

*Mr. [unclear]*  
*Approved the [unclear]*  
*and submitted it for*  
*your signature*

*[Signature]*

*D'Annunzio 10/20/48*

CC: ✓ Director, OSS (3)  
Rosen (1)

Mr. Edward E. Travers  
Chief, Visa Division  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Antonia D'Annunzio

My dear Mr. Travers:

The above subject has been of very considerable value to the war effort and is needed by this Agency for consultation in this country. Antonia D'Annunzio, who is traveling on a French passport, is residing at the present time at the Hotel Victoria in Lisbon with her two sons, Christian (18 years), and Emanuel (14 years).

Although Antonia D'Annunzio is financially independent, this organization will assume financial responsibility for her and for her children, who must accompany her, while they are in this country.

It would be appreciated if the Department would indicate to the Legation in Lisbon that favorable action may be taken with respect to application for Visitors' Visas to this country in behalf of Antonia D'Annunzio and her two sons.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

WHD/ww/da  
Oct. 21, 1948

*WHD*  
*WHD*  
*WHD*

Dir 1001 N 10,804

To: Col. [unclear]  
Ensign E. J. Putsell, Jr.  
Lt. Col. Howard W. Dix

12 October 1963

We have been informed that there will be a vacancy  
in the grade of Lt. Colonel for Continental U.S.  
when and if Lt. Col. Butler is transferred out of  
the organization.

It is our understanding that SI expects to effect  
such transfer shortly.

E.J.P., Jr.

E.J. Putsell: Birchard

Mrs. [unclear] ✓

*12 14 57*  
*Letter to [unclear]*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Higelow  
FROM: Ensign Putzell  
SUBJECT: Lt. Col. Howard W. Dix

DATE 14 October 1943

The attached memorandum from Colonel O'Connor to General Donovan, dated October 11, 1943, is forwarded to you with General Donovan's request that you be good enough to ascertain whether it will be possible to obtain a vacancy in the rank of Lt. Colonel for Continental U.S.A.

*C. J. P. Jr.*  
*E. J. P., Jr.*

*If Lt. Col. Butler is bumped out of OSS  
there will be a vacancy.*  
*Col. [unclear] 10/16*

*Dy Howard 2/4/41*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Gen. Moran  
FROM: Col. G. G. Grier  
SUBJECT: Lt. Col. Howard W. Dix

DATE: 24th Feb, 1941

1. Request for transfer of the above subject from the Ordnance Department, Aberdeen Proving Grounds to SI Branch, O.S.S. has been made by the Director of SI to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. At present there are no vacancies available in the grade of Lt. Colonel, for continental U.S.A.
2. Subject is former patent attorney of the firm Emery, Varney, Whittemore & Dix, New York City; for the past year and half has been in charge of technical and scientific liaison between Ordnance Technical Intelligence and National Research Development Council, with General Williams, former Chief of Ordnance. He is well known to the writer, during a business association over ten years, and I know of no officer more capable of filling this assignment, and who might now be available.
3. It is requested that you authorize Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment to allocate a vacancy in the grade of Lt. Colonel from one of the existing theater-allotments in order to have subject transferred here, through established channels. Commanding Officer Aberdeen Proving Grounds signified willingness to release subject for this assignment.

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_



Gen. Donovan

Oct. 15, 1948


Col. O'Conor

Lt. Col. Howard W. Dix

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APPROVED

JHO' C: ja

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

To: Sanderson

A copy has been sent to X-2, the Intelligence Branch, with request that a reply be drafted for you.

*[Handwritten initials]*

Office of the \_\_\_\_\_

(9150)

ADDRESS ONLY TO  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DeRaad Joseph J. 12, 1941  
1 A P. Transport

**ARMY AIR FORCES**  
**HEADQUARTERS, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND**  
**WASHINGTON 25**

November 2, 1941.

Mr. William J. Donovan, Director,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I regret to have found it necessary to comment delay this reply to your letter of October 18 in reference to your request for the transfer of Captain Joseph J. DeRaad to the Office of Strategic Services.

Since it is always my desire to accommodate you so far as it is within my power, my immediate inclination was to turn this officer over to you without further debate. However, my intelligence people have so impressed upon me the urgent need of the services of a man of DeRaad's experience that I felt it advisable to delay a decision until the matter could be further looked into.

There is an acute shortage of capable intelligence officers in this Command, particularly in our European Wing. Under present conditions it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the assignment of intelligence officers from other branches of the service, and the only other procurement source is the Army Air Forces Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the supply from this source is meager. As an example, we requested the assignment of thirteen officers from the last class and only received three.

As you are aware, Captain DeRaad is a superior officer and was formerly assigned to the Counter Intelligence Division of the Air Staff. We had planned to assign him to our European Wing in the capacity of Supervisor of counter intelligence activities, as he is apparently thoroughly familiar with such functions. He is the only officer of the proper caliber we can find available for that important job.

I fully appreciate your desire for DeRaad's services, but not being familiar with the details of the work you have in mind for him, I am not in a position to weigh its importance in relation to the job waiting for him in this Command.


So in view of the foregoing, I leave it up to you to determine which assignment will represent the maximum utilization of DeRaad's talents and



experience, and whatever you do in this connection will be satisfactory to me.

With my very best regards.

Sincerely yours,



M. L. GEORGE,  
Major General, USA,  
Commanding.

SECRET

18 October 1943

Major General Harold L. George  
 Commanding General, Air Transport Command  
 Room #184, Army Annex #1  
 Gravelly Point, Virginia

Dear General George:

In connection with a certain very important activity and foreign mission in our work we have recently been searching for officers with a highly specialized background of experience and training. Some time ago there was recommended for this work a Captain Joseph J. Dehaad, AAF, (Serial No. O-902042). We had been attempting to locate this officer and on Saturday of last week he called to see one of our officers whom he has known for some time. This officer then told Captain Dehaad that we had been looking for him and they then discussed the assignment which we had in mind. Captain Dehaad was greatly interested, appears to be in every way qualified, and expressed his desire and willingness to accept the assignment.

Captain Dehaad stated that his Commanding Officer is Colonel William H. Beatty, Army Air Forces Training Command, Fort Worth, Texas. We immediately telephoned Colonel Beatty and he stated that he would grant Captain Dehaad's release upon our request. Today we started the formal papers for the assignment. We have now been informed by Captain Dehaad that the Intelligence Branch of AAF has filed a request for his assignment to that Branch, for duty in England.

As you will see by the attached copy of Captain Dehaad's biography, he has the ideal background, by reason of education, training and experience, to perform the particular work here with which you are familiar. It has occurred to me that you might possibly find less difficulty in obtaining an officer for the particular AAF assignment than we would in attempting to find another man to fill the assignment which we have proposed for him. We have been given recently certain responsibilities in the

SECRET

**SECRET**

- 2 -

theaters for specialized counter-espionage and counter-subversive work, and this officer does have all of the specialized qualifications for assisting in the direction and carrying out of such activities. I should greatly appreciate it if you could find it possible to withdraw the AFO request in order that Captain Belmont may be assigned to OCS.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

**SECRET**

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

OF

ARJAIN JOSEPH JAY DEKARD

NAME: Captain Joseph Jay DeKard, Serial No. 0-406240

BOUN: February 10, 1913 Webb City, Missouri

FATHER: Albert Leroy DeKard  
Born: March 22, 1894, Omaha, Nebraska

MOTHER: Martha Pearl Hickey DeKard  
Born: September 12, 1892, Fayetteville, Arkansas.  
(Ancestors for at least four generations born in United States).

