment, relaying messages over our network, and supplying information, were performed for American, British, Greek, and Turkish agencies when occasion permitted. The writer was particularly gratified that genuine friendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence and respect, was developed (sometimes in the face of considerable opposition and prejudice) with the State Department and G-2, British military and secret services, and Turkish intelligence. At the closing of the Imir base in November 1944, several American and British officers of AML and of the British operational command in the Aegean (Force 142) expressed genuine regret that our services and facilities would no longer be available.

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4. Conditions which might be improved:

Note: Since the operation under discussion has been terminated, no changes in it can now be made. The following remarks can, therefore, be of interest only as guides in other similar enterprises, present or future. The writer would also state that he is fully aware of the extreme difficulty of meeting even the basic requirements in men and supplies, as well as organization, of an operation so complex and delicate as that conducted in Izmir.

a. Staff - general qualifications -

In an operation dependent, like ours, on the services of Greeks, it is important that many of the staff should have at least a working knowledge of the language, and almost indispensable that they should have some familiarity with the Greek character and mentality. Working, furthermore, in neutral Turkey, and being dependent on the good will of the Turks, it was most desirable that the staff should know something of that country too, and be able to behave with tolerance and tact in order to avoid friction and to remain inconspicuous. Most of the members of the Izmir staff who had not lived in the Near East before made up in good humor for what they lacked in experience. A few, however, allowed their immature judgment to be warped by ignorance and personal prejudice, to the detriment of the operations in hand and to the danger of security.

b. Staff - specific needs -

The Izmir base was undermanned. As a result, several officers were drawn from the intelligence work for which they were qualified

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and obliged to spend most of their time at clerical jobs for which they had not been trained. The office never had a secretary, though requests were repeatedly made for one, from June 1943. This secretary should have been an intelligent, reliable American (man or woman) knowing typing, stenography and filing. A full-time code clerk was needed from the fall of 1943; he arrived at the end of June 1944; up to that time, the work was shared among the officers of the staff or done by a highly trained wireless technician who was thus kept from his own tasks. From the beginning of 1944 onward the duties of cashier and bookkeeper became increasingly burdensome and complex; they were performed first by the writer and later by one of his unfortunate assistants who could have used her time more profitably in other work. Security investigations could not be conducted as thoroughly as was desired, and records were never adequately maintained. This was a part-time job, calling for a man of good common sense rather than specialized training. A sound knowledge of Greek would have been especially valuable in his case, though not essential. In fact the writer would gladly have undertaken to train an able and willing NGO in financial and security duties, continuing thereafter to supervise and be responsible for the conduct of both. Finally, the function of Supply Officer, most important and exacting, was never quite satisfactorily performed. It was undertaken by various men, in turn and in combination. One officer, familiar with ordering, handling, and shipping supplies, and with keeping inventory, would have added greatly to the efficiency of the organization.

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c. Jurisdiction - command -

As stated in Section 2, above, the chief officer of OSS in Imir was held responsible by the Turks for all OSS activities in the area, and it was therefore necessary that he be in absolute command of all personnel and operations there. For example, wireless could not be set up or used without the sanction of the Emniyet; caiques on secret mission could not touch at unauthorized ports except under the cover of the Emniyet; supplies could not be moved, nor could men land and travel without passports and visas except as elements of the Emniyet. (Note: An Italian resident of Imir was summarily tried and hanged in 1944 because a small wireless transmitter, belonging to someone else, was found buried on his land; whereas OSS wireless, arms, explosives, etc., were handled with considerable freedom and hundreds of tons of supplies were moved without the customs control which was normally imposed even on the British secret services.) Under these conditions, the independent direction of communications men, maritime operations, SO, SI, etc., by different branch heads in Cairo was an unthinkable anomaly. And yet the various branches, being responsible each for its own type of operation and feeling an understandable jealousy of its own activities, often initiated actions which could not be reconciled with the realities of the situation. This was particularly true with various officers of MU, who, apparently with little knowledge of the ways of caiques and their crews, or of Aegean weather as it affects small craft, or of the immediate requirements governing our operations from day to day, frequently made plans and gave orders

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that were impossible to carry out. As a result, unnecessary friction developed between Cairo and the advanced bases; Immir gained an exaggerated reputation for obstructiveness, and much time and energy were wasted. These difficulties would have been largely eliminated by: (1) placing each operation in the Aegean unconditionally under the command of Immir from the start; (2) restraining the branches in Cairo from making plans for that area without previously consulting Immir; (3) frequent personal conferences between officers of the forward and rear headquarters.

d. Supply -

Until mid-summer of 1944 the bases were poorly equipped and supplied. They often lacked items of basic necessity for their operations, to say nothing of those that would contribute to the comfort and well being of the men. This was owing partly to a general lack of experience and partly to inefficient ordering in Immir; but the major responsibility rests with the ordering and procurement departments in Middle East and with those who failed to provide adequate transport and to see that the goods moved forward promptly.

e. Finance -

Immir was generally well supplied with funds, the expenditure of which was properly left to the discretion of the officer in charge. Pinches were felt only occasionally when funds were not delivered on schedule. The procedure of accounting, however, was not well worked out. The writer was told before he left Washington that, for reasons of security, no records of the expenditure of special funds would be

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required. As the nature and scope of the Imir operations became evident, however, he did devise a system of bookkeeping; and made the accounts as detailed as time and circumstances allowed. Repeated requests were made for instructions in this matter, but none were received until the end of August 1944 when a representative of the Special Funds Branch came to Imir to examine the books and explain the proper system. (For full statement of the case, see letter of 16 August 1944 from Caskey to Bland). Errors and inadequacies in the financial records could have been eliminated by: (1) a clear statement of financial policy and instructions in the form of bookkeeping that was wanted; (2) sufficient clerical staff to keep the records and prepare the reports.

f. Training -

A number of officers and other members of the Imir staff were recruited overseas and, having no formal training, were obliged to pick up the necessary knowledge from day-to-day experience. Those who had gone through OSS schools in America or Middle East had been exposed to a good deal of theory on security and methods of undercover work, but knew painfully little about military and other technical fields of intelligence or about the correct organization and form of an intelligence report. In practice, common sense and native wit proved far more important than special training in the field of Security. The same qualities were drawn upon (with rather astonishing success in some cases) for the main job of reporting, but a very large amount of valuable information was overlooked or inadequately reported.

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for lack of proper training among the agents. The writer has recently seen that great changes have been made in the training programs since 1942, and assumes that the deficiencies are being made up, but cannot emphasize too strongly the need of concentration on this aspect of preparation, for both agents and staff officers.

5. Specific difficulties in the field:

Note: Most of the difficulties encountered by the writer have been classified or set down as examples in the preceding section, and need not be repeated.

a. Internal discord -

The writer's chief disappointments, discouragement and exhaustion came not from the difficulty of opposing the enemy, but from profitless and wasteful antagonism and inefficiencies among Allies, between American agencies, and within OSS itself. Fortunately his own periods of depression did not last long, and his efforts could usually be directed toward eliminating rather than prolonging the conflicts.

b. Disagreement over policy -

It may be worth recording (without undue emphasis) that an unhappy atmosphere of discontent showed itself occasionally at Boston during the last few months of work at that base. Certain American members of the staff complained of the conditions of life there, of being given too little consideration from Cairo and Iqmir, and of favoritism being shown to Greek personnel of the missions. Irritability gave rise to thoughtless accusations and grudges. It is true that

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life at the base was uncomfortable and monotonous. Many facilities were lacking and the conditions of secret operation in a neutral country made even a simple American sort of camp impossible. Ismir and Cairo undoubtedly failed at times to do all they should have done for Boston. It is the writer's opinion that the discontent was due partly to weariness and boredom, partly to ignorance and immaturity in some of the officers of the base. (There were no complaints from the commander of Key West, who performed single-handed a more difficult and trying task than any of the men at Boston.) When there was a shortage of supplies, the writer tried consistently to carry out the policy of favoring the most forward unit -- missions taking precedence over base and base over headquarters -- irrespective of the nationality of personnel, provided only that base and headquarters were not stripped to the point of helplessness. It was argued by others that this was an American operation and that, therefore, American personnel should receive first consideration in all cases. The Chief of OSS Middle East supported the latter argument. After the closing of the Turkish bases, therefore, the writer, feeling that he was not well qualified to carry out the policy laid down by his commanding officer, requested transfer to another theater.

