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ITALY

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[redacted]

[redacted] letter from
[redacted] to Chevalier was brought
[redacted] late. For the Record
[redacted] and he still has the
[redacted] translation.

Jean

[redacted]
Director's office

[redacted]
[redacted]

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Allegato n.1

LETTERA INVIATA DA HITLER A MUSSOLINI IL 28 OTTOBRE 1941

Quartier Generale del Führer
28 ottobre 1941

D U C E,

Vi scrivo questa lettera in un momento nel quale credo di poter assumere la responsabilità di dichiarare che la campagna all'Est non soltanto è vinta, ma è anche - in sostanza - definitivamente decisa.

Quando ho avuto il piacere di poter salutare Voi ed il Vostro seguito nel mio Quartier Generale Vi ho dato notizia delle operazioni pregiudicate e di quelle che si trovavano in preparazione. Il Comando del Gruppo di armate russe del Sud, non rendendosi assolutamente conto della situazione, ha atteso fino a che da parte nostra sono state realizzate le premesse per la chiusura del grande anello intorno a Kiew. Questa battaglia ha condotto ad un risultato che ha superato anche la mia stessa aspettativa. Parlavo di un numero di prigionieri da 300 a 500 mila; in realtà, alla chiusura delle ultime operazioni di rastrellamento, essi sono divenuti oltre 700 mila. Il successivo urto del Gruppo corazzato Kleist per la formazione della testa di ponte attorno a Kriwoj-Rog ha dato anche alle Vostre divisioni, Duce, la possibilità di effettuare per la prima volta una propria e, soprattutto, vittoriosa operazione nel quadro di una grande battaglia di annientamento.

Come ora previsto, l'attacco effettuato nel frattempo a Sud del Dnjepr contro la Crimea ha ottenuto, come una calamità, gli ultimi resti dell'8a Armata di Budjenny fra il Dnjepr e Melitopol alla coda di cadere in un momento di crisi la nostra 11 Armata con un attacco sui nostri collegamenti. Noi ci aspettavamo ciò. Il Gruppo corazzato Kleist, divenuto nuovamente libero dopo la costituzione della testa di ponte di Dnjeprepetrowsk aveva già dall'inizio l'ordine, in questa eventualità, di attaccare di sorpresa il tergo delle divisioni russe che premono fino al limite e di portarle ad una nuova resistenza in conseguenza

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non le truppe bolsceviche, rimaste ad ingaggiare operanti in corso.

Il risultato di questa battaglia di accerchiamento fu un nuovo annientamento di circa 13 divisioni sovietiche. L'operazione potè considerarsi compiuta all'alba dell'11 ottobre. La mia Guardia del Corpo, un'altra divisione S.S. nonchè due divisioni corazzate procedettero immediatamente il nemico nella direzione di Mosca.

Esse costituiscono la testa di forti formazioni che diventeranno prossimamente libere.

Il 2 ottobre è avvenuta la completa rottura del Gruppo di Armate di Timoscenko. E ciò in tre punti, in una larghezza di fronte di oltre 300 km. L'arma aerea, le forze corazzate e le formazioni motorizzate, ma soprattutto la fanteria hanno non soltanto confermato le loro qualità, ma hanno superato loro stesse. E' stato possibile rinchiudere circa 75 divisioni russe in tre sacche ed effettuare il loro totale annientamento. Da allora in poi forti formazioni marciano su un ampio fronte contro Mosca.

Due ulteriori operazioni sono previste per l'annientamento delle divisioni russe che si trovano ancora sul fronte Nord. Io spero, che anche esse cadranno a grandi successi. Leningrado, Da~~~, non verrà attaccata, perchè io non penso a sacrificare un uomo di più di quanto non sia assolutamente necessario. A parte ciò noi abbiamo fatto l'esperienza a Kiew e da ultimo ad Odessa, che i russi hanno collocato su interi tratti di strada e soprattutto in tutti i più importanti edifici mine che esplodono da sole dopo qualche tempo oppure vengono fatte esplodere a mezzo radio. Secondo le dichiarazioni dei russi, essi hanno preparato per noi tante nella regione di Leningrado che in quella di Mosca delle particolari sorprese. Ora non si tratta di occupare delle città bensì di distruggere l'avversario. Leningrado e Mosca cadranno entrambe, senza che noi si sia costretti ad introdurre nelle città stesse - e forse, quindi, a sacrificare - un solo uomo. I Finlandesi sono della medesima opinione e ciò è importante perchè essi tengono non le loro sole forze il fronte di accerchiamento contro Leningrado.

Dal canto il bolscevismo sarà la vittima della sua stessa mira tra ditrici poichè soltanto la gigantesca concentrazione di tutti i suoi sog si è attuata al confine tedesco, ecco a quelli finlandesi e romeno, ha abbandonato il comando russo a lottare dove la lotta era per noi la più favo

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[illegible] l'irreparabile [illegible] del suo materiale da guerra per l'estremo sforzo di noi già ha impedito di arrestare in profondità per battersi [illegible] a Kiev e [illegible] di distanza dal confine. Ad ogni modo ciò [illegible] essere la possibile delle sue zone di maggior prima [illegible] quella dei centri delle grandi industrie. Complessivamente in breve tempo noi avremo già occupato o saremo comunque già in possesso di raggiungere il 70-90 per cento delle sue risorse industriali e di materie prime. In tali circostanze, Duce, non credo di essere un profeta troppo [illegible] se, quali che siano le decisioni di Stalin, dichiaro battuto l'impero bolscevico.

Con ciò, Duce, viene distrutta l'unica ed ultima grande speranza continentale degli inglesi.

Che a Londra non si facciano su di ciò illusioni, è, oppure da [illegible] dire. Mi sembra perciò possibile che all'ultimo momento, sotto la pressione della pubblica opinione, venga tentata una qualche - sia pure stolta - offensiva di alleggerimento.

Partendo da questo concetto avevo già da prima considerato tutte le possibilità che restano ancora agli inglesi in un simile caso.

1) - Aiuto [illegible] alla Russia:

Escluso dal lato materiale esso appare ridicolo e ad ogni modo non troverebbe - in poche settimane - il modo di arrivare in sufficienti quantitativi colà dove dovrebbe essere usato.

Lo stesso mio detto anche per il cosidetto aiuto americano.

2) - Aiuto di truppe:

Esso è da prendersi in considerazione. In ogni modo noi saremo naturalmente lieti se l'Inghilterra vorrà inviare in Russia in un modo o in un altro alcune squadriglie di aeroplani. Tale aiuto verrebbe in breve tempo ad esaurirsi a causa della difficoltà della situazione, della rigidezza dell'inverno russo e soprattutto per mancanza di rugolari e sicuri rifornimenti.

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f) - Ritenete di attaccare la penisola alla sua estremità

a) - in settembre attraverso la Danimarca.

Presentare tale eventualità come decisiva, data la grande importanza degli stretti navigabili di Kattegat come potrebbe del resto anche un trasporto aereo.

b) - in settembre attraverso il Caucaso.

Dal punto di vista militare questo sarebbe particolarmente desiderabile in quanto di lì l'inghilterra sarebbe in grado di disporre, per lungo tempo ancora, di ingenti quantità di petrolio. Il petrolio in questo caso non dovrebbero trasportarsi non con navi, ma con treni già preparati e sperimentati in combattimenti, la loro distruzione sarebbe ancora possibile da parte nostra.

c) - nel Caucaso, e cioè un obiettivo di ripiego, in Norvegia.

Si tratterebbe di Norvegia. Sarebbero sufficienti contingenti di truppe. La fuga di Narvik naturalmente quella che era il 9 aprile 1939. Batterie di grosso e grossissimo calibro sono state installate. I rifornimenti di generi alimentari, foraggio e soprattutto di munizioni e combustibile, sono assicurati per un anno intero. Se ciò nonostante gli inglesi dovessero mettersi in qualche modo piede, ritengo ciò come vantaggioso, perchè essi potrebbero mantenere soltanto con un continuo impiego di navi da trasporto e, a copertura delle stesse, con l'impiego di incrociatori, cacciatorpediniere, ecc.. Non si tratterebbe che ripetere quanto avvenuto nel 1940, ma con la seguente differenza: allora avevamo noi un solo di minori campi di aviazione. Questa volta invece vi sono oltre una cinquantina di aeroporti di prim'ordine con grandi piste di lancio sufficientemente sicure contro eventuali attacchi dall'aria. In ogni modo ho fatto preparare per la Norvegia rapporti normali che continuamente vengono rinforzati, tanto coloro, isolati con le altre unità motorizzate, attaccare Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Oslo, Christiansund, Narvik, Trondheim, Bodø, Trondheim fino a Kirkenes ecc. sono dal resto già in parte approntati di modo che le difficoltà maggiori di ogni simile impresa si avvarrebbero essere utilizzate subito - sono già altre volte ho comunicato per - anche la possibilità che già si [illegible]

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1)- Guerra nell'Europa occidentale.

Il sig. - dato che per gli alleati inglesi la costa tedesca non viene presa in considerazione - non esiste in Danimarca, Olanda, Belgio e Francia settentrionale.

Anche un simile tentativo, non potrei in coscienza che augurarmelo. In questa zona in tutti i punti più importanti sono state ricostruite costruzioni di batterie a pareine cannoni di calibro 40,6 cm. Aggiungasi una straordinaria densità di mine in tutto il territorio ed un sistema di apprestamenti difensivi che sono sufficienti ad opporre in caso di un simile tentativo una prima e insormontabile resistenza. A prescindere da ciò ha lamentato in precedenza, cioè soltanto in Francia, Olanda e Belgio vi hanno di 49 divisioni, che, in parte, appartengono alle migliori che noi possediamo. Si aggiungano due unità corazzate con materiale francese e due divisioni corazzate con materiale tedesco. Indipendentemente da ciò cominciano già ad effettuarsi i primi trasporti da orientale verso occidente. Ciò non rappresenta alcun maggiore aggravio per il nostro sistema di trasporti poichè con tali trasporti noi inviamo al fronte orientale vettovagliamento e munizioni e ritiriamo le truppe.

Ciò fin d'ora, come ho detto, si effettuano dal fronte orientale trasporti di contingenti per ferrovia parte per la Germania e parte direttamente verso occidente. Anche l'arma aerea comincia ad essere tra spostata indietro. Io credo anche che già tra pochi settimane passerà completamente agli inglesi la breve gioia di aver potuto gettare delle bombe su singole città tedesche senza aver subito una decupla ritorsione. E ciò prescindendo completamente dal fatto che viene costruito in sempre più grandi serie un nuovo tipo di bombardiere il quale per capacità di portata, capacità di volo e velocità supera sicuramente tutto quello che gli inglesi hanno ritenuto possibile.

