

Roll 8
AVIATION
(CONT)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **January 5, 1946**

REC'D **January 5, 1946 5:55 PM**

TO **TEKHL, NEW DELHI**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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FROM **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

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DIRECTOR

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(FOR INFORMATION)

Shepardson, Bangalore
SECRETARIAT

Naguder, Tel, SO, X-2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37853-1

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SECRET

SECRET

#22487. Hunter from Secretariat.

Kindly advise whether Sultan has cable request mentioned in our #20694. We have been holding our letter to Air Corps regarding planes pending receipt of Sultan's cable by War Department.

FILE COPY

SECRET

REC'D 1/5/46 7:37 PM

AWS

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OSS Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **DECEMBER 28, 1944**

| | |
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| FROM CHANG, KUNMING | PRIORITY |
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Amoy 15 5/8

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883

SECRET

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#3944. To Heppner and Bird (#1044 Kunming-Kandy) from Stevens.

Captain Evans, who is attached to Dickey's* office, will leave for Yenan shortly. He has asked us if we can help him obtain some fleece-lined aviator's boots, which he urgently requires. Please let us know if you can help. He wears 9-C.

The War Department has informed us in a communication that authorization has been granted for one air-sea rescue squadron for the India-Burma Theater. This squadron is to consist of 6 helicopters and is to meet the China and Thai theater needs as decided by the respective commanders. Taylor is inquiring of New Delhi about this matter, since China had heard nothing beforehand about the allocation of the squadron. The War Department also outlined the modifications which OSS requested with regard to helicopters and C-47's. They state that it is possible to effect them in the United States in the event that it is impossible to supply them in the theater. With respect to the B-24's, General Wedemeyer was informed that they can't* be secured from outside sources and that it is still the position of the War Department that OSS theater needs are to be supplied from Army Air Force equipment and personnel which the Theater Commanders place at our disposal as required. Taylor and I are at work on all of the foregoing matters.

*Received DICKENS
** Received CNT.
FOR: 12/28/44 2:34 P.M.

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SEC 11

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 26, 1944 REC'D 12/26/44 11:07 AM

TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRIORITY
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES DTG 26219
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COUGHLIN DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 16-37883-1

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Copy
SECRET

#21577. Hunter from Coughlin.

Arnold will release 30 light airplanes to 3SS if the Theater Commander will request them for that purpose. Peers is in urgent need of some of them. Other planes will be required in China. When I get there, I will try for them, but I have no doubt that Frank will take action, since every day is precious.

SECRET

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JGC

TO: 12/26/44 1:11 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: NOVEMBER 18, 1944

FROM: STAFF, WASHINGTON

PRIORITY
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TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DISPATCH

1. [Illegible]
2. [Illegible]

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#5000: [Illegible]

BE HAS PLACED A REPORT WITH THE [Illegible] FOR THE
[Illegible] AND THE [Illegible]. [Illegible] TO BE [Illegible] ON THE [Illegible] AT
[Illegible] FOR A SHORT [Illegible] [Illegible] [Illegible]

NOV 18/44 11:41 AM

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Colonel McNeese *called* ✓
War Department (85- direct line)
ext. 3753

*9:30 AM up
to the Highway*

*Col
Compton
will call
Col McNeese
AT*

Form OS (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **DECEMBER 12, 1944**

FROM **CG, USAF, CHINA THEATER CHUNGKING, CHINA**

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TO **WAR DEPT.
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~**

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WAR DEPT.

151518

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
BIBBLOW, FETO, SO, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET "IVI"

1077-28963. Wedemeyer to Marshall for Donovan and Arnold.
We have come into possession of information showing that the Office of Strategic Services has been assigned the 492nd Bombardment Group of B-24 airplanes. At present, this theater is able, logistically, to support 1 squadron of this group. The only limitation on opportunities for the use of secret personnel in China is our ability to supply and transport them. Would like you to assign this squadron to the China theater at earliest opportunity. We have made plans for its use, which will bring in unusually big dividends.

ACTION: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD, G-2, OSS
CH-IN-12505 (13 Dec. 44) 05282
TOR: 12/13/44 8:30 a.m.

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TOP SECRET

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| 2. <i>Ed. Brown</i> | <i>[Signature]</i> | <i>Edward Sexton</i> | <i>12/19</i> | <i>12:40</i> | <i>RSB</i> | <i>[Initials]</i> |
| 3. <i>Ed. Brown</i> | <i>[Signature]</i> | <i>[Signature]</i> | <i>12/19</i> | <i>2:15</i> | <i>[Initials]</i> | <i>[Initials]</i> |
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 18, 1944

REC'D 12/18/44, 6:30 PM

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| (CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) DIRECTOR(1) | (FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT(2) | |
| TOP SECRET | | |

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 16-37882-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#3979. 109 and Heppner to Bird and Dow only, for Wedemeyer.

A reliable source in the Air Force has informed us the 492nd Liberator Group, which we thought could be transferred at least in part to China to aid in your operations, is not available. This group is considered as a heavy bomber unit, in spite of any modifications, and HTO, as well as Wimitz and MacArthur, have priority over you for any such requests. These would have to be filled before consideration could be given to your requirements. One of these modified aircraft and its crew is now in India conducting a survey of conditions and needs there, and demonstrating the most recent methods used in Europe. We believe that after this work is completed we can obtain permission to retain the plane, but not its crew. The Air Force argues that Chennault has 72 Liberators assigned to his command, 24 in India and 48 in China, and that you can put as many of those as you wish on OSS Missions; further, that this survey crew, which was assigned for 60 days temporary duty, can train such crews as you may feel necessary. They feel that such crews ought to be comparatively new for the theater so that rotation will not disrupt the plan. The unit now used in HTO by OSS was originally established by the Theater Commander there, as is now being suggested to you. The modifications on the planes did not influence their decision. If such a request is made, the planes now being sent to Chennault each month can be modified as these have been. Additional groups or even squadrons are impossible to secure at this time, but I do think that you could secure more planes. Will you please tell me if you will supply the necessary lift for our operations on the above basis. Both as far as supplies and personnel are concerned, we are planning our operations on the assumption that you will do so.

100 12/18/44, 11:38 PM

WJD

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 16, 1944

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, BIGELOW,
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37882-2

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SECRET

#95904. Cheston from Armour and Bross. In reference to your #87884.

1. 492nd Bomber Group ceased operations for this headquarters on 17 September and from 21 to 29 September carried gasoline to front for U.S. Army.
2. On approximately 15 October it was decided by 8th Air Force to retain 1 squadron of 492nd for dropping operations and convert the 3 remaining squadrons to night bombardment. Training and conversion commenced at once.
3. As result of paper submitted by this headquarters and following conversations between Generals Spaatz, Isler and Doolittle, 8th Air Force agreed to send one of the 3 squadrons in training to HEDTO to supplement airlift from that theater.
4. Squadron retained for dropping operations has had practically nothing to do as it has been handling only SI operations. However, it is expected, as result of paper now before SHAF, they will soon be doing operations for SFHQ.

SECRET

FOR: 12/16/44

8:53 AM

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OSS Form 97 (Rev. 1-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DATE **December 15, 1944**

FROM **PARIS, FRANCE**

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SECRET

#4044. From Canfield, Paris to OPFAF, London (#29414).
For Armour, Jackson, Bross, and Bartlett.
Information: Washington and Caserta (#1644).

1. SHAEF airlift reply to CG USSTAF signed today.
2. It requests:

A) allotment 1 squadron of 492nd Group to carry out sorties for OSS and SFHQ.

B) assignment of officer for both SFHQ and OSS for similar duty performed by group Captain Wood.

C) consideration of possibility of increased air lift requirements in connection with squadron loaned IAAF.

3. Letter further provides that 161st squadron of bomber command and 1 squadron of 492nd Group should do special operations work with 38th Group providing remainder of air effort required.

4. Have discussed para 2B with Lt. Col. Bander USSTAF who agrees that officer should preferably be of 492nd group.

5. Letter being forwarded to OSS and SFHQ.

SECRET

TOR: 12/16/44 5:32 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 18, 1944

FROM

TRISH, NEW DELHI

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12/15/44 ✓

FOR INFORMATION

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BIGELOW, SHEPARDSON, 90, X-2

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SECRET

SECRET

#13954. Hunter to Donovan for Hoppner and Coughlin.

Today the air drop survey groups left New Delhi. They will go to Calcutta, Assam, Ceylon, and then return here for conference and instruction prior to seeing Stratemeyer. Will be kept posted on party's whereabouts, and they will be prepared to carry out a China survey when and if the approval of the theater commander is obtained. Ricker has been sent directly to Calcutta from Karachi in order to go over his equipments. As soon as he gets back here we will let you know the story.

✓

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FOR: 12/15/44 2:11 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: **DECEMBER 15, 1944** REC'D **12/15/44 - 1:55 PM**

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#67884. Cheston to Armour and Bross.

AWIN

SECRET

Jerry Miller advises that until time his departure 492nd Bomber Group planes and personnel were idle and had not been used by Air Corps for any purpose since termination of their services for OSS. Will you please advise immediately if this was true and whether these planes and personnel are in use now? The answer to this inquiry has bearing on our ability to obtain planes and personnel for Far East.

SECRET

TO: **12/15/44 - 2:24 PM**

CSC/RT

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Form 8-58

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 14, 1944

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TI 28208

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S E C R E T

SECRET

- #13937. New Delhi-Washington.
- #3237. New Delhi-Calcutta.
- #0477. New Delhi-Iyitkyina.
- #4907. New Delhi-Kandy.

From Hunter. Action: To Donovan for Heppner and Coughlin;
 Information: McGehee, Berno and Peers.

The following is a paraphrase of New Delhi-Washington #13957
 (#3197 to Calcutta, #4857 to Kandy and #0447 to Iyitkyina):

General Ludeke and I conferred in New Delhi with Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, Major Rudolph and Lieutenant Colonel Gable of the B-24 squadron and airdrop group. General Ludeke stated that General Chennault would not allow a survey group in China at present but he would be very glad to have the airplane and its crew made available to him. Colonel Gable reported that this airplane was not an advance craft belonging to the squadron but was borrowed for the survey from the 492nd Bomber Group. General Ludeke replied that if those were the facts, the plane should not proceed to China now and that he would not request clearance for it. He advised that he would maintain one squadron and that qm (sic) is required. Ludeke's troop strength does not provide for more personnel. We therefore considered the prospects of OSS obtaining the additional personnel required to maintain more than a single squadron. Ludeke will confer with IO9 on this matter when he arrives. After obtaining as much data as possible at this end, the survey group will proceed to Calcutta, Ceylon and Assam.

TO: 12/14/44 5:45 PM

To [unclear] [unclear]
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE DECEMBER 14, 1944 REC'D 12/14/44 4:31 PM

TO DELHI, NEW DELHI

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(FOR INFORMATION)

COUGHLIN

151518

So. Fd. by low. Mas.
DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT. *X-2. Sheppard*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57843-1

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#20694. Coughlin to Hunter.

SECRET

Everything possible is being done to secure the squadron of Liberators and also the 4 YR5's (helicopters). In order to obtain the helicopters and the modified Liberators, it is necessary to have a new request from Sultan. Wedemeyer has already sent in the request for his theater. Can you get Frank to forward such a request? JCS is to decide on this matter and they may take action soon. I still cannot say when I shall leave.

SECRET

JGD: 12/14/44 - 6:26 PM

JGC

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|----------|
| DATE | 13/11/44 | RECD | 13/11/44 |
| TO | CHIEF, UNITED STATES | SECURITY | |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | ROUTINE | |
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| HEADQUARTERS | | DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | |

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#3397: Boppner to Bird.

(Handwritten circled mark)

Will you please ask General Fedemeyer to call on the Department, strongly requesting them to provide OSS in China with 2 Yaris (the fighters) and 3 C-47's? These planes are to be used in evacuating wounded airmen in an air rescue network and will be used, in addition, by OSS in the various intelligence services we have organized. Air Corps personnel to operate and maintain these planes for 1st and 2nd division maintenance and also crews who will fly them from the U.S.; if Fedemeyer and the CG of the Air Corps give approval. This request is in addition to the one which was received on 11/11/44 for #3349. Please convey to General Fedemeyer our thanks for his promptness in that request.

✓

13/13/44 + 6:14 PM

13/13/44

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 13, 1944

REC'D 12/13/44 4:16 PM

TO HHHI, NEW DELHI

PRIORITY

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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 25262

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COUGHLIN 15, 518

DIRECTOR, SECR TARLAN, MACRODER,
SO, BIGELOW, X-2, FETO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87533-1

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SECRET

#20574. To Hunter from Coughlin.

In connection with the 30 liaison airplanes, Sultan has not answered Marshall's wire #WARX-61130 of November 9th, 1944. OSS will be able to obtain these airplanes provided Sultan wires a reply to Marshall stating as follows: "The 30 liaison airplanes mentioned in CRA-18883 are necessary for assignment to IBT, to be operated and maintained by AAF personnel, in support of OSS projects which I have approved. They are above and beyond the 30 L-4's referred to in CABX-7430 of October 19th, 1944." From inquiry at G-4, War Department, yesterday, we learned that no answer had arrived from Sultan, even though they have already sent one follow-up to the wire. If Sultan will take action, the planes will be shipped, as they are available.

12/13/44 9:36 PM

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ICC AWS

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 18, 1944

REC'D December 18, 1944

TO **DELHI, NEW DELHI**

PRIORITY
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FROM **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

OUT 26103

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(FOR INFORMATION)

COUGHLIN

**DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, DELHI
MIGELON, SO, PERS**

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-31283-1

SECRET

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#20367. From Coughlin to Hunter only, New Delhi.

SECRET

Kindly advise us if survey party has reached New Delhi and, if so, the date of its arrival. 109's departure date has still not been definitely determined. It is essential that we have squadrons of those airplanes, so kindly see that we have formed of party's location, plans, progress. If you think your request may be refused, kindly keep the question open until his arrival. The Thai project seems to be going very well and will give planes. General Wedemeyer has also requested a squadron. Statements on servicing facilities in theater may decide the issue.

SECRET

TC: 12/18/44 2153 PL

700101

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GSS Form 6 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: DECEMBER 12, 1944

FROM: CG, USAF, CHINA THEATER CHUNGKING, CHINA

TO: WAR DEPT.
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON,
BIOELOW, PETO, SO, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET "TVI"

#CPB-28965. Medemeyer to Marsnall for Donovan and Arnold.
 We have come into possession of information showing that the Office of Strategic Services has been assigned the 492nd Bombardment Group of B-24 airplanes. At present, this theater is able, logistically, to support 1 squadron of this group. The only limitation on opportunities for the use of secret personnel in China is our ability to supply and transport them. Would like you to assign this squadron to the China theater at earliest opportunity. We have made plans for its use, which will bring in unusually big dividends.

ACTION: CG AAF
 INFORMATION: OPD, G-2, GSS
 CM-IN-12505 (13 Dec. 44) 0520Z
 TOR: 12/13/44 8:39 a.m.

Secretariat copy

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **December 9, 1944**

REC'D **December 9, 1944 6:24 PM**

TO

CHAFZ, RUMING

OP

PRIORITY

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFF **24924**

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HEPPNER

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, PERS, ETC

Bigelow, Magruder, X-2, 50

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SECRET

#3207. From Heppner to Bird.

AIRLIFT +

SECRET

The 492nd Bombardment Group, as you are aware, is now assigned to OSS ETO; they wish to be transferred to our organization in the Far East. The type of aircraft they use are Liberators.

Kindly request Wedemeyer to make the strongest request possible to the War Department asking that one squadron be sent to the China Theater. These planes could be located in the vicinity of Calcutta, and General Iudeke has assured me verbally that they could take care of and service one squadron.

We will confer with highest quarters in this concern as soon as you inform me that Wedemeyer has sent this request to the War Department.

SECRET

TO: **12/9/44 6:45 PM**

HPH

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE NOVEMBER 25, 1944

REC'D 11/25/44 1:05 PM

TO TEKEL, NEW DELHI

4 NOV 27

PRIORITY
ALL INFORMATION
ROUTINE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

~~REFERENCE~~ *Cheston*

SECRETARIAT, *Cheston*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-1

SECRET

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#18957. Coughlin and Cheston to Hunter.

Within the next few days, the converted Liberator will leave with the survey party. They have instructions to report in New Delhi, where you will brief them on the setup. The items which they are definitely to establish include:

1. How many planes the personnel currently in theater can service.
2. How many planes can be serviced with spare parts from stocks presently in theater.

At the present time, the War Department will not release either additional service personnel or parts for that theater.

The survey party is not to go on to China until 109 arrives there.

They are to go ahead, however, with the necessary discussions with the Air Command in the IBT and go forward as planned, except that they will not go on to China until 109 gets there approximately the 13th of next month, at which time he will arrange for the Stratomeyer conferences.

SECRET

REC'D 11/25/44 1:05 PM

CSO

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 24, 1944

REC'D 11/14/44 6:42 PM

TO DESAIVE, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 22907

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER **S E C R E T**

SECRET

#81574. Armour from Cheston.

Please have survey plane together with Colonels Fish and Gable and engineer officer of group pick Heppner, Coughlin and 109 up at either LeSourget or Orley Airfield, Paris, on Monday, November 27. Have them notify our people in Paris at which Airport they will be.

It is fortunate that the 2 Far East theater chiefs are here now and can be available for the survey party. Believe that our 3 men can assist the party and expedite its mission.

aircraft
5:51.5 a

SECRET

OSS/LJP

T.D: 11/14/44 7:13 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---|-----------|
| DATE: November 13, 1944 | | PRIORITY |
| FROM: Ustravic, London | | ROUTINE |
| TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | | DEFERRED |
| DISTRIBUTION | | III:25485 |
| (FOR ACTION) | (FOR INFORMATION) | |
| CHESTON | DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, IAGRUAR, NIGELON, ETC. | |

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27583-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

#88754. Cheston from Armour and Miller.
In reference to your #80324.

1. USSTAF has received cable from IAGRUAR re survey party.
2. Most important that authority to dispatch be received from you earliest possible moment as Air Forces rapidly losing interest in view time interval since subject first broached.

Handwritten:
Aircraft
15, 15, 15 a

TOR: 11/13/44 7:58PM

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE NOV 10, 1944 REC'D 11/11/44 1:25 p.m.

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------|
| TO MADAG, CALCUTTA | | PRIORITY |
| FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | | ROUTINE |
| DISTRIBUTION | | DEFERRED |
| (CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) | OPD-22660 | |
| SUPPLY | (FOR INFORMATION) DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAJOR GEN, SERVICES, P&O, BIGELOW. | |

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37850-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

✓ #3997. Ream and Mayo for Coughlin. In reference to CRA-10883 to Marshall for Hoffmann from Sultan concerning 30 liaison type planes for OSS.

OPD War Department is now handling this matter and we are advised that OPD will send Sultan a wire inquiring if these planes constitute a Theater requirement, if he agrees to maintain them, and asking for operational justification. Advise your getting in touch with Sultan and if you can, preparing an answer to cover the following: (1) confirmation of existence of Theater need for such planes; (2) guarantee that planes can be maintained by Theater Air Corps; (3) operational necessity.

Request notification when Sultan sends his cable.

W. Wright
11/11/44

TOP: 11/11/44 5:18 p.m.

LHR 9CD:RHB WMR:HEM

SECRET

FILE COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE NOVEMBER 9, 1944 REC'D 11/13/44 12:45 P.M.

| | | |
|------|---|----------|
| TO | COMMANDING GENERALS: USAR INDLA BURMA THEATER, INDLA BURMA ARMY AIR FORCES, INDLA BURMA SECTOR, | PRIORITY |
| | CALCUTTA, INDLA | ROUTINE |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | DEFERRED |

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(FOR INFORMATION)

WAR DEPT.

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, HIGHCOM, BIRMINGHAM, FEPO, SO, X-2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57886-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

Handwritten: 15/518

WARX-61130. Marshall to Sultan. Information: Strategoy. With reference to your #GRA 18883, dated November 5th.

Policy remains unchanged regarding the planes for OSS referred to above message and outlined in letter AG 458-1 of 29 June, 1943, OB-S-E subject aircraft for OSS operations in Western Europe (JOB 375) of 29 June, 1943 and in radios 2133 of July 20th and 2238 of July 28th. We assume, therefore, that the 30 Liaison Aircraft referred to in GRA 18883 are over and above the 30 L-4's mentioned in CAPX 7430, dated October 19th, and that they are wanted for assignment to the India Burma Theater for operations and maintenance by Army Air Force personnel, in support of OSS projects which you have approved.

ORIGINATOR: OED
 INFORMATION: CO. AAF, OSS
 OUT-61130 (11 Nov 44) 1588 Z

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Form 64 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 8, 1944

REC'D 11/8/44 6:02 PM

TO USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY

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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(FOR INFORMATION)

CHESTON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER,
BIGLOW, ETC.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87688-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#80324. Armour from Cheston. Re your #87424.

SECRET

Informed War Department has cabled 8th Air Force authorizing survey party, but we do not want you to Brief and dispatch personnel until you hear further from us. Hopper and Coughlin due here 13th or 14th. 109 away today. Will answer your paragraph 2 on his return.

*X a... ..
15.11.44*

SECRET

1001 11/8/44 6:41 PM

FILE ONLY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 7, 1944

FROM

EMBASSY, LONDON

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

CHESTON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
BIGELOW, ETO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37589-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER S E C R E T

SECRET

#87424. From Armour and Miller to Cheston, with reference to your #78644.

1. Would greatly appreciate latest word on status of survey party.

2. In view Heppner's and Coughlin's presence there, believe routing via Washington should be considered.

*Approved
11/7/44*

TIME 11/7/44 8:14 AM

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 7, 1944

REC'D 11/10/44 4:52 PM

| | | |
|------|--|------------|
| TO | AMC BELOW | PRIORITY |
| | | ROUTINE |
| | | DEFERRED |
| FROM | WAR DEPARTMENT CONFIDENTIAL - STRATEGIC SERVICES | OUT: 22006 |

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(FOR INFORMATION)

WAR DEPARTMENT

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRODER,
BIGELOW, PEPO, ETC, 30, X-2.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

TO:

Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main Echelon,
Versailles, France.

Headquarters, Communications Zone,
European Theater of Operations,
Main Echelon,
Paris, France.

Commanding General,
USAF India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India.

Commanding General,
Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
London, England.

Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
India-Burma Sector,
Calcutta, India.

WAR 38891. From Marshall to Eisenhower for Spatz.
Information: Lee, Stratemeyer, Sultan.

You will publish orders for 1 complete crew of the 492nd Bombardment Group to travel in B-24 of 492nd Group from the European Theater of Operations to New Delhi, where they will report upon their arrival to the CG of the AB Theater for TD not over 60 days. The personnel selected to comprise this crew should be fully trained in all

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Aircraft X
15:10

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 11/11/44

WAR DEPARTMENT
FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: SEE ABOVE

TRANSMIT

operations in connection with the activities of the Office of Strategic Services, for the purpose in sending them to India is to help in studying the practicability of carrying out similar operations there. The Office of Strategic Services have expressed the desire for Colonel Fish and Lieutenant Colonel Louis N. Gable to go along with this mission. If it is possible to spare them, this seems to be desirable. Before leaving for OMI, the crew chosen for the mission should get in touch with the BFO representative of OSS, who is familiar with the plan and possesses a list of the equipment which they are to take with them. He will also advise when they are to leave. When the above has been done, notify the War Department.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: CG AAF

OM-OUT-68891 (7 Nov. 1944) 2064Z mes

SECRET

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Form 17 (Rev. 10-1-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **NOVEMBER 5, 1944**

FROM **CG, US ARMY FORCES INDIA BURMA THEATER,
NEW DELHI, INDIA**

PRIORITY

TO **WAR DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~**

ROUTINE

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IN-24935

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(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

WAR DEPARTMENT

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
EIGELOW, PETO, SO, X-2, SUPPLY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57883-1

CONFIDENTIAL, "CUM"

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

#CRA-18883. Sultan to Marshall for Hoffmann, OSS.

Permission is hereby granted for shipment by the first possible sea transportation of 30 liaison type planes to be secured from the Air Corps. These are needed by OSS in this theater.

*Aircraft
15,518 a*

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION CQ AAF OSS
NM-IN-5146 (6 Nov 44) C337Z

TO: 11/6/44 10:30 a.m.

FILE COPY CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 2, 1944 REC'D 11/3/44 1423 147

TO TEHRAN, NEW DELHI PRIORITY
ROUTINE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES DEFERRED

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

SO

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MARGRUBER,
BIGELOW, PETO, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87883-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

~~SECRET~~

#17057. Action: Coughlin, New Delhi. From Hoffmann.
Information: Heppner, Kandy, #9277.

The Air Corps here has agreed to let us have 30 small aircraft of the type currently being used at Detachment 101. We could use these in SFAC and CBI theaters. We shall have to obtain TCA and shipping space approval because of the change in the command. Can you handle this with either General Sultan or General Wedemeyer? We can decide later on how many planes should go to each theater.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COH CSC QCB
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TO: 11/3/44
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 2, 1944

REC'D 11/2/44 12:08 PM

| | | | |
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| TO | 6 BEX, KANDY | GCX | PRIORITY |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | | ROUTINE |
| | | | DEFERRED |
| DISTRIBUTION | | DUY | 21905 |

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| (CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) | (FOR INFORMATION) |
| CHESTON | DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, BIGLOW, MAGRUDER, SO, FITO, X-2 |

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

#9147. Action: Heppner, Kandy. From Cheston.
Information: Coughlin, New Delhi #16907.

War has sent a cable to the Theater Commander asking whether he would like to have 1 B-24 plane from the 492nd Bombardment Group, 8th USAF, sent to your theater with a specially selected crew, together with samples of air ground equipment employed by the Office of Strategic Services in FTG. The purpose of this would be to carry out a survey to decide whether a portion or all of the group could be employed in your theater. It is essential that you obtain the Theater Commander's approval to ship the survey party right away.

Handwritten initials and date: 15/11/44

SECRET

FILE COPY

138: 11/2/44 2:16 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 31, 1944**

REC'D **10/31/44 4:17 PM**

| | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|-----------|
| TO | USTRAVIC, LONDON | PRIORITY |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | ROUTINE |
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| | | OUT 21726 |

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| CHESTON | DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDELL, BIRKLOW, ETC |

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87888-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

✓ #78644. To Armour, Jackson and Gable from Cheston.

1. OPD has agreed to dispatch message to 8th Air Force substantially as requested in Paragraph 2 your #85494.
2. Whether message will request that plane be dispatched to Washington D.C. or go directly to Far East from ETO will be determined after conference between Heflin and OPD tomorrow. Heflin absent from Washington today.
3. Please advise 8th Air Force that message will be forthcoming from OPD within next several days. We will notify you when message is actually dispatched.
4. Chandler and Gable are to be included. Our understanding Heflin will make trip himself. Will check finally on this when he returns tomorrow.

CSC JDW

TIME **10/31/44 4:28 PM**

SECRET

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Form 88 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 10/29/44

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|--------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------|
| FROM | USTRAVE, LONDON | PRIORITY | |
| TO | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | ROUTINE | |
| DISTRIBUTION | | DEFERRED | |
| (FOR ACTION) | | (FOR INFORMATION) | |
| DIRECTOR | <i>HACLEY</i> <i>15/11/44</i> | SECRETARIAT | IN 24158 |

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#85494. To 109 from Armour, Jackson and Gable.

1. USSTAF and 8th Air Force have concurred in plan to dispatch B-24 aircraft with specially selected crew, complete with specimens of all air-ground equipment used by OSS in this theater to Washington for briefing and picking up balance of survey party; from there to proceed to such other theaters as War Department may direct at OSS request.

2. A request from the War Department to USSTAF is required to release personnel from the 492 Group and should read in general as follows:
Request one specially trained crew from the 492nd Bombment Group (H) 8th United States Air Force be dispatched to Washington, D.C. and thence to such other theaters as the War Department may direct for the purpose of examining the possible use of personnel and facilities now available in ITO for OSS activities in those theaters.

3. All arrangements have been made for immediate departure upon arrival of War Department request to USSTAF.

4. Heflin left understanding that Fish was to make survey trip. Fish cannot go unless Heflin returns. Can you ascertain Heflin's plans and notify us?

FOR: 10/29/44 - 2:08 PM

FILE COPY

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 26, 1944

FROM

USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN 25871

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(FOR ACTION)

Aircraft 15, 518
 DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT, MACRODIER, BIGLOW,
 SO, FETO, X-2, ETO, MEDTO

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#84934. To 100 from Armour, with reference to your #77224.

Memorandum was submitted prior to receipt of this cable. When 105 and I visited 7th Army Unit they were working on use of light planes and also use of planes for dropping bodies. As far as 492nd Bombardment Group was concerned, they are perfectly willing to undertake these missions but the difficulty was getting the bodies back to London to be dispatched from here. It should be clearly understood that Air Force is most desirous of having entire 492nd Bombardment Group conduct operations for which they were trained. They are also desirous of keeping this Group together and using it as a Group in this theater until there is no more work for it to do here and then transfer it as a Group to some other theater. Our difficulty is to find work for the entire Group in this theater.

FOR: 10/26/44 3:22 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

| | | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|-------|---|
| DATE | October 26, 1944 | REC'D | 10/26/44 |
| TO | US TRAVEL, LONDON | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> DEFERRED |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | | OUT 21217 |
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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR 

SECRETARIAT, 3rd, Bldg., W. 1st St.,
WASH., D.C. ROOM X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37080-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#77834. Cheston to Bruce, Paris (#0994) and Arnold, London.

OPD now advises us they have not sent cable to Theater Commander asking if 492nd Bomber group can be made available to other theaters for OSS operations, as a matter has developed that may necessitate their using group for another purpose. Expect to hear within 48 hours. Will advise you.

SECRET

TO: 10/26/44 1:45 P.M.

CSC

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 25, 1944

REC'D 10/25/44

TO USNAVY, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, SO, BICARD, LONDON
WFO, MAURICE, X-2

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#77314. From 100 and Cheston. Action: Armour, London
Information: Bruce, Paris (#984).

OPD has asked Theater Commander if 2 squadrons of Bombardment Group are available for OSS use Far East. Stillwell asked to make new request for them and for survey party. Have told Glavin that if he wants remaining 2 squadrons he must have Baker request them of Spaatz. As soon as replies are received and survey party approved we want to dispatch Hable, Hefflin and Major Messer, Engineer officer of group, to make survey for Heppner and Couplin. Hefflin who is here on leave feels very strongly that group should remain intact and wants all 4 squadrons to go to CHI, which is one more reason why a survey should be made.

Y. A. Craft 15, 518

SECRET

10/25/44

1106

CSG CSO

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Form OS (Rev. 1-5-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

15700

| | | | |
|--------------|--|-------------------|--|
| DATE | October 24, 1944 | PRIORITY | |
| FROM | USNAVIC, LONDON | ROUTINE | |
| TO | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | DEFERRED | |
| DISTRIBUTION | | IN 23667 | |
| (FOR ACTION) | | (FOR INFORMATION) | |
| CHESTON | SO, BTO, LEO, HILLON, MAGNILL, SECRETARIAL, LIAISON, X-2 | | |

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87489-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

✓ #84391. To Cheston, Hoffmann, and Bross from Armour and Miller.

Armour

Cmdr Taylor advises that there is some confusion as between SAC and CBI regarding air lift due to belief only one squadron can be requested. Since there are four squadrons in the group, there is no reason why requests from both theatres for separate squadrons could not be met if OP will approve.

Have you been in touch with Hefflin re survey trip as he is due back here from his leave. Both he and his executive officer, Col Fish, have been discussed for trip so need know what steps taken there.

At Coughlin's suggestion, we plan send Lt. Col. Chandler to CBI immediately to work out details. This does not overlap survey trip as his sole concern will be establishment packing station which Coughlin has requested. Request your approval.