EDUCATION: Public Schools, Sioux City, Iowa  
Graduated, Central High School, Sioux City, Iowa.  
Received U.S. Degree (Law) Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.  
(Formerly Des Moines College of Law). Admitted to Iowa  
Bar and Iowa U.S. Federal Courts.

EXPERIENCE: 1933-1940 Employed by State of Iowa.  
Duties: Superintendent of Identification, Hand writing  
Fingerprinting, Photography.  
Special Agent: Identification of all major crimes.  
State Narcotic Agent: Set up organization for the enforce-  
ment of Uniform Narcotic Act and enforced said Act for period of  
one year. This work dealt entirely with the establishing of  
contacts and handling of informant and enforcement of narcotic laws.

January 1940 - Appointed Agent, United States Secret Service,  
stationed at District Headquarters, St. Paul, Minnesota.

1941 - Assigned to White House detail, U.S. Secret Service  
for personal protection of the President. This included traveling  
with the President on all trips made during this period, contacting  
police, officials, and making arrangements for travel, etc.

April, 1942 - Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, 488 and assigned  
Assistant Executive Officer, Counter Intelligence Division, Head-  
quarters, Army Air Forces.

December, 1942 - Appointed Assistant Director of Training,  
AAF Intelligence School, Austin, Texas, and thereafter to AAF  
Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Director of Base  
Security Section, Air Base Intelligence Course, and instruction  
of Counter-Espionage, Counter-Sabotage, Subversive work, handling  
of enforcements, etc.

April, 1943 - Named Assistant G-3 to Technical Training Command Headquarters at Earlwood Field, North Carolina. Under the amalgamation of the Technical Training Command and the Flying Training Command. Was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3 and placed in detached service at Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of organizing the Training Intelligence Service. Have been Chief of this Service since that time. The work of the Training Intelligence Service includes the receipt, evaluation and the extracting of information contained in intelligence reports from all theaters of operations, the incorporation of this information into Training Intelligence Reports which are disseminated to Stations of the Training Command.



*November 12 1948**Photostat*

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan                      DATE 5 November 1948  
 FROM: William L. Langer  
 SUBJECT: Frederick Dewhurst

I have had a talk with Mr. John Fahey, the President of the Twentieth Century Fund, and have gotten from him a more complete picture than I previously had regarding the qualifications of Frederick Dewhurst.

In conversation with me, as with you, Mr. Fahey stressed the fact that Dewhurst had no particular executive gift and should hardly be thought of for any administrative assignment. Since our idea was to put Dewhurst into an administrative position as head of our Unit in New Delhi, it would seem to me that our idea was mistaken and that we ought to drop it, the more so as Twentieth Century Fund would evidently be very reluctant to release him from his present work.

I am sorry to have troubled you in this matter, but I am glad to have been able to get the estimate of Dewhurst's capability before final decision was made.

*William L. Langer*  
 William L. Langer  
 Director, Branch of  
 Research and Analysis

V

17, 766

1 November 1943

TO: Dr. Langer  
FROM: General Donovan

I talked to John J. J. about Frederick Dewhurst. He was very much opposed to Dewhurst leaving at first, but I told him I would ask you to call and see him and also that you would tell him frankly the purpose for which he was to be used.

He said he ought to know that they had Dewhurst a long time and consider him of great value as a student and as a economist, but he is not much use as an administrator. He was very agreeable about it, and I think it is quite important that you should talk with him.

*File in [unclear] Folder - 12-766*

18 October 1943

Mr. John H. Fahey  
President, Twentieth Century Fund  
726 Jackson Place, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fahey:

This office is most interested in securing the services of Mr. Frederick Dehurst, Executive Secretary of the Twentieth Century Fund. It is contemplated that Mr. Dehurst, if his services were made available to us, would be assigned to New Delhi to carry on certain duties of great importance in the prosecution of the war.

I should be most pleased if the Twentieth Century Fund could see its way clear to release Mr. Dehurst for these duties. I realize that it would be a hardship on the Fund, and I would not make this request were I not convinced that Mr. Dehurst is just the man for this all-important task.

I know that you will not hesitate to call me if you have any questions or doubts on the matter.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

BAHE:PETERSON

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONFIDENTIAL

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General William J. Donovan DATE 11 October 1948  
 FROM William L. Langer  
 SUBJECT Frederick Dewhurst

I spoke to you this morning to enlist your aid in securing the release of Mr. Frederick Dewhurst from the Twentieth Century Fund of which he is now Executive Secretary. I am told that Mr. John H. Fahy, Home Loan Bank Commission, Washington, D.C., is the President of the Twentieth Century Fund and that he would be the man to talk to.

You will recall that we are planning to make Mr. Dewhurst the Chief of the New Delhi Branch of our Far Eastern set-up. Although he has no particular experience of the Far East he is just the type of organizer and administrator that we all want there.

*William L. Langer*  
 William L. Langer  
 Director, Branch of  
 Research and Analysis

*Delivered to Joseph - 12, 1945*



**SECRET**

2 September 1945

**MEMORANDUM TO JOSEPH STURM**

**SUBJECT: SECRET**

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Algiers, where you will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, U.S.M.C., who is in charge of all G-2 activities in the North African Theater. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Eddy's instructions.

2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons, but must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressees, if any.

William J. Donovan  
Director

*Approved, NATO:  
Sturm*

SEP 25 1 13 18

**SECRET**

RECEIVED-21

Ensign Putzell

To: \_\_\_\_\_

Prepare a cable to Bruce  
along the lines suggested  
by Colonel Hoag.

To AWS -  
Please take care of  
this for me

ZJP

Director's Office

(9900) Done AWS



... as a reward, the paratrooper drops out his  
spare. My and work into steady. This is a  
recovery supply. Intensity in the clear morning

### *With Tommy on the Jump*

by ALAN DRAANO

THE TELEPHONE rings and instantly every man is awake. It seems that no depth of slumber can offer refuge from that phone. From down the dark hallway we hear the adjutant's sleepy "Immediately, Sir." The receiver clicks down and we all know. We're taking off at once.

"Bad show this, jumping before breakfast," announces George from the next bunk. "Exercising on an empty stomach isn't scientific training. Any intelligent bloke knows that."

George's distraction evaporates before breakfast has long since caused to elicit comment from my six other roommates who dress in silence: battle dress, field boots, gaiters, crash helmets, and "strip tease"—a kind of rompers suit without legs. On mornings like this every man seems deep in his own thoughts.

Outside, as we heard our legs for the aerodrome, dawn is feeling its way

across the night sky. A chattering wind rustles the curtains beneath.

"What's it be this morning, Sergeant Major?" someone asks.

"Fast stroke of ten, Gentlemen. Numbers one to ten in the first flight, the remainder in flight two. Remember your numbers, please." Remarkable quality, the sergeant's native politeness. Somehow it's hard to imagine an American sergeant telling his men to do something please.

Fast stroke of ten. This means that one of us will jump during a single trip over the target in as rapid an orbit as possible. "Which" designates the paratrooper jumping from one aircraft during one flight. My number is five which luckily means I'll take off with the first flight.