J.L.C.  
J. L. C.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****SECRET**

TO : Director ✓

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Carl Schaefer

DATE: 16 February 1945

1. Attached is a report from Mr. Carl Schaefer, who served with MO/ETO and was assigned to the PWD training Section. Mr. Schaefer makes the following general observations:

a. PWD training program was less effective than the MO because of disagreements on policy matters between the British and Americans and rather uninspired caliber of the British officers engaged in this training.

b. Because MO was unwilling to allow its personnel to be screened by PWD and the "S" reports were unavailable, MO personnel were not always considered for key jobs by many PWD section heads.

c. MO operations would have been considerably more effective had there been a common understanding between London and Washington on matters of policy and leadership.

✓

*W B Kantack*  
W. B. Kantack  
Capt., A.C.  
Reports Officer

Attachment

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*Gen. Von ...*

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Schaeffer  
1 MO  
x ETO

22 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** European Theatre of Operations Field Report

**TO:** Colonel Kenneth Mann, Chief Morale Operations Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. Following recruiting by Lt. (s.j.) John Reinhardt and signing by Edward Cushing, on 2 February 1944, reported to OBS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1944. Between dates was confined under physician's care, suffering attack of serum poisoning.
2. Attended "B" 12-15 March. Trained for New York 17th, sailed for ETO 20th, arrived in Scotland 28th, reported to MO Office in London 29th.
3. While awaiting definite assignment developed and wrote "black" newspaper aimed at foreign slave workers in Germany. Also produced rumors and submitted several poster and radio project ideas.
4. Attended the two week Brondesbury Training School operated by the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
5. Asked for and received assignment to PWD-SHAEP. I could see that this would be the successful operation in psychological warfare.
6. Slotted by PWD to the Training Section. As senior training officer I was associated closely with No. 4 War Office Selection Board, which was the PWD equivalent of "G". At the area, where I spent much of my time, I officially represented SHAEP and unofficially the United States Army. With the exception of myself the staff of No. 4 WOSEB was British.
7. Additionally served in the administration of the other PWD training centers: Clevedon, field school located near Bristol; Brondesbury, basic lecture-leaflet-opinion survey-prisoner interrogation school near London; Rushton, field school located in the Midlands; the Garden, German prisoner of war cages near London.
8. Following liberation of France, by which time I was deputy chief of training, it was decided to close the Training Section until such time as policy toward occupied Germany were defined.
9. The Film Section of PWD-SHAEP requested I be assigned to that unit in view of my motion picture background. The training

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was arranged.

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10. With my opposite number, a British major, planned German combat and occupational operations insofar as use of films for propaganda and education were concerned. It was originally planned that I would join combat team of 12th Army as Film Officer; later it was decided I should go direct to Berlin upon fall of the city.

11. When it appeared to me that Berlin would not be taken for six or more months, asked MO in London whether I could take my leave back in the United States and so visit my wife and child. This was arranged.

12. Arrived in Washington 27 November 1944 and was given choice of returning to the BTO, going to the CBI or teaching MO at WA for Schools and Training Branch. I chose the instruction assignment.

13. Colonel Robinson approved on 4 December to my joining S&T, which would necessitate my being transferred from MO. The following day I checked out of Washington.

14. Reported 2 January 1945, at completion of my leave, to Newport Beach, California, for transport to WA.

15. General Observations:

a) Of the British and Americans who passed through FWD, those from MO came best trained, those from OWI worst. The OWI Huntington School appeared to have been more of a country club than training center and/or the OWI was sloppy in its recruiting.

b) "S" reports were not available and MO was unwilling, rightly or wrongly, to send personnel to No. 4 WOEB for screening; consequently, MO men were not always considered for key jobs by many FWD section heads.

c) The FWD training program was generally less effective than the MO because the British and Americans could not always agree on policy; the majority of instructors were uninspired British officers, the training was too general in nature.

d) More training in white techniques might have been given MO personnel who, in London, found themselves assigned to work in white and/or wait six or seven weeks after D Day for the black directive to come through.

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16. Conclusion to Field Report: I wish to go on record as pleased to have had the opportunity of representing MO in the BTO

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The operation of MO proper, as I observed it, could have been more successful had there been a common understanding between Washington and London on matters of policy and leadership. Much of the success of PWD can be traced to the efforts of MO men, army and civilian, who probably would have been wasted had they not have been contributed to Supreme Headquarters. I am afraid the MO Branch in London would have failed in its purpose had it not had the Psychological Warfare Division to lean on.

*Carl Schaefer*  
CARL SCHAEFER  
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