Inoltre sono fin da ora in corso trasporti anche di nuove divisioni ed corazzate dalle stesse Russia verso la Francia e la Norvegia.

Se gli inglesi volessero tentare di sbarcare in qualche punto dell'Europa occidentale, ciò li porterebbe ad una vera catastrofe, come è stato già sperimentato.

Sole chiaro, per le truppe che si trovano in occidente e che in vi sta di tale eventuale impegno stanno e sono certamente a speciali cons

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ultimata, costituirebbe perciò, probabilmente, un serio sollievo. Inoltre non abbiamo in tali territori molti reggimenti di quelli a stanza fissa, non può pertanto di discostare il loro valore, come è avvenuto ad esempio.

Io non so quindi, Duce, se gli inglesi - pure in loro del tutto tradizionale guida militare - tenteranno qualche cosa di simile, ma in ogni modo io ho con tutta la cura possibile preparato ogni cosa al riguardo.

a)- un attacco nel Mediterraneo, contro le coste dell'Italia meridionale e della Sardegna o un attacco contro la Libia e la Cirenaica.

Io non credo che contro la Sardegna e la Sicilia si possa tentare più di uno sbarco "disperato", poichè anche nel caso che lo sbarco riuscisse al primo assalto, ciò porterebbe ad una lunga distruzione del tonnellaggio inglese il che in un breve tempo renderebbe non agile alla fine di una tale azione su alla ripresa delle ultime possibilità di manovra, che l'Inghilterra ha ancora nel suo tonnellaggio.

Nel caso poi che si voglia prevedere che si cerchi di raggiungere uno scopo determinato con forze limitate, allora si dovrebbe prendere in considerazione - come per la isola del Canale dove noi siamo a ciò preparati - anche l'isola di Pantelleria nel Mediterraneo. Possibilità questa che si deve sempre tener d'occhio, come del pari un attacco contro la Corsica e la Sardegna.

In tali considerazioni, Duce, resta infine, soprattutto, la possibilità che si cerchi ancora una volta per prevenire i nostri attacchi, di effettuare un'azione contro la Libia e precisamente in via frontale sulla linea avanzata presso Bellum sostenuta da un urto laterale proveniente da Tobruk. Quantunque negli ultimi tempi si siano considerevolmente rinforzati, Duce, i Tedeschi effettivi e quelli del Corpo Germanico Africano, io resto ancora alcuno personalmente dell'opinione che deve essere fatto ancora di più per fare apparire come del tutto vana un qualsiasi attaccamento di questa natura.

Le vie per raggiungere ciò, sono a mio avviso, due:

1° - [illegible]

2° - [illegible]

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Per quanto concerne il primo punto, devo dire che si debba di tanto in tanto centralizzare movimento se è stato detto tutto e che non si può nessun fare per scaricare nel miglior modo i materiali sporti.

Per quanto mi concerne io ho ordinato che il X Corpo aereo - a cui sono stati assegnati altri compiti - assuma in formazioni rinforzate la difesa di tutti i convogli marittimi dall'Italia e dalla Grecia, in aiuto di quelli che si dirigono verso Bengasi e Derna ed eventualmente verso Tripoli.

Anche la lotta contro i sommergibili diretti Bengasi e Derna deve essere considerata uno dei primi compiti del Corpo.

Poichè però assunto a tali compiti, occorre che anche l'Egeo sia mantenuto contro ulteriormente inglesi e contro i conseguenti sensibili ti pericolosi delle nostre riserve vitali in tali acque, non è pur troppo possibile destinare permanentemente una parte del X Corpo aereo per scortare i convogli marittimi tra l'Italia meridionale - via Sicilia - e Tripoli.

Tuttavia ho ordinato che, nel caso di trasporti particolarmente importanti, il X Corpo aereo, sia di volta in volta messo anche a disposizione della scorta supplementare a detti convogli che seguiranno tale via.

Sono però convinto, che qui il compito principale possa essere assolto dalla stessa aeronautica italiana e che si debba in modo particolare impedire che l'aviazione inglese a Malta riprenda la sua attività su una scala più vasta. Io vedo perciò, nel cercare di indebolire Malta e nell'assicurare la supremazia dell'aria e della navigazione, due compiti egualmente importanti, che richiedono il massimo sforzo dell'arma aerea italiana.

Ove fosse possibile, l'ulteriore affrettamento e l'intensificazione dei lavori per la migliore utilizzazione dei porti di Bengasi e di Derna sarebbero molto opportuni per l'accordamento delle vie terrestri e per il rifornimento dei materiali di traffico che ne conseguirebbe. Sarebbe molto utile anche il valersi dell'aiuto di ferrovie da campo leggere e di rapida costruzione per l'avviamento di rifornimenti verso località più vicine al fronte. Io ho già emesso pareri di un simile desiderio. Mi pronuncerei molto dalla sua effettuazione e farò tutto il

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possibile. Duce, per porre a Vostra disposizione, per quanto possibile, il materiale occorrente.

Se per questo e altri simili scopi si constatasse una maggiore difficoltà, potrei senz'altro, Duce, porre a Vostra disposizione ulteriori forze tolte dalle grandi masse dei prigionieri russi attualmente a disposizione.

In quest'ordine di idee vorrei suggerire, nell'interesse di un celere rifornimento della Grecia e di Creta, che sarebbe particolarmente desiderabile che potesse essere mandata avanti al più presto possibile la ricostruzione del ponte di Ponte presso Lamia che viene eseguita, in conformità degli accordi, dall'esercito italiano.

Per quanto si riferisce al punto 2° e cioè "estendere i rifornimenti aerei", ho inoltre ordinato di affrettare l'invio di sommergibili e di naviglio celere per appoggiare la Vostra lotta contro il traffico marittimo inglese, come pure ho disposto l'impiego di una flottiglia di dragamine.

Inoltre io sono pronto, Duce, se siete d'accordo, ad inviare ulteriori forze dell'arma aerea germanica, ed anche, eventualmente, cacciatori notturni a lungo raggio in Sicilia ed anche in Sardegna, per portare un soccorso per i Vostri porti dell'Italia meridionale con una neutralizzazione possibilmente totale di Malta e per contribuire ai assicurare i nostri convogli. Nel caso che, Duce, siate d'accordo con ciò, il Maresciallo del Reich si porrà in contatto con i Vostri uomini competenti.

A prescindere da ciò verranno assegnati al Corpo Germanico Africano, per quanto lo consenta la situazione dei trasporti, cannoni antiaerei particolarmente efficaci e di lunga portata, in parte su affusti corazzati semoventi, ma in parte anche per postazioni fisse. Io spero che allora si riuscirà di porre a disposizione su tutto il fronte un tale numero di efficaci cannoni anticarro da 5 cm. ed ancora più pesanti, che i futuri attacchi degli inglesi falliranno sin dall'inizio con le più gravi perdite di materiale.

Del pari tengo ad inviare al Corpo Africano Germanico - (per quanto sia possibile dal punto di vista trasporti) - una più grande riserva di carri armati III° e IV°. Infine debbono essere inviate ancora ar-

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ni speciali per l'attacco contro Tobruk. Ma per ritornare ancora una volta sull'argomento, mi sembra che la cosa più importante sia di assicurare in Sicilia ed in genere nell'Italia meridionale, mediante una forte concentrazione della Vostra arma aerea, Duce, e anche l'appoggio di quella tedesca, non soltanto l'assoluta supremazia nell'aria, ma anche la protezione dei nostri propri trasporti e di contrastare con successo i tentativi nemici di attacco e di sfondamento. Dovrebbe anche essere effettuata una sistematica collaborazione con i sommergibili per l'affondamento di Malta.

Passo a pervenire al Vostro esame, Duce, speciali proposte al riguardo.

Con l'occasione mi permetto di esprimerVi, Duce, le più cordiali felicitazioni per il grande successo dei Vostri aviatori e dei Vostri combattenti speciali contro la Marina inglese.

Sono stato assai dolente che ancora una volta la nave da battaglia "Nelson" non sia affondata. Disdetta di soldati ! Comunque, la nave sarà certo neutralizzata per molti mesi e quelle che sono state distrutte lo sono per sempre.

Se io con tutta obiettività considero, Duce, i successi degli ultimi tempi e valuto la situazione delle forze delle due parti tenendo conto di tutte le difficoltà economiche, mi sento sempre più rafforzato nella mia granitica persuasione che questa guerra è vinta.

Io non so che cosa pensino di fare gli inglesi, ma, secondo la tradizione, sarà certo qualche cosa di insensato.

Ma qualsiasi cosa essi vogliano tentare, un fatto è deciso:

essi non hanno in Europa più alcuna Potenza continentale su cui potersi appoggiare in avvenire.

La difesa dell'Europa e del Nord Africa è, dopo il collasso del loro ultimo aiuto continentale:

la Russia,

resa da ora assicurata dalle nostre forze comuni in qualsiasi circostanza.

E se Voi avrete, Duce, trovato a ciò qualche difficoltà, io Vi

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Major General William J. Donovan

FROM: Major Felix Pasquilino

SUBJECT: Report and Documents

DATE: 10 June 1945

1. As per your request of yesterday, the following documents were sent from MTO to Washington by pouch:

a. Letter of Adolph Hitler to Benito Mussolini outlining new plans for attack on Russia and Great Britain. This letter was written previous to our entry into the war and warned Il Duce that the United States would keep out of the war.

b. A letter from Count Galeazzo Ciano to the King of Italy, which was written a week before his execution.

c. A copy of the original Italian Armistice terms imposed on the Italian Government by General Eisenhower.

d. Report on the status of the Italian Navy as submitted to General Eisenhower by the Italian Government.

2. Many other original documents will be made available to us in Italy at a later date by some of our contacts who are well placed in government and religious circles.

Felix Pasquilino
FELIX PASQUILINO
Major, C.M.