FILE COPY

TO: 10/24/44 4:55 P.M.
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE *October 23, 1944*

REC'D *October 24, 1944 7:06 PM*

TO STRATVTC, LONDON

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OUT 21107.

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR *aircraft*
15, 578

SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, EIGELO,
SO, X-2, FETO, ETO, MEETO

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37853-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#77224. To Armour from 109.

SECRET

In preparing the memorandum on possible uses of 492nd Bomber Group in ETO, to which you refer in your #83664, include requirements arising out of intelligence work being performed by Gamble's unit with 7th Army. Major Crosby reports lack of airlift has limited work of this group.

SECRET

TOD: 10/24/44 9:20 PM

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 23, 1944 REC'D October 23, 1944 0151 PM

TO TRIC, NE, DULIT PRIORITY 2

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ROUTINE
DEFERRER

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 21040

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)
DIRECTOR *(Handwritten initials)*

(FOR INFORMATION)
SECRETARIAT, MAGNIDER, DELBY,
WFO, PHOTO, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-47581-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET
SECRET

#15917. To Goughlin and Hoppner (#0407 to Kandy) from 100.

X 1. Your airplane problem has been discussed by Chester with General Hull and others of OPD who have been very helpful. A short time ago, they refused Stilwell's request for one squadron chiefly, we think, because they did not know for what purpose it was intended. In order to discover if 2 squadrons can be made available for use in your theaters, OPD will cable T/O HQ. We recommend that Stilwell repeat his request, saying that the planes will be employed in connection with OSS operations.

2. We suggest that you ask for one squadron for each theater, and that your request be made subject to the findings of a survey party not to exceed 3 officers. This party would investigate the requirements of OSS for planes in the 2 theaters.

SECRET

TIME 10/23/44 11:21 PM INITIALS OPD/CDC "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: 10 OCT 1954
FROM: CASERTA, ITALY
TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ACTION: 10 OCT
INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, BOSTON, WASHINGTON, X-2, OO, ETO, SI.

aircraft 15110

14344 CASERTA-WASHINGTON
14354 CASERTA-LONDON

FROM EARLY AND WOOD, CASERTA. ACTION: GLAVIN, DAVIS AND ROSS, BARI. INFORMATION: ARMOUR AND KATEK, LONDON, DONOVAN, WASHINGTON. REFERENCE #277 FROM LONDON, RELAYED BARI #597. CONCERNING 482ND GROUP FROM USSTAF, AFTER CONFERENCE THIS MORNING WITH MAAP, GENERAL CABELL WILL TAKE UP WITH SPAATZ, NOW AT CASERTA, THE MATTER OF TRANSFER OF GROUP FROM UK TO BRINDISI AND GIVE US ANSWER BY TUESDAY NOON 17 OCTOBER.

REQUEST INFORMATION ON NEED FOR GROUP INER IMMEDIATELY FOR FURTHER ASSIGNMENT WITH MAAP. GENERAL CABELL SPECIFICALLY WANTS TO KNOW (1) WOULD PLANES BE USED ONLY FOR SUPPORTING SLOVAKS AND BUILDING UP BOHEMIANS AND HUNGARIANS OR WOULD THEY BE THROWN INTO GENERAL POOL SUPPORTING 85TH IN SUPPLYING NORTH ITALY AND BALKANS? (2) SINCE CROWDED CONDITIONS BRINDISI AIRPORT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO HOOD AND MAINTAIN ADDITIONAL PLANES, INFORM NAMED AIRPORTS NEAR BRINDISI VICINITY WHICH MIGHT BE USED. (3) IF AIRPORT IS CHOSEN IN BRINDISI AREA WITHIN TRUCKING DISTANCE BRITISH PACKING STATION, CAN YOU PROVIDE NECESSARY VEHICLES FOR TRUCKING CONTAINERS TO AIRPORT?

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

FILE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE OCTOBER 10, 1944

IN 22070

FROM NAPLES, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

(CONTINUATION OF #8344 PAGE TWO)

PLEASE STATE ANY OBJECTIONS TO ESTABLISHING AMERICAN AIR CORPS
WING IN BRINDISI AREA SIMILAR TO 334 AND PLACING WITH IT 885,
482, AND 2 AMERICAN TROOP CARRIER UNITS NOW THERE.
INFORM TONNAGE YOU PLAN TO HAUL BY 492 AND COUNTRIES TO BE SERVED.

TBR: 10/10/44 2134PM

SECRET
FILE COPY

6-45 22506

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 14, 1944**

| | | |
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| FROM | USTRAVIC, LONDON | PRIORITY |
| TO | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | ROUTINE |
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| (FOR ACTION) DIRECTOR | (FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER, ETO, SO, FETO, BIGELOW | IN 22799 |

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~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

#82204. To 109 and Hoffmann. From Armour and Miller.

1. Has proposed survey trip been examined in light firm request CBI for Squadron? Alternative would be to send Lieut. Colonel Chandler and possible Major Thayer and Lieut. Colonel Embary by ATC immediate to Ceylon and New Delhi.

2. Discussed survey trip with JSSTAF. Were advised that arrangements must be finalized in Washington if survey still deemed advisable. Please advise.

Mr. Ch...

Message Center Note: This message appears to refer to #74557 to London, OUT 20068.

SECRET

FOR: 10/14/44 12:27 PM

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Form (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

15.517

492 Bombard. Squad

DATE **October 14, 1944**

FROM **USSTAF, LONDON**

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TO **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

IN **22832**

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BARI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT

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~~SECRET~~
SECRET

#82234. London-Washington ✓
#2774. London-Caserta.

From Armour and Katek. Action: Green, Chapin and Ross.
Information: Donovan.

Discussions re use of 492nd with USSTAF here indicate that request from General Eaker to General Spaatz for assignment of squadron from 492nd to MEDTO on TD might hasten progress on point 9A in your #4034. Since General Eaker was responsible for promulgating clandestine night OPS program here, he will probably be sympathetic toward (1) supporting Slovak resistance (2) building up Bohemian-Moravian resistance. We suggest he be approached with our needs and told of possibilities which lie with 492nd of fulfilling them.

X aircraft

SECRET

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TR: 10/14/44 4:18 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

492 Bomb. Sq. 15, 20, 30

DATE **October 14, 1944**

FROM **OSTRAVIC, LONDON**

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TO **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

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IN 22895

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

NEW DELHI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELON, ETO, FETO, SO

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SECRET

#82177. Action: Hoppner, New Delhi #58. From Miller and Arson, Washington. **SECRET**

We understand the Southeast Asia Command is asking the 492nd Group for airplanes. If this is true, so that we can tell USSTAF, it is imperative that we be informed at once how many planes are being requested.



X am...

SECRET

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TOP: 10/14/44 4:54 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE OCTOBER 14, 1944 REC'D 10/14/44 - 4:48 PM

TO SDEX, KANDY

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(FOR INFORMATION)

442
15:25
DIRECTOR ✓

SECRETARIAT

SECRET

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27883-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#7884. Cheston to Heppner.

SECRET

Coughlin had already asked CG, CBI to apply for the assignment of a squadron before our former message was sent out. I would advise you to see that a like request is filed by SPAC at once for another squadron if you have a need for planes.

X

SECRET

10/14/44 - 6:29 PM

CSC

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157552-A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 11, 1944** REC'D **10/12/44 9:22** *HeHo*

| | | |
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| TO | USTHAVIC, LONDON | PRIORITY |
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(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR ✓

SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, *49* SO,
FETO, BIGELOW

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27553-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#74557. 109 to Forgan. Action: London. Information: Heppner, Kandy, #7637 and Coughlin, New Delhi, #14697.

Messages have been received from both Coughlin and Heppner saying that they will require bombers for parachuting operations and they have asked that survey party be sent out at once. This party should be sent to Kandy and New Delhi. Please continue to notify us as actions are taken.

TOD: 10/12/44 2:21 p.m.

WJD

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE SEPTEMBER 19 1944

FROM STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

URGENT

ACTION: CASIRTA - 001

**INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, BUCKLEY, WETTER, H-2,
CG, FETB, ETC.**

**INFO: ACTION: CLAVIN AND DAVIS. CASIRTA #2394, GREEN, HART,
INFORMATION: PLOENC, PARIS #7504, TOS AND HOFFMANN,
WASHINGTON.**

*Amal...
A. Green*

1. USSTAF HAS OFFERED USE OF 493RD GROUP TO OSS THIS THEATER.
APPEARS THAT NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS WILL EMPLOY ABOUT 10 PLANES
CERTAINLY NOT MORE THAN 7 SQUADRON. CG, CBI HAS REQUESTED 1
SQUADRON. IN ABOUT 30 DAYS, ANY FACILITIES FOR WHICH WE DO NOT
HAVE FIRM COMMITMENT WILL BE ASSIGNED OTHER TASKS.

2. SINCE IMMEDIATE TASKS NOT AVAILABLE, PROBLEM IS TO HAVE
AVAILABLE LIFT FOR ANTICIPATED OPERATIONS INTO GERMANY LATER. IF
YOU HAVE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLIES TO KEEP PLANES EMPLOYED,
SUGGEST YOU MAKE REQUEST THROUGH CG, YOUR THEATER. SINCE SUPPLIES
AVAILABLE HERE WHEN AND IF REQUIREMENTS FOR GERMANY APPEAR, SQUADRON
CAN IN TURN BE RETURNED THIS THEATER AT APPROPRIATE TIME FOR
OPERATIONS INTO GERMANY.

3. ADVISE PRIORITY WHAT ACTION YOU PROPOSE SO WE MAY KEEP
USSTAF INFORMED.

Made on 10/10/44 by...

FILE COPY

SEP 19 1944 11:30 AM

6-43 11 22495

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 10, 1944

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|------------------------------------|--|-----------|
| FROM DELHI, NEW DELHI | | PRIORITY |
| TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | | ROUTINE |
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| (FOR ACTION) ✓ | (FOR INFORMATION) | II 22371 |
| DIRECTOR | SECRETARIAT, NEW DELHI, INDIA 17 TO, SO | 492/10/44 |

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#10317. Donovan from Coughlin. Information: McCarthy London. In reference to your #1446. - *attached*

SECRET

On the 5th, CBI Headquarters forwarded to the War Department a request for the assignment of one squadron. This action was taken at my request, which was based upon information provided by McCarthy. A copy of the letter should reach you on the 13th. It was forwarded to you by pouch on the 8th. Since this request has already been made, believe that no authorization is required here for survey trip. Propose that the survey party start immediately with New Delhi as its destination.

SECRET

FOR: 10/10/44 2:18 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 10, 1944

FROM SIGEX, ICANDY

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TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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IN-22396

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

472 wdf
130
cc

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#7534. For Donovan only from Hoppner. Referring to your *724*

1. The above mentioned message was most timely. We have attained our first notable success in Thailand. Numerous drops of personnel and supplies will be required for the follow up.

2. We have planned a great many air activities for Southern Burma and Malaya.

3. Rivalry for British ships is very keen, and in my opinion the 402nd Border (group) Squadron is vital to our operations.

4. I will coordinate with Coughlin and dispatch a memo to you at a later date.

5. I think your recommendation concerning a survey party is very good.

Answer
10/10/44

* Received BODNER
TOR: 10/10/44 4:50 P.M.

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 7, 1944 REC'D 10/9/44 10:32 AM

| | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|----------|
| TO | STOEX, HANBY | PRIORITY |
| FROM | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | ROUTINE |
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| | | OCT 1946 |

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| (CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) | (FOR INFORMATION) |
| DIRECTOR ✓ | SECRETARIAT, MORUDT, BIELLA, S., PPTO. |

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87533-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#7427. Coughlin and Hemmer from 109. New Delhi, #14467 **SECRET**

We have been offered the services of a squadron of the 492nd Bomber Group in the Far East if we can put forth a definite plan for its use. This squadron is now assigned to us in France, and is made up of experts in, and planes designed for, pinpoint parachuting of supplies and bodies. We must send our reply to this proposal to the War Department within 25 days. London has recommended that we send a survey party of bomber group men and some of our own specialists in parachuting work there to study the situation. This would seem advisable if you can furnish a good case for the need of such a trip and if it can be arranged within the time allowed. Please let us know your opinion of this suggestion. If you feel that it would strengthen our case, please have STAC and CBI submit a combined recommendation and you and I can later straighten out the matter of allocation. If you do not feel that this would be practical, then each should set forth its own position. My suggestion would be that you exchange opinions immediately, draw up definite plans and compose a recommendation. You should make an effort to solicit the aid of Stillwell and perhaps Chennault and Stratemeyer.

*Approved
all*

SECRET

10/9/44 2:12 PM JD INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 23, 1944**

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| <i>151 518</i> DIRECTOR ✓ | SECRETARIAT, ETO, PETO, SO, BIGLO, MAGRUDER, X-2 |

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **CONFIDENTIAL**

84101. From Armour to 109. In reference to my #83991.

By agreement with Maskell, Lt. Col. Gable is remaining with CSS and is therefore available for air survey trip.

X 21 6

Armour

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 1 10/23/44 2:47 PM FILE COPY

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FORM 8 2294

Jan Form 8 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 22, 1944

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|--------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| FROM | USTRAVIC, LONDON | PRIORITY |
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| TO | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | DEFERRED |
| | | IN 23536 |
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| DI RECTOR | <i>15,518</i> ✓ | SECRETARIAT |

✓

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#83991. To 109 from Armour.

CONFIDENTIAL

With reference to the air survey trip, we are endeavoring to persuade USSTAF to release us from our moral obligation of transferring to them Lieutenant-Colonel Gable. His transfer to the organization had your approval sometime ago as well as the approval of 105, but the official orders have not yet gone through. We should know definitely by Monday what the actual situation is regarding Gable.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR: 10/22/44 3:03 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 21, 1944**

FROM **USTRAVIC, LONDON**

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TO **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

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Am. copy 15.518
DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

**SECRETARIAT, MACGRUDER, BIGHTON,
SO, PTO, MDTO, FTTO, X-2**

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SECRET

#83664. To 109 from Armour. Referring to your #76107

SECRET

The 492nd Bomber Group is not supplying the 7th Army or any other Army in this Theater. In fact they are doing nothing. USSTAF is very anxious that these crews and planes be employed in work they were trained for. General Anderson spoke to me about it last night and I am writing memorandum for him outlining possible employment of personnel and planes of this group in this theater and other theaters. Copy of memorandum will be sent to you.

Handwritten signature

10/21/44 - 9:32 AM

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SECRET

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Form of (Official)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 10/19/44

REC'D 10/19/44 4344 YD

TO BOUTX, KNDY

PRIORITY
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 20707

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Ans Craft 10/18/44
DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIES, BINGL, 40, TO, P. T. I.
INFO, MORGAN, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87488-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#8267.. To Heppner and Coughlin (#15527 to 'Low Delhi' from
Information: (#75107)..

As planes of the 492nd Harbor group are required to support
General Patch's army, OIG has ruled that they are not available
at the present time. Therefore General Stillwell's request has
been refused for the present. However, we intend to continue
with survey group tentatively made up of Colonel Keelin, A.P.,
Colonel Gable who is in charge of the OIS packing unit in FTO,
and perhaps a representative of OIG. Additional information
will be forthcoming.

ans

TO: 10/19/44 8:25 PM

1JD/6

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 19, 1944**

FROM **TEKHI, NEW DELHI**

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TO **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

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(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, BIGELOW, MAGRUDER,
60, SI, PTO, SERVICES. X-2

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#10897. From Heppner and Coughlin to Donovan.

SECRET

Many problems were settled at the meeting held today and we submit the following arrangements for your approval: Captain Chartrand and Lt. Col. McGehee are to be transferred, with their slots, from SEAC to CBI. We request that the Director's Pool make 2 slots available to SEAC to replace the above.

We decided that the best set-up for the P-24 squadron which we hope to secure, would be to have the planes assigned to CBI but have them be at the disposal of SEAC for its missions. We will work out schedules for sorties among ourselves.

Handwritten notes:
Send cable regarding this
Computable then in building and then
SECRET

TO: 10/19/44 1:27 PM

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Original in Sec 492 Bank

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 16, 1944**

| | |
|---|--|
| FROM SIDEX, KANDY | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE |
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SECRET

SECRET

#7944. To Donovan and Cheston from Heppner. Reference your #7884.

1. The highest ranking Air Force Officers have assured Captain Dabney that there will be no more than 1 squadron taken in the entire Far East. More airfields would have to be built if another squadron were taken, and they refuse to do such building.

2. In my opinion this detachment has been very unfairly treated as to aircraft. We need many more semi-long range aircraft than does Col. Coughlin, and our plans for their future use are already formulated, down to the number of monthly sorties.

3. We ask you to right this wrong by advising Coughlin that he must allow us to share this squadron with him. The squadron comprises a dozen aircraft, and we have been told by the Air Force that they will not allow all of them to go across the hump into China.

4. We will have to abandon the majority of our operations, all of which are planned to help with the war plans, unless we receive your assistance in this matter.

X aircraft

SECRET

TOP: 10/16/44 2:33 PM

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SECRET

DATE: 10/20/1944

TO: PEARL

Note Attached is a telegram of October 7 from Porgan, which the General wanted sent to the Joint Chiefs.

In view of the later telegram from London, which is also attached, we agreed that it would serve no purpose to send this to the Joint Chiefs until the question of air support for GSS had been settled. I am returning the papers to you, and will do nothing further unless I hear from you about it.

JWA
J. W. Auchincloss
1st Lt. JAGD

SECRET

Office of the Secretariat

FORM NO. 1001
(Rev. 7/27/40)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SL
DATE

| TO | NAME | INITIALS |
|----|---------------------|----------|
| | G. C. Doering, Jr. | |
| | J. J. Monigan | |
| | E. J. Putzall, Jr. | |
| | R. Thrum | |
| | D. C. Lee | |
| | J. W. Auchincloss | |
| | W. B. Kantack | |
| | W. H. Miley | |
| | B. E. Pugliese | |
| ✓ | A. W. Sulloway | |
| | J. R. Donovan | |
| | A. W. Amuth, Jr. | |
| | A. L. Dart | |
| | H. H. Hamilton | |
| | L. R. Houston | |
| | C. H. McClelland | |
| | J. L. McDonnell | |
| | J. R. Schoemer, Jr. | |
| | Secretariat Files | |
| | Director's Files | |
| | O. G. C. Files | |

for [unclear]

11/11/41

(21695)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 4, 1944

FROM LETHBRIDGE, LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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IN 21276

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(FOR INFORMATION)

(FOR AGNOR)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, RECORDS, PRINTING,
NO. 11, BPO, P.O.

To Cdr

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SECRET

#79924. To 109 from Armour and Miller.

1. Your letter of 12 September concerning reassignment of 492nd Bomb Group to another Theater has been returned with endorsement by USSTAF and 5th Air Force approving in principle.

2. USSTAF has offered use of 492nd Group to OSS in this Theater but it now appears that lift available from British sources is adequate to make all projected sorties to Holland, Denmark, Norway and Germany. The question of lift to Moravia and Bohemia is being investigated although preliminary indications are that such operations are not feasible from this Theater.

3. At this time, the situation is as follows:

(A) 3 Liberators and 2 Mosquitos with crews are being reserved for GI purposes.

(B) In about 30 days, the 492nd Group will be assigned to other tasks although, in the meantime, a squadron, made up of the most highly specialized personnel, will remain earmarked for OSS in the event need is found for them during next 30 days.

(C) In discussions with USSTAF, it appears that they are receptive to transferring substantially all of the establishment to another Theater for the supplying of resistance by OSS provided decision and request for such transfer is made by War Department and Theater Commander concerned.

(D) If a survey party to War last is necessary, in your opinion and is approved by War Department, believe USSTAF will action a plane to be accompanied by such personnel from OSS here as are necessary to prevent facilities to be offered including supplies and packing. It is suggested that this party be composed of Lieut. Colonel Gross, Chandler, Embury and Major Thayer along with representative of the 492nd Group who would be the Captain of the aircraft crew. If this party is sent, it is particularly important that Col. Gross and Major Thayer accompany it.

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

FROM

USSTRAY 10

RECEIVED

SECRET

4. It is our opinion that everything has been done in this Theater that can be accomplished to make available for reassignment air lift facilities used by SO-CSS that are now uncommitted. The problem is now one for your handling in Washington in consultation with War Department and the various Theater Commanders. USSTAF has stated that definite project must be presented within 30 days, which may not permit the dispatch of the survey party and may require that the problem be presented by cable to the Far East.

5. Col. Bross, who is now in the United States has a broad knowledge of matter and it is suggested that he may be of considerable assistance in working out solution.

ACTION COPY

SECRET

TOR: 10/4/44 2:44 PM

FILE COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 10/3/44

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY
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TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN 21768

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(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER, BIGELOW, ETO,
SO, SI, OG

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#79664. To 109 from Forgan,

SECRET

As you knew, 492nd group was shifted from our work some weeks ago to urgent supply job for armies. Subsequently group was transferred from ATC to 1st AF. Talked to General Curtis last week and pointed out to him that we were now back where we started and in the hands of our cousins for future operations. Particularly stressed commitments which we had made to Norwegians for next moon period, which, if we were not going to be able to satisfy, would necessitate our informing them immediately. Curtis called Monday and stated after consulting with Spruells and Anderson they had decided to return the group to its former status with us.

TOR: 10/3/44 3:20 PM

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SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Lt. Colonel Doering

SUBJECT: Proposed Land Rescue Squadron for China

DATE: 24 Nov. 1945

* Land Rescue

Colonel Early and I went over today to see Lt. Colonel Maury of Colonel C. V. Whitney's office in regard to the questions which had been raised by G-3 as to the assignment of OSS slots to the Air Forces for the purpose of activating the initial flight, including 15 officers and 35 enlisted men, and the possible activation at a future time of a full squadron. Colonel Maury took us to see Colonel Ladd, who is the G-1 for that division of the Air Forces. I explained to Colonel Ladd that we wished to cooperate in every way, and that our desire for having this lift available to us in China was so that we would be able to do our job of intelligence, target and rescue work, etc. for the Air Forces; but that in view of the relatively small TO which we had, we could not permanently give up these slots without impairing our ability to do the job for them.

The upshot was that Colonel Ladd agreed that the flight would be activated with Air Forces slots. He stated that it would of course be strictly an Air Force Land Rescue Unit but that it could be used by OSS, in addition, if and to the extent desired by the Theater Commander.

I believe this is a happy solution since the result in the field would have been the same whether we had provided slots or not. The meeting ended on the most friendly terms.

This memorandum of course should serve to release the slots which had been earmarked for this flight back to the Director's pool.

cc: Mr. Cheston
Mr. O'Gara
Com. Carey
Lt. Edw. Wilson
Lt. G. A. Bane



G. A. Bane, Jr.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SOUTH EAST ASIA
APO #432, NYC

Copy to [unclear]
29 January 1955

SUBJECT: Liaison planes

TO: Major General William J. Donovan

1. The following is a general discussion of the various types of liaison planes now in operation with Detachment 104; characteristics and necessary landing field.

2. L-1: Probably the most efficient airplane for our use is the L-1. This airplane was obsolete in 1941 and its existence. It is a large airplane weighing approximately 285 h.p. motor and capable of carrying up to 1,000 lbs. designed as an artillery observation aircraft having a speed which can be dropped down to as low as 25 miles per hour, cruising speed is 25 miles per hour, about 80 and landing speed is 28. It is definitely a short field airplane. On a good field take off in about 200 feet and can land in the same space with a safety factor, it is most desirable for a minimum of a 1000 feet of the landing strip is loaded to capacity. In tail section high and around 1200 feet of runway is required. For our use not have time to make long and elaborate strips, this aircraft is excellent.

3. There are two factors in the operation of the L-1. To be given maximum attention, (1) selection of pilots, (2) selection of aircraft. We have been most particular in selection of pilots and find that approximately one out of five of the ordinary pilot is capable of mastering the L-1. We have laid down a simple rule: do not have a pilot that we are completely satisfied with the L-1 stays on the ground. We have also been very particular on the selection of these airplanes and any time a minor defect appears the airplane is on the deadline. In a like sense, when one of the periodical checks scheduled the airplane is automatically deadlined.

4. As a special note, the weight of this aircraft presents some problem, especially during the monsoon. Most of our strips are old paddy fields which are partially under water during this period. As a consequence the footing is not solid and the airplane has tendencies to be down. Thus the operation of this airplane during the monsoon is somewhat restricted.

5. L-5: The L-5 is a Stinson 185 h.p., two passenger airplane. Take-off speed for the L-5 is approximately 60 miles an hour, cruises at about 105 and lands at approximately 70. A minimum of 1,000 feet is required as a runway for an L-5, although it gains its flying speed at 100.

600 feet, the other space is required as a safety factor. This airplane has several advantages over the L-1, the main ones being the ease of replacement and the increased cruising speed. The latest model of this airplane, the L-5 B, is generally the same as its predecessor with the exceptions that it has a top flap through which stretcher cases are lowered into the aircraft, it has a better radio and a two-pilot cockpit.

6. This aircraft is used by all of the liaison squadrons in the theater and as a consequence the theater is well stocked in them.

7. L-4: The L-4 is a 75 h.p. Piper Cub. It is a single-engine aircraft which has a take-off speed of approximately 50 miles an hour, stalls at 90 and lands at about 50. It carries two passengers and requires approximately 600 feet of runway. For evacuation work this aircraft is considered most satisfactory.

8. When I was in the states recently General [Name] [Name], General of the 10th Air Force, introduced me to the [Name] [Name] Consolidated. He said that the Army had given the specifications for a new type liaison plane which they were now working on and that they estimated would take them approximately one year to turn out. From what he told me this new aircraft should have the following characteristics: it should be somewhat like the [Name] [Name] should have a take-off speed of about 40 miles an hour, stall speed and landing about 40. It should have an increased range of about 200 miles and should be able to carry about 1000 pounds. When it goes into production it is believed that it will [Name] [Name]

[Handwritten Signature]

V. J. Peare
Lt. Col., Inf.

WRP:hws

00-0000-0001

Date 11/15/54

To: _____

show to EJP & Sect. The
File - with copy
to SO LAP

has Ed Wilson
seen it?

- | | |
|--------------|------------|
| 1) EJP | ✓ |
| 2) E. Wilson | How is it? |
| 3) Sect. | ans |
| 4) O'Donnell | for filing |

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

SECRET

BRANCH HEADQUARTERS
OSS-SU DETACHMENT 101
APO 488

20 JANUARY 1948

TO: Final Report of Survey Party

TO: The Director of the Office of Strategic Services

DETAILS OF SURVEY

1. Purpose: The survey party proposed to investigate the possible employment of any aircraft that might be made available from the European Theater of Operations for the support of OSS activities in China, Burma, or South East Asia Command.

2. Host of Personnel: The crew of the aircraft provided for the mission was furnished by the 49th Bombardment Group (H) of the 8th United States Air Force and acted as technical advisors on Air Force matters in addition to their normal flying duties. They traveled under Special Orders 233, Page 225 Station 122, APO 487, dated 27 November 1944. Lt. Col. Cable and Chandler traveled under letter orders U.K. Base dated 26 November 1944.

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|--------------|-----------|
| Lt. Col. Lewis M. Cable | 0561136 | | 0561136 |
| Lt. Col. Fitzhugh R. Chandler | 0272187 | | 0272187 |
| Major Denton R. Rudolph | 0650842 | (P) | 850th Sq. |
| Capt. Emanuel Chapp | 0790555 | (CP) | 856th Sq. |
| 1st Lt. Charles W. Mcquire | 0755191 | (I) | " " |
| 1st Lt. Robert A. France | 0680324 | (A) | " " |
| Capt. Clifford M. Fulton | 0385708 | (Engr) | " " |
| 1st Sgt. Willis L. Delano Jr. | 1102041 | (Crew Chief) | " " |
| 1st Sgt. William M. Lewis | 39120408 | (RO) | " " |

3. Equipment: The party traveled in a B-24 (D) airplane, numbered 42-23290, of the 8th United States Air Force, that was a specimen of the aircraft used in the support of resistance groups from England. One set of each type of navigational and air-ground communications equipment that was used in the operations from England was carried in the airplane for the information of interested personnel.

4. Itinerary: Headquarters and Detachments at New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay in India; Dacca and Madras in Burma; Rangoon in Burma; Colombo and Ceylon in Ceylon; and Kunming, China, were visited.

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that the current project will be concluded as operations move south out of Kachin territory. Plans for the continued use or re-employment of Detachment 101 after the conclusion of the present project were not announced on the date of visit.

b) A maximum of eight sorties per day is being provided by the 10th United States Air Force from Binjan, Burma. The greater part of the sorties are flown by C-47 aircraft. An average of one in each six sorties delivered by landing while the balance use "free" or parachute drops. Approximately six operations per month are conducted at night to provide security for the receiving ground unit. Operations require an average of from four to five hours flying time. Enemy air activity is negligible. The air lift provided by the 10th Air Force has been adequate.

c) Liaison aircraft assigned to the Detachment number:

| | |
|---|----------------------------|
| 4 | L-1 aircraft |
| 1 | L-1 aircraft with pontoons |
| 1 | L-5 aircraft |
| 1 | L-4 aircraft |

These aircraft are being made maximum use of and operational requirements could employ double the number.

3. Detachment 404: Fifty to seventy five sorties per month are provided by the British Squadron of B-24 aircraft supporting British clandestine activities in SMLC. Of the total sorties air to ten are allocated to OSS each month. Sixty per cent is the overall rate of successful completion. Operations are limited to moon periods and are all conducted at night. The installation of navigational and air-ground communications equipment now in progress may make some non-moon operations feasible. Operations very closely resemble those conducted by OSS aircraft in the European Theater; the greatest difference being found in the longer ranges required for SMLC operations and the lack of enemy activity.

b) A small number of extreme range operations are conducted by Catalina flying boats. Recent experiments indicate that personnel may be dispatched by parachute from this type aircraft at the rate of not more than two for each person over an average sized dropping zone.

c) Initial supply of personnel has been computed at fifteen hundred pounds for each three man party.

d) Within a few weeks Detachment 404 could make use of double the number of aircraft sorties now assigned. This figure could be doubled again if operations were flown in the non-moon periods. Expansion of the present field network could be developed in from two to four months to make use of a sixteen aircraft squadron. The need for additional aircraft in this number of sorties is evidenced by recent requests for two more British squadrons.

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e) There appears to be a great need for a parachute school to train OSS personnel. Such a school, centrally located, might be supported by an OSS squadron working in addition to normal operational employment.

5. Detachment 202: Plans for the supply of resistance groups uses eight tons for initial supply of two hundred and fifty Chinese with a ten man staff team and four tons per month in re-supply.

b) Further development of AGENTS network envisages an increase of personnel numbering near one thousand.

c) Development of plans for North China anticipates the use of approximately one thousand OSS personnel to provide sixty four "ten man teams" and necessary headquarters and service installations.

d) Plans for activities in Indo-China entail such requirements for air lift because the projects are primarily concerned with liaison activities, training programs and the establishment of radio facilities.

e) The proposed plan for Thailand foresees including roughly fifty thousand Thais.

f) Experiences in parachute delivery in China have not been entirely satisfactory and technical advice is needed to reduce the difficulties that are being encountered.

4. Conclusions: One squadron of aircraft could be fully employed in SEAC operations and in addition might support the functioning of an OSS parachute school. Air operations in SEAC very closely resemble those conducted by OSS from England and require identical flying equipment and air crew training.

b) It appears evident that the implementation of present plans for the operation of intelligence networks in China alone can employ at least two squadrons of aircraft without considering the development of resistance groups or the arming of existing military organizations in China, Indo-China or Thailand. China air operations are not similar to those carried out from England in that they are executed in the day light without strong enemy air or antisircraft activity.

c) B-24 aircraft are suitable for employment in either SEAC or China and the modifications used in the European Theater fit operational requirements. C-47 are more suitable than B-24 aircraft to support present Detachment 101 operations because of the short range involved, air field and maintenance requirements, and lack of enemy air activity.

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS

1. Navigation: British and U. S. Morse facilities are available with operating radio that cover the territory included in present and proposed plans for SEAC and China.

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b) Plans for MAO and Burma operations are satisfactorily accurate for altitude, wind, temperature, humidity and present considerable difficulties in operations. These however are limited in MAO but is used extensively in both Burma and MAO operations.

c) Navigation is primarily H. H. with celestial work used secondarily.

d) Monsoon periods cut both the number of operations flown and the rate of success by at least fifty percent.

2. Delivery: MAO operations deliver by air chute from seven hundred feet of altitude. Altitudes are selected since most are not equipped with radio altimeters. Fifty percent of MAO operations drops are not met on the ground by a receiving party. Conditions are usually extreme ranging from two to three thousand feet. Extreme rescue operations are flown by C-47 line and C-54 line.

b) The majority of operations in China are conducted by air drops from which distribution of supplies is made to the personnel in the field. Difficulties have been experienced in the parachute dropping of radio equipment. Technical help would be of great assistance in solving this sort of problem.

c) Burma operations tend to be out of reach of air drops, the balance being dropped free and by air chute. Most of the articles and clothing are some of the better quality.

3. Reception: Normal use of parachute, free, parachute, and chute in made in certain dropping zones. Air drops and air drops equipment and portable hoisting devices are rarely used. It is essential for each efficient operation. Security of the receiving party receiving supplies frequently requires that aircraft stay a few minutes in the target area while on the other hand the use of enemy air activities permits as much searching or circling over the target by the aircraft as is desired without fear of interception.

4. Remarks: Air Force service personnel and facilities are not available in great enough strength in either MAO or China to make it possible to cover new squadrons. Any squadrons arriving from England should therefore arrive complete with service personnel.

b) Problems of supply, maintenance and service air field requirements and personnel requirements should discuss that MAO aircraft must cover the range of operations and the same aircraft will permit. Example: Conditions in the present Burma operations are the best ideal cargo carrying aircraft.

c) Attached find a range map that roughly describes the operating limits of MAO aircraft with variations in load and sea conditions.



157518A

Shaded areas show normal to maximum range

Radii of action computed for 500 gallon fuel reserve and one hour to one and one half hour target and route searching time.

Shuttle distance from India to Mindoro 1450 miles; possible with 6000 lb payload. Distance from Kunming to Philippines 1300 miles. Distances in nautical miles.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY GROUND FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315
FORM NO. 100-10 (REV. 1-61)

SECRET
BRANCH HEADQUARTERS
OSS-SU DETACHMENT (CI)
APO 465

20 January 1945

SUBJECT: Final Report of Survey Party

TO: The Director of the Office of Strategic Services

DETAILS OF MISSION

1. Purpose: The survey party proposed to investigate the possible employment of any aircraft that might be made available from the European Theater of Operations for the support of OSS activities in China, Burma, or South East Asia Command.

2. Matter of Personnel: The crew of the aircraft provided for the mission was furnished by the 492nd Bombardment Group (H) of the 8th United States Air Force and acted as technical advisers on Air Force matters in addition to their normal flying duties. They traveled under Special Orders 222, Hdq AAF Station 179, APO 667, dated 27 November 1944. Lt. Cols. Gable and Chandler traveled under letter orders U.S. Base dated 26 November 1944.

| | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|------------------|
| Lt. Col. Lewis M. Gable | 0351135 | OSS HQ |
| Lt. Col. Fitzhugh H. Chandler | 0272157 | OSS HQ |
| Major Bertram R. McDough | 0659842 | (P) 688th Sq. |
| Capt. Emanuel Choper | 0799335 | (OP) 684th Sq. |
| 1st Lt. Charles W. Mcquire | 0755121 | (W) " " |
| 1st Lt. Robert A. France | 0628334 | (S) " " |
| Capt. Clifford H. Fulton | 0263706 | (Engr) " " |
| R/Sgt. Willis L. Delano Jr. | 11020421 | (Crew Chief) " " |
| Sgt. William E. Lewis | 39120406 | (MO) " " |

3. Equipment: The party traveled in a B-24 (D) airplane, numbered 45-43700, of the 8th United States Air Force, that was a specimen of the aircraft used in the support of resistance groups from England. One set of each type of navigational and air-ground communications equipment that was used in the operations from England was carried in the airplane for the information of interested personnel.

4. Itinerary: Headquarters and Detachments at New Delhi, Calcutta, and Ranchi in India; Bhausa and Masira in Assam; Myittha in Burma; Colaba and Bombay in England; and Kuning, China, were visited.

PLANS AND ORGANIZATION

1. Organization: The operational project being conducted from Myittha, Burma, involves approximately one hundred and fifty U.S. personnel in the field with six transport machines. It is organized

SECRET

Page 2

that the current project will be concluded as operations move north out of Kachin territory. Plans for the continued use or re-employment of Detachment 101 after the conclusion of the present project were not announced on the date of visit.

b) A maximum of eight sorties per day is being provided by the 10th United States Air Force from Duzjan, Assam. The greater part of the sorties are flown by C-47 aircraft. An average of one in each six sorties delivers by landing while the balance use "free" or parachute drops. Approximately six operations per month are conducted at night to provide security for the receiving ground unit. Operations require an average of from four to five hours flying time. Enemy air activity is negligible. The air lift provided by the 10th Air Force has been adequate.

c) Liaison aircraft assigned to the Detachment number:

| | |
|---|----------------------------|
| 4 | L-1 aircraft |
| 1 | L-1 aircraft with pontoons |
| 1 | L-5 aircraft |
| 1 | L-4 aircraft |

These aircraft are being made maximum use of and operational requirements could employ double the number.

2. Detachment 404: Fifty to seventy five sorties per month are provided by the British Squadron of B-24 aircraft supporting OSS and British clandestine activities in SEAC. Of the total sorties six to ten are allocated to OSS each month. Sixty per cent is the over all rate of successful completion. Operations are limited to moon periods and are all conducted at night. The installation of navigational and air-ground communications equipment now in progress may make some non-moon operations feasible. Operations very closely resemble those conducted by OSS aircraft in the European Theater; the greatest difference being found in the longer ranges required for SEAC operations and the lack of enemy activity.

b) A small number of extreme range operations are conducted by Catalina flying boats. Recent experiments indicate that personnel may be dispatched by parachute from this type aircraft at the rate of not more than two for each pass over an average sized dropping zone.

c) Initial supply of personnel has been computed at fifteen hundred pounds for each three man party.

d) Within a few weeks Detachment 404 could make use of double the number of aircraft sorties now assigned. This figure could be doubled again if operations were flown in the non-moon periods. Expansion of the present field network could be developed in from two to four routes to make use of a sixteen aircraft squadron. The need for additional aircraft in this sphere of activity is evidenced by recent requests for two more British squadrons.

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page 2

c) There appears to be a great need for a parachute school to train OSS personnel. Such a school, centrally located, might be supported by an OSS squadron working in addition to normal operational employment.

3. Detachment 101: Plans for the supply of resistance groups use eight tons for initial supply of two hundred and fifty tons with a ten man staff team and four tons per month in re-supply.

b) Further development of AGENTS network envisages an increase of personnel numbering near one thousand.

a) Development of plans for North China anticipates the use of approximately one thousand OSS personnel to provide sixty four "ten man teams" and necessary headquarters and service installations.

d) Plans for activities in Indo-China entail such smaller requirements for air lift because the projects are primarily concerned with liaison activities, training programs and the establishment of radio facilities.

e) The proposed plan for Thailand foresees including roughly fifty thousand Thais.

f) Experiences in parachute delivery in China have not been entirely satisfactory and technical advice is needed to reduce the difficulties that are being encountered.

4. Conclusions: One squadron of aircraft could be fully employed in SHAO operations and in addition might support the functioning of an OSS parachute school. Air operations in SHAO very closely resemble those conducted by OSS from England and require identical flying equipment and air crew training.

b) It appears evident that the implementation of present plans for the operation of intelligence networks in China alone can employ at least two squadrons of aircraft without considering the development of resistance groups or the arming of existing military organizations in China, Indo-China or Thailand. China air operations are not similar to those carried out from England in that they are executed in the day light without strong enemy air or antiaircraft activity.

c) B-24 aircraft are suitable for employment in either SHAO or China and the modifications used in the European Theater fit operational requirements. C-47 are more suitable than B-24 aircraft to support present Detachment 101 operations because of the short ranges involved, air field and maintenance requirements, and lack of enemy air activity.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Expansions: British and U. S. bases facilities are available with operating radio that cover the territory included in present and proposed plans for SHAO and China.

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b) Maps for SEAC and Burma operations are satisfactorily accurate for piloting. China maps are very inaccurate and present considerable difficulties in operations. Photo coverage is limited in China but is used extensively in both Burma and SEAC operations.

c) Navigation is primarily D. E. with celestial work used secondarily.

d) Monsoon periods cut both the number of operations flown and the rate of success by at least fifty percent.

2. **Delivery:** SEAC operations deliver by parachute from seven hundred feet of altitude. Altitudes are estimated since aircraft are not equipped with radio altimeters. Fifty percent of SEAC personnel drops are not met on the ground by a receiving party. Ranges are usually extreme running from two to three thousand miles. A few extreme range operations are flown by Catalinas that land their cargo.

b) The majority of operations in China land cargo at advanced air bases from which distribution of supplies is made to the personnel in the field. Difficulties have been experienced in the parachute dropping of radio equipment. Technical advice would be of great assistance in solving this sort of problem.

c) Burma operations land one out of each six supply loads, the balance being dropped free and by parachute. Rice, staple food articles and clothing are examples of the material dropped free.

3. **Navigation:** Normal use of panels, fires, flashlights and smoke pots is made in marking out dropping zones. Air-ground communication equipment and portable hoisting devices are rarely used. It appears that such equipment, particularly where maps are inaccurate, is an essential for most efficient operation. Security of the ground party receiving supplies frequently requires that aircraft spend only a few minutes in the target area while on the other hand the lack of enemy air activities permits as much searching or as many passes over the target by the aircraft as is desired without danger of interception.

4. **Remarks:** Air Force service personnel and facilities are not available in great enough strength in either SEAC or China to make it possible to serve new squadrons. Any squadrons arriving from England should therefore arrive complete with service personnel.

b) Problems - supply, maintenance and service; air field requirements and personnel requirements should dictate that C-47 aircraft used wherever the range of operations and the enemy situation will permit. Example: Conditions in the present Burma program make the C-54 the most ideal cargo carrying aircraft.

c) Attached find a range map that roughly describes the operating limits of B-24 aircraft with variations in load and gas consumption.

LEWIS H. GOIN, Lt. Col., Inf.

OSR FORM 80018
25

Date 3 Jan 1985

Col. Bourn

Col. Bourn
has requested the
Secretariat to submit
the attached for
your information.
It also requested
that if he held
for General Bourn
return.

Peter F. Ruffner
1st Lt. USAF

Office of the Secretariat

(443)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

15757872
SECRET

Aircraft
& Personnel

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Proposed Land Rescue Squadron
TO : The Files

1. Upon our providing sufficient grades and ratings for 15 Officers and 35 EM, Colonel C. V. Whitney, AC, Chief, Projects Branch of the Operational Plans Division, AAF, will cable General Sultan on behalf of CG, AAF, requesting his approval for 1 flight of a proposed land rescue squadron. It is understood that the squadron will be under command of General Chennault but will be made available to OSS for operations in the China theater. This flight will consist of 3 C-47s, 2 YR6s, plus necessary equipment, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck and jeeps.

2. By May 1945 it is expected that the above flight of planes will be expanded to a squadron under the same command and for the same type of operations. The squadron will consist of 8 C-47s, 12 YR6s plus 6 reserves, and 8 amphibian planes, together with necessary equipment. The squadron will be a self-sustaining unit; its full complement will include 47 officers and 133 enlisted men.

3. After conferring with Colonel Buxton, Mr. Cheston and Mr. O'Gara, I have written Colonel Whitney (copy of letter attached) advising him that we are at this time providing the 15 officer and 35 EM slots for the flight and will provide the 47 officer and 133 EM slots necessary to accommodate the full complement of the proposed squadron.

~~HOLD FOR WHIT~~

DO
O. C. DOERING, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

Attachment
cc: Col. Burton
Mr. Cheston

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

8 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PROJECTS BRANCH, OPERATIONAL PLANS
DIVISION, AAF

SUBJECT: Grades and Ratings for Personnel of Proposed
Land Rescue Squadron

1. In connection with the flight of a proposed land rescue squadron which is to be under General Ghenault's command and to be made available to the Office of Strategic Services for operations in the Far East, this Agency will provide sufficient grades and ratings for 15 officers and 35 enlisted men to be assigned to such flight.

2. It is our intention further to provide sufficient grades and ratings for the full complement of the proposed squadron, totalling 47 officers and 135 enlisted men.

For the DIRECTOR:

O. C. DOERING, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

~~SECRET~~

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Proposed Land Rescue Squadron
TO : The Files

1. Upon our providing sufficient grades and ratings for 15 Officers and 35 EM, Colonel C. V. Whitney, AG, Chief, Projects Branch of the Operational Plans Division, AAF, will cable General Sultan on behalf of CG, AAF, requesting his approval for 1 flight of a proposed land rescue squadron. It is understood that the squadron will be under command of General Chennault but will be made available to OSS for operations in the China theater. This flight will consist of 3 C-47s, 2 Y2Cs, plus necessary equipment, 1 1/2 ton truck and jeeps.

2. By May 1945 it is expected that the above flight of planes will be expanded to a squadron under the same command and for the same type of operations. The squadron will consist of 8 C-47s, 12 Y2Cs plus 8 reserves, and 8 amphibian planes, together with necessary equipment. The squadron will be a self-sustaining unit; its full complement will include 47 officers and 133 enlisted men.

3. After conferring with Colonel Sutton, Mr. Cheston and Mr. O'Gara, I have written Colonel Whitney (copy of letter attached) advising him that we are at this time providing the 15 officer and 35 EM slots for the flight and will provide the 47 officer and 133 EM slots necessary to accommodate the full complement of the proposed squadron.

O. C. DOERING, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AAF
Executive Officer

Aircraft
~~SECRET~~

8 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PROJECTS BRANCH, OPERATIONAL PLANS
DIVISION, AAF

SUBJECT: Grades and Ratings for Personnel of Proposed
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For the DIRECTOR:

O. C. DOERING, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

~~SECRET~~

001 Form 4-51

SECRET

Date 26 Dec.

To: MR. CHESTON

Attached is the letter of 24 December from the Chiefs of Staff with regard to Helicopters about which I spoke with you on the phone, together with Mrs. O'Donnell's file on this subject.

Oest
O. C. D., Jr.

file

Office of the Executive Officer

SECRET

(10469)



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CR 13926
12.21.44
C. G. ...
...
...

24 December 1944.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Employment of Helicopters by the
Office of Strategic Services.

The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, has referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your letter of 8 December 1944, on the subject of employment of helicopters by the Office of Strategic Services.

Since the Army Air Forces have taken the lead in experimental and developmental work in this field, it is believed that your needs in developing types of helicopters and special equipment to make them satisfactory for your operations can best be met by establishment of necessary liaison with the Army Air Forces agencies concerned, who will be pleased to work with your representatives and to make use of your valuable OSS experiences.

Consistent with their over-all commitments, the Army Air Forces will undertake to provide air requirements in conjunction with approved OSS operations in combat theaters. Aircraft, including helicopters, which are employed in such air operations will continue in accordance with existing policy to be operated and maintained by the Army Air Forces. It therefore appears unnecessary and inappropriate to seek an actual assignment of helicopters and personnel to the Office of Strategic Services.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CS 13925

Handwritten notes:
11:37
10550-001
10550-001

24 December 1944.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Employment of Helicopters by the Office of Strategic Services.

The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, has referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your letter of 8 December 1944, on the subject of employment of helicopters by the Office of Strategic Services.

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Consistent with their over-all commitments, the Army Air Forces will undertake to provide air requirements in conjunction with approved OSS operations in combat theaters. Aircraft, including helicopters, which are employed in such air operations will continue in accordance with existing policy to be operated and maintained by the Army Air Forces. It therefore appears unnecessary and inappropriate to make an actual assignment of helicopters and operating personnel to the Office of Strategic Services.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Handwritten signature of A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

15,518
18 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING GENERAL ARMY AIR FORCES
 Attention: ACAS, OC & R, Commitments
 Division

SUBJECT: Procurement of Aircraft

1. Subsequent to the transmittal to you by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of correspondence concerning request of this agency for two squadrons of helicopters, we have learned that it will be at least six to nine months before planes in the number requested can be made available with trained crews. In view of this (although we wish to have the request remain with you) we desire to have made available in the interim 6 YR-5's (or YR-6's, whichever are available) modified as indicated in my memorandum of 11 December 1944, with crews. The 6 planes requested include the 2 YR-5's asked for in my 11 December memorandum to be used in the China Theater and an additional 4 to be used in SEAC. The 3 C-47's requested in the 11 December memorandum are in addition to the 6 YR-5's.

2. Request for these planes has been made by General Wedemeyer for the China Theater and General Sultan for SEAC.

William J. Donovan
 William J. Donovan
 Director

SECRET

- 2 -


The modified liberator has the range to cover all of China, Indo-China, and Formosa from fields still under our control, i.e., Kunming, Chengtu, Sian, and Laohokou. Best results in such operations can only be attained by using crews who specialize in their work. Inexperienced crews have been used more than once in the past with discouraging results. Dates have been missed and missions cancelled because we did not have our own planes.

This work is important but must have support. It has proved itself in other theaters. If properly backed now while there is still time to get organized, it will be a godsend later and will justify whatever was passed up to permit it, whether it be ships sunk, Japs killed, or what have you, for both directly and indirectly we will be engaged in doing this same thing.

Required for China Theater -
One squadron Modified Liberators

Required for India-Burma Theater -
One squadron Modified Liberators

Both General Wedemeyer and General Sultan have requested these planes after careful consideration of what they would have to give up in order to have them.


John G. Coughlin
Colonel, Infantry

To:

Captain Flint
Room 4B144 Pentagon Bldg.

Director's Office

055 Form 3054
(3900)

SECRET

11 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING GENERAL ARMY AIR FORCES
Attention: ACAS, OC & R, Commitments
Division

SUBJECT : Procurement of Aircraft

1. Request assignment of 3 C-47's and 2 A-1's to OSS Detachment 202, China Theater for special mission to be permanently used by that Detachment in that Theater. These aircraft are to be used for the air evacuation of downed airmen in an air rescue network which is to be organized immediately in that Theater. The 5 aircraft involved will be used for pickup, for supply and for general evacuation purposes and, in addition, will be used for the various Intelligence Services with which this office provides theater striking forces. It is requested that the aircraft be flown to destination by pilot and crew personnel furnished from Headquarters, OSS Washington. It is further requested that upon completion of staging of C-47's, this Headquarters be advised in order to dispatch crews for ferry.

a. It is desired that the C-47's be modified as follows:

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(1) Strip all troop carrier equipment such as jumping lights, parachute trip cords, jump seats and any cargo equipment not essential in order to make the aircraft as light as possible.

(2) Install SCR-729 and SCR-269G (if latter is not already installed).

(3) Four fuselage tanks piled above each other in forward end of fuselage to permit as much room as possible for freight in the fuselage.

b. It is desired that the YR-6's be modified as follows:

(1) Install on each helicopter the hydraulic winch developed by Vickers Inc., Detroit, and now in use by the Coast Guard, Floyd Bennet Field, N.Y.

(2) Remove right-hand seat and controls to permit use of the winch and out window in the floor to permit a visual angle of at least 60 degrees by the pilot for pick up.

c. Installation of SCR-274.

(For detailed information on above modifications contact Captain Flint of AFRES, Requirements Division, OO & R)

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2. It is at present planned to fly the YR-6's to ultimate destination in the C-47's therefore no shipping instructions are necessary for the YR-6's.

3. It is requested that arrangements be made to fly the C-47's (by crews furnished by the Headquarters) to Detroit, Michigan where crating will be accomplished by the Nash-Kelvinator Corporation. This has already been informally coordinated with that Corporation.


4. It is further requested that 150% spares be procured for the YR-6's to be shipped at the same time. This will include all movable parts such as rotor blades, rotor heads, tail rotors, wheel assemblies, engines, etc.

William J. Donovan
Director

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MINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



003547

8 DEC 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Employment of Helicopters by Office of
Strategic Services.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of memo from Director of Strategic Services
to CNO dated 13 November 1944.
(B) Copy of First Endorsement to Encl. (A) by
Coast Guard, dated 25 November 1944.

1. The attached correspondence from the Director of Strategic Services to the Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, requesting that two helicopter squadrons together with required operating personnel be made available to the Office of Strategic Services, is forwarded for information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Since helicopters used in connection with U.S.S. operations would normally, and in the theaters proposed most certainly, operate from Army fields, and would require Army support, it would appear logical that Army-owned helicopters be employed for the purpose. Furthermore, the operations proposed by General Donovan involve the use of naval aviation in purely land operations. The use of Coast Guard or other naval aviation for this purpose is considered to be an improper allocation of functions tending to unnecessary and wasteful duplication.

3. It is recommended the U.S. Army Air Force undertake such assistance to U.S.S. as may require the use of helicopters for operations approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

E. J. KING
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Copy to:
Chief, Office of Strategic Services
12/14/44
EJK

Admiral Donovan

SECRET**SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

12 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FROM: Director of Strategic Services

TO: Chief of Naval Operations

THROUGH: The Commandant, United States Coast Guard

SUBJECT: Employment of helicopters by the Office of Strategic Services.

1. This office is interested in the development and employment of helicopters in connection with the activities of agents and other personnel employed to accomplish the secret intelligence and operations responsibilities imposed upon this office by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 152/11/D). For certain operations, where arrangements for parachuting cannot be made, or where no landing strips or even clearings are in existence, or where agents must be put in or taken out with mathematical accuracy as to location, the helicopter may be able to be developed so as to be invaluable. This would be particularly true if there could be perfected for the aircraft a rescue hoist or mechanism which makes possible the landing or picking up of personnel from almost any terrain or at sea while the helicopter remains in flight, and if the range and payload of the helicopter can be increased.

2. The opportunity has recently been presented to me, at the invitation of Captain de Flores, Chief of the Special Devices Division of the Bureau of Aeronautics, to witness a demonstration of the Sikorsky HO-4 helicopter at the Coast Guard Air Station, Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn. One such helicopter had been equipped with a rescue hoist which indicates the practicability of this type of mechanism, and although that particular machine was rated as a trainer and has limited range and performance, it seems that it could be developed so as to meet the needs of this office.

3. This office would be pleased to cooperate with the Coast Guard Air Station at Floyd Bennett Field in the development of types of helicopters and special equipment designed to make the helicopter satisfactory for our operations, and authorization for such joint developmental work is hereby requested.

SECRET

- 2 -

For the purpose of such developmental work, and in order to test the present types of helicopters in actual operations in the European Theater and in the Far East, it is further requested that two helicopter squadrons, together with the required operating personnel, be made available to the Office of Strategic Services. Any required authorization from theater commanders would be obtained prior to the use of any such squadrons by OSS in the European Theater and the Far Eastern theaters.

William J. Donovan
Director

End - 1
25 November 1944

1. Forwarded, approved. The Coast Guard is not only willing, but eager, to furnish the operating personnel, including maintenance personnel, for the helicopters described in basic correspondence. The Coast Guard will give such assistance to the Bureau of Aeronautics as it may desire in making the helicopters available for the duty requested. Any further assistance from the Coast Guard for carrying out the project will be furnished.

R. H. WARSOB
Commandant

SECRET

15, 2017
F. J. ...

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Cheston
FROM : The Secretariat
SUBJECT:

DATE: 14 November 44

With respect to the attached, the Director and Colonel Doyring have both asked me whether adequate notifications have been given to our people in the European Theater and in the Far East to put them on notice that approval for dispatching the survey aircraft has been obtained. If you would like to have us prepare any cables or memoranda to this effect, we shall be glad to do so.

*See Bane
This has been
taken care of*

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11/5/44
Nov 7 - 1944
WOB
7 November 1944
1. Allocation & Service
1. Delivery (B.I. 10)
She

OPD 334.8 OSS (6 Nov 44)

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

In my letter of 1 November 1944, I acquainted you with the action taken by the War Department regarding Mr. Cheston's proposal to send an airplane and crew of the 492nd Bombardment Group to India for the purpose of making available the experiences of this Group to the India Burma Theater. The Commanding General of the India Burma Theater has replied and concurs fully in the plan.

A radio is being dispatched to the European Theater directing that a well-experienced crew, including Colonels Fish and Gable if they can be spared, and a B-24 aircraft of the 492nd Bombardment Group proceed to the India Burma Theater on temporary duty. The European Theater is also being advised that the crew should contact the OSS representative in ETO for necessary information regarding details of the plan, time of departure and equipment to be carried.

The foregoing information has been communicated to Mr. Cheston informally.

Sincerely,

J. E. Hull
J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.



SECRET

SECRET

CFD 334.8 OSS (6 Nov 44)

7 November 1944

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

In my letter of 3 November 1944, I acquainted you with the action taken by the War Department regarding Mr. Cheston's proposal to send an airplane and crew of the 492nd Bombardment Group to India for the purpose of making available the experiences of this Group to the India Burma Theater. The Commanding General of the India Burma Theater has replied and concurs fully in the plan.

A radio is being dispatched to the European Theater directing that a well-experienced crew, including Colonels Pich and Gable if they can be spared, and a B-24 aircraft of the 492nd Bombardment Group proceed to the India Burma Theater on temporary duty. The European Theater is also being advised that the crew should contact the OSS representative in ETO for necessary information regarding details of the plan, time of departure and equipment to be carried.

The foregoing information has been communicated to Mr. Cheston inferentially.

Sincerely,

J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

022



SECRET

Mr. Donohue *11/1/44*
SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF P. OFD
1 Nov 44 *VIII*
11/1/44
11/1/44

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OPD 334.8 OSS (27 Oct 44)

1 November 1944.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

col

Dear General Donovan:

Your proposal to send certain squadrons of the 492nd Bombardment Group from ETO to other theaters has been discussed at some length in the War Department in the light of current and proposed operations in Europe. It has been determined that the transfer of any part of this group from ETO at the present time is not advisable.

Subsequent to your letter, Mr. Cheston has taken up with us a proposal to send an experienced crew from the 492nd Group to India for the purpose of making available to CBI the experience which has been acquired by the 492nd Group. You are aware, of course, that in its operations over the European continent this Group's activities were confined to low-level night operations. During the past several months the enemy air situation in Burma has been such that the necessity for night operations is questionable. However, in view of your request we are dispatching a radio to the Commanding General, India-Burma Theater requesting his comments as to the desirability of sending this crew on temporary duty to India Burma. The theater is being advised that this proposal is being made with the understanding that no personnel or equipment is available for permanent transfer. If the theater commander indicates a desire to have this crew proceed to India, there should be no difficulty in making the necessary arrangements.

I shall advise you further upon receipt of General Sultan's answer.

Sincerely,

jr J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

and in charge
W. E. Gaillet
W. E. GAILLET,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive, OPD

SECRET



SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF A.O. 119, 1953

Date

Initials

OW 334.8 OSS (27 Oct 44)

1 November 1944.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Your proposal to send certain squadrons of the 492nd Bombardment Group from BTO to other theaters has been discussed at some length in the War Department in the light of current and proposed operations in Europe. It has been determined that the transfer of any part of this group from BTO at the present time is not advisable.

Subsequent to your letter, Mr. Cheston has taken up with us a proposal to send an experienced crew from the 492nd Group to India for the purpose of making available to CBI the experience which has been acquired by the 492nd Group. You are aware, of course, that in its operations over the European continent this Group's activities were confined to low-level night operations. During the past several months the enemy air situation in Burma has been such that the necessity for night operations is questionable. However, in view of your request we are dispatching a radio to the Commanding General, India-Burma Theater requesting his comments as to the desirability of sending this crew on temporary duty to India Burma. The theater is being advised that this proposal is being made with the understanding that no personnel or equipment is available for permanent transfer. If the theater commander indicates a desire to have this crew proceed to India, there should be no difficulty in making the necessary arrangements.

I shall advise you further upon receipt of General Sultan's answer.

Sincerely,

J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. E. GARNEY,
Colonel, General Staff;
Executive, OW

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL

SECRET

SECRET
17 October 1944

Major General John E. Hull, G.S.
Operations Division
Room 3E816
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Hull:

Mr. Cheston has told me of his talks with you concerning assignment of squadrons of the 13th Bomber Group from ETO to other theaters for use of this agency in its activities.

I think it is desirable to proceed with a survey to determine how many planes can be effectively used in CBI and SEAC. We therefore desire to send Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, AC, 022617, commanding officer of the 492nd Bomber Group, and Lt. Colonel Louis M. Gable, Inf., 0351135, the head of OS' packing station activities for ETO, to the Far East to make such a survey. I am asking General Arnold if he will permit Colonel Heflin to make the survey.

We should be happy to have you designate a representative of OPD to participate with them.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

OS Form 4001A

Date 6/17/1944

To: Mr. Chester

General Donovan has
not yet seen this.

CA Bane

Neil D.

Please consider

reply -

D.

Office of the Secretariat

~~No reply deemed necessary~~

(9139)

informal you D. who
agreed - 1944

ADDRESS ONLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ATTENTION:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SECRET

| | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| SECRET | |
| By Authority of | PERIODICITY |
| The Commanding General | DATE |
| Army Air Forces | WAR |
| 3 Nov 44 | RECORDS |
| Date | INITIALS |

7 NOV 1944

William J. Donovan
Brig General, U S Army
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Your note of 27 October, recommending the use of the 492d Bomb Group for OSS operations in China, Burma-India and the Southeast Asia Command, has been thoroughly discussed with the Air Staff and Operations Division, War Department General Staff. It has been determined that it is impracticable to transfer this group since there is a requirement for it in supplying our Ground Forces on the continent and a future use as a Pathfinder Group.

I have agreed, however, to dispatching a qualified crew of this group with operational aircraft to CBI for the purpose of consulting with the Commanding Generals of CBI and SEAC in order to assist them in any of their OSS operational plans, share with them the benefits of the experience gained in operation in the European Theater of Operations and to assist them in adapting special equipment for use in CBI. Colonel Heflin cannot be made available since he has been assigned a job of responsibility which will require his complete attention.

A cable has been sent by the War Department to the Commanding Generals, China, Burma-India, requesting their concurrence in dispatching a crew to their theaters on temporary duty for the above purposes, the reply to which will indicate the action that will be taken on this matter.

Sincerely,

James W. Lee
F. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



SECRET

SECRET

By Authority of
The Commanding General
Army Air Force
3 Nov 44
Date

9 NOV 1944

William J. Donovan
Brig General, U S Army
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Your note of 27 October, recommending the use of the 492d Bomb Group for OSS operations in China, Burma-India and the Southeast Asia Command, has been thoroughly discussed with the Air Staff and Operations Division, War Department General Staff. It has been determined that it is impracticable to transfer this group since there is a requirement for it in supplying our Ground Forces on the continent and a future use as a Pathfinder Group.


I have agreed, however, to dispatching a qualified crew of this group with operational aircraft to CBI for the purpose of consulting with the Commanding Generals of CHI and SEAC in order to assist them in any of their OSS operational plans, share with them the benefits of the experience gained in operation in the European Theater of Operations and to assist them in adapting special equipment for use in CBI. General Harkin cannot be made available since he has been assigned a job of responsibility which will require his complete attention.

A cable has been sent by the War Department to the Commanding Generals, China, Burma-India, requesting their concurrence in dispatching a crew to their theaters on temporary duty for the above purposes, the reply to which will indicate the action that will be taken on this matter.

Sincerely,

BARNEY M. CILES,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Force

JH
H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces



SECRET

RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO:
AIR CLASSIFIED MAIL ROOM
PENTAGON BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

POSTAL
Registry No.

Serial No. _____
File No. _____
or Subject _____

Date 7 November 44
with _____

Address:
Brig General W. J. Donovan
Director, (Office of Strategic Services)
Room #125
54th & "E" Sts., NW, Washington, D. C. (DUPLICATE)

Note: Print 2 addresses above to insure
addresses.

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT RECEIPT

15 2404 1

27 October 1944

General H. H. Arnold, AAF
Room 3E1009
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Arnold:

Mr. Cheston of this office has had talks recently with General Hull concerning assignment of certain squadrons of the 492nd Bomber Group (presently in FTO) for use of this agency in its activities in other theaters.

I think it very desirable that a survey in the field be made to determine how many planes can be used effectively in CBI and SPAC. I should therefore like to send Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, AC, 022617, commanding officer of the 492nd Bomber Group, and Lt. Colonel Louis M. [redacted], Inf., 0351135, the head of OSS picking station activities for FTO, to the Far East for that purpose. I have also asked General Hull if he would care to designate a representative of OPD to participate.

I should greatly appreciate it if you would make Colonel Heflin available for this survey. It should not take longer than 2 to 3 weeks.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

15,517
file
B...

28 October 1944

General H. H. Arnold
Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

NOT SENT
MR CHESTON
TALKED WITH
GENERAL CILES
RT

My dear General Arnold:

Since my earlier letter to you concerning possible reassignment of squadrons of the 492nd Bomber Group to this agency, Mr. Cheston has been informed by General Hull of OPD that consideration is being given to the assignment of these squadrons for other purposes. You will recall the struggle we had to have planes assigned to us in ETO, and that despite the help you gave us we succeeded in securing adequate air support only after the French resistance groups had shown the substantial contribution they could make in behalf of the Allies, and after the use of British aircraft was exploited to give the impression that the British were supporting the French while the Americans were not.

The planes in this Bomber Group have been modified for high dropping operations and the crews are trained for the purpose. They have served us superbly and it is my belief that their most effective contribution can be made by continuing to aid us in these activities. We need them, not only for activities based on Italy (where lack of planes is preventing adequate assistance to resistance in Northern Italy and Czechoslovakia, particularly Bohemia and Moravia), but also in our developing activities in the Far East.

It is not our purpose to ask for planes we cannot use. That is one reason we desire to make the survey about which I wrote you yesterday. I do feel, however, that the accomplishments of French resistance show that supply operations, in behalf of resistance, can be a most effective contribution to the success of our Armed Forces.

I should therefore appreciate whatever help you feel you can give us on this matter.

Sincerely,

SECRET
William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Aircraft 15,518

Allocation

X OSS ops CBI

12 October 1944

X 4192nd Bomb Sq
X OSS ops SEAC

See

Gene Stull

*plus
Happner
Squad
etc.*

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Deputy Director, SSO

SUBJECT: Assignment of One Squadron of 492nd Bombardment Group to CBI

1. General Background

a. Cable #21876, dated 4 October 1944, from London, states that one squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group, made up of the most highly specialized personnel, will remain earmarked for OSS in the event that need is found for them during the next 30 days. The cable goes on to state that from discussions with USSTAF, it appears that they are receptive to transferring substantially all of the establishment (presumably, the squadron referred to above) to another Theater for the supplying of resistance by OSS, providing decision and the ~~aircraft~~ ^{aircraft} for such transfer is made by the War Department and the Theater Commander concerned. The cable goes on to suggest that a survey party be sent to the Far East to present facilities to be offered, including supplies and packing.

b. On 7 October 1944 (#19806), the Director cabled Colonels Coughlin and Happner, stating that the services of a squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group will be available if a definite plan for its use can be submitted.

c. Incoming cable #22149 for Hoffmann from Coughlin, dated 7 October 1944, states that a paper from the Commanding General, CBI, has been sent to the War Department asking for the assignment of one squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group to FETO.

2. Conclusions.

a. At a conference attended this afternoon by Colonel Peers, Colonel Smith, Colonel Bross, Lieutenant Duggan and Mr. Cooley, the conclusion was reached that a survey trip to the Far East for the purpose of presenting facilities available by way of a packing service and air transportation was unnecessary.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

in view of the fact that Colonel Coughlin has already expressed his desire to have the squadron transferred and that General Stilwell has forwarded a written recommendation that the planes be transferred to his Theater. It is, however, thought desirable that one plane, including technical experts from London, should be dispatched from the United Kingdom to report to Colonel Coughlin as soon as possible, for the purpose of working out necessary details as to the location of the squadron and packing station and to determine the amount and type of equipment to be ultimately dispatched from the United Kingdom. This advance party could also discuss with representatives of the Commanding General, CBI, the question of what arrangements should be made with respect to the attachment of the squadron for purposes of maintenance and general administration of the air crews concerned.

b. It was also concluded that OPD of the War Department should be informed that General Stilwell's paper is on its way and that representatives of OSS should take up personally with representatives of the War Department the desirability of issuing as soon as possible a directive from OPD to the 8th Air Force, through the USSTAF, directing the assignment of the squadron to CBI and the dispatch of an advance party in a plane from the 492nd Bombardment Group to discuss the details of the ultimate location of the squadron and of the packing station.

3. Recommendations.

It is recommended that an appropriate representative of OSS be directed to communicate with OPD of the War Department on the subject of General Stilwell's paper and to prepare a draft directive to be issued by the War Department to USSTAF directing the assignment of the squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group to the Commanding General, CBI, for the exclusive use of OSS in that Theater for the purpose of operational commitments undertaken by OSS in that Theater under the direction of the Commanding General.

Edward L. Bigelow
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director-SSO

SECRET

Form 4131

12 Oct. '44

To: Mrs. O'Donnell

I understand that the original
was given directly to Mr. Cheston.
It should be logged in and sent
to Colonel Doering and the
Secretariat for information.

E. J. Putzell, Jr.

*Secretariat ans
✓ Col. Doering, etc.*

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

SECRET

12 October 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Deputy Director, SSO

SUBJECT: Assignment of One Squadron of 492nd Bombardment Group to CBI

1. General Background

a. Cable #21975, dated 4 October 1944, from London, states that one squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group, made up of the most highly specialized personnel, will remain earmarked for OSS in the event that need is found for them during the next 30 days. The cable goes on to state that from discussions with USSTAF, it appears that they are receptive to transferring substantially all of the establishment (presumably, the squadron referred to above) to another Theater for the supplying of resistance by OSS, providing decision and the assent for such transfer is made by the War Department and the Theater Commander concerned. The cable goes on to suggest that a survey party be sent to the Far East to present facilities to be offered, including supplies and packing.

b. On 7 October 1944 (#19806), the Director cabled Colonel Coughlin and Heppner, stating that the services of a squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group will be available if a definite plan for its use can be submitted.

c. Incoming cable #22149 for Hoffmann from Coughlin, dated 7 October 1944, states that a paper from the Commanding General, CBI, has been sent to the War Department asking for the assignment of one squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group to FERO.

2. Conclusions

a. At a conference attended this afternoon by Colonel Fears, Colonel Smith, Colonel Brown, Lieutenant Duggan and Mr. Cooley, the conclusion was reached that a survey trip to the Far East for the purpose of presenting facilities available by way of a packing service and air transportation was unnecessary.

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In view of the fact that Colonel Coughlin has already expressed his desire to have the squadron transferred and that General Stilwell has forwarded a written recommendation that the planes be transferred to his Theater. It is, however, thought desirable that one plane, including technical experts from London, should be dispatched from the United Kingdom to report to Colonel Coughlin as soon as possible, for the purpose of working out necessary details as to the location of the squadron and packing station and to determine the amount and type of equipment to be ultimately dispatched from the United Kingdom. This advance party could also discuss with representatives of the Commanding General, CBI, the question of what arrangements should be made with respect to the attachment of the squadron for purposes of maintenance and general administration of the air crews concerned.

It was also concluded that OPD of the War Department should be informed that General Stilwell's paper is on its way and that representatives of OSS should take up personally with representatives of the War Department the desirability of issuing as soon as possible a directive from OPD to the 9th Air Force, through the USSTAF, directing the assignment of the squadron to CBI and the dispatch of an advance party in a plane from the 492nd Bombardment Group to discuss the details of the ultimate location of the squadron and of the packing station.

3. Recommendations.

It is recommended that an appropriate representative of OSS be directed to communicate with OPD of the War Department on the subject of General Stilwell's paper and to prepare a draft directive to be issued by the War Department to USSTAF directing the assignment of the squadron of the 492nd Bombardment Group to the Commanding General, CBI, for the exclusive use of OSS in that Theater for the purpose of operational commitments undertaken by OSS in that Theater under the direction of the Commanding General.

022

Edward L. Bigelow
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director-OSO

1344 OCT 13 6W 15 20

SECRET

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| 4. | | | <i>William V. Donovan</i> | <i>10/28</i> | <i>7.00</i> | <i>WFO</i> | <i>10/28</i> |
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
CHINA BURMA INDIA

Handwritten notes:
Approved
by [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]

322 (AG) (5 Oct 44)
27

A.F.O. 886
5 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Assignment of Squadron from 492nd Group, 8th A.F. to
CBI Theater.

TO : The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington 25,
(Attn: Chief of Asiatic Section, S.P.D.)

1. It is understood that the 492nd Group, 8th Air Force, which has been conducting dropping operations in Europe in conjunction with OSS activities, will shortly be released from this duty by reason of transfer of the OSS packing personnel.

2. It is requested that one (1) Squadron of the 492nd Group be transferred to this Theater for air re-supply and troop missions.

3. The transfer of this squadron has the approval of Hq. Army Air Forces, CBI.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ Frank Milani
/w/ FRANK MILANI
Colonel, A.G.F.
Adjutant General.

020

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET REGISTER NO. 2088-D

TO: GENERAL GUYAN

Col. Burton gave me the attached paper this morning, which he said you wished to have

R/Waeba

*10
Dunkan
Y. M. ...
for your report*

10 Nov. 1944

Director's Office

698

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 27, 1944 REC'D 10/29/44 1:18 P.M.

TO US NAVY, LONDON

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
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(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

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151



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TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#77794. To Armour and Miller from 109.

In view of return to you by Adjutant General of my recommendation that 492 Bomber Group be cited, do you believe further action advisable or possible to secure recognition for bomber squadrons which assisted us?

SECRET

10/29/44 1:28 P.M.

FILE

WJD/ET
INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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15-253-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81114 - Citation

15 Oct 1944

V. Rosenbaum

2492

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SO Branch
European Theater of Operations

4 October 1944

SUBJECT: Enclosures

TO : Brigadier General William J. Donovan

1. In accordance with my cable of this date, we are enclosing your letter of 12 September concerning reassignment of the 492nd Bomb Group, together with your letter of the same date concerning the presentation of a Presidential citation to this Group. Endorsements covering the subject matter of these letters are attached.

Gerald E. Miller
Executive Officer, SO Branch

OS Form 10, 10-64

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| 2. | | <i>W. J. Donovan</i> | <i>[Signature]</i> | <i>10/11</i> | <i>800</i> | <i>WJD</i> | |
| 3. | | <i>Russell</i> | <i>[Signature]</i> | <i>10/11</i> | <i>1200</i> | <i>[Initials]</i> | |
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TOP SECRET

HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633.

TO: Office of Strategic Services, European T of Opns US Army, APO 887.

Attention is invited to preceding indorsement. Col. Clifford J. Heflin, C.O., 492nd Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this headquarters for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He did not receive direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of this group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of operations.

For the Commanding General:

R. S. Barnard
R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., ACD.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls.
n/c

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2nd W/Incl.

(B)

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, APO 634, 21 September 1944

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633.

1. Inasmuch as the 492nd Group has only recently been charged with the activities for which citation is recommended in Inclosure No. 1, it is felt that the true purpose of unit citation would not be obtained by presidential citation of this Group. It is considered more appropriate that the two separate squadrons - 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons (H) - which carried out the main "Carpet-bagger" functions during their development and employment, should be the units recognized rather than the 492nd Group, recently assigned these functions. However, since many personnel associated with this development and participating therein were, of necessity, assigned to organizations which cannot be cited as such, it is felt inadvisable at this time to undertake to recommend any form of WD citation.

2. Inasmuch as plans for redeployment of organizations of the Eighth Air Force is a matter concerning which the Eighth Air Force has as yet only a very limited directive, this headquarters feels it is in a poor position to make recommendations regarding Inclosure No. 2. However, in the event that the proposed redeployment is not prior to cessation of hostilities in this theater, and is not inconsistent with directives and plans of Headquarters, USSTAF, this headquarters concurs in the desirability of a survey being made in conjunction with the War Department, the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services as to the possibilities of the future employment of the 492nd Bomb Group. In this connection, it is desired to call attention to the fact that Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, O22617, AC, Commanding Officer of the 492nd Bomb Group, is at present on temporary duty in the U.S. for rest and recuperation, and, undoubtedly, arrangements can be made for him to proceed to Washington for such meetings upon completion of his rest and recuperation and prior to his return to this theater.

For the Commanding General:

Lindsey L. Braxton
 LINDSEY L. BRAXTON
 Lieutenant Colonel, A.G.D.
 Adjutant General

2 Incls:
n/c

EIGHTH AIR FORCE
 REGISTER No. 1735
 COPIES
 104


Date 10/23

General Donovan

File With reference first paragraph of the attached, do you wish to cable London asking whether further action is advisable or possible with reference to some kind of citation for the Bomber Squadrons that assisted us? *Yes*

That CRJL send [unclear]
Robert Thrun
SECRET
who is [unclear]
Office of the Executive Officer
[unclear]

(0049)



TOP SECRET

3rd W/In.
HQ, 1st Strategic Air Force in Europe, APO 937.

Office of Strategic Services, European I of Ops US Army, APO 937.

Attention is invited to procedure agreement. Col. Clifford J. Heflin, 1st
Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this command
for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He was
given direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of his
group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another
theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of
operations.

For the Commanding General:

2 Incls
n/c

H. B. BARNARD,
Capt., APO.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO: US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 887.

FROM: Office of Strategic Services, European T of Army, APO 887.

Attention is invited to preceding memorandum. Col. Clifford J. Hoffman, C-47
492nd Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this headquarter
for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He did not
receive direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of this
group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another
theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of
operations.

For the Commanding General:

2 Incls
n/s

R. S. HARVARD,
Capt., AST.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Basic: 1st W/Ind 14 Sep 44 to 8th AF sending corres relating to
recommendation for Presidential Citation to 492nd Bomb Gp.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

etc

HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633. 1st W/Incl. 17 September 1944.

TO: CG, Eighth AF, APO 634.

Attached correspondence forwarded to you for your consideration and action deemed appropriate by you.

By command of Lieutenant General SPANZ:

R. S. Barnard
R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., ACD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

- 2 Incls:
- #1 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services
ETO dated 12 Sep 44, w/1 Incl.
- #2 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services,
ETO dtd 12 Sep, subj: Reasonnat
of 492 Bomb Gp.

Copies Received 2 Copy No:

#1 to c/s
#2 to file - only 1 copy. Just Read

EIGHTH AIR FORCE
REGISTER No. 1473
COPIES
COPY No. 1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HQ USA

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Reassignment of 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy)
TO : Commanding General, USSTAF

1. The 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) is providing support of the United States Air Forces to the allied program to supply resistance in countries of Europe occupied by the enemy (CARPETBAGGER Project). This group has attained the highest proficiency in training for individual operations at night under the most hazardous conditions. It has taken a considerable period of time to build up the efficiency that exists in this organization. In addition, the aircraft with which this Group is equipped have been extensively modified to permit the dispatch of personnel and supplies by parachute and to facilitate the execution of night operations. In addition, considerable navigational and communications equipment has been installed to assist in such missions.

2. The Special Operations Branch of OSS Detachment, ETO, has worked in conjunction with the 492nd Bombardment Group in providing:

a. Pin-point targets that are offered to the 492nd Bombardment Group for execution subject to the approval of Air Force authorities. This section of eight officers and two EM receive requests for supplies and personnel from the National Interest concerned, control the supply and production of the Packing Unit (sub-paragraph b), regulate the provision of the supplies requested by the field, process each target through Air Force intelligence facilities, coordinate radio signals to Resistance in the field, issue final operational requests for Air Corps execution, and maintain all operational data and records.

b. Supplies prepared for delivery by air. This function is performed by a packing unit manned by 300 EM and eight officers with a top production capacity of 70,000 delivery units per month. The Packing Unit has been provided with extensive special equipment as well as key personnel, i.e. parachute packing and maintenance equipment, warehousing trolleys, stackers, cranes, tractors, and transportation.

3. It is considered that the most efficient use of the 492nd Bombardment Group would be to continue in another theater of war operations in support of OSS activities for which they have been so excellently trained. However, for

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WITH AIR FORCE
REGISTER No. 1023
COPIES 1
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TOP-SECRET

To: CG, USSTAF, 12 Sept 44

Individuals are familiar with the equipment, facilities and technique of such operations, and before concluding that this recommendation is in fact feasible it is believed that a survey party consisting of officers who have performed this work in the European Theater should be dispatched to the theater which the War Department considers such activities could be most profitably employed.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. It is recommended, therefore, that a survey party consisting of the Commanding Officer, 492nd Bomb Group, with the Chief of Air Operations Section, 30 Branch, OSS, and an officer to be designated by General Donovan, be dispatched in a modified aircraft of the 492nd Bomb Group to Washington to determine, in conjunction with the War Department, the office of the Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services likely areas of operation. It may then be determined that the survey party should proceed to the theater in question to examine at first hand the possibilities of its employment.



WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Strategic Services

TOP-SECRET

SECRET

These belong in your files. Thanks for letting me borrow them.

JWA
J. W. A.

Office of the Secretariat

SECRET

(9139)

ARCHIVED 15, 25
1998

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SUBSISTANT THEATER OF OPERATIONS**

SECRET

Group 2 British ~~TOP SECRET & SECRET~~

12 September 1944

Ref # 79664 from London 10/9/44

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Presentation of Presidential Citation to the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy).

TO : Commanding General, USSTAF, European Theater of Operations.

1. On October 19th 1943, the Project of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services authorizing two (2) Squadrons of B-24 aircraft had been approved by the Commanding General European Theater of Operations (Lieutenant General Devers), and Commanding General of the 8th United States Army Air Force (Lieutenant General Bakers). The 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons which had been previously engaged in anti-Submarine Patrol were allocated (formed as the 328 Service Squadron) to execute these operations and the project was given the cover name of CARPETHBAGGER. The first United States aircraft flew a carpethbagger mission on the night of 4/5 January 1944, from U.S.A.A.F. Station 102 at Alconbury, Huntingdonshire.

2. The progress of the Group from its small beginning to date is indicated by the attached chart and, I believe, shows the outstanding operational history of the organization. During the rapid growth in the past few months from the initial Squadrons to a full Bomb Group the problems of training individual crews to fly single sorties at night to pinpoint targets distinguishable only by a pattern of flashlights on the ground have been solved so exceptionally well that a record equal to that of the Royal Air Force Squadrons permanently assigned to this type work has been constantly maintained. Navigational training and technique has been developed to such a high state that the percentage of successful operations during the non-moon periods of each month now equals that achieved during moon periods.

3. The Carpethbagger missions have involved the dangers of enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses and the hazards of flying at very low altitudes (normally 500 ft above terrain) while throttled back to 135 miles per hour to make parachute drops over, in many cases, mountainous country.

4. It is now known that the assistance given the Allied Forces invading Europe by Resistance Groups has been of tremendous value and far beyond what was reasonable to expect. I believe the services performed by the ground and flight personnel of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) has brought immense credit to that personnel and to the Armed Forces of the United States and request that a recommendation for Presidential Citation be given favourable consideration.

SECRET

WILLIAM J. MOGVAR
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Director of the Office of Strategic Services

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 PERSONNEL RECORDS BY OFFICE

SECRET

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION IS UNDER EMPLOYMENT OVERSIGHT OF STRATEGIC SERVICES BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. THE INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

12 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Presentation of Presidential Citation to the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy).

TO: Commanding General, USSTAF, European Theater of Operations.

1. On October 19th 1943, the Project of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services authorizing two (2) Squadrons of B-24 aircraft had been approved by the Commanding General European Theater of Operations (Lieutenant General Devers), and Commanding General of the 8th United States Army Air Force (Lieutenant General Eakers). The 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons which had been previously engaged in Anti-Submarine Patrol were allocated (formed as the 325 Service Squadron) to execute these operations and the project was given the cover name of CARPETBAGGER. The first United States aircraft flew a carpetbagger mission on the night of 4/5 January 1944, from U.S.A.A.F. Station 102 at Alconbury, Huntingdonshire.

2. The progress of the Group from its small beginning to date is indicated by the attached chart and, I believe, shows the outstanding operational history of the organization. During the rapid growth in the past few months from the initial Squadrons to a full Bomb Group the problems of training individual crews to fly single sorties at night to pinpoint targets distinguishable only by a pattern of flashlights on the ground have been solved so exceptionally well that a record equal to that of the Royal Air Force Squadrons permanently assigned to this type work has been constantly maintained. Navigational training and technique has been developed to such a high state that the percentage of successful operations during the non-moon periods of each month now equals that achieved during moon periods.

3. The Carpetbagger missions have involved the dangers of enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses and the hazards of flying at very low altitudes (normally 500 ft above terrain) while throttled back to 135 miles per hour to make parachute drops over, in many cases, mountainous country.

4. It is now known that the assistance given the Allied Forces invading Europe by Resistance Groups has been of tremendous value and far beyond what was reasonable to expect. I believe the services performed by the ground and flight personnel of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) has brought immense credit to that personnel and to the Armed Forces of the United States and request that a recommendation for Presidential Citation be given favourable consideration.

William J. Donovan

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Director of the Office of Strategic Services

United States

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United States
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

Equivalent British **TOP SECRET & SECRET** Period 1944.
1 Jan - 31 Dec

REPORT OF THE 492nd BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE IN GERMAN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES OF EUROPE & SCANDINAVIA.

| Designations of Bombardment Squadrons | Air- MONTH | FRANCE | | | BELGIUM | | | DENMARK | | | NORWAY | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | air-craft assgn. | Sorties Personnel | Containers Packages. | Sorties Personnel | Containers Packages. | Sorties Personnel | Containers Packages. | Sorties Personnel | Containers Packages. | | | | | | | | |
| 325th Service Group | JAN: | 12 | 18 | - | 96 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | |
| | FEB: | 22 | 58 | - | 228 | 58 | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 24 | | | | | |
| | MAR: | 30 | 61 | 6 | 391 | 170 | 5 | - | 24 | 5 | - | - | 24 | | | | | |
| 801st Bomb Group (H) | APR: | 30 | 148 | 9 | 988 | 649 | 81 | 4 | 551 | 299 | - | - | - | | | | | |
| | MAY: | 25 | 161 | 24 | 1139 | 742 | 44 | 4 | 286 | 61 | 1 | - | 24 | | | | | |
| | JUN: | 61 | 223 | 43 | 1936 | 958 | 19 | 2 | 83 | 16 | - | - | - | | | | | |
| 492nd Bomb Group (H) | JUL: | 61 | 581 | 64 | 5074 | 3069 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 5 | - | - | - | | | | | |
| | AUG: | 67 | 434 | 136 | 3770 | 2203 | 26 | 20 | 188 | 70 | 9 | - | 44 | | | | | |
| TOTALS | | 308 | 1687 | 282 | 13622 | 7879 | 179 | 33 | 1144 | 456 | 10 | - | 44 | - | 8 | - | 72 | 15 |

United States
SECRET

Equivalent British **TOP SECRET & SECRET**

492nd Bomb
* 1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SO Branch
European Theater of Operations

4 October 1944

SUBJECT: Enclosures

TO : Brigadier General William J. Donovan

1. In accordance with my cable of this date, we are enclosing your letter of 12 September concerning reassignment of the 492nd Bomb Group, together with your letter of the same date concerning the presentation of a Presidential citation to this Group. Endorsements covering the subject matter of these letters are attached.

Gerald E. Miller
Executive Officer, SO Branch

NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: 1

DATE: 11/10/50

LOGGED BY: [Signature]

ATTENTION:

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The document, together with the subject documents, should be returned to the originating office.

TOP-SECRET

3rd W/In.

NO. 00 STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 830

TO: Office of Strategic Services, European T of COM US ARMY, APO 807.

Attention is invited to preceding endorsement. Col. Clifford J. Berlin, C.O., 492nd Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this headquarters for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He did not receive direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of this group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of operations.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ R. S. BARNARD.

R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., AGD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

2 incls: n/c

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

NO. 2 STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE, APO 634. 14 September 1944.
TO: CO, Eighth AF, APO 634.

Attached correspondence forwarded to you for your consideration and action deemed appropriate by you.

By command of Lieutenant General SPATS:

/s/ R. S. BARNARD,

R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., APO,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls:

- 1 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services APO dated 12 Sep 44, w/1 Incl.
- 2 - Ltr Off of Strat. Services, APO dtd 19 Sep, subj: Reassmt of 492 Scab Op.

TOP SECRET

2nd w/ind.

TOP SECRET (B)

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, APO 634, 21 September 1944
TO: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 634.

1. Inasmuch as the 492nd Group has only recently been charged with the activities for which citation is recommended in Inclosure No. 1 it is felt that the true purpose of unit citation would not be obtained by presidential citation of this Group. It is considered more appropriate that the two separate squadrons - 36th and 408th Bomb Squadrons (H) - which carried out the main "Carpet-bagger" functions during their development and employment, should be the units recognized rather than the 492nd Group, recently assigned these functions. However, since many personnel associated with this development and participating therein were of necessity, assigned to organizations which cannot be cited as such, it is felt inadvisable at this time to undertake to recommend any form of WD citation.

2. Inasmuch as plans for redeployment of organizations of the Eighth Air Force is a matter concerning which the Eighth Air Force has as yet only a very limited directive, this headquarters feels it is in a poor position to make recommendations regarding Inclosure No. 2. However, in the event that the proposed redeployment is not prior to cessation of hostilities in this theater, and is not inconsistent with directives and plans of Headquarters, USSTAF, this headquarters concurs in the desirability of a survey being made in conjunction with the War Report, the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Force, and the Office of Strategic Services as to the possibilities of the future employment of the 492nd Bomb Group. In this connection, it is desired to call attention to the fact that Colonel Clifford J. Koflin, O88017, AC, Commanding Officer of the 492nd Bomb Group, is at present on temporary duty in the U.S. for rest and recuperation, and, undoubtedly, arrangements can be made for him to proceed to Washington for such meetings upon completion of his rest and recuperation and prior to his return to this theater.

For the Commanding General: **TOP SECRET** [Signature]

2 Incls: 1, 2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECRET

18 September 1944

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Presentation of Presidential Citation
to the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy).

TO: Commanding General, USSTAF, European Theater of Operations.

1. On October 19th 1943, the Project of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services authorizing two (2) Squadrons of B-24 aircraft had been approved by the Commanding General European Theater of Operations (Lieutenant General Devers), and Commanding General of the 9th United States Army Air Force (Lieutenant General Baker). The 36th and 405th Bomb Squadrons which had been previously engaged in Anti-Submarine operations and the project was given the cover name of CARPETBAGGERS. The United States aircraft flew a carpetbagger mission on the night of 4th January 1944, from U.S.A.A.F. Station 102 at Alconbury, Huntingdonshire.

2. The progress of the Group from its small beginning to late indicated by the attached chart and, I believe, shows the outstanding operational history of the organization. During the rapid growth in the past few months from the initial Squadrons to a full Bomb Group the problems training individual crews to fly single sorties at night to pinpoint targets distinguishable only by a pattern of flashlights on the ground have been solved so exceptionally well that a record equal to that of the Air Force Squadrons permanently assigned to this type work has been constantly maintained. Navigational training and technique has been developed to such a high state that the percentage of successful operations during the non-moon periods of each month now equals that achieved during moon periods.

3. The Carpetbagger missions have involved the dangers of enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses and the hazards of flying at very low altitudes (normally 500 ft above terrain) while throttled back to 135 miles per hour to make parachute drops over, in many cases, mountainous country.

4. It is now known that the assistance given the Allied Forces invading Europe by Resistance Groups has been of tremendous value and far beyond what was reasonable to expect. I believe the services performed by the ground and flight personnel of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) brought immense credit to that personnel and to the Armed Forces of the United States and request that a recommendation for Presidential Citation be given favourable consideration.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Director of the Office of
Strategic Services.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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SECRET
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RECORD OF THE 49th BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE IN GERMAN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

| Designations of CARPETBAGGER Squadrons. | MONTH. | Air- craft assign. | Sorties | FRANCE | | BELGIUM | | | DENMARK | | NORWAY | | |
|---|--------|--------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| | | | | Personnel | Containers | Sorties | Containers | Personnel | Containers | Sorties | Con | | |
| | | | | Personnel | Packages. | Personnel | Packages. | Personnel | Packages | Person | ton | | |
| 508th Service Group | JAN: | 18 | 18 | - | 96 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 24 |
| | FEB: | 22 | 58 | - | 228 | 58 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | 24 |
| | MAR: | 30 | 61 | 6 | 391 | 170 | 5 | - | 24 | 5 | - | - | - |
| 501st Bomb Group (F) | APR: | 30 | 148 | 9 | 988 | 649 | 81 | 4 | 551 | 299 | - | - | - |
| | MAY: | 25 | 164 | 24 | 1139 | 742 | 44 | 4 | 286 | 61 | 1 | - | 9 |
| | JUN: | 61 | 223 | 43 | 1936 | 968 | 19 | 2 | 83 | 16 | - | - | - |
| 49th Bomb Group (H) | JUL: | 61 | 581 | 64 | 5074 | 3069 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 5 | - | - | - |
| | AUG: | 67 | 434 | 136 | 3770 | 2203 | 26 | 20 | 188 | 70 | 9 | - | 44 |
| TOTALS | | 308 | 1887 | 282 | 13622 | 7879 | 179 | 33 | 1144 | 456 | 10 | - | 44 |

United States
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Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

TOP SECRET**OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES
STOUSA**

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Reassignment of 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy)**TO : Commanding General, USSTAF**

1. The 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) is providing support of the United States Air Forces to the allied program to supply resistance in countries of Europe occupied by the enemy (CARPETBAGGER Project). This group has attained the highest proficiency in training for individual operations at night under the most hazardous conditions. It has taken a considerable period of time to build up the efficiency that exists in this organization. In addition, the aircraft with which this group is equipped have been extensively modified to permit the dispatch of personnel and supplies by parachute and to facilitate the execution of night operations. In addition, considerable navigational and communications equipment has been installed to assist in such missions.

2. The Special Operations Branch of OSS Detachment, ETO, has worked in conjunction with the 492nd Bombardment Group in providing:

a. Pin-point targets that are offered to the 492nd Bombardment Group for execution subject to the approval of Air Force authorities. This section of eight officers and two EM receive requests for supplies and personnel from the National Interest concerned, control the supply and production of the Packing Unit (sub-paragraph b), regulate the provision of the supplies requested by the field, process each target through Air Force Intelligence facilities, coordinate radio signals to Resistance in the field, issue final operational requests for Air Corps execution, and maintain all operational data and records.

b. Supplies prepared for delivery by air: This function is performed by a Packing Unit manned by 300 PW and eight officers with a top production capacity of 20,000 delivery units per month. The Packing Unit has been provided with extensive special equipment as well as key personnel, i.e. parachute packing and maintenance equipment, warehousing trolleys, stackers, cranes, tractors, and transportation.

3. It is considered that the most efficient use of the 492nd Bombardment Group would be to continue in another theater of war operations in support of OSS activities for which they have been so excellently trained. However, few

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TAG CG, COMSTAF, 12 Sept 44

Individuals are familiar with the equipment, facilities and technique of such operations, and before concluding that this recommendation is in fact feasible it is believed that a survey party consisting of officers who have performed this work in the European Theater should be dispatched to the theater which the War Department considers such activities could be most profitably employed.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. It is recommended, therefore, that a survey party consisting of the Commanding Officer, 492nd Bomb Group, with the Chief of Air Operations Section, SO Branch, OSS, and an officer to be designated by General Donovan, be dispatched in a modified aircraft of the 492nd Bomb Group to Washington to determine, in conjunction with the War Department, the office of the Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services likely areas of operation. It may then be determined that the survey party should proceed to the theater in question to examine at first hand the possibilities of its employment.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Strategic
Services

TOP SECRET

TOP-SECRET

HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 886

TO: Office of Strategic Services, European T of Opns US Army, APO 887.

Attention is invited to preceding indorsement. Col. Clifford J. Herlin, C.O., 492nd Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this headquarters for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He did not receive direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of this group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of operations.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ R. S. BARNARD

R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., AGD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls;
n/c

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

1st W/Ind.

HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633.

14 September 1944.

TO: CG, Eighth AF, APO 634.

Attached correspondence forwarded to you for your consideration and action deemed appropriate by you.

By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZ:

/s/ R. S. BARNARD,

R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., AGD,
Ass't. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls:

- #1 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services
ETO dated 12 Sep 44, w/1 Incl.
- #2 - Ltr Off of Strat. Services,
ETO dtd 12 Sep, subj: Reassmt
of 492 Bomb Gp.

TOP-SECRET**TOP-SECRET (B)**

2nd W/Ind.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, APO 634, 21 September 1944

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633.

1. Inasmuch as the 492nd Group has only recently been charged with the activities for which citation is recommended in Inclosure No. 1, it is felt that the true purpose of unit citation would not be obtained by presidential citation of this Group. It is considered more appropriate that the two separate squadrons - 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons (H) - which carried out the main "Carpet-bagger" functions during their development and employment, should be the units recognized rather than the 492nd Group, recently assigned these functions. However, since many personnel associated with this development and participating therein were, of necessity, assigned to organizations which cannot be cited as such, it is felt inadvisable at this time to undertake to recommend any form of WD citation.

2. Inasmuch as plans for redeployment of organizations of the Eighth Air Force is a matter concerning which the Eighth Air Force has as yet only a very limited directive, this headquarters feels it is in a poor position to make recommendations regarding Inclosure No. 2. However, in the event that the proposed redeployment is not prior to cessation of hostilities in this theater, and is not inconsistent with directives and plans of Headquarters, USSTAF, this headquarters concurs in the desirability of a survey being made in conjunction with the War Department, the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services as to the possibilities of the future employment of the 492nd Bomb Group. In this connection, it is desired to call attention to the fact that Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, 022617, AC, Commanding Officer of the 492nd Bomb Group, is at present on temporary duty in the U.S. for rest and recuperation, and, undoubtedly, arrangements can be made for him to proceed to Washington for such meetings upon completion of his rest and recuperation and prior to his return to this theater.

For the Commanding General,

TOP-SECRET

LINDSEY L. BRAXTON
Lt Col, A.G.D., Adj Gen.

2 incls: n/c/

United States
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Presentation of Presidential Citation to the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy).

TO : Commanding General, USSTAF, European Theater of Operations.

1. On October 19th 1943, the Project of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services authorizing two (2) Squadrons of B-24 aircraft had been approved by the Commanding General European Theater of Operations (Lieutenant General Devers), and Commanding General of the 8th United States Army Air Force (Lieutenant General Bakera). The 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons which had been previously engaged in Anti-Submarine Patrol were allocated (formed as the 328 Service Squadron) to execute these operations and the project was given the cover name of CARPETBAGGER. The first United States aircraft flew a carpetbagger mission on the night of 4/8 January 1944, from U.S.A.A.F. Station 102 at Alconbury, Huntingdonshire.

2. The progress of the group from its small beginning to date is indicated by the attached chart and, I believe, shows the outstanding operational history of the organization. During the rapid growth in the past few months from the initial Squadrons to a full Bomb Group the problems of training individual crews to fly single sorties at night to pinpoint targets distinguishable only by a pattern of flashlights on the ground have been solved so exceptionally well that a record equal to that of the Royal Air Force Squadrons permanently assigned to this type work has been constantly maintained. Navigational training and technique has been developed to such a high state that the percentage of successful operations during the non-moon periods of each month now equals that achieved during moon periods.

3. The Carpetbagger missions have involved the dangers of enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses and the hazards of flying at very low altitudes (normally 500 ft above terrain) while throttled back to 135 miles per hour to make parachute drops over, in many cases, mountainous country.

4. It is now known that the assistance given the Allied Forces invading Europe by Resistance Groups has been of tremendous value and far beyond what was reasonable to expect. I believe the services performed by the ground and flight personnel of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) has brought immense credit to that personnel and to the Armed Forces of the United States and request that a recommendation for Presidential Citation be given favourable consideration.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
 Brigadier General U.S.A.
 Director of the Office of
 Strategic Services.

United States
SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

United States
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RECORD OF THE 492nd BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE IN GERMAN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

| Designations of AIRCRAFT Squadrons | MONTH | Air- craft assgn. | Sorties Personnel | FRANCE | | Sorties Personnel | BELGIUM | | Sorties Personnel | DENMARK | | So Packages% |
|--|---------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| | | | | Containers Packages. | Sorties Personnel | | Containers Packages. | Sorties Personnel | | Containers Packages. | | |
| 385th Service Group | JAN: | 12 | 18 | - | 96 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | FEB: | 22 | 58 | - | 228 | 58 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | MAR: | 30 | 61 | 6 | 391 | 170 | 5 | - | 24 | 5 | - | - |
| 501st Bomb Group (F) | APR: | 30 | 148 | 9 | 988 | 649 | 81 | 4 | 551 | 299 | - | - |
| | MAY: | 25 | 164 | 24 | 1139 | 742 | 44 | 4 | 286 | 61 | 1 | - |
| | JUN: | 61 | 223 | 43 | 1936 | 968 | 19 | 2 | 83 | 16 | - | - |
| 492nd Bomb Group (H) | JUL: | 61 | 581 | 64 | 5074 | 3069 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 5 | - | - |
| | AUG: | 67 | 434 | 136 | 3770 | 2203 | 26 | 20 | 188 | 70 | 9 | - |
| | TOTALS | | 308 | 1687 | 282 | 13622 | 7879 | 179 | 33 | 1144 | 456 | 10 |

United States
SECRET

TOP-SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ETOUSA**

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Reassignment of 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy)**TO : Commanding General, USSTAF**

1. The 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) is providing support of the United States Air Forces to the allied program to supply resistance in countries of Europe occupied by the enemy (CARPETBAGGER Project). This group has attained the highest proficiency in training for individual operations at night under the most hazardous conditions. It has taken a considerable period of time to build up the efficiency that exists in this organization. In addition, the aircraft with which this Group is equipped have been extensively modified to permit the dispatch of personnel and supplies by parachute and to facilitate the execution of night operations. In addition, considerable navigational and communications equipment has been installed to assist in such missions.

2. The Special Operations Branch of OSS Detachment, ETO, has worked in conjunction with the 492nd Bombardment Group in providing:

a. Pin-point targets that are offered to the 492nd Bombardment Group for execution subject to the approval of Air Force authorities. This section of eight officers and two EM receive requests for supplies and personnel from the National Interest concerned, control the supply and production of the Packing Unit (sub-paragraph b), regulate the provision of the supplies requested by the field, process each target through Air Force Intelligence facilities, coordinate radio signals to Resistance in the field, issue final operational requests for Air Corps execution, and maintain all operational data and records.

b. Supplies prepared for delivery by air: This function is performed by a Packing Unit manned by 300 EM and eight officers with a top production capacity of 20,000 delivery units per month. The Packing Unit has been provided with extensive special equipment as well as key personnel, i.e. parachute packing and maintenance equipment, warehousing trolleys, stackers, cranes, tractors, and transportation.

3. It is considered that the most efficient use of the 492nd Bombardment Group would be to continue in another theater of war operations in support of OSS activities for which they have been so excellently trained. However, few

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

To: CG, USSTAF, 12 Sept 44

Individuals are familiar with the equipment, facilities and technique of such operations, and before concluding that this recommendation is in fact feasible it is believed that a survey party consisting of officers who have performed this work in the European Theater should be dispatched to the theater which the War Department considers such activities could be most profitably employed.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. It is recommended, therefore, that a survey party consisting of the Commanding Officer, 492nd Bomb Group, with the Chief of Air Operations Section, SO Branch, OSS, and an officer to be designated by General Donovan, be dispatched in a modified aircraft of the 492nd Bomb Group to Washington to determine, in conjunction with the War Department, the office of the Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services likely areas of operation. It may then be determined that the survey party should proceed to the theater in question to examine at first hand the possibilities of its employment.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Strategic
Services

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

3rd W/ind.

DA, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE, APO 633

TO: Office of Strategic Services, European T of Ops US ARMY, APO 607.

Attention is invited to preceding indorsement. Col. Clifford J. Saffin, C.O., 488th Bomb Group, was directed to proceed to Washington on orders of this headquarters for the purpose of discussing the activities of his organization. He did not receive direction from this command to discuss the possibility of movement of this group to another theater of operations, nor was he directed to proceed to another theater of operations to examine the possibility of employment of this type of operations.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ R. B. BARNARD

R. B. BARNARD,
Capt., AOD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 incls:
n/s

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1st W/Ind.

TO: **CD STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633.**

24 September 1944.

TO: **CO, Eighth AF, APO 634.**

Attached correspondence forwarded to you for your consideration and action deemed appropriate by you.

By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZ:

/s/ R. S. BARNARD,

R. S. BARNARD,
Capt., AGP,
Ass't. Adj. Gen.

2 Incls:

- #1 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services
ETO dated 12 Sep 44, w/1 Incl.
- #2 - Ltr Off. of Strat. Services,
ETO dtd 12 Sep, subj: Reassmnt
of 492 Bomb Gp.

TOP SECRET

2nd W/Ind.

TOP SECRET (3)

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, APO 634, 21 September 1944

TO: **Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633**

1. Inasmuch as the 492nd Group has only recently been charged with the activities for which citation is recommended in Inclosure No. 1, it is felt that the true purpose of unit citation would not be obtained by presidential citation of this Group. It is considered more appropriate that the two separate squadrons - 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons (H) - which carried out the main "Carpet-bagger" functions during their development and employment, should be the units recognized rather than the 492nd Group, recently assigned these functions. However, since the personnel associated with this development and participating therein were of necessity, assigned to organizations which cannot be cited as such, it is felt inadvisable at this time to undertake to recommend any form of WD citation.

2. Inasmuch as plans for redeployment of organizations of the Eighth Air Force is a matter concerning which the Eighth Air Force has as yet only a very limited directive, this headquarters feels it is in a poor position to make recommendations regarding Inclosure No. 2. However, in the event that the proposed redeployment is not prior to cessation of hostilities in this theater, and is not inconsistent with directives and plans of Headquarters, USSTAF, this headquarters concurs in the desirability of a survey being made in conjunction with the War Department, the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services as to the possibilities of the future employment of the 492nd Bomb Group. In this connection, it is desired to call attention to the fact that Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, O22617, AG, Commanding Officer of the 492nd Bomb Group, is at present on temporary duty in the U.S. for rest and recuperation, and, undoubtedly, arrangements can be made for him to proceed to Washington for such meetings upon completion of his rest and recuperation and prior to his return to the theater.

For the Commanding General

TOP SECRET

WINISKY L. BRAXTON
Lt Col, A.C.D., AGP

2 Incls: 2/c/

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECRET

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Presentation of Presidential Citation to the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy).

TO: Commanding General, USSTAF, European Theater of Operations.

1. On October 19th 1943, the Project of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services authorizing two (2) Squadrons of B-24 aircraft had been approved by the Commanding General European Theater of Operations (Lieutenant General Devere), and Commanding General of the 8th United States Army Air Force (Lieutenant General Eakers). The 38th and 40th Bomb Squadrons which had been previously engaged in Anti-Submarine Patrols were allocated (formed as the 328 Service Squadron) to execute these operations and the project was given the cover name of CARPETBAGGER. The United States aircraft flew a carpetbagger mission on the night of 4/5 January 1944, from U.S.A.A.F. Station 102 at Alconbury, Huntingdonshire.

2. The progress of the Group from its small beginning to date is indicated by the attached chart and, I believe, shows the outstanding operational history of the organization. During the rapid growth in the past few months from the initial Squadrons to a full Bomb Group the problems of training individual crews to fly single sorties at night to pinpoint targets distinguishable only by a pattern of flashlights on the ground have been solved so exceptionally well that a record equal to that of the United States Air Force Squadrons permanently assigned to this type work has been constantly maintained. Navigational training and technique has been developed to such a high state that the percentage of successful operations during the non-moon periods of each month now equals that achieved during moon periods.

3. The Carpetbagger missions have involved the dangers of enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defenses and the hazards of flying at very low altitudes (normally 500 ft above terrain) while throttled back to 135 miles per hour to make parachute drops over, in many cases, mountainous country.

4. It is now known that the assistance given the Allied Forces in invading Europe by Resistance Groups has been of tremendous value and far beyond what was reasonable to expect. I believe the services performed by the ground and flight personnel of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) has brought immense credit to that personnel and to the Armed Forces of the United States and request that a recommendation for Presidential Citation be given favourable consideration.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Director of the Office of
Strategic Services.

United States
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

SECRET

REPORT OF THE 49th BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE IN GERMAN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

| Designations of Operations | MONTH | Air- craft assgn. | Sorties Personnel | FRANCE | | BELGIUM | | DENMARK | | NORWAY | |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------|--------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| | | | | Containers | Packages. | Sorties personnel | Containers Packages. | Sorties personnel | Containers Packages | Sorties Personnel | Packages |
| 501st Bomb Group (F) | JAN: | 19 | 18 | - | 96 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | FEB: | 88 | 88 | - | 298 | 58 | - | - | - | - | 2 |
| | MAR: | 30 | 61 | 8 | 591 | 170 | 5 | - | 24 | 5 | 4 |
| 49th Bomb Group (H) | APR: | 80 | 148 | 9 | 985 | 649 | 81 | 4 | 551 | 299 | - |
| | MAY: | 25 | 164 | 24 | 1139 | 742 | 44 | 4 | 286 | 61 | 1 |
| | JUN: | 61 | 223 | 43 | 1929 | 968 | 19 | 2 | 83 | 16 | - |
| 49th Bomb Group (H) | JUL: | 61 | 581 | 64 | 5074 | 3069 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 5 | - |
| | AUG: | 67 | 434 | 136 | 3770 | 2203 | 26 | 20 | 153 | 70 | 9 |
| TOTALS | | 308 | 1887 | 298 | 13692 | 7879 | 179 | 33 | 1144 | 456 | 10 |

United States
SECRET
English: British MOST SECRET & SECRET.

TOP-SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ETOUSA**

12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Reassignment of 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy).**TO : Commanding General, USSTAF**

1. The 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy) is providing support of the United States Air Forces to the allied program to supply resistance in countries of Europe occupied by the enemy (CARPETBAGGER Project). This group has attained the highest proficiency in training for individual operations at night under the most hazardous conditions. It has taken a considerable period of time to build up the efficiency that exists in this organization. In addition, the aircraft with which this Group is equipped have been extensively modified to permit the dispatch of personnel and supplies by parachute and to facilitate the execution of night operations. In addition, considerable navigational and communications equipment has been installed to assist in such missions.

2. The Special Operations Branch of OSS Detachment, ETO, has worked in conjunction with the 492nd Bombardment Group in providing:

a. Pin-point targets that are offered to the 492nd Bombardment Group for execution subject to the approval of Air Force authorities. This section of eight officers and two EM receive requests for supplies and personnel from the National interest concerned, control the supply and production of the Packing Unit (sub-paragraph b), regulate the provision of the supplies requested by the field, process each target through Air Force Intelligence facilities, coordinate radio signals to Resistance in the field, issue final operational requests for Air Corps execution, and maintain all operational data and records.

b. Supplies prepared for delivery by air: This function is performed by a Packing Unit manned by 300 EM and eight officers with a top production capacity of 20,000 delivery units per month. The Packing Unit has been provided with extensive special equipment as well as key personnel, i.e. parachute packing and maintenance equipment, warehousing trolleys, stackers, cranes, tractors, and transportation.

3. It is considered that the most efficient use of the 492nd Bombardment Group would be to continue in another theater of war operations in support of OSS activities for which they have been so excellently trained. However, few

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To: CG, OCSAF, 12 Sept 49

Individuals are familiar with the equipment, facilities and technique of such operations, and before concluding that this recommendation is in fact feasible it is believed that a survey party consisting of officers who have performed this work in the European Theater should be dispatched to the theater which the War Department considers such activities could be most profitably employed.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. It is recommended, therefore, that a survey party consisting of the Commanding Officer, 492nd Bomb Group, with the Chief of Air Operations Section, 30 Branch, OCS, and an officer to be designated by General Donovan, be dispatched in a modified aircraft of the 492nd Bomb Group to Washington to determine, in conjunction with the War Department, the office of the Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, and the Office of Strategic Services likely areas of operation. It may then be determined that the survey party should proceed to the theater in question to examine at first hand the possibilities of its employment.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Strategic
Services

TOP-SECRET

151023
James [unclear]
x [unclear]
x [unclear]

Mr. Hintonop H. Mayo, Procurement & Supply

22 Sept. 1944

Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn

1944 SEP 23 AM 10 14

Attached cables

OSS

Request that information as to distribution of OSS aircraft procurement policy, which was drafted by this office on 26 June 1944 and sent to your office for distribution, be checked against attached cables to ascertain whether or not the field requesting this information received a copy of procurement policy. If no copy was sent or it is questionable if the copy was received, suggest you dispatch a copy to this theater in answer to query raised in attached cable.

Lt. Patzell requests that he be advised as to action taken.

This office would appreciate a list of distribution made of procurement policy - local and field. As you no doubt are aware, the only aircraft that OSS can procure and ship overseas are light liaison type aircraft manufactured and procurable from civilian sources. Suggest this information be also included with the air dispatch to the field.

ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
OSS Air Officer

cc: Lt. Patzell

15073
Memo from WJD to Gen. Baker re Assignment
of C-47 Airplane to GCS

Distribution - 23 Sep 44

- 1 MedSO: Mr. Dodd
- 2 ETO: Lt. Wilson
- 3 SSO: Col. Bigelow
- 4 SO: Lt. Col. Hoffmann
- 5 Air: Col. Quinn
- 6 Svcs: Mr. Ream
- 7 Secretariat

75-100-7
William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: Assignment of a C-47 Airplane to OSS
FROM: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
TO: Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, AFHQ

1. You will recall our conversation of a couple of weeks ago when I requested the full-time assignment of a C-47 airplane for use by OSS theater personnel when the need became great enough.

2. With the fast moving conditions of military activities in this Theater, and the necessity for OSS personnel to be shifted around rapidly to meet the changing needs, I feel justified in placing this formal request before you at this time.

✓
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brig. General, AUS
Director

United States

SECRET

Equals Brills

4 September, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: General Donovan

1. Colonel Fletcher of USTAAF called me this afternoon and asked me if I was familiar with the conversation which you had with General Anderson in regard to securing a PBY.

2. He stated that they thought they would have one available around the 15th of September, but that he had to know a little more about what it was to be used for, and if it required any special equipment so that he might advise the Navy. I told him that I knew nothing about it, but would endeavor to answer his questions as soon as you returned.

Lester Armour

LESTER ARMOUR
Commander, USNR

United States

SECRET

Equals Brills



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

15,088
SEP 5 1944
free

TO : Mr. Cheston
FROM : Lt. Putzell
SUBJECT:

DATE: 5 September 1944

Lt. Colonel Howard Beir, formerly of this organization, has just returned from Italy with a message to me from Colonel Glavin.

It appears that Colonel Glavin would like to have a C-47 airplane for his and his staff's use. He has requested that we obtain one for him.

Before taking this matter up with Colonel Quinn I am submitting it to you for your instructions.

EJP
E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Lt. (j.g.) USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

CSC has talked with Col. Quinn who says that plane must be old in theater - 291' 9/18

Quinn 13, 087

Mr. Cheston

5 September 1964

Lt. Putzell

Lt. Colonel Howard Beir, formerly of this organization, has just returned from Italy with a message to me from Colonel Glavin.

It appears that Colonel Glavin would like to have a C-47 airplane for his and his staff's use. He has requested that we obtain one for him.

Before taking this matter up with Colonel Quinn I am submitting it to you for your instructions.

E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Lt. (j.g.) USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

• Col. David K. B. Bruce
• Col. Edw. J. F. Glavin
Col. J. E. Foulmin
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Col. H. L. Berno

Mrs. O'D - For the Director's files.
Please make notification that attached
was given distribution noted on slip
by Mr. Mayo, going out 8/2.

HJP Jr.

Director
X policy
X Procurement and of
(undated)

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MEMORANDUM TO: All Concerned
SUBJECT: Procurement of Aircraft for OSS

1. As a result of frequent requests from the theaters for procurement by OSS of Government aircraft for field operations, the data contained in this memorandum is submitted in an effort to clarify the issues involved.

2. Policy regarding procurement of aircraft by OSS, or actual assignment of aircraft to OSS organizations, has been established by letter dated 26 June 1943 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, Attachment 1 to this memorandum. It will be noted that, although at the time of writing the shortage of aircraft was quoted as partial reason for laying the policy, the fact that present alleviation of these shortages to a great extent does not alter the basic implications of this statement of policy as summed up in the final paragraph:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the matter of assignment of aircraft, ships or other equipment in any theater over and above the organizational equipment furnished to the OSS must be left in the hands of the respective Theater Commanders."

3. Copies of this letter were transmitted to all Theater Commanders by letter dated 28 June 1943 from the Adjutant General's Office, Washington.

4. While this policy remains in effect, there are two methods of obtaining Government aircraft for OSS operations:

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a. Use of aircraft on hand in the various theaters can be requested from the Theater Commander for OSS operations, or

b. Specific types of aircraft or aircraft not on hand in the theaters, such as training and certain liaison or utility (light) cargo types, can be requested by the Theater Commander and made available for use in OSS operations.

c. These provisions apply also to gliders, amphibious craft and special equipment.

8. Although procurement by these means necessitates requisitioning by the Theater Commander where subject aircraft are not on hand in the theater and may involve seeming inconvenience and delay, in the long run it is the most expeditious in view of other considerations. Request by a Theater Commander for aircraft is unquestioned and receives attention and priority which OSS would not enjoy even if authorized to request aircraft directly; were the aircraft procurable by OSS in the United States and prepared for overseas shipment, theater approval would still be required for transportation to their destination. Furthermore, countless operational details are avoided by having aircraft under the control of the Theater Commander, such as problems of maintenance, supply and servicing facilities. The often quoted "ben on the ground for one in the air" is no exaggeration, as the combat table of organization for any airplane equipped organization will testify. Finally, if it were possible to procure, transport, service, maintain and supply the necessary aircraft without recourse to the Theater Commander, still no missions could be flown without his approval. It appears illogical, therefore, to attempt to side-step or short-circuit the agency whose approval sooner or later is necessary; the earlier

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-3-

this reaction is obtained, the smoothen the entire series of operations.

B. Some consideration has been given to outright purchase of military or civilian type aircraft by OCS for shipment to theater missions:

a. Sales of surplus Government aircraft to individuals is now authorized, and such sales are controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, under authority of the Munitions Assignment Committee, Air, through the Air Force Redistribution and Salvage Office and the Surplus Property Office of DPC. None of the aircraft thus sold, however, are new; many, in fact, are sold because they have gone beyond the point of economical repair or any degree of operational predictability. No provisions for spare parts or maintenance equipment are possible under this arrangement.

b. Certain civilian aircraft previously used in War Training Service are now being disposed of. These airplanes have been in use for several years, for the most part. Their condition is unknown and CAA will not vouch for or certify airworthiness. Most of them are being purchased by civilian individuals or agencies who have adequate time and facilities for patching them up, and they will be flown under controlled conditions which could not be expected operationally in the field.

c. Requisitioning of new or special types of aircraft in production for assignment direct to OCS is possible only through the Munitions Assignment Committee, Air, which is an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Obviously the JCS policy stated in the

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attached letter and discussed in paragraph 4, above, will eliminate the possibility of any approval by the committee of such OSS requisitions. Also, upon the advice of the Aircraft Distribution Control Office of Material, Maintenance and Distribution, AAF, the minimum elapsed time between receipt of such a request for aircraft and actual delivery of the items is approximately four months. Requests from Theater Commanders, on the other hand, do not have to pass through any of the committees or agencies and new aircraft are immediately available, delivery being accomplished in an average of six weeks.

7. Practically all types of liaison and utility (light) cargo aircraft are now immediately available upon Theater Command request, including liaison, primary trainers, and basic trainers, and all two- and three-place training gliders, with the exception of the now obsolete Type L-1 liaison aircraft.

8. In summary, then, the only quick and simple method of obtaining aircraft for OSS use in the theater is from the Theater Commander. By this method, not only is it possible to obtain the aircraft more quickly - even if they must be requested in turn from the United States - but problems of initial shipment and subsequent relocations of aircraft, maintenance (both personnel and supplies), service and operations are all expedited.

Attachment:
Copy letter JCS to
Gen. Donovan dated
26 June '45

15,000
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington

26 June 1945.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
20th and H Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

Your letter of 13 June with attached appendices has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you know, the conduct of all operations, including those of the OSS within any theater, is the responsibility of the theater commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have allocated to the several theaters the total of ships, aircraft and other resources of the U.S. production available for our forces. Where means other than those assigned to the OSS as basic organizational equipment (OSS stock catalog) are required by the OSS in any theater, it is presumed that the operational plans have set forth such requirements. It is presumed also that in reviewing such plans the theater commanders will indicate to what extent the necessary means can be furnished and to what extent the plans must be altered to come within the means allocated to them.

For your information there exists at the present time an acute over-all shortage of transport aircraft, and no bomber-type aircraft will be available out of the U.S. allocations in the 1945 production in excess of the present commitments to the theaters.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the matter of assignment of aircraft, ships or other equipment in any theater over and above the organizational equipment furnished to the OSS must be left in the hands of the respective theater commanders.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

FORREST D. ROYAL
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

Copies furnished:
Aide to COMJCS
Operations Div., WDC

File Location
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 July 1944

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
FROM: Major Carl O. Hoffmann
SUBJECT: Your Inquiry Concerning Bombardment and Dropping Groups

FAR EAST

- Burma** - 10th Air Force
 - 2nd Troop Carrier Sqdn.
 - Rescue Sqdn ATC
 - 1st Air Dropping Co.
 - 5301st, 5302nd, and 5303rd Air Dropping Platoons
- China** - 14th Air Force; has no Bombardment or Dropping group. They have cooperated in deliveries of personnel and supplies in China and drops in Burma.

MEDITERRANEAN

Mediterranean Allied Air Force - 885th Bombardment Sqdn., aiding in SPOC operations. This Squadron formerly known as 122nd Bombardment Squadron.

WESTERN EUROPE

8th Air Force - 385th Bombardment Sqdn.

032

Carl O. Hoffmann
CARL O. HOFFMANN
Major, AUS
Chief, 120 (VUWI)

20 June 1946

SUBJECT: Assignment of Pilot for temporary period for flying duty with OSS

TO : Chief, Officers Branch
Military Personnel Division
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel
Army Air Forces
ATTN: Colonel Stanley T. Wray, AC

1. In accordance with your conversation yesterday with an officer of the Director's staff, it is requested that the services of a C-45 pilot with a current instrument rating of 3-2 (white card) be made available to this Agency for flying duty only, for the period 18 July through 13 August 1946.

2. Officer requested is needed to pilot the C-45 assigned by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for the use of this Agency, which aircraft is based at Helling Field.

CHARLES S. CRISTON
Assistant Director

To: General Donovan

Lt. Pugliese states that Capt. Fransted would like to know the answer to this request by noon.

FILE

Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
(3300)

Info (1/1)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FILE

28 April 1945

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SUBJECT: Request for Use of C-45
TO : General William J. Donovan


1. Communications Branch through Captain Framsted requests use of the C-45 for a proposed trip to Charleston, Rhode Island, on 30 April, returning the following day.
2. Purpose of the trip: to observe the experiments on "blind" or night landings to be conducted there by the Navy. Ensign Hill will represent the Communications Branch.
3. On discussing the matter with Captain Framsted the Secretariat was informed that the experiments would be very helpful to him and he urged that clearance for the flight be obtained from you.
4. The Secretariat has received no other requests for the use of the plane for the period 30 April - 1 May.

Peter F. Pugliese
PETER F. PUGLIESE
1st Lieut., AUS

022

APR 29 10 46 AM '45
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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**HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON**

7 NOV 1944

*123 112
The Compt*

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Assignment of Army Aircraft

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 20 October 1944, subject as above.

2. Action has been initiated to continue the assignment of aircraft UC-45 P, Serial Number 43-35936, for use of the Office of Strategic Services. The airplane is presently stationed at Bolling Field.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.
Commanding General, U. S. Army.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff

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19, 504
 01
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 1 Down on 7/16
 1 On 10/1/44

20 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, ARMY AIR FORCES

SUBJECT: Assignment of Army Aircraft

1. Reference Office Instruction no. 55-a, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 9 October 1944, paragraph 8 of which lists certain key personnel and agencies to which assignment of military aircraft will be continued.
2. It is requested that the Office of Strategic Services be included in such list on the basis of considerations outlined below.
3. Aircraft WC-45 F, Air Corps Ser. No. 42-35936, was assigned for use of the Office of Strategic Services by The Commanding General, Army Air Forces in 1st Indorsement to memorandum from CG, subject: Assignment of WC-45 Aircraft to Director of Strategic Services, dated 19 June 1944.
4. From the date of the above assignment, the aircraft has been in almost constant use by this Agency except, of course, for periods during which it was grounded for maintenance, because of poor weather or loaned to Bolling Field Operations.
5. The aircraft has been invaluable to this Agency in operational testing of highly classified equipment proposed for air operations in the various theaters of operations. Test work in the process of completion has already speeded the development of a new type cargo parachute, techniques of aerial pick-up of cargo and free throw containers, communications and other equipment.
6. The aircraft has been used also for the purpose of transporting the Director and key personnel of this Agency when other facilities were impractical, for security reasons, or emergency travel was urgent.

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Chief of Air Staff, Army Air Forces
20 October 1944, contd.

7. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it is requested that assignment of aircraft W-45 F, Air Corps Ser. No. 43-35996, for the use of the Office of Strategic Services be continued.

Charles W. Weston
Assistant Director

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Mr. Cheston 11/11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Charles S. Cheston

DATE: 11 September 1944

FROM : Lt. P. F. Pugliese

SUBJECT: C-45

Colonel Quinn called this morning to inform me that the C-45 had returned from Orlando, Florida about 7:00 PM yesterday. He wishes you to know that he received your message about returning today, but he felt that they had insufficient equipment in Florida to warrant his staying over another day for any tests.

Peter F. Pugliese
PETER F. PUGLIESE,
1st Lieut., AUS

OSR Form 4001

OSR SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

| TO | Name | Initials |
|----|--------------------|------------|
| | O. C. Doering, Jr. | |
| | G. A. Bano | |
| | J. B. Donovan | |
| | D. C. Lee | |
| | G. S. Platt | |
| | P. F. Pugliese | |
| | E. J. Putzell, Jr. | |
| | A. W. Sulloway | |
| | R. Thrum | |
| | Elios | |
| | Col. Buxton | <i>Yes</i> |

(23095)

CONFIDENTIAL

8 August 1944

SUBJECT: Official Use of C-45 Aircraft

TO : Branches Concerned.

1. A C-45 Beech aircraft has been assigned to the Director by the War Department for use by him and authorized officials of this Agency in connection with OSS activities. The plane will be piloted by the OSS Air Officer (Col. Quinn) and his assistant, Capt. Karsner, and will be serviced by Operations, Bolling Field.

2. The following procedure has been approved by the Director to govern all requests for use of the C-45:

a. The Secretariat will (1) act as a clearing house for all requests for the use of the above aircraft, and (2) keep a Log of all trips made which is to include: name of passenger and of requesting officer, destination, reason for trip, time of departure and arrival, etc.

b. All requests for use of the C-45 will include information required for the Log, as set forth immediately above, and will be submitted to the Secretariat far enough in advance so as to give the Secretariat a reasonable opportunity to clear the proposed trip with the OSS Air Officer, Col. Quinn. Sufficient time must also be allowed to permit Operations, Bolling Field, to properly service the plane for the proposed trip.

3. General Donovan has directed that the following OSS officials are authorized to request use of the C-45:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Colonel Buxton | Deputy Director, Intelligence |
| Mr. Cheston | Deputy Director, SSO |
| Chrm, Planning Group | Deputy Director, S&T |
| Chrm, Planning Staff | Deputy Director, Admin. Serv. |
| Executive Officer, OSS | Chief, SI |
| Asst. Executive Officer, OSS | Chief, X-2 |
| Chief, Secretariat | Chief, R&A |
| General Counsel | Chief, SO |
| Chief, Security Office | Chief, MO |
| Chief, PPB | Chief, S&T |
| Chief, Communications | Chief, R&D |

4. Lt. P. F. Pugliese (Extension 2580) will act as the Secretariat in this matter.

Duncan C. Lee
Duncan C. Lee
Major, AUS
Chief, Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

5 August 1954

SUBJECT: Official Use of C-45 Aircraft
TO: Branches Concerned.

1. A C-45 Beech aircraft has been assigned to the use of this Agency in connection with OMS activities. The plane will be piloted by the OMS Air Officer (Col. Quinn) and his assistant, Capt. Karstner, and will be serviced by Operations, Bolling Field.

2. The following procedure has been approved by the Director to govern all requests for use of the C-45:

a. The Secretariat will (1) act as a clearing house for all requests for the use of the above aircraft, and (2) keep a log of all trips made which is to include name of passenger and of requesting officer, date, reason for trip, time of departure and arrival, etc.

b. All requests for use of the C-45 will include information required for the log, as set forth immediately above, and will be submitted to the Secretariat for review in advance so as to give the Secretariat a reasonable opportunity to clear the proposed trip with the OMS Air Officer, Col. Quinn. Sufficient time must also be allowed so permit Operations, Bolling Field, to properly prepare the plans for the proposed trip.

3. General Donovan has directed that the following officials are authorized to request use of the C-45:

- Colonel Burton
- Mr. Sheston
- Chmn, Planning Group
- Chmn, Planning Staff
- Executive Officer, OMS
- Asst. Executive Officer, OMS
- Chief, Secretariat
- General Counsel
- Chief, Security Office
- Chief, PRS
- Chief, Communications

- Deputy Director, Intelligence
- Deputy Director, OMS
- Deputy Director, AFM
- Deputy Director, Admin. Serv.
- Chief, AI
- Chief, A-2
- Chief, A-3
- Chief, SO
- Chief, LO
- Chief, AFM
- Chief, MAP

4. Lt. P. P. Pugliese (Extension 2880) will act for the Secretariat in this matter.

[Signature]
Major, AFM
Chief, Secretariat

OSS Form #191

Date 3 July 1944

To: General Donovan

For your signature.

Alvan W. Sulloway
Alvan W. Sulloway

The plane is a Beechcraft and carries four passengers (in addition to pilot and co-pilot). Its speed is about 165 miles per hour.

RT

Office of the Executive Officer.

(30449)

Basic Ltr to OSS, dtd 19 Jun 44, subject: Assignment
of C-47 Aircraft to Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan, Dir.
OSS, Wash., D.C.

W. J. Donovan
W. J. Donovan
W. J. Donovan
W. J. Donovan

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES, Washington 25, D.C.

27 Jun 1944

TO: DIRECTOR, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

Action has been initiated to assign one (1) UC-45 airplane to the
1st AAF Base Unit, Bolling Field, for use of the Office of Strategic
Services. It is expected to be available within three weeks.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

T. L. Mosley,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Commitments Division,
Office, Asst. Chief of Air Staff,
Operations, Commitments & Requirements

2nd Ind

Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C., 3 July 1944

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C.

Receipt is acknowledged of 1st Indorsement, the contents of
which have been noted.

William J. Donovan
Brigadier General, USA
Director of Strategic Services

*Aircraft 14, 646
x 11 program
x Air Force Group
1/2/44*

19 June 1944

SUBJECT: Assignment of C-45 Aircraft to Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

TO: Assistant Chief of Air Staff, O.C. & R., Allocations Branch, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

1. It is hereby requested that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, assign to me or place at my disposal at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C. a C-45 aircraft.

2. Such an airplane would be of great value to me and to the Office of Strategic Services for use within the continental United States.

3. There are several Army Air Forces officers assigned to this organization who are qualified to pilot such an aircraft.

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 June 1944

SUBJECT: Procurement of Suitable Type Aircraft for Use
of Brigadier General William J. Donovan, OSS

TO: Commanding General, Office of Strategic
Services, Washington, D.C.

1. It is respectfully requested that action be taken (suggest a direct approach to General Arnold) to procure a suitable type aircraft (Beechcraft C-45) ostensibly for use of General Donovan to enable him to more efficiently carry out the functions of OSS within the continental limits of the United States.
2. A secondary use of this aircraft would be to enable OSS to carry out the numerous tests of airborne equipment being developed by OSS. Examples:- Rebecca Eureka equipment as an aid to precision cargo drops; development of a suitable trailing hook to simplify the two stage accelerated pick-up for ease of on-the-fly pick-up of information dispatches and light cargo from agents in enemy territory; aerial recorder of voice or code transmission from agents within enemy country, etc.
3. Much valuable time has been lost in the past on numerous tests due to lack of testing facilities (aircraft) and the necessary and time-consuming liaison required to set up and coordinate a test or series of tests.

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4. This aircraft could also be used to ferry key OSS personnel and cargo when urgent sudden demands require it and other means of transportation are not easily obtainable.

5. It is suggested that General Donovan procure this aircraft for his own personal use and not for OSS which is not authorized aircraft.

6. If available, this aircraft could be assigned to the 311th Photo Wing Headquarters, Bolling Field, for service and maintenance and for joint use of General Donovan and Photo Wing Headquarters. Colonel Northup, Commanding Officer, 311th Photo Wing, concurs in this action.

7. The type aircraft suggested (C-45) is one well suited for type of test work being conducted by OSS as well as having desirable characteristics as a cargo and personnel transport aircraft incorporating speed, range, and general good flying characteristics. Any other type of cargo aircraft that might be assigned in lieu of C-45 in all cases would not meet the requirements of the test work to be performed by OSS. Suggest every effort be made to procure a C-45.

Robert S. Quinn
ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Colonel, A.C.
Air Officer

SECRET

6 June 1944

SUBJECT: Procurement of Suitable Type Aircraft for Use
of Brigadier General William J. Donovan, OSS

TO: Commanding General, Office of Strategic
Services, Washington, D.C.

1. It is respectfully requested that action be taken (suggest a direct approach to General Arnold) to procure a suitable type aircraft (Beechcraft C-45) ostensibly for use of General Donovan to enable him to more efficiently carry out the functions of OSS within the continental limits of the United States.
2. A secondary use of this aircraft would be to enable OSS to carry out the numerous tests of airborne equipment being developed by OSS. Examples:- Rebecca Eureka equipment as an aid to precision cargo drops; development of a suitable trailing hook to simplify the two stage accelerated pick-up for ease of on-the-fly pick-up of information dispatches and light cargo from agents in enemy territory; aerial recorder of voice or code transmission from agents within enemy country, etc.
3. Much valuable time has been lost in the past on numerous tests due to lack of testing facilities (aircraft) and the necessary and time-consuming liaison required to set up and coordinate a test or series of tests.

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4. This aircraft could also be used to ferry key OSS personnel and cargo when urgent sudden demands require it and other means of transportation are not easily obtainable.

5. It is suggested that General Donovan procure this aircraft for his own personal use and not for OSS which is not authorized aircraft.

6. If available, this aircraft could be assigned to the 311th Photo Wing Headquarters, Bolling Field, for service and maintenance and for joint use of General Donovan and Photo Wing Headquarters. Colonel Northrup, Commanding Officer, 311th Photo Wing, concurs in this action.

7. The type aircraft suggested (C-45) is one well suited for type of test work being conducted by OSS as well as having desirable characteristics as a cargo and personnel transport aircraft incorporating speed, range, and general good flying characteristics. Any other type of cargo aircraft that might be assigned in lieu of C-45 in all cases would not meet the requirements of the test work to be performed by OSS. Suggest every effort be made to procure a C-45.

ROBERT H. QUINN
Lt. Colonel, A.C.
Air Officer

SECRET

14-55
A. Models
X. Poirier, Inc.

2 June 1944

Mr. H. Noel Poirier,
American Models, Inc.,
1048 Potomac Street, N.W.,
Georgetown,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Poirier:

General Donovan is out of the country
at the present time and therefore I am acknow-
ledging your letter of 30 May 1944.

You may be assured that consideration
will be given to your suggestion.

Sincerely yours,

M. Quinn Shaughnessy,
1st Lt., USMCR,
Asst. Chief, Secretariat

14.535

ROY D. CHAULGIRD, Sec. Treas.

*Aircraft
Models
Parsons*

AMERICAN MODELS, Inc.



SCIENTIFIC ENGINEERING

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PRECISION MACHINE WORK AND MANUFACTURING

WE ARE ALSO MAKERS OF AIRCRAFT, NAVAL AND INDUSTRIAL MODELS

TELEPHONE NORTH 4256

1028 POTOMAC STREET, N. W.
GEORGETOWN
WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

May 30, 1944

Office of Strategic Service
21st & E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Atten: General William Donovan

Dear Sir:

We have an idea which might be of extreme value to your organization. The idea consists of a radio controlled model airplane with a wing span of from 6 to 12 feet depending on the weight it is to carry. For many years I have been recognized in this field of endeavor and would like to place this experience at your disposal at a time when perhaps it will be most beneficial, the idea incorporates an automatically operated motion or still camera carried within the model, since the model would be radio controlled and directed over certain areas or over enemy territory, say within an area of 15 miles and returning to either its starting position or to alternate position by direction of the field men handling the radio controls station which also would be a single or a group of light portable stations to direct the model with its important photographs, thereby getting some very valuable information from places that would hardly be accessible otherwise, the model I have in mind would be readily dismantled and stowed into light weight carrying case and could be used many times, the speed of this type of model could be regulated from 15 miles per hour to 40 miles per hour depending on the speed of the men changing their position. I might say that the 6 ft. model would meet certain conditions and the larger model would be known as the long range and more capable of carrying the heavier equipment for the long range duty.

I think that in about 90 days we could have the first models ready and perhaps we could arrange to launch one of them direct from our factory right to the front door of the Pentagon Building to demonstrate its practical usefulness, and perhaps you could invite others as a reception to an idea that will demonstrate a practical new field.

We would be very glad to discuss this matter in more complete detail at your convenience making possible to utilize this idea within a short time.

Copy to Lowell

ROY D. SPALLONE, Sec. Vep.

AMERICAN MODELS, Inc.



SCIENTIFIC ENGINEERING

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PRECISION MACHINE WORK AND MANUFACTURING

WE ARE ALSO MAKERS OF AIRCRAFT, NAVAL AND INDUSTRIAL MODELS

TELEPHONE NORTH 4256

1048 POTOMAC STREET, N. W.
GEORGETOWN
WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

page 2

Thanking you very kindly for your attention, we are,

Very truly yours,

American Models, Inc.

H. Noel Poirier

P/hs

P.S. These models would be hard to shoot down as their speed or ceiling height would make them poor targets for the enemy. Also the models could be equipped with pontoons for watered areas.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Aircraft 13,785
x German x Industry
x Production

15 February 1944

gzb

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. BUXTON

Subject: Attached statements of German aircraft
and tank strength and production

Transmitted herewith are statements prepared at your request by Pvt. Sidney Alexander, Chief, Industrial Resources Section, Economics Sub-division, R & A. These figures were the basis of Pvt. Alexander's report in the Situation Room 15 February.

S. E. Gleason

S. E. Gleason, Maj., AUS
Chief, Current Intelligence Staff

Hold for Gen. Donovan

S E C R E T

AIRCRAFT, GERMANY

| | 1st. line I.E. Strength 4 Feb. 1944 | Stored Reserves 1 Jan. 1944 | Monthly Production at 1 Jan. 1944 |
|---------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Total Combat | 5,365(5,395) ¹ | 950 | 1,335 |
| Bombers ² | 1,285 |) 300 |) 315 |
| Long Range Reconnaissance | 370 |) |) 600 |
| Single Engined Fighters | 1,590(1,690) ¹ |) 325 |) |
| Fighters Bombers | 335 |) | 255 |
| Twin Engined Fighter | 1,075 | 175 | 85 |
| Dive Bombers | 230 | 50 | 80 |
| Tactical Reconnaissance | 480 | 100 | |

¹ Actual² Principally Ju 88 bombers, Do 217, He. 177. Ju 188, He 111.TANKS, GERMANY

Monthly production, (estimated) December 1943

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Light Tanks (10 ton) | 60 |
| Mark III | 20 |
| Mark IV | 90 |
| Mark V & VI | 130 |
| | 300 |

* Assault Guns on Mark III Chassis 60

Strength:

Front Line Entitlement Strength, Dec. '43: 5,000
 Total actual tank strength, Dec. '43: 3,500 to 5,000

Industry
 X general
 X Production

BRITISH AIR FORCE

A.D.I.(K) Report No. 473/1943.

TOP SECRET
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AS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF IT SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUBSIDIARIES OF COMBAND OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD IT BE ACCEPTED AS FACT UNTIL COMMENTED ON IN AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUBSIDIARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

THE GERMAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY.
 (September 1943).

1. The information in this report was obtained from an aeronautical engineer who was closely connected with German Air Ministry circles from 1937 until early September 1943. Throughout this period he was in almost daily contact with the Generalluftzeugmeister's department of the R.L.M. on technical matters and during the course of his work he inevitably picked up a large volume of information on the subject of aircraft and aero-engine production.

2. This man had a good general knowledge of the principles underlying the new policy laid down in 1942 for the development of the German aircraft industry and, although he had no detailed information on individual plants he could in many instances quote production figures. He had obtained these from the highly reliable sources, including in some cases no less a personage than General Feldmarschall Milch.

3. The present report has been divided into four parts: Part I deals with the general policy for aircraft and aero-engine production which was laid down during the summer of 1942. It also shows how this new policy achieved an all-round increase in the total production. Part II describes the production of air-frames by individual types, the production of 1942-43 being shown in the greatest detail. This description demonstrates how the new policy worked out in practice and the results which were achieved. Part III deals similarly with the aero-engine situation. Part IV summarizes the position and makes some suggestions as to how the industry could best be attacked so as fully to exploit the peculiarly vulnerable nature of the present production system.

4. Before starting on the report proper, due acknowledgements must be made to the many who were present at various stages of the interrogation. They are too many to mention individually here, but they may rest satisfied that, but for this intervention, this report would never have appeared in its present form.

PART I - POLICY.

General.

5. At the beginning of 1942 the labour shortage, coupled with the realization that the production of arms of all types had to be increased, caused the Germans to plan a very large-scale re-organization of the entire armaments industry. This re-organization was planned to reach its full effect during the second half of 1944 and the German High Command freely admitted that the intervening period, particularly the year 1943, was the critical one for Germany.

6. In this programme the expansion of the aircraft industry played a leading role and it was planned that by December 1944 the production of aircraft other than trainers should reach 3,000 per month as compared with the 1942 average of about 1,250 per month.

7. In the aircraft programme the greatest priority of all types of aircraft was given to fighters. Production of fighters was to be increased from about 400 a month to 1,000 a month. Hitler and the High Command took the view that winning a large production of fighter aircraft was the key to victory over Germany and the rest of the armaments programme could be attacked by Allied bombing attacks.

8. This emphasis on the importance of the aircraft production programme is well shown by the following extract from a speech made in June 1941 by Hitler to a meeting attended by all the leaders of the German Air Force, Operational and Planning Sections and also by the heads of the Industrial Council:

"We must not speak theoretically of victory. We must admit that the Allies are much stronger in the air than we are and they are building more than three times the number of aircraft. If we cannot carry out our aircraft production programme to the full then Germany must lose the war".

9. This extract illustrates the critical importance to Germany of aircraft production and there can be little doubt that Hitler, and Goering and Goering, considered the aircraft industry, and in particular the factories concentrating on fighters, as the most vital targets in Germany to-day. Suggestions by the present informant as to how these targets could best be attacked are given in Part IV of this report.

The Re-Organisation of the Aircraft Industry.

10. In the spring of 1942 a Committee was set up under the personal direction of Goering to examine ways and means of overcoming labour difficulties in the aircraft industry and at the same time of increasing aircraft production.

11. At that time the industry was organised in the usual way and it consisted of a large number of firms each building their own components and producing a comparatively small number of aircraft. Further expansion was blocked by the shortage of skilled labour and in particular by the dilution of labour with foreign workers; between 65% and 80% of the labour force in any given factory was not only completely unskilled but was largely made up of foreigners of the peasant type who had never previously been inside a factory.

12. Having studied this problem the Committee decided that the only solution was to re-organise the entire industry on mass production lines and to break down the individual working processes to the simplest possible stages. Some of the existing factories were to switch to the production of one particular component, while others were to specialise on assembly.

13. Geographically the industry was to be organised so that the production of any particular type of aircraft centred round the assembly plants each of which was to be fully integrated with its own component-producing factories, and it was considered desirable that these satellites should be situated, if possible, within a radius of about 50 miles.

14. Each of these integrated complexes is known as an *Ausachse* and each is under a Chief Engineer known as the *Ausachsleiter* who normally has his office at the assembly plant. One of the *Ausachse* is selected as a Pilot complex which lays down the production methods to be employed by the others.

15. The various *Ausachse* engaged on the production of one type of aircraft are collectively known as the *Sonderauschasse* and the *Sonderausachsleiter*

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**BRITISH SECRET SERVICE
 MEMORANDUM**

to the man responsible to the R.L.M. for the production of that particular type of aircraft. The Generalflugzeugmeister has the power to divert components from one Ausschuss into another which has a temporary shortage.

14. The new system necessitated fundamental changes in the Generalflugzeugmeister's department at the R.L.M. and the new organization is given in Appendix I. Appendix II shows the liaison between the Generalflugzeugmeister's department, Ministry of Armaments Production (Speer) and the aircraft industry and at the same time it explains the channels through which the wishes of the High Command were discussed and interpreted and how the various raw materials are diverted into the aircraft industry. These two appendices show very clearly how completely the Germans have gone over to the new system and at the same time demonstrate how difficult it will be for them to change over on to any other.

17. The Germans were fully aware that this new system was extremely vulnerable to air attack and they took certain precautions. The industry was to be organized on a single-shift basis so that if any one assembly plant or one component plant were to be damaged by bombing then the personnel could be transferred in a body to one of the corresponding plants at another Ausschuss where, by working a second shift, production could more or less be maintained.

18. As a precaution against the unlikely contingency of simultaneous damage to all the plants it was laid down that when jigs were ordered, a duplicate set should always be made and stored in a place of safety. The present informant had no concrete knowledge regarding the jig position but he was very strongly of the opinion that this 100% cover had not, in fact, been achieved.

19. When they adopted this policy of re-organization the Germans, however, made one serious miscalculation: they reckoned only with "lucky" damage during a night attack and they did not believe it possible that systematic precision attacks could be carried out by day. This error arose because, in those days, the night raids had not reached their present proportions and precision attacks on factories by day had not commenced.

20. This new system applies only to the German Reich. For political reasons the Germans fostered the aircraft industry in other countries but these factories were never intended to make any real contribution to the German production scheme and it is unlikely that they will be able to do so; indeed informant was strongly of the opinion that these factories were a drain on Germany's resources since they required raw materials and technicians which Germany herself could ill spare.

German Production Increases.

21. The re-organized industry was not expected to reach its peak output until the end of 1944 but there was an immediate and considerable increase in the number of aircraft produced.

22. In June 1943 the Italian Air Attaché and his Assistant were summoned to the Generalflugzeugmeister's department to attend a conference which had been called with a view to explaining the German production system and forcing the Italian Allies to adopt it in their own industry. General Feldmarschall Milch and General von der Seyditz were present at this conference and Milch announced that within the last few days he had had the pleasure of informing his Führer that German aircraft production had doubled in the eight months which had elapsed since he had taken over the post of Generalflugzeugmeister on the death of Udet.

23. Milch followed up this remark by quoting figures for the total German production of operational and transport aircraft; the figures did not include trainer types but informant thought that they did include such aircraft as

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**BRITISH SECRET SERVICE
UNITED STATES OFFICE**

were being built in occupied territories.

24. In view of the source the figures ought to be genuine but the possibility must be borne in mind that they may have been prepared "ad hoc" to enable Milch to present a favourable picture of his own stewardship. The Italians took this view and their estimates of the real German production figures are given in brackets in the following table:-

Total German Production of Operational and Transport Aircraft.

| Month | Figures quoted by Milch | Italian Estimates. |
|--------------|-------------------------|--|
| | Aircraft. | Aircraft. |
| June 1942 | 900 | 1,200 |
| January 1943 | 1,200/1,250 | 1,250/1,300 |
| May 1943 | 1,600 | 1,600 |
| June 1943 | 1,400 | " |
| August 1943 | 1,600/1,700 | German estimates made 1st August 1943. |

25. The fall in production which occurred during the month of June 1943 was a direct result of the spurt which had taken place during the preceding months and which had led to a temporary exhaustion of the raw materials flowing into the industry.

26. General Feldmarschall Milch also told the conference that the German programme provided for a production of 2,000 aircraft per month by January 1944 and 3,000 per month by December, the latter figure including 1,600/1,700 S.E. fighters. Milch added that he had been instructed by the Führer to bear in mind the possibility of the war continuing even beyond December 1944 and to make plans for an eventual production of 5,000 aircraft monthly.

PART II - AIR-FRAME PRODUCTION.

27. Generally speaking the production of air-frames and the assembly of complete aircraft was the easiest part of the production programme and output was always well up to schedule if not actually in advance of it. Indeed it sometimes happened that factories producing air-frame components and assembling aircraft had to be instructed to throttle back their production.

28. The present informant could not give much detail concerning the individual factories as it did not lie within his province to investigate their activity and production. He was, however, well acquainted with the scheme for Me.109 production as he had accompanied various parties of Italian technicians on visits to factories engaged on the manufacture of this type and had heard the production methods, etc. explained.

Me.109 Production.

29. The production of Me.109 aircraft is centred round the three assembly plants at Leipzig, Regensburg and Wiener/Neustadt. In all three works assembly is carried out on a conveyor belt system, each conveyor belt being designed for a production of 300 aircraft monthly. The work of assembly has been broken down from the former 12 fairly lengthy stages into 50/55 shorter ones.

30. The final German plans provide for one assembly belt each at Leipzig and Regensburg and two at Wiener/Neustadt, thus accounting for a total

/production

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BRITISH SECRET EQUALS
UNITED STATES SECRET.

production of 1,100/1,200 Me.109 G's each month, but by August 1943 this figure had not been reached. Basing his figures on his general knowledge of the Messerschmitt concern and on conversations which he had had with German and Italian officials informant estimated that in August 1943 the actual production of the three assembly plants was as follows:-

| | | | |
|-----------------|---|------------|--------------------|
| Wiener/Neustadt | - | 280 | aircraft per month |
| Regensburg | - | 200 | " " " |
| Leipzig | - | 130 | " " " |
| | | <u>610</u> | " " " |

31. At this date the Wiener/Neustadt plant was only using one of the assembly belts and, although work on the erection of the second had commenced as early as March 1943, this was not planned to go into production before 1944 when the production of fuselages, wings and other components would have grown accordingly.

32. The present informant only remained in contact with official circles for about two weeks after the first U.S.A.A.F. raid on the factory and he could therefore describe only the immediate effects. The factory stopped production entirely for about one week but then resumed operations and turned out aircraft at a rate of approximately 150 per month. The first inspection of the *Sonderaufbau* was that it would take three months to restore the output to its pre-raid figure but the engineers sent from the A.I.A. to inspect the damage reported on their return that this could be achieved in six weeks, i.e. by the end of September.

33. The Regensburg complex was not so far advanced as Wiener/Neustadt and it was generally considered that the production was about two-thirds as great. Informant had not visited Regensburg during the last two years of his stay in Germany but on seeing the post-raid photographs showing that no attempt had been made to repair some of the buildings even one month after the raid he hazarded the guess that the buildings concerned may, in fact, have been engaged on the production of components such as fuselages and that the building of these shops had in fact only hastened the removal of this activity to a specialized factory elsewhere.

34. The Leipzig complex was even less advanced than Regensburg but in August 1943 it was developing rapidly and informant estimated that, other things being equal, it would reach the final target figure of 300 aircraft per month within 4/5 months, i.e. by about January 1944.

35. The extent to which the new production methods speeded up output is well shown by the number of productive man hours which the Germans calculated they required for Me.109 construction. At the beginning of the war the work took on an average, between 7,000 and 8,000 hours and even in 1942 some 6,500 hours were required. By June 1943, however, under the new system, Wiener/Neustadt had already reduced the time to 3,900 hours and it was hoped that all three new complexes would eventually work down to a figure of 3,500 hours.

36. These man hour figures should only be taken as an index showing how the time has been reduced as it is not known precisely what work is covered. It is certain, however, that only productive labour is calculated and that the total covers only the work which was carried out by the *Ausschüsse* - that is to say the manufacture of components and the assembly of completed aircraft.

37. The total does not include any allowance for the pre-fabrication of the profiles, Duralumin sheet, steel castings, etc., which were nearly all delivered to the *Ausschüsse* in their finished form, nor does it include the

/number of

MEYER'S WORK REPORT
MEYER'S WORK REPORT

number of man hours necessary for the production of the parts, the instruments and radio equipment, the undercarriage and the hydraulic gear, which were likewise made by outside firms. It is noted that the time taken for the assembly of these parts into the aircraft.

38. As a basic figure the Generalinspektorat's department approximated the work necessary for producing a twin-engine bomber of 250 feet wingspan, 20% for the power unit and 80% for the rest, including instruments, electrical gear and armaments.

Me. 109 Production:

39. The present informant was not as well acquainted with the production position of the F.W. 190 as he was with that of the Me. 109 but he knew that in August 1943 it was not as highly developed into distinct complexes. He thought that the Germans calculated that 6,000 man hours were required to produce the aircraft using the same basis as that described above. This figure represented the position soon after the start of series production and efforts were being made to reduce it.

40. The final aim was for F.W. 190 aircraft to be built in two divisions or complexes and the assembly plants were each to have a capacity of just over 200 aircraft per month. Unfortunately informant did not know where these two assembly lines were to be located nor which factories were to undertake the component production.

Me. 110, 210 and 410 Production:

41. The Me. 110 was a failure in its original conception as an escort fighter and the Germans have also come to the conclusion that it is unsuitable as a ground attack aircraft on all excepting second-class fronts. This type is therefore going out of production but small numbers are still being produced for use as night-fighters and they are now equipped with D.B. 605 engines, the D.B. 601 having gone out of production about 18 months ago.

42. The Me. 210 was designed as a fast light bomber but it proved a failure and such aircraft as had not been crashed were sent to Augsburg where they were modified into Me. 410's.

43. The Me. 410 is the type at present in production at Augsburg but the output is severely limited owing to difficulties which are being encountered in connection with the production of the D.B. 603 engine.

Me. 88 Production:

44. Informant heard from a reliable source that in August 1943 the production of Ju. 88's amounted to 430 aircraft per month, a total which included bomber, reconnaissance and fighter versions.

45. Bamberg acts as the pilot assembly for this type, the Bamberg plant being fed, as is already well-known, by the fuselage factory at Ischertshausen, the wing factory at Halberstadt and other specialised plants. In August 1943 this complex required 14,500 man hours to manufacture a complete Ju. 88, the figures being calculated as described above.

46. At this time the Bamberg factory itself was assembling both the night-fighter and the bomber Ju. 88's and the rate of production was about 110 aircraft per month; there were two assembly lines, each producing one aircraft every three hours.

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BRITISH SECRET EMALS
UNITED STATES SECRET

47. Informant estimated that the Heinkel factory at Schönewald was producing about 50 Ju. 88's per month and when he last visited the plant in June 1943 he noticed that the conveyor line had been built so that Ju. 188 aircraft could be handled without any modification.

48. It was planned that the A.T.G. factory at Leipzig, which informant estimated to be producing about 40 Ju. 88's monthly in July 1943, should shortly cease this work and concentrate on modifications - in accordance with the German policy of not disturbing the flow at the main production centres and carrying out modifications at separate and specialized factories.

49. Informant estimated production at the Siebel works at Schönewald at 60 aircraft per month and, in order to make up the total to the figure of 430 aircraft per month, he allotted the balance to the Heinkel factory at Oranienburg. It is true that he had last visited this factory in the middle of 1942 but, at that date, the series production of Ju. 88's was in full swing and as, either at that time or subsequently, he had not heard of any change of activity at the plant he assumed that they were still engaged on this work.

Ju. 188 Production.

50. The Ju. 188 was ready to go into series production early in 1943 and when, in May 1943, informant made a tour of Ischoreleben, Halberstadt and Bernburg he noticed that some Ju. 188's were already being manufactured. During a subsequent visit to the same factories in July 1943 he noticed that the proportion had increased and that it then amounted to approximately 10% of the total production, i.e. the assembly of roughly 15 aircraft per month.

51. At both the component factories and the assembly plant the Ju. 188's were being put through in between and mixed up with the Ju. 88's. The conveyor belts were not slowed down and the extra work entailed was undertaken by the reserve of workers who normally stand by in the assembly line to assist any slow workers.

52. As mentioned above informant noticed that the conveyor belts at the Heinkel factory at Schönewald had been erected with a view to the eventual change over of this plant on to Ju. 188 production.

Do. 217 Production.

53. Informant could give little information regarding the production of Do. 217 aircraft but he had heard that the series was gradually being built out and that it would certainly be completed within the next 12 months. He believed that the factories which are at present engaged on the production of this aircraft and components for it would gradually be switched over to the production of components for the Ju. 88.

He. 177 Production.

54. In the summer of 1942 informant saw the He. 177 for the first time on the air flying over Brandenburg where it had been built. At that time production had just started and the construction of this aircraft entailed 30,000 man hours - a figure which the Germans planned eventually to reduce to 25,000/30,000 hours.

55. Informant was able to confirm that serious difficulties had been encountered both with the air-frame and with the engines of the He. 177 and amongst other points he mentioned that the fuselage was to be lengthened 12' in order to improve the aero-dynamic qualities. In the summer of 1943 all the troubles had still not been overcome and fewer He. 177's were being built each month.

/56

HEINDEL WORKS HEINDEL PLANT, HANNOVER

57. The production series of the No. 111 is drawing to its close and this aircraft and components for it are now only being built by the Heindel works at Hanover. The production of the No. 111 has been calculated by the Germans to cost 12,000 man hours work.

No. 111 Production

58. The production series of the No. 111 is drawing to its close and this aircraft and components for it are now only being built by the Heindel works at Hanover. The production of the No. 111 has been calculated by the Germans to cost 12,000 man hours work.

Production of Other Types

59. The production of the Ju. 52, Ju. 252 and Ju. 290 are the responsibility of the Sonderaussehleiser Ju. 88 who works at Bamberg. Similarly the production of the No. 321 and 323 come under the Sonderaussehleiser who is responsible for the No. 110, 220 and 410 and who works from Augsburg. The production of these types of aircraft in Germany is only small and the present document had no particular remarks to make about them.

PART III - AERO-ENGINE PRODUCTION.

60. In the summer of 1942 the German aero-engine works were re-organized along the same lines as the air-frame factories - that is to say into groups each consisting of a central assembly plant with its own satellite component factories.

61. The adoption of mass production methods with short work stages forced the Germans to lay down the principle that it was uneconomical to have any aero-engine factory with a production of less than 1,000 engines per month. Such large factories are obviously vulnerable and the position is still more dangerous owing to the large number of machine-tools required and to the shortage of machine-tool manufacturing capacity in Germany.

62. There are in Germany virtually only three firms manufacturing operational types of engines - Junkers Motorenwerke, Bayerische Motorenwerke and Daimler-Benz - and, in this section of the report, the position of the various types of engines at present in production or due to come into production in the reasonably near future, are discussed under these three headings.

Junkers Motorenwerke.

63. In the German aero-engine industry Junkers Motorenwerke has come to be regarded as specializing in engines for bomber aircraft. The Dessau factory concentrates on research work and on the development of new engines; its responsibility ceasing in this respect as soon as a prototype has been approved by the R.L.H.

64. Once this approval has been granted the engine is passed to Kötzen which is responsible for working out methods of large-scale production and which immediately receives an order for an unspecified number of engines known as the "O Series". These are manufactured as slowly as is necessary - usually at the rate of about 50 per month - until all the production problems have been solved and then large-scale production is begun at Ingolstadt, which acts as the pilot factory for the Junkers concerns.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FLUGMOTORENWERK OSTMARK**

62. Research completed during the previous September was the most advanced technology factory in Germany and that it had the first to go into the assembly line in the country. By June 1943 it was producing engines at a rate of 40/60 per month and output was rising to monthly total of 1,000 engines per month.

63. Ostmark had no special knowledge of the other well-established German manufacturing base except that a new works was planned in Austria which was to be similar in importance to Flugmotorenwerk Ostmark.

64. For the last six months the Japanese concern as a whole has been lagging behind the other two large engine manufacturers in that the bulk of the production is still the obsolete Jumo 211. This engine has been in production for several years and virtually the only aircraft using it is the Ki-44. The newly produced Jumo 211's were invariably offered to the Italian whenever they tried to obtain new engines from Germany.

65. The Jumo 213 engine is not yet ready for production and the 24-cylinder Jumo 223 is required in a factory which not even its own designers will bring to production.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

66. The Deutsche Motorenwerke have only one engine in production - the BMW 801 - and informant had not heard of any other type on which any great work was being done or which was due to go into production in the near future.

67. The primary research work on new engines is carried out at Werk I in the town of Munich and the same factory manufactures the "O Series" and faces the production problems. The pilot works is Werk II at Munich/Allach which, in line with the general policy, has recently been considerably expanded and is scheduled to produce about 1,000 engines per month.

68. The position regarding the production of the B.M.W. 801 engine is not nearly as easy as it is for the Jumo 211. Although the actual output figures are fairly large this engine has a much shorter operational life and only quite recently it had to be overhauled after an average of 30 running hours; this figure has since been increased to 50/60 but even so, this is only about half the life of other types of engine which means that proportionately more B.M.W. 801's are required for any given number of air-frames.

69. It was not thought likely that any shortage of B.M.W. 801's would be allowed to hold up the fighter production programme although some bomber production might have to be sacrificed on this account.

Deimler-Benz

70. Deimler-Benz has always been regarded as the leading manufacturer of engines for fighter aircraft and to-day this concern is of vital interest for the Germans since D.B. engines are used to power the Me.109's which form the bulk of the all-important fighter production.

71. The research work of the firm is carried out at Stuttgart/Unterturkheim and the "O Series" is manufactured at Marienfeld. Marienfeld is at present engaged on the "O Series" of the D.B. 603 engine which it is producing at a rate of 40/60 monthly. When the "O Series" is satisfactory it is intended that Flugmotorenwerk Ostmark should become the pilot works.

- 10 -

BRITISH SECRET SIGNALS
UNITED STATES SECRET

73. The production of the D.B. 603 received a serious set-back in that the bottom and end castings for the crank-case, as designed by Stuttgart, could not be produced by chill-casting. Consequently, when the order for these castings was placed in July 1943 with the Wernigerode factory of the firm of Rudolf Rautenbach, it was rejected for re-designing, production being thereby delayed for 4/5 months. This delay has caused a hold-up in the production of the D.B. 603.

74. At present the D.B. 605 is the engine which is most widely manufactured by Daimler-Benz, and the pilot factory is Genshagen which, in July 1943, had a production of 650/700 engines per month. At that date the conveyor belt system was rapidly getting into its stride and it was expected that the target figure of 1,000 engines a month would be reached in the not too far distant future.

75. While waiting for the production position of the D.B. 603 to be clarified Flugmotorenwerk Ostmark is producing the D.B. 605 engine, albeit in a somewhat half-hearted manner, output being probably not more than 100/150 engines per month.

76. In the middle of August 1943 there was a very serious shortage of D.B. 605 engines, a shortage so acute that there had been several cases of operational units having aircraft grounded owing to lack of replacement engines.

77. The Germans estimate that they require to achieve an air-frame: aero-engine ratio of 1: 1.8 - 2 for the D.B. 605, whereas, up to August, production of this type had not quite reached a ratio of 1: 1.4. In this connection it must, however, be pointed out that August was the date of the attacks on the He.109 assembly factories; these attacks will have reduced the number of new aircraft requiring engines, and the very acute engine position may therefore have been eased to some considerable extent.

Aero-Engine Components.

78. In general the aero-engine industry in Germany is hampered by a shortage of essential raw materials, in particular the various metals required for hardening and toughening steel. Even though German metallurgical research has made great strides in the use of substitute analyses new engines have frequently to be modified on this account and their performance suffers accordingly. In particular difficulties are constantly being experienced in connection with pistons, valves and supercharger impellers and the production of these items is a constant source of worry and research.

79. In the spring of 1943 night raids on German towns knocked out three of the plants producing crank-shaft forgings for the D.B. 605. One was in Hagburg, one in Cologne and the third in Essen and it was only from the last-named that even the dies could be salvaged.

80. Even before this date the supply of crank-shafts was not easy and the destruction of these plants made the position so desperate that the Germans were obliged to put in store several thousand D.B. 605 engines which were complete except for the crank-shafts. At this time the Germans made strenuous efforts to obtain un-machined crank-shaft forgings from Italy and their position had become so desperate that they were offering to exchange one complete D.B. 605 engine for two un-machined forgings. Other steps were taken to overcome the shortage but, even at the beginning of September 1943, the stock of D.B. 605 engines awaiting crank-shafts still amounted to several hundred.

/PART IV

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

80. He stated that the German High Command was very much aware of the inherent vulnerability of the present German production system. Furthermore it should be noted distinctly clear to the German High Command that their aircraft industry was being attacked systematically and that the attack was carefully planned on a basis of a thorough knowledge of the way the industry was organized.

81. In this way the Germans would be forced to consider and eventually to revert to the old system - a reversion which would cause an enormous drop in production due to the period of complete shutdown and disorganization which would ensue and to the impossibility of continuing to employ the efficient production methods which are the advantage of their present system.

82. Up to the time of informant's departure from Germany, official circles were actively congratulating themselves that the Allies were not following any strategic plan in their attacks on aircraft factories. Had this been the case, then the raids on Regensburg and Trier/Neustadt would have been followed by a raid on the third No.109 assembly plant - Leipzig.

83. The first essential for any attack on the German aircraft industry was, in informant's opinion, to cripple fighter production as this was the branch of the industry which the Germans themselves considered to be vital. It was greatly necessary to check the growth of the German fighter force or attack in other branches of German industry would become very much more easily than at present - especially by day.

84. As the No.109 G was the fighter produced in the largest numbers, he recommended that the production of this type should be the first to receive attention. He accordingly suggested that the offensive should be started by raids on the three No. 109 Aussenwerke, Leipzig, Regensburg and Trier/Neustadt.

85. He emphasized very strongly that the attacks should be synchronized to take place within the shortest possible time, say not more than two weeks between all three, thus denying to the Germans the possibility of switching their labour from bombed to un-bombed factories. It would also demonstrate forcefully to the German High Command that we meant business.

86. Naturally the same type of plant should be attacked in each Aussenwerk and informant suggested the following factories as being the most vulnerable; his reason for this choice was that in the German aircraft industry the work on fuselages is the most complicated and these factories contain the largest number of jigs and machine-tools.

87. As air-frame construction has always been one of the lightest of the production problems informant strongly recommended attacking aero-engine production as well, and particularly the works producing the D.B. 605 of which there was a current shortage. He accordingly suggested that the D.B. factory at Genshagen was the best target as this was the pilot works for the D.B. 605 and by far the largest producer of this type of engine. He advised that Flugzeugwerk Ostwerk should be left in peace for another two or three months and held when it had time to help for its real work - the manufacture of the D.B. 605.

BRITISH SECRET
BYALLS UNITED STATES
SECRET.

20. As auxiliary targets for the attack on aero-engine production, informant proposed very strongly the claims of the two factories of Rudolf Diesel, one at Salzgitter and the other at Wernigerode. These two factories are, in informant's opinion, the most important producers of light alloy castings in Germany. The Wernigerode factory is producing a very large percentage of the crank-case castings for the D.B. 603 and a raid on the plant at this juncture would be doubly effective as it is at present engaged on the design of the chill-cast moulds for the D.B. 603 crank-cases.

21. Having thus dealt with the production of the Me.109 G, informant proposed to switch the attack to F.W. 190 production, again concentrating on the furthest factories as being the most complicated and therefore the most vulnerable. Here again he stressed the absolute necessity of tackling all the factories in rapid succession - if not simultaneously.

22. Satisfactorily to attack night-fighter production was a more difficult problem owing to the diversity of types employed and also because the production of these types was not in all cases so highly organized as in the case with the day-fighters. Indeed informant suggested that it might be well worth considering whether an attack on the production of Radar equipment might not prove more effective and less costly.

23. The actual targets for night-fighter production suggested by informant were Juchersleben to reduce Ju.88 production, the factories producing Me.110 fuselages, and similar plants of the Dornier concern. Equally worthy of consideration in this connection was the B.M.W. Werk II at Munich/Allach, as the destruction of this plant would also be of some assistance in the attack on F.W. 190 production.

24. In conclusion, informant remarked that, whereas the German people feared the night attacks, Hitler and the German High Command feared the daylight precision attacks on individual factories. Hitler openly boasted that he could, by means of his party organizations, control the morale of the population for some considerable time - certainly over the critical year 1944. The attacks on the aircraft industry, however, threatened to destroy the illusion of a happy 1944.

G. B. Simpson
S.B. SIMPSON, S/L
for Wing Commander.

A.S.I.(C)
H. B. W. K.

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SECRET

ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL AIR FORCE DEPARTMENT

Note: The chart attached to this Appendix is a reproduction from memory of the official R.L.M. chart of Organization.

GENERALLUFTWAFFENAMT
(General Feldmarschall Milch)

Development and production of all equipment required by the G.A.F. with the exception of the manufacture of Flak guns and Flak instruments and the development and production of certain signals equipment.

Note: The Generalluftwaffenamt is at the same time a Secretary of State (Staatssekretär) and signs important documents "Staatssekretär/Generalluftwaffenamt" (St-GL).

AMT FÜR DISZIPLIN UND PERSONAL

Discipline, postings, promotions etc., for all the engineer officers of the G.A.F. and also for all civilian officials of the Generalluftwaffenamt's Department both inside and outside the R.L.M.

GL/A - PLANUNGSAMT
(General Major von der Heyde)

Planning, in conjunction with other R.L.M. departments, of the G.A.F. production programs in relation to the productive capacity of the factories. Maintenance and expansion of factories, provision of machine tools, raw and semi-finished materials, and labour. Provision of building materials for works extensions. Liaison with Speer's organization on general economic questions.

GL/O - TECHNISCHES AMT
(General Major Vorwald)

Development and series production of all G.A.F. material except for Flak and certain signals equipment.

GL/Fl - AMT FÜR FLAK ENTWICKLUNG

Development of Flak guns, ammunition and instruments. This branch has sub-sections respectively responsible for guns, ammunition, Kommandogeräte and gun mountings. Reports direct to the Generalluftwaffenamt.

GL/B - NACHSCHUB AMT
(General Lörzing)

Responsible for the planned deliveries of G.A.F. material to Luftwaffe and to operational units. This branch has sub-sections responsible for aircraft, armaments, ground equipment, oil and fuel.

GL/W - WIRTSCHAFTS AMT
(Ministerialdirektor Geyka)

Policy on all economic questions connected with production of G.A.F. equipment.

/SUB-SECTIONS OF GL/A

British Airways
Main Office London

DIRECTIONS OF G/A.

G/A - Dr. AUGUSTE F. VON (Gen. Ing. Ballerha). All questions connected with planning and production control.

G/A - Dr. J. HAHN. Questions of policy and planning connected with all the aircraft factories.

G/A - Dr. 2. WERK FORTITUNG. Planning the provision of machine tools and building materials to factories.

G/A - Dr. 3. ROHSTOFFE (Oberstabs Ing. Richter). Planning the distribution of raw materials and semi-finished products to the aircraft industry.

G/A - Dr. 4. WERKSTÄTTE. Planning the distribution of labour throughout the aircraft industry.

G/A - Dr. 5. KRAFTSTOFFE (Oberstabs Ing. Richter). Production and distribution of fuel and lubricants.

G/A - Dr. 6. WERKSTÄTTE. Economic and security planning on all questions connected with the development and series production of G.A.P. material.

G/A - Dr. 7. WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG. All questions of economic development.

G/A - Dr. 8) Unknown.
G/A - Dr. 9)

G/A - Dr. 4. AGENS (Oberst. Gumbach). Organisation of Werkchats guards and "agents provocateurs" in factories.

G/A - Dr. 10. WELTWEITE SAMMELUNGS-ABTEILUNG (Oberst. Ing. Schmidt). (Also under G.A.P. I.O.) Collection and collation of intelligence concerning the equipment of all Air Forces throughout the world. Technical and technical-tactical comparisons between German and enemy material.

G/A - Dr. 11. HAUPTSTÄBTE FÜR SONDERUMSTÄNDLICHKEITEN. Responsible for unworking bottle necks and the solution of particularly vital and urgent problems of a technical or organisational nature which arise from unforeseen circumstances.

G/A - Dr. 12. HAUPTSTÄBTE FÜR VERBINDUNGSSTELLEN. Organisation and general activities of the G.A. - Verbindungsstellen (correspondents) abroad in occupied territories, allies, neutrals etc. These offices are responsible under R.F.V. for the general execution of the orders of the Generalstab in connection with purchases abroad and the organization of the aircraft industry in occupied countries.

DIRECTIONS OF G/C.

G/C - Dr. 1. FORSCHUNG (Oberst in Generalstab Pasewald). Co-ordinating the activities of the research sections of the individual manufacturers, the G.A.P. research statistics and the research institutions.

G/C - Dr. 2. LUFTZUG (Oberst Ing. Brühl). Air-frame design and development.

G/C - Dr. 3. MOTOREN (Gen. Ing. Kerschbaum). Aero-engine design and development.

G/C - Dr. 4. INSTRUMENTE. Instrument design and development.

G/C - Dr. 5. WERKZEUGE. Tool equipment design and development. Liaison with the G.A.P. and the manufacturing industry.

G/C - Dr. 6. WERKZEUGE (Oberst Ing. Brühl). Aircraft instrument design and development.

- 3 -




British Secret Service
United States Bureau

- GI/CE. 7 BOMBEN (Gen. Ing. Marquart). Bomb design and development.
- GI/CE. 8 INSTRUMENTE. Design and development of ground installations.
- GI/CE. 9 UNKNOWN.
- GI/CE. 10 MATERIALIEN (Oberstabs. Ing. Leyenwetter). Research and testing of all materials used by the G.n.F.
- ERPROBUNGSTELLEN (Oberst Petersen). Technical and flying tests on all prototypes. Reports direct to GI/C.
- WISSENSCHAFTLICHE BESCHAFFUNG (Gen. Ing. Heide). All technical problems connected with series production and repair of the selected prototypes.
- GI/CE. 1 FRONTREPARATUR. Organization of Frontreparaturbetriebe.
- GI/CE. 2 ZELLEN (Oberst. Ing. Albers). Air-frame production.
- GI/CE. 3 MOTOREN (Gen. Ing. Mahke). Aero-engine production.
- GI/CE. 4. The remainder of the sub-sections of GI/CE follow the lines of the sub-sections of GI/CE but concentrate on the production aspect. Oberst Ing. Haase is head of GI/CE.6 (Armaments).
- GI/C - Fa. VERLEBUNG. Examination of the methods used for the series production of new equipment with a view to the rational employment of raw materials and machine tools. The issue of Directifs thereon.
- GI/C - LT. GRUPPE LUFTTORPEDO. Development and series production of aircraft torpedoes and the corresponding equipment in aircraft.
- GI/C - BA. BAUAUFSICHT. Organization and direction of the technical quality control throughout the aircraft industry. Examination of standard specifications. Organization of apprentices schools, laying down the courses and providing materials.

SUBSECTIONS OF GI/F.

- GI/F. 1 VERTRAGGE UND ANLAGEANLIEGEN (Ministerialdirektor Müller). The execution of contracts between German and foreign firms for the sale or purchase of material for aircraft production.
- GI/F. 2. FINANZLEISTUNGS- UND KONTROLLE. Financial inspection and control of all factories.
- GI/F. 3. FINANZLEISTUNGS- UND KONTROLLE. All questions of finance vis-à-vis the aircraft industry.
- GI/F. 4. PATENT. Responsible for all questions concerning patents.

APPENDIX I



Gezeichnet in der B.T.D.
 Dresden
 200.1953.

FORSCHUNGS- UND
SEKRETARIAT
COMANT INM. DR. LOEGER

GL

Wissenschaften Amt

| GL/FL - BESCHAFFUNG | |
|---------------------|---------|
| 1 | |
| 2 | ZELLEN |
| 3 | MOTOREN |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |

| GL/FL | PLAN ENTWICKLUNG |
|-------|------------------|
| 1 | FERTIGUNG |
| 2 | LUFT TORPEDO |
| 3 | TRAGFLUGGERÄTE |

| GL/FL | PLAN ENTWICKLUNG |
|-------|------------------|
| 1 | GESCHÜTZE |
| 2 | MUNITION |
| 3 | KOMMANDOGERÄTE |
| 4 | GESTELLE |

| GL/E | NACHSCHUB AMT |
|------|-------------------------|
| 1 | FLUGZEUGE |
| 2 | AUSRÜSTUNG |
| 3 | BODENGERÄTE |
| 4 | Schicht- u. Brennstoffe |
| 5 | u. a. v. |

| GL | WIRTSCHAFTS AMT |
|----|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | PERSONAL u. AUSLÄNDER-VERHÄLTNISSEN |
| 2 | IMPORTE u. KONTRAKTE |
| 3 | FINANZBEREICH |
| 4 | PATENTE |

GL

WISSENSCHAFTEN AMT

~~British Security Council~~
~~United States Secret~~

APPENDIX II.

1. OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT.

Under the direction of the Führer as C-in-C. of the Armed Forces, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht decides the general policy of German armament production and decrees the various priorities between different types of equipment.

2. REICHSMINISTERIUM FÜR BEWAFFNUNG UND MUNITION.

Reichsminister Speer's organization is responsible to the Führer for the production of various semi-finished materials and of machine tools for the whole armament industry. It also undertakes the production of military weapons and of ammunition.

3. REICHSMARSHALL GÖRING, REICHSMINISTER DER LUFTFAHRT UND OBERKOMMANDANT DER LUFTWAFFE.

Reichsmarschall Goering, Reichsminister der Luftfahrt and Oberkommandant der Luftwaffe, is responsible to the Führer for the execution of the general strategical plans of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht for the production of all weapons for air warfare from the semi-finished materials provided by Speer's organization. Goering is of course also responsible to the Führer for the general conduct of the air war in all its aspects except for civil air defence which has been passed over to the S.S.

4. GENERALFELDMARSHALL MILCH, REICHSMINISTER DER LUFTFAHRT UND OBERKOMMANDANT DER LUFTWAFFE.

Generalfeldmarschall Milch is responsible to Goering for the entire development and series production of all material for air warfare except for the production of Flak and certain signals equipment.

5. RÜSTUNGSRAT.

The Rüstungsrat, under the presidency of Speer, consists of Milch representing the G.A.F. and an Admiral and a General representing the other two Services. It is responsible for the general armament programme as laid down by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and for the allocation of semi-finished materials and machine tools into the various factories working for the different services.

6. INDUSTRIERAT DES REICHSMARSHALLS.

Under the Presidency of Milch, the Industrierat des Reichsmarschalls formulates, on behalf of the Generalluftzeugmeister, the necessary technical and organizational proposals for the establishment of the air production plan. It is also responsible to Goering for the practical execution of the series production programs.

7. ORGANISATION DER RINGE.

The Organisation der Ringe für die Herstellung von Halbsaugen und Werkzeugmaschinen is responsible to Speer's organization for the production of all semi-finished materials and machine tools for the entire German armament programme. All manufacturers of a particular type of semi-finished product are grouped together into a ring under a Ringführer (11). As a close liaison between the rings and the consuming industries is necessary, special liaison engineers are attached to the Industrierat (6).

/8. ANFORDERUNG PLANUNG (G1/8)

- 2 -

British Secret Service
United States Secret

8. ANSCHEFFE PLANUNG (GL/A)

This subsection of the Generalluftzeugmeister's Department is fully described in Appendix I. It is responsible to Milch for all the aspects of the planning for the air production programs.

9. HAUPTAUSSCHUSSELEITER.

The three Hauptauschusseleiter, Ing. Dts. Fridtag (Airframes), Messner (Aero-engines) and Heyve (Equipment) are responsible to Milch for the treatment and organizational execution of the production programs. They work very closely with the production section of the Generalluftzeugmeister's Department (GL/CB).

10. ANSCHEFFE BESCHAFFUNG (GL/CB).

This section of the Generalluftzeugmeister's Department is fully described in Appendix I. It is responsible to Milch for all aspects of the production programs and for the proper working of the individual Sonderauschüsse (12).

11. RINGFÜHRER.

Each Ringführer is responsible to Speer's organization for the entire German production of one particular type of semi-finished material.

12. SONDERAUSSCHUSS.

All factories in Germany working on a particular type of airframe or aero-engine are grouped into a Sonderausschuss under a Sonderauschusseleiter who is the man responsible to the respective Hauptauschusseleiter for the entire production of that particular type.

13. AUSSCHUSS.

The airframe, engine and equipment final assembly plants have the various component factories (Fachauschüsse) grouped geographically around them and the Ausschusseleiter is responsible to the corresponding Sonderauschusseleiter.

14. BAU AUFSICHT DES LUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS.

In every factory the quality control is effected by the Bau Aufsicht des Luftfahrtministeriums organization, the officials of which are directly under GL/C-BA (see Appendix I).

REICHSMINISTER
 O. K. V.
 MINISTER
 BEFELSHABER
 KEMMERTH
 ... M ... (1933)

REICHSMINISTER FÜR ERNÄHRUNG
 UND RICHTUNG
 (SPERR)

RÜSTUNGSRAT
 (PRESIDENT SPERR)

| | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| GENERAL-FELD-MARSCHAL MILCH | GENERAL-MAJOR MEER ? | ADMIRAL ? MARINE |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------|

STABSEKRETÄR DER LEITUNG
 GENERALSTABSEKRETÄR
 St/QL

ORGANISATION
 DER ARBEIT
 FÜR DIE
 HERSTELLUNG
 VON
 HALBZEUGEN
 UND WERK-
 ZEUGMASCHINEN

GL
 C R E F

G/B
 G/BAL

HALBZEUGE
 FÜR
 LUFTWAFFE

HALBZEUGE
 FÜR
 MEERESFL.

HALBZEUGE
 FÜR
 PANZERTRUPPEN

SYSTEME ALLEGERIA...
 ...
 ...
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UND
 SO
 WEITER

E - INDUSTRIE
 ...
 ...
 ...

O. R. W.

REICHSMINISTER DER LUFT-
UND FLEGERWESEN
(REICHSMARSCHALL GÖTTLICH)
R. L. M. und (L. F. W.)

STAATSEKRETÄR DER LUFT-
UND FLEGERWESEN
St/QL

INDUSTRIERAT
DES REICHSMARSCHALLS
(PRESIDENT MILCH)

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| HAUPTAUS- SCHUSS ZELLEN | HAUPTAUS- SCHUSS FLUGMOTOREN | HAUPTAUS- SCHUSS GERÄTE | VERBIN- DUNGSS- Mittel |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|

GL

| | | | | |
|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| A | C | D | E | F |
| PLANNING | BEWAHRUNG | BEWAHRUNG | BEWAHRUNG | BEWAHRUNG |
| GL/ATL | GL/CB | GL/AL | GL/AL | GL/AL |

ZELLEN INDUSTRIE

| | |
|------------------------|---------------|
| SONDERAUSSCHUSS ME 109 | UND SO WEITER |
|------------------------|---------------|

FLUGMOTOREN INDUSTRIE

| | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| SONDERAUSSCHUSS IIR 109 | UND SO WEITER |
|-------------------------|---------------|

GERÄTE - INDUSTRIE

| | |
|------------------------|---------------|
| SONDERAUSSCHUSS ME 109 | UND SO WEITER |
|------------------------|---------------|

ABSCHEIDUNG LAUFZEIT

ABSCHEIDUNG WENNIGER LAUFZEIT

Aviation 13654
x Parlow
x Lencovsk

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 21 February 1944

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Attached cable (State Dept.) to Am Embassy Moscow Feb. 15, 1944

1. You will note the probability of British-American-Canadian-Soviet Russia talks on post-war civil aviation.
2. I am sure that you will agree that the importance of the subject is very great.
3. I feel sure, that beginning now, OSS through SI Branch could make a contribution to this subject, set up modest (and unannounced) facilities for following this matter by our own means.
4. To give value and direction to such an effort on our part we should have a man (a) in touch with our government people who are working on the problem (b) who would also, under cover of normal duties, be present throughout at any such conferences as this cable suggests.
5. If you will clear with Stettinius, I will find the suitable man.

WH
JAN 21 1944

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Copy 5

SECRET

UTM

February 19, 1944

February 15, 1944

Civil aviation conversations

OS 6 20770

American Embassy

Moscow

We have received requests from the British and Canadian Governments to begin talks with them on civil aviation for the post-war period. The Department agreed but stated that Soviet Russia should be informed. Probably broad questions of policy will be given consideration. These would include such topics as the extent to which commercial air traffic shall be available, freedom of transit with refueling and overland rights, etc. If it seems feasible we might follow this with a meeting of representatives of all the United Nations later in the course of 1944. It is not impossible that an organization might be formed for the handling of questions related to civil aviation.

If the Soviet Government is interested, we would favor having Soviet participation at an early stage in such discussions.

Mention the Canadian and British request to the Foreign Office in Moscow and inform the Department of the amount of interest which is shown. In about four weeks, conversations should open in Washington with the British and Canadians.

STANTON (Acting)
(100)

SECRET

Handwritten: 11 May 1944
CONFIDENTIAL

11 May 1944

COL Gregory, Raymond A.

SUBJECT: Extension of Period of Temporary Duty
TO : Commanding Officer, Hq. and Hq. Detachment

1. Reference your memorandum to Colonel Duxton on the above subject, dated 5 May 1944, requesting information as to time Subject enlisted man will be returned to his organization or whether or not his transfer to this organization might be effected.

2. The Secretariat has discussed your request with Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn, AD, who has informed us that the experimental work upon which Staff Sergeant Gregory is engaged will be completed on or about 10 June 1944 and that Sergeant Gregory should not be transferred to OSS but should be allowed to go along with the experiments when they are taken over by other agencies.

3. Request therefore that you obtain from appropriate authorities extension of period of temporary duty with OSS of Subject enlisted man, said period to terminate on or about 10 June 1944. At that date it is anticipated that this soldier will be returned to his organization.

For the Chief, Secretariat:

PETER P. FUGLIASE
Snd Lieut., ADG

1 Incl.
Incl 1. Correspondence re
S/Sgt Raymond A. Gregory

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13,426 F

Aircraft

HEADQUARTERS and HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 112, NORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

x Gregory R.
x Riedel

5 May 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel Buxton.

1. Attached hereto is letter pertaining to S/Sgt Raymond A. Gregory, 15096278, who reported to this organization for a 30 day period of temporary duty with your office on 8 Feb 44. Period of temporary duty was subsequently extended 90 days.

2. In order to comply with request of attached correspondence, request that this headquarters be furnished information as to time enlisted man will be returned to his organization or whether or not soldier's transfer to this organization might be effected.

For the Commanding Officer:

George B. Riggins
GEORGE B. RIGGIN,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant.

1 Incl.
Correspondence.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120004-7



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/19 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120004-7

CONFIDENTIAL

B. 4 2 4

awc
x. [unclear]
x. [unclear]
1 December 1944

Mr. L. M. Ream and Mr. M. I. McHugh
Executive Office

Your memorandum of 24 November to the Director on
Brodie Devices

The Director has instructed me to advise you
that he approves the additional amount to be expended in
connection with the Brodie Devices as stated in subject
memorandum.

F. J. Putzell Jr.
Lieutenant (j.g.), USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

GSS FORM 4001B

DATE 11/3/44

TO:

~~Mr. Board~~ General J. J. [unclear]

Board of Review has indicated that it does not believe this comes within its province since the basic agreement was made as a procurement matter not within its province.

JED.

OK
D

Office of the General Counsel

(42934)

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Classified
L. M. Ream
M. I. McHugh

24 November 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director
FROM: L. M. Ream and M. I. McHugh

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office under date of 12 September 1944, concerning Contract No. OSS-592 with All American Aviation, Incorporated, for eighteen (18) Brodie Devices. You will recall that an expenditure of approximately \$93,000.00 was authorized.

2. This office is now in receipt of a request from All American Aviation, Incorporated, for approval of an additional amount of \$8,938.97 occasioned by changes initiated and approved by either Lt. Brodie, Sgt. Gregory, or Major Keller, all military personnel assigned to the Office of Strategic Services. This office requested substantiation of this additional amount from the contractor, which substantiation was received in a letter dated 17 October 1944.

3. Briefly, a price increase of \$8,938.97, plus a few minor changes, is involved. The record shows that all changes concerned herein on the Brodie Arresting Device were made antecedent to the Air Corps's accepting responsibility for the technical supervision of production, testing, engineering, and redesigning of any part of the device. As stated, the changes were initiated and approved by either Lt. Brodie, Sgt. Gregory, or Major Keller, and since these changes were undertaken for the greater efficiency of the unit, your approval of the additional amount of approximately \$8,938.97 is requested.

4. Your attention is invited to the recommendation of Colonel Edward L. Bigelow, Deputy Director, SSO, of the expenditure involved.

L. M. Ream
L. M. REAM
Deputy Director
Administrative Services

M. I. McHugh
M. I. McHUGH
Chief
Procurement and Supply Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 October 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn,
OSS Air Officer

From: Deputy Director - SSO

Subject: Brodie Device

1. OSS interest in this device is based on its usefulness in the Far East Theatres, and Colonel Coughlin has requested that several units be furnished to him for use in CBI by OSS and by General Stilwell.

2. I understand that the device has now been turned over to the Air Corps for further development pursuant to letter dated 27 September from W. J. McHugh, Acting Chief of the Procurement and Supply Branch, OSS, and that upon completion, nine units will be furnished to OSS.

3. Before units are sent to Colonel Coughlin they must be thoroughly tested, must be complete in every respect, and suitable personnel to operate and service them must be trained and ready.

4. Mr. McHugh's letter makes it clear that the Air Corps is to be responsible for perfecting and testing the equipment and for developing and testing methods of dropping it by parachute.

5. In addition, we must know whether the Air Corps will train our personnel in operation of the device, will instruct liaison pilots in its use, and will instruct mechanics in adapting planes for use with the device, or if not, what arrangements are being made to cover these three points.

6. Colonel Coughlin originally requested shipment of the Brodie device by 1 November. This has clearly become impossible. As I should advise him of current progress in development of this device, as well as training personnel in its use, may I have a reply to this memorandum and a monthly report thereon?

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Mr. Preston
Mr. Quinn

Mr. Quinn
Mr. Anderson, R&D
Mr. Quinn, R&D

Mr. McHugh
Lt. Anderson, R&D

Edward L. Bigelow
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - SSO

CONFIDENTIAL

18 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director

FROM: L. M. Ream and H. I. Mollugh

1. As a result of meetings held in your office and certain recommendations made to you by Lt. Col. Bigelow, a meeting was arranged with representatives of the Army Air Corps on 6 September 1944. The meeting was attended by Lt. Col. Quinn and Mr. Mollugh.

2. Lt. Col. Bigelow had originally proposed for your approval that contract OSS-592 with All-American Aviation, Inc., be immediately terminated, and all completed or uncompleted Brodie Devices turned over to the Air Corps for testing and redesign if necessary to complete the eighteen (18) devices. An understanding had been reached with the Air Corps that as compensation for their efforts and expense nine (9) sets would be retained by them and the other nine (9) sets delivered to OSS. It was understood that all of the work in connection with these devices would be undertaken and completed by the Air Corps with its own facilities at Wright Field and that no outside contractor would be necessary.

3. At the meeting referred to above, the Air Corps representatives (Major Sherin, Major Johnston, and Captain Webb) advised that due to the lack of sufficient manpower, the Air Corps would not be able to undertake the work of actually producing the Brodie Device. In view of these circumstances, it was first suggested that the OSS cancel its contract and that the Air Corps negotiate a new contract for the same work with All-American Aviation, Inc.; however, the principal objection to this course of action was the fact that it would require several weeks for the Air Corps to negotiate such a contract. In view of this time-consuming procedure, it was suggested by Lt. Col. Quinn and Mr. Mollugh that the Air Corps take over the administration of the OSS contract, including all testing, engineering, redesigning, etc. This was agreed upon by all present, and the following conclusions were reached as being necessary to the successful completion of this project. All these conclusions have been discussed and approved by Lt. Col. Bigelow and Lt. Col. Quinn.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
September 1944

Director

1. OSS will continue its All-American contract.
2. The Air Corps will immediately accept responsibility for the technical supervision of production, testing, engineering, and redesigning of any part of the device as may be necessary. The OSS contract with All-Americans will be amended so to provide.
3. The Air Corps will develop a means of dropping the completed Brodie Device by parachute, and information resulting from tests in connection with this work will be made available to OSS.
4. The OSS will bear the expense of the completion of the All-American contract to the extent of \$65,000.00 (approximately), which sum includes all obligations as sets.
5. The OSS contract with Maryland Engineering Co. for additional equipment required in the Brodie project (in the sum of \$135,000.00), which is substantially completed, will be continued to its present termination date and remain in full force and effect. Upon completion the equipment will be tested by the Air Corps and will be used in connection with the devices developed under the All-American contract.
6. The OSS will transfer to the Air Corps nine (9) complete sets upon completion of the project, without reimbursement, in consideration for the services rendered by the Air Corps, and will retain nine (9) sets for its own purposes.

Your approval of this method of handling the project is requested.

E. H. Ream
Deputy Director
Administrative Services

E. J. Madigan
Acting Chief
Procurement and Supply Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Director

- 8 -

12 September 1944

I concur. I further propose that the Instruction Manual prepared by OSS Presentation Branch be finally revised after completion of the project and then be turned over to the Air Corps, with OSS retaining such copies as it may need for its purposes.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 August 1944

Jels

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Charles S. Cheston
 Acting Director

FROM: Deputy Director - SSO

SUBJECT: Brodie Device

1. The Brodie Device is a piece of equipment designed to permit the landing and launching of light planes from a cable suspended from four poles. It was first offered for evaluation to OSS by Lt. Col. Quinn, who felt that such a rig would be suitable for and helpful to our operations. Requirement for 18 sets of this equipment was made by Col. Elfler.

2. In order that the facts as to the present status of this device be assembled, a meeting was held in this office on 28 August 1944, at which were present:

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| From SO | - Lt. Duggan Major Prasnjak Lt. Reardon Mr. Dewey Sgt. Donovan |
| From R&D | - Mr. Stone Major Byrnes |
| From Procurement & Supply | - Mr. McHugh |
| Air Officer, OSS | - Lt. Col. Quinn |

The Brodie Device, as set up at Fort Belvoir, was constructed of 50' poles, whereas the poles for sets now

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SECRETTo: Mr. Charles S. ChestonPage Two

procured are 65 feet. The brakes installed in the device, as set up at Fort Belvoir, have been re-designed and the new brake is now in process of manufacture. It is expected that a model for testing will be available within the next two weeks. Nineteen sets have been procured and are now in the warehouse complete, except for the new brake and trolleys being manufactured by All American Aviation. In order to gain a picture of the possible delivery of sets in the field, an estimated schedule is here set forth:

| | | |
|---|---|-----------------------|
| Procurement of brake drums | - | 10 September |
| Testing of same | - | 17 September |
| Procurement of drums if satisfactory during testing | - | 15 October |
| Erection and testing of each set | - | 1 November |
| Shipment to Calcutta | - | 10 November |
| Arrival in Theatre | - | 1 February to 1 April |

This schedule is subject to possible delays due to various factors and should be regarded as a minimum.

4. It should be pointed out that the device with 65' poles has not as yet been tested and also that the new braking device has not been tested. It should further be pointed out that contemplated use of the device in the field requires that it be dropped from C-47s. The problem of dropping material of this character presents many difficulties. The dropping of supplies from a B-17 in which the supplies are packed in containers dropped from the bomb bays by use of bomb sights is a more accurate procedure than pushing packages of various sizes and weights from the door of a C-47. Under the latter procedure it would be well nigh impossible to avoid loss of some packages due to inaccurate dropping and wind drift. There is some question as to whether the trolley cable, which weighs 1600 pounds, can be fitted with chutes which will retard the drop, and there is also serious question as to whether this cable can be gotten out the door. Should it be dropped free, it would likely become embedded to such an extent that the ground crew would have extreme difficulty in recovering it. It is estimated that four C-47s would be required to drop one unit and each plane would make several runs over the target in order to discharge all the packages. Some would undoubtedly be lost and others damaged. Should the drop be made in wooded areas, security of the installation might well be compromised if a number of the chutes became entangled in high trees.

5. It has been claimed that the device can be erected in times varying from 21 to 40 hours by a crew of 9 men. A group

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To: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

Page Three

of officers and men from SO spent two days working with this device and from this experience estimated that a very much longer time would be required, possibly running up to several weeks.

6. It is agreed by those present that this device is still in its development stage and that if OSS is to continue sponsoring the project, a Project Director must be obtained, whose duty it will be to complete the development and to make all the tests. At the present time there does not appear to be in OSS an appropriate candidate for this position. Lieutenant Brodie, who invented the equipment and carried on the development work, has now been transferred to the Air Corps, and it is doubtful whether his services could be obtained to complete the development and tests.

7. Colonel Quinn stated that the Air Corps are initiating procurement of 22 sets for use by the Ground Forces, and that the Air Corps would undoubtedly be glad to take over the project. Since the Air Corps has facilities for experimenting with the dropping of this device and training pilots, which facilities are not available to OSS, it is suggested that serious consideration be given to exploring the possibility of transferring the Brodie Device to the Air Corps. In so doing, OSS might be able to make arrangements to procure the 19 sets now partially available when the device has been passed by AAF, provided that at that time we have a constructive use for them.

8. Of the 19 sets now ~~in the warehouse~~ ^{at All American and Maryland Engineering Co.,} 6 are reserved for IOI and the balance for General Stilwell. When Colonel Quinn was here recently, he stated that sets for Stilwell were to reach the Theatre by 31 October 1944. It is reported by Colonel Piffers that the original conversations regarding the Brodie device were held by General Donovan and General Leather. It is understood that OSS would supply the trained crew to erect the sets and further that information was given that the device could be dropped from the air. In view of the present status of the development and testing of this device, it seems desirable to advise Colonel Coughlin of the delay which must be expected, regardless of whether OSS continues to sponsor the project or the device is turned over to the Air Corps.

SECRET

Quest of equipment and Maryland Eng. Co. Army States and Army (Apt) at All American

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To: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

Page Four

9. To summarize: There are two courses of action, either

- (a) OSS continue development of Brodie Device to satisfactory completion including all tests and drops from C-47, or
- (b) OSS turn entire project over to Army Air Forces reserving if possible the right to obtain sets if needed when the device is operational.

Edward L. Bigelow
 Edward L. Bigelow
 Lt. Colonel, AUS
 Deputy Director - 330

*OSS will consult with Air Corps
 to work out joint arrangement
 to continue development*

*csc
 17 4/51*

SECRET

18 February 1944

SUBJECT: Request for Temporary Service of Staff Sgt. H. A. Gregory (A.C.)

TO: Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D.C.

THRU: channels

1. It is hereby respectfully requested that the assignment of S/Sgt. H. A. Gregory (A.C.) for temporary duty with this organization in Washington be extended for a period of thirty days beginning on or about 18 February in connection with special experiments on landing equipment installed on L-5 airplane.

O. G. Deering, Jr.
Lieut. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

Air mail 13:420
K. Quinn
X. Brink

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 16 Feb. 1944

TO: Ensign Futzell
FROM: Colonel Quinn
SUBJECT:

24.
16 FEB 16 PM 4 47

Suggest that letter be submitted to Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D.C., requesting that Staff Sgt. R. A. Gregory's (A.C.) temporary duty in Washington be extended for a period of 30 days on or about 18 February, in connection with the special experiments on landing equipment installed on L-5 airplane, also now at Bolling Field.

Robert S. Quinn
Robert S. Quinn
Lt. Col., A. C.

[Handwritten mark]

065 Form 103

Date 14 Feb 46

To: Lt. Col. R. G. Galt

The attached is forwarded to you for appropriate action.

Please advise this office at your early convenience of your recommendations in connection with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum.

20
E. J. Tuttle, Lt.,
Asst. Exec. Dir.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

CONFIDENTIAL

STAFF SGT. Gregory, R. A. (Mal) 1st Ind.
AAP, OCT, Washington. 11 February 1944.

To: The Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.
ATTENTION: Lt. Col. Doering Jr.

1. Staff Sgt. R. A. Gregory, Air Corps, and L-5 airplane are at Bolling Field, D. C. for such use as it is desirable to be made by your agency.
2. Since the action was taken by this office at your request, it is desired that you initiate any further action, administrative or otherwise, as may appear desirable and necessary under the circumstances.
3. If continuous services of this soldier is desired, it is believed that he should be transferred to one of your installations with the consent of the Commanding General, AAP, as he is loaned to the Transportation Corps for experimental purposes only.

For the Chief of Transportation:

A. KOJASSAR,
Lieutenant Colonel, TC,
Chief, Military Personnel Division.

11 Feb 44

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CONFIDENTIAL

27 January 1944

Colonel Suxton

Executive Officer

Bredie Method of Launching and Landing Airplanes

1. Attached is Colonel Richards' recommendation that funds be provided to install a working model of this device.

2. Paragraph 4 of Colonel Quinn's report to Colonel Richards, dated 25 January 1944, also attached, estimates the cost of the above at \$6,000. In discussing this figure with Colonel Quinn, he advises me that it did not include certain items of equipment which it was believed that Lt. Bredie would be able to provide us on a loan basis. In order to have reasonable assurance that the amount authorized will actually provide a working model, Colonel Quinn now recommends that the sum of \$16,000 be authorized. I concur in this recommendation.

O. C. D., Jr.

APPROVED:

S. G. [Signature]
O. Edward Suxton
Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1944

BRODIE LAUNCHING AND LANDING SYSTEM FOR AIRPLANES ON
A CABLE SUSPENDED FROM GROUND TOWERS

865

The following is a brief summary of events to date, regarding action taken on procuring and demonstrating the Brodie system.

On 24 January 1944, a film was shown at staff meeting and again later in the day for other personnel, covering the Brodie system for launching and landing aircraft from a cable suspended between booms over the side of a cargo vessel. Lt. James H. Brodie, Water Transportation Division, Quartermaster, Port of Embarkation, New Orleans, Louisiana, originator and designer of this equipment, was present at the showing and made explanatory remarks and answered questions regarding this equipment and its use.

Colonel Carl Eifler was present at the second showing and upon being informed that such a system could be designed for land use, with the mast in portable sections capable of being dropped from an aircraft and erected by a small number of personnel parachuted in with the equipment, expressed a keen interest in this equipment and requested that the airplane with special landing gear attachment be brought to Washington by Sgt. Gregory (pilot during tests of this equipment on the cargo vessel) so that Colonel Eifler might inspect this equipment and talk with the pilot. Colonel Eifler expressed definite interest in the immediate procurement of all sets for erection in FETO.

Lt. Colonel C. C. Doering, Jr., Executive Officer, OSS, initiated a request to the Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D.C., requesting that Sgt. Gregory bring the airplane to Washington (see Enclosure #1). Sgt. Gregory arrived at Bolling Field with the airplane Thursday afternoon, 27 January 1944. Colonel Eifler, Lt. Fisher, Mr. [redacted] and Colonel Quinn inspected the airplane with Sgt. Gregory on 1 February 1944.

On Friday, 28 January, Colonel Quinn and Lt. Brodie proceeded to All American Aviation at Wilmington, Delaware, to interest the engineering staff of All American in assisting in the design and engineering work necessary to accomplish a portable mast of light, standard aluminum angles. After discussion with the engineering staff, a suggestion was offered that masts suitable for our purposes might be obtained from Maryland Engineering Company of Pikesville, Maryland, without the delay required to design and procure the aluminum angles.

Maryland Engineering Company officials were contacted by telephone and expressed an opinion that they might have a product which would suit our particular requirements. Colonel Quinn and Lt. Brodie proceeded to

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-
CONFIDENTIAL

Pikesville, Maryland, and contacted the engineering branch of the Maryland Engineering Company who demonstrated some of their equipment to us. Lt. Brodie, after talking with these engineers, was sufficiently convinced that their masts would meet our requirements. Engineering details on rig of the equipment and various other factors were gone into at that time. In order to enable Maryland Engineering Company engineers to sufficiently appreciate the problems to be met, they were taken into confidence and explained what the masts were to be used for.

Authorization of \$10,000 was made by Colonel Buxton for the working model of this equipment (see Enclosure #2).

Maryland Engineering Company is proceeding with the fabrication of the first set of four masts required for the test model from 8" hexagonal plywood masts now on hand, on Colonel Quinn's verbal assurance that a contract would be forthcoming without delay for the first test model plus six sets made up of the 8" tubular mast section. Such verbal assurance, while given in good faith, was obviously grossly in error as evidenced by the time lost in red tape and failure of an order to be submitted pending drawing up and approval of a project.

It is expected that the first set, complete with accessories, will be available by 15 February. It was requested of Maryland Engineering that they notify us when the complete set was ready for shipment and OSS would dispatch a truck to Pikesville, Maryland, a distance of approximately 45 miles, to pick up this equipment and transport it to OSS.

Lt. Brodie departed Monday, 31 January, per his orders ordering him to Washington and return to New Orleans via Wright Field. It is expected that Lt. Brodie will return by 7 February. Lt. Colonel O. C. Doering, Jr., initiated request to the Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D.C., requesting Lt. Brodie be placed on temporary duty with the Office of Strategic Services for a period of 10 days, on or about 1 February 1944, to assist in the erection of this equipment (see Enclosure #3).

The following suggestions are offered in following this project to a successful conclusion:

1. An area for the erection and test of this equipment be designated (area should be level and at least 2000' x 750') for the initial test, later equipment to be set up in typical terrain.
2. A crew of approximately six be placed at Lt. Brodie's disposal after arrival of the equipment (prefer men with some rigging experience) to assist in the erection of this equipment. Maryland Engineering will send a rigger down to help set up the equipment if requested.
3. The pilot, Sgt. Gregory, and the specially equipped L-5 airplanes are at Bolling Field and will be available for the initial tests and

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construction of this equipment. Upon satisfactory completion of this working model, key erecting personnel should be trained here and processed to the area in which the equipment is to be used to further train crews in that area on the erection of this equipment.

A pilot should be trained in the proper use and technique of this equipment and likewise dispatched to the area in which the equipment will be used to train pilots already in that area. (Suggest Sgt. Gregory be approached with a view to transferring to OSS to accomplish this mission.)

The special arresting hook mounted on top of the airplanes will have to be designed to fit each different type of aircraft in the theater to be used with this equipment.

The ultimate aim of this equipment and its use is to enable this equipment plus riggers to be parachuted from cargo airplanes over a pre-selected spot for erection of this equipment, equipment to be erected and made ready for an airplane to come in and land on within a matter of hours.

This equipment is suited for use in rugged terrain, behind enemy lines where suitable cleared and level spaces are not available for normal landing. This installation lends itself admirably to concealment as masts, supporting cables, and accessories can be camouflaged to blend in with terrain and no tall-tale tracks on the ground will disclose its location or the use to which the area is being put.

Army Ground Forces are interested in this type equipment. Upon satisfactory completion of the test, Army Ground Forces' representatives will be called in and offered the system. They are not being invited in on the initial detail work in an effort to shorten the time from conception to completion of the working model.

Robert S. Quinn
 ROBERT S. QUINN
 Lt. Col., A. C.
 OSS Air Officer

Distribution:

Colonel Burton ✓
 Colonel Richards
 Colonel Deering
 Colonel Davis
 Colonel Carter
 Lieut. Fisher
 Captain Allison

CONFIDENTIAL

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ENCLOSURE #1

26 January 1944

SUBJECT: Request for Temporary Service of
Staff Sgt. R. A. Gregory

TO: Chief of Transportation, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

THRU: Channels

1. It is requested that Sgt. R. A. Gregory, A.C., now assigned to the Transportation Corps on temporary duty at New Orleans Port of Embarkation, be brought to Washington for the purpose of conference and demonstration of the L-5 airplane with special landing equipment installed.

2. The equipment appears to be adaptable for use by this agency in operations which it is conducting in certain theaters. It is desirable that the demonstration be within the near future since there are presently in Washington officers of this command recently returned from the field, to whom the demonstration will be of particular interest.

O. C. Doering, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

CERTIFIED TO BE
A TRUE COPY:

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ENCLOSURE #2

To: Colonel Buxton
 From: Executive Officer
 Subject: Brodie Method of Launching and Landing Airplanes

27 January 1944

1. Attached is Colonel Richards' recommendation that funds be provided to install a working model of this device.

2. Paragraph 4 of Colonel Quinn's report to Colonel Richards, dated 25 January 1944, also attached, estimates the cost of the above at \$5,000. In discussing this figure with Colonel Quinn, he advises me that it did not include certain items of equipment which it was believed that Lt. Brodie would be able to provide us on a loan basis. In order to have reasonable assurance that the amount authorized will actually provide a working model, Colonel Quinn now recommends that the sum of \$10,000 be authorized. I concur in this recommendation.

/s/ O C D

O. C. D., Jr.

APPROVED:

/s/ G. EDWARD BUXTON

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

CERTIFIED TO BE
A TRUE COPY:

[Handwritten signature]

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED 02

27 January 1944

SUBJECT: Request for Temporary Service of
1st Lieut. James H. Brodie

TO: Chief of Transportation, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

THRU: Channels

1. It is requested that 1st Lieut.
James H. Brodie, Transportation Corps, New
Orleans Port of Debarkation, be placed on temporary
duty with the Office of Strategic Services for
a period of ten days beginning on or about 1
February 1944 for consultation and technical ad-
vice in connection with special landing equipment
to be installed on airplanes.

O. C. Dearing, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

CERTIFIED TO BE
A TRUE COPY:

[Handwritten signature]



CONFIDENTIAL

Col. Brodie

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington 25, D. C.

Aircraft 13, 426
x Jumi, Cal.
x Brodie Method

12 April 1944

TO: Officially Interested Parties

SUBJECT: Demonstration of Brodie Landing and Launching System for Light Liaison Type Aircraft on a Cable Suspended from Ground Masts (Entire System Portable and Droppable by Air)

1. You are invited to inspect the equipment and witness the landing and takeoff demonstration which will be held at Ebee Field, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, on 27 April 1944. (See enclosed map for finding landing field.) Takeoffs and landings will be made at two-hour intervals during the day on the even hour, 1000 through 1600.

2. Lt. James H. Brodie, the designer of the equipment, will be on hand to answer questions. All engineering specifications will be made available to interested branches and services.

3. In case non-flying weather prevails on the day of the test, the demonstration will be held on the following day.

ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Col., A. C.
Air Officer

file
↑


C O N F I D E N T I A L


Route Directions

Leave Washington via U.S. Highway No. 1 south through Alexandria, Va.

Continue past Ft. Belvoir main gates (20 miles from Wash.) Do not enter Ft. Belvoir proper.

Just past Ft. Belvoir turn right at Accotink (you'll overshoot this turn), keep left at first fork and continue on this road 3.2 miles to Ebee Field gate (left side of road). From there you will be directed to parking area.





Original 13 3100
CONFIDENTIAL

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.**

9/26/44
 26 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Personnel Pick-up System
TO: The Director's Office, OSS


1. On Saturday, 23 September 1944, the Tow Target Aerial Pick-up Department of Equipment Laboratory, Materiel and Services Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, performed two successful pick-ups of personnel from the ground by an aircraft in flight (C-64 Noorduyt Norseman). Further pick-ups will be completed using this type aircraft until a sufficient number of pick-ups have been compiled to justify a conclusion that the system is sound, practical, and only a minimum of risk is involved.
2. A C-47 is now being converted to perform this type of operation, and a series of pick-ups will be run with this type aircraft. This aircraft is in universal usage and has a large carrying capacity, long range, and is suited for this type of operation due to its low wing loading and relatively good zoom characteristics at low (120-130 mph) contact speeds. The only objection to this type of aircraft is its lack of defensive fire power and protective armor, if used over enemy territory.
3. Upon successful completion of the C-47 trials, a B-25 will be outfitted and checked out on this system.
4. The undersigned was not able to remain at Wright Field to witness the tests on 23 September 1944. However, while there I met a British Army Captain, one Lee-Warner, a paratrooper who has been working with Colonel Cochran's and General Wingate's airborne forces in Burma and who had been sent here to investigate and report on the system of personnel pick-up. Captain Lee-Warner was very interested and volunteered for the trial tests and pick-up. Some pressure was required to keep Captain Lee-Warner from being the first subject picked up, AAF trying to retain the integrity of the system as an AAF project. Captain Lee-Warner expressed an interest in the source of this equipment available for immediate overseas shipment to the CBI area.

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5. The thought is advanced that OSS should maintain its position as the organization originating the requirement for this type of equipment by selling the Theater Commander in the CBI on this system and having him request the aircraft with trained crew and equipment installed be shipped to that Theater for his command and OSS use. Motion pictures of the entire operation are being prepared by Wright Field. OSS will receive a copy of this film, and if copies of it are made and sent out to the field the problem of selling this system to the Theater Commanders will be vastly simplified.



ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
Air Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Quinn 13, 16, 21
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Charles S. Cheston

X PERSONAL FILE
DATE: 9 September 1944

FROM : Secretariat

X Wilson Jr

SUBJECT: Volunteers for Personnel Pick-up System

Major Riggin and Mr. Cooley have agreed to publicize this matter in Headquarters and Schools and Training and in SO and OG, respectively. These are believed to be the most likely sources of volunteers. Colonel Quinn advises that he has one volunteer and needs one or two more.

William H. Miley

William H. Miley
1st Lt. JAGD

OK
ese

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Gen. Craft 1949
~~RESTRICTED~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, OSS
FROM : Air Office
SUBJECT: Personnel Pick-up System

DATE: 1 September 1949

x Personnel Pick-up
x W. Lambert

The attached progress report of PPS (personnel pick-up system) is forwarded for your information.

The advantages to be gained by the simplification and safe operation of a system of this kind are readily apparent. This equipment will be highly useful as rescue equipment for personnel downed in isolated and remote areas where overland means of transportation are non-existent or will result in weeks of travel in unfriendly territory, or under unfavorable climatic conditions which may result in loss of personnel. The simplified pick-up system can be a very valuable weapon to OSS for removal of agents from enemy territory, etc. The Office of Strategic Services, through this office, has sponsored the refinement and simplification of this system which was first successfully demonstrated by Lt. Doster of OSS more than a year ago at Wright Field.

The system is now ready for final proving, namely the actual pick-up of personnel. Volunteers for this work are solicited. It is believed that the personnel who volunteer for this work should spend some time at Wright Field in an orientation and familiarization period with this system before actual trials are made. It is requested that personnel in your department be canvassed for volunteers for this work. Volunteers for this work, with approval of their department heads, are asked to contact the undersigned at extension 641.

Robert S. Quinn
ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Colonel, A. C.
OSS Air Officer

Attachment

RESTRICTED

11, 36

Address reply to ENVELOPE to:

RESTRICTED

Commanding General
 AAF Materiel Command
 Engineering Division
 Reference: Dept. 54-5 106780
 Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio

ARMY AIR FORCES
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE MATERIEL COMMAND

L. V. Larson
 vb Ext. 2-5214

WRIGHT FIELD, DAYTON, OHIO

29 April 1944

Subject: Progress on Personnel Pick-Up

To: Office of Strategic Services
 Room 106, North Building
 25th and East Street, N.W.
 Washington 25, D. C.
 Attention: Lt. Col. B. S. Quinn

1. Reference is made to Memorandum from your Office dated 16 August 1944 regarding the above subject.
2. The initial tests of the personnel pick-up installation are virtually complete. Three sheep pick-ups have been completed, and the system is considered to be ready for man trail tests and then actual man pick-up tests. Tests to date have been successful in 115 to 140 miles per hour speed range.
3. Work is in progress on a personnel pick-up installation for C-47A type aircraft and this installation will be delivered in September. The 130 to 160 miles per hour speed range will be investigated during tests of this installation. All experience to date indicates that higher speed pick-ups can be made successfully by addition of more nylon to loop and leader and by increasing the length of the drum line. However, engineering data that will be obtained from these tests may indicate changes to be made in Model 15B Unit to make it suitable for high speed operations necessary with such a system.
4. Contractual negotiations are under way with All American Aviation, Inc. to have them install a personnel pick-up system in B-25H and B-17F type aircraft. Revised proposal drawings have been received and approved. The B-25H installation will be made first.

For the Commanding General:

F. O. CARROLL,
 Brig. General, U.S.A.,
 Chief, Engineering Division.

RESTRICTED

MAY 4 1944

OSS Form 4001

OSS SECRETARTAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

| To | Name | Initials |
|----|--------------------|----------|
| | O. C. Doering, Jr. | |
| | C. A. Bane | |
| | J. B. Donovan | |
| | D. C. Lee | |
| | G. S. Platt | |
| | P. F. Pugliese | |
| | E. J. Putzell, Jr. | |
| | A. W. Sulloway | |
| | R. Thrun | |
| | Files | |

(23695)

(Handwritten signature and scribbles)

Aircraft 13 212
X ~~Procurement~~
SECRET
X ~~Procurement~~
X ~~Procurement~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Charles Cheston

FROM: Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn

SUBJECT: Procurement of All American Pick-Up Units

DATE: 12 January 1954

The following is suggested for consideration and recommendation:

1. The All American pick-up unit, which has been used by the duPont organization for their mail and cargo pick-up service for a period of over three years, has a direct application to OSS uses, and it is suggested that a minimum of four (4) Model 15-B pick-up units (capable of man pick-up) be procured for use by OSS organizations in the Theaters. These units to be installed in tactical aircraft, B-25, B-26, B-17, which are available in most Theaters of Operations. These units are to be used for cargo and dispatch pick-up from agents in enemy territory in either day or night operation. Future use of this equipment can be adapted to personnel pick-up after a training period on cargo and dispatch pick-ups and after further refinement for the man pick-up operation by Wright Field.
2. Procurement of this equipment, as advised by All American Aviation, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware, will take 120 days from receipt of order and priority for this equipment. During this time, the winch operators (key man in successful pick-up) to attend a training course given by All American on operation, maintenance, and installation of this equipment in various aircraft. These operators will be thoroughly trained when equipment is available and should be sent to the various Theaters with the equipment.
3. Miscellaneous Equipment Branch, Equipment Laboratory, Engineering Division, Materiel Command, Wright Field, suggests that procurement of this equipment be routed through their office as a means of consolidating various other agencies' requirements for this equipment and presenting the manufacturer with but one request for this type equipment.

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SECRET

4. Operation and installation information on this type equipment has been procured and mailed to the various OSS Theater Officers for their information in response to requests received from the Theater Officers in the field. Lt. H. H. Proctor, London, has expressed interest in this equipment and its uses. (See attached copy of his letter). Mr. Brennan, SI Italian Desk, has also expressed an interest in this equipment for use and operation in the Balkan area. (See attached copy of his memorandum).

Robert S. Quinn
Robert S. Quinn
Lt. Col., A. C.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

United States of America

American Embassy

London

20th December 1943

FROM: H. H. Proctor
TO: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson
SUBJECT: Mail Pick-up, night operation of
Attention: Lt. Col. Robert S. Quinn

1. For some years All American Aviation Company, DuPont Field, Wilmington, Delaware, has engaged in a regular air mail pick-up service.
2. If it were possible to perform a similar operation at night the value of the information which could be brought back from behind enemy lines would be very great.
3. The British are attempting to perfect this technique, and have gone far enough to indicate that such an operation is feasible. In general, they do it by putting a light at the top of each pole and putting another light at the same height 50 yards or so beyond the poles and in line with the left-hand pole. However, they are handicapped at the moment by lack of equipment.
4. The possible benefits from the perfecting of this operation are so great, and the time within which it may be needed is so short, that it is urged that an experimental project along these lines be initiated without delay in cooperation with the Army Air Forces.
5. It should be determined not only what technique is best for the actual pick-up, but also what types of airplanes now available in the European Theatre could best be adapted for this work. It is suggested that this matter be treated with the greatest secrecy.

/s/ H. HARRISON PROCTOR
Air Dispatch Officer

SECRET

To: Lt. Col. Robert Quinn,
Air Officer, OSS

10 December 1943

From: Earl Brennan

Subject: Request for Information re Plane Pick-Up

It is requested that you compile and transmit to our representatives listed below such information as is available concerning the technique and equipment required to enable moving planes to pick up small articles such as dispatches and small pieces of equipment at places in the field where actual landings are impossible and where other means of communication may not exist. It is our understanding that this has been done with considerable success on an experimental scale. The development of this technique and such facilities as may be required would be of the greatest possible value to certain missions which are operating in foreign territory under our jurisdiction, and we are, therefore, anxious that our overseas representatives be informed as fully as possible on this process.

The information should be forwarded to Mr. Vincent Scamporino, 2677th Headquarters Co., Experimental (Prov.), AFHQ, Algiers, Algeria, with copies to ourselves and to Mr. Harry T. Fultz, c/o Vincent Scamporino.

/s/ E. B.

SECRET

12 January 1964

Mr. Charles Cheston

Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn

Procurement of All American Pick-Up Units

The following is suggested for consideration and recommendation:

1. The All American pick-up unit, which has been used by the Dupont organization for their mail and cargo pick-up service for a period of over three years, has a direct application to OAS units, and it is suggested that a minimum of four (4) Model 15-B pick-up units (capable of man pick-up) be procured for use by OAS organizations in the Theaters. These units to be installed in tactical aircraft, B-25, B-26, B-17, which are available in most Theaters of Operations. These units are to be used for cargo and dispatch pick-up from agents in enemy territory in either day or night operation. Future use of this equipment can be adapted to personnel pick-up after a training period on cargo and dispatch pick-ups and after further refinement for the man pick-up operation by Wright Field.

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Lt. Col., A. C.

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