We are comparatively silent as our feet bounce through 15 quiet little English villages. Some smile, others talk . . . a disjointed, an even kind of

JULY, 1943

chitchat, mainly about the weather. We are nervous, but even for seasoned troops, winds are anathema. Slightly gentle breezes can cause drift over the target into trees, or oscillations during descent. An oscillation is a pendulum-like swinging motion which cannot always be checked before landing, adding a very disconcerting whack against the ground to the shock of vertical impact.

No, there isn't much conversation this morning. Every man develops his own theme for contemplation during these interludes when he wants to think of almost anything except the situation confronting him.

We're lurching along now toward the aerodrome down a lane flanked by great oaks whose hospitable branches shelter a giant Stirling, a Beaufighter, or camouflaged troop trucks. When our bus stops finally at the rear of a long, rambling training hangar, we form and march inside. Around RAF stations troops always form and march, they don't just walk about. That way they're more easily distinguished by landing aircraft, we are told.

Inside the hangar we wave at a group of pretty, smiling WAAP parachute packers, then troop to the parachute storage room where an RAF sergeant sizes up each man and hands him his parachute. The Sergeant Major enters the number of each man's parachute on a report sheet opposite the name of the wearer so that if an accident occurs through failure of the parachute it can be traced back to the girl who packed it or to the manufacturer of the chute.

38

Every man properly fitted, and Sergeant Major delivers us into the hands of the RAF officers who will go with us on our jump. When picked for this job seem to possess a kind of mother-in-all-men personality, incapable of anxiety, infamously cheerful, and this one is no exception.

Whatever other regulations we are associated with jump training, the long wait before take-off are remembered as special agony. It's during such periods of suspense that men soothe themselves psychologically by a peer show. Or, as an antidote, become absorbed in the bustling activity all about them in the rearing hangar.

At the far end a student swings back and forth from a suspended parachute harness, learning to turn during descent. A handkerchief clamped between his knees must not be allowed to fall as he swings and turns. A which on his buttocks from his classmates is the penalty if it does.

Nearby another class is practicing "drops" from an unpowered airplane fuselage propped up 12 feet above the



Since writing this article, Alton Downing has been transferred to the 317th Parachute Infantry Regiment. An adventurous man and newspaperman in Florida and by working in Rio. Before that he flew freighters across the Atlantic and bicycled over Europe. When the war is won, Al says he will finish a biography of Sinner Bodner, now a year overdue at Doubleday Doran.

Fred Barber, he served his nosebleed by newspapering in Florida and by working in Rio. Before that he flew freighters across the Atlantic and bicycled over Europe. When the war is won, Al says he will finish a biography of Sinner Bodner, now a year overdue at Doubleday Doran.

CORONET



hangar five American paratroops, we are told, jump out through a door in the side of their aircraft, but the British drop through a tunnel-like hole in the floor of the plane, about half way between the cockpit and the tail.

When the aircraft is over the target the pilot switches on a tiny red light in the ceiling just above the hole. "Action Stations!" yells the jumpmaster and number one, sitting nearest the hole, swings his feet into it, his body rigid, his head up, eyes fixed on the jumpmaster. The red light goes off. A green one comes on. "Go!" screams the jumpmaster and number one, like a bolt, drops through the hole as number two on the other side of the aperture swings his feet into it, ready for the "Go" command. In the electrifying seconds between the red light flash, the command "Action Stations," the green light, and "Go," a kind of hypnosis is generated between the jumpmaster and parachutist. Events must move without incident, without hesitation. The jumpmaster's "Action Stations" is screamed to seize you, to move you mechanically into position. "Go" comes like the crack of a rifle. And go you do, like a bullet, without a thought except body rigid, feet and knees together, head up . . .

Several great Whitleys are warming up across the aerodrome and through the hangar doors I see a new battalion wearing the shoulder flashes of distinguished guards regiments and special army corps. Paratroops the world over are volunteers, an elite corps, we are told and these guardsmen look the part. There is an expression of

unshakable confidence as they march off to their first jump. Between the experienced jumpers and newcomers there's no kidding or joking, only murmuring words, and thumbs up. One never gets used to parachute jumping in the quiet that it holds no secrets. Men who have made hundreds of jumps undergo a familiar hesitation—the stomach heaving before each take-off. For the firstling there there must be every encouragement. If he has confidence he will exit properly from the aircraft, and in 75 per cent of all cases, we are convinced, a good exit means a good landing.

Before our first jump (two are now veterans of four) we had been taken on a routine tour of the target area to watch experienced paratroops perform. The first plane over the target executed a fast dash of 12 who popped out of their aircraft with clockwork precision. But the number two man of the second plane stopped through the hole, all arms and legs. With a hundred-mile-an-hour wind, the slipstream from the propellers tossed him like a rag doll into a somersault which threw several rigging lines of his parachute over the top of the opening canopy, preventing it from ballooning fully. Twisting and kicking in a desperate attempt to free himself, he ploughed crazily to earth under a half opened parachute, smacking the ground with a dull thud.

"Now we'll watch operations over there. About turn!" commanded our instructor abruptly marching us off in the opposite direction, the ambu-

later changing as we went. Maybe, as we observed at noon that evening, this operative didn't inspire much confidence. But it did emphasize one point—a proper exit, a good landing.

"Let's go, Number One Flight," suddenly shouts the jumpmaster.

We scramble quickly to our first engine. At the shoulder harness, for the long wait has made our 10 ground packs seem several times their normal weight, then waddle out awkwardly across the field. The sun is up. Off down the main runway a flight of Lancasters roars in from a dawn operation somewhere. In front of the furthest hangar a sleek American Lockheed receives great attention.

"Main!" "Left turn!"

We are under the wing of our Whitley, the wind from its propellers swirling ground water at us, its engines drowning out our thoughts.

Then "Explosion F" is the command.

Instantly, as the dark flaring I brace myself to cross over the great yawning hole and burrow into a cross-vented position on the floor near the front. It is hot and uncomfortable in the crowded, windowless darkness. The only light is an eerie orange reflection that comes through the hole.

The faces of my comrades are firm with resolve though it would be untrue to call them eager. I look across at Scrapper who winks. We were seated like this when he made his first jump. He felt excessively shy about it because he'd always been sick. I tried to buck him up with "You'll be top hole, Old Boy, chin up." Later

he gratefully told I'd pushed him through with those remarks.

Every man in position, the jumpmaster closes the emergency door and our big Whitley begins its waddle across the muddy ground to the runway. With a jerk the pilot pulls up to a stop to rev up the engine. Wh-H, whiffly, whiffly goes the port engine rattling its pitch in a series of rattling bellows that shake us with its vibrations. Frisco, that's the British Lion, F engine, and there goes the Yankee Eagle, or the starboard engine which just whirrs in a challenging scream.

Then with a sudden jolt the Lion and Eagle rev up together and we are racing down the runway fast, heavy, in an abrupt lift that causes us all to hold on, leaning forward. We are shot in a steep climb. Sunlight reflected up through the hole warms up the whole interior. Frisco and Hurry, numbers one and two, are starting loudly through the opening at the runway below. There's really no hazard to this, I reassure myself. Many thousand jumps have been made from this airbus with only a few fatalities. I wonder if the few didn't confuse themselves with their name stations!

To pass the time I try systematically to recall all the anecdotes about parachuting. The crash about the jumpmaster's boat being the paratrooper's secret weapon. The description of the Italian paratrooper plane which carried a crew of 22 men—one jumper and 21 men to throw him out . . .