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

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HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
177th FAO [illegible]
APO 512, U.S. Army
Italian Division [illegible]

6 March 1945

TO: Whitney H. Shepardson
Chief, OSS
Mediterranean Base
Area
Chief, Italian Section

FROM: Vincent J. Scamporino
Chief, Italian Division, SI, Hdqtrs

SUBJECT: Photostatic Copies of Italian Documents

1. The following photostatic copies of documents were brought in by Major Felix Pasqualino, who procured them from high Italian Government officials:

a. Allegato No. 1 - Convenzione Della Forze Navali in Atto Del 5 Aprile 1945

b. Allegato No. 2 - Condizioni of Armistice Presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian C. in C.

c. Allegato No. 3 - Proclama Rivolto Dal Maresciallo Badoglio Alla Nazione Dal Tardo Domenicale Dell'8 Settembre.

d. Allegato No. 4 - Memoria Segretissima Di Mussolini in Data 27 Maggio 1939.

e. Allegato No. 5 - Memoria Segretissima di Mussolini in Data 31 Marzo 1940.

f. Allegato No. 6 - Memoria Segretissima Presentata Nel Primi Giorni Dell'4 Aprile 1940 Dalle Supreme Autorita' Della Marina a Mussolini in Risposta Alla Memoria Del Segretissima di Quest'Ultimo in Data 31 Marzo 1940.

g. Allegato No. 7 - Testo Di "Accordo Fra La R. Marina Italiana e La Marina Tedesca", Proposto Dalle Supreme Autorita' Navali Germaniche nel Marzo 1943.

h. Allegato No. 8 - Lettera Inviata Da Hitler a Mussolini il 18 Ottobre 1944.

i. Allegato No. 9 - Ordini Emanati Dal Comando Supremo Per L'Osservanza di Atti di Ostilita' Armata Da Parte Germanica ed In Previsione Dell'Armistizio.

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COSTITUZIONE DELLE FORZE NAVALI IN ATTO DAL 5 APRILE 1943 (1)

1) - FORZE NAVALI DA BATTAGLIA

COMANDO IN CAPO FORZE NAVALI DA BATTAGLIA - sul Littorio

2ª DIVISIONE : Vittorio Veneto - Roma - Littorio

5ª DIVISIONE : Duilio - Doria - Cesare

3ª DIVISIONE : Cesaria - Trieste

7ª DIVISIONE : Eugenio di Savoia - Duca d'Aosta - Montecuccoli

8ª DIVISIONE : Garibaldi - Duca degli Abruzzi - Caderna

GRUPPO CACCIATORPEDINIERE DI SQUADRA

Regolo - Scipione

10ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Maestrale - Grecale - Velite - Carabiniere - Corazziere - Granatiere

12ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Mitragliere - Carabiniere - Fuciliere

13ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Alpino - Bersagliere - Oriani

14ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Legionario - Camicia Nera - Giberti

15ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Pigafetta - Pessagno - Da Noli

16ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere : Zeno - Da Recco - Vivaldi

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(1) - Questa costituzione tratta delle Forze Navali di superficie. Per avere un'idea completa della situazione bisognerebbe anche riportare le unità dipendenti dall'Ispettorato generale del M.A.S. e dal comando in capo della squadra sommergibili; ma esse non interessano direttamente ai fini dell'esposizione.

Le costituzioni di cui sopra rimase in vigore, nelle sue grandi linee, fino all'8 settembre 1943. Le piccole varianti che furono man mano ad esse apportate, debbono essere considerate come adattamenti alle circostanze di tratto in ogni caso solo di spostamento di qualche unità minore da un complesso ad un altro...

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2) - FORZE NAVALI DI PROTEZIONE DEL TRAFFICO

COMANDO IN CAPO FORZE NAVALI DI PROTEZIONE DEL TRAFFICO

a) - COMANDO SUPERIORE FORZE PROTEZIONE

- Gruppo Caccialorpediniere trasporto truppe : F.R. 21 - F.R. 22 - F.R. 23 - F.R. 31

- 1ª Flottiglia Siluranti di scorta

- 1ª Squadriglia Caccialorpediniere : Freccia - Lampo - Dardo

- 1ª Squadriglia Torpediniere : Sirio - Pallade - Castore - Climene - Clio

- 2ª Squadriglia Torpediniere : Sagittario - Calliope - Perseo - Andromeda - Aretusa

- 3ª Squadriglia Torpediniere M. : Alisео - Ardimentoso - Ardito - Animoso

- 4ª Squadriglia Torpediniere M. : Pegaso - Orione - Orsa - Procione

- 5ª Squadriglia Torpediniere S. : Ghibli - Groppo - Partenope - Mitrano

- 6ª Squadriglia Torpediniere S. : Indomito - Intrepido - Impavido - Impetuoso

- 7ª Squadriglia Torpediniere : Libra - Lince - Lira - Cigno - Partenope - Canopo

- 3º Gruppo Torpediniere : San Martino - Medici - Abba

- Squadriglie e Gruppi Dipartimentali

- 1º Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Alto Tirreno)

Pantanari - Bassa - Cascino

- 2º Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Basso Tirreno e Sardegna)

Cosmo - Papa - Fabrizi

- 4º Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Sicilia)

La Masa - Cantini - Stocco

- 1ª Squadriglia Caccialorpediniere (Settore Jonio e Basso Adriatico)

Lanciano - Bellondo - Libeccio

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- 5° Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Jonio e Basso Adriatico)
  Riseari - Monte - Sirtori

- 6° Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Alto Adriatico)
  Nassini - Audace - Insidioso - T.3 - Pilo

- 7° Gruppo Torpediniere (Settore Dalmazia)
  Giovannini - T.1 - T.5 - T.6 - T.7 - T.8

- 13ª Squadriglia Torpediniere (Settore Egeo Occidentale)
  Munassibano - Belfiorino - Calatafimi - Castelfidardo

- 4ª Squadriglia Cacciatorpediniere (Settore Egeo Orientale)
  Crispi - Sella - Nullo - Turbine

b)- COMANDO SUPERIORE DEI MEZZI ANTISOM

- 1ª Flottiglia per caccia a.s.

  - 1ª Squadriglia Corvette : Trapani
  - 2ª Squadriglia Corvette : Trapani

- Gruppo Scuola a.s. : La Spezia
- Sottogruppo a.s. : Bastia
- 2° Gruppo a.s. : Palermo
- 3° Gruppo a.s. : Napoli
- 4° Gruppo a.s. : Messina
- 5° Gruppo a.s. : Palermo
- 6° Gruppo a.s. : Biserta
- 7° Gruppo a.s. : Cagliari
- 8° Gruppo a.s. : Taranto
- 9° Gruppo a.s. : Brindisi
- Sottogruppo misto a.s. : Spalato
- 10° Gruppo a.s. : Argostoli

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- 11° Gruppo C.T. : Pisa
- 14° Gruppo C.T. : Lecce

a)- DOCENTE GRUPPO DECROCIATORI AUSILIARI

- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- Navigno
- Olbia
- Arborea
- Recoaro
- Brindisi
- Maresallo
- Lubiana
- Barletta
- Marsala

4)- DOCENTI DELLE MOTOVAVI VELOCI

- Castagnolo
- Caterina Costa
- Fabriano
- Mangiavacca
- Mazzarello
- Orione
- Rosolino
- Rosselli
- Sentinella
- Salvatore
- Unione
- Valfierita
- Belluno
- Aquino
- Tommaseo
- Anagni
- Pesaro

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

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ALLEGATO N.1

CONDIZIONI DI ARMISTIZIO PRESENTATE DAL GENERALE EISENHOWER
AL GOVERNO ITALIANO E DA QUEST'ULTIMO ACCETTATE (1)

ALLIED HEADQUARTERS

PATRITELLI CAMP,
SICILY

3rd September, 1943

The following conditions of an armistice are presented by

General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces,

acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by

Marshal PIETRO BADOGLIO,
Head of the Italian Government.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the need of his military-naval program.

.../...

(1) - Si riporta la traduzione italiana del documento:

CONDIZIONI DI ARMISTIZIO PRESENTATE DAL GENERALE EISENHOWER
AL GOVERNO ITALIANO E DA QUEST'ULTIMO ACCETTATE

QUARTIER GENERALE

CAMPO IN SICILIA
3 settembre 1943.

Le seguenti condizioni di un armistizio sono presentate dal Generale DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Comandante in Capo delle Forze Alleate,

.../...

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5. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both inland and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allied may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal in Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

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in nome dei governi degli Stati Uniti e della Gran Bretagna e nell'interesse delle Nazioni Unite, e come accettati dal

Maresciallo PIETRO BADOGLIO,
Capo del Governo Italiano.

1. Immediata cessazione da parte delle forze armate italiane di ogni ostilità.

2. L'Italia darà impiegare ogni mezzo per impedire ai tedeschi tutto ciò che potrebbe facilitare loro azioni contro le Nazioni Alleate.

3. Tutti i prigionieri e gli internati delle Nazioni Alleate debbono essere immediatamente consegnati ai comandi degli eserciti alleati senza che venga di essi arrestato o in qualunque altro momento venga inviato in Germania.

4. La flotta navale e aerea italiana dovrà portarsi in luoghi indicati dal Comando Supremo alleato in conformità delle disposizioni particolari che esso successivamente darà.

5. La flotta mercantile italiana potrà essere requisita dal Comando Supremo alleato a seconda delle necessità del suo programma militare o marittimo.

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12. Other possible terms of a political, economic and financial nature which Italy will be bound to comply will be communicated at later date.

The conditions of present armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander in Chief. The English will be considered the original text.

Sgd. Marshal PIETRO BADOGLIO
Head of Italian Government

By:
/s/ Giuseppe Castellano
GIUSEPPE CASTELLANO
Brigadier General, attached to
The Italian High Command.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, U.S. Army,
Commander in Chief,
Allied Forces.

By:
/s/ Walter B. Smith
WALTER B. SMITH
Major General, U.S. Army.
Chief of Staff.

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6. Zona immediata della Corsica e di tutto il territorio italiano, isole comprese, agli alleati che ne useranno come base di operazioni e per ogni altro scopo che essi ritengano opportuno.

7. Garanzia immediata del libero uso da parte degli alleati di tutti gli aeroporti e porti in territorio italiano, indipendentemente dalla cacciata dei tedeschi dal suolo italiano; porti e aeroporti da vranno essere difesi dalle forze armate italiane fino a che non subentrino le forze alleate.

8. Immediato richiamo in Italia delle forze armate italiane che par tecipano alla guerra da qualunque zona nella quale esse siano attualmente impegnate.

9. Il Governo italiano garantisce che se sarà necessario si varrà di tutte le forze armate a disposizione per assicurare la più rapida e precisa applicazione dei termini dell'armistizio.

10. Il Comandante in Capo delle forze alleate si riserva il diritto di prendere ogni provvedimento che egli ritenga necessario per la pro tezione e l'interesse delle forze alleate e per la prosecuzione della guerra. Il Governo italiano si impegna a collaborare con le forze am- ministrative, che in ogni altra forma che il Comandante in Capo alleg ve possa richiedere, e in particolare il Comandante in Capo potrà sta bilire un governo militare alleato in quelle parti del territorio ita liano dove egli lo creda necessario nell'interesse militare delle Na- zioni Unite.

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Allegato N. 1

[redacted]

Il Governo italiano, riconosciuta la impossibilità di continuare la lotta contro la soverchiante potenza avversaria, nell'intento di risparmiare ulteriori e più gravi sacrifici alla nazione, ha chiesto l'armistizio al Generale Eisenhower, Comandante in Capo delle Forze alleate anglo-americane.

La richiesta è stata accolta.

Conseguentemente ogni atto di ostilità contro le forze anglo-americane deve cessare da parte delle forze italiane in ogni luogo. Esse però reagiranno ad eventuali attacchi da qualsiasi altra provenienza.

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Allegato n. 18

[redacted] (1)

These terms will visualise active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations however state without reservation that wherever the Italian forces or Italians fight the Germans or destroy German property or impede German movement they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect movement and operations of German forces.

Cessation of hostilities between United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

Italian Government must undertake to proclaim armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

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(1) « Si riporta la traduzione italiana del documento:

[redacted]

I presenti termini non prevedono attiva assistenza da parte dell'Italia nella lotta contro la Germania. Il punto fino al quale tali termini potranno essere modificati a favore dell'Italia dipende dal modo in cui quella il Governo italiano ed il Popolo italiano aiuteranno le Nazioni Unite contro la Germania nel resto della guerra. Tuttavia le Nazioni Unite dichiarano senza riserva che ovunque forze militari italiane o italiani combatteranno i Tedeschi, o distruggeranno beni tedeschi o ostacoleranno movimenti dei Tedeschi, esse riceveranno ogni possibile aiuto dalle Forze armate delle Nazioni Unite. Nel frattempo, se verranno fornite immediatamente e regolarmente informazioni circa il nemico, i bombardamenti alleati saranno per quanto possibile diretti contro obiettivi relativi a movimenti e ad operazioni di forze militari tedesche.

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The Italian Government must at hour of armistice order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by Germans shall be immediately released.

The Italian Government must at the hour of armistice order Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

Meanwhile there is good deal that Marshal Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment but the following are the general lines suggested.

(I) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without Germans knowing.

(II) Minor sabotage throughout the country particularly of communications and air fields used by Germans.

(III) Safeguard of allied prisoners of war. If Germans succeed in hand them over because too great they should be released.

(IV) The Italian warships to be allowed to fall in German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all those ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

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La cessazione delle ostilità tra le Nazioni Unite e l'Italia avrà effetto a partire dal giorno e dall'ora che verranno notificate dal generale Eisenhower.

Il Governo italiano deve provvedere a fondere nella l'armistizio annunciato dal generale Eisenhower, e deve ordinare alle sue forze armate ed alla popolazione di collaborare da tale ora con gli Alleati ed opporre resistenza ai Tedeschi.

Il Governo italiano deve ordinare al momento dell'armistizio che tutti i prigionieri delle Nazioni Unite che corrono pericolo di essere presi dai Tedeschi, siano immediatamente lasciati liberi.

Il Governo italiano al momento dell'armistizio deve dare ordine alla Flotta italiana e al maggior numero possibile di navi mercantili di prendere il mare diriggendo verso porti alleati. Il più gran numero possibile di aerei deve dirigere verso basi alleate. Ogni nave e aereo che corre pericolo di cattura da parte tedesca deve essere distrutto.

Nel frattempo il maresciallo Badoglio può compiere un certo numero di azioni senza che i Tedeschi si accorgano di ciò che sta per avvenire. I dettagli sono lasciati al suo giudizio tuttavia ecco quali di seguito i criteri di massima:

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(V) [illegible] shipping be allowed to fall into enemy hands. For
short shipping in northern ports should it prove [illegible] to move
south of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scut-
tled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Central Me-
diterranean.

(VI) The German must not be allowed to take away Italian coal de-
posits. Mine experts to be put in force at the proper time for this
purpose. Note arrangements to be made to the effect that a view to their
being taken off in Italy by the United Nations.

(X) Proclamation passive general in tutto il Paese se questo ordi-
ne può essere emesso a cessazione delle autorità locali senza che lo
vengano a sapere i Tedeschi.

(XI) piccoli atti di sabotaggio in tutto il Paese, con particola-
re riguardo alle comunicazioni ed agli aeroporti usati dai Tedeschi.

(XII) prevenzione dei prigionieri di guerra alleati se i Tedeschi d[illegible]
vessero fare qualsiasi proposizioni per prenderli nelle loro mani, essi deb-
bono essere lasciati liberi.

(XIV) [illegible] navi da guerra italiane deve essere lasciata andare in
mani tedesche. Devono essere date disposizioni atte ad assicurare che tut-
te le navi da guerra possano dirigere verso porti designati dal generale
Eisenhower appena egli ne darà l'ordine. I sommergibili italiani [illegible] deb-
bono essere rimossi dalle missioni, perchè ciò potrebbe evitare le ma-
novre intese ad ingannare.

(V) [illegible] nave mercantile deve essere lasciata andare in mano ta-
desca. Il naviglio mercantile che si trova nei porti dell'Italia Setten-
trionale dovrà, se possibile, essere inviato in porti a sud della linea Ve-
nezia-Livorno, come ultima eventualità deve essere affondato. Tutte le
navi devono essere pronte a partire per i porti designati dal generale
Eisenhower.

(VI) I Tedeschi [illegible] devono venire in possesso di alcuno costiero ita-
liano; deve disposizioni, che devono entrare in vigore al momento oppor-
tuno, perchè le forze armate italiane nei Balcani cessino verso la costa
in vista di un loro trasporto in Italia da parte delle Nazioni Unite.

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[redacted]

Rt. Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN,
British Resident Minister, A.F.H.Q.

ROBERT MURPHY,
Personal Representative of the
President of the United States.

NORMAN DIEZ,
Commodore, R.N.
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A.F.H.Q.

FRANCO MONTANARI
Official Italian Interpreter.

Brigadier KENNETH STRONG,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A.F.H.Q.

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11. Il Comandante in Capo Alleato ha pieno diritto di imporre le modalità per il disarmo e la smobilitazione.

12. Altre condizioni di natura politica, economica e finanziaria che l'Italia si impegna di accettare, verranno dettate in seguito.

I termini del presente armistizio non saranno resi pubblici senza la previa approvazione del Comandante in Capo alleato. Il testo inglese sarà considerato quello ufficiale.

Seguono le firme.

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

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Allegato

PROCLAMA EMESSO DALL'AMMIRAGLIO CUNNINGHAM, COMANDANTE IN CAPO DELLE FORZE NAVALI ALLEATE DEL MEDITERRANEO, ALLA FLOTTA ED ALLA MARINA MERCANTILE ITALIANE, LA SERA DELL'8 SETTEMBRE 1943.

Dall'Ammiraglio Cunningham, comandante in capo delle forze navali alleate del Mediterraneo, alla flotta ed alla marina mercantile italiane.

Marinai della flotta italiana e della marina mercantile italiana: il vostro Paese ha dichiarato le ostilità contro le Nazioni Unite. Le forze armate tedesche sono ora apertamente ostili al popolo italiano che tanto valse honotrattta. Noi intendiamo requisire le vostre navi che sono invece ad urgentemente necessarie per collaborare al trasporto di prodotti alimentari in Italia. Le vostre navi da guerra dovranno aiutare nella protezione di questi trasporti dagli attacchi tedeschi. Di conseguenza evitate di affondare le vostre navi e non permettete che esse siano catturate. Le forze delle Nazioni Unite sono in attesa di ricevervi e di proteggervi. Salvate le vostre navi seguendo le direttive che vi diamo in nome delle Nazioni Unite.

Navi nel Mediterraneo: navigate fino ad un punto in cui non ci sia pericolo di intervento delle forze armate tedesche. Dalpate possibilmente verso l'Africa del Nord o Gibilterra o la Sicilia o Malta o Haifa o Alessandria e attendete in questi porti ulteriori istruzioni.

Navi nel Mar Nero: salpate verso i porti sovietici; se non avete carburante a sufficienza per fare questo viaggio, procedete allora verso porti neutrali.

Se incontrate forze delle Nazioni Unite segnalate la vostra identità durante il giorno con una bandiera nera e bianca sull'albero maestro e con grandi cerchi sui ponti per essere identificati dall'aviazione. Di notte le navi scortate dovrebbero utilizzare luci speciali e segnalare le lettere M e A. Seguite attentamente tutte le direttive delle Nazioni Unite; queste sono date per assicurare la vostra salvezza.

Uomini della marina mercantile: se voi potete salvare le vostre navi e permettete loro di raggiungere alle Nazioni Unite, sarà possibile per

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Voi continuare a navigare su navi italiane. Quelli di voi che sono nel Mare Egeo e nel Mar Nero, non potendo fuggire ai tedeschi che sono ora vostri nemici, siate attenti e non lasciar prendere le navi da poste-ro. In necessario, sabotate o affondate le vostre navi piuttosto che la sciarle andare in mano ai tedeschi che le utilizzerebbero contro l'Ita-lia. Quelle navi che intenderanno agire conformemente a questo messag-gio, dovranno dirigersi Malta V.P.T.; Algeri F.U.O. o Alessandria S.U.K. su 900 kilocicli.

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To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd.	Comments
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				

- Comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
- Line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
- Officer designations should be used in To column.
- Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
- Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
- This sheet should always be returned to Registry.
- For routing to other offices (designations see separate sheet).

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Allegato N.12

TRASFERIMENTO A MALTA DELLE FORZE NAVALI DA BATTAGLIA

1) - GRUPPO DIRIGENTE DELL'ALTO TIRRENO
(Comandante in capo: amm. di sq. Bergamini sul Roma)

7ª DIVISIONE (amm. di div. Oliva)

- Regonia di Savoia (n.a.) - (1) - cap. di vasc. Villarigo
- Duca d'Aosta (2) - cap. di vasc. d'Aloja
- Montecuccoli (1) - cap. di vasc. Enri Ubaldini

8ª DIVISIONE (amm. di div. Biancheri)

- Duca degli Abruzzi (n.c.)- (2) - cap. di vasc. Battaglia
- Garibaldi (2) - cap. di vasc. Ghè
- Attilio Regolo (aggr.) - (1) - cap. di freg. Barbarbarolo

9ª DIVISIONE (amm. di div. Accorretti)

- Roma (n.a. c.c.) - (1) - cap. di vasc. del Cima
- Vittorio Veneto (n.a.)-(1) - cap. di vasc. Peneri Giraldi
- Italia (1) - cap. di vasc. Battiglieri

GRUPPO INCROCIATORI TORPEDINIERE DI SQUADRA (cap. di vasc. Carminale)

- 14ª Squadriglia

Legionario	(1)	- cap. di vasc. Baldo
Grismi	(1)	- cap. di freg. Sommacona
Artigliere	(1)	- cap. di freg. Tabacchi
Granale	(1)	- cap. di freg. P[illegible] di San Martino

../..

NOTA. Le abbreviazioni "n.a. c.c." e "n.a." indicano rispettivamente "nave ammiraglia del comandante in capo" e "nave ammiraglia del eg[illegible] comandante la divisione".

(1) - [illegible] La Spezia

(2) - [illegible] Genova

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1) - GRUPPO DISLOCATO A TARANTO

Vittorio Veneto	(1)	- cap. di vasc. Marini
Artigliere	(1)	- cap. di freg. Serafini
Fucilire	(1)	- cap. di freg. Bonaiuti
Grecale	(1)	- cap. di freg. Ferri
Velite	(1)	- cap. di freg. Ferri

Il gruppo in questione dispone di una forza navale divisa in due flotte composte delle seguenti unità sottili:

Libra	(2)	- cap. di freg. Riccardi
Pegaso	(1)	- cap. di freg. Imperiali
Orione	(1)	- cap. di corv. Bernabò
Orsa	(1)	- cap. di corv. Del Pin
Impetuoso	(1)	- cap. di corv. Cigala Fulgosi

2) - GRUPPO DISLOCATO A TARANTO

(comandante com. di div. in mare sul Duilio)

Duilio (n.a.)		- cap. di vasc. Bucci
Doria		- cap. di vasc. Palmieri
Caderna		- cap. di vasc. Romagnoli
Da Zara		- cap. di vasc. Dalmasso
Pompeo Magno		- cap. di freg. Mimbelli
Scipione	(3)	- cap. di freg. Pellegrini

Alle forze navali da battaglia si univano la Nalda dopo quel-

Stromboli	
- proveniente da Pola il "Cesare"	- cap. di freg. Carminati
- proveniente da Venezia il "Giuglia"	- cap. di vasc. Durreale

L'abbreviazione "n.a." indica "nave ammiraglia del comandante la [illegible]".

(1) - partito da La Spezia

(2) - partito da Genova

(3) - [illegible]

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Allegato N.1

RAGGRUPPAMENTO DEL NAVIGLIO MINORE PER IL TRASFERIMENTO

PALERMO – MALTA

COMANDANTE DEL NAVIGLIO MINORE: amm. di div. Nomis di Pollone (1)

1° Gruppo (velocità Kg. 17)

tp. Aliseo	– cap. di freg. Fecia di Cossato
tp. Ardimentoso	– cap. di corv. Ravera
tp. Fortunale	– cap. di corv. Castelli della Vinca
tp. Ariete	– cap. di corv. de Grossi
tp. Indomito	– cap. di corv. Perucca
tp. Calliope	– cap. di corv. Romperti
tp. Animoso	– cap. di corv. Cuzzi
corv. Cormorano	– ten. di vasc. Raimni

2° Gruppo (velocità Kg. 9)

tp. Mosto	– ten. di vasc. Bonsi
corv. Danaide	– ten. di vasc. Fabiani

../..

NOTA: Le abbreviazioni si riferiscono alla parola a fianco di ciascuna indicata

tp.	..... torpediniera
corv.	..... corvetta
smg.	..... sommergibile
M.S.	..... motosilurante
V.A.S.	..... vedetta antisommergibile
rim.	..... rimorchiatore.

(1) – In realtà, alla data dell'8 settembre 1943, l'ammiraglio di divisione Nomis di Pollone ricopriva l'incarico di comandante superiore delle silu ranti, con sede a Roma.

Nella probabile eventualità di un colpo di mano tedesco, egli rice- vette l'ordine di recarsi a La Spezia per assumere di un ordine conven- ziopale il comando di tutte le unità siluranti presenti sul posto, le qua li avrebbero dovute trasferirsi in Sardegna, dispersi nello stesso tem po l'eventuale affondamento di quelle inefficienti.

Anche i tedeschi erano stati [illegible] contrasti sullo Spezzino [illegible] per i quali [illegible] sommergibili [illegible] [illegible] per le unità silurante presenti

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

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Oltre ai predetti tre gruppi, venne formato un quarto gruppo per il trasferimento del duca d'Aosta, il quale, partito da La Spezia (dove aveva la sede l'ispettorato generale dei mas da lui tenuto) sull' "Indomito" e dopo aver proseguito da Portoferraio a Palermo sull' "Aliseo", imbarcò - al momento di lasciare Palermo - sul comp. "Zagabria" (tem. di vasc. Lucchi), che - scortato dalla corv. "Folaga" (cap. di corv. Thorel) e dalla corv. "Ora" (ten. di vasc. Cimeri) - raggiunse, dopo breve scalo ad Augusta, Taranto.

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Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For officer Designations see separate sheet.

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Allegato N. 14

PROCLAMA DEL RE D'ITALIA AGLI ITALIANI

Per il supremo bene della Patria, che è stato sempre il mio primo pensiero e lo scopo della mia vita, e nell'intento di evitarle più gravi sofferenze e maggiori sacrifici, ho ogi tierimesto la richiesta di armistizio.

ITALIANI, per la salvezza della capitale e per potere pienamente assolvere i miei doveri di RE, col Governo e con le mie Autorità Militari, mi sono trasferito in altro punto del sacro e libero suolo nazionale.

ITALIANI, facedo sicuro affidamento su di voi per ogni evento sono vsi potete contare fino all'estremo sacrificio sul vostro RE.

Che IDDIO assista l'Italia in questa ora grave della sua storia.

XXX, 11-9-1943

VITTORIO EMANUELE

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Alleato N.1.

PROCLAMA DEL MARESCIALLO BADOGLIO AGLI ITALIANI

ITALIANI, nell'assumere il peso della grave decisione di chiedere un armistizio, io sento precisato che le nostre Forze armate non devevano più compiere atti di ostilità contro le truppe Anglo-Americane, ma dovevano essere pronte a reagire contro chiunque le attaccasse.

Ora le Forze armate tedesche, non appena note l'armistizio, hanno violentemente assalito città e porti e avviato contro di noi animi oppressivi, sia in terra sia in mare sia in cielo.

ITALIANI, il momento è molto grave e solo virili decisioni ci possono salvare l'Italia.

Perciò ad ogni atto di imperio e di violenza noi risponderemo di pari modo e con la massima energia.

In mezzo al fuoco di tutti siamo cascati e pretendiamo verso il nostro compito di non lasciare soffocare il nostro Paese.

Roma, 11-9-1943

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO
Pietro Badoglio

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[redacted]

M a r i n a i d' I t a l i a

Da soli pochi giorni, e già sembrano secoli, voi avete lanciato in ottemio a nostri ordini per obbedire, in perfetta disciplina, alle condizioni dell'armistizio chiesto ed accettato per il supremo interesse del Paese.

Io condivido tutta la profonda amarezza della vostra partenza ed ho offerto con voi alla Patria questo nuovo sacrificio di dedizione e di sacrificio.

Ora che per lealtà e generoso riconoscimento del comando in capo anglo-americano, il mare, testimone e guardo del vostro valore, rivedrà l'eco possente della vostra fede, vi giunga la voce grata e commossa del Re.

Buona prova vi attendiamo, nuove glorie vi arrideranno.

M a r i n a i d' I t a l i a

Dimostrate a tutti quanto ogni italiano può e sa dare per la libertà e la salvezza della Patria.

VITTORIO EMANUELE

23 settembre 1943

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Allegato N. 17

[redacted]

[redacted]

Da Nave "Nova" al Comando in Capo di Taranto

Dal vice ammiraglio inglese sul "Nova"

Il vice ammiraglio inglese che rappresenta il comando in capo navale alleato nel Mediterraneo è giunto a Taranto con lo scopo di assicurarsi che i termini dell'armistizio vengano osservati alla lettera. Il vice ammiraglio richiede in primo luogo che nei piloti siccuramente qualificati siano inviati a disposizione delle navi inglesi quando le navi si troveranno nelle acque di Taranto. Quanti piloti saranno in ogni caso autorizzati a ritornare a Taranto dopo aver pilotato le navi fuori dal porto alla lettera inglese mi chiede inoltre che sei rimorchiatori e dodici battelini pontate con equipaggi completi siano subito inviate sotto bordo H.M.S. "Nova" che alza l'insegna del vice ammiraglio alla

Nova

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Allegato n. 30

MINISTERO DELLA MARINA

ORDINE DEL GIORNO

11 ottobre 1943

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

M I N I S T E R O D E L L A M A R I

ORDINE DEL GIORNO

13 ottobre 1943

MARINAI D'ITALIA!

S.M. il Re ha dichiarato la guerra alla Germania.

La Marina, fedele alle sue salde tradizioni di onore resta [illegible] Patria interno al suo Re ed inizia la lotta [illegible] dicendo che, per mantenere la guerra lontana dalle frontiere [illegible] sono la nostra Patria in un campo di battaglia nel quale si decidono [illegible] in rovine e distruzioni, sacrificando la nostra gente, annientando i frutti del nostro lavoro e la ricchezza nel la nostra civiltà.

La guerra contro la [illegible] tenace: la via tracciata [illegible] bevere il mare molte delle nostre [illegible] cremire di pace e di giustizia.

I nuovi e gli eterni testimoni [illegible] di Italiani, vi incontrerà ad esaltare il libro prove del nostro loro. E voi, o mar [illegible] che già avete dimostrato di sapere [illegible] nuovi testimoni [illegible] per il bene della Patria [illegible] indomito coraggio, del [illegible] valore delle vostre anime.

VIVA IL RE

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Allegato N. 24

MINISTERO DELLA MARINA

ORDINE DEL GIORNO

16 marzo 1944

Il 16 marzo 1944, al Consiglio dei Ministri, ho illustrato l'attività passata e presente della R.Marina, ho citato le perdite inflitte o subite, ho rievocato i nostri caduti, ho confermato la fede e la costanza dei nostri uomini, ho riaffermato la volontà di combattere per l'avvenire della Patria.

Il Maresciallo Badoglio, in nome dei Ministri del Governo di S.M. il Re, vuole che il plauso della Patria, che accompagna la R.Marina nel suo duro lavoro, sia da me recato a tutti i marinai d'Italia.

A voi, marinai d'Italia, che a bordo ed a terra adempite al vostro dovere con tanta fede, superando con animo forte anche i momenti di avversità e di dubbio, giunga questa espressione dell'amore di tutto il popolo italiano, incitamento a sempre più forte operare in tutti i campi, in tutti i mari, in tutti gli istanti.

IL MINISTRO

de Courten

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CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

COUNTRY	Italy
SUBJECT	Italian Official Reports Political and Military
ORIGIN	Rome
THEATRE	
SOURCE	Z
SUB-SOURCE	
EVALUATION	Documentary

NUMBER A-54930
ORIGINAL REF. J-11641;d;e;
J-11641;f;k
DATE OF INFO. As stated
DATE OF RPT. 1 April 1945
DISTRIBUTED 9 May 1945
CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT
NO. OF PAGES
ATTACHMENTS

The attached reports concern Italian Political and Military activities as listed below:

1. Letter from Hitler to Mussolini dated 28 October 1941.
2. Agreement between the Italian and German Navy - March 1943.
3. Message from the Italian Chief of Staff Ambrosio announcing arrival of Allied troops at Taranto - 9 September 1943.
4. Secret memorandum written by Mussolini dated 27 May 1939.
5. Secret memorandum written by Mussolini dated 31 March 1940.
6. Secret memorandum dated 4 April 1940 from the Naval High Command to Mussolini in answer to his memorandum of 31 March 1940.
7. Orders from the Italian High Comm[illegible] dated 6 September. German hostility - Armistice Provisions.
8. Italian merchant ships (more than 300 tons) placed at the disposal of N.A.T.B. now MEDBO - April 1944.
9. Admiral de Courten's declaration to the Italian Navy dated 9 September 1943.
10. List of naval units transferred to the Allies after the Armistice on 3 September 1943.

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CLASSIFICATION

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Allegato N.I J- 11/942

TESTO DI "ACCORDO TRA LA R.MARINA ITALIANA E LA MARINA TEDESCA"

PROMOSSO DALLE RISPETTIVE "FORZE NAVALI OPERANTI NEL MARIO 1942

Riconosce de chiaramente il fatto che la posizione strategica delle potenze dell'Asse in Tunisia è di decisiva importanza per la lotta per l'esistenza dei due Paesi, e per l'esito della guerra in generale, e che la soluzione dei compiti presenti dipende soltanto dai rifornimenti, la R.Marina italiana e la Marina germanica dichiarano la loro reciproca volontà di prendere al più presto possibile, in reciproca collaborazione, tutti i passi necessari per aumentare il rendimento dei rifornimenti per la Tunisia.

Esse sono convinte che i pericoli della situazione presente richiedono imperiosamente di prendere con la massima efficacia e sollecitudine tutte le misure necessarie a questo scopo.

Perciò in esecuzione degli ordini del FUHRER e del DUCE le due Marine prendono accordi per la futura collaborazione che ha lo scopo di consentire lo scambio delle reciproche esperienze e delle più recenti cognizioni circa l'esecuzione e la sicurezza dei rifornimenti oltremare, come pure dell'impiego delle armi per la difesa contro attacchi nemici.

Questo accordo otterrà il suo scopo soltanto se esso viene considerato dal primo capo all'ultimo gregario come un dovere patriottico ed attuato in chiara collaborazione per condurre la lotta comune nello spirito del già provato fedele camaratismo d'armi.

Se si rinuncia per mezzo di reciproche misure, che devono avere nella situazione odierna risultati pronti, di conservare la posizione strategica in Tunisia, il piano degli anglosassoni verrà sventato e il loro sbarco nell'Africa Settentrionale rimarrà una mossa sbagliata.

Le conseguenze che saremmo raggiunto assolvendo con successo il compito delle due Marine sono perciò di massima importanza per la vittoria dell'Asse.

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La R.Marina italiana presta perciò con la Marina germanica i seguenti accordi:

1.- Il V.Ammiraglio BUSCH della Marina germanica, fino ad ora capo responsabile della sicurezza delle scorte in Fiandra, nel Canale della Manica e nella Francia Occidentale, viene messo con il suo immediato Stato Maggiore agli ordini di S.E. Amm. RICCARDI ed aggregato a Supermarina. Il suo compito consiste nella collaborazione con gli enti responsabili di Supermarina per assicurare il rifornimento in Tunisia.

2.- Per lo scambio delle reciproche esperienze, vengono destinati quali Capi di Stato Maggiore presso i Comandi di Napoli, Palermo, Messina, Trapani e Tunisi ufficiali della Marina germanica.

3.- Per lo stesso scopo vengono imbarcati sulle navi da guerra italiane, impiegate per la sicurezza dei rifornimenti in Tunisia, ufficiali tedeschi come pure personale per il servizio delle armi e.a..

4.- Le navi da carico italiane imbarcano anche personale tedeschi d'aiuto e personale tedesco per le armi e.a..

5.- A capo dei convogli verranno destinati alternativamente ufficiali di Marina italiani e germanici.

6.- Le ex navi da guerra francesi catturate verranno prese in consegna da personale tedesco ed idonee per il servizio di sicurezza dei rifornimenti oltremare.

Questa misura durerà solamente fino a che sia necessario il rifornimento dell'Africa settentrionale e non muta assolutamente il diritto da parte della Marina italiana al possesso delle navi. Queste navi continueranno a portare la bandiera italiana.

7.- Tutte le navi che si trovano in porti italiani e che possono essere impiegate per la scorta di convogli verranno requisite e approntate al più presto possibile da Supermarina; esse verranno prese in consegna da personale tedesco.

12

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8.- La Marina germanica è pronta a fornire alla Marina italiana tutti gli aiuti possibili per l'addestramento ed istruzione del personale italiano per l'impiego delle armi convenzionali, degli apparecchi di ricerca e per il dragaggio delle mine, e ciò in scuole italiane e tedesche.

Gli accordi sopraindicati vengono firmati dalle due Marine con la ferma volontà di assolvere, nello spirito già provato nel campo di guerra Atlantico, il grande compito di assicurare l'esistenza delle forze armate in Tunisia, in una reciproca fiduciosa collaborazione per il bene dell'Italia e della Germania.-

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Allegato N. 44

MESSAGGIO DEL COMANDO SUPREMO ANNUNCIANTE L'ARRIVO A TARANTO DEL PRIMO REPARTO DI TRUPPE ALLEATE

COMANDO [illegible]

Reparto [illegible]

n. 15001 di prot.- Segretissimo

P.M. 21, 9 settembre 1943

A S.E. IL COMANDANTE DELLA 7ª ARMATA
A S.E. IL COMANDANTE DEL IX CORPO D'ARMATA
AL COMANDANTE MILITARE MARITTIMO DI TARANTO

Dicono che a partire dalle ore 13 di oggi 9 settembre pilota si trovi in posizione 206° per 12 miglia da Capo San Vito per guidare formazione navale britannica che deve sbarcare Taranto per appoggiare nostre truppe.

Intanto costiere non dico non debbono aprire il fuoco.

Per l'eventualità che il presente non giunga al Comando Militare Marittimo invito la Eccellenza in indirizzo a provvedere per l'esecuzione.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE
Ambrosio

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Allegato N.1

COPIA SPEDITA DAL MINISTERO IN DATA 27 OTTO 1939

27 maggio 1939 - XVII

Ora che l'Alleanza fra l'Italia e Germania è firmata e trovasi, in ogni momento, secondo la lettera e lo spirito del trattato, la sua piena applicazione, ritengo opportuno esporre quanto io penso sulla situazione attuale e sui probabili sviluppi futuri.

I

La guerra fra le nazioni plutocratiche e quindi egoistiche ormai conservatrici e le nazioni popolose e povere è inevitabile. Data questa premessa, bisogna prepararsi.

2

Colle posizioni strategiche conquistate in Boemia e Albania, le Potenze dell'Asse hanno in mano un elemento fondamentale di successo.

3

Ho spiegato in una memoria a Von Ribbentrop, all'epoca del Convegno di Milano, i motivi per cui l'Italia ha bisogno di un periodo di preparazione che può andare a tutto il 1942. Essi sono:

"Le due Potenze europee dell'Asse hanno bisogno di un periodo di pace di durata non inferiore ai tre anni. E' solo dal 1943 in poi che una sferza bellica può avere le più grandi prospettive di vittoria. Un periodo di pace è necessario all'Italia per le seguenti ragioni.

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a) per sistemare militarmente la Libia, l'Albania [illegible] mare l'Etiopia, dalla quale deve uscire un'armata di [illegible] ne di uomini.

b) per ultimare la costruzione e il rifornimento [illegible] vi di linea attualmente in corso.

c) per il rinnovamento di tutte le nostre artiglierie [illegible] dio e grosso calibro.

d) per ottenere immediata realizzazione dei piani [illegible] ci che devono rendere vano ogni tentativo di blocco da parte [illegible] le democrazie occidentali.

e) per realizzare l'Espansione del 1941, la quale oltre a documentare il primo ventennio del Regime può fornirci riserve di valore.

f) per effettuare il rimpatrio degli italiani della Francia, problema di natura militare e [illegible] molto serio.

g) per ultimare il già iniziato trasferimento di molte industrie di guerra dalle valli del Po nell'Italia meridionale.

h) per approfondire sempre più i rapporti non solo fra i Governi dell'Asse ma fra i popoli, al che gioverebbe indubbiamente una distensione dei rapporti fra Chiesa e Nazismo, distensione che è anche nella desiderata del Vaticano.

Per tutte queste ragioni l'Italia Fascista non desidera di anticipare una guerra di carattere europeo, pur convinta che essa sia inevitabile. Si può anche pensare che fra tre anni il Giappone abbia condotto a termine la sua guerra in Cina.

E' prevedibile che il triangolo Londra-Parigi-Mosca cerchera - in tempo di pace - di danneggiare in tutti i modi la Germania dell'Asse, specie dal punto di vista economico e morale. Sul terreno economico si ripercuoterà sviluppando sino all'estremo i piani autarchici e sul terreno morale controbilanciando su tutti i campi.

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Oltre all'assieme di subbiettile materiale vero e proprio ogni sforzo dovrà essere intrapreso per lavorare l'animo long. in dei singoli col favorire i movimenti anti-comunisti, coll'aiutare i movimenti positivi (come Rad Fouro in Francia), col potenz. nare le autonomie regionali (Alsazia, Bretagna, Corsica, Irlanda), coll'accelerare la decomposizione dei costumi, coll'esalt. re alla rivolta le popolazioni coloniali.

L'ingresso della Russia bolscevica nell'Occidente - anche se per mano de Londra - è un elemento indubbiamente favorevole allo sviluppo di questi piani.

5

Dal punto di vista strategico le mosse di accidente per poco concilierebbero "mosse" aiuti praticamente inattaccabili per forze di terra. Si può quindi prevedere una difensiva reciproca sul Reno e sull'Alpi e in Libia. Viceversa le forze metropolitane e coloniali in Etiopia possono iniziare operazioni offensive contro le colonie francesi e britanniche confinanti.

Ad Occidente la guerra assumerebbe quindi un carattere prettamente aero-marittimo. Colla conquista dell'Albania, il problema navale italiano è notevolmente alleggerito. L'Adriatico è un mare interno che può essere ermeticamente chiuso.

6

Solo verso Oriente e sud-est la guerra può assumere un carattere dinamico. Polonia ed altri Stati garantiti dovranno fare assegnamento su di stessi e potranno essere paralizzati prima che giunga un concreto aiuto, anche dalla confinante Russia.

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ALLEGATO N.

NOTA SEGRETISSIMA DI MUSSOLINI IN DATA 31 MARZO 1940

IL DUCE DEL FASCISMO
CAPO DEL GOVERNO

In una situazione quale l'attuale che potrebbe chiamarsi di estremo disagio, è difficile – se non impossibile – fare delle previsioni sullo sviluppo degli eventi e sulla fase avvenire della guerra. Bisogna dare larga parte all'imprevisto (vedi guerra russo-finlandese) e tenere conto di quanto può succedere sulla politica di paesi lontani come gli Stati Uniti e il Giappone.

Pace separata di compromesso

Allo stato degli atti, tale possibilità è da escludersi. E' vero che forti correnti pacifiste si agitano pubblicamente in Inghilterra e sotterraneamente in Francia, ma gli obiettivi di guerra degli Alleati, come tali – sono – che un compromesso è impossibile. Esso non potrebbe che partire dall'accettazione del "fatto compiuto" delle conquiste tedesche e russe a nord-est, ma questo non si concilia con la proclamata volontà di ricostituire la Polonia, la Cecoslovacchia e persino l'Austria. Una pace di compromesso può essere più agevolmente accettata dalla Germania, non dalle grandi democrazie, le quali tuttavia non sarebbero aliene dall'accettare il "fatto compiuto" del bottino polacco fatto dalla Russia, se la Russia "scollasse" la Germania.

Il Signor Welles ha – dopo il suo pellegrinaggio – concluso che per una pace negoziata i tempi non sono ancora maturi.

Operazioni militari terrestri

E' prevedibile che i franco-inglesi assumano l'iniziativa delle operazioni, cioè di un attacco al Westwall sul fronte occidentale ? Allo stato degli atti, è da escludersi. Le forze terrestri inglesi in Francia sono molto esigue; la situazione interna della Francia non è tale da consentire la perdita gravissima

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La guerra che le grandi democrazie preparano è una guerra di usura. Bisogna quindi partire dall'ipotesi più dura, che è la possibile al conto per conto. L'Asse [illegible] vincerà più nulla [illegible] prima. Questa ipotesi sarebbe grave, ma le posizioni strategiche conquistate dall'Asse riducono di molto la gravità e il pericolo di una guerra di usura. A tale scopo sin dalle prime ore della guerra, bisogna impadronirsi di tutto il bacino danubiano e balcanico. Non contentarsi di dichiarazioni di neutralità, ma occupare i territori e sfruttarli ai fini dei rifornimenti bellici alimentari e industriali. Con questa operazione che dovrebbe essere fulminea e condotta con decisione estrema non solo si metterebbero fuori combattimento i "garantiti", cioè Grecia, Romania e Turchia, ma si avrebbero le spalle sicure. In questo gioco noi possiamo contare su due pedine favorevoli: l'Ungheria e la Bulgaria.

8

L'Italia può mobilitare proporzionalmente un numero maggiore di uomini che la Germania. A una abbondanza di uomini corrisponde una modestia di mezzi. L'Italia - nel piano bellico - darà quindi più uomini che mezzi: la Germania più mezzi che uomini.

Desidero sapere se le considerazioni suesposte incontrano l'approvazione del Führer. Nel qual caso bisogna che su tali direttive si preparino i piani degli Stati Maggiori.

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che un attacco di Vertoali imperrotte. Quanto al morale dei soldati francesi è difensivo, non offensivo. I franco-inglesi sono alla ricerca di un fronte terrestre, senza incontrarlo, di quello occidentale e a tale scopo è stato preparato l'esercito di Weygand. Ma questo fronte non si delinea ancora dal punto di vista strategico. Balcanico ? Caucasico ? Libico ?

I franco-inglesi continueranno quindi:

a)- a non assumere iniziativa di operazioni su terra;

b)- a operare più controffensivamente che offensivamente sul mare e nell'aria;

c)- a cercare di rendere più stretto il blocco attorno all'asse Berlino-Roma.

Operazioni germaniche

Da parecchi mesi si parla di una offensiva germanica contro la Maginot e contro Belgio e Olanda per arrivare alla Manica. A rigore di logica anche questa offensiva sembra doversi escludere per i seguenti motivi:

a)- perchè la Germania ha già raggiunto i suoi obiettivi di guerra e può quindi attendere l'attacco avversario;

b)- perchè è troppo rischioso giocare il tutto su una carta, perchè se l'offensiva fallisse del tutto e si concludesse con un insuccesso e si fossero perdite rilevanti, una crisi interna nella Germania sarebbe inevitabile, date che anche il morale del popolo tedesco è complessivamente mediocre e in taluni grandi centri come Berlino e Monaco meno che mediocre. E' quindi di probabile che fra la guerra di attesa e quella di resistenza, la Germania sceglierà l'ultima e cioè:

1° - metterà tutte in opera per resistere al blocco;

2° - assumerà l'iniziativa di operazioni marittime e aeree sempre più vaste di controblocco. L'offensiva terrestre avrà luogo nell'eventualità di una certezza matematica di schiacciante vittoria o come carta della disperazione se il blocco a un certo momento non consentisse altra via di uscita.

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Posizione dell'Italia

Se si avverasse la più improbabile delle eventualità - cioè una pace negoziata nei prossimi mesi - l'Italia potrà - malgrado la sua non-belligeranza - avere posto in capitolo e non essere esclusa dalle negoziazioni; ma se la guerra continua, sembra che l'Italia possa rimanervene estranea sino alla fine, il che è impossibile. L'Italia non è accontentata in un angolo di Europa come la Spagna, non è semi-asiatica come la Russia, non è lontana dai teatri di operazione come il Giappone o gli Stati Uniti. L'Italia è in mezzo ai belligeranti, tanto in terra, quanto in mare. Anche se l'Italia mantenesse atteggiamento e passasse armi e bagagli ai franco-inglesi, essa non eviterebbe la guerra immediata colla Germania, guerra che l'Italia dovrebbe sostenere da sola e sola Fallemagna colla Germania, cioè con uno Stato che non ha ancora bisogno del nostro concorso militare e si contenta dei nostri aiuti economici e della nostra solidarietà morale, che ci permette il nostro stato attuale di non-belligeranza. Escluso l'ipotesi del voltafaccia che del resto gli stessi franco-inglesi non contemplano e in questo dissentono di apprezzarci, rimane l'altra ipotesi cioè la guerra parallela a quella della Germania per raggiungere i nostri obiettivi che si compendiano in queste affermazioni: la Corsica ai nostri, finestra sull'oceano. L'Italia non avrà veramente una nazione indipendente sino a quando avrà a sbarre della sua prigione mediterranea la Corsica, Biserta, Malta e a sud della stessa prigione Gibilterra e Suez. Risolto il problema delle frontiere terrestri, l'Italia se vuole essere una potenza veramente mondiale, deve risolvere il problema delle sue frontiere marittime: la stessa sicurezza dell'Impero è legata alla soluzione di questo problema.

L'Italia non può rimanere neutrale per tutta la durata della guerra, senza diminuirsi del suo ruolo, senza squalificarsi, senza ridursi al livello di una Svizzera moltiplicata per dieci.

Il problema non è quindi di sapere se l'Italia entrerà o non entrerà in guerra perchè l'Italia non potrà a meno di entrare in

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guerra, si tratta soltanto di sapere quando e come ci torna di intervenire il più a lungo possibile, compatibilmente con l'onore e la dignità, la nostra entrata in guerra

a) per prepararci in modo tale che il nostro intervento determini la decisione;

b) perchè l'Italia non può fare una guerra lunga, non può cioè spendere centinaia di miliardi come sono costretti a fare i paesi attualmente belligeranti.

Ho detto il perchè, cioè la fame, nel corso del Direttorio mi è nettamente stabilito che ciò riguarda l'Italia e soltanto l'Italia.

Piano di guerra

Premesso che la guerra è inevitabile e che non possiamo muovere coi franco-inglesi, cioè non possiamo muoverci contro la Germania, si tratta di fissare sin da questo momento le linee della nostra strategia, in modo da orientarvi gli studi di dettaglio.

Fronte occidentale - Difensivo sulle Alpi occidentali. Nessuna iniziativa. Eventualmente. Iniziativa solo nel caso a mio avviso improbabile di un completo collasso francese sotto l'attacco tedesco. Una occupazione della Corsica può essere contemplata, ma fuga se il gioco non vale la candela: bisogna però neutralizzare le basi di sosta di questa isola.

Al Brennero, verso la Jugoslavia, in un primo tempo, assolutamente difficile. Offensiva nel caso di un collasso interno di quello Stato, dovuto alla secessione, già in atto, dei croati.

Fronte Albanese: l'atteggiamento verso nord (Jugoslavia) e sud (Grecia) è in relazione con quanto accadrà sul fronte orientale.

Libia: difensivo tanto verso la Tunisia, quanto verso l'Egitto. L'idea di una offensiva contro l'Egitto è da scartare, dopo la distruzione dell'Esercito di Wavell.

Mare: difensivo.

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Marina: offensiva per spezzare l'Eritrea e operazioni su Gedaref e Kassala; offensiva su Gibuti, difensiva e al caso controffensiva sul fronte del Kenia.

Aria. Adeguare la sua attività a quella dell'Esercito e della Marina: attività offensiva e difensiva a seconda dei fronti e a seconda delle iniziative nemiche.

Sintesi. Offensiva su tutta la linea nel Mediterraneo e fuori.

E' su queste direttive che gli Stati Maggiori devono basare i loro studi e il loro lavoro di preparazione senza perdere un'ora di tempo, poichè, malgrado la nostra volontà di ritardare - per le ragioni già dette - il più a lungo possibile la nostra attuale non-belligeranza, la volontà dei franco-inglesi e una complicazione imprevedute potrebbe metterci, anche in un avvenire immediato, di fronte alla necessità di impugnare le armi.

M.

Roma, 31 marzo XVIII

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[redacted]

[redacted] SEGRETISSIMA PERVENUTA NEI PRIMI GIORNI DI GENNAIO 1940
[redacted] SUPREMA AUTORITA' DELLA MARINA A RISPONDERE IN RISPOSTA ALLA
[redacted] SEGRETISSIMA DI QUEST'ULTIMO IN DATA 31 MARZO 1940

La direttiva riservata "offensiva su tutta la linea nel Mediterraneo e fuori" deve essere interpretata e precisata.

A tale scopo occorre stabilire gli obiettivi assegnati alla Marina.

Se non si pensa ad operazioni concentriche delle tre forze armate per conseguire un importante obiettivo strategico, il compito della flotta italiana sarà principalmente e ovviamente quello di battere le forze navali nemiche.

Queste saranno costituite da due ingenti complessi, operanti l'uno nel bacino orientale, l'altro nel bacino occidentale del Mediterraneo. Si aggiungeranno le non trascurabili forze navali turche, nella sezione dell'Egeo, e, probabilmente, quelle jugoslave in Adriatico.

In un conflitto, come quello che ci si prospetta, l'inferiorità dei mezzi è aggravata dalla situazione geografica a noi avversa.

Probabilmente non potremo neppur contare su di una neutralità benevola della Spagna, che arrivi sino a facilitare una nostra eventuale occupazione delle Baleari e a considerarci l'uso di porti spagnoli in Mediterraneo e di basi atlantiche per i nostri sommergibili.

Nel punto di vista geo-strategico, qualora l'Esercito e l'Aeronautica fossero in condizione da poter concorrere con mezzi adeguati all'impresa, sarebbe ogni per la Marina più vantaggioso la conquista della Grecia, che non quella delle Baleari.

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Mancando, quindi, la possibilità di conseguire obiettivi strategici importanti e la certezza della forza navale avversaria, non sembra giustificata l'entrata in guerra di nostra iniziativa, con la prospettiva di dovere poi mantenere sulla difensiva, anche sul mare.

Le nostre forze navali, di superficie e subacquee, sono totalmente pronte ad affrontare una guerra, se considerata a sè stante. Ma la loro efficienza e la loro capacità di resistenza sono pregiudicate dalle seguenti cause:

- Troppo scarsa aviazione da ricognizione marittima e, data la schiacciante avversaria, probabile non sufficiente concorso alle operazioni sul mare dell'arma aerea.
- Deficienza delle nostre basi nel numero e nell'attrezzamento, specialmente in considerazione dell'immancabile persistente offensiva aerea del nemico e della vicinanza delle sue basi aeree.
- Deficienza del naviglio silurante da attribuire ai comandi dei vari scacchieri e da assegnare alle squadre, come riserve.

Qualunque sia il carattere che la guerra potrà assumere in Mediterraneo, inoltre sarà, alla fine, il bilancio delle nostre perdite navali.

Alle trattative di pace l'Italia potrebbe giungere, non soltanto senza pegni territoriali, ma anche senza flotta e forse senza aeronautica.

Aprile 1940/XVIII

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Allegato N.9

ORDINI EMANATI DAL COMANDO SUPREMO PER L'EVENTUALITA' DI ATTI
DI OSTILITA' ARMATA DA PARTE GERMANICA ED IN PREVISIONE DEL-
L'ARMISTIZIO.

a)- PROMEMORIA N° 1 in data 5 settembre 1943

b)- PROMEMORIA N° 2 in data 6 settembre 1943

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COMANDO SUPREMO

SEGRETO

F.M. 21, li 6 settembre 1943

PROMEMORIA N°1

1°)- PREMESSA

La presente memoria, riguarda il caso che forze germaniche in
traprendano di iniziativa atti di ostilità armata contro gli organi
di governo e le forze armate italiane, in misura e con modalità tali
da rendere manifesto che non si tratta di episodi locali, dovuti al
l'azione di qualche irresponsabile, bensì di azione collettiva ordi
nata.

Tali atti possono consistere in occupazione di comandi, centra
li di collegamento, stazioni ferroviarie, porti, aeroporti, ecc. -
interruzione delle trasmissioni - disarmo di guardie - mobilitazione
to di reparti ed intimazione di resa - azioni belliche vere e proprie
ecc.

2°)- SITUAZIONE DELLE FORZE TERRESTRI GERMANICHE IN ITALIA ALLA DATA DEL 10 SETTEMBRE 1943.

- 44ª divisione e brigata Docchia : alto Adige - Trentino
- 71ª divisione : sulle ferrovie di Tarvisio, di Piedicolle e di Postumia
- Blocco nord : divisioni 76ª - 94ª - 65ª - 305ª : fra Savona e Lucca e relativi retroterra. Divisioni Hitler e 24ª : fra Parma e Bologna
- Blocco centrale : divisioni 3ª motocorazzata (zona del lago di Bolsena) e 2ª paracadutisti (zona lido di Roma-Nettunia)
- Blocco sempre : divisioni 15ª - 16ª = Goering : tra Gaeta ed Eboli
- Blocco calabro : divisioni 26ª e 29ª
- 1ª divisione paracadutisti : in movimento verso la zona di Roma

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Vi sono inoltre

- i reparti della difesa c.a. e della zona di avvistamento
- un distaccamento di Carabinieri
- Comando Sanità (gruppo armate II)
- Comando Centrale Marina (C.S.M.)
- Basi della Flotta Aerea
- altre basi varie
- corrispondi Sottosegni e misti
- elementi in Roma (per la più in civile)
- la Cavalleria e brigata "Folgore" ed altri elementi minori
- la Sardegna e 90ª divisione ed altri elementi minori

3°)- AZIONI DEI VARI ELEMENTI

A completamento delle norme generali già dimostrate in precedenza (memoria 44) circa l'impiego delle S.F. si aggiunge quanto segue:

a)- DIFESA DELLA CAPITALE

Oltre alle disposizioni già emanate, dovrà in particolare essere assicurato che tutte le strade adiacenti a Roma siano bloccate al di dall'inizio dell'emergenza.

b)- PARACADUTISTI

Occorrerà essere prima adeguate predisposizioni per assicurare alla truppa i rifornimenti, specie di carburante, per il quale si attraverserà una crisi gravissima, poichè evidentemente i depositi non sono costituiti in vista della ipotesi considerata e il servizio ferroviario sarà molto irregolare.
Sarà probabilmente necessario attuare subito i possibili spostamenti di carburante dall'Italia settentrionale all'Italia centrale.

c)- COLLEGAMENTI

- interrompere tutte le comunicazioni telegrafoniche indocche ricevute sulla rete nazionale (spegnimento degli amplificatori, ma nuovi interruttori, isolamento permutatori)
- difendere ad oltranza le stazioni amplificatrici della rete na-

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nicali (ufficiali compresa) e le centrali telegrafoniche urbane ed interurbane, le stazioni r.t. militari e civili; nel (che) la difesa venga espressamente devranno essere resi immobilizzabili gli impianti.

Occorre rinforzare sensibilmente fino da ora il presidio dei vari organi predetti.

6)- BATTERIE CONTRO AEREI E RETE DI AVVISTAMENTO

I germanici hanno ovunque numerose batterie contraeree, che impiegheranno efficacemente contro di noi, ed una estesa rete di avvistamento.

Compito dei reparti di speciali forze aeree dovrà essere quello di far fuori al più presto e dove possibile tali batterie; prima disporre tutto minutamente.

Inoltre bisognerà ordinare alle nostre batterie contraeree di aprire il fuoco contro aerei tedeschi, e invece non sparare contro aerei anglo-americani.

c)- PRIGIONIERI BRITANNICI

Impedire che cadano in mano tedesca.

Poichè non è possibile difendere efficacemente tutti i campi, si potranno anche lasciare in libertà i prigionieri bianchi, trattenendo in ogni modo quelli di colore.

Potrà anche essere facilitata l'azione in avanzata verso l'Italia meridionale, per la costiera adriatica. I prigionieri addetti a lavori potranno anche essere trattenuti, con abiti borghesi, purchè fuori della linea di ritirata dei tedeschi.

Ai prigionieri liberati dovranno, a momento opportuno, essere distribuiti viveri di riserva e date indicazioni sulla direzione da prendere.

f)- POPOLAZIONE ALTO ADIGE

Farà causa comune con i tedeschi e cercherà di sopraffare i reparti italiani. Questi dovranno il più possibile essere raggruppati ed operare a civili e militari, ma la loro azione sarà fortemente contrastata e in caso di necessità ripiegheranno a sud, sulla linea di fronte.

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3)- DISTRUZIONI TEDESCHE

I tedeschi, lungo la loro linea di ritirata (presumibilmente Napoli-Roma-Firenze-Bologna-Brennero) distruggeranno completamente o lasceranno intatto tutto.

Questo bisogna tenerlo presente per tagliare possibilmente i depositi più importanti dal loro cammino e cercare di impedire energicamente ogni distruzioni.

Particolare attenzione va posta ai bacini idroelettrici, che certamente saranno oggetto di particolare distruzione.

4°)- AZIONE DELLA A.N.

a)- Unità navali da guerra e mercantili germaniche debbono essere catturate, o, nella impossibilità, affondate o quanto meno inutilizzate, in qualunque porto esse si trovino, da comandi e personale della R.Marina col concorso, ove necessario, di reparti dell'esercito.

b)- Deve essere assolutamente impedito con qualunque mezzo che navi italiane da guerra o mercantili cadano in mano tedesca. Non potendo evitare quanto sopra, le navi dovranno autoaffondarsi.

c)- Reparti della marina germanica dislocati presso le varie basi i comandi di Marina, in accordo con quelli dell'esercito, li cattureranno o comunque li metteranno in condizioni di non nuocere.

d)- Unità da guerra italiane debbono uscire al più presto in mare tutte quelle comunque in condizioni di navigare, per raggiungere i porti della Sardegna, della Corsica, dell'Elba, oppure di Gibilterra e Cattaro; tutte le unità non in condizioni di muovere, oppure che in uno dei porti di di rifugio di cui sopra verranno a trovarsi in condizioni di cadere in mano germanica, dovranno essere autoaffondate.

e)- Naviglio mercantile italiano armato e in condizioni di muovere dovrà al più presto partire per raggiungere i porti italiani, dalmati ed albanesi a sud del parallelo di Ancona, in Tirreno, a sud di Livorno. Le navi non armate e non in condizioni di muovere dovranno, mediante sabotaggio, essere inutilizzate per lungo tempo.

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f)- Impianti logistici, arsenali, basi di rifornimento, ecