

Uhe

Postscript to an Exploration

(Part One)

And then one day I found myself at home out there.

out there.
And it was, truth to tell, a very great relief. For in another few weeks I was slated to return eart; and to have left without ever having felt: "This, too" would grievouslyand I knew it-have meant defeat. There is no pretending that one feels at home. I've tried that, and it simply doesn't work in a year of wandering up and down a coast, be-tween San Francisco and the Mexican border, there ned been mary scenes to fill the eyes and the scenes themselves many-mooded, many-hued, so that anyone at all, it might have been supposed, would have managed at least once to experience a rapprochement. And almost had I managed it, helf-a-dozen times. "In a moment-in another mement-I had thought. But never had the moment really come to flower. And pressure, of course, had but served to void it sconer. This place and that one, they had been good places: fine places for staying inthe matter stood.

Until quite suddenly one day it happened.
And this is the manner in which it came about,

I had gone off walking, not knowing where, with sandwiches in one pocket and poetry in the other; and a great bold wind was abroad in the sky, and sun of such a brilliance that it stun, the eyes. To the right were hills, thrust bluntly into the blue; and sheering clean away, to the left of the road, a long deep valley, rich-textured, like velour—with its scattering of cabins wearing spider-threads of smoke and windows that were glittery as sequins in the sun. Some

little jumping dots were children playing for their volces, personlessly pure and very thin, came spiraling up freshly through insensities of smac; and a long way off, one a cropped green slope—pranting, lies percoptibly, like a tiny toy ballet—were what a supposed must be a herd of dress.

The read litted sixward: and it was all very fine—the bigness, the brightness, the brightness, the bold rings of wind. And I mund myself thinking in so offert I had thought in this place and that one, throughout those months: "How handsome, how tremendous everything really is!" Whitmaneaque country: canlid—exposed: copious and especious, instrumented, unsubshed. A hind of sunny sensationalism of effect, messive out simplified, unsubtle as a gong so that from the first these great menes had had for me the do-personalized quality of a mural or an epic. So that from the first I had felt like a appectator: examining, appraising, from a point apart.

Well, there the road was, curving steeply into sky; and after I had been following it for perhaps an hour I tound, in the high-banked green on my right, are unotherwise break—another road, not much more than a trail, grassed over and branched over, franked with sun. There was a padlocked gate, guarding it officiously; there was a sign there, too, prominent as could has thut hagply the sign was so rinsed with ruins that not a syliable of it could even an alderman have deciphered. So I climbed across the gate, into the dim green hush; and almost lymediately the feeling began.

There is no way, I realize, of telling about the feeling. It is a kind of stillness laid upon stillness. It isn't expectation, not exactly the part of



DAY, JULY 19, 1945

lish Solution norial to Truman

Threstonn Trivace Monitor

A table organizations, freely to circulate in Poland and other Soviet occupied territories upon the same terms as we allow Soviet journalant is and other agents to circulate in countries under our control.

5. The application of auch "concert" principles accepted in the Yalta declaration not only to resimilate the poland but to all other countries, such as Greece where a single special power is in dominant control as a result of recent military operations.

Government of the state of the

By War Department

Washington, July 18 (P)—
nour The War Department came to
quick defense yesterday of 16
fections, Jeb no
Gapitol Hill as having backgrounds which reflect Comtoning to the minism in some foun.


I the holdstrengthen holdpolish
bur ally

fered a
strengthen holdstrengthen holdstrengthe

First C. G. Craft Had Salls The first Const Guard cutter was a 48-foot sailing vessel.

Sell Your Piamonds





American Expense TRAVELERS CHEQUES



| | nd Approved Fo | r Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X0000 | 01R000100110001-1 | |
|-----------------------|----------------|--|--|---------------|
| १८४, दीवृत्ता उत्तर्ष | | Director's office cross reference sheet | CAZA TO TO TE TO TE TO TE TE TE TE | ener Great |
| Letter | ro | | • | |
| Cable | | The state of the s | Construction and Construction (Automatical Construction) | |
| DATED: FROM: | | | | |
| TO: SUBJECT: | | | b | • |
| alley | sation l | her rane Boran | | |
| See | file: | 15arau , 1 /3 | raul a | Lyanda |
| • | | | | |
| • | | | | |
| | | | | |
| ORIGINAL FILED | IN: | | | |

Declassified and Approved For Release

2013/09/09:

1

CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

| | Declassified and Approved For | Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000 | 0100110001-1 | |
|-----|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| 038 | 1 199H 3001e | | | |
| | | director's office | TEP BECHET BECHET CONTINENTED CESTOLOTED | |
| | Letter Memo re | CROSS REFERENCE SHEET | | |
| | | sk, Edward a. 11. 49 | • | |
| | FROM: | | | |
| | SUBJECT: | | | |
| | See: Jahle Marga | indewsky, David . | المرابع | |
| | General | Clark 16, 158 | | |
| | | | | |
| | • , | | | |
| | ORIGINAL FILED IN: | | | |
| | | | | |

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09

0001R000100110001-1

| Declassified and Approve | ed For Release 2013/09/09 . CIA-RDP13X00001R00 | 0100110001-1 |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| 098 FYRM 306111 | director's office | TOP OCCUPET TO THE PROPERTY OF |
| Letter | CROSS REFERENCE SHEET | feet |
| Memo re_ Cable | in the de seem to | |
| DATED: FROM: | , | |
| то: | | |
| SUBJECT: | t | |
| | | |
| | · | |
| | | |
| | , | |
| ORIGINAL FILED IN | I: | |
| FILE #: | The state of the s | |

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 - C/A-RDF 15X00001R00010011001

House of Mouresessing at M

Report of Process and

Bearing beid before

Special Committee of the Committee of Market 1981

Earth 13, 1948


Washington, D. C.

from the files of the Director
Please Return

WARD & PAUL

NATIONAL 4266 4267 4268

OFFICIAL REPORTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE IT APRIL 1943

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

FROM DISTRIBUTION

IN ICSS.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

DIRECTOR

FOR INFORMATION

#13414. 109, TRIANGLE, TO GLAVIN ALONE, CASERTA. PARIS-CASERTA ATECAL

REPORTED TO ME BEFORE THIS DAY. ME SHOULD HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND THAT I APPEARED BEFORE CONGRESSIONS. COMMITTEE INQUIRING INTO LOYALTY OF AMERICAN OFFICERS WHO WERE CHARGED AS WELL AS AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM YOUR THEATER. I SINCERELY DEFENDED IN WANT NOW TO HAVE FULL INFORMATION INCLUDING REPORTS OF THE INQUIRIES. ETC. WITH RESPECT TO MESSAGES TO MISSING YOUR REFER, GIVE ME REASON FOR BELIEF THEY WERE PASSED, WHAT THEY SINCERED TO WHOM THEY WERE SENT AND WHO WAS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE.

GIVE WRITTEN STATEMENTS TO SHEPARDSON. IF NOT POSSIBLE, POUR DIMETE

TOR: 2209 17 APRIL 1945

CASERTA


ت کے ث

RBIDDEN TO COPY OF

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CARLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SEGRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-




WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SEGIL

OBÅ Vorm 64 (Kovind) OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICIAL DISPATCH 16 APR 45 DATE PINOPINI FROM CASERTA, LTALY DREEMEN TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES IN 101/14 DISTRIBUTION FOR INFORMATION (FOR ACTION) DIRECTOR, SECRETAR AT, GIGARIE CHESTON RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER GLAVIN TO 109 ONLY (PARIS #10204) AND YORKER AND CHESTOR #44254. 1. U.S. G-2 (CI) HAS REQUESTED US TO EVALUATE TO THE UNITED STATES LTS. GOFF, LOSSOWSKI, FAJANS AND WOLF, AND 2 JAMES BROTHERS. ON VICTORY IN ITALY DAY OR BEFORE. THEATER HAS RULED THAT WE CANNOT DELAY FOR DEBRIEFING PURPOSES. TO RELAY PARTY DESSAGES FROM ROME TO NORTH ITALY IN DIRECT VIOLE TION SPECIFIC ORDERS THIS HQS. THIS ILMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED.
RESULTS OF INQUIRY LAID BEFORE US. G-2 (CI) WHO RECOMMENDED NO
ACTION UNDER ARTICLES OF WAR BUT REEMPHASIZES NECESSITY FOR GETTIME
THEM OUT OF THEATER ON OR BEFORE HOSTILITIES CEASE. WE WILL THE PLEMENT . AND JIMINEZ. SUHLING HAS RECOMMENDED THEM. WASHINGTON BOARD OF OFFICERS HAS ALREADY APPROVED GOFF AND LESSOWSKI LIPON OUR REQUEST AND THE OTHERS ARE PENDING THERE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ACOVE. BELIEVE PROMOTIONS OF ALL 4 SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED. YOUR ADVICE. WOULD BE APPRECIATED. SECRET

16 APR 45 TOR: 1407

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT



Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DAIRY 11 MAY 1946

General Donovan

PROM : J. J. Monigan, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Report on Traffic Over Circuits to Communist Party Pertins Banda

In accordance with your order, I have reviewed the six tached file on the above subject, and discussed with major Pacatte the basic agreement pursuant to which the messages wore transmitted.

Major Pacatto has stated that there was in fact on agree ment by which messages for the Communist Party were transmitted over the communication facilities of this agency. At the time the agreement was made, the intelligence attaction In Rome was such that the need for agents was acute. The Communist Party had such agents and as part of the price for their working on our bohalf, the message arrangement was made. Lt. Goff wan in immediate charge of the chain of agents which then began to function.


In view of the evidence of this agreement, there appears to be no criticism of Lt. Goff for transmitting the measages In accordance with this undertaking.


Pocommondations on the request of AFRQ G-2 that Lts. Goff, rajans, Wolff, and Siminez to returned to the United States are contained in the memorandum of the Special investigation Committee which has again reviewed the cases of the abovenamed officers in the light of the cossation of hostilities. The case of Lt. Jiminez, whose return was also requested by and G-2, has not been considered by the Committee.

It is recommended that no action be taken concerning Et. Goff's activity with regard to the transmission of Communist messa-30s.

> J. J. Monigan, Jr. Major. CAC

SECRET





Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

LOMANGEORES

2677H REGIMENT OSS (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

24 April 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Goff Agent Chain

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Regt OSS (Prov) APO 112, F.S. Army

- 1. Pursuant to verbal instructions of Colonel Glavin passed to me by Lt. Col. Rosen the following report is made on the activities of the Goff agent chain, and of the officers connected therewith.
- 2. This report covers the period from mid-July 1944 to date said period being that during which I have been in command of the Company. made to me from time to time and should be verified by actual statements of the subject officers before being taken as fact.
- 3. From statements made from time to time by Lts. Goff and Lossowaki and by Major Cagiati the approximate history of the Goff chair is about as follows. Shortly after the Salerno/Passtum landings in September 1943 it became apparent that agents were needed in Rome, and sundry attempts were made to establish such agents. As the stalemate at Cassino became intensified various officers of OSS as well as British agencies tried to contact the Communist Party representatives in Maples to secure their help, it being known that this party had a good underground to the North. Much confusion resulted from the duplication of efforts by different branches, and personnel all trying to make the above mentioned contact. Lt. Goff was finally selected as the OSS officer to establish a contact, his selection being deemed suitable on account of his service in the Spanish Revolution. He made the contact. Subsequently it is reported that an agreement was reached by Capt. Pacatte with the Communist Party under which the Communist Party agreed to furnish personnel and safe houses to be used by OSS for its intelligence and operational purposes and, in return, OSS was to allow such agent personnel, from time to time, to keep the Communist Party advised
- 4. The personnel working with Lt. Goff is as follows. Lt. Lossowski, Lt. Fajans, and Lt. Wolff. Lt. Goff reported for duty at Sisma about the end of July, 1944, where he carried on by hisself until about 1 October, 1944. He was relieved and assigned the duty of recruiting German agents. He made his headquarters in Rome, paying periodic visits to Siena headquarters and the Brindisi training area. He returned to Company D headquarters in Florence in mid-Harch 1945. Lt. Lussowski



ran the training area in Brindlet until he was transferred to Siena in Cotober to replace Lt. Goff. He was hospitalized in January with jaundice. Upon release from the hospital he took several where restand then took over the training area near Cecims. It. Fajake registed Lt. Lossowski at the Brindlet training area in Getober. He made several trips to Africa to recruit German agents and came the title headquarters in January, when Lt. Lossowski was sent to the hospital. Lt. Wolff was sent to France on a mission at the end of September 1944, and was returned to Brindlet about the end of Getober. He replaced Lt. Fajans when the latter was transferred to Complay I headquarters. He has continued at the training area since its removal to Cocima.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/

6. It. Coff had in the field in July, 1944, seven teams. The present number in the field is eighteen, comprising forty-three personnel. In addition to those in the field there are twenty-three agents and radio operators being held at the training area for infiltration into Austria. Operational results have been good. Recent teams infiltrated have been briefed to stress intelligence as much as operations, this in view of the general military situation as well as general Army directives restricting unlimited organization of partisans. Financial costs of these missions has been below average. The entire work of recruiting, training, briefing and direction while in the field has been done by the officers listed, with the help of four enlisted men.

6. The Goff chain has accounted for the following signal traffic from 10 November to 15 April, 194 & 1

| · | T.4./_ | | | 741 | | |
|---------|-----------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|------------|
| Station | No. Maga. Received | No. Intell. Items Rocvd | Non-Intell. Ops. Mags. Red. | Mags Sont | Non-Inte Cya.Naga | |
| MARGOT | 580 | 776 | 2 | 165 | Q | CSF (Male) |
| DODGERS | 407 | 372 | 0 | 94 | ā | |
| MELE | 373 | 318 | Ð | 155 | ì | |
| MARINA | 442 | 318 | 5 | 130 | ī | |
| JUNEAU | 32 | 24 | 0 | 15 | Ō: | ٠ |
| GRAVES | 1.41 | 117 | 1 | 73 | ō | - 1 - |
| (Chica | ago) | | | , - | ~ | |
| ODETTE | 82 | 11 | 1 | 32 | 0 | - ; |
| SOPHIE | 60 | Б | 1 | 17 | ō. | 小潭 |
| TIGERS | 87 | 26 | 3 | 24 | Ď | .9 |
| TETAS | 38 | 33 | 1 | 6 | <u> </u> | p × |
| Totals | 2232 | 1936 | 19 | 621 | 3 | |

Average 0.86 intelligence items per message received.

-2-1

USSECCET

This is a high average of messages per team and a good percentage of missions operating.

7. Compilation of other field traffic for the same period from

| Total | The second secon | idak nagata ku | الم المواقعة | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| Station No. Mags. Received | No. Intell. Items Recyd | Non-Intell Open Mese. | · Kegs. | No. | intell. | | | |
| MERIDEN 632 GOEI 390 MARIANNA 105 SALEM 302 (Joliot) YOUNGSTOWN 412 LOBO 268 EAYBFOOK 25 AUGUSTA 188 (Baldwin) FIROSCAFO 39 LOCUST 159 ROSETTA 205 BETTY 138 ANITA 119 CROLWELL 99 WESTWOOD 181 ELINOR 115 Totals 3877 | 648 529 55 208 260 165 12 87 47 167 116 88 57 47 91 65 | 2 1 2 3 3 3 0 1 0 1 5 0 1 1 | 96 130 35 74 112 14 63 24 29 46 22 30 24 15 | | Maga Rain | | | |
| Totals 3877 | 2622 | 24 | 38 | <u>o</u> 8 | | | | |

Average 0.77 intelligence items per message.

The ratio of non-intelligence and non-operational messages for these teams in messages received is 0.71% as compared to 0.85% for the doff missions. For messages sent to the field the average for the latter teams is 0.93% as compared to 0.32% for the Goff missions.

8. Upon assuming command of the Company I was instructed that no activities in support of any political party were to be allowed, this ruling to include support through agents or radio. Consequently I kept as close a check as possible on signal traffic as well as on the agents involved. On 10 November, 1944, a signal from Scoccimerra (Erceli) to Gallo (head of the Communist Party in enemy occupied Italy) came to my me of the agreement set forth in Paragraph 3 above. On the advising this discussion I addressed a letter dated 10 November to the Commanding Officer, Regiment (attached as Appendix "A"), setting forth my views and

HERNOTE WHEN THE WAR AT

III SECOLI

requesting a directive. On 13 November I sent to Colonel Cleville signal (attached as Appendix "H"), setting forth sy views and ripequesting his decision. Reply dated 14 November (attached as Appendix "C") set forth the policy desired by Regiment. On 15 November signal (attached as Appendix "D") was received in answer to my letter of 10 November. The policy as outlined in the above has been excrited through to the best of my ability and the traffic has been excellibly watched. The next instructions bearing on the matter were verbal instructions from Col. Rosen which were later confirmed by Col. Glavin's instructions dated 16 April (Appendix "E").

- 9. In view of the instructions of 16 April all braffle has been reexamined. The meanages listed as neither intelligence per operational have been carefully gone ever in the light of the complaints recently made with regard to this traffic. In my opinion all classify well within the directive issued in Nevember. Incidentally, I have made commission t complaint to Lts. Goff, Lossowski, etc., about this type of message -- not however on account of the political flavor but simply because they, in my opinion, are "full of bull" and waste valuable eigher groups and time on the air. A study of them will I believe bear out these remarks. I further believe that a careful atudy will indicate that where instructions have been given, they uniformly urge unity of action by all parties against the Nasi-Pagoists, and discarding of individual political action and the support of the CIN and Bonomi government. All three of these points have been urged by all Allied a encies as basic tenots to all partisan forces. The messages listed in Appendix "E" represent the worst of the sonintelligence and operational messages. I feel they likewise come under the descriptions riven above.
 - 10. From the facts set forth above it appears:
 - a. That whether wisely or unwisely agreement was made to use Communist agents for intelligence and operational purposes.
 - b. That the existence of such an agreement was made known to Regiment as scon as it was made known to me.
 - o. That Regiment concurred in the continuance of said agreement.
 - d. That traffic since Regimental policy was enunciated has been within the limitations set forth.
 - e. That traffic has been of a high intelligence and operational value, fully in line with other field stations.

- f. That percentage of traffic of non-intelligence made non-operational nature has been at least at greater than that of other chains.
- g. That advice and instructions given in such in the little land and non-aperational messages has been sound are along the lines desired by all Allied agencies.
- 11. In my opinion the following conclusions may be demand:
- a. OSS had certain intelligence and operational objective to obtain, -- among which was political intelligence, regulated of the color of that intelligence. We have agents from the party ical parties. The Communist Party is among the stronger in Martin Italy. To leave out contacts with it would seem dissistrate for a balanced intelligence picture.
- b. The agroement with the Communist Farty opened an average to political intelligence not otherwise available and at the same time provided valuable military intelligence and operations.
 - c. The price paid has been cheap for the results obtained.
- d. Criticism cannot properly be made of it. Goff, who, for carrying out an agreement concurred in by Regiment.
- 8. Revision of the policy or cancelling of the agreement will mean loss of very valuable field missions, which at this date would soom inexcusable from both military and pulitical standpoints.
- 12. The above report has attempted to give the facts as they are known here and my evaluation of these facts as objectively as possible. It is not intended as a defense of the officers concerned, but it is a defense of the Regimental policy involved. I do not know what if any actions outside their official duties have brought about the G-2, AFEG opinion on the personnel. If the opinion is based on facts available to me I cannot help but feel that so far as their official actions in conducting and carrying out the Regimental policy is concurred, and so far as Regimental policy itself is concerned, G-2 AFEQ has not been presented with a fair picture of the, situation.

13. I request that I be advised of any further action desired.

WILLIAM G. SUHLING Major, Infantry

Commanding

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

APPENDIX OF

SUNJECT: Communist Agents.

APO 512, U. S. Army.

- 1. The question of the use of oss radio fastilities by the Connection that y has come up for discussion by the townwell and concern with Communist activities. This whole matter is discussed from the field evidence.

 The whole matter is discussed.
- 2. The first question, mamely the use of OSS radio familiation, is follows: I am informed that Major Koch made a verbal agreement with the Communist party in Naples that we, OSS, would forward to the field all coming measures received from the field, we retaining septem of the field all measures. This agreement was made in return for the Communist Party of all the ing available to OSS the best agents available from their membership.

 The following measure (#45 to Marina) was sent out on 8 measures.

"From Erooli, 1 November 1944; We call the attention of all the organizations of the party and of all the somrades to our duties at the present moment. The declarations of the leaders of the United Nations during and after the meetings at Quebec and Mossow have underlined the fact that we are in the last months of the war. Churchill said the war might even be ended before Christman but might last until apring. It is evident that these declarations impose upon all combatants against the Hitlerian Germany the duty of immediate action and greatest of fort to reduce to a minimum and make victory as soon as possible. Communists and Italien Patriots must multiply their activities in this moment. If we augoood in foreing the Germans to abandon our country quickly is would be a great victory for us and all the forces of liberty. Collect all your onorgies, plunge yourselves into the struggle with greater decisions. onsolous of the fact that it will be the last decisive effort. Strange then your battle lines and extend it in all manners and forms. Do not give any rest to the Gormans and to the Faccists. Attack them with all wonpons. Dostroy them, kill them. Unloach all possible revolts among the masses in the occupied regions. Forward, for the most rapid semplete

3. We question the propriety as well as the advisability of centing to allow the Communist Party to send messages to the field in which prioty in allowing them to send any instructions or messages to the field in which provided such messages and instructions or messages to the field Communist Party. The work mil the Communist agents are doing for us is

USSECRE

Party stating that they would be allowed to send and receive he committee through us, it would be a breach of faith for us to at this date refuse to continue the terms of our agreement. In my opinion they we like made such a breach of faith. In view of their chains for and with us if we dation that we continue to send messages, but only provided they do not run along party lines. I request that Regiment Readquarters of the benefit of a ruling on this matter.

4. The following cables were received from Major Smith of S

(#4 from Mercury) "Happy to hear Hall all right. Give him all possible support. According to unconfirmed reports, Russians includerwise from Ampezzo Valleute Tolmezzo and have left San Francesco. Will make to area of Sauris to receive daylight drop if this is true. In is ruse mored that reason for withdrawal is to meet threat of Jugiand Martisans to Italian horder. If this is true and we receive arms at once, we will be able to raise hell with German traffic on route Sensons Ponisible."

(#5 from Moreury) "Nicholson (a British efficer) and myself lixing perfectly. Recent events necessitates the placing of all CSS litation agents this area under my command. A sentinuous spreading of domaintal propaganda by our agents and others prevents complete union bedieven CSCPPC and Garibaldini. OSCPPO is non-political. Unless these agents are placed under my command and informed of such immediately and I be consulted about ontry of all OSS personnel to this area, my mission is coming out promis."

We propose answoring these two messages with the following:

"Re your Number 4, situation is as follows: Regular resupply to Partisans in desired quantities cannot be expected during winter months. The proposed mass drops of about 40 tons may be expected not extens than once per month and probably less often. Purpose mass drops is to provide food, clothing and sufficient ammunition to allow Partisans to protect themselves throughout winter months. Drops are not expected to provide sufficient supplies for any offensive actions. In view of above, Partisans should attract as little attention from the enemy as possible, under no circumstances inviting mopping-up operations. You will instance instructions.

"Re your Number 5. Any previous instructions as to your dubies are horewith rescinded. Your instructions are:

*1. To establish yourself at such suitable location in relation to mass dropping ground D Z as will enable you to be present at the drops.

"2. To supervise the fair distribution of these supplies jointly with British officer present according to instructions sent from here and No. 1 Special Force.

- 2 -

USSEGNET

- 93. To inform the Partisans of policy to be followed egather the
- "4. To collect and pass on to this headquarters all fater frame
- not participate in nor interfere with, day political actions of states the Partiesns nor our agents.
- ond you will be informed of the entry into your area. In this special Force teams, but you will not take command of them nor of these already there. Your mission is for listen purposes and advice to the Fartisans, and not to command.
- "7. You will inform us if you are willing to follow these orders. If your decision is negative, we will try to arrange your evacuation by Lysander, and instructions will be sent you as to disposition of other personnel with you."

This matter is brought up under this head as indicating the feeling of ame American officer in the field. The briefing of Major Smith was not done by any of the personnel at this headquarters, nor are we informed as to what his briefing was. For this reason we have felt it wise to give him the instructions as set forth in the above telegram. As he is taking a position, which in our opinion is contrary to OSS directives and objectives, I request that Regimental Headquarters decision be sent in regard to the proposed cable being set up for Smith as similar occurrences may come up from time to time.


5. This letter is being forwarded by pouch tonight and we request that you wire us your decisions. The position with reference to both points requires prompt and immediate action.

WILLIAM G. SUHLING, JR. Major, Infantry Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

| CO, | 26 | 7 | 7t | h | | R | 0 | g | t | 0 | S | 8 | | | | 1 |
|------|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|--|--|---|
| Ops | å | T | ng | ; | ٠ | • | • | • | • | | • | | | | | 1 |
| s.ı. | | • | | • | | • | | | | | | | | | |] |
| File | | ٠ | ٠. | • | | | e | | | | | ٠ | | | | 1 |

U.S.SECTET





APPENDIX HAW

Cable to Clavin, Caserta from Shiling, Siene, 1562


"I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT A VERBAL ACREEMENT MAS MADE BETWEEN MAJOR KOCH AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN NAPLES BY WEIGH AGREEMENT OSS WOULD TRANSMIT TO THE PIRILD PARTY MESSAGES AND RECEIVE THEIR INCOMING MESSAGES IN METURN FOR THE SENT AVAILABLE SEND THESE MESSAGES IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS QUESTIONED BY US. WE CAN SEN NO IMPROPRIETY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S SENDING INSTRUCTIONS IF THAT PARTY IS NOT WE RECOMMEND THAT OSS CONTINUE TO SEND THESE MESSAGES IF THEY DO NOT RUN ALONG PARTY LINES. A RULING BY REGIMENT IN THES

U.S.SECRET





QUESTIONED FROM ERCOLI DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OSS POLICY OF HOS-PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS. THE COMMUNISTS ARE MERCLY UNGSD BY



electorie

O April 1946

SUBJECT: Extracts from cable traffic of GOFF chain.

TO: Executive Officer, 2677th Regt., OSS (Prov), APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. The following are translations of cables sent in the Italian language through stations of the GOFF chain. The stations through which the messages were transmitted, the cable numbers and their respective dates are indicated and underscored. Very little outgoing traffic dealing with the subject of these cables was found.

From ODETTE

No. 4 11 March 1945

"Message for PALMIRO TOGLIATTI. Rome. Message No. 5. 22 February. The great Soviet victory has facilitated the reactivation of the Partisan movement and also of the masses. Strike at 0.M. Srescia; elsewhere widespread unrest; successful coups de main on the part of the SAP. Good resistance to the mopping-up operations of Bielle, Val Sesia, and Val Dossola; a new influx of forces in the Partisan movement. Germans and Fascists are starting again attempts at compremise. Our intension is surrender or death. Our position for transforming the Partisan Formations into regular military units have been accepted in the most essential points. We can realize it. We have impreved the unitarian work with the Socialists. We are trying to seal our relations with the Christian Democrats. The unity with the ChNAI has been strengthened. Signed GALLO."

No. 8 16 March 1945

(Same as No. 236 from MELE).


No. 9 16 March 1945

"Message No. 7 for ERCOLI. Eugenic Curien, founder, animator and lander of the Youth Front was assassinated in the street in the city of Milan by the Fascists on Saturday, 24 February. In his name the Patrict youth tighten their ranks and intensify the fight for liberation to save the honor of their country and the future of the youth of new Italy. Signed GALLO.

No. 10 16 March 1946

I-ARREST AND ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTY OF THE

"Message No. 8 for ERCOLI. An agreement was concluded at Turin between the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. Realisting that there



the Veneto C. L. evidence a trond to advance a proposal at the sample of liberation which would take away the authority from the control gove ormnent and would lead toward secession. We are remuting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the geopte, sould be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition. Signed GALLO.

TO MELE

28 February 1945 No. 91

"For the Commando Unico. We have seen MARI and he is well."

31 March 1946 No. 136

"Ref. your 278. MARIO GUE MANI and PAOLO FABRI, representatives Socialist Party Bologna, left our lines in the middle of February to return to their point of origin. Nothing has been heard from them sines.

From MELL

5 March 1945 No. 216

"To his Excellency SCOCCIMARC, Minister for Occupied Italy. The representative of the Democrazia Cristians has decided (garble) on a separation of the Patriot forces into formations of single parties; in so doing they would break the present unity. The representatives of the Action Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party oppose such a proposition which is against the unitarian principle, and they call for your urgent intervention in regard to the Democrasia (ristians and instructions on the subject. Such a question is of extremely urgenture due to the developments of the military situation. For the Action party, SERGIO; for the Socialist Party, GICRGIO; for the Communist Party, MARIO.

5 March 1945 No. 219

(Same as No. 4 from ODETTE, except that "message No. 5" was cutting



U.S.SEOMET

No. 222 7 March 1946

"To ERCOLI. The workers, men and women, wish to have ness of empedde Ciuseppe Passarenti (or Giuseppe Massarenti) who wall disposed of by Mussolini nine years ago by intermement in the saylim of the shore large deals Pista in Rome. The workers take interest in his status and ago they will furnish him full financial means for more essectioned. The workers will take the responsibility of reinbursing the anount necessary (garble) comfortable living. Assure him that the projective will tone to fight the hated enemy and will be waiting for him when the liberation is completed. Signed SERTI (rest garbled)."

No. 223 7 March 1948

"To ERCOLL. The "Giunta of Intesa" in order to strengthen until of action and to create, in the common fight, the premises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leminist Party of the working class, has decided to promote a general subscription in favor of the "Avanti" unita", to begin the publication of a common chain of Marxist and Leminist articles, and to publish a bulletin of preletarian unity. This press communique was approved at the meeting of the Socialist-Communicat Committee on 26 January. Signed CALLO."

No. 224 & March 1945


"To ERCOII. We do not understand ERCO.I's message concerning the delay concerning the realization of the "Commando Unico" in the unacceptable form which would obstruct our unitarian work. The "Commando Unico" was realized according to the docision preceding the departure of NITLO and pointed out in the WILSON letter. On the lat of January we made the proposal to transform the Partisan Fromations into regular units of the Italian Army; dissolution of the Partisan Commands; strict kierarchical subordination; and conferring of military rank. Signed GALLO. 3 february 1945"

No. 236 15 March 1945

"Mossage No. 6 to ERCOLI. ETTORE has arrived. Taking the pretence of a banal incident which arose between himself and the representative of the Partito d'Azione in the Command, the General handed in his resignation. He demands exclusive military command without interference from the CEMET. feeling himself to be responsible in the first place to the Allies and CASATI from whom he pretends to have received the appointment. We are making efforts to effect a conciliation but this is rendered difficult due to the fact that the General has no sympathy for comprehension what scever of the Fartisan movement and problems, and also because of his scepticism and fundamental hostility toward the organization of the Partisan movement, would fill the post of Commanding General better, and greater power could be granted to him since he has full confidence of Instricts.

GALLO. This message is for ERCOLI. 1 March 1945.*

-3-



no. 237 16 March 1946

(Same as No. 9 from ODETTE except for addition of date " | mron 1860 end of message and emission of massage No. In these to be the second mossage bearing same Mall number containing purely eperational informations.

21 March 1946

(Same as No. 10 from ODETTE except that "message No. 2", will emption).

Nol 263 23 March 1945

"We request you to transmit to the Confederations Generals Fishing des Lavoro for But Federterra, Bone. The reconstruction of fediritary the Province of Bologna meets with great enthusiasm from all interpreted oategories, joined together in a single brotherhood. Category committees being formed with dispatch. We pledge ourselves that he bill of land will be left untilled. We request authorisation to put out in your name a circular for the workers of the Province of Federterra. The mederator to atrongly falt of inviting these workers to fight tegether with their brothers of Bologna for defense of their produce and to bring to an end all dissent between catogories of workers. Greatings for the Provisional Secretariat. BENTI. Repeated gunty. 10 March 1945.

No. 278 29 March 1948.

"We receive from CUMER for SCHOOLWARKS. We urge also to the usual of the Communist Party for your authoritative intervention with the Executive Committee of the Sociadist Party and Allied Command for the immediate return of comrade PAOLO whose presence in our region is indispensable. Signed Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Emilia and Romagne.

To MARINA

No. 130 11 February 1945

"For TONY. Soon as possible establish contact direct with GALLO...." (rest of message deals with operations).


No. 153 28 February 1946

"For GALLO. Am in agreement with your line for the realization of a Unified Command and with your proposal for unity within the army of the Partisan movement. Signed ERCOLL. 26 February 1946,"

From MARINA

No. 500 16 February 1945

"Message from TONY. I am waiting the drop of the WT BERNARDY. Reception field at sheet 55, 4475. On this zone two planes can drop at end time Delegation of the Communist Party requests printing reterial to replace that which was in the sack captured by the Germans in the car of my drop a



- II.S.S.CALT

No. 519 21 February 1945

"From the CLN Delegation of Piemonte. The CLN of Piemonte expresses its admiration for the Soviet Armies victoriously engaged in the increase struggle for the liberation of the populations oppressed by the increase rance of the Soviet Union for the heroism from which the Italian Patrices draw a new enthusiasm and a new drive for the final battle."

No. 525 21 February 1945

(Same as No. 223 from MELE).

No. 626 22 Fobruary 1945

(Same as No. 224 from MELE).

No. 505 17 March 1945

"The Questurn from the Partite d'Aliene and the Municipal Services from the Socialists and Communists. An excellent impression was made on the local CIN by your generous offers of medicines for a reorganization of Medical Services. End of political report."

U.S.S.F.CRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

C BECHET

HEADQUARTERS
2077th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC BERVICES (PROV)
APO 612

20 Acrts 1946

SUBJECT: Report on Traffic Over Circuits to Communist Farty Fartises Equates

To : The Director, OSS, Washington

l. Reference Cable 715(4). Paris to Caserta (First to Vaciditate 1341(4)), at Appendix A. Verbal report was made to Mr. Shegherdeen at Caserta and as requested by him a written report is submitted herewith.

- 2. In support of military operations, this handquarters has been in contact with Partisan Bands of all political leanings, among them the Communist brigados. These operations are dual in characters being for the most part 50 but yielding not inconsiderable 51 material. It is pointed out that 51 and 50 activity is carried on with all bands with which CSS is in contact, trospective of whether our agents in centact are werking for our SI or 50 Branch.
- a. All of those North Italy operations have been conducted under the operational and administrational control of Company D of the Regiment and coordinated with the appropriate military headquarters, 15th Army Groupe
- 3. Regimental Headquarters on 13 Nov 44 received Signal #389; Biena to Caserta, Suhling (Major Wm. G. Suhling, C.O. of Co. D) to Glavin (Colonel E.J.F. Glavin, C.O. of the Regiment), capy at Applicia Ba
- a. Jurisdiction over the problem posed involved two staff meetiens. Since the contacts with the specific Communist bands were through the 100 Branch via the circuits established by Lt. Irving Coff. on the operational side, staff jurisdiction rested with Cel. Wm. P. Davis. then Regimental Operations and Training Officer. In view of the basic problem involved, the matter also required coordination by the Intelligence Officer and Chief of SI. Officer and Chief of SI.
- b. Upon the direction of Cel. Glavin, Cel. Bavis, Cel. Maddax and Lt. Cel. (then Maj.) N.N. Newhouse investigated the matter. Lt. Geff teld this group that the original agreement had been made by Maj. (then Capt.) Andre Pacatte, one time Operations Officer of Company D. at that time commanded by Cel. Alfred D. Routershan. Lt. Geff was then specific instructions by Cel. Maddax and Newhouse never to transmit personness are clearly operational in character without specific products this Commander (Major Suhling), to police carefully all his traffic and at me Commander (Major Suhling), to be used as an implement of the Centre of the Centre of Centre of

c. Further, in acting upon signal at Amendia B. signal Gallage Corp. Caserta te Siena, from Davis and Maddex for Glavin to Subling Copy of Appendix C. was dispatched.

"SECRE

Signal SSS. Sions to Caperte, Juliane to Garde at management Families of

Davis for Glavin to Sublings at suggestion.

from Major Subling dated 10 Nov 48, and Jests General Townson and Jests General Townson and Appendix F.

been submitted (Appendix D) and answered (Appendix D) a street with account reply to the remaining question peaced by para. 3, 500, Cameria to Street, Darks.

6. Subsequently there was interest shown by ANG. Coll (Mr. College) of our efficer personnel. Special conversity was desirable of each and incoming mail for Lt. Michael Jimines. 20 for the college of community was informed spet checks had revealed his wife was formating.

a. Similar special axil consorthip was instituted on wasters during March by G.3 (OI) for Lt. Goff, Lt. Vincent Leaponski, Lt. Inving

7. Late in March, Cel. Earle B. Nichele. Read of AFRA (Mass CE) informed Maj. Graham Erdwurm. Chief of X-2 MEDTO, that the theater wished OSS to act quickly on the evacuation of certain efficers issuediately after VI (Victory in Italy) Day. The efficers listed were Li. Geff. Lie Lieuwaki. Lt. Jiminez, Lt. Wolff and Lt. Fajans. It was made clear that while the theater authorities understood our use of these men, it was believed been to return them to the States as seen as their assignments were completed our if this condition did not arise prior to constitute of heatilities in Italy.

a. This ruling was communicated to certain key personnel that it would be implemented without delay.

8. To avoid discussion, plans for Austria and Merch Italy which names. Since some of these teams were to serve under the direction of the Vincent J. Scamperine. Chief of Italian Division SI, it was desired interest to acquaint him of the decision by APRC.

a. This was done by the Executive Officer on 39 Mar 45 when its Scamperine passed through Caserta enroute from Rome to Paris. These Exercise Mr. Scamperine commented on the wiston of the decision and in passing pressed his belief that Lt. Geff was transmitting accounts for the Communical Party in Rome to North Italian Communist brigades ever Old Circuits. Communist funds further on the subject. Mr. Scampering said he was succeed the report back to headquarters on his return from Paris as that the matter wight be explored thoroughly.

SECHE

SECHEL

orders cited in para. S(b) above fives to Lts Gerff a Forestian in management of the late before Col. Rissell B. Iversory, then lett a forestian in management, the present of the transfer of the late of the lat

10. Comminisations Dranch was requested to bythe to Restautions. as quickly and quietly as possible, the original account files at

s. Dile was done and the files (in Itelian Language) were then ever to Mr. Scamperine who was anked to oull out the landsmages for the Communic t Party" transmitted by Lie Goff.

11. At Aurendia H is letter, dated 9 April 48, subjects "Estraction Cable Tructic of Goff Chain", which was submitted by Hr. Schappering in

a. Hr. Scamporine pointed out that these messages required interpretation since their significance was apparent only when related to the Party's pelicy and his interpretation as digested by Lt. Early Margar of the Pelitical Divinien. SI Reperts Section. this Residenties is at

18. The record was referred to Chief X-8, for epiaton. Copy of his recommendation to at Appendix Is.

a. In view of the expressed taterest of Col. Michels in this persennel, Appendix H was shown to him and an informal spinian was requested.

13. On 16 April 45, an orders dony at appendix I was disputched to the Commander of Company D by Col. Olavin covering the subjects


14. On the same date, signal 1020(4). Casorta to Paris, | Casorta to Washington 4435(4)) at Appendix M was dispatched inferming the Director


18. In response to the inquiry in para one of Angentin is it is pointed out that action on this matter was in fact expedited and communication cated to higher headquarters as soon as presetteable.

16. For the record, this Feedquarters requested a written manage andum on the performance of the cited officers from their temperature This has been received from Maj. Judeon B. Smith. Operations Officer Co. E. and Chief 80. See letter dated 18 Aprile subject: Repart on Lt. Diving Geff, Lt. Vingent Laggeweki, Lt. Irving Fajans and Lt. Milien Walff.

17. The above and all the appending tabulated harein were referred to Chief. SI, and Chief, R.D. for demant. Chief the Chief etates "the entire report is factually correct inserer as Law assets with the case," Celenel Maddox for 31 sprint tod a memoral distance.

SECAL







INCOMING BIRGSFIGE VOS (PARAPHRASE COPY

13 Nevember 1946 Date From: SIEKA


To: Action: EG

Precedunces bulgare

Nr. #389


GLAVIN FROM SUHLING

I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT MAJ. KOCH MADE A VINEAL AND MENT WENT HE COMMUNIST PARTY IN NAPLES TRAT OSS WOULD PORWARD PARTY MESSAGES TO THE FIELD AND RECEIVE INCOMING MUSSAGES IN RETURN PGS. TELL TEST AGENTS: 報信 起題 AVAILABLE FROM PARTY MEMBERS. WE QUESTION THE ADVISABILITY OF COUNTERFEE TO SEND MESSAGES IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS SPECIFICALLY MINES. COMMUNIST AGENTS ARE DOING FINE WORK. IT WOULD BE A BRHACE OF THE TREE TO REFUSE NOW IF AGREEMENT WAS MADE. RECORDEND THAT WE GO ON SEMPLEMENT MESSAGES IF THEY DO NOT RUN ALONG PARTY LIKES. REGIMENTAL RULLING ON THIS SAMPLE IS requested.



Verbation copy of original

"The making of an exact copy of this message is turbidden



IMCOMPRES THEATAGE FORES

Prom:

Prom:

Prom:

Prom:

Information

No. \$388

GLAVIN PROM SUMLING

- 1. THE FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF S REMARKS OF STREET AND MAJ. SKITH (KERGURY):
- A. If husbians koving from medica and he celt and described we can oreast havoc with enemy tradpica.
- D. ALL OSS ITALIAN AGENTS THIS REGION HUNT BE THESE AT ADMINISTRATION OF OSSPPO AND CARIDALDISI PREVENTED BY CHARGE AND ASSETS. UBLESS THESE AGENTS ARE PLACED UNDER MY COMMAND AND ASSET TOLD OF SUCH AT ONCE, AND I AM COMSULTED ABOUT THE SETTEM OF AGE.

 OSS PERSONNEL THIS REGION, MY MISSION IS COMING OUT QUICING.
- 2. AS SMITH'S BRIEFING IS NOT KNOWN HERE, THE RELEASED PROPOSED BY US:
- A. VINTER DEOPS VILL BE MINIMUM ANDUMY TO IDEA PARTIES OF THUS THEY SHOULD BE ADVISED TO ATTRACT AS LITTLE ATTRACTOR AS POSSIBLE. DO NOT ASK FOR MOP-UPS.
- B. ANY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS OF YOUR SURIES AND RESIDENCE.
 - (1) SHT TOURISH UP 19/20 IN IN DRUGO WERE PRESENTED AT DROPE.
 - (B) ||UPRILIES DIRECTORION COLUMN THE RESERVE |

HEAQUARTURS

PARAPHRASE COPY


| Date | |
|---|--|
| Date | |
| From: | |
| * rOW : | The same of the same |
| | Precedence |
| The second residue and the | |
| To: | |
| | the state of the second and are the second and the state of the second and the state of the second and the second and the state of the second and the second |
| | Information |
| bear to the same of the same of | |
| • | The state of the s |
| Nr. | The state of the s |
| 6 T 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |

- (3) THE PARTICANS OF POLICY MALINE HEAT ACCORDINGS
 TO INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL SECURITY FROM US.
 - (4) COLLECT AND SEED TO US ALL INTELLIGENCE.
- (II) REPORT ON OUR AGENTS! POLITICAL ASSISTANCE, MIT MAD PARTICIPATE OR INTERFERE WITH PARTICLE OR ASSIST POLITICIE.
- (6) HECEIVE AND AID INCOMING TEAMS. THE VILL BE INFORMED.

 OF ALL OSS AND NUMBER ONE SF TEAMS THAT ARE EXPEDITED. FOR VILL.

 KOT ASSUDE COMMAND OF THEM HOR OF THE TEAMS ALMEADY TEMES.

 YOUR MISSION IS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURFOSES AND YOR LIAISON AND ADVICE TO THE PARTISANS. AND NOT TO COMMAND.
- YOU BY LYSANDER, AND WILL DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISPATCH OF OTHERS WITH YOU.
- AND OBJECTIVES. SINCE SI





og Uligecher

2677TH RECIMIENT CIS (PROVINCENAL) APO 55L U. S. ARMY

Marian Inc.

SUBJECT: Communist Agents.

TO Germanding Officer, 2077 H Roge Code (Drum), APO 511, U. S. Army.


1. The question of the use of OSS radio facilities by the Grant last Party in Italy has come up for discussion by It. Instantial and a walking concern with Communist activities. This while sation is discussed below as to separate items, though each ties in which the other.

2. The first question, namely the use of deli radio facilities, is as follows: I am informed that Major Koch ander a verbal agreement with the Communist Party in Maples that we, Odd, would forward to the Malle est messages which the Communist Party wished to send and would haddle all forming messages received from the field, we retaining copies of such massages in our files, and of course informing the Communist Party of all messages. This agreement was made in return for the Communist Party of all ing available to OSS the best agents available from their messages. The following message (#45 to Marina) was sent out on 8 Hovenburg

"From Ercoli, 1 November 1944: We call the attention of all the organizations of the party and of all the conrades to our design at the present moment. The declarations of the leaders of the United Intions during and after the meetings at Quebuc and Moscow have underlines the fact that we are in the last months of the war. Churchill said the war might even be anded before Christmas but might last until spring. It is evident that these declarations imposu upon all combatents against the Hitlerian Germany the duty of immediate action and greatest offert to reduce to a minimum and make victory as soon as possible. Communication Italian Patriots must multiply their activities in this somet. It was succeed in forcing the Germans to abandon our country quickly it would be a great victory for us and all the forces of liberty. Collect all your energies, plunge yourselves into the struggle with greater decision conscious of the fact that it will be the last decisive effort. then your battle lines and extend it is all manners and forms. In walk give any rest to the Germans and to the Fasciets. Altack them with the weapons. Destroy them, kill them. Unleash all possible reveils same the masses in the occupied regions. Forward, for the most rapid business

3. We question the propriety as well as the advisability of constituting to allow the Communist Party to send messages to the Field it while the Communist Party is specifically mandismed by mass. We see as impropriety in allowing them to send any instructions or assistages to the Field provided such massages and instructions do not specifically refer to the Communist Party. The work the Communist agents are doing for as

USSECRET



excellent in every respect. If an agreement was made with the Communication stating that they would be allowed to send the receive absenced through us, it would be a breach of faith for us to at this diffe refuse to continue the terms of our agreement. In my opinion they would be justified in cancelling the work of their chains for any with ay if me made such a breach of faith. In view of the above, it is my recommission that we continue to send assenges, but only provided they do make the benefit of a ruling on this matter.

4. The following cables were received from Major Smith on 9

(#4 from Mercury) "Happy to hear Hall all right. Give him all possible support. According to unconfirmed reports, Sussians withdrawing from Ampezzo Vallento Tolmenzo and have left San Francesco. While more to area of Sauris to receive daylight drop if this is true. It is removed that reason for withdrawal is to meet threat of Angland Particular to Italian border. If this is true and we receive area at once, so while be able to raise hell with German traffic on route Sensone Poniciple."

(#5 from Mercury) "Micholson (a British officer) and mysuif liasing perfectly. Recent events necessitates the placing of all OSS Mealism agents this area under my command. A continuous spreading of communist propagands by our agents and others prevents complete union between OSOFFO and Garibaldini. OSOFFO is non-political. Unless these agents are placed under my command and informed of such immediately and I be consulted should entry of all OSS personnel to this area, my mission is coming out promise."

We propose answering these two messages with the following:

"Re your Number 4, situation is as follows: Regular resupply to Partisans in desired quantities cannot be expected during winter sonths. The proposed mass drops of about 40 tons may be expected not oftener than once per month and probably less often. Purpose mass drops is to provide food, clothing and sufficient ammunition to allow Partisans to protect themselves throughout winter months. Drops are not expected to provide sufficient supplies for any offensive actions. In view of above, Partisans should attract as little attention from the enemy as possible, under no circumstances inviting mopping-up operations. You will instruct instructions.

"Re your Number 5. Any previous instructions as to your duties are herewith rescinded. Your instructions are:

"l. To establish yourself at such suitable location in relation to mass dropping ground D Z $\,$ as will enable you to be present at the drops.

"2. To supervise the fair distribution of these supplies jointly with British officer present according to instructions sent from here and No. 1 Special Force.



- "3. To inform the Partisans of policy to be followed springs the enamy according to instructions you will receive from us.
- "4. To collect and pass on to this headquarters all lavelliness of whatever nature.
- "5. To report any political activity by our agents, but you will not participate in nor interfere with, any political detains of sinker the Partisans nor our agents.
- "6. To receive and assist any tours coming into your area of these and you will be informed of the entry into your area of both fell and lies is Special Force teams, but you will not take command of them now of these already there. Your **Firefills** is for liaison purposes and advice to the Partisans, and not to command.
- "7. You will inform us if you are willing to follow these erders. If your decision is magative, we will try to arrange your evaduation by Lysander, and instructions will be sent you as to disposition of other personnel with you."


This matter is brought up under this head as indicating the feeling of an American officer in the field. The briefing of Major Smith was not done by any of the personnel at this headquarters, nor are we informed as to what his briefing was. For this reason we have felt it wise to give him the instructions as set forth in the above telegram. As he is thicking a position, which in our opinion is contrary to OSS directives and objectives, I request that Regimental Headquarters decision be sent in regard to the proposed cable being set up for Smith as similar occurrences may come up from time to time.


5. This letter is being forwarded by pouch tonight and no request that you wire us your decisions. The position with reference to be points requires prompt and immediate action.

WILLIAM G. SUHLING, OR Major, Indanty, Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

| co, | 26 | 57 | 71 | th | | R | e | g | t | | 0 | S | S | | • | • | • | • | • | | 2 |
|-----|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8q0 | & | T | nį | 3 | • | ٠ | • | • | • | ٠ | • | • | ٠ | • | ٠ | ٠ | • | • | • | • | 1 |
| S.I | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F11 | | | | | | | | | | | • | | ٠ | | | | | | ٠ | ٠ | 1 |





HEADQUAITE IF
2071H REGIMINT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SURVICES (FROY)
AFO 612

9 April 1945

SUBJECT: Extracto from cable traffic of COFF chains

TO : Executive Officer, 2677th Regt., GBS (Preu), ABB 512, U. S. Army.

1. The following are translations of sables need in the Italian language through stations of the GOTF claim. The stations through which the messages were translated, the calle numbers and their respective dates are indicated and underscored. Very little outgoing traffic dealing with the subject of these cables was found.

From ODETTE

No. 4 11 March 1945

"Mossage for PAIMIRO TOGLIATTI. Home. Message No. 5. 22 February. The great Soviet victory has facilitated the readsized tion of the Partisan movement and also of the masses. Siring at 0. M. Brescia; elsewhere widespread unrest; successful coaps de main on the part of the SAP. Good resistance to the application of part of the SAP. Good resistance to the application of forces in the Partisan mevement. Germans and Fasciste are starting again attempts at compromise. Our intimation is surrender or death. Our position for transforming the Partisan Formations into regular military units have been accepted in the most essential points. We can realize it. We have improved the unitarian work with the Socialists. We are trying to seek our relations with the Christian Democrats. The unity with the CINAI has been strengthened. Signed GALLO."

No. 8 16 March 1945

(Same as No. 236 from MELE).

No. 9 16 March 1945

是我们的我把她们的说话,可是

"Message No. 7 for ERCOLI. Eugenio Curies, founder, animator and leader of the Youth Front was assessmented in the street in the city of Milan by the Fascists on Saturday, 24 February. It has name the Patriot wouth tighten their ranks and intensity

° SEGRET ©

the fight for liberation to save the honor of their country and the future of the youth of new Italy. Signed Galley

No. 10 16 March 1945

"Message No. 8 for ERCOLI. An agreement was constructed at Turin between the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Beach crats. Realizing that there is a community of interests and free the masses of people concerning insurrection, eparation and free construction with a mutual respect for everyone's political and religious convictions, we agreed on periodic somethering of and on united action within the CIN for the strengthening of syndical unity. We are trying to overcome epposition to obtain a similar agreement in the Central Committee. Signed dation."

No. 32 29 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. Message No. 9. Some elements of might responsibility of the Veneto C. L. evidence a trend to advance a prepent at the moment of liberation which would take away the authority from the central government and would lead toward sectionity. We are reacting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the people, could be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition. Signed GALIO."

TO MELE

No. 91 28 February 1945

"For the Comando Unico. We have seen MARIO and he is well."

No. 136 31 March 1945

"Ref. your 278. MARIO GUERMANI and PAOLO FAERI, Representatives Socialist Party Bologna, left our lines in the middle of February to return to their point of origin. Nothing has been heard from them since."

From MELE

No. 216 5 March 1945

"To his Excellency SCOCCIMARRO, Minister for Occupied Italy."
The representative of the Democrazia Cristians has decided (garble) on a separation of the Patriot forces into formations of single parties; in so doing they would break the present unity. The representatives of the Action Party, the Societies.

SEGGET

SECRET

Party and the Communist Farty oppose such a prospection which is against the unitarian principle, and they call for your urgent intervention in regard to the Democrasic Gristians, and instructions on the subject. Such a question is of extremely urgent nature due to the developments of the misse tary situation. For the Action Farty, MARGIO; for the Socialist Party, GIORGIO; for the Communist Party, MARGIO.

No. 219 5 March 1945

(Same as No. 4 from ODETTE, except that massage No. 5" was omitted.)

No. 222 7 March 1945


"To ERCOLI. The workers, men and women, wish to have asses at comrade Gluseppe Fassarenti (or Gluseppe Massarenti) who was disposed of by Mussolini nine years ago by intermement in the asylum of the Sucre Maria della Pieta in Rome. The workers take interest in his status and say they will fursien bim full financial means for moral assistance. The workers will take the responsibility of reimbursing the amount assessary (garble) comfortable living. Assure him that the preletarist of Molinella, without political distinction, has continued and will continue to fight the hated enemy and will be waiting for him when the liberation is completed. Signed BERTI (rest garbled)."

No. 223 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. The "Giunta of Intesa" in order to strengthen unity of action and to create, in the common fight, the premises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class, has decided to premote a general subscription in favor of the "Avanti" and "Unita", to begin the publication of a common chain of Marxist and Leninist articles, and to publish a bulletin of proletarian unity. This press communication was approved at the meeting of the Socialist-Communist Committee on 26 January. Signed GALLO."

No. 224 7 March 1945

"To ERCOLI. We do not understand ERCOLI's message conserning the delay concerning the realization of the "Commado Unico" in the unacceptable form which would obstruct our unitarian work. The "Commando Unico" was realized according to the decision preceding the departure of NULLO and pointed out in the WILSON letter. On the let of January we used the proposal to transform the Partisan Formations into regular units of the Italian Army; dissolution of the Partisan Commands; strict hierarchical subordination; and conferring of military ranks.



e SECRET &

Signed GALLO. 3 February 1945.*

No. 236 15 March 1945

"Message No. 6 to ERCOLI. ETTORE has derived. The same the pretence of a banal incident which arose between himself and the representative of the Partite d'Assone in the Command the General handed in his resignation. He demands exclusive military command without interference from the Cimal exclusive ing himself to be responsible in the first place to the Allies and CASATI from whom he pretends to have received the appointment. We are making efforts to effect a conciliation but this is rendered difficult due to the fact that General has no sympathy nor comprehension whatsover of the Partisan movement and problems, and also because of his securification of the masses for national insurrection. The Commanding General of Picanonte, because of his better emprehension of the Partisan movement, would fill the past of Commanding General better, and greater power could be granted to him since he has full confidence of Patriots. (AALLO, This message is for ERCOLI. 1 March 1945."

No. 237 15 March 1945

(Same as No. 9 from ODETTE except for addition of date of March 1945 at end of message and emission of message No. 70, There is also another message bearing same MELE number scattering purely operational information).

No. 256 21 March 1945

(Same as No. 10 from ODETTE except that "message No. S^{α} , was omitted).

No. 263 23 March 1945

The request you to transmit to the Confederatione Generale
Italiana del Lavoro for Bat Federterra, Rome. The reconstruction of Federterra in the Province of Bolegna meets with great enthusiasm from all interested categories, joined tegether in a single brotherhood. Category committees being formed with dispatch. We pledge ourselves that no bit of land will be left untilled. We request authorization to put out in your name a circular for the workers of the Province of Federterra. The necessity is strongly felt of inviting these workers to fight together with their brothers of Bolegna for defense of their produce and to bring to an end all dissent between categories of workers. Greetings for the Provisional Secretariat. Repeated BUNTY. 10 March 1945.



No. 278 29 March 1945

Me receive from CUMER for SCOCCIMARGO. We arge sind in the name of the Communist Party for your authoritative intervaluation with the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party and Allied Commund for the immediate return of command Figure whose presence in our region is indispensable. Signed Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Initia and Romagna."

TO MALINA

Ng. 136 11 February 1963

"For TONY. boon as possible establish direct contact with GALLO....." (rest of message deals with operations).

No. 153 26 February 1945

"For GALLO. Am in agreement with your line for the Feeligation of a Unified Command and with your proposel for unity within the army of the Partisan movement. Signed ENGALL. 26 February 1945."

From MARINA

No. 500 16 February 1945


"Message from TONY. I am waiting the drop of the WT MERRARDE.
Reception field, at sheet 55,4475. On this zone two planes same drop at one time. Delegation of the Communist Party requests printing material to replace that which was in the sauk captured by the Germans on the day of my drop."


No. 519 21 February 1945

"From the CLN Delegation of Picsonte. The CLN of Picsonte age presses its admiration for the Soviet Armies victoriously excapaced in the enormous struggle for the liberation of the populations oppressed by the Nazi-Fascist tyransy. It sends its brotherly greeting to the peoples and the armies of the Saviet Union for the heroism from which the Italian Patriots draw a new enthusiasm and a new drive for the final battle."

No. 525 21 February 1945

(Same as No. 223 from MELE).





Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1



Message No. 4 (Continued):

Toxt .

"We have improved the unitarian work with the Socialists."

"We are trying to seal our relations with the Christian-Domoorats."

"The unity with the CLNAI has been strengthened."

This is a continuation in Course and Italy of the policy of manying the Socialist Party stigned with the Communist Party 50 the point where the Socialist Party as such loses its identity.

Callo is here passing on what sucosss he is having on a directive with the Christian-Democrate. So far, the Communists have successful in drawing the Christian-Damcerete into a tri-partite arrangement for control of the Italian Lallor move ment.

This is a report by Jaile on the success of the Communities in carrying out directives to keep the CLNAI Intact.

B. Message No. 10, 16 March 1945 from Odette: Gallo states.

"An agreement was concluded at Turin between the Communists, Socialists and Christian-Lomocrats, "copt on paper; Communists Look and speaks of: "Mutual respect for upon Christian-Democrats as reconvictions."

"We arreed on periodic consultations and on united action with CLN for the strengthening of syndical unity."

This exaggerates the actual situation. No such unity exists, exupon Christian-Democrats as reactionaries. But they are playing "possum," realizing that the Christain-Democrats are see strong at present.

Jallo is continuing the tri-partite arrangement in the Etakian labor movement. Actually it is a misnomer to call "syndical unity" the struggle on the part of the three parties to obtain control of the Italian Labor movement.

C. Message No. 23, 29 March 1945:

"We are reacting by supporting the unified authority of the central government, which, in case it did not respond to the situation and the aspirations of the people, could be changed in a normal way as governments can be changed even in our condition."

Ma Secule.

Gallo is reporting on his attempt to keep certain elements from seceding. By "our condition," Callo refers to the chaptic state of Italian affairs. There is social unrest, but the Communist Party has not sufficient strength to obtain control of the government by

IIP SECULT

7 6

Menneko No. 88 (Gairt Money)

Comment

rore, to control the important covernment departments, and advantage by subsettlesses and not by revolution.

D. Mossage No. 216, 5 March 1945 from Mele:

Socialist and Communist Parties of the attempt on the part of the Christian-Democrats to separate patriot formations into positive party formations. This is contrary to established Communists policy. Yet the attempt of the Christian-Democrats constitutes actually the present state of affairs, since the Communists their partisans as well as the Socialists and Actionists. When the message states: "Such a proposition is against the unitarian principle," again we have a misrepresentation of the actual situation. In the same message, instructions are requested from Scool imarro, and also his intervention here with Christian-Democrat

. Message No. 223, 7 March 1945:

Text

Commont

"To strengthen unity of action and to create, in the common fight, the promises for the creation of the single large Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class."

This hardly needs comment. Gaile again reports results on directatives issued to him.

F. Message ho. 224, 7 March 1945:

"On the first of January we made the proposal to transform the Partisan Formations into regular units of the Italian Army."

Infiltration and domination of the Army by the Communista would be accelerated if this proposal to Ercoll were activated.

7. Mossage No. 236, 15 March 1945;

This message from Tailo to Ercoli is evidence of manipulations on the part or the Communist Party to obtain control of the military situation in the North. The Jeneral referred to in the message is General handed in his resignation." Furthermore, it is not true that the General demanded "exclusive military command without interference from the CLNAI." It is true that the General felt himself responsible to the Allies and Casati, who is the Minister of War. The Commanding

Secret

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

General Of Plannont 1s General Online of the Company of the

H. Message No. 263, 23 March 1946:

COMMENT

No comment confession

from Ercoll:


Toxt


"Am in agreement with your line for the realization of a Unified Command and with your proposal for unity within the army of the Partisan movement." Common t


The proposal did not come from Oslic - dottally to in Communist Party policy. What is meant by "omity within the army" is making the Particula movement part of the Army.

3. Such messages have apparently not been used by OSS as a basis for objective reports on Communist activities — an arrangement which would serve as justification for their transmission. To avoid possible future embarrasament, therefore, it is recommended that the persons responsible be asked to submit a complete report of their relations with the Communist Party, and a report revealing Communist policy in detail. This should go will the record to show that such activities on the part of OSS were permitted in order to obtain intelligence.

MIP SECRET







EDWARD J.F. OLAVIN Celonel Infantry Commanding

Attachment: 1

CONFIDENTIAL

(TINO BITH SAULT) HOTHER DIES ON ATTALLED ON ATTALLED

- TO U.S. J.S (OI) HAS EXQUIPMED US TO TYANGACE TO THE CHEST STATES LTD. GOST, LOSSOVERI. TATAIN AND HOLF, AND S JENTREE SALTHERS. OR VIDTORY IN ITALY DAY OR REPORTS. TREATER HAG HOLD THAT WE GENERAL TELAY FOR DEBRIEFIED PURPOSES.
- S. SCAMPORINO REPORTED RIG BELLED GOTT HAS USED GENERATED.


 HELAY PARTY MESIMORS FROM ROME TO HORIFI ITALY IN DEMNIT VIGILATION

 SPECIFIC ORDERS THIS HOS. THIS IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED. RESILTED

 OF INQUIRY LAID SECONE U.S. G. 3 (CI) USED RECONSTRUED ID ACTION UNDERSTANDING OF VAR HEROPHASIZED HECKSBITY FOR GETTING THEM OUT OF

 THEATER ON OR BEHORE HOSTILITIES CHASE. WE WILL IMPLEMENT.
- 3. PROMOTIONS PENDING FOR LTD. COPP. LOSSONNEI, VALUE AND AME
 JINUEZ. SUBLING HAS RECOMMENDED THEM. WASHINGTON BRAND OF OFFICIENT
 HAS ALREADY APPROVED GOFF AND LOSSONNEI UPON OUR DESIGNATION AND THE CURRENT
 ARE PENDING THERE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ABOVE, RELIEFE PROMOTIONS OF
 ALL FOUR SHOULD RE RECOMMENDED. TOUR ADVICE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

Seriel No. Cable No. MESSAGE CENTER USE ONLY Routing ROM



- I have had a very close hand view, however, of Lt. Lossowski, Lt. Fajans and, to a lesser degree, Lt. Wolff, the latter having moved the agent school and training area to Casaglia from Brindisi about six weeks ago.
- Speaking of the school and training and holding area run by Lt. Wolff and set up by Lt. Goff, I have inspected the school both at Brindisi and Casaglia. The course is typical SO training and my inspections have revealed that the school is run in a very orderly manner, the students are well disciplined and kept busy at their assignments. The physical property is clean and orderly as a military establishment should be, and the establishment is run on a very economical basis. In fact, the cost of the training and holding area is, I would say, below the expense incurred in the usual OSS establishment. This school has been run up to now by Lt. Wolff and Lt. Fajans, as previously men-

OU.S.SECRET O

- 5. When operations are laid on, they apparently go off with maximum efficiency as I have heard of no cases where, because of the desk's failure to prepare the personnel or have them properly equipped, the "snafuing" of an operation resulted.
- 6. I have had occasion to observe it. Lossowski and it. Fajans for approximately four months and it. Goff for approximately three weeks in work in the Operations Room. These men are all unsparing in their time; attend diligently to their duties with every semblance of whole-hearted patricism in winning the war. The direction of their field missions has been intelligent and in no single case have foreved a signal going to the field that did not deal with straight-from-the-shoulder instructions pertaining directly to the military effort.
- 7. I have observed practically every message to and from the field and can say that, on the whole, the intelligence traffic has been on a par with the over-all traffic coming from all stations in enemy occupied territory. The instruction and briefing of agents in guerilla and sabotage tactics has apparently been imparted to the Partisan formations with whom they are operating and, by and large, the Partisan bands with whom they operate have done good for excellent work against the enemy in direct guerilla tactics or in subotage.
- 8. In observing the traffic, there has been a very limited amount of so-called "flag waving", indicating that the "party" was at work and united; in only the most rare instances did such messages not convey allitary intelligence or information along with a sentence or two of flag waving.
- 9. All traffic on each separate agent or mission is kept in a separate file and the record of each mission stands for itself. I would say these records would stand up under even a critical review. These files, in fact, show an effort on the part of the mission head to weld together political parties and factions into a common front for action against the enemy.
- 10. I am also of the definite conclusion that the efforts of Lt. Goff, the other officers working with him and the personnel of his missions have rendered a very substantial contribution to the over-all war effort.

U.S.SECRET®

11. The fact that these men are reputed to be of Communistic leaning or outright Communists has not reflected itself in a single instance that has come to my observation that they are interested in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the underwining of it, nor, for that matter, the overthrow of the existing Italian Government.

12. As stated in the beginning, this report is a purely objective one and represents only my observation of their work and contribution to the Operations Section, Company "D#, and I make no attempt to deal with other than the facts as I have seen them, for any other comment would depend from hearsny.

13. The only opinion I would render on their back-ground is that they appear to be men born from the lower walks of life, of considerably more intelligence than men so born, and who, like most in their sphere, feel that there is a too great divide between the "Have Got's" and

JODSON B. SMITH, Major, A.G.D., Operations Officer.

SECHLI

APPARTED FOR

likalquarters 2077/h Regiment Office of Sunategic Services (Prov.) Apo 612

24 April, 1945

SUBJECT: Reports on Lts. Goff, Lossowski, Pajans & Males

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment, OSS (Free) thru Executive Officer

l. In reviewing the evidence on this case it is important to distinguish between two aspects. First, there is the question as to whether it. Goff and his associates are guilty of violating the directive laid down in our cable #492, dated 14 November, 1944 to Major Subling. If it. Goff is innocent and if, further, he has, as Major Subling. If smith contends, made a magnificent contribution to the military effort, the pending recommendation for promotion should be judged on its own merits. The second question is whether, at the termination of hostilities in the north, it. Coff and his associates should be returned immediately to the United States rather than be allowed to proceed to North Italy or Austria.

In regard to the first question, I am not satisfies with the interpretation of the messages (produced is evidence) as offered by Mr. Scamporing. It should first of all be remembered that these messages have been culled from a great number which have passed over our links and that Major Smith has seen the entire traffic. In his judgment the body of material taken as a whole would stand up under any critical inspection. However, we are obligated to look at the messages which have been brought into question. According to the directive laid down in our cable referred to above, no objection was expressed by this headquarters to messages designed to build morale for the support of military activity or to coordinate military activity. In my view, these messages can be interpreted as a part of a morale-building campaign for the military activities of the Communist Farty, It is true that there are political implications to the organization of the Communist units for military purposes, but the same may likewise be said of every ounce of support which this headquarters and AFHQ has given to CNLAI, with which the Communists are associated. Mr. Scamporing objects to the messages which reveal a plan on the part of the Communists to

SEGRET

(**L**4(4))

cooperate more closely with other parties in the TLAI He alleges that there is a dushing design bolling this plan which is almost at building up communist dissinction. I do not believe it is proper to enter into the question of ultimate Communist Intentions in view of the fact that present military objectives are far better served by con-munist cooperation with all Partisan organizations than the would be il the Communists struck out on a separate little and refused to ecoperate. It should also be remembered that the Communist Party is a recognized political organization in liberatud Italy and has given support to the present Italian regime. It is surely an advantage, even on political terms, that the Communists should at least profess to establish working relationships with the other parties in Northern Tear. There is no evidence in the messages in question to show that the Communists deliberately intend to violate this working agreement when Northern Italy is liberated.

- 3. On the basis of the above argument, I do not believe there has been any serious violation on the part of Lt. Goff and his associates of the directive issued by this headquarters. Indeed, the full responsibility for the policing of these messages was placed on the Commanding Officer of Company D, who in turn placed it on Major Smith.
 If there have been violations, the judgment of Major Sublime and Major Smith must also be brought into question by this headquarters. No two officers in this Regiment would be less likely to countenance activities which had a direct support of the Communist political program than Majors Schmidte and Smith.
- 4. The testimony of Major Smith in regard to the unstinting efforts, skillful operations and wholekeasted devotion to the establishment of field missions on the part of these officers is so strong that in my judgment it warrants giving favorable consideration to the pending promotions.
- 5. As to the question whether Lt. Goff and his associates should be returned to the United States upon the termination of hostilities, I do not believe we have any choice in the matter in view of the directive laid down by G-2, APHQ.

LLIAM P. MADDOX Lt. Colonel, AUS Acting S-2 F. & Chief, \$I, MEDICO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1
HEADQUARTERIS
2977th ILEGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC REGYICES (PROV.)

24 April 1948

HOENCHRAHDUM

TO : Commending Officer, 2677th Regiment.

l. At the time Major Koch teds over as Chief of Operations; OSS Italy in May 1944, the question was raised of people of a type who were fully equipped and qualified to do a jet, as we know it in OSS, concerning the organization of intelligence network; to liaise between OSS Italy and the Resistance Movement in Enemy Occupied Territory; in order to properly coordinate the efforts of the partisan groups in ERN with those of the Atlied armies in Italy. Up until that time the type and callber of personnel was not up to that standard.

APO 612

- 3. In a discussion between Major Roch and Lt. Geff, who was at the time limison between the Communist and Secialist Parties in Italy and the OSS, it was discussed that the Communist and Socialist Parties, being illegal movements during the Fascish rogime, had the necessary experienced personnel who would be able to do a job under our direction. Major Koch suggested to Lit. Goff that he contact the Communist and Socialist Parties in order to be able to get such personnel if they were available. Lite Goff, in speaking with Mr. Roule and Mr. Nenni of the Communist and Spelalist Parties, respectively, in Maples, was able to get the assurance of those Parties that they would be willing to release some of their bost people with the stipulation that they would like to have the possibility of communication with their Parties via our radio. This stipulation was conveyed to Major Kech who agreed, providing that all such messages would have to conform with Allied policy, as regarding the enemy reare
- 3. We were able to obtain 30 or 35 of their people who were subsequently trained, briefed, and sent into Enemy Occupied Territory to organise intelligence networks. It was understood by all of them that they were going in as representatives of the OSS and that all policy, in reference to their work, would eminate from thet organization. All messages that were directed to the Communist and Socialist Parties via our radios, between Allied Liberated Territory and enemy occupied territory, went directly to Operations Section, Company D. All messages from the Communist and Socialist Parties in Liberated Territory, before transmission, had to have the necessary approval of Major Subling, Company D.

SECRET

42.

- 4. All of these messages from the Communist Party is interpreted. Italy were, more or less, exhortations to Communist Party selfers on the other side to get into the fight in order to sid in any shape form or manner by substanting the enemy's rear, in order to sid that Allied armies in Italy. Major Subling sont the general contents of the type of messages to Regiment for approval and clearances. All of the assesses were in line with Allied Readquarters policy.
- terms composed of Communist and Socialist Party members had the addition of their party's sources in receiving information about the enemy's activities through their party besides the intelligence organization that these individuals organized within the varieus mass where they were located. Most of the information was statight military coverage of the enemy's forces within their operations.
- 6. The G-2 Section of the 15th Army Group has been extremely matisfied with the type of military information transmitted by these teams and has, on a number of occasions, taken the trauble to demmend through Company D the excellent coverage concerning the energy a disposition of forces.

VINCENT VINCENT LOSSIDVERI VINCENT LOSSIDVERI Let Lieut. AUS.

LAW OFFICES Julius P. Peyseri ненич в обошнан AARON W JACOBSON July 28, 1946 TO ALL WHOM IT WAY CONCERN: There appears in the newspapers a report nade by He hitch history concerning his testimony before the subcommittee of the light will law Affairs Committee against certain Army of ficers as of a commission from and I desire to tell something about Burton, the Israelizatory I have known Mr. Burton for a long period of time, period thirty-five (35) years. He is approximately 16 years pld, practiced law in Washington, D. C. with George McLanahar until Mr. McLanahar a death in about 1951. Burton, while he was in debt, transferred property at 2631 Carfield Street to his sons. About Pubruary of 1857 he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy claiming some massis with a liability of \$78,155.28. There was no payment made to the cruit love. Prior to his bankruptcy he was sued on 12 or 13 occasions in anomale. ranging from \$6.65 to \$4,800. Four judgments were against him was unreliable in business transactions, and, a banking corporation of which I am an officer, lost \$4,000 on him which was lossed him to He was attorney for Father toughting take care of his family. Mrs. Sherman Malker and many members of the American Conlittion Organization. While I was one of the Receivers for the Carlton Hotel at 180 and K Streets, he spent most of his time loafing around said hetel until one of the floor men suggested that he should eliminate himself from the premises. On July 26, 1948, a tax lien in behalf of the District of Columbia was filed. Court records will prove these statements. Very truly mans. JIP: CTA

28 July 1945 Maj. Gen. William J. Donavan Office of Strategic Services Washington, D. O. Sir: Will you adopt my thanks for your very kind letter of 25 July 1945. And also for the fine stand you took when I, among others, was the object of a smear campaign initiated by Rackin and Burton. It is unfortunate that it has become impossible for us to continue on other missions for your organization. Unfortunate because we now have all the experience and training needed to do a really bangup job without any faltering or blundering around. Unfortunate, too, because we liked working for you and the opportunities to do much for our country appear to abound in the OSS. Should you ever require my services, knowing who and what Iam and what my capabilities and limitations are, I gladly offer them. It is with real regret that I leave your command. Respectfully with worl Milton Wolff 2nd Lt. Inf

2nd Lieut. Milton Wolff 1599 East 18th Street Brooklyn, New York

My doar Lieutenant Holff:

I am sorry that, your mission with us having been performed with great credit, you must now return to the from which you had originally volunteered to serve with use

I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my our observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to our organization.

At all times you have not only shown the discipline and training of a soldier, but a special knowledge in demolition and other skills required in our kind of operation. In addition, you have displayed real ability as an instructor.


More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark.


More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of levelty and develtion to our common country.

Sincerely,

William J. Domoves

Captain Vincont Lossowski 117 Durnan Street Rochester, New York lay deer Ceptain Lossowski: I am sorry that, your mission with as having bost performed with great credit, you must now return to the te from which you had originally volunteered to serve with has I want you to know that upon the testimony of your immediate commanders, as well as from my own observation of you in action, you have been of the greatest service to but organization. At all times you have not only shown the discipline and training of a soldier, but a special knowledge in demolition and other skills required in our kind of operations In addition, you have displayed real ability as an instructor. More especially, you have been of the greatest assistance to our units fighting with the Partisans in northern Italy, which work won the special commendation of General Clark. More than anything else, I want to tell you that you have always shown the highest conception of loyalty and devotion to our common country. Sincerely. William J. Donoven Director





INTEROPPICE

Director TO

FROM: dol. P. B. Welson

SUBJECT:

18 July

Confirming verbal report to Mr. Cheston, the following officers, ex-Spanish Revolutioniats, were transferred from OSS as por instructions during the past week;

Captain Michael A. Jiminez, 02055969; To: Ninth Service Command, Camp Moquaido, Calif.

Captain Irving Goff, 02055518;

Captain Vincent Lossowski, 02055519

lst Lieut. Irving Pajana, 0545925

2nd Lieut. Filton Wolff, 0889197


To:

Bame


To: Samo


To: IPTC, Camp Gordon, Gal.

To: ORD, Ft. Benning, Gs.





SEIRE












United States Government DATE: 10 May 1845 General Donovan PROM Special Investigation Committee Roport on 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Invine Palant. SUBJECT let Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and let Lt. Trying Goff On 8 May 1945, the Committee met to done ider the fellowing cases: 2nd Lt. Milton Wolff, 2nd Lt. Irwing Fafans, Lat Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and let Lt. Irving Goff. You are familiar with each of these officers, and as you recall testified concerning them before the House Military Affairs Comm1ttoe. It is the opinion of the Committee that these officers should be returned to the United States for re-assignment to the Army or released from active duty. The Chiefs of SO and SI have been consulted by Mr. Offers. SO does not have a definite program for the above-named officers, nor is it interested in them for any future assignment. SI is interested in a possible assignment for them with Col. Hoppnor, subject to your decision about retaining them, but there is no definite program fixed. It is recommended that Col. Glavin be directed to return these officers to the United States if he has not already done so, and that in the absence of a specific assignment suitable for their capabilities and satisfying the necessary elements of security that they be released to the army or from active duty, whichever appears more appropriate in the individual case. The Committee has not yet considered the case of Lt. Jiminez, but since AFRQ G-2 has requested his return to the United States, it is recommended that he also be included with the four other officers above mentioned. FOR THE COMMITTEE: 6. J. Monigan, Jr Major, CAC



Report on and Lt. Hilton Welff, and lt. I wing De tens. Let Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and let lo. Lyang Gall.

On 8 May 1945, the Compittee not to emisses the 12 less ing cases: 2nd Lt. Kilton Wolff, and Lt. in its 2nd less in Lt. Vincent Lossowski, and let Lt. Erving the 2nd less sent familiar with each of these officers, and is you remail to find concerning them before the Bone will be affects.


It is the opinion of the Countities that these of lieure should be returned to the United States for desertainment in the Army or released from active dilina

The Chiefs of 80 and 31 have been committed by the committee by SO does not have a definite progres for the severement of ficers, nor is it interested in them for any fature destination. SI is interested in a possible assignment for them with Col. Repper, subject to your feeling mout retaining them, but there is no definite program Simole

It is recommended that Col. Clavin be directed by return these officers to the United States if he has not already done so, and that in the absence of a specific essignment suitable for their capabilities and satisfying the absence closents of security that they be released to the Army or from active duty, whichever appears more apprendicts in the


The Committee has not yet considered the sace of the June but since AFRQ G-2 has requested his return to the based of the States, it is recommended that he also be included that its four other officers above mentioned.

FOR THE COMMUNICATION



TOD: 1635 14 LIAY 1945

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CARES
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE BICKET RIAT



Donwall Faces Quiz of Reds

P.).-A House committee will question Major General William J. Doneven temorrow about reports that some Communist sympathisers see working in his Office of Strategic Elervices.

General Donovan was called to: appear before a subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee which is investigating Army policies toward commissioning Communists.

EXPLORING WHOLE FIELD

EXPLORING WHOLE FIELD

"We want to explore the whole field and get all the information possible" Representative R. Ewing Thomason (D., Tex.), subcommittee chairman told reporters.

In addition to General Donovan, the subcommittee will re-examine war Department officials who teatified earlier that there are no Communists in important uniformed or civilian posts within the department.

BISSELL TO BE QUIZZED

Major General Clayton Bissell, head of Army Intelligence, told the committee several days ago that there are no Communists in the Army as officers.

The committee recalled him for further examination Tuesday, however, fo lowing a published assertion that 10 Communists rold commissions to the Army or Navy. Navy.

and the

In Proble of 'Resks' Republics in CES John


St. 18. Instantial of the control of


allegations in a distinction army on the Navy.

Meanwhile, the full Military affairs committee in planting new investigations of Army hospitals and the treatment of war prisoners, both American and Ails. Both subjects were probed last, year.

H. Rabh Burden committee counsels, said that history counsels will be visited to miss assurance doubly sure that our sich and wounded subject to miss assurance doubly sure that our sich and wounded subject in the counsels are receiving the best justified as are receiving the best justified as will look into allegations that formatic prisoners of was a bat United States prisoners of was a bat United States. prisoners of was a be Un are being spointed.

Office Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT · General Donovan DATE: 15 March 1945 FROM . E. J. Putzell, Jr. SUBJECT: Colonel Cutler called yesterday evening to say he had had an opportunity to renew his aquaintance with Congressman Hart, Chairman of the Dies Committee, when walking down the street yesterday. Colonel Cutler told him the War Department was dollar everything it could towards investigating Communists -- Hart replied that it was an important matter. Upon the Colonel's asking whether Hart had heard about your testimony, he replied that he thought the manner in which you testified had been admirable, that when you said a man was loyal, that meant something to him. Colonel Cutler thought you would like to know you have a staunch supporter in the person of Hart. EJP CC: Colonel Doering





General Donovan 12 Meron 1941 is the additional fact that the Suprame Court has recently expressly stated that it has not yet deliced whether the Communist Party does in fact advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence. The Attorney General in 1942 made such a riling as an administrative finding of fact. Since them, however, the Communist Party was disbanded, and the principles of its successor do not, so far as can be shown, advocate overthrow of the government by such means. 2. From the above it is apparent that Congress has left in a very confused state the posttion of Army personnel who may be shown to be members of the Communist Party. Congress has issued no clear mandate to the War Department as to the policy it should follow. In adopting its recent policy the War Department, in my personal opinion, may well have anticipated the probable decision of the Courts based upon the present state of the law. 3. The position of OSS is not identical with that of the War Department. It does not draft men into the Army although it may on occasion request the Army to commission or induct civilians. It does not pay the salaries of Army personnel. OBS furthermore may choose the personnel which it wishes assigned to it, whether they be Army, Navy, or civilian. With respect to Service personnel OSS obviously endeavors to adhere to the policies and directives of the War and Navy Departments. We are not, however, compelled to take on any personnel whom for any reason we may regard as unsuitable for work in this agency. The OSS policy is: (a). With respect to civilians: All Civil Service personnel, if they have not already been approved by the Civil Service Commission,

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

Ceneral Dorovin

VZ KE POL 1945

termination made by that commission and a contermination made by it as to the fitness of the employee for government employment. To the best of my knowledge, in each instance where the Civil Service Commission has made a final ruling of ineligibility, that decision has been accepted by OSS. The converse has not always been true. We have at times desired it in the best interests of the government not to employ civilians who have been ruled eligible by the Civil Service Commission. These decisions are made upon the basis of the individual's qualifications and background for the task which it is proposed he shall perform.

- OSS has at various times requested the induction of civilians into the Army and has at times requested the commissioning by the Army and Navy of civilians especially qualified for tasks of a military nature. We have also requested the assignment of certain enlisted and commissioned personnel from the Army and Navy. Before taking any action to request the induction or commissioning of civilians or transferring to OSS of any already inducted or commission, OSS undertakes an examination of the character, background, and qualifications of each individual with a view to determining whether he is capable of effectively performing his job, both from the standpoint of efficiency and of security. No individual is employed by or transferred to OSS when in our opinion he will acquire information in the course of his duties which will result in future jeopardy to this country, whether by unlawful transmittal of such information to persons who are not authorized to receive it or by any other means.
- 5. One point, however, must be made clear. In view of the nature of the duties of OSS, it is essential for the performance of particular tasks to use all types of personnel. This does not result in any loss of security. On the contrary it enhances


Duneral Denoven 12 Mayen 1945 the security of this country by furnishing it with the information necessary to the conduct of the war and the safety of the country and its institutions. The only possible security in this situation lies in picking the right men for the right jobs, and this is a matter determined in each individual case by the person who is responsible for achieving the necessary results. It cannot be done by public debating in the newspapers as to the merits and demerits of particular individuals who are performing tasks in the intelligence field. (M), Jr.


Q. What is the policy of OSS regarding the employment of Communists?

A. No person who has been found to be a member of the Communist Party has been employed by OSS. In view of the nature of our work, we might find it desirable to employ someone who is a member of that party for particular work.

- Q. What is the policy of OSS concerning the employment of persons associated with the so-called Popular Front organizations?
- A. Each case is considered on its own merits and in the light of the job which it is proposed the individual shall do. The file is reviewed by the Security Officer, the Branch Chief concerned, and the Executive Officer of the agency and the nature of the individual's past record and affiliations are carefully reviewed.

 The purpose of the review is to determine, in the light of all available evidence, whether the person being considered is both competent and secure for the work intended.
- Q. What evidence would you consider sufficient to bar employment or to require special safeguards?





Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 · CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-



Beneral Donovan

. 2

6 the 1/1/5


Bissell's testimony. This material includes the papers which the War Department furnished us, including the summary of the military records of all ten of these officers; also my exchange of cables with Edional Clavin regarding four of them.

Michael Jiminez. He was not among the 4 OSS officers listed. They were: Lieutenants Goff, Fajans, Lossowski, and Wolf.

0 (C. 61 Ary).

Attached as Tab 4 is the Security Office file on the 4 Lieutenants, prefixed by a brief summary.

CONFIDENTIAL





TIMES-HERALD - 13 MARCH 1949 TUESDAY - THE STAR EDITION

Stimson Withholds 'Red' Data

Won't Give Congress Records of Officers

By International News Service Secretary of War Stimson today refused to give Congress access to confidential files of officers investigated for alleged Communistic affiliations or to permit Army spokesmen to "answer questions" concerning the records.

His stand was revealed in a letter to a House Military sub-, committee presented by Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Army intelligence chief. Bissell said that under those instructions he could not go into "specific" charges of alleged Communist connections against 10 officers and five enlsited men named in published reports.

Loyalty Unquestioned

Stimson's letter, in which the Army offered to produce only the military records of individuals in executive session of the committee, was offered after Bissel testifled that the records of the 10 officers had been reviewed without any findings against the men.

The review revealed nothing to question the loyalty of these men," said Bissell. "They are now fighting overseas in combat theaters.

The War Department is satisfied that these 10 men were loyal at the time they were commissioned and are loyal today."

At the same time, Mall. Gen. William J. Donovan, head of the "hush-hush" office of 'sirategic services told the committee that he was "perfectly satisfied" that certain ramed OSS personnel were not Communists.

Defends Four of Them

Donovan, in his first public appearance before a congressional committee since he took over OSS. expressed confidence in four of the 10 officers reviewed by General Bissell. Only two of them were identified in testimony -Lieut. Milton Wolff and Lieut. Irvin Falans.

"These four aten I've been hi slit trenches with, I've been in the muck with, and I'd measure them up with any men," said Donovan. "I did not find that they were Communists. I found that they were not."

Donovan testified that David Zablodowsky, senior economic editor in OSS was "not a Communist" in his opinion. Zablodowsky had been mentioned as a former contributor to "Fight" which Representative Elston (R.) of Ohio, contended was a Communist front organ. Similarly a "young lieutenant" assigned to

(Turn to Page 2, Col. 4)

Yingmayin by sale, browered and year bound by line sale to be soon munities.

"If any male if a lighter of any dynamication that transcends the foregainst the transcends that, and bodyan. The poster of the country should draw as stillness advised the committee that records of the countries that records of translations much by the intelligence division are "northead at the nature for the use of the saggestary of war, such the dillet of shaft."

fireach of Falls

Bachinese of the intelligence

trainings of the fitellapies division's work is largely based on the accrety of its investigations and files, he asserted.

Such reports, Stimson said in the later, include hearts of the drive and the conclusions of the investigators who might feel related to the conclusions of the investigators who might feel rethrestings in a continuous of the fis-siricted if the reports were to be made pullic. Anoth information is obtained on promise of "confi-dential treatment" to obvillar in definite translations to definite and formation are well as the FBE and other against cooperating with the Army, he said, adding:

"The War Department does not

feel free to broak faith with these agencies. To do so would mean that their vital assistance in further, investigations of disloyal or subvarsive personnel would be

The Secretary added that there are security considerations for men in the armed forces as well as "our military relationship with our Ailies on combat areas." volved in the question. And the Army, he said, wants to assure all military personnel that confiden-tial information concerning them will not be disclosed except in "proper judicial proceedings and under the constitutional sale-

Reads the Names

Stimson promised to provide as any time an individual's "militargi record' and to produce in executive session behind closed doors -the soldier's personal file. Bis-sell admitted that this would not

sell admitted that this would not cover any of the investigative work by his division.

General Eissell, who sharply or it is ized published reports naming the 10 officers as alleged. Communists, said that all 10 men were inducted or enlisted none better correlationed from a building. being commissioned from civilian life.

life.

Seven of the 10 have held commissions more than 17 months, he said, while five of the eight officers now overseas "earned and received promotions," three were wounded and won the Furple Heart—one being wounded twice—and one was retired for disability after overseas service. "These are the officers—thousands of miles from home being wounded—who are charged with idistingtion to the committee." Esset told the committee.

distinguity to Amilia

Gen. Bissell Defends Officers Accused of Being Communists

IF the Augustated Praise.

The chief of Army Intelligence decisive today that 10 Army efficies of Communist afflictions are now "actually engaged in upholding the United States by force."

Eight of the 10 have been in combat everstag, Maj. Con. Clayton Bissell told an investigating House Military Subcommittee,

Baying several have received the Purple Heart for wounds in action, one twice, Cen. Bissell said the War Department was antisfied of their loyalty despite any possible former connection with the Communist party.

Reads Resume of Records.

Cen. Bissell read a resume of the military records of the officers and a number of enlisted men, including Corpl. Dashiell Hammett, well-known author of mystery thrillers.

Even if any one of them "had been inclined to preach subversive theories" to troops, superior officers would have reported on their activities and proper action would have been taken, Gen. Bissell asserted.

In response to demands by Representative Elston, Republican, of

tites and proper action would have been taken, Gen. Bissell asserted.

In response to demands by Representative Elston, Republican, of Ohlo for military intelligence reports on the men. Gen. Bissell produced a letter from Secretary of War Stimson saying such records are confidential.

Lists Names of Those Attacked. These were the names Gen. Bissell read to the committee as "men whose patriotism and loyalty has been attacked while they are not here to defend themselves":

Maj Edward Newhouse, First Lts. Isadore J. Trauber, Richard L. Criley, Irving Goff, Richard Kenney, Vincent Lossowski and Harry Schoenberg, Second Lts. Gerald Cook Irving Fajaus and Milton Wolff; Sergts, William P. Gandell and Walter Bernstein, Corpl. Hammett, Pyt Lyle Dowling.

Gen. Bissell said a John Lord San Francisco, also had been listed, but apparently there was no such person as Lord in the Army, Gen. Bissell did not name the newspapers which he said had accused the men.

Army's Pollor Is Investigated: The anbecommittee is investigating the Army's policy regarding com-missions for Communiate dy pensions. Kniwn to have had Communist at-

kitiwn to have had Communish affillations.
Maj. Gen. William Donovan,
director of the Office of Strategie
fervices, denied any one of questioned layalty to the United Sinces
was employed by his organization.
Gen. Donovan said he investigated
personally say of his employee
under suspicion.
Guestloned about Crayle Zehite.

under suspicion.

Questioned about David Zablijdowsky, senior economic editor of
OSS, Chen. Donovan field he was
antisfied of his allegiance to this

antisfied of his allegiance to this country.

Four of the 10 Army officers referred to earlier by Gen. Bissell now are employed by GSS, Gen. Doncovan asserted, although he did not name them. He said he had been in "allt trenches and the muck" with, all four and would "put them up against any Americans on loyalty."

TIMES-HERALD, TUESDAY, I

Pro-Communist Officer Holds Key OSS Post

By WILLARD EDWARDS

By WILLARD EDWARDS

A pro-Communist Army officer, who assailed Hitler and Churchill as equally guilty "tyrants" during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, holds a key post under the joint chiefs of staff in the Office of Strategies Services, it was learned yesterday.

This latest evidence of Communism in the Army was disclosed as a House Military Affairs sub-committee leday reopens hearings into the new Army policy permitting commissions for men whose loyally is divided between the United States and Boylet Russia.

Another Name Added

The name of tient, Alexander Vuchingh was added to the list of more than a dozen officers with Communistic strillations made known to the subcommittee since Maj Gen Clayton Bissell, head of the Army Intelligence Corps, as serted on February 27 that he know of no commissioned Communists.

Munists.

Vuchinich was former editor of the Yugoslav American Herald, foreign language newspaper which has phiesed for Soviet domination of the Hakan Mate. Although the CESI is said to have a long dossier on his pro-Communist activities he was stationed in Cairo where he was said to have exercised full censorship at thority over all dispatches there.

Writings Coplans

The conferie writings of this of-flier before he entered the first show him extending the shviet Unich while bittery sylicishing the United States and fivishin On-May 20, 1941, when the ficiness gression pacts between Germany and Russia was still in force, he wrote:

gression pact, between Germinay and Russian was atill in tores, he wrote;

"This was is war against liberty and for the purpose of condimination the history of slavery. This is known by Rome, Bestim and London. On one dide are the Germaes, English and all other peoples over the world and on the other aids are Hitler. Chering, Halling, Churchill, and others similar to them. This is the war of political tyrants against the broad ontional masses."

The New Doul's land-lease bill was harship criticised by Vuentialed as an act to intensity the conflict between the warring powers and the continuance of European bloothind. The Rousevelt administration, he wrote, was "willing to sacrifice everything for the magnates of war inclustry."

Russian Contrast.

Russian Contrast

The Soviet Union, he wrote, by contrast was a country which considered "peace as a basic principle for its internal as well as its foresten settler."

ciple for its internal as well as that foreign policy."

After Hitler invaded Russia, Vuchnich switched over to some ous advocacy of America's energy into "the war against intorey."

A subcommittee member and the appeared evident there were a large number of pro-Communication the OSB with access to the most closely guarded scentricy operations. Demands have been made on the House floor for a thorough housecleaning of this husb agency

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS TURSDAY, 18 MARGH

THE WANTINGTON DALLY NEWS PRESIDAY MARCH IT (916). Commie Probers Denied Army Officer 'Histories'

War Secretary Himson told Congress today that Army investigative records will not be revealed to legislative committees.

Ifs wrots Chairman Thomason (D. Tex.) of a House Military Affairs sub committee investigating charges that Communista have been commissioned in the Army, that the records include testimony obtained on the promise that it would be kept in confidence,

Maj. Cien Clayton Bissell, chief of Army Intelligence, told the committee he would make service conduct records available in closed seasion but could not reveal any details of the personnel investigations

Bissell previously told the committee there were no Communists holding Army commissions. He was recalled after the manes of 15 men with alleged Communist affiliations were published

after the names in to been with along at the factor of the the spot Tribune. Blancil and seven of the officers had been commissioned 11 months or longer, eight had served many months overseas and five had earned promotions overseas. These had been wounded and one had been retired because of injuries in a bomber crash. "By the implications charged these men advocate overthrow of the U. B. Government by force and violence," Bisself said but he added "by their individual records it is shown that they actually are uploading the U. B. Government by force and violence."

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1

Form 50 (Revined)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

| DATE | Z MARCH 1045 | and the same of | و ا | | |
|--|----------------|---|---|------------|---|
| FROM | | | | | |
| TO | CABERTA, ITALY | The advantage of the second section of the section of the second section of the section of the second section of the section of the second section of the section of the second section of the section of | -21 | M. M. M. | |
| brog standards. And a life species when it is not a person | OFFICE OF STRA | TEGIC SERVICES | ad from the second and the first first is being a being a | THE TOTAL | |
| Programme to the Principle of the Control of the Co | (FOR ACTION) | DISTRIBUTION | OR INFORM | Ills Sody | *************************************** |
| U. C. QUYENMENT PEIN | DOER ING | | | a de se se | · 20 |

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#35904. GLAVIN TO DOERING ONLY. RE YOUR #26634 (CUT: 5200) SECRET


ALL IN SO AND SO (SIC) TRAINING WORKING IN NORTH ITALY. GOFF RECENTLY DETAILED TO INFILTRATION OF AUSTRIA FOR SI USING COMMUNIST CONTACTS. WE ARE AWARE OF THEIR POLITICS AND ALL CONCERNED CAREFULLY SUPERVISE ACTIVITIES TO SEE THAT WE ARE NOT INVOLVED. HOWEVER, WE USE ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE DO NOT PERMIT ANY AID OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY ANY OF OUR PEOPLE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT LT. MICHAEL JIMINEZ, ALSO SO, IS IN SAME CATEGORY AND THAT HIS MAIL IS NOW BEING CENSORED BY CI ON REPORT THAT HIS WIFE IS SENDING HIM COMMUNIST LITERATURE.

TOR: 1055 2 MARCH 1945

FILE GIP'S SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CARLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110001-1



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

Mar . A.

PROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC BERVICES

TOL CISEMA PLACE

TRANSMIT

SECTIF

ON VERIT BASIS. ALL PRESENT AGREED NO DISCLOSURE OF ASSIGNMENTS.

THESE OFFICERS WILL BE MADE. EXPECT NO DIFFICULTY HUT SEND FOR FEGURE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION. HAVE NO DETAILS CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT OF MORP
BUT ASSURE HE IS ENGAGED IN SAIE TYPE ORK AS OTHERS. PLEASE CONTINUA.

TOD: 1900 1 WAR 45

OCO

SECOLIT

THE CON

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT