





COMMUNISTS

COMMUNISTS

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Postscript to an Exploration

(Part One)

AND THEN ONE DAY I found myself at home out there.

And it was, truth to tell, a very great relief. For in another few weeks I was slated to return east; and to have left without ever having felt: "This, too!" would grievously—and I knew it—have meant defeat. There is no pretending that one feels at home. I've tried that, and it simply doesn't work. In a year of wandering up and down a coast, between San Francisco and the Mexican border, there had been many scenes to fill the eye, and the scenes themselves many-mooded, many-faceted, so that anyone at all, it might have been supposed, would have managed at least once to experience a rapprochement. And almost had I managed it, half-a-dozen times. "In a moment—in another moment—" I had thought. But never had the moment really come to flower. And pressure, of course, had but served to void it sooner. This place and that one, they had been good places: fine places for staying in—and there the matter stood.

Until quite suddenly one day it happened.

And this is the manner in which it came about.

I had gone off walking, not knowing where, with sandwiches in one pocket and poetry in the other; and a great bold wind was abroad in the sky, and sun of such a brilliance that it stung the eyes. To the right were hills, thrust bluntly into the blue; and sheering clean away, to the left of the road, a long deep valley, rich-textured, like velvet—with its scattering of cabins wearing spider-threads of smoke and windows that were glittery as sequins in the sun. Some

little jumping dots were children playing, for their voices, personlessly pure and very thin, came spiraling up freshly through immensities of space; and a long way off, on a cropped green slope—prancing, just perceptibly, like a tiny toy ballet—were what I supposed must be a herd of deer.

The road lifted skyward; and it was all very fine—the bigness, the brightness, the bold rings of wind. And I found myself thinking in so often I had thought, in this place and that one, throughout those months: "How handsome, how tremendous everything really is!" Whitmanesque country: candle-exposed: copious and capacious, untrammelled, unabashed. A kind of sunny sensationalism of effect, massive but simplified, unobtrusive as a gong; so that from the first these great scenes had had for me the de-personalized quality of a mural or an epic. So that from the first I had felt like a spectator: examining, appraising, from a point apart.

Well, there the road was, curving steeply into sky; and after I had been following it for perhaps an hour I found, on the high-banked green on my right, an unobtrusive break—another road, not much more than a trail, grassed-over and branched-over, freaked with sun. There was a padlocked gate, guarding it officiously; there was a sign there, too, prominent as could be. But happily the sign was so rimed with ruins that not a syllable of it could even an alderman have deciphered. So I climbed across the gate, into the dim green hush; and almost immediately the feeling began.

There is no way, I realize, of telling about the feeling. It is a kind of stillness laid upon stillness. It isn't expectation, not exactly—
it's only a part of
the feeling.

DAY, JULY 19, 1945

Polish Solution Memorial to Truman

Christian Science Monitor

A table organizations, freely to circulate in Poland and other Soviet occupied territories upon the same terms as we allow Soviet journalists and other agents to circulate in countries under our control.

8. The application of such "concert" principles accepted in the Yalta declaration not only to Poland but to all other countries, such as Greece where a single great power is in dominant control as a result of recent military operations.

'Communism' Denied By War Department

WASHINGTON, July 19 (AP)—The War Department came to quick defense yesterday of 16 Army officers and men described on Capitol Hill as having backgrounds which reflect Communism in some form.

A Department statement said thorough investigations of the commissioned and noncommissioned personnel listed "did not lead the Army to conclude that any of the individuals was disaffected or disloyal."

The statement was issued shortly after a House Military Subcommittee made public the names as compiled by the Committee's chief counsel, H. Ralph Burton, and submitted to the group in private testimony.

Still later Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, issued a separate statement voicing praise of the "outstanding service" of four of the officers described in the list as assigned to OSS.

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Letter

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re _____

DATED:

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT:

Allegation that Paul Baran is a communist

*see file: 13aran, 1/13 Paul Alexander
16, 385*

ORIGINAL FILED IN: _____

FILE #: _____

OSN 11644 50614

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Letter

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re

Communism

DATED:

See: Mack, Edward A. 11, 449

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT:

See: Jablonsky, David 8, 457

Margani 8, 315 and 10, 204

Security Check 16, 158

Moss, Edward 10, 333

ORIGINAL FILED IN: _____

FILE #:

039 PQRM 30614

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Letter
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re

Compendium

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FILE #: _____

House of Representatives

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs

March 13, 1948

Washington, D. C.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.**

House of Representatives

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs

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Washington, D. C.

From the Files of the Director
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(4266
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088
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 17 APRIL 1945

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(FOR ACTION)

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(FOR INFORMATION)

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SECRET

#13414. 109, TRIANGLE, TO GLAYIN ALONE, CASERTA. PARIS-CASERTA (7154).
INFORMATION: BUXTON, CHESTON AND PUTZELL ONLY. RELAY #158.

1. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ALL FACTS OF THIS MATTER WERE NOT REPORTED TO ME BEFORE THIS DAY. WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND THAT I APPEARED BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE INQUIRING INTO LOYALTY OF AMERICAN OFFICERS WHO WERE CHARGED WITH HAVING BEEN MEMBERS OF THAT PARTY. RELYING UPON MY OWN OBSERVATIONS AS WELL AS AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM YOUR THEATER, I SINCERELY DEFENDED THESE MEN AND TESTIFIED AS TO THEIR LOYALTY AND THEIR EFFICIENT SERVICE. I WANT NOW TO HAVE FULL INFORMATION INCLUDING REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES WHO HAD CHARGE OF THE INQUIRIES, ETC. WITH RESPECT TO MESSAGES TO WHICH YOU REFER, GIVE ME REASON FOR BELIEF THEY WERE PASSED, WHAT THEY STATED TO WHOM THEY WERE SENT AND WHO WAS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM.

2. THIS NOT MATTER WHICH CAN BE HANDLED BY CABLE. IF POSSIBLE, GIVE WRITTEN STATEMENTS TO SHEPARDSON. IF NOT POSSIBLE, POUCH DIRECT TO ME IN WASHINGTON.

TOR: 2209 17 APRIL 1945

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Form 10
(Rev. 1-45)
A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 17 APRIL 1945
FROM USTRAV 10, LONDON

TO
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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1. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ALL FACTS OF THIS MATTER WERE NOT REPORTED TO ME BEFORE THIS DAY. WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND THAT I APPEARED BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE INQUIRING INTO LOYALTY OF AMERICAN OFFICERS WHO WERE CHARGED WITH HAVING BEEN MEMBERS OF THAT PARTY. RELYING UPON MY OWN OBSERVATIONS AS WELL AS AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM YOUR THEATER, I SINCERELY DEFENDED THESE MEN AND TESTIFIED AS TO THEIR LOYALTY AND THEIR EFFICIENT SERVICE. I WANT NOW TO HAVE FULL INFORMATION INCLUDING REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES, WHO HAD CHARGE OF THE INQUIRIES, ETC. WITH RESPECT TO MESSAGES TO WHICH YOU REFER, GIVE ME REASON FOR BELIEF THEY WERE PASSED, WHAT THEY STATED, TO WHOM THEY WERE SENT AND WHO WAS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM.

2. THIS NOT MATTER WHICH CAN BE HANDLED BY CABLE. IF POSSIBLE, GIVE WRITTEN STATEMENTS TO SHEPARDSON. IF NOT POSSIBLE, POUCH DIRECT TO ME IN WASHINGTON.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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#44254. GLAVIN TO 109 ONLY (PARIS #10204) AND YORKER AND CHESTON ONLY.

1. U.S. G-2 (CI) HAS REQUESTED US TO EVACUATE TO THE UNITED STATES LTS. GOFF, LOSSOWSKI, FAJANS AND WOLF, AND 2 JIMINEZ BROTHERS. ON VICTORY IN ITALY DAY OR BEFORE, THEATER HAS RULED THAT WE CANNOT DELAY FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES.

2. SCAMPORINO REPORTED HIS BELIEF GOFF HAS USED CIRCUITS TO RELAY PARTY MESSAGES FROM ROME TO NORTH ITALY IN DIRECT VIOLATION SPECIFIC ORDERS THIS HQS. THIS IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED. RESULTS OF INQUIRY LAID BEFORE US. G-2 (CI) WHO RECOMMENDED NO ACTION UNDER ARTICLES OF WAR BUT REEMPHASIZES NECESSITY FOR GETTING THEM OUT OF THEATER ON OR BEFORE HOSTILITIES CEASE. WE WILL IMPLEMENT.

3. PROMOTIONS PENDING FOR LTS. GOFF, LOSSOWSKI, FAJANS AND JIMINEZ. SUHLING HAS RECOMMENDED THEM. WASHINGTON BOARD OF OFFICERS HAS ALREADY APPROVED GOFF AND LOSSOWSKI UPON OUR REQUEST AND THE OTHERS ARE PENDING THERE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ABOVE, BELIEVE PROMOTIONS OF ALL 4 SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. YOUR ADVICE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

SECRET

TOR: 1407 16 APR 45

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INCOMING PARIS NO 305

CASERTA NO 10204

16 APR'45

TO: LOS ONLY ESPIN YORKER AND CHESTON ONLY WASH
FROM: CLAVIN CASERTA

(1). U.S. G-2 (CAST ITEM) HAS REQUESTED US TO EVACUATE TO THE UNITED STATES LTS. GOFF, LOSOWSKI, FAJANS AND WOLF, AND TWO JIMINEZ BROTHERS ON VICTORY IN ITALY DAY OR BEFORE. THEATER HAS RULED THAT WE CANNOT RPT NOT DELAY FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES.

(2). SCAXPORINO REPORTED HIS BELIEF GOFF HAS USED CIRCUITS TO RELAY PARTY MESSAGES FROM ROME TO NORTH ITALY IN DIRECT VIOLATION SPECIFIC ORDERS THIS HQ. THIS IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED. RESULTS OF INQUIRY LAID BEFORE US G-2 (CAST ITEM) WHO RECOMMENDED NO ACTION UNDER ARTICLES OF WAR BUT REEMPHASIZED NEED FOR GETTING THEM OUT OF THEATER ON OR BEFORE HOSTILITIES CEASE. WE WILL IMPLEMENT.

(3). PROMOTIONS PENDING FOR LTS. GOFF, LOSOWSKI, FAJANS AND JIMINEZ. SUHLING HAS RECOMMENDED THEM. WASHINGTON BOARD OF OFFICERS HAS ALREADY APPROVED GOFF AND LOSSOWSKI ON OUR REQUEST AND THE OTHERS ARE PENDING THERE. BUT IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE PROMOTIONS OF ALL FOUR SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. YOUR ADVICE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

TOS: 161705

TOR: 162110

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : J. J. Monigan, Jr.

SUBJECT: Report on Traffic Over Circuits to Communist Party Parties
Hands

DATE: 11 May 1946

In accordance with your order, I have reviewed the attached file on the above subject, and discussed with Major Pacatte the basic agreement pursuant to which the messages were transmitted.

Major Pacatte has stated that there was in fact an agreement by which messages for the Communist Party were transmitted over the communication facilities of this agency. At the time the agreement was made, the intelligence situation in Rome was such that the need for agents was acute. The Communist Party had such agents and as part of the price for their working on our behalf, the message arrangement was made. Lt. Goff was in immediate charge of the chain of agents which then began to function.

In view of the evidence of this agreement, there appears to be no criticism of Lt. Goff for transmitting the messages in accordance with this undertaking.

Recommendations on the request of AFHQ G-2 that Lts. Goff, Majans, Wolff, and Jiminez be returned to the United States are contained in the memorandum of the Special Investigation Committee which has again reviewed the cases of the above-named officers in the light of the cessation of hostilities. The case of Lt. Jiminez, whose return was also requested by AFHQ G-2, has not been considered by the Committee.

It is recommended that no action be taken concerning Lt. Goff's activity with regard to the transmission of Communist messages.

J. J. Monigan, Jr.
J. J. Monigan, Jr.
Major, GAC

SECRET

To: Major MONICAN

WJD

6 May 45

OSS Form 3054
(3308)

Director's Office

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
287TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 512

26 April 1948

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO : The Director, OSS, Washington

1. Transmitted herewith is report from Major Suhling which should be attached as Appendix Q to letter dated 26 April 1948, subject: "Report on Traffic over Circuits to Communist Party Partisan Bands".

2. Reference to para. 12 of the enclosed letter, Major Suhling refers to the request made by Colonel Nichols, AFHQ, G-3, (CI) to evacuate certain officers as soon as hostilities cease in Italy or sooner if practicable. Major Suhling erroneously infers that this request is in some way related to the matter in discussion. Colonel Nichols has made it clear to Chief X-3, MEDTO, that he understands our use of these officers and merely wishes them evacuated so that they will not become involved in any post-hostilities difficulties that may arise between the various Partisan, political bands in the North.

*Thomas H. Newcomb, Lt. Col. G.C.
File. Officer*

For and in the Absence of:

EDWARD J.F. OLAVIN
Colonel Infantry
Commanding

Attachment: Appendix Q

Copy #1 - The Director, OSS Washington
#2 - Commanding Officer, Company D - minus appendix
#3 - Headquarters Executive File 022

HVA 5 10 40 1948

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2677TH REGIMENT OSS (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

24 April 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Goff Agent Chain

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Regt OSS (Prov) APO 512, U.S. Army

1. Pursuant to verbal instructions of Colonel Glavin passed to me by Lt. Col. Rosen the following report is made on the activities of the Goff agent chain, and of the officers connected therewith.
2. This report covers the period from mid-July 1944 to date, said period being that during which I have been in command of the Company. Information on the chain prior to the above period is from statements made to me from time to time and should be verified by actual statements of the subject officers before being taken as fact.
3. From statements made from time to time by Lts. Goff and Lessowski and by Major Cagliati the approximate history of the Goff chain is about as follows. Shortly after the Salerno/Pesertum landings in September 1943 it became apparent that agents were needed in Rome, and sundry attempts were made to establish such agents. As the stalemate at Cassino became intensified various officers of OSS as well as British agencies tried to contact the Communist Party representatives in Naples to secure their help, it being known that this party had a good underground to the North. Much confusion resulted from the duplication of efforts by different branches, and personnel all trying to make the above mentioned contact. Lt. Goff was finally selected as the OSS officer to establish a contact, his selection being deemed suitable on account of his service in the Spanish Revolution. He made the contact. Subsequently it is reported that an agreement was reached by Capt. Pacatte with the Communist Party under which the Communist Party agreed to furnish personnel and safe houses to be used by OSS for its intelligence and operational purposes and, in return, OSS was to allow such agent personnel, from time to time, to keep the Communist Party advised of actions by its own members.
4. The personnel working with Lt. Goff is as follows. Lt. Lessowski, Lt. Pajans, and Lt. Wolff. Lt. Goff reported for duty at Siena about the end of July, 1944, where he carried on by himself until about 1 October, 1944. He was relieved and assigned the duty of recruiting German agents. He made his headquarters in Rome, paying periodic visits to Siena headquarters and the Brindisi training area. He returned to Company D headquarters in Florence in mid-March 1945. Lt. Lessowski

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ran the training area in Brindisi until he was transferred to Sicily in October to replace Lt. Goff. He was hospitalized in January with jaundice. Upon release from the hospital he took several weeks rest and then took over the training area near Cicina. Lt. Fajans replaced Lt. Lossowski at the Brindisi training area in October. He made several trips to Africa to recruit German agents and came to this headquarters in January, when Lt. Lossowski was sent to the hospital. Lt. Wolff was sent to France on a mission at the end of September 1944, and was returned to Brindisi about the end of October. He replaced Lt. Fajans when the latter was transferred to Company D headquarters. He has continued at the training area since its removal to Cicina.

5. Lt. Goff had in the field in July, 1944, seven teams. The present number in the field is eighteen, comprising forty-three personnel. In addition to those in the field there are twenty-three agents and radio operators being held at the training area for infiltration into Austria. Operational results have been good. Recent teams infiltrated have been briefed to stress intelligence as much as operations, this in view of the general military situation as well as general Army directives restricting unlimited organization of partisans. Financial costs of these missions has been below average. The entire work of recruiting, training, briefing and direction while in the field has been done by the officers listed, with the help of four enlisted men.

6. The Goff chain has accounted for the following signal traffic from 10 November to 15 April, 1945:

Station	<i>Total</i> No. Msgs. Received	No. Intell. Items Recvd	Non-Intell. Ops. Msgs. <i>Recd</i>	<i>Total</i> Msgs Sent	Non-Intell. Ops. Msgs Sent
MARGOT	580	776	2	165	0
DODGERS	407	372	0	94	0
MELE	373	318	0	155	1
MARINA	442	318	5	130	1
JUNEAU	32	24	0	15	0
GRAVES	141	117	1	73	0
(Chicago)					
ODETTE	82	11	1	32	0
SOPHIE	60	5	1	17	0
TIGERS	87	26	3	24	0
TEXAS	38	33	1	6	0
Totals	2232	1936	19	621	2

Average 0.86 intelligence items per message received.

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This is a high average of messages per team and a good percentage of intelligence items per message. It compares favorably with other missions operating.

7. Compilation of other field traffic for the same period from non-American missions follows:

Station	<i>Total</i> No. Msgs. Received	No. Intell. Items Recvd	Non-Intell. Ops. Msgs. <i>Recd.</i>	<i>Total</i> Msgs. Sent	Non-Intell. Ops. Msgs. <i>Sent</i>
MERIDEN	832	648	2	96	0
GODI	390	529	1	120	1
MARIANNA	105	66	2	55	2
SALEM	302	208	3	94	1
(Joliet)					
YOUNGSTOWN	412	260	3	74	0
LOBO	268	166	3	112	1
SAYBROOK	26	12	0	14	0
AUGUSTA	188	87	1	63	2
(Baldwin)					
PIROSCAFO	39	47	0	24	0
LOCUST	159	167	1	29	1
ROSETTA	205	116	5	46	0
BETTY	138	88	0	22	0
ANITA	119	57	1	30	0
CROWWELL	99	47	1	24	0
WESTWOOD	181	91	0	16	0
ELINOR	116	65	1	30	0
Totals	3877	2622	24	858	8

Average 0.77 intelligence items per message.

The ratio of non-intelligence and non-operational messages for these teams in messages received is 0.71% as compared to 0.85% for the Goff missions. For messages sent to the field the average for the latter teams is 0.93% as compared to 0.32% for the Goff missions.

8. Upon assuming command of the Company I was instructed that no activities in support of any political party were to be allowed, this ruling to include support through agents or radio. Consequently I kept as close a check as possible on signal traffic as well as on the agents involved. On 10 November, 1944, a signal from Scoccimarra (Ereoli) to Gallo (head of the Communist Party in enemy occupied Italy) came to my attention. I called in Lt. Lossowski to discuss the signal, he advising me of the agreement set forth in Paragraph 3 above. On the basis of this discussion I addressed a letter dated 10 November to the Commanding Officer, Regiment (attached as Appendix "A"), setting forth my views and

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requesting a directive. On 13 November I sent to Colonel Glavin a signal (attached as Appendix "B"), setting forth my views and requesting his decision. Reply dated 14 November (attached as Appendix "C") set forth the policy desired by Regiment. On 16 November signal (attached as Appendix "D") was received in answer to my letter of 10 November. The policy as outlined in the above has been carried through to the best of my ability and the traffic has been carefully watched. The next instructions bearing on the matter were verbal instructions from Col. Rosen which were later confirmed by Col. Glavin's instructions dated 16 April (Appendix "E").

9. In view of the instructions of 16 April all traffic has been reexamined. The messages listed as neither intelligence nor operational have been carefully gone over in the light of the complaints recently made with regard to this traffic. In my opinion all classify well within the directive issued in November. Incidentally, I have made consistent complaint to Lts. Goff, Lossowski, etc., about this type of message -- not however on account of the political flavor but simply because they, in my opinion, are "full of bull" and waste valuable cipher groups and time on the air. A study of them will I believe bear out these remarks. I further believe that a careful study will indicate that where instructions have been given, they uniformly urge unity of action by all parties against the Nazi-Fascists, and discarding of individual political action and the support of the CIN and Bonomi government. All three of these points have been urged by all Allied agencies as basic tenets to all partisan forces. The messages listed in Appendix "E" represent the worst of the non-intelligence and operational messages. I feel they likewise come under the descriptions given above.

10. From the facts set forth above it appears:

- a. That whether wisely or unwisely agreement was made to use Communist agents for intelligence and operational purposes.
- b. That the existence of such an agreement was made known to Regiment as soon as it was made known to me.
- c. That Regiment concurred in the continuance of said agreement.
- d. That traffic since Regimental policy was enunciated has been within the limitations set forth.
- e. That traffic has been of a high intelligence and operational value, fully in line with other field stations.

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f. That percentage of traffic of non-intelligence and non-operational nature has been at least as great as that of other chains.

g. That advice and instructions given in such non-intelligence and non-operational messages has been sound and along the lines desired by all Allied agencies.

11. In my opinion the following conclusions may be drawn:

a. OSS had certain intelligence and operational objectives to obtain, -- among which was political intelligence, regardless of the color of that intelligence. We have agents from all political parties. The Communist Party is among the stronger in North Italy. To leave out contacts with it would seem disastrous for a balanced intelligence picture.

b. The agreement with the Communist Party opened an avenue to political intelligence not otherwise available and at the same time provided valuable military intelligence and operations.

c. The price paid has been cheap for the results obtained.

d. Criticism cannot properly be made of Lt. Goff, etc., for carrying out an agreement concurred in by Regiment.

e. Revision of the policy or cancelling of the agreement will mean loss of very valuable field missions, which at this date would seem inexcusable from both military and political standpoints.

12. The above report has attempted to give the facts as they are known here and my evaluation of these facts as objectively as possible. It is not intended as a defense of the officers concerned, but it is a defense of the Regimental policy involved. I do not know what if any actions outside their official duties have brought about the G-2, AFHQ opinion on the personnel. If the opinion is based on facts available to me I cannot help but feel that so far as their official actions in conducting and carrying out the Regimental policy is concerned, and so far as Regimental policy itself is concerned, G-2 AFHQ has not been presented with a fair picture of the situation.

13. I request that I be advised of any further action desired.

W. G. Sueling, Jr.
WILLIAM G. SUELING, JR.
Major, Infantry
Commanding

APPENDIX "A" **SECRET**
10 November 1944

SUBJECT: Communist Agents.

TO : Commanding Officer, 8077th Regt OSS (Prov),
APO 812, U. S. Army.

1. The question of the use of OSS radio facilities by the Communist Party in Italy has come up for discussion by Lt. Lowmowski and myself. Coincidental therewith, a cable has been received from the field evidencing concern with Communist activities. This whole matter is discussed below as to separate items, though each ties in with the other.

2. The first question, namely the use of OSS radio facilities, is as follows: I am informed that Major Koch made a verbal agreement with the Communist party in Naples that we, OSS, would forward to the field all messages which the Communist Party wished to send and would handle all incoming messages received from the field, we retaining copies of such messages in our files, and of course informing the Communist Party of all messages. This agreement was made in return for the Communist Party making available to OSS the best agents available from their membership. The following message (#45 to Marina) was sent out on 8 November:

"From Ercoli, 1 November 1944: We call the attention of all the organizations of the party and of all the comrades to our duties at the present moment. The declarations of the leaders of the United Nations during and after the meetings at Quebec and Moscow have underlined the fact that we are in the last months of the war. Churchill said the war might even be ended before Christmas but might last until spring. It is evident that these declarations impose upon all combatants against the Hitlerian Germany the duty of immediate action and greatest effort to reduce to a minimum and make victory as soon as possible. Communists and Italian Patriots must multiply their activities in this moment. If we succeed in forcing the Germans to abandon our country quickly it would be a great victory for us and all the forces of liberty. Collect all your energies, plunge yourselves into the struggle with greater decisions, conscious of the fact that it will be the last decisive effort. Strengthen your battle lines and extend it in all manners and forms. Do not give any rest to the Germans and to the Fascists. Attack them with all weapons. Destroy them, kill them. Unleash all possible revolts among the masses in the occupied regions. Forward, for the most rapid complete liberation of our country."

3. We question the propriety as well as the advisability of continuing to allow the Communist Party to send messages to the field in which the Communist Party is specifically mentioned by name. We see no propriety in allowing them to send any instructions or messages to the field provided such messages and instructions do not specifically refer to the Communist Party. The work all the Communist agents are doing for us is

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excellent in every respect. If an agreement was made with the Communist Party stating that they would be allowed to send and receive messages through us, it would be a breach of faith for us to at this date refuse to continue the terms of our agreement. In my opinion they would be justified in canceling the work of their chains for and with us if we made such a breach of faith. In view of the above, it is my recommendation that we continue to send messages, but only provided they do not run along party lines. I request that Regiment Headquarters give us the benefit of a ruling on this matter.

4. The following cables were received from Major Smith on 9 November:

(#4 from Mercury) "Happy to hear Hall all right. Give him all possible support. According to unconfirmed reports, Russians withdrawing from Ampezzo Vallette Tolmezzo and have left San Francesco. Will move to area of Sauris to receive daylight drop if this is true. It is rumored that reason for withdrawal is to meet threat of Jugland Partisans to Italian border. If this is true and we receive arms at once, we will be able to raise hell with German traffic on route Samsone Pontebba."

(#5 from Mercury) "Nicholson (a British officer) and myself listening perfectly. Recent events necessitates the placing of all OSS Italian agents this area under my command. A continuous spreading of communist propaganda by our agents and others prevents complete union between OSOPPO and Garibaldini. OSOPPO is non-political. Unless these agents are placed under my command and informed of such immediately and I be consulted about entry of all OSS personnel to this area, my mission is coming out pronto."

We propose answering these two messages with the following:

"Re your Number 4, situation is as follows: Regular resupply to Partisans in desired quantities cannot be expected during winter months. The proposed mass drops of about 40 tons may be expected not oftener than once per month and probably less often. Purpose mass drops is to provide food, clothing and sufficient ammunition to allow Partisans to protect themselves throughout winter months. Drops are not expected to provide sufficient supplies for any offensive actions. In view of above, Partisans should attract as little attention from the enemy as possible, under no circumstances inviting mopping-up operations. You will instruct Partisans to above effect. You will be advised of any change in these instructions.

"Re your Number 5. Any previous instructions as to your duties are herewith rescinded. Your instructions are:

"1. To establish yourself at such suitable location in relation to mass dropping ground D Z _____ as will enable you to be present at the drops.

"2. To supervise the fair distribution of these supplies jointly with British officer present according to instructions sent from here and No. 1 Special Force.

U.S. SECRET

"3. To inform the Partisans of policy to be followed against the enemy according to instructions you will receive from us.

"4. To collect and pass on to this headquarters all intelligence of whatever nature.

"5. To report any political activity by our agents, but you will not participate in nor interfere with, any political actions of either the Partisans nor our agents.

"6. To receive and assist any teams coming into your area. To this end you will be informed of the entry into your area of both OSS and No. 1 Special Force teams, but you will not take command of them nor of those already there. Your mission is for liaison purposes and advice to the Partisans, and not to command.

"7. You will inform us if you are willing to follow these orders. If your decision is negative, we will try to arrange your evacuation by Lysander, and instructions will be sent you as to disposition of other personnel with you."

This matter is brought up under this head as indicating the feeling of an American officer in the field. The briefing of Major Smith was not done by any of the personnel at this headquarters, nor are we informed as to what his briefing was. For this reason we have felt it wise to give him the instructions as set forth in the above telegram. As he is taking a position, which in our opinion is contrary to OSS directives and objectives, I request that Regimental Headquarters decision be sent in regard to the proposed cable being set up for Smith as similar occurrences may come up from time to time.

5. This letter is being forwarded by pouch tonight and we request that you wire us your decisions. The position with reference to both points requires prompt and immediate action.

WILLIAM G. SUHLING, JR.
Major, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 2677th Regt OSS 2
Ops & Tng 1
S.I. 1
File 1

- 3 -

U.S. SECRET

U.S. SECRET**APPENDIX "B"**

Cable to Glavin, Caserta from Ehrlich, Siena, 1962
13 November, 1944

"I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT A VERBAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE BETWEEN MAJOR KOCH AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN NAPLES BY WHICH AGREEMENT OSS WOULD TRANSMIT TO THE FIELD PARTY MESSAGES AND RECEIVE THEIR INCOMING MESSAGES IN RETURN FOR THE BEST AVAILABLE AGENTS FROM THEIR MEMBERSHIP. THE ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING TO SEND THESE MESSAGES IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS DESIGNATED SPECIFICALLY IS QUESTIONED BY US. WE CAN SEE NO IMPROPRIETY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S SENDING INSTRUCTIONS IF THAT PARTY IS NOT NAMED. THE WORK BEING DONE BY THE COMMUNIST AGENTS IS EXCELLENT. WE RECOMMEND THAT OSS CONTINUE TO SEND THESE MESSAGES IF THEY DO NOT RUN ALONG PARTY LINES. A RULING BY REGIMENT IN THIS MATTER IS REQUESTED."

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APPENDIX "C"

Cable to Suhling, Siena, From Davis and Madden
for Glavin, Caserta, #482
14 November, 1944

"REFER YOUR NR. 359. WE HAVE TALKED OVER THE SITUATION WITH LT. GOFF AND HE TELLS US THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SERVICED BY HIM, AN AGREEMENT ORIGINALLY CONTRACTED BY PACATTE. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT NO MESSAGES WHICH ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND DESIGNED TO BUILD UP THE COMMUNIST PARTY OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY SHOULD BE SENT TO THE FIELD BY US. NO PARTY OR POLITICAL MOVEMENT SHOULD BE DEVELOPED THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTATION OF OSS. THE TRANSMISSION OF CABLES CONCERNING MILITARY MATTERS OR CABLES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO COORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR BUILD MORALE FOR THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ANOTHER MATTER AND WE CANNOT SEE ANY OBJECTION TO THE SENDING OF SUCH MESSAGES. WE AGREE, IN THIS REGARD, WITH THE VIEWS WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED IN YOUR CABLE 359. THE POLICING OF THESE MESSAGES AND THOSE TRANSMITTED FOR THE SOCIALISTS WITH WHOM LT. GOFF DECLARES THAT WE HAVE A SIMILAR AGREEMENT IS LEFT TO YOU. WE REQUEST THAT YOU SEND TO US HERE A COMPLETE FILE OF PAST MESSAGES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSMITTED FOR OUR INFORMATION AND OUR FILES. WE EXPECT THAT YOU WILL PASS ON THE PROPRIETY OF ANY FUTURE MESSAGES BUT WE WILL GLADLY GIVE YOU OUR OPINION UPON ANY CONCERNING WHICH YOU HAVE ANY DOUBT."

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APPENDIX "D"

To Suhling, Siena from Davis, Caserta, #606
16 November, 1944

"WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER IN REGARD TO THE COMMUNIST AGENTS OF 10 NOVEMBER; IN OUR OPINION THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU HAVE QUESTIONED FROM ERCOLI DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OSS POLICY OF NON-PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS. THE COMMUNISTS ARE MERELY URGED BY ERCOLI TO RENEW THE JOINT MILITARY EFFORT WITH ALL THOSE WHO FIGHT AGAINST NAZI-ISM."

U.S. SECRET**APPENDIX "E"**

**HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 612**

16 April 1946

**Major Wm. G. Suhling, Jr.
Commanding Officer
Company D**

1. Upon an informal report made to this Headquarters, an examination has been made of all cable traffic transmitted over the Goff circuits to determine whether party messages were being transmitted from Rome north or return.

2. Attached is a copy of extracts made from this traffic, which was submitted for opinion to U.S., G-2 (CI). We have been advised that no punitive action is recommended but emphasized was the necessity for implementing orders from G-2 (CI), to evacuate certain officers previously listed to you, on or before "Victory in Italy" Day.

3. The question of promotions of the officers involved, for your information, has been referred to higher OSS headquarters.

4. You are requested to institute rigid check on all traffic on these circuits to prevent transmission of traffic not concerned with our operations against the enemy.

**EDWARD J.F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding**

Attachment: 1

U.S. SECRET

• U.S. SECRET •

• April 1946

SUBJECT: Extracts from cable traffic of GOFF chain.

TO : Executive Officer, 2877th Regt., OSS (Prov), APO
512, U. S. Army.

1. The following are translations of cables sent in the Italian language through stations of the GOFF chain. The stations through which the messages were transmitted, the cable numbers and their respective dates are indicated and underscored. Very little outgoing traffic dealing with the subject of these cables was found.

From ODETTE

No. 4 11 March 1945

"Message for PALMIRO TOGLIATTI. Rome. Message No. 5. 22 February. The great Soviet victory has facilitated the reactivation of the Partisan movement and also of the masses. Strike at O.M. Brescia; elsewhere widespread unrest; successful coups de main on the part of the SAP. Good resistance to the mopping-up operations of Biella, Val Sesia, and Val Dossola; a new influx of forces in the Partisan movement. Germans and Fascists are starting again attempts at compromise. Our intention is surrender or death. Our position for transforming the Partisan Formations into regular military units have been accepted in the most essential points. We can realize it. We have improved the unitarian work with the Socialists. We are trying to seal our relations with the Christian Democrats. The unity with the CLNAI has been strengthened. Signed GALLO."

No. 8 16 March 1945

(Same as No. 236 from MELE).

No. 9 16 March 1945

"Message No. 7 for ERCOLI. Eugenio Curien, founder, animator and leader of the Youth Front was assassinated in the street in the city of Milan by the Fascists on Saturday, 24 February. In his name the Patriot youth tighten their ranks and intensify the fight for liberation to save the honor of their country and the future of the youth of new Italy. Signed GALLO."

No. 10 16 March 1945

"Message No. 8 for ERCOLI. An agreement was concluded at Turin between the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. Realizing that there

- 1 - U.S. SECRET

U.S. SECRET

is a community of interests among the masses of people concerning the surrection, spuration and reconstruction with a mutual respect for everyone's political and religious convictions, we agreed on periodic consultations and on united action within the CIA for the strengthening of syndical unity. We are trying to overcome opposition to obtain a similar agreement in the Central Committee. Signed GALLO."

No. 32 29 March 1946

"To ERCOLI. Message No. 9. Some elements of minor responsibility of the Veneto C. L. evidence a trend to advance a proposal at the moment of liberation which would take away the authority from the central government and would lead toward secession. We are reacting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the people, could be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition. Signed GALLO."

To MELE

No. 91 28 February 1946

"For the Comando Unico. We have seen MARI and he is well."

No. 136 31 March 1946

"Ref. your 278. MARIO GUE-MANI and PAOLO FABRI, representatives Socialist Party Bologna, left our lines in the middle of February to return to their point of origin. Nothing has been heard from them since."

From MELE

No. 210 5 March 1946

"To his Excellency SCOCCIMARCO, Minister for Occupied Italy. The representative of the Democrazia Cristiana has decided (garble) on a separation of the Patriot forces into formations of single parties; in so doing they would break the present unity. The representatives of the Action Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party oppose such a proposition which is against the unitarian principle, and they call for your urgent intervention in regard to the Democrazia Cristiana and instructions on the subject. Such a question is of extremely urgent nature due to the developments of the military situation. For the Action Party, SERGIO; for the Socialist Party, GIORGIO; for the Communist Party, MARIO."

No. 219 5 March 1946

(Same as No. 4 from ODETTE, except that "message No. 5" was omitted)

U.S. SECRET

U.S. SECRET

No. 222 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. The workers, men and women, wish to have news of comrade Giuseppe Fassarenti (or Giuseppe Massarenti) who was disposed of by Mussolini nine years ago by internment in the asylum of the Torre Maria della Pista in Rome. The workers take interest in his status and say they will furnish him full financial means for moral assistance. The workers will take the responsibility of reimbursing the amount necessary (garble) comfortable living. Assure him that the proletariat will continue to fight the hated enemy and will be waiting for him when the liberation is completed. Signed BERTI (rest garbled)."

No. 223 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. The "Giunta of Intesa" in order to strengthen unity of action and to create, in the common fight, the premises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class, has decided to promote a general subscription in favor of the "Avanti" and "Unita", to begin the publication of a common chain of Marxist and Leninist articles, and to publish a bulletin of proletarian unity. This press communique was approved at the meeting of the Socialist-Communist Committee on 26 January. Signed GALLO."

No. 224 8 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. We do not understand ERCOLI's message concerning the delay concerning the realization of the "Commando Unico" in the unacceptable form which would obstruct our unitarian work. The "Commando Unico" was realized according to the decision preceding the departure of NELLO and pointed out in the WILSON letter. On the 1st of January we made the proposal to transform the Partisan Formations into regular units of the Italian Army; dissolution of the Partisan Commands; strict hierarchical subordination; and conferring of military rank. Signed GALLO. 3 February 1945"

No. 236 15 March 1945

"Message No. 6 to ERCOLI. ETTORE has arrived. Taking the pretence of a banal incident which arose between himself and the representative of the Partito d'Azione in the Command, the General handed in his resignation. He demands exclusive military command without interference from the GENAI, feeling himself to be responsible in the first place to the Allies and CASATI from whom he pretends to have received the appointment. We are making efforts to effect a conciliation but this is rendered difficult due to the fact that the General has no sympathy nor comprehension whatsoever of the Partisan movement and problems, and also because of his scepticism and fundamental hostility toward the organization of the Patriots and of the masses for national insurrection. The Commanding General of Piemonte, because of his better comprehension of the Partisan movement, would fill the post of Commanding General better, and greater power could be granted to him since he has full confidence of Patriots. GALLO. This message is for ERCOLI. 1 March 1945."

- 3 - U.S. SECRET

U.S. SECRET

no. 237 18 March 1946

(Same as No. 9 from ODEITE except for addition of date "1 March 1946" at end of message and omission of "message No. 7". There is also another message bearing same MMLN number containing purely operational information).

No. 258 21 March 1946

(Same as No. 10 from ODEITE except that "message No. 8", was omitted).

No. 263 23 March 1946

"We request you to transmit to the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro for Bat Federterra, Rome. The reconstruction of Federterra in the Province of Bologna meets with great enthusiasm from all interested categories, joined together in a single brotherhood. Category committees being formed with dispatch. We pledge ourselves that no bit of land will be left untitled. We request authorization to put out in your name a circular for the workers of the Province of Federterra. The necessity is strongly felt of inviting these workers to fight together with their brothers of Bologna for defense of their produce and to bring to an end all dissent between categories of workers. Greetings for the Provisional Secretariat. BENT1. Repeated GUNTY. 10 March 1946."

No. 278 29 March 1946.

"We receive from CUMER for SOCCIMARCO. We urge also in the name of the Communist Party for your authoritative intervention with the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party and Allied Command for the immediate return of comrade PAOLO whose presence in our region is indispensable. Signed Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Emilia and Romagna."

To MARINA

No. 130 11 February 1945

"For TONY. Soon as possible establish contact direct with GALLO...."
(rest of message deals with operations).

No. 153 28 February 1946

"For GALLO. Am in agreement with your line for the realization of a Unified Command and with your proposal for unity within the army of the Partisan movement. Signed ERCOLI. 26 February 1946."

From MARINA

No. 500 16 February 1945

"Message from TONY. I am waiting the drop of the WT BERNARDI. Reception field at sheet 55,4475. On this zone two planes can drop at one time. Delegation of the Communist Party requests printing material to replace that which was in the sack captured by the Germans on the day of my drop."

U.S. SECRET

No. 51921 February 1945

"From the CLN Delegation of Piemonte. The CLN of Piemonte expresses its admiration for the Soviet Armies victoriously engaged in the enormous struggle for the liberation of the populations oppressed by the Italian Fascist tyranny. It send its brotherly greeting to the people and the armies of the Soviet Union for the heroism from which the Italian People draw a new enthusiasm and a new drive for the final battle."

No. 52521 February 1945

(Same as No. 223 from MELE).

No. 52622 February 1945

(Same as No. 224 from MELE).

No. 50517 March 1945

"The Questura from the Partito d'Azione and the Municipal Services from the Socialists and Communists. An excellent impression was made on the local CLN by your generous offers of medicines for a reorganization of Medical Services. End of political report."

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HEADQUARTERS
207TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV)
APO 612

25 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Traffic Over Circuits to Communist Party Partisan Bands
TO : The Director, OSS, Washington

1. Reference Cable 715(4), Paris to Caserta (Paris to Washington 1341(4)), at Appendix A. Verbal report was made to Mr. Shephardson at Caserta and as requested by him a written report is submitted herewith.

2. In support of military operations, this headquarters has been in contact with Partisan Bands of all political leanings, among them the Communist brigades. These operations are dual in character, being for the most part SO but yielding not inconsiderable SI material. It is pointed out that SI and SO activity is carried on with all bands with which OSS is in contact, irrespective of whether our agents in contact are working for our SI or SO Branch.

a. All of these North Italy operations have been conducted under the operational and administrative control of Company D of the Regiment and coordinated with the appropriate military headquarters, 15th Army Group.

3. Regimental Headquarters on 13 Nov 44 received Signal #389, Siena to Caserta, Suhling (Major Wm. G. Suhling, C.O. of Co. D) to Glavin (Colonel E.J.F. Glavin, C.O. of the Regiment), copy at Appendix B.

a. Jurisdiction over the problem posed involved two staff sections. Since the contacts with the specific Communist bands were through the SO Branch via the circuits established by Lt. Irving Geff, on the operational side, staff jurisdiction rested with Col. Wm. P. Davis, then Regimental Operations and Training Officer. In view of the basic problem involved, the matter also required coordination by the Intelligence Officer and Chief of SI Branch. At the time, Lt. Col. Wm. P. Maddox was both Acting Intelligence Officer and Chief of SI.

b. Upon the direction of Col. Glavin, Col. Davis, Col. Maddox and Lt. Col. (then Maj.) H.N. Newhouse investigated the matter. Lt. Geff told this group that the original agreement had been made by Maj. (then Capt.) Andre Facette, one time Operations Officer of Company D, at that time commanded by Col. Alfred D. Reutershan. Lt. Geff was given specific instructions by Col. Maddox and Newhouse never to transmit messages not clearly operational in character without specific permission from his Commander (Major Suhling), to police carefully all his traffic and at no time to permit OSS circuits to be used as an instrument of propaganda for party activity.

c. Further, in acting upon signal at Appendix B, signal #389, Caserta to Siena, from Davis and Maddox for Glavin to Suhling, copy at Appendix C, was dispatched.

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4. On the same date, 10 Nov 44, Regimental Headquarters received Signal 858, Siena to Caserta, Suhling to Glavin, at Appendix A.

a. Reply to this query was made in Signal 407, Caserta to Siena, Davis for Glavin to Suhling, at Appendix A.

5. Subsequently, a letter was received by Regimental Headquarters from Major Suhling dated 10 Nov 44, subject: Communist Agents, copy at Appendix A.

a. Since the problem posed by para. 4 of this letter had already been submitted (Appendix B) and answered (Appendix C), a signal was sent in reply to the remaining question posed by para. 5, 508, Caserta to Siena, Davis and Maddox to Suhling, copy at Appendix A.

6. Subsequently there was interest shown by AFHQ G-2 (CI) through OIC in certain of our officer personnel. Special censorship was instituted on all outgoing and incoming mail for Lt. Michael Jiminez, 30 Jan 45, and our X-2 Branch was informed spot checks had revealed his wife was forwarding Communist literature to him from the U.S.

a. Similar special mail censorship was instituted on various dates during March by G-2 (CI) for Lt. Geff, Lt. Vincent Lesowski, Lt. Irving Fajans and Lt. Milton Wolff.

7. Late in March, Col. Earle B. Nichols, Head of AFHQ G-2, CI, informed Maj. Graham Erdwurm, Chief of X-2 MEDTO, that the theater wished OSS to act quickly on the evacuation of certain officers immediately after VI (Victory in Italy) Day. The officers listed were Lt. Geff, Lt. Lesowski, Lt. Jiminez, Lt. Wolff and Lt. Fajans. It was made clear that while the theater authorities understood our use of these men, it was believed best to return them to the States as soon as their assignments were completed or if this condition did not arise prior to cessation of hostilities in Italy, immediately thereafter.

a. This ruling was communicated to certain key personnel so that it would be implemented without delay.

8. To avoid discussion, plans for Austria and North Italy which list all of the men cited in para. 5 above were not altered to delete their names. Since some of these teams were to serve under the direction of Mr. Vincent J. Scamperino, Chief of Italian Division 81, it was deemed necessary to acquaint him of the decision by AFHQ.

a. This was done by the Executive Officer on 30 Mar 45 when Mr. Scamperino passed through Caserta enroute from Rome to Paris. When informed, Mr. Scamperino commented on the wisdom of the decision and in passing expressed his belief that Lt. Geff was transmitting messages for the Communist Party in Rome to North Italian Communist brigades over OSS circuits. Questioned further on the subject, Mr. Scamperino said he was sure this was so. He was asked to report back to headquarters on his return from Paris as to the matter might be explored thoroughly.

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9. Since the statement, if true, indicated a violation of the orders cited in para. 8(b) above, given to Lt. Geff in November, an order was laid before Col. Russell B. Livermore, then Acting Commander. (Col. Glavin had left the theater on temporary duty for AFSA - London) and with his consent, the promotions of Lt. Geff and Lt. Lessewski took place in process, were temporarily suspended.

10. Communications Branch was requested to bring to Headquarters as quickly and quietly as possible, the original message center files of all the Geff circuits.

a. This was done and the files (in Italian language) were turned over to Mr. Scamperine who was asked to cull out the "messages for the Communist Party" transmitted by Lt. Geff.

11. At Appendix H is letter, dated 9 April 45, subject, "Extracts from Cable Traffic of GOFF Chain", which was submitted by Mr. Scamperine in response to this request.

a. Mr. Scamperine pointed out that these messages required interpretation since their significance was apparent only when related to the Party's policy and his interpretation as digested by Lt. Harry Harper of the Political Division, SI Reports Section, this Headquarters is at Appendix I.

12. The record was referred to Chief X-3, for opinion. Copy of his recommendation is at Appendix J.

a. In view of the expressed interest of Col. Nichols in this personnel, Appendix H was shown to him and an informal opinion was requested. His recommendation is at Appendix K.

13. On 18 April 45, an order, copy at Appendix L was dispatched to the Commander of Company D by Col. Glavin covering the subject.

14. On the same date, signal 1080(4), Caserta to Paris, (Caserta to Washington 4425(4)) at Appendix M was dispatched informing the Director and requesting advice.

15. In response to the inquiry in para one of Appendix A, it is pointed out that action on this matter was in fact expedited and communicated to higher headquarters as soon as practicable.

16. For the record, this Headquarters requested a written memorandum on the performance of the cited officers from their immediate superior. This has been received from Maj. Judson B. Smith, Operations Officer, Co. The and Chief SO. See letter dated 18 April, subject: "Report on Lt. Irving Geff, Lt. Vincent Lessewski, Lt. Irving Fajans and Lt. Milton Wolff, at Appendix N.

17. The above and all the appendices tabulated herein were referred to Chief, SI, and Chief, X-3, for comment. Chief X-3 (Major Abraham) states "the entire report is factually correct insofar as I am acquainted with the case." Colonel Maddox for SI submitted a memorandum at Appendix O.

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18. Lt. Lesewski visited Regimental Headquarters at 22 hours and in the course of his visit asked the Executive Officer to be made to field, informally, why his and Lt. Carl's promotions had not been higher. He was given an oral review of the country directed at the situation on the Goff circuits and made a statement on the subject to the Executive Officer.

19. Report and comment on the matter was taken up at the Commanding Officer of Company D (Major Sullivan). This was done as he had arrived at Regimental Headquarters but will be transmitted, with comment, for addition to this record as Appendix G.

20. Forwarded:

Norman H. Kunkin, Lt Col. AC
Executive Officer

For and in the absence of:

EDWARD J. F. GRANT
Colonel Infantry
Commanding

Attachments: Appendix A to P, inclusive

Copy #1 - The Director, OSS Washington
#2 - Commanding Officer, Company D
#3 - Headquarters Executive File

SECRET

267
SECRET
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: PARIS

ACTION:

D. T. C. FROM

INFORMATION

715(1)

TO GLAVIN ONLY CASERTA INFO BUXTON CHESTON AND PUTZKE ONLY
 WASHINGTON # 1347 (L) FROM 109, TRIANGLE
 RELAY # 160

YOUR 1020(1)

1. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ALL FACTS OF THIS MATTER WERE NOT REPORTED TO ME BEFORE THIS DAY. WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND THAT I APPEARED BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE INQUIRING INTO LOYALTY OF AMERICAN OFFICERS WHO WERE CHARGED WITH HAVING BEEN MEMBERS OF THAT PARTY. RELYING UPON MY OWN OBSERVATIONS AS WELL AS AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM YOUR THEATRE, I SINCERELY DEFENDED THESE MEN AND TESTIFIED AS TO THEIR LOYALTY AND THEIR EFFICIENT SERVICE. IF YOU WOULD TO HAVE FULL INFORMATION INCLUDING REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES, WHO HAD CHARGE OF THE INQUIRIES, ETC. WITH RESPECT TO MESSAGES TO WHICH YOU REFER, GIVE ME REASON FOR BELIEF THEY WERE PASSED, WHAT THEY STATED, TO WHOM THEY WERE SENT AND WHO WAS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM.
2. THIS NOT MATTER WHICH CAN BE HANDLED BY CABLE. IF POSSIBLE, GIVE WRITTEN STATEMENTS TO SHEPARDSON. IF NOT POSSIBLE, POUCH DIRECT TO ME IN WASHINGTON.

SECRET

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden

RECEIVED 1216
 DELIVERED 1223

HEADQUARTERS

2677th REGIMENT OSS (PROV)

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM (PARAPHRASE COPY)

Date 13 November 1944

From: SIENKA

To: Action: EG

Precedence:

Priority:

Information: PG 01 25 PAGES

Nr. 4352

GLAVIN FROM SUHLING

I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT MAJ. KOCH MADE A VERBAL AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN NAPLES THAT OSS WOULD FORWARD PARTY MESSAGES TO THE FIELD AND RECEIVE INCOMING MESSAGES IN RETURN FOR THE BEST AGENTS WHO ARE AVAILABLE FROM PARTY MEMBERS. WE QUESTION THE ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING TO SEND MESSAGES IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS SPECIFICALLY NAMED. THE COMMUNIST AGENTS ARE DOING FINE WORK. IT WOULD BE A WHACK ON THE HEAD TO REFUSE NOW IF AGREEMENT WAS MADE. RECOMMEND THAT WE GO ON SENDING MESSAGES IF THEY DO NOT RUN ALONG PARTY LINES. REGIMENTAL RULING ON THIS MATTER IS REQUESTED.

Verbatim copy of original

2077
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO: SIENA

CONFIRMATION: WPM

DATE OF FILING: 16 December 1946
INFORMATION: FROM HQ WPM FILED IN

#492.

FROM DAVIS AND MADDOX FOR GLAVIN TO BURLING.

HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR 359 WITH GOFF WHO STATES HE HAS BEEN ADVISING THIS AGREEMENT ORIGINALLY MADE BY PACATTE. NO MESSAGES DESIGNED TO BUILD UP THIS, OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED BY US. WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO MESSAGES DESIGNED TO BUILD MORALE FOR THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO COORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITY BUT ONE MUST NOT BE AN INSTRUMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ANY POLITICAL MOVEMENT OR PARTY. WE ARE IN AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD WITH CABLE 359, IN WHICH YOU EXPRESS SIMILAR VIEWS. UP TO YOU TO POLICE THESE MESSAGES AND THOSE TRANSMITTED FOR SOCIALISTS WITH WHOM GOFF STATES WE HAVE SAME AGREEMENT. PLEASE SEND FOR OUR INFORMATION AND FILE ALL PAST MESSAGES ALREADY TRANSMITTED. WE WILL BE GLAD TO GIVE YOU OUR JUDGMENT ON THE PROPRIETY OF ANY MESSAGES BUT EXPECT YOU TO PASS ON FUTURE MESSAGES.

CABLE NR.:

Verbatim copy of original

"The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden."

HEADQUARTERS

2677th REGIMENT OSS (PROV)

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM
(PARAPHRASE COPY)

Date 13 NOVEMBER 1944

From: BIRMA

Precedence

To: WFO

Information

Nr. #389

GLAVIN FROM SUNLING

1. THE FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF 2 REGIMENTS OF NOVEMBER 13TH
MAJ. SMITH (MERCURY):

A. IF RUSSIANS MOVING FROM REGION AND WE GIVE THEM IMMEDIATELY
WE CAN CREATE HAVOC WITH ENEMY TRAFFIC.

B. ALL OSS ITALIAN AGENTS THIS REGION MUST BE UNDER MY COMMAND
UNION OF OSSPO AND CARIBALDINI PREVENTED BY CHINESE AGENTS BY OUR
AGENTS. UNLESS THESE AGENTS ARE PLACED UNDER MY COMMAND AND ARE
TOLD OF SUCH AT ONCE, AND I AM CONSULTED ABOUT THE ENTRY OF ALL
OSS PERSONNEL THIS REGION, MY MISSION IS COMING OUT QUICKLY.

2. AS SMITH'S BRIEFING IS NOT KNOWN HERE, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS
PROPOSED BY US:

A. WINTER DROPS WILL BE MINIMUM AMOUNT TO IDEAL PARTIAL.
THUS THEY SHOULD BE ADVISED TO ATTRACT AS LITTLE ATTENTION AS IS
POSSIBLE. DO NOT ASK FOR MOR-UPS.

B. ANY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS RE YOUR BUTTER AND REPAIRS.
THESE ARE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) GET YOURSELF UP EARLY IN ORDER TO BE PRESENT AT
AT DROPS.

(2) SUPERVISE DISTRIBUTION JOINTLY WITH SERGEANT SMITH

HEADQUARTERS

2677TH REGIMENT OSS (PROV)

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM (PARAPHRASE COPY)

Date
From:

To:

Nr.

Precedence:

Information

(3) TELL PARTISANS OF POLICY AGAINST HENRY ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL RECEIVE FROM US.

(4) COLLECT AND SEND TO US ALL INTELLIGENCE.

(5) REPORT ON OUR AGENTS' POLITICAL ACTIVITY, BUT DO NOT PARTICIPATE OR INTERFERE WITH PARTISAN OR AGENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

(6) RECEIVE AND AID INCOMING TEAMS. YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF ALL OSS AND NUMBER ONE SF TEAMS THAT ARE ENTERING. YOU WILL NOT ASSUME COMMAND OF THEM NOR OF THE TEAMS ALREADY THERE. YOUR MISSION IS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES AND FOR LIAISON AND ADVICE TO THE PARTISANS, AND NOT TO COMMAND.

(7) IF YOU ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT WE WILL ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE YOU BY LYSANER, AND WILL DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS RE THE DISPOSITION OF OTHERS WITH YOU.

8. WE FEEL THAT THE STAND OF SMITH IS CONTRARY TO OSS INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. SINCE SIMILAR OCCURRENCES MIGHT ARISE, WE REQUEST A REGIMENTAL DECISION ON THE PROPOSED MESSAGE. ON 10 NOVEMBER 1944 OF PART OF LETTER FOUNDED.

2471 HQ. CO OUTCOMING MESSAGE FORM

Date: 14 NOVEMBER 1964

To: SAC, USA

Classification: UFD

Review

Priority

Information

14 NOV 1964

#497

DATA FOR OLIVER TO SURVIVE. IMPROVE YOUR INFO.

1. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO FIND OUT MUCH OF INTEREST
GIVEN TO SMITH BECAUSE WE CAN'T FIND HIS RECORDS BUT WE
PRESUME HE MUST HAVE BEEN DELETED BY MAJOR SMITH.

2. YOUR PROPOSED ANSWER APPEARS ENTIRELY UNSATISFACTORY.
THIS HEADQUARTERS RELIES ON YOUR JUDGMENT AND WILL BACK
YOUR DECISIONS IN ANY CONTROVERSIAL MATTERS SINCE AS THIS OFFICE
YOU'RE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OSS OPERATIONS IN THE AREA OF THE
ACTION.

Originator's Initials

Serial No.

Cable No.

MESSAGE CENTER USE ONLY

Authenticated

Routing

TO

U.S. SECRET
 COMPANY D
 2677TH REGIMENT CDS (PROVINCIAL)
 APO 531, U. S. ARMY

10 November 1944

SUBJECT: Communist Agents.

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Regt CDS (Prov),
APO 531, U. S. Army.

1. The question of the use of OSS radio facilities by the Communist Party in Italy has come up for discussion by Lt. Lescow and myself. Coincidental therewith, a cable has been received from the field expressing concern with Communist activities. This cable is discussed below as to separate items, though each ties in with the other.

2. The first question, namely the use of OSS radio facilities, is as follows: I am informed that Major Koch made a verbal agreement with the Communist Party in Naples that we, OSS, would forward to the field all messages which the Communist Party wished to send and would handle all incoming messages received from the field, we retaining copies of such messages in our files, and of course informing the Communist Party of all messages. This agreement was made in return for the Communist Party making available to OSS the best agents available from their membership. The following message (#45 to Marina) was sent out on 8 November:

"From Ercoli, 1 November 1944: We call the attention of all the organizations of the party and of all the comrades to our duties at the present moment. The declarations of the leaders of the United Nations during and after the meetings at Quebec and Moscow have underlined the fact that we are in the last months of the war. Churchill said the war might even be ended before Christmas but might last until spring. It is evident that these declarations impose upon all combatants against the Hitlerian Germany the duty of immediate action and greatest effort to reduce to a minimum and make victory as soon as possible. Communists and Italian Patriots must multiply their activities in this moment. If we succeed in forcing the Germans to abandon our country quickly it would be a great victory for us and all the forces of liberty. Collect all your energies, plunge yourselves into the struggle with greater decisions, conscious of the fact that it will be the last decisive effort. Strengthen your battle lines and extend it in all manners and forms. Do not give any rest to the Germans and to the Fascists. Attack them with all weapons. Destroy them, kill them. Unleash all possible revolts among the masses in the occupied regions. Forward, for the most rapid complete liberation of our country."

3. We question the propriety as well as the advisability of continuing to allow the Communist Party to send messages to the field in order the Communist Party is specifically mentioned by name. We see no propriety in allowing them to send any instructions or messages to the field provided such messages and instructions do not specifically refer to the Communist Party. The work the Communist agents are doing for us is

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U.S. SECRET

excellent in every respect. If an agreement was made with the Communist Party stating that they would be allowed to send and receive messages through us, it would be a breach of faith for us to at this date refuse to continue the terms of our agreement. In my opinion they would be justified in canceling the work of their chains for and with us if we made such a breach of faith. In view of the above, it is my recommendation that we continue to send messages, but only provided they do not run along party lines. I request that Regimental Headquarters give me the benefit of a ruling on this matter.

4. The following cables were received from Major Smith on 9 November:

(#4 from Mercury) "Happy to hear Hall all right. Give him all possible support. According to unconfirmed reports, Russians withdrawing from Ampezzo Vallesio Tolmezzo and have left San Francesco. Will move to area of Sauris to receive daylight drop if this is true. It is rumored that reason for withdrawal is to meet threat of Jugland Partisans to Italian border. If this is true and we receive arms at once, we will be able to raise hell with German traffic on route Seneone Pontebba."

(#5 from Mercury) "Nicholson (a British officer) and myself liaising perfectly. Recent events necessitates the placing of all OSS Italian agents this area under my command. A continuous spreading of communist propaganda by our agents and others prevents complete union between OSQFPO and Garibaldini. OSQFPO is non-political. Unless these agents are placed under my command and informed of such immediately and I be consulted about entry of all OSS personnel to this area, my mission is coming out pronto."

We propose answering these two messages with the following:

"Re your Number 4, situation is as follows: Regular resupply to Partisans in desired quantities cannot be expected during winter months. The proposed mass drops of about 40 tons may be expected not oftener than once per month and probably less often. Purpose mass drops is to provide food, clothing and sufficient ammunition to allow Partisans to protect themselves throughout winter months. Drops are not expected to provide sufficient supplies for any offensive actions. In view of above, Partisans should attract as little attention from the enemy as possible, under no circumstances inviting mopping-up operations. You will instruct Partisans to above effect. You will be advised of any change in these instructions.

"Re your Number 5. Any previous instructions as to your duties are herewith rescinded. Your instructions are:

"1. To establish yourself at such suitable location in relation to mass dropping ground D Z _____ as will enable you to be present at the drops.

"2. To supervise the fair distribution of these supplies jointly with British officer present according to instructions sent from here and No. 1 Special Force.

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U.S. SECRET

"3. To inform the Partisans of policy to be followed against the enemy according to instructions you will receive from us.

"4. To collect and pass on to this headquarters all intelligence of whatever nature.

"5. To report any political activity by our agents, but you will not participate in nor interfere with, any political actions of either the Partisans nor our agents.

"6. To receive and assist any teams coming into your area. To this and you will be informed of the entry into your area of both OSS and the 1st Special Force teams, but you will not take command of them nor of those already there. Your ~~purpose~~ is for liaison purposes and advice to the Partisans, and not to command.

"7. You will inform us if you are willing to follow these orders. If your decision is negative, we will try to arrange your evacuation by Lysander, and instructions will be sent you as to disposition of other personnel with you."

This matter is brought up under this head as indicating the feeling of an American officer in the field. The briefing of Major Smith was not done by any of the personnel at this headquarters, nor are we informed as to what his briefing was. For this reason we have felt it wise to give him the instructions as set forth in the above telegram. As he is taking a position, which in our opinion is contrary to OSS directives and objectives, I request that Regimental Headquarters decision be sent in regard to the proposed cable being set up for Smith as similar occurrences may come up from time to time.

5. This letter is being forwarded by pouch tonight and we request that you wire us your decisions. The position with reference to both points requires prompt and immediate action.

WILLIAM G. SURLING, JR.
Major, Infantry
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 2677th Regt OSS 2
Ops & Tng 1
S.I. 1
File 1

U.S. SECRET

SECRET

2677 REGT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO SIENA

DATE:

15 NOVEMBER 1944

CONFIRMATION

WPM

INFORMATION:

IS, WFO, DIA, FBI

#505

DAVIS AND MADDOX TO SUHLING.

CONCERNING YOUR NOV. 10 LETTER ON COMMUNIST AGENTS. IN OUR OPINION
THE SPECIFIC MESSAGE IN QUESTION FROM ERCOLI DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OUR
POLICY OF NOT PARTICIPATING IN POLITICS. ERCOLI IS SIMPLY CALLING UPON
THE COMMUNISTS TO RENEW JOINT MILITARY EFFORT WITH ALL FIGHTING NATIONS.

SECRET

CABLE NR.: C-1518/01

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
287TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 612

9 April 1945

SUBJECT: Extracts from cable traffic of GOFF chain.

TO : Executive Officer, 287th Regt., OSS (Prov), APO
612, U. S. Army.

1. The following are translations of cables sent in the Italian language through stations of the GOFF chain. The stations through which the messages were transmitted, the cable numbers and their respective dates are indented and underlined. Very little outgoing traffic dealing with the subject of these cables was found.

FROM ODETTE

No. 4 11 March 1945

"Message for PALMIRO TOLLIATTI. Home. Message No. 3. 22 February. The great Soviet victory has facilitated the reactivation of the Partisan movement and also of the masses. Strike at O. M. Brescia; elsewhere widespread unrest; successful coups de main on the part of the SAP. Good resistance to the mop-up operations of Biella, Val Sesia, and Val D'Aosta; a new influx of forces in the Partisan movement. Germans and Fascists are starting again attempts at compromise. Our intimation is surrender or death. Our position for transforming the Partisan Formations into regular military units have been accepted in the most essential points. We can realize it. We have improved the unitarian work with the Socialists. We are trying to seal our relations with the Christian Democrats. The unity with the CINAI has been strengthened. Signed GALLO."

No. 8 16 March 1945

(Same as No. 236 from MELLE).

No. 9 16 March 1945

"Message No. 7 for ERCOLI. Eugenio Curcio, founder, animator and leader of the Youth Front was assassinated in the street in the city of Milan by the Fascists on Saturday, 24 February. In his name the Patriot youth tighten their ranks and intensify

SECRET

- 1 -

SECRET

the fight for liberation to save the honor of their country and the future of the youth of new Italy. Signed GALLO."

No. 10 16 March 1944

"Message No. 8 for ERCOLI. An agreement was concluded at Turin between the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. Realizing that there is a community of interests among the masses of people concerning insurrection, operation and reconstruction with a mutual respect for everyone's political and religious convictions, we agreed on periodic consultations and on united action within the CLN for the strengthening of syndical unity. We are trying to overcome opposition to obtain a similar agreement in the Central Committee. Signed GALLO."

No. 32 29 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. Message No. 9. Some elements of minor responsibility of the Veneto C. L. evidence a trend to advance a proposal at the moment of liberation which would take away the authority from the central government and would lead toward secession. We are reacting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the people, could be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition. Signed GALLO."

To MELE

No. 91 28 February 1945

"For the Comando Unico. We have seen MARIO and he is well."

No. 136 31 March 1945

"Ref. your 278. MARIO GUERMANI and PAOLO FAERI, representatives Socialist Party Bologna, left our lines in the middle of February to return to their point of origin. Nothing has been heard from them since."

From MELE

No. 216 5 March 1945

"To his Excellency SCOCCIMARRO, Minister for Occupied Italy. The representative of the Democrazia Cristiana has decided (garble) on a separation of the Patriot forces into formations of single parties; in so doing they would break the present unity. The representatives of the Action Party, the Socialist

SECRET

SECRET

Party and the Communist Party oppose such a proposition which is against the unitarian principle, and they call for your urgent intervention in regard to the Democrazia Cristiana, and instructions on the subject. Such a question is of extremely urgent nature due to the developments of the military situation. For the Action Party, ERGIO; for the Socialist Party, GIORGIO; for the Communist Party, MARIO."

No. 219 5 March 1945

(Same as No. 4 from ODETTE, except that "message No. 5" was omitted.)

No. 222 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. The workers, men and women, wish to have news of comrade Giuseppe Fassarenti (or Giuseppe Massarenti) who was disposed of by Mussolini nine years ago by internment in the asylum of the Suore Maria della Pietà in Rome. The workers take interest in his status and say they will furnish him full financial means for moral assistance. The workers will take the responsibility of reimbursing the amount necessary (garble) comfortable living. Assure him that the proletariat of Molinella, without political distinction, has continued and will continue to fight the hated enemy and will be waiting for him when the liberation is completed. Signed BERTI (rest garbled)."

No. 223 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. The "Giunta of Intesa" in order to strengthen unity of action and to create, in the common fight, the premises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class, has decided to promote a general subscription in favor of the "Avanti" and "Unità", to begin the publication of a common chain of Marxist and Leninist articles, and to publish a bulletin of proletarian unity. This press communique was approved at the meeting of the Socialist-Communist Committee on 26 January. Signed GALLO."

No. 224 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. We do not understand ERCOLI's message concerning the delay concerning the realization of the "Comando Unico" in the unacceptable form which would obstruct our unitarian work. The "Comando Unico" was realized according to the decision preceding the departure of NULLO and pointed out in the WILSON letter. On the 1st of January we made the proposal to transform the Partisan Formations into regular units of the Italian Army; dissolution of the Partisan Commands; strict hierarchical subordination; and conferring of military rank.

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Signed GALLIO. 3 February 1945."

No. 236 15 March 1945

"Message No. 6 to ERCOLI. ETTORI has arrived. Taking the pretence of a banal incident which arose between himself and the representative of the Partito d'Azione in the Command, the General handed in his resignation. He demands exclusive military command without interference from the CLNAI, feeling himself to be responsible in the first place to the Allies and CASATI from whom he pretends to have received the appointment. We are making efforts to effect a conciliation but this is rendered difficult due to the fact that the General has no sympathy nor comprehension whatsoever of the Partisan movement and problems, and also because of his scepticism and fundamental hostility toward the organization of the Patriots and of the masses for national insurrection. The Commanding General of Piemonte, because of his better comprehension of the Partisan movement, would fill the post of Commanding General better, and greater power could be granted to him since he has full confidence of Patriots. GALLIO. This message is for ERCOLI. 1 March 1945."

No. 237 15 March 1945

(Same as No. 9 from ODETTE except for addition of date "1 March 1945" at end of message and omission of "message No. 7". There is also another message bearing same MMLK number containing purely operational information).

No. 256 21 March 1945

(Same as No. 10 from ODETTE except that "message No. 8", was omitted).

No. 263 23 March 1945

"We request you to transmit to the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro for Bat Federterra, Rome. The reconstruction of Federterra in the Province of Bologna meets with great enthusiasm from all interested categories, joined together in a single brotherhood. Category committees being formed with dispatch. We pledge ourselves that no bit of land will be left untillied. We request authorization to put out in your name a circular for the workers of the Province of Federterra. The necessity is strongly felt of inviting these workers to fight together with their brothers of Bologna for defense of their produce and to bring to an end all dissent between categories of workers. Greetings for the Provisional Secretariat. BUNTY. Repeated BUNTY. 10 March 1945."

SECRET

SECRETNo. 27829 March 1945

"We receive from CUMER for SCOCOTMARNO. We urge also in the name of the Communist Party for your authoritative intervention with the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party and Allied Command for the immediate return of comrade PABLO whose presence in our region is indispensable. Signed Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Emilia and Romagna."

To MARINANo. 13011 February 1945

"For TONY. Soon as possible establish direct contact with GALLO....." (rest of message deals with operations).

No. 15326 February 1945

"For GALLO. Am in agreement with your line for the realization of a Unified Command and with your proposal for unity within the army of the Partisan movement. Signed ERCOLI. 26 February 1945."

From MARINANo. 50016 February 1945

"Message from TONY. I am waiting the drop of the WT HERNARDI. Reception field, at sheet 55,4475. On this zone two planes can drop at one time. Delegation of the Communist Party requests printing material to replace that which was in the sack captured by the Germans on the day of my drop."

No. 51921 February 1945

"From the CLN Delegation of Piemonte. The CLN of Piemonte expresses its admiration for the Soviet Armies victoriously engaged in the enormous struggle for the liberation of the populations oppressed by the Nazi-Fascist tyranny. It sends its brotherly greeting to the peoples and the armies of the Soviet Union for the heroism from which the Italian Patriots draw a new enthusiasm and a new drive for the final battle."

No. 52521 February 1945

(Same as No. 223 from MELE).

SECRET

SECRET

No. 526 22 February 1944

(Same as No. 224 from MOLE).

No. 605 17 March 1944

"The Questura from the Partito d'Azione and the Municipal Services from the Socialists and Communists. An excellent impression was made on the local CLN by your generous offers of medicines for a reorganization of Medical Services. End of political report."

SECRET

TOP SECRET

19 Apr 1 1948

Digest of Memorandum from Vincent J.
Scampering to the Executive Officer,
2877th Regt. GSC (Prov.) on the GOF Chain.

1. It has been a long-standing OSS rule, and indeed a policy of the Theater Commander, to keep outside of Italian political affairs and to lend no aid to any political group. Despite this, it is apparent from the following analysis of cable traffic on the GOF Chain that information of operational interest to the Communist Party in Italy is being transmitted to Communist leaders over OSS communications. In order to appreciate the extent of this misuse of OSS facilities, it is necessary to review briefly the position of the Communists in Italy.
2. The Communist Party, like all other political parties in Italy, has been confronted with the problem of organizing its movement, both in Liberated and Occupied Italy. Under the leadership of three Moscow-trained Communists -- Togliatti, Grieco and Sacco-- it has long been its policy to infiltrate all branches of Italian political and economic life. In the government it plays "possum," waiting for the proper moment when it should strike to seize total power. Communists have succeeded in practically nullifying the Socialist Party by virtue of a pact, and through the Italian Confederation of Labor, now seek to control the labor movement -- thereby the masses --, minimizing the competition of the Christian-Democrats. The Communist plan has been to obtain control by joining with other parties, under the guise of a "united front." Once the unification is effected, the Communists invariably find themselves holding top positions and working astutely to undermine the other members in the so-called "united front." While this work has been proceeding effectively, in Liberated Italy, it has become increasingly important to Togliatti and his colleagues in Rome to know what success the Communists are having in Occupied Italy. It is submitted that some of the following communications have helped to supply this information. Others have pictured for broader consumption the political scene as the Communists would like to have it represented.

A. Message No. 4, 11 March 1948 from Odette to Togliatti,
signed Gallo:

Text

"Our position for transforming the Partisan Formations into regular military units have been accepted in the most essential points. We can realize it."

Comment

This is part of the policy enunciated by Togliatti to infiltrate the Army, since only with the Army can any insurrection succeed.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-

Message No. 4 (Continued):Text

"We have improved the unitarian work with the Socialists."

"We are trying to seal our relations with the Christian-Democrats."

"The unity with the CLNAI has been strengthened."

Comments

This is a continuation in Occupied Italy of the policy of keeping the Socialist Party aligned with the Communist Party to the point where the Socialist Party as such loses its identity.

Gallo is here passing on what success he is having on a directive issued to him to seal any relations with the Christian-Democrats. So far, the Communists have succeeded in drawing the Christian-Democrats into a tri-partite arrangement for control of the Italian labor movement.

This is a report by Gallo on the success of the Communists in carrying out directives to keep the CLNAI intact.

B. Message No. 10, 16 March 1945 from Odette:Gallo states:

"An agreement was concluded at Turin between the Communists, Socialists and Christian-Democrats, and speaks of: "Mutual respect for everyone's political and religious convictions."

"We agreed on periodic consultations and on united action with CLN for the strengthening of syndical unity."

This exaggerates the actual situation. No such unity exists, except on paper; Communists look upon Christian-Democrats as reactionaries. But they are playing "possum," realizing that the Christian-Democrats are too strong at present.

Gallo is continuing the tri-partite arrangement in the Italian labor movement. Actually it is a misnomer to call "syndical unity" the struggle on the part of the three parties to obtain control of the Italian labor movement.

C. Message No. 23, 29 March 1945:

"We are reacting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the people, could be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition."

Gallo is reporting on his attempt to keep certain elements from seceding. By "our condition," Gallo refers to the chaotic state of Italian affairs. There is social unrest, but the Communist Party has not sufficient strength to obtain control of the government by

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3-

Message No. 23 (Continued):Comment

violent means. It plans, therefore, to control the important government departments, and advocates change by substitution and not by revolution.

D. Message No. 216, 5 March 1945 from Mele:

Scoccimarro is informed by representatives of the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties of the attempt on the part of the Christian-Democrats to separate patriot formations into political party formations. This is contrary to established Communist policy. Yet the attempt of the Christian-Democrats constitutes actually the present state of affairs, since the Communists have their partisans as well as the Socialists and Actionists. When the message states: "Such a proposition is against the unitarian principle," again we have a misrepresentation of the actual situation. In the same message, instructions are requested from Scoccimarro, and also his intervention here with Christian-Democrat leaders.

E. Message No. 223, 7 March 1945:Text

"To strengthen unity of action and to create, in the common fight, the premises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class."

Comment

This hardly needs comment. Gallo again reports results on directives issued to him.

F. Message No. 224, 7 March 1945:

"On the first of January we made the proposal to transform the Partisan formations into regular units of the Italian Army."

Infiltration and domination of the Army by the Communists would be accelerated if this proposal to Ercoli were activated.

G. Message No. 236, 15 March 1945:

This message from Ballo to Ercoli is evidence of manipulations on the part of the Communist Party to obtain control of the military situation in the North. The General referred to in the message is Valenti, and Gallo misrepresents the facts when he states that "The General handed in his resignation." Furthermore, it is not true that the General demanded "exclusive military command without interference from the CLNAI." It is true that the General felt himself responsible to the Allies and Casati, who is the Minister of War. The Commanding

TOP SECRET

General of Piacent is General Trabucchi, over whom Gailo has been able to exercise much influence. That accounts for his having Trabucchi (now in enemy hands) as the Commanding General of the Partisan movement.

H. Message No. 263, 23 March 1946:

Comment:

No comment necessary.

I. Message No. 153, 28 February 1946 to Marina for Gailo from Ercoli:

Text

"Am in agreement with your line for the realization of a Unified Command and with your proposal for unity within the army of the Partisan movement."

Comment

The proposal did not come from Gailo -- actually it is Communist Party policy. What is meant by "unity within the army" is making the Partisan movement part of the Army.

3. Such messages have apparently not been used by OSS as a basis for objective reports on Communist activities -- an arrangement which would serve as justification for their transmission. To avoid possible future embarrassment, therefore, it is recommended that the persons responsible be asked to submit a complete report of their relations with the Communist Party, and a report revealing Communist policy in detail. This should go with the record to show that such activities on the part of OSS were permitted in order to obtain intelligence.

TOP SECRET

(Classification)	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (P.W.)	NO.
	100 112	
FILE:		

SUBJECT: Review of GORF Chains

No.	FROM	TO	DATE	
	X-2	Exeo	9 Apr	<p>1. A review of selected messages from traffic of the GORF chains has been accomplished. It is the opinion of the undersigned that IOF should be made fully aware of this traffic, in view of the alleged political sentiments of Lt GORF.</p> <p>2. This traffic does not reveal, however, any participation by Lt GORF or his staff in the activities of the Partito Comunista Italia other than serving as technical intermediary for the transmission of same.</p> <p>3. Furthermore, this use by Lt GORF of agents and partisan groups of the PCI merely parallels the use of the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Action Parties by other OSS personnel for the production of intelligence or other action against the enemy. At one time or another these parties also have availed themselves of OSS communications or transportation for the relay of messages, although possibly not to this extent.</p> <p>4. This situation is further complicated by Communist Party participation in the Italian Government and in the OLIVAT. With regard to the North Italy situation it is well known that agents have been dispatched by all the leading parties for purely political campaigning among the partisans and other resistance groups.</p> <p>5. On the strength of these messages it certainly would not be possible to take action against GORF under AW 66 or AW 25. They do affirm the necessity, however, for prompt removal of Lt GORF or any other officer upon completion of active operational duties against the enemy, to insure that he assumes no operational position vis-a-vis the PCI.</p>

GRAHAM LEBRON

NO. 100 112

SECRET

SECRET

(Classification)

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (INCOM)

APO 812

Log No.

SD

FILE:

DATE:

SUBJECT: **GOFF Affair**

No.	From	To	Date
	X-2	Exec	10 Apr

1. Colonel Earle B. Nichols, G-2(GI), AFHQ read the GOFF cable traffic excerpts while in conference with me this afternoon.

2. He reiterated that the addition of this positive intelligence concerning Goff's activities to previous reports he had received serves to confirm his contention that this officer should be removed from the theater as soon as operational necessity permits, and that in no case should Goff be permitted continued participation in any OSS post-hostilities program.

3. With reference to prosecution of this officer, Colonel Nichols advanced the opinion that it would be impossible to bring charges against Lt Goff based solely on this cable traffic, and that any attempt at prosecution might prove embarrassing to OSS and AFHQ, in view of Communist party participation in the Italian Government.

Graham Hindwurm
GRAHAM HINDWURM
 Major, Infantry

SECRET

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

18 April 1946

Major Wm. C. Hurling, Jr.
Commanding Officer
Company D

1. Upon an informal report made to this Headquarters, an examination has been made of all cable traffic transmitted from the Goff circuits to determine whether party messages were being transmitted from Rome north or return.
2. Attached is a copy of extracts made from this traffic, which was submitted for opinion to U.S. G-2, (CI). We have been advised that no punitive action is recommended but emphasized the necessity for implementing orders from G-2 (CI), to evacuate certain officers previously listed to you, on or before "Victory in Italy" Day.
3. The question of promotions of the officers involved, for your information, has been referred to higher G-2 Headquarters.
4. You are requested to institute rigid check on all traffic on these circuits to prevent transmission of traffic not concerned with our operations against the enemy.

EDWARD J. OLAVIN
Colonel Infantry
Commanding

Attachment: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE	12 APRIL 1946	TO	SECRET
FROM	PARIS	INFO	SECRET
SUBJECT		REMARKS	

#1020(4) WASHINGTON #4425(4)

GLAVIN TO 109 (HIS BYES ONLY)

GLAVIN TO YORKIN AND GIBSON (THREE BYES ONLY)

1. U.S. G-2 (CI) HAS REQUESTED US TO RECOMMEND TO THE UNITED STATES LTB. GOFF, LOSSOWSKI, FAYARD AND WOLF, AND 2 JIMINEZ BROTHERS, ON VICTORY IN ITALY DAY OR BEFORE. THEATER HAS RULED THAT WE CANNOT DELAY FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES.

2. SCAMPORINO REPORTED HIS BELIEF GOFF HAS USED CIRCUITS TO RELAY PARTY MESSAGES FROM ROME TO NORTH ITALY IN DIRECT VIOLATION SPECIFIC ORDERS THIS HQS. THIS IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED. RESULTS OF INQUIRY LAID BEFORE U.S. G-2 (CI) WHO RECOMMENDED NO ACTION UNDER ARTICLES OF WAR EMPHASIZED NECESSITY FOR GETTING THEM OUT OF THEATER ON OR BEFORE HOSTILITIES CEASED. WE WILL IMPLEMENT.

3. PROMOTIONS PENDING FOR LTB. GOFF, LOSSOWSKI, FAYARD AND JIMINEZ. SUBLING HAS RECOMMENDED THEM. WASHINGTON BOARD OF OFFICERS HAS ALREADY APPROVED GOFF AND LOSSOWSKI UPON OUR REQUEST AND THE OTHERS ARE PENDING THERE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ABOVE, BELIEVE PROMOTIONS OF ALL FOUR SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. YOUR ADVICE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

Originator's initials	
Serial No.	Cable No.

MESSAGE CENTER USE ONLY

Authenticated by	
Routing	RDR
	WDD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-60827-1

U.S. SECRET

COMPANY D
2677TH REGIMENT, OSS, (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY
OPERATIONS SECTION

JEB:glm
18 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Report on Lt. Irving Goff, Lt. Vincent Lossowski,
Lt. Irving Fajans and Lt. Milton Wolff.

TO : Commanding Officer, Hq. 2677th Regt., OSS (Prov).
Attention: Lt. Colonel Mattox.

1. As per telephone conversation, following is a report on Lt. Goff and the officers generally considered as working with him in the direction and training of agent teams. The report I submit is purely objective, being my observation of their work since taking over as Operations Officer, Company "D", on 27 December, 1944.

2. Lt. Goff until about three weeks ago, spent a goodly portion of his time in Rome and other sections of Italy, as well as the school at Brindisi. It is my understanding that he was directed to maintain contacts in Rome for the purpose of recruiting agent personnel to be trained and infiltrated behind the lines. I, therefore, have not had intimate contact with Lt. Goff but a short period of time.

3. I have had a very close hand view, however, of Lt. Lossowski, Lt. Fajans and, to a lesser degree, Lt. Wolff, the latter having moved the agent school and training area to Casaglia from Brindisi about six weeks ago.

4. Speaking of the school and training and holding area run by Lt. Wolff and set up by Lt. Goff, I have inspected the school both at Brindisi and Casaglia. The course is typical SO training and my inspections have revealed that the school is run in a very orderly manner, the students are well disciplined and kept busy at their assignments. The physical property is clean and orderly as a military establishment should be, and the establishment is run on a very economical basis. In fact, the cost of the training and holding area is, I would say, below the expense incurred in the usual OSS establishment. This school has been run up to now by Lt. Wolff and Lt. Fajans, as previously mentioned.

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5. When operations are laid on, they apparently go off with maximum efficiency as I have heard of no cases where, because of the desk's failure to prepare the personnel or have them properly equipped, the "snafuing" of an operation resulted.

6. I have had occasion to observe Lt. Lossowski and Lt. Fajans for approximately four months and Lt. Goff for approximately three weeks in work in the Operations Room. These men are all unsparing in their time; attend diligently to their duties with every semblance of whole-hearted patriotism in winning the war. The direction of their field missions has been intelligent and in no single case have I observed a signal going to the field that did not deal with straight-from-the-shoulder instructions pertaining directly to the military effort.

7. I have observed practically every message to and from the field and can say that, on the whole, the intelligence traffic has been on a par with the over-all traffic coming from all stations in enemy occupied territory. The instruction and briefing of agents in guerilla and sabotage tactics has apparently been imparted to the Partisan formations with whom they are operating and, by and large, the Partisan bands with whom they operate have done good ~~to~~ excellent work against the enemy in direct guerilla tactics or in sabotage.

8. In observing the traffic, there has been a very limited amount of so-called "flag waving", indicating that the "party" was at work and united; in only the most rare instances did such messages not convey military intelligence or information along with a sentence or two of "flag waving".

9. All traffic on each separate agent or mission is kept in a separate file and the record of each mission stands for itself. I would say these records would stand up under even a critical review. These files, in fact, show an effort on the part of the mission head to weld together political parties and factions into a common front for action against the enemy.

10. I am also of the definite conclusion that the efforts of Lt. Goff, the other officers working with him and the personnel of his missions have rendered a very substantial contribution to the over-all war effort.

- 2 -

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11. The fact that these men are reputed to be of Communistic leaning or outright Communists has not reflected itself in a single instance that has come to my observation that they are interested in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the undermining of it, nor, for that matter, the overthrow of the existing Italian Government.

12. As stated in the beginning, this report is a purely objective one and represents only my observation of their work and contribution to the Operations Section, Company "D", and I make no attempt to deal with other than the facts as I have seen them, for any other comment would depend from hearsay.

13. The only opinion I would render on their background is that they appear to be men born from the lower walks of life, of considerably more intelligence than men so born, and who, like most in their sphere, feel that there is a too great divide between the "Have Got's" and the "Have Not's".

[Signature]
JUDSON B. SMITH,
Major, A.G.D.,
Operations Officer.

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ATTACHED COPY

HEADQUARTERS
2077th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 612

24 April, 1946

SUBJECT: Reports on Lts. Goff, Lossowski, Tadjans & Wolff
TO : Commanding Officer, 2077th Regiment, OSS (Prov)
thru Executive Officer

1. In reviewing the evidence on this case it is important to distinguish between two aspects. First, there is the question as to whether Lt. Goff and his associates are guilty of violating the directive laid down in our cable #492, dated 14 November, 1944 to Major Suhling. If Lt. Goff is innocent and if, further, he has, as Major Smith contends, made a magnificent contribution to the military effort, the pending recommendation for promotion should be judged on its own merits. The second question is whether, at the termination of hostilities in the north, Lt. Goff and his associates should be returned immediately to the United States rather than be allowed to proceed to North Italy or Austria.

2. In regard to the first question, I am not satisfied with the interpretation of the messages (produced in evidence) as offered by Mr. Scamporino. It should first of all be remembered that these messages have been culled from a great number which have passed over our links and that Major Smith has seen the entire traffic. In his judgment the body of material taken as a whole would stand up under any critical inspection. However, we are obligated to look at the messages which have been brought into question. According to the directive laid down in our cable referred to above, no objection was expressed by this headquarters to messages designed to build morale for the support of military activity or to coordinate military activity. In my view, these messages can be interpreted as a part of a morale-building campaign for the military activities of the Communist Party. It is true that there are political implications to the organization of the Communist units for military purposes, but the same may likewise be said of every ounce of support which this headquarters and AFHQ has given to CNLAI, with which the Communists are associated. Mr. Scamporino objects to the messages which reveal a plan on the part of the Communists to

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- 8 -

cooperate more closely with other parties in the PISA. He alleges that there is a cunning design behind this plan which is aimed at building up Communist domination. I do not believe it is proper to enter into the question of ultimate Communist intentions in view of the fact that present military objectives are far better served by Communist cooperation with all Partisan organizations than they would be if the Communists struck out on a separate line and refused to cooperate. It should also be remembered that the Communist Party is a recognized political organization in liberated Italy and has given support to the present Italian regime. It is surely an advantage, even on political terms, that the Communists should at least profess to establish working relationships with the other parties in Northern Italy. There is no evidence in the messages in question to show that the Communists deliberately intend to violate this working agreement when Northern Italy is liberated.

3. On the basis of the above argument, I do not believe there has been any serious violation on the part of Lt. Goff and his associates of the directive issued by this headquarters. Indeed, the full responsibility for the policing of these messages was placed on the Commanding Officer of Company D, who in turn placed it on Major Smith. If there have been violations, the judgment of Major Suhlman and Major Smith must also be brought into question by this headquarters. No two officers in this Regiment would be less likely to countenance activities which had a direct support of the Communist political program than Majors Suhlman and Smith.

4. The testimony of Major Smith in regard to the unstinting efforts, skillful operations and wholehearted devotion to the establishment of field missions on the part of these officers is so strong that in my judgment it warrants giving favorable consideration to the pending promotions.

5. As to the question whether Lt. Goff and his associates should be returned to the United States upon the termination of hostilities, I do not believe we have any choice in the matter in view of the directive laid down by G-2, AFHQ.

William P. Maddox
WILLIAM P. MADDOX
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Acting S-2 P. & Chief, SI, MEDTO

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HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 612

24 April 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO : Commanding Officer, 267th Regiment.

1. At the time Major Koch took over as Chief of Operations, OSS Italy in May 1944, the question was raised of people of a type who were fully equipped and qualified to do a job, as we know it in OSS, concerning the organization of intelligence networks to liaise between OSS Italy and the Resistance Movement in Enemy Occupied Territory, in order to properly coordinate the efforts of the partisan groups in ETO with those of the Allied armies in Italy. Up until that time the type and caliber of personnel was not up to that standard.

2. In a discussion between Major Koch and Lt. Goff, who was at the time liaison between the Communist and Socialist Parties in Italy and the OSS, it was discussed that the Communist and Socialist Parties, being illegal movements during the Fascist regime, had the necessary experienced personnel who would be able to do a job under our direction. Major Koch suggested to Lt. Goff that he contact the Communist and Socialist Parties in order to be able to get such personnel if they were available. Lt. Goff, in speaking with Mr. Raulo and Mr. Nenni of the Communist and Socialist Parties, respectively, in Naples, was able to get the assurance of those Parties that they would be willing to release some of their best people with the stipulation that they would like to have the possibility of communication with their Parties via our radio. This stipulation was conveyed to Major Koch who agreed, providing that all such messages would have to conform with Allied policy, as regarding the enemy rear.

3. We were able to obtain 30 or 35 of their people who were subsequently trained, briefed, and sent into Enemy Occupied Territory to organize intelligence networks. It was understood by all of them that they were going in as representatives of the OSS and that all policy, in reference to their work, would emanate from that organization. All messages that were directed to the Communist and Socialist Parties via our radios, between Allied Liberated Territory and enemy occupied territory, went directly to Operations Section, Company D. All messages from the Communist and Socialist Parties in Liberated Territory, before transmission, had to have the necessary approval of Major Suhling, Commanding Company D.

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4. All of these messages from the Communist Party in liberated Italy were, more or less, exhortations to Communist Party members on the other side to get into the fight in order to aid in any shape or manner by sabotaging the enemy's rear, in order to aid the Allied armies in Italy. Major Suhling sent the general contents of the type of messages to Regiment for approval and clearance. All of the messages were in line with Allied Headquarters policy.

5. The intelligence that was channelized through the various teams composed of Communist and Socialist Party members had the addition of their party's sources in receiving information about the enemy's activities through their party besides the intelligence organization that those individuals organized within the various zones where they were located. Most of the information was straight military coverage of the enemy's forces within their operational zone, in addition to political and economic information.

6. The G-2 Section of the 15th Army Group has been extremely satisfied with the type of military information transmitted by these teams and has, on a number of occasions, taken the trouble to comment through Company D the excellent coverage concerning the enemy's disposition of forces.

Vincent Lossowski
VINCENT LOSSOWSKI
1st Lieut., AUS.

SECRET

HENRY B. GOODMAN

LAW OFFICES
JULIUS I. PEYSEN
AARON W. JACOBSON

July 25, 1945.

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

There appears in the newspapers a report made by H. Ralph Burton concerning his testimony before the subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee against certain Army officers as of a communist front, and I desire to tell something about Burton, the investigation.

I have known Mr. Burton for a long period of time, perhaps thirty-five (35) years. He is approximately 56 years old, practiced law in Washington, D. C. with George McLanahan until Mr. McLanahan's death in about 1931. Burton, while he was in debt, transferred property at 2831 Garfield Street to his sons. About February of 1937, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy claiming some assets with a liability of \$73,155.28. There was no payment made to the creditors. Prior to his bankruptcy he was sued on 12 or 13 occasions in amounts ranging from \$6.65 to \$4,800. Four judgments were against him. He was unreliable in business transactions, and, a banking corporation, of which I am an officer, lost \$4,000 on him which was loaned him to take care of his family. He was attorney for Father Coughlin, Mrs. Sherman Walker and many members of the American Coalition Organization.

While I was one of the Receivers for the Carlton Hotel at 18th and K Streets, he spent most of his time loafing around said hotel until one of the floor men suggested that he should eliminate himself from the premises.

On July 26, 1945, a tax lien in behalf of the District of Columbia was filed.

Court records will prove these statements.

Very truly yours,

Julius I. Peysen
Julius I. Peysen

JIP:OTA

10/6/50
28 July 1945

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Will you accept my thanks for your very kind letter of 25 July 1945. And also for the fine stand you took when I, among others, was the object of a smear campaign initiated by Rankin and Burton.

It is unfortunate that it has become impossible for us to continue on other missions for your organization. Unfortunate because we now have all the experience and training needed to do a really bang-up job without any faltering or blundering around. Unfortunate, too, because we liked working for you and the opportunities to do much for our country appear to abound in the OSS.

Should you ever require my services, knowing who and what I am and what my capabilities and limitations are, I gladly offer them.

It is with real regret that I leave your command.

Respectfully
Milton Wolff
Milton Wolff
2nd Lt. Inf

enc

25 July 1944

2nd Lieut. Milton Wolff
1599 East 18th Street
Brooklyn, New York

My dear Lieutenant Wolff:

I am sorry that, your mission with us having been performed with great credit, you must now return to the Army from which you had originally volunteered to serve with us.

I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my own observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to our organization.

At all times you have not only shown the discipline and training of a soldier, but a special knowledge in demolition and other skills required in our kind of operation. In addition, you have displayed real ability as an instructor.

More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark.

More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of loyalty and devotion to our common country.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

23 July 1945

Captain Vincent Lossowski
117 Durnan Street
Rochester, New York

My dear Captain Lossowski:

I am sorry that, your mission with us having been performed with great credit, you must now return to the army from which you had originally volunteered to serve with us.

I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my own observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to our organization.

At all times you have not only shown the discipline and training of a soldier, but a special knowledge in demolition and other skills required in our kind of operation. In addition, you have displayed real ability as an instructor.

More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark.

More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of loyalty and devotion to our common country.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

25 July 1945

Captain Irving Goff
10 Monroe Street
New York, New York

My dear Captain Goff:

I am sorry that, your mission with us having been performed with great credit, you must now return to the Army from which you had originally volunteered to serve with us.

I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my own observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to our organization.

At all times you have not only shown the discipline and training of a soldier, but a special knowledge in demolition and other skills required in our kind of operation. In addition, you have displayed real ability as an instructor.

More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark.

More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of loyalty and devotion to our common country.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

25 July 1943

Captain Michael A. Jimenez
#2055969, AUS
5th Service Command
Camp McQuaide, California

Dear Captain Jimenez:

I am sorry that, your mission with us having been performed with great credit, you must now return to the Army from which you had originally volunteered to serve with us.

I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my own observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to our organization.

Your knowledge, your experience and your skill in communications was of the greatest help in all of our operations, and your ability to impart your knowledge to others was of constant help in the instruction of new men.

More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark.

More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of loyalty and devotion to our common country.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Director
 FROM: Col. P. B. Nelson
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 18 JULY 1945

Confirming verbal report to Mr. Cheston, the following officers, ex-Spanish Revolutionists, were transferred from OSS as per instructions during the past week:

Captain Michael A. Jiminez, 02055969;	To: Ninth Service Command, Camp McQuaide, Calif.
Captain Irving Goff, 02055518;	To: Same
Captain Vincent Lossowski, 02055519	To: Same
1st Lieut. Irving Pajans, 0545925	To: IPTC, Camp Gordon, Ga.
2nd Lieut. Milton Wolff, 0989197	To: ORD, Ft. Benning, Ga.


 P. B. N.

SECRET

SECRET

Director

Col. F. B. Nelson

12 JUL 1943

Confirming verbal report to Mr. Cheston, the following officers, ex-Spanish Revolutionists, were transferred from OSS as per instructions during the past week:

Captain Michael A. Jiminez, 02055969; To: Ninth Service Command, Camp Buena Vista, Buena Vista, Calif.

Captain Irving Goff, 02055518;

To: Same

Captain Vincent Lossowski, 02055819

To: Same

1st Lieut. Irving Fajans, 0545026

To: INTC, Camp Gordon, Ga.

2nd Lieut. Milton Wolff, 0869197

To: ORD, Ft. Benning, Ga.

P.B.W.

SECRET

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1946

ARMY USED REDS HOUSE GROUP TOLD

Subcommittee Gives Out Names
of 16 Whose Past Reflects
Communism, Says Counsel

WASHINGTON, July 18.—Sixteen commissioned and non-commissioned Army officers were listed by the chief counsel of a House Military Affairs subcommittee today as having backgrounds which "reflect communism."

The names given by H. Ralph Burton in private testimony were released by the subcommittee without comment.

The War Department at once issued a statement saying thorough investigation "did not lead the Army to conclude that any of the individuals was disaffected or disloyal."

It added: "The performance of these officers and soldiers of their military duties during the last three years has clearly evidenced their loyalty to this country and the principles for which this country is fighting."

Army "Vigilant" in Selection
"The Army has been vigilant to see that its military personnel have not overlooked allegiances to communism, fascism, socialism, and other alien ideologies and have been loyal to the United States."

but the real criterion always remains: Is the individual at the present time wholeheartedly loyal to the United States?"

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, also issued a statement in which he praised four of the officers for "outstanding service" in organizing resistance groups in enemy-occupied northern Italy. These officers served with an OSS unit of the Fifteenth Army Group.

List Released by Committee
Following are the names of the sixteen individuals, as listed by Mr. Burton and made public by the committee, with his references to their past affiliations:

Maj. Edward Newhouse, Fifteenth Army Air Force, "contributor to the Daily Worker, 1934. The New Masses, 1936, responded to the call for Congress of American revolutionary writers."

Capt. Herbert Aptheker, 940th Field Artillery Battalion, "contributor to New Masses, contributor to Negro Quarterly."

Capt. Henry Clara Collins, 21st Base Unit, Naples Field, Alabama, "panel member of National Action Conference for Civil Rights, April 19-20, 1940. This conference was called by the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, which since its inception in June, 1940, has perhaps been the foremost Communist-front organization in the United States."

Capt. Horace Warner Cruesell, Seventh Civil Affairs Unit, "member, American League for Peace and Democracy; president, Russian Reconstruction Forum, Inc."

Lieut. Richard C. Crispy, Corps of Military Police, Seventh Civil Affairs Unit, "is Dick Crispy, alias, handles California Young Communist League."

Lieut. Irving Palans, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, "on honor roll of Young Communist League members fighting in the Spanish civil war."

First Lieut. Edward W. Finkelstein, Twenty-sixth Field Artillery Battalion, "chairman, Political Union, District International Workers Order, which Mr. Burton called 'a subversive instrument of the Communist party of the United States.'"

In Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Lieut. Irving Goff, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, "former Communist School, New York City, and a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain."

Lieut. Vincent L. Gorman, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, "former member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain."

Lieut. Jerry Traubner, 940th Field Artillery Battalion, "editorial board, New Masses, Communist organization."

Lieut. William H. Wolf, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, "former member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain."

Lieut. William H. Wolf, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, "former member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain."

Probers List 16 in Army as Communists

By RAYMOND WILCOVE
International News Service Staff Correspondent

WASHINGTON, July 18.—A House Military Affairs sub-committee reported today that an investigation had disclosed 16 Army commissioned and enlisted personnel with a "Communist background," including four in the highly secret Office of Strategic Services.

The 16 included:

Sgt. Samuel Dashiell Hammett, author of "The Thin Man," and composer.

2nd Lt. Joseph Lash.

The committee reported that 40 other Army men, whose names were not made public, had been removed in 1942 and 1943 from various officer candidate schools and aviation cadet training schools "for alleged counter-intelligence reasons."

These cases, the committee stated, "involved matters of al-

leged sympathy or affiliation with subversive ideologies (8 Nazi, 3 Communist, one Fascist and one Japanese)."

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Nine of these were commissioned as second lieutenants; the committee stated, on orders from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, and eight are serving overseas.

The subcommittee, headed by Rep. Thomason (D-Tex.), was set

Continued on Page 6, Column 2

Form 67 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 15 MAY 45

FROM

CASERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 12001

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, FIELD SECTION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57825-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHERCONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

#48271. NEWHOUSE FOR GLAVIN TO 109.
REFERENCE YOUR #34341 (OUT 11370).
attached

WOLFF AND FAJANS SAIL TODAY FOR U.S. FAJANS NOW 1ST LT.
JIMINEZ LEAVES BY NEXT BOAT. CAN SHIP BY AIR IF DESIRED. NOW
1ST LIEUTENANT AND WILL BE PROMOTED TO CAPTAINCY 17 MAY. PROMOTIONS
OF JIMINEZ AND FAJANS CLEARED IN WASHINGTON.

TOR: 0956

15 MAY 45

FILE COPY**CONFIDENTIAL**

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CASE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

To: Major MONIGAN

See that these cables
be sent. (L. Frank Goff
and Lossowski already
done.)

WJD

Director's Office

(3304)

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 10 May 1945

FROM : Special Investigation Committee

SUBJECT: Report on 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Irving Pajans,
1st Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and 1st Lt. Irving Goff

On 8 May 1945, the Committee met to consider the following cases: 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Irving Pajans, 1st Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and 1st Lt. Irving Goff. You are familiar with each of these officers, and as you recall testified concerning them before the House Military Affairs Committee.

It is the opinion of the Committee that these officers should be returned to the United States for re-assignment to the Army or released from active duty.

The Chiefs of SO and SI have been consulted by Mr. O'Gara. SO does not have a definite program for the above-named officers, nor is it interested in them for any future assignment. SI is interested in a possible assignment for them with Col. Heppner, subject to your decision about retaining them, but there is no definite program fixed.

It is recommended that Col. Glavin be directed to return these officers to the United States if he has not already done so, and that in the absence of a specific assignment suitable for their capabilities and satisfying the necessary elements of security that they be released to the Army or from active duty, whichever appears more appropriate in the individual case.

The Committee has not yet considered the case of Lt. Jiminez, but since AFHQ G-2 has requested his return to the United States, it is recommended that he also be included with the four other officers above mentioned.

FOR THE COMMITTEE:

G. J. Mohigan, Jr.
G. J. Mohigan, Jr.
Major, CAC

*See that these cases
be sent + I think I will know
CONFIDENTIAL already done*

CONFIDENTIAL

General Donovan

10 May 1946

Special Investigation Committee

Report on 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Irving Weiss,
1st Lt. Vincent Lescowski, and 1st Lt. Irving Galt

On 6 May 1946, the Committee met to consider the following cases: 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Irving Weiss, 1st Lt. Vincent Lescowski, and 1st Lt. Irving Galt. They are familiar with each of these officers, and as you recall testified concerning them before the House Military Affairs Committee.

It is the opinion of the Committee that these officers should be returned to the United States for re-assignment to the Army or released from active duty.

The Chiefs of SO and SI have been consulted by Mr. Glavin. SO does not have a definite program for the above-named officers, nor is it interested in them for any future assignment. SI is interested in a possible assignment for them with Col. Heppner, subject to your decision about retaining them, but there is no definite program fixed.

It is recommended that Col. Glavin be directed to return these officers to the United States if he has not already done so, and that in the absence of a specific assignment suitable for their capabilities and satisfying the necessary elements of security that they be released to the Army or from active duty, whichever appears more appropriate in the individual case.

The Committee has not yet considered the case of Lt. Glavin, but since AFHQ G-2 has requested his return to the United States, it is recommended that he also be included with the four other officers above mentioned.

FOR THE COMMITTEE:

J. E. Haggard, Jr.
Major, GAI**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 14 MAY 1945

REC'D 1621 14 MAY 1945

TO CASERTA, ITALY

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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#34341. GLAVIN FROM 109.

CONFIDENTIAL

IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO KINDLY MAKE ARRANGEMENTS
TO TRANSFER FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS TO WASHINGTON AT YOUR
EARLIEST CONVENIENCE :

2ND LT. MILTON WOLFF
2ND LT. IRVING FAJANS
2ND LT. MICHAEL A. JIMINEZ

FILE COPY

TOD: 1635 14 MAY 1945

WJD

CONFIDENTIAL

INITIALS OF "RELEASED" OFFICER

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'Unable to Find' OSS Subvers

By United Press

If there are any Fascists or Communists in the highly confidential Office of Strategic Services, Director William J. Donovan hasn't been able to find them.

He so testified yesterday before a House Military Affairs Committee subcommittee inquiring into charges that subversives have been granted Army commissions.

This the War Department has denied previously, but today it clamped down on releasing any further confidential information on its personnel to the subcommittee headed by Rep. Thompson (D., Tex.).

Donovan, commander of the famous "Fighting 69th" Regiment of the Rain-

bow Division in World War I, said that to his knowledge, OSS never has hired a man "who advocates overthrow of the Government." He testified after the House Military Affairs Committee had put into the record a letter from War Secretary Stimson advising that investigative records of Army personnel are confidential.

To prove his point, Donovan brought into the inquiry the names of two alleged Communists who have figured in published reports about subversives in OSS, the highly secret investigative and interpretive organization operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The men, Donovan revealed were OSS Senior Economic Editor David Zabolodowsky, and a "young lieutenant in Yugoslavia" presumed to be Lieut. Alexander Vuchinich.

Zabolodowsky was thoroughly investigated before he was hired, Donovan said. He added Zabolodowsky yesterday denied ever having been a Communist or member of any organization advocating overthrow of the Government. Turning to the "young lieutenant,"

Lieutenant Slings Paint While Cops Hunt \$1100

NEW YORK, March 14 — Lieut. (j.g.) Stewart W. Johnson, 24, of Detroit, has \$1100 tucked away somewhere in New York but he's working for his room and board.

Johnson left the \$1100 one-dollar bills with a hotel clerk while he took a look at the city. Then he forgot the name and location of the hotel. He has a painting job at another hotel while the police look for his back pay.

Donovan said he had no way of knowing if Zabolodowsky was a Communist.

"I am sure he is not a Communist," he said.

Donovan said the committee's inquiry into the charges that subversives have been granted Army commissions.

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Donovan Faces Quiz on Reds

3-12 PHILA. INQ.
WASHINGTON, March 11 (A.P.)

—A House committee will question Major General William J. Donovan tomorrow about reports that some Communist sympathizers are working in his Office of Strategic Services.

General Donovan was called to appear before a subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee which is investigating Army policies toward commissioning Communists.

EXPLORING WHOLE FIELD

"We want to explore the whole field and get all the information possible," Representative R. Ewing Thompson (D., Tex.), subcommittee chairman, told reporters.

In addition to General Donovan, the subcommittee will re-examine War Department officials who testified earlier that there are no Communists in important uniformed or civilian posts within the department.

BISSELL TO BE QUIZZED

Major General Clayton Bissell, head of Army Intelligence, told the committee several days ago that there are no Communists in the Army as officers.

The committee recalled him for further examination Tuesday, however, following a published assertion that 10 Communists held commissions in the Army or Navy.

Donovan Questioned In Probe of 'Reds' Reported in OSS Jobs

Major General William J. Donovan, chief of War Reliance Administration, was called before a House Military Affairs Subcommittee today to answer questions about the alleged presence of Communist sympathizers within his organization.

The subcommittee expects also to continue questioning of War Department officials as to the reported commissioning of Communists as officers. Last week the group heard Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, chief of Army Intelligence, testify that there were no Communists among important uniformed or civilian personnel within the department. He has been called again for questioning tomorrow.

"We want to explore the whole field and get all the information possible," said Chairman Thompson of the subcommittee.

The subcommittee has received allegations that 10 Communists held commissions in either the Army or the Navy.

Meanwhile, the full Military Affairs Committee is planning new investigations of Army hospitals and the treatment of war prisoners, both American and Axis. Both subjects were probed last year.

H. Ralph Burton, committee counsel, said that hundreds of Army hospitals will be visited to make assurance doubly sure that our sick and wounded soldiers brought in from overseas combat areas are receiving the best possible care and treatment. The committee also will look into allegations that German prisoners of war in the United States are being "looted."

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
FROM : E. J. Putzell, Jr.
SUBJECT:

DATE: 15 March 1945

Colonel Cutler called yesterday evening to say he had had an opportunity to renew his acquaintance with Congressman Hart, Chairman of the Dies Committee, when walking down the street yesterday.

Colonel Cutler told him the War Department was doing everything it could towards investigating Communists -- Hart replied that it was an important matter. Upon the Colonel's asking whether Hart had heard about your testimony, he replied that he thought the manner in which you testified had been admirable, that when you said a man was loyal, that meant something to him.

Colonel Cutler thought you would like to know you have a staunch supporter in the person of Hart.

EJP

CC: Colonel Doering

16 March 1945

Mr. H. Ralph Burton
Room 519
Old House Office Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Burton:

Attached is copy of volume 3 of Report of
Proceedings of hearing held before Special Committee of
the Committee on Military Affairs, 13 March 1945.

This copy was made available to General Donovan
who has made certain typographical changes in the record
of his testimony.

As has been indicated to you earlier, the
General desires to obtain a copy of the final print of
volume 3.

Sincerely,

E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Lt. (jg), USNR
Acting Executive Officer

Attachment

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Colonel Deering

DATE: 12 March 1943

SUBJECT: Basic Principles re Army and OSS Policies re
 Communists, etc.

1. It should be kept in mind that the immediate cause of the committee's inquiry into War Department policies and practices arises from the December Directive of the War Department, copy of which is in your papers on this subject. This paper says in effect that membership in the Communist Party will not affect the status of Army personnel if it is established that their loyalty to this country is greater than any other loyalty. Legally the position is this: The Hatch Act forbids using any Congressional appropriation to pay the salaries and wages of any person who is proved to be a member of an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence. This clearly would apply to civilian War Department employees. However, it is not clear whether it would apply to members of the Armed Services since the term "salaries and wages" is not very appropriate in connection with the pay and allowances of Army or Navy personnel. There is no definitive court decision or ruling on this point.

On top of this situation, there arises the question of the effect of the draft (National Selective Service Act). There is no provision in this act for excluding from military service members of the Communist Party nor members of any class which would a fortiori include members of the Communist Party. By specifically mentioning Conscientious Objectors, it might be argued that Congress did not intend to exempt Communists. Furthermore, if such a rule were to be applied, it would enable wholesale evasion of military service since all a potential draftee would have to do would be to claim that he was a Communist.

General Donovan

- 2 -

12 March 1945

On top of the foregoing complications, there is the additional fact that the Supreme Court has recently expressly stated that it has not yet decided whether the Communist Party does in fact advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence. The Attorney General in 1942 made such a ruling as an administrative finding of fact. Since then, however, the Communist Party was disbanded, and the principles of its successor do not, so far as can be shown, advocate overthrow of the government by such means.

2. From the above it is apparent that Congress has left in a very confused state the position of Army personnel who may be shown to be members of the Communist Party. Congress has issued no clear mandate to the War Department as to the policy it should follow. In adopting its recent policy the War Department, in my personal opinion, may well have anticipated the probable decision of the Courts based upon the present state of the law.

3. The position of OSS is not identical with that of the War Department. It does not draft men into the Army although it may on occasion request the Army to commission or induct civilians. It does not pay the salaries of Army personnel. OSS furthermore may choose the personnel which it wishes assigned to it, whether they be Army, Navy, or civilian.

With respect to Service personnel OSS obviously endeavors to adhere to the policies and directives of the War and Navy Departments. We are not, however, compelled to take on any personnel whom for any reason we may regard as unsuitable for work in this agency.

4. The OSS policy is:

(a). With respect to civilians: All Civil Service personnel, if they have not already been approved by the Civil Service Commission,

General Donovan

12 March 1945

are investigated by that commission and a determination made by it as to the fitness of the employee for government employment. To the best of my knowledge, in each instance where the Civil Service Commission has made a final ruling of ineligibility, that decision has been accepted by OSS. The converse has not always been true. We have at times deemed it in the best interests of the government not to employ civilians who have been ruled eligible by the Civil Service Commission. These decisions are made upon the basis of the individual's qualifications and background for the task which it is proposed he shall perform.

(b). With respect to Service personnel OSS has at various times requested the induction of civilians into the Army and has at times requested the commissioning by the Army and Navy of civilians especially qualified for tasks of a military nature. We have also requested the assignment of certain enlisted and commissioned personnel from the Army and Navy. Before taking any action to request the induction or commissioning of civilians or transferring to OSS of any already inducted or commissioned OSS undertakes an examination of the character, background, and qualifications of each individual with a view to determining whether he is capable of effectively performing his job, both from the standpoint of efficiency and of security. No individual is employed by or transferred to OSS when in our opinion he will acquire information in the course of his duties which will result in future jeopardy to this country, whether by unlawful transmittal of such information to persons who are not authorized to receive it or by any other means.

5. One point, however, must be made clear. In view of the nature of the duties of OSS, it is essential for the performance of particular tasks to use all types of personnel. This does not result in any loss of security. On the contrary it enhances

General Donovan

- 4 -

12 March 1946

the security of this country by furnishing it with the information necessary to the conduct of the war and the safety of the country and its institutions. The only possible security in this situation lies in picking the right men for the right jobs, and this is a matter determined in each individual case by the person who is responsible for achieving the necessary results. It cannot be done by public debating in the newspapers as to the merits and demerits of particular individuals who are performing tasks in the intelligence field.

W.C. Sullivan, Jr.

✓
To Hon. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.
Q. What is the policy of OSS regarding the employment of Communists?

A. No person who has been found to be a member of the Communist Party has been employed by OSS. In view of the nature of our work, we might find it desirable to employ someone who is a member of that party for particular work.

Q. What is the policy of OSS concerning the employment of persons associated with the so-called Popular Front organizations?

A. Each case is considered on its own merits and in the light of the job which it is proposed the individual shall do. The file is reviewed by the Security Officer, the Branch Chief concerned, and the Executive Officer of the agency and the nature of the individual's past record and affiliations are carefully reviewed. The purpose of the review is to determine, in the light of all available evidence, whether the person being considered is both competent and secure for the work intended.

Q. What evidence would you consider sufficient to bar employment or to require special safeguards?

- A. Each case requires an independent judgment. In general, the elements which we consider are:
1. Membership or participation in any subversive organization.
 2. Adherence in speeches, writings or conversations to subversive or disloyal doctrine.

A. Each case requires an independent judgment. In general the elements which we consider are:

1. Membership or participation in any subversive organization.
2. Adherence in speeches, writings or conversations to subversive or disloyal doctrine.

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Lt. Colonel Doering
 SUBJECT: House Military Affairs Sub-committee Investigation of War Department Policy re Communists

DATE: 6 March 1945

I. I am attaching as Tab 1 my own file in regard to Zablodowsky. Tab 2 is Zablodowsky's Security Office file. My file contains a statement of Zablodowsky to me in regard to the newspapers, a memo from the Security Office dated 27 February, outlining our procedural methods with regard to personnel investigations, copies of Zablodowsky's public statement and his letter to the Times-Herald, and clippings from the newspapers regarding Mr. Zablodowsky. The first memo in the Security Office file is the 24-page summary of Zablodowsky's record, which I have already shown you.

II. Attached as Tab 3 is the folder containing the rather voluminous data which I have accumulated in regard to personnel investigations and policies on Communists. The items of principal interest include the report of the Department of Justice, dated 1 Sept. 1942, with respect to the basic policies of the Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations; an outline of policy and procedure, dated 1 Sept. 1943, from the Interdepartmental Committee; two opinions, dated 11 July 1944 and 5 Oct. 1944, from OSS General Counsel, which I requested in order that we might be brought up to date on the legal questions involved; memo from the Interdepartmental Committee, dated 18 May 1942, which discusses the legal status of members of the Communist Party or of the German-American Bund

The first paper on the left-hand side is the War Department Directive of 30 December 1944 which, although then classified secret, was published by the Chicago Tribune, and which outlined the War Department's policy with respect to Communists and persons in sympathy with Communism. On the right-hand side of this tab is material relating to the 10 officers whose names were published by the Times-Herald in an attempt to refute Mr. McCloy's and Gen.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

General Donovan

- 2 -

6 March 1945

Bissell's testimony. This material includes the papers which the War Department furnished us, including the summary of the military records of all ten of these officers; also my exchange of cables with Colonel Glavin regarding four of them.

III. There was some mistake with respect to Michael Jimenez. He was not among the 4 OSS officers listed. They were: Lieutenants Goff, Fajans, Lossowski, and Wolf.

O. C. D. R. J.

Attached as Tab 4 is the Security Office file on the 4 Lieutenants, prefixed by a brief summary.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: _____

General

Monimchal sent
 'This up' for you
 to see

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

to permit the giving of officers' commissions to Communists.

The interest of Congress in this directive is very direct, of course, but particularly because it violates several Acts of Congress which specifically ban the naming of Communists to any appointive positions on any Government payroll. Since the position of an officer in the armed forces of the United States is appointive, and since it is on a government payroll, the War Department directive openly violates the law.

The question of whether or not Communists should be permitted to hold positions in the employ of the United States Government, therefore, is superseded at this moment by the question of whether the War Department is a law unto itself; whether it stands above the law of the land and above Congress; whether the Army Brass Hats can with impunity pick and choose

phrase was not explained with
 Naz was explained how the
 commission in the U. S. Army
 any foreign power.

The General Refers to the

In fact, General Hissell was on this phrase, but steadfastly to remark:

"I am an officer of the Army and the instructions of my chief A member of the Congress Charles M. Ellison (R., Ohio) if there was any delay in the trading his testimony of fact point to an untruth in any part The General's reply was that

I Hissell replied with contemptuously told the Army's investigations in United States Government and for the staff."

of shocked comment soon as Congressman Secretary Skinsen's letter and it would be to clone them in a public Secretary Skinsen's phrase which has sent here that the relationship with the meant by that phrase was not explained with Naz was explained how the commission in the U. S. Army any foreign power.

The New Leader

Vol. XXVIII—No. 11

MARCH 17, 1943

10 CENTS

TIMES-HERALD - 13 MARCH 1945
TUESDAY - TEN STAR EDITION

Stimson Withholds 'Red' Data

Won't Give Congress Records of Officers

By International News Service
Secretary of War Stimson today refused to give Congress access to confidential files of officers investigated for alleged Communist affiliations or to permit Army spokesmen to "answer questions" concerning the records.

His stand was revealed in a letter to a House Military subcommittee presented by Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Army intelligence chief. Bissell said that under those instructions he could not go into "specific" charges of alleged Communist connections against 10 officers and five enlisted men named in published reports.

Loyalty Unquestioned

Stimson's letter, in which the Army offered to produce only the military records of individuals in executive session of the committee, was offered after Bissell testified that the records of the 10 officers had been reviewed without any findings against the men.

"The review revealed nothing to question the loyalty of these men," said Bissell. "They are now fighting overseas in combat theaters."

"The War Department is satisfied that these 10 men were loyal at the time they were commissioned and are loyal today."

At the same time, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, head of the "hush-hush" office of strategic services told the committee that he was "perfectly satisfied" that certain named OSS personnel were not Communists.

Defends Four of Them

Donovan, in his first public appearance before a congressional committee since he took over OSS, expressed confidence in four of the 10 officers reviewed by General Bissell. Only two of them were identified in testimony—Lieut. Milton Wolff and Lieut. Irvin Fajans.

"These four men I've been in all trenches with. I've been in the muck with, and I'd measure them up with any men," said Donovan. "I did not find that they were Communists. I found that they were not."

Donovan testified that David Zablodowsky, senior economic editor in OSS was "not a Communist" in his opinion. Zablodowsky had been mentioned as a former contributor to "Fight" which Representative Elston (R.) of Ohio, contended was a Communist front organ. Similarly a "young lieutenant" assigned to

(Turn to Page 2, Col. 4)

Yukonville by 1944, Donovan said was found by the OSS to be a Communist.

"If any man is a member of any organization that transcends the government, it is not our business," said Donovan. "The people of this country should know."

Stimson advised the committee that records of investigations made by the intelligence division are "confidential in nature for the use of the Secretary of War and the chief of staff."

Breaks of Faith

Usefulness of the intelligence division's work is largely based on the secrecy of its investigations and files, he asserted.

Such reports, Stimson said in the letter, include hearsay evidence and the conclusions of the investigators who might feel restricted if the reports were to be made public. Much information is obtained on promise of "confidential treatment" to civilian informants as well as the FBI and other agencies cooperating with the Army, he said, adding:

"The War Department does not feel free to break faith with these agencies. To do so would mean that their vital assistance in future investigations of disloyal or subversive personnel would be lost."

The Secretary added that there are security considerations for men in the armed forces as well as "our military relationship with our Allies on combat areas" involved in the question. And the Army, he said, wants to assure all military personnel that confidential information concerning them will not be disclosed except in "proper judicial proceedings and under the constitutional safeguards guaranteed to every American citizen."

Reads the Names

Stimson promised to provide at any time an individual's "military record" and to produce in executive session—behind closed doors—the soldier's personal file. Bissell admitted that this would not cover any of the investigative work by his division.

General Bissell, who sharply criticized published reports naming the 10 officers as alleged Communists, said that all 10 men were inducted or enlisted—none being commissioned from civilian life.

Seven of the 10 have held commissions more than 17 months, he said, while five of the eight officers now overseas "earned and received promotions," three were wounded, and won the Purple Heart—one being wounded twice—and one was retired for disability after overseas service.

"These are the officers—thousands of miles from home—being wounded—who are charged with disloyalty to America," Bissell told the committee.

THE EVENING STAR - 12 MARCH 1948
TUESDAY

Gen. Bissell Defends Officers Accused of Being Communists

By the Associated Press.

The chief of Army Intelligence declared today that 10 Army officers accused in newspaper articles of Communist affiliations are now "actually engaged in upholding the United States by force."

Eight of the 10 have been in combat overseas, Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell told an investigating House Military Subcommittee.

Saying several have received the Purple Heart for wounds in action, one twice, Gen. Bissell said the War Department was satisfied of their loyalty despite any possible former connection with the Communist party.

Reads Resume of Records.

Gen. Bissell read a resume of the military records of the officers and a number of enlisted men, including Corp. Dashiell Hammett, well-known author of mystery thrillers.

Even if any one of them "had been inclined to preach subversive theories" to troops, superior officers would have reported on their activities and proper action would have been taken, Gen. Bissell asserted.

In response to demands by Representative Elston, Republican, of Ohio for military intelligence reports on the men, Gen. Bissell produced a letter from Secretary of War Stimson saying such records are confidential.

Lists Names of Those Attacked.

These were the names Gen. Bissell read to the committee as "men whose patriotism and loyalty has been attacked while they are not here to defend themselves":

Maj. Edward Newhouse, First Lt. Isadore J. Trauber, Richard L. Orley, Irving Goff, Richard Kenney, Vincent Losowski and Harry Schoenberg, Second Lt. Gerald Cook Irving Fajaus and Milton Wolff; Sergeants William P. Gandell and Walter Bernstein, Corp. Hammett, Pvt. Lyle Dowling.

Gen. Bissell said a John Lord San Francisco, also had been listed, but apparently there was no such person as Lord in the Army.

Gen. Bissell did not name the newspapers which he said had accused the men.

Army's Policy Is Investigated.

The subcommittee is investigating the Army's policy regarding communications for Communists or persons known to have had Communist affiliations.

Maj. Gen. William Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, denied any one of questioned loyalty to the United States was employed by his organization. Gen. Donovan said he investigated personally any of his employees under suspicion.

Questioned about David Zaslowsky, senior economic editor of OSS, Gen. Donovan said he was satisfied of his allegiance to this country.

Four of the 10 Army officers referred to earlier by Gen. Bissell now are employed by OSS, Gen. Donovan asserted, although he did not name them. He said he had been in "all trenches and the muck" with all four and would "put them up against any Americans on loyalty."

TIMES-HERALD, TUESDAY, 13 MARCH 1946
(1 star edition)

Pro-Communist Officer Holds Key OSS Post

By WILLARD EDWARDS

A pro-Communist Army officer, who assailed Hitler and Churchill as equally guilty "tyrants" during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, holds a key post under the joint chiefs of staff in the Office of Strategic Services; it was learned yesterday.

This latest evidence of Communism in the Army was disclosed as a House Military Affairs subcommittee today resumes hearings into the new Army policy permitting commissions for men whose loyalty is divided between the United States and Soviet Russia.

Another Name Added

The name of Lieut. Alexander Vuchitch was added to the list of more than a dozen officers with Communist affiliations made known to the subcommittee since Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, head of the Army Intelligence Corps, asserted on February 27 that he knew of no commissioned Communists.

Vuchitch was former editor of the Yugoslav American Herald, foreign language newspaper which has played for Soviet domination of the Balkan State. Although the OSS is said to have a long dossier on his pro-Communist activities, he was stationed in Cairo where he was said to have exercised full censorship at Ghorly over all dispatches there.

Writings Copious

The copious writings of this officer before he entered the Army show him excelling the Soviet Union while bitterly criticizing the United States and Britain. On May 30, 1941, when the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was still in force, he wrote:

"This war is war against liberty and for the purpose of continuing the history of slavery. This is known by Rome, Berlin and London. On one side are the Germans, British and all other peoples over the world and on the other side are Hitler, Goering, Haffner, Churchill, and others similar to them. This is the war of political tyrants against the broad national masses."

The New Deal's lend-lease bill was harshly criticized by Vuchitch as an act to intensify the conflict between the warring powers and the continuance of European bloodshed. The Roosevelt administration, he wrote, was "willing to sacrifice everything for the magnates of war industry."

Russian Contrast

The Soviet Union, he wrote, by contrast was a country which considered "peace as a basic principle for its internal as well as its foreign policy."

After Hitler invaded Russia, Vuchitch switched over to zealous advocacy of America's entry into "the war against liberty."

A subcommittee member said it appeared evident there were a large number of pro-Communists in the OSS with access to the most closely guarded security operations. Demands have been made on the House floor for a thorough housecleaning of this hush-hush agency.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
TUESDAY, 13 MARCH

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1946

Commie Probers Denied Army Officer 'Histories'

War Secretary Hinson told Congress today that Army investigative records will not be revealed to legislative committees.

He wrote Chairman Thomason (D., Tex.) of a House Military Affairs subcommittee investigating charges that Communists have been commissioned in the Army, that the records include testimony obtained on the promise that it would be kept in confidence.

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, chief of Army intelligence, told the committee he would make service conduct records available in closed session but could not reveal any details of the personnel investigations.

Bissell previously told the committee there were no Communists holding Army commissions. He was recalled after the names of 15 men with alleged Communist affiliations were published by The Chicago Tribune.

Bissell said seven of the officers had been commissioned 12 months or longer, eight had served many months overseas and five had earned promotions overseas. Three had been wounded and one had been retired because of injuries in a bomber crash.

"By the implications charged these men advocate overthrow of the U. S. Government by force and violence," Bissell said. But he added "by their individual records it is shown that they actually are upholding the U. S. Government by force and violence."

Form 89 (Revised)

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TO CASERTA, ITALY

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT *Security*

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ALL IN SO AND SO (SIC) TRAINING WORKING IN NORTH ITALY. GOFF
RECENTLY DETAILED TO INFILTRATION OF AUSTRIA FOR SI USING COMMUNIST
CONTACTS. WE ARE AWARE OF THEIR POLITICS AND ALL CONCERNED CAREFULLY
SUPERVISE ACTIVITIES TO SEE THAT WE ARE NOT INVOLVED. HOWEVER, WE USE
ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS. WE DO NOT PERMIT ANY AID OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY ANY OF
OUR PEOPLE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT LT. MICHAEL JIMINEZ, ALSO SO, IS IN
SAME CATEGORY AND THAT HIS MAIL IS NOW BEING CENSORED BY CI ON REPORT
THAT HIS WIFE IS SENDING HIM COMMUNIST LITERATURE.

TOR: 1055 2 MARCH 1945

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FILE NO. 3

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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CISERTA ITALY

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THESE OFFICERS WILL BE MADE. EXPECT NO DIFFICULTY BUT SEND FOREGOING
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TOD: 1900 1 MAR 45

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