I glance at my watch. About a minute and a half left to go. I grin. By the pulsing beat of the engines

You can tell we have reached 300 feet and are levelled off in the direction of our target. I wonder how soon we'll be over Germany in real action. If we can get a hundred thousand airborne troops over Germany some bright morning we'll paralyze the Hun's communications and decide this war in a matter of hours. We'll . . . "Action Stations!" screams the

jumpmaster!

Instantly every eye is on his face, which glows lividly in the red light flashing above his head. Number one, sitting erect, breathless, has spun into position. It is Francis. His upturned face is marble white in the sunlight reflected from below. His large brown eyes glared on the jumpmaster, Francis looks like an acolyte transfixed by his bishop's every move.

"Go!"

Swift, a shadow flashes across the interior, and Francis is gone. His detached static line rattles noisily against the bottom of the plane.

"Go!" "Go!"

The next two have swung into position and are on their way. Others are edging crablike towards the tail.

"Go!" I am clamped in position,

heart up, body rigid, face rigid.

"Go!"

Swift, still as a statue, I drop out onto the wind tunnel, and feel as if I'm being carried over a waterless sky and earth are spinning above. Tail, tail, two seconds, then all is quiet—serenely quiet—and I am swinging free, pleasantly, in the beautiful clear morning sky. We've dove to the right and Whittier is moving off. Snapper is already out behind me. Below, the green patches, the new gardens, the brown rail, are coming up at me perceptibly faster. Suddenly I am seized by the grandeur of it all, the vast relief after the crying hours of tension. I pull up on my life wires, stretch my legs and swing expertly to and fro.

Instructors on the ground are calling up commands over a loud speaker.

"Okay, Number One. Good exit. Number Two. Turn. Number Three. Very good. Four. Stop kicking your feet. Number Five. Number Five, stop kicking your feet. Five, are you here? Why are you kicking your feet?"

I don't know, Captain. I don't know why I'm kicking my feet. Just always wanted to, I suppose.

### Excess Enthusiasm

THE CAR of John C. Schowen of Denver looked bumpier with another machine. In the subsequent argument, Mr. Schowen waved his arms so wildly that he dislocated his left shoulder.

TOM WILLIAMS of Falls City, Nebraska, got into a political argument. He banged his fist so hard on the table that he broke a bone in his hand.

DOLores MORTLEY of Denver played the forbidden fruit to a plant course with such energy that a piano leg gave way. The instrument fell on her leg and fractured her ankle.

—Dr. W. H. Fossberg

JULY, 1943

**CONFIDENTIAL**

30 August 1943

MEMORANDUM:

FOR : General Donovan

RE : Attached Cable and Article on Pages 37 to 41, July copy of Coronet Magazine, written by Lt. Albin Dearing.

1. Lt. Dearing was released from duty with OSS on 27 December 1942, when he reported to Fort Benning. During 1942, Lt. Dearing attended a Parachute School in England conducted by the RAF, and it is apparent that the experiences around which the article in question was written occurred while he was a member of the OSS.

2. There are many articles in Coronet and other magazines written by our officers which are of the same nature as that written by Lt. Dearing. However, it is my belief that the British have a slightly different conception of such literature. While we would probably pass up such a semi-facetious article, it is my belief that they might take it somewhat more seriously. From par. 1 of Cable 27151, unquestionably they have taken a more serious view of the article.

3. It is believed that this matter could have been handled through our London Office with an apology to the SOE, and a secret letter to Lt. Dearing's present Commanding Officer requesting that he be admonished for his indiscretion. It is believed that any action by the Adjutant General would give undue and unwanted publicity to the SOE. It is recommended that the London Office be instructed in accordance with the above suggested procedure.

*Cable sent  
9/3/43*

J. A. HOAG  
Colonel PA  
Commanding  
Hq. & Hq. Detachment.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

17, 2 19



СРПСКА ПРАВОСЛАВНА ЦРКВА  
IA ЦРКВИ СПРАВАМ АМЕРИЧКЕ И КАНАДЕ  
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN AMERICA  
THE CHURCH OFFICE IS LOCATED 1000 JESSIE  
LEONARD ST. NEW YORK, N.Y.  
LIVINGSTON, N.Y.

17. August 6 1948

General William J. Donovan  
Director, Office of Coordinator of Information  
25th and K Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

My dear General,

The Serbian Orthodox Church in America has just published a volume of trustworthy testimony supported by documentary proof, concerning the horrible atrocities inflicted upon the Serb people and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia by the ruthless enemy. Under separate cover we are forwarding a copy of Martyrdom of the Serbs knowing well that you would be interested in the fate of the heroic Serbian people.

By its tradition the Serbian Orthodox Church has always protected and safeguarded the interests of its people. In the performance of its sacred duty the Serbian Orthodox Church in America, being the only free Serbian Church body, of necessity assumes the duty of speaking at this hour on behalf of the Mother Church and her faithful who are now subjugated by the common enemy.

The contribution of the Serbian people to the cause of Democracy in the present struggle against the enemies of the United Nations has already captured the admiration of all freedom-loving peoples. But the immeasurable toll of sacrifices exacted by the enemy in the avowed purpose

of exterminating the Serbs as a nation must be recorded and presented to the tribunal of mankind, not to obtain vengeance but justice.

We are in the hope that you may find it possible to devote a few spare moments of your time to the examination of this indictment of the common enemy which we submit, grief-stricken but without passion and prejudice, on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its people.

Assuring you in advance of our deep gratitude for your kind consideration in this matter, we beg to remain in prayer for a speedy victory of Allied arms

Yours very truly,

*for the Rt. Rev. Dionisije*  
The Rt. Rev. Dionisije

Bishop of the American-  
Canadian Diocese of the  
Serbian Orthodox Church

June 17, 1943

Mr. Ward Delaney  
Barclay Hotel  
111 East 48th Street  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ward:

I have your note of June 11, and I greatly appreciate your expressions, although I regret that you find it necessary to give up your work with the organization. I am grateful for the excellent services which you have rendered to us and for your loyalty to the organization.

If at any time in the future you feel it possible to return to war service, I hope you will feel free to discuss with me the possibilities of further service.

With my very good wishes,

Sincerely,

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES ARMY

000001

AG 500.4

4 June 1943

By Authority of  
CM, E.P.O. S.A.  
Initials  
Date 4 June 43

Subject: Orders.

To : Mr. SYLVA DESPRES, Civilian Employee, 123.

1. You are hereby authorized to proceed by first available transportation from London, England to Washington D. C., reporting upon arrival immediately to the Director, Office of Strategic Services for duty.
2. Travel will be performed by military, naval or commercial (or other) belligerent vessel or aircraft, Government vessel, commercial steamship and/or rail. If travel is performed by air, a baggage allowance of 50 lbs. is authorized.
3. Reimbursement for the expense incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number and citation of this order, by letter of transmittal to the Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.
4. TCNT. TDN. PD 32 P 432 -01, 02, 03, 07, 08 A 0415-23.
5. Attention is invited to Section IV, Circular No. 414, 10, 1942, regarding the preparation and the distribution of extract copies.

By command of Lieutenant General DEWEES,

*[Signature]*  
W. M. MAURETT  
Lt. Col., AG  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Despres	8
OSS Lond Miss	2
Dir OSS, Wash DC	2
TAG, Wash DC	2
Air Priorities	1
AG Records	1
AG Off Div	3

25109

-1-



June 11, 1944

From: The Director of Strategic Services.  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.  
Subject: John de Wilde

1. Mr. de Wilde is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed by the Board of Economic Warfare.
2. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.
3. Mr. de Wilde is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 22-45.
4. The nature of Mr. de Wilde's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.
5. Mr. de Wilde's address is:

The Board of Economic Warfare,  
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan,  
Director.

*de*

*deWilde - McCoy*  
*Ch. Egan, Branch*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 2, 1948

To: Brigadier General William J. Donovan  
From: William L. Langer  
Subject: John C. deWilde

I am returning to you General McCoy's letter regarding the case of John C. deWilde of the Board of Economic Warfare.

As Mr. Cheston has stated in his note to you, he has applied for a commission and it has been understood between us that in the event of his securing it, OSS will request his assignment for work in the R & A Branch.

Mr. deWilde is a very competent person who has done first rate work for the BEW both here and in London. We are extremely eager to add him to our staff and we should greatly appreciate anything that General McCoy may be willing to do in support of his application.

*William L. Langer*  
William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of  
Research and Analysis

Attachment

To: DR. LANGIER

2/

Would you want General  
McCoy to do anything about  
this as he suggests?

689

Director's Office

(9900)

31 000 01

General Wagoner  
this man is trying for  
a Navy Commission as  
the man looks if not  
RAA and asks for his  
name as is addressing  
RAA to ask for his name  
now. If commissioned,  
would be is badly  
needed.

CS Chester  
by Maj Rajula

to: Mr. Clinton

Do you

know about this?

D

Director's Office

(3300)


# FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Incorporated  
MIDTOWN HOUSE 11 EAST 59th STREET NEW YORK, 17  
Telephone: MUrray Hill 1-4700 Cable Address: Foreign

FRANK RING MCCOY  
President

MAY 28, 1945

General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
25th and E Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.



Dear General:

I understand that the application of John C. deWilde of the Board of Economic Warfare for commissioned service has been sent to you for approval. Mr. deWilde informs me that this is with the concurrence and approval of his superiors on the Board of Economic Warfare and of Mr. Morse, the chief of the Economic Division of the O.S.S. Under the circumstances, it is a pleasure for me to recommend favorable action. This is based on some two years of intimate association with Mr. deWilde in the Foreign Policy Association, when he was a senior research associate. Due to his work and character I recommended him for important and responsible work as an economist on the Board of Economic Warfare, and I should be glad to follow up with a recommendation for a commission now so that he can continue the work as a commissioned officer.

Very sincerely yours,

*Frank McCoy*  
" h

FRMcC:P

**SECRET**

May 18, 1948

MEMORANDUM TO AND FROM : DATA : FRANCE

SUBJECT: Orders



1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Algiers, where you will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, U.S.M.C., who is in charge of all OSS activities in the North African Theater. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Eddy's instructions.

2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons, but must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressees, if any.

William J. Donovan  
Director

PUTZELL: NELSON

**SECRET**

Mr. Leonard R. Davis  
Chief of Naval Personnel

March 24, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
Subject: Leonard R. Davis

1. Mr. Leonard R. Davis is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.
2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.
3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.
4. Mr. Davis is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 28-42.
5. The nature of Mr. Davis' duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.
6. Mr. Davis' address is:

Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan  
Director



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET


INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General Donovan  
FROM William L. Langer  
SUBJECT Andre Levy-Despas

DATE May 1, 1943

I am returning to you herewith the portion of material by and concerning Andre Levy-Despas. I referred this material to Mr. Walter Dilline who is one of our keenest men on this area. He has returned Levy-Despas' manuscript with his own interpolations. Many of these seem to me to be very penetrating and useful.


On the general issue Mr. Dilline comments that in his opinion Secretary Hull is absolutely correct. To ~~omit~~ a representative of the North African Jews in the United States without at the same time inviting a Moslem delegate, would be a first-class strategic error. Arab and Berber representatives would not be difficult to select. Mr. Dilline thinks they should be chosen from conservative aristocracy, not from the nationalists. He sees no reason why the French should not be allowed to choose them if there is any danger of the French being offended by our taking direct action in the matter. On the other hand, it is important that such representatives should not be Frenchified Moslems or well-known stooges of the French. Still less should they be rabid nationalists with their attitude foreign to the North African Moslems.

  
William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of V  
Research and Analysis

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATE

TO  
FROM  
SUBJECT



*W. H. ...*

To be handled -

To write & return

Col. A:

David King and  
A. Williams, if my memory is  
correct, both have considerable  
knowledge of the above subject

*WHP*

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

● O P Y

SECRET

March 4, 1944

Wiley

March 1, 1944

NY # 1000

My opinion is that the difficulties of selecting representatives of Arab interests for this work should be unwisely to attempt to extend an invitation at this time either to one man or to a group. Levy de Pits is a person of great discretion and is acutely conscious of the necessity of avoiding the sort of publicity which would play into the hands of Axis or pagandists. In his private talks in the United States, he will stress the importance of the problems which concern the Arab cause in himself well-known in Arab circles in Tunisia and has been intimately associated with them. Refer to your #296. Message is from Murphy.

WILEY

C O P Y

SECRET

HF  
February 23, 1944

February 23, 1944

SECRET

American Consul

Algiers

Would it not be well to have an Arab of some influence visit the United States, now that we are commencing Andre Levy Despres to come here and discuss the Jewish situation in French North Africa. The publicity about Despres may be unfortunate if it is not obvious that we are giving Arab interests equal attention. The person invited should be someone who would not offend French susceptibilities or give any impression that we are trying to lessen French prestige, or undermine French authority.

HULL  
(SW)

## I. THE NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION

This problem has always been a vexing one in North Africa.

At the present time the implications of the Moslem problem have had serious effects upon military operations in that region (security, number of men under arms, etc.).

Even after the liberation of all Tunisia, this question must be given the most careful and serious attention on the part of the Authorities.

Indeed, if we expect to take all necessary measures for effective military action in Europe, in an atmosphere free from tension and disturbances, it is essential to obtain, if not outright neutrality, at least the passivity of the ten million North African Arabs.

To date, we have repeatedly and emphatically called to the attention of the Allied Authorities (particularly the English) the seriousness of the Moslem problem.

At this point the disturbing turn taken by the situation leads us to assume that the measures thus far accomplished have been ineffective and that our present organization needs to be revamped and improved.

The scope of this report does not permit us to elaborate in detail all the aspects of the North African Native problem.

Let us recall that the problem has developed with individual peculiarities in the following countries: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, one must not apply in North Africa the propaganda methods employed in Egypt and the Near East.

### A. TUNISIA

The following points deserve consideration:

1. The nationalist movements have had their origin and inspiration in Tunisia.
2. The prestige which the Tunisian enjoys, as far as the Algerian and Moroccan are concerned.
3. Despite his scorn for the Italian the Tunisian has always been impressed by German military might.

Document by Title

REPORT OF ...

Page 1.

Paragraph 1: Indeed it has as ever since 1930.

Paragraphs 2-4: Good points. If anything, Paragraph 1 is not strong enough. The fundamental problems are localized in various districts of the three colonies. Tactics of psychological warfare successful in Egypt and the Near East may fail in North Africa. It is not safe to base planning on the assumption that the two areas have anything in common.

A. TUNISIA -

Point 1: This is an overstatement. Nationalist movements are certainly more mature in Tunisia than elsewhere in French North Africa, but they cannot all be traced back to Tunisia. Egypt has played a big part. The main factors are European education, which seems to be common to most leading nationalists, and western ideas of democratic government. In a certain sense the nationalist movements have had their origin and inspiration in Paris.

Point 2: I have not been aware of this, but am checking it.

Point 3: True; but better say, "The Tunisian, like most sensible people, is impressed by military might."

4. Wartime exigencies have placed 1,000,000 Arabs under the domination of Axis troops.

5. The Arabs have not forgotten that the Germans were the allies of the Turks during the first World War.

### THE PRESENT SITUATION

#### OCCUPIED ZONE

After having enjoyed the benefits of the French Protectorate for fifty years, the entire Arab population has welcomed with open arms, not only the German troops, but also the Italians (German order carried out).

We note several facts:

1. Arabs have been enlisting in the German Army, serving in German uniform (J-PHA-BIZ NIK); they have undertaken dangerous missions (gliders at St. Arnaud, paratroopers at Tubessa); they collaborate with the line troops (French sentinels captured by the Arabs and taken to the Germans).
2. The Arabs claim that the Germans:
  - a. Want no colonies but desire the liberation of the oppressed peoples (Goebbels' speech on Egypt).
  - b. Have distributed large amounts of food (oil, cereals, textiles) which the French had unfairly stored, the Arabs assist for shipment to France.
  - c. Have revoked ration cards for certain foods and have lowered taxes on foods (oil, normal sale price lowered from 20 francs to 8 francs per liter).
  - d. Have imposed upon the Jewish colony a fine of 20,000,000 francs for the benefit of the wounded Arabs. (English bombings of the Arab city of Tunis).
  - e. On the railways, the Arab railroad workers and their cereigionaries have come with palms to greet the Axis forces. They have been working doubly hard so that an increased volume of traffic might be possible.
  - f. The Bey, who is a Destourian, does not attempt to justify his attitude on the basis of the pressure from occupation authorities (proclamation, decorations given to Axis generals). His whole family (brothers) do not conceal their sympathies.

minutes of talks with

Page 2.

Point 4. True but a little out of date.

Point 5. Is this a true statement? Is it important? How many of them are pro-Axis?

THE PRESENT SITUATION

OCCUPIED TUNISIA

Paragraph 1. Read Khalil's "La Tunisie martyre" or the columns on Tunisia in L'Afrique Française to see how well the Tunisians have enjoyed the French Protectorate since World War I. They welcomed the Axis invasion because it was not French. If, however, the "entire Arab population welcomed the Germans with open arms", French policy has had a more unifying effect on the Arabs than has anything since Mohammed himself. I don't believe it.

Fact 1. Extremely interesting. M. Despas should be asked for a detailed report on this subject. His brief statement is of little value as it stands. Tunisians who had been associated with the nationalist movement might have aided the Germans for patriotic reasons or because they hated the French. but my guess would be that most of the collaborators were attracted by the guns.



Comments by Walter Line

Page 2 - continued

ammunition, rations, and prestige which the Germans offered, and  
 b. the opportunity to fight and plunder. Many of them had probably  
 served in the French army, and would willingly fight for the  
 Americans or the British if we offered them better inducements.  
 What rewards did the Germans give for the capture of French  
 sentinels? To estimate the extent of Axis influence in Tunisia  
 and find ways to counteract it, we need careful studies in the  
 field. It is fallacious to lump all the culprits together as  
 "Axis sympathizers."

Fact 2, a-d. This is the kind of psychological warfare that  
 works. How is it being counteracted in Tunisian territory now  
 occupied by the United Nations? Could Despas give us more  
 details?

Fact 3. Is this the particular reaction of labor groups to  
 liberation from French exploitation? If so, strike out "Bereligionaries",  
 since this word implies that it was a Moslem reaction. Did the Germans  
 make any special appeal to Tunisian labor unions, such as an  
 immediate improvement in pay or working conditions?

Fact 4. I don't think that the Bey's relation with the Destour  
 and Neo-Destour was very close before the Axis occupation, though he  
 was certainly not pro-French. The Destour leaders were the best  
 men to choose for his new government.

5. At the present time there is a very marked intensification of activity on the part of the Nationalist parties (Destour). Their demands have been made more exacting no longer are they satisfied with a mere reduction of privileges for the protectors, but they now ask an unconditional liberation of Tunisia. They even claim that certain of the prisoners at Marseille (Nou-Boutourine) have been set free by the Germans and that they are operating secretly in Tunisia.

6. The Bey, acting together with the German authorities has dismissed or departed all the French Directors of the Tunisian Administration. He has created an entirely new administration, of which all the chiefs are without exception or Nationalist leaders (Behri Saïd, Minister of Justice - Doctor Mabiri (?), Minister of the War (Ministre de la Plume), Mohammed Ghannik, Prime Minister - Mohamed ben Rouman, chief of Economy - El Ammi, Director of Public Works).

7. Goebbels' utterances of June, 1942, have been widely publicized and repeated. These concern the liberation of North Africa, promised in the near future, and the commitment made by the Germans to liberate the colonial lands from foreign domination. This propaganda is paralleled by pamphlets demonstrating that in Tunisia the Allies have respected the pledges they had made.

Page 2

...  
...  
... administration, as well as ...  
...  
...  
...  
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...  
...

### Free Zone

1) The Arabs of the present free zone were in the past considered to be relatively peaceful (Ain-uraban, Souk-el-Arba, Neja, Le Kef). There was an exception in the case of those of Gafsa.

At the moment, despite the Allied occupation, these Arabs are openly hostile and disloyal. They give information to the enemy by messages; they hide paratroopers who come down in battle; they steal allied supplies, etc., etc.

It is difficult to disentangle the network of an organization which reveals its presence by:

a) The persistence with which the Arabs sing the praises of the Axis. They announce that an Axis offensive is imminent, and they discuss and exaggerate the Axis gains to the East of Michon (January 4 talks), at Pont-du-Fane (January 2 talks), the Col of Faid (January 29), of southern Tunis, Uknessy (January 30), etc.

b) Giving effective aid to the enemy. Because of their nomadic habits, which would be practically impossible to control, they can give information to the enemy (incidents around the station at Souk-el-Arba, at Megods, etc.).

They hide airmen and Comanches (Fernana, January 8; St. Arnaud, January 13; Bordj-Bou-Arreidj, January 29).

2) Under present circumstances, the surveillance of these Arabs is difficult. They have taken refuge in the wilds and no longer hold meetings in cafes and markets; they meet in the "douars".

What is evident, is that certain chiefs, who before the war were known for their views, now reveal their existence by activity, which may appear insignificant, but is in reality cunning and energetic.

These people take refuge in the country, then come to a village, call on their friends, get information about the villagers, the military, and then depart. ~~At present, severe measures are not taken against them.~~ At present, severe measures are not taken against them.

### The Causes

The nationalistic movements are aided (morally and physically) by the Axis - encouraging their policy of revenge, helping to perfect their organization, and drawing up in-

summary by Walter Lipp

Page 4.

Free Zone.

Excellent hints. See my comments under Occupied Zone, Part I.  
"Severe measures" should not be taken against Arabs in areas  
reoccupied by the Allies. That would only substantiate the  
Arab claims. British and Americans should work to secure Arab  
cooperation.

The Causes.

Paragraph 1. The nationalist movements cannot be permanently  
suppressed by any means which democratic civilization can employ.  
They result from the contact of the politically undeveloped Moslem  
world with Western nations, and they will increase in strength as  
this contact becomes more intense. The United States, Great  
Britain and France can control them only by coming to terms with  
them. The Tunisian nationalists' "policy of revenge" might be  
gradually neutralized by the intervention of the United States or  
Great Britain, if either of these powers would negotiate fairly  
with the nationalists and at the same time, by diplomatic means,  
weed out the more intractable elements of the party. The aim of  
such negotiations should not be to give complete independence to  
Tunisia in the near future but to give the more rational nationalists  
a voice in all discussions concerning their country.

-6-

creasingly effective plans of action.

This development is disturbing those observers familiar with Moslem problems, and they seek to find the causes of this, some of which are as follows:

- 1) The Allied military defeat in June 1940, putting the Allies in a bad light before the natives, who are always impressed by power.
- 2) Certain concessions on the part of the local authorities, who did not have sufficient resources, authority, or experience to cope with a difficult situation.
- 3) The power gained by the Axis after the Armistice of June, 1940.

The Armistice Commission was able to penetrate into the French Empire and operate with surprising ease.

Unfortunately, added to these reasons, powerful enough in themselves, must be added:

- a) The role played by the family of the Bey and by Moncef Pacha Bey.
- b) The recent promises and concessions made by the Administration in Tunisia.
- c) The activities of agents who came from Spanish Morocco and those recruited in the French Zone by the Spanish Consulates (formerly under the control of Senor Dumer). This is a particularly important point and we presume to make certain valuable observations on the subject.

#### The Probable Development

The present situation can only become worse, because of:

- 1) The presence in Tunisia of Allied forces, who, because of ignorance on the native problem, are too apt to commit acts of violence, (public executions) make premature concessions (raised salaries), etc., or even, in the presence of Arabs, make hasty comments on the methods of Colonial Government (standard of living, nomadism, etc.). In this case, we might refer to the incident of December 20, involving the American ambulance at Souk-El-Kheis.
- 2) The difficulties will increase as the military operations proceed in the turbulent areas of Tunisia (Mehdia, Hammam, Ksar Hellal, Djennal, les Zlass).

Comments by Valter Hine

Page 5.

Causes of this development -

1) The Tunisians' impression of Allied weakness will have been corrected by the present campaign. Their conviction of French weakness will probably continue, due to the fact that France required American and British aid to win back Tunisia, and to the concessions recently granted to the nationalist by the French under pressure.

2) This is one of the worst things that could have happened. Its effect on the Arabs can best be counteracted by allowing the Bey and his government to retain nominal leadership under the military and economic supervision of the United Nations. This might convince the Arabs that our treatment of them is inspired by a policy of friendly cooperation rather than by direct pressure from the Arabs or the Axis, as was the case when the French in Tunisia made their recent concessions.

3) No comment.

The Probable Development.

Points generally good. We should have more details on the incident at Souk el Khemis.

3) After the liberation of Tunisia, our propaganda will continue to be active; the nationalistic organization will have deep roots in the subject will be felt by all the Tunisian population.

4) In conclusion, and taking into account the present time, to deride the French population is not the best way to propaganda. It is to be feared that the war will be a spark smoldering in Tunisia, which will develop into a conflagration to which only secretarial brutality will be the answer.

\*(Conclusion - See End)

Measures Taken

The aggravation of the Arab problem is, therefore, serious for the Allies. After many deliberations, our collaboration has been retained; there are moves toward a unified action.

A. We have been successful in the fact that, viz. the permission of the French authorities, we have the transfer of a printing press from Kef (there was no press in the free zone), which was adequate for editing all propaganda leaflets necessary (in French, Italian, and Arabic).

Our document and materials, suggestions and Arab collaborators (of Tunisian origin and familiar with Arab peculiarities) have been retained.

Propaganda by means of leaflets and pamphlets has been intensified.

B. For the occupied zone, only radio propaganda can be effective. We have drawn up a plan for the establishment of a small sending station. This requires:

1. The writing of propaganda with long-range aims. Although we needed powerful transmitters, we were pressed for time, since German propaganda was so effective.
2. Immediate action for the procurement of a mobile radio transmitter (even one which was not very powerful) which we could immediately make use of. The Germans already had some very specialized stations for radio broadcasting in Arabic (Radio-Bari, Paris-Mondial, Berlin), but also expanded such activity and employed Radio-Carthage for this same purpose.
3. That this little sending station, beamed solely to Tunisia, appeal to the particular preferences of the people



Comments by Valter Tine

Page 6. Measures taken.

I doubt that radio broadcasts, pamphlets, etc. are very effective except as publicity for tangible benefits accorded the Arabs. However, they are worth trying. The station appealing to Arab preferences (music, prayer, etc.) is a good idea. Straightforward news broadcasts, speeches by well known Arab leaders, etc. should be stressed; promises, and propaganda with "long range aims", may be <sup>f</sup>infactual or even dangerous unless they are backed up by immediate reforms.

- 7 -

(music, prayer, etc.).

4. Being on Tunisian and Italian territory, that counter-propaganda be disseminated to destroy the effect of the German lies (when it was announced that Tabarka had been taken in Tunisia, the village spoke was forced to come to the microphone and proclaim this falsehood, etc.).

We wrote directives on the use of this small transmitting station. Unfortunately, despite our efforts (we came twice to Algiers) it was impossible at that date to carry out a project which had the complete and qualified support of the Allied authorities.

#### Evolution of the Problem

During the last three months, the problem of the Moslem native has become increasingly complex. Our previous experience with the Arabs and with the country leads us to fear for the future.

We fear that the means at the disposal of the Allied forces will be insufficient to counteract the progress of Axis propaganda directed to the Moslems.

In addition, we feel obliged to insist on an important aspect of this problem:

After the liberation of Tunisia and for the first time in the history of Islam, all the Moslem peoples of Africa will be in the same sphere of influence and will think of themselves as bound by common interests.

In the future, peace talks before the peace treaty, the claims will be exacting, and since the action of these peoples will be a concerted one, it will be effective.

This consideration is very important and deserves special attention. It will be necessary to establish a special organization with adequate resources at its disposal (men and documents, etc.) to counteract Axis propaganda.

We are ready, as in the past, to make our contribution to this effort by offering our knowledge of Islam and especially of the Tunisian Moslems.

In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to delve deeply into Arabic documents and materials dealing with the Near East, and which are in the possession of the English forces. This will provide a working basis for a North African organization.

\* B. CONCLUSION

The importance of this problem is evidenced by the following:

Only France and England have empires. Upon the cessation of hostilities, ~~the colonies remain a vast~~ ~~numerous claim~~ (let us remember the heated discussion of November 1918).

At the present, there are grave fears for the aggravation of the situation, due to the rapidly growing rifts between the population and the protectors.

Document No. 100-1110

Page 7. Conclusion of the paper

In this section Despas makes the mistake of extending his Tunisian observations to cover all of North Africa. I cannot agree with his statement that "after the liberation of Tunisia all the Moslem peoples of Africa will think of themselves as bound by common interests", or that in the future talks before the peace treaty "the reaction of these peoples will be a concerted one." Such assumptions are much too optimistic. Nationalism is strong in northern Tunisia and in certain towns of Algeria and Morocco, not elsewhere. The war may stimulate its growth, but not to the extent expected by Despas. The fundamental problems in our relations with most North African Moslems are not those of nationalism. They arise from the impact of French imperialism, the Allied military occupation, and the European social system on the many different cultural groups of which the Moslem population of North Africa is composed.

Last paragraph: I cannot see how "delving deeply into Arabic documents and materials dealing with the Near East" can be of great help in our work in North Africa. The most important problems are strongly localized.

CONCLUSION: Despas has obviously a considerable knowledge of events in Tunisia under the Axis occupation, though his conclusions for North Africa as a whole are a little on the alarmist side. I hope that someone in OSS has interviewed him at length on Tunisia and that the notes will be made available to the psychological warfare staff.

U. S. Office, Washington, D. C.  
1-11-45  
1-11-45

**CONFIDENTIAL**

March 29, 1945

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am appreciative of your cooperation in re-  
spect of the proposed trip of Captain Henry P. Bellows.

Sincerely yours,

CONFIDENTIAL  
3/29/45

*De Vries, Henry, 10, 116*  
*Kimbel*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

~~SECRET~~

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Colonel Wm J Donovan  
FROM George K Bowden  
SUBJECT: Captain Henry de Vries

DATE March 15, 1949

Captain de Vries has been assigned to the London office. Prior to his going to London he desires to make a trip to Santiago, Chile. You are familiar with the nature of his mission to Santiago.

With your permission, Captain de Vries has applied, through Kimbel, for necessary travel documents to go to Santiago and return. Kimbel has taken the matter up with the State Department. State has communicated with F.B.I. and has clearance for the trip. State will issue a passport and the necessary visas.

There remains the problem of transportation. I am informed you have conferred with Generals Handy and Hull. They informed you that a clearance with the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs would be necessary before they could issue transportation priorities. You informed the Generals that you would secure this clearance. They now report that no clearance has been furnished. Kimbel informs me that upon receipt of this clearance from C.I.A. he will proceed to complete the work necessary to get Captain de Vries on his way.

*GKB*

*Talked with  
Bowden - T in phone  
1 - did not say  
would clear with*

*DeVries, Henry 19, 715*  
*File*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN  
FROM: WILLIAM A. KINDEL  
SUBJECT: CAPTAIN HENRY PETER DEVRIES

DATE: MARCH 17 1943

I have obtained approval from the Department of State for passport for the above to go to South America. This was delayed, pending clearance by F.B.I.

OPD of the War Department, through Colonel Jones, has now raised the question of clearance for this subject by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Colonel Jones states that it was General Handy and General Wall's understanding, when discussing this matter with Colonel Donovan, that assurance of clearance from this source would be submitted to them. Apparently this is the only remaining factor to be established before concluding transportation.

*W.A.K.*  
W. A. K.

*Talked with  
Col. Jones & he said  
it would be cleared  
D*

**SECRET**

De Vries  
C-30

March 5, 1963

Brigadier General John E. Hall,  
Room 3 E 816  
Pentagon Building,  
Arlington, Va.

Dear General Hall:

Following my letter to you of March 3, I hope that you will be able to provide air priority at the earliest possible date for Captain Henry P. De Vries from Brownsville, Texas, to Santiago, Chile, and return.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Copy to Kunkel



March 7, 1943

Brigadier General John S. Hull  
Room 3E-816 Pentagon Building  
Arlington, Virginia

Dear General Hull:

I am enclosing copy of a request for orders sent through Chief, Combined Subjects Section to the Adjutant General for Captain Henry P. De Vries.

I would like to have passage arranged for him to Santiago. The matters connected with it I will be glad to state to you. In any case, it is of great importance that he should go there.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

March 2, 1963

Subject: Orders

Thru: Chief, Combined Subjects Section  
Room 3E780, Pentagon Bldg., Arlington, Va.

To: The Adjutant General, Room 1515, Munitions Bldg.,  
Washington, d.c.

1. Request necessary orders detailing Captain HENRY P. DE VRIES, 0912346, AUS, to proceed on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to Santiago, Chile, for the purpose of carrying out a mission of this organization.
2. Travel is requested by air.
3. Permission to wear civilian clothing should be authorized.

William J. Donovan  
Director

*De Vries Henry 12/21/5*  
*x Chile*

March 7, 1943

**MEMORANDUM**

FOR: Major Oliver

FROM: Mr. Murphy

Will you please prepare a request for orders for Captain Henry De Vries, to include the following:

1. Travel from Washington, D. C. to Santiago, Chile by air and return
2. To be gone about six weeks.
3. The purpose a special mission for this office.
4. For permission to wear civilian clothes while engaged on this mission.
5. It is vitally important that the orders be issued at the earliest possible moment for immediate departure.

March 2, 1943

**MEMORANDUM**

FOR: Mr. Mygatt

FROM: Mr. Murphy

Will you please engage air transportation to Santiago, Chile for Captain Henry Le Vriew. I have asked Major Oliver to obtain Army travel orders which should be done within the next 48 hours. He will be ready to leave any time thereafter.

Will you please make any other arrangements that will be necessary incident to the travel, including passport and travel documents.

Handwritten notes and stamps at the top right of the page.

20/252/200  
February 25, 1943

**SUBJECT:** Orders.

**TO:** The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Request necessary orders directing the following named officer, when directed by the Director, Office of Strategic Services, to proceed on temporary duty from Washington, D. C., to London, England, for the purpose of carrying out the directive for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to perform such other duties as may from time to time be assigned by the Director of Strategic Services or by the head of the Office of Strategic Services in London, England, reporting on arrival thereof to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, London, for duty as  

Captain Henry P. DeVries, 0912346, MSB
2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, ballingast vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, army or naval transport, and rail should be authorized. Travel by air from Washington, D. C., to destination, and return, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. Transportation is being arranged by this office; therefore it is requested that officer proceed to the Port of Embarkation or take such route as the Director, Office of Strategic Services may direct.
3. For the travel involved and while on temporary duty, a flat per diem of \$6.00 should be authorized.
4. A baggage allowance of seventy-seven (77) pounds while travelling by aircraft should be authorized. It is further requested that additional baggage be authorized to be shipped by vessel or transport to destination.
5. It is further requested that authority be granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such other places as may be necessary in the performance of this mission. The duties to be performed being exceptional, may require more than seventy-two (72) hours at different places for their performance therefore, a delay of not to exceed thirty (30) days at any place where necessary should be authorized.
6. Prior to departure from his present station, he should be equipped for extended field service, tropical climate, including steel helmet and gas mask.
7. Request that an APO be designated for this officer while on duty in London.
8. Officer should be authorized to wear civilian clothing while travelling and when deemed necessary in accomplishing this mission.
9. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services.

WILLIAM J. BROWN  
Director



COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTERVIEW MEMO

**SECRET**

FROM: George K. Bowlen  
TO: General Donovan  
SUBJECT: Plaza

Date April 26, 1943

I recommend that you reconsider your decision on Plaza. Both Shepardson and Thomas gave encouragement to the expectation that Plaza was available for CE. This was done prior to Murphy's leaving for London.

Murphy had conference with Plaza in London. Both the British and Murphy recommended that Plaza be used for CE work. Murphy has requested of you his transfer.

Subsequent to this recommendation Shepardson and Thomas now take the position that they want to keep Plaza, for SI work. It appears now that Plaza, who was first on the outs with Fish, is now very much in his favor.

Weeks would have to be spent to acquaint any other man than Plaza with the Lisbon situation. It is extremely important that CE have a man there now.

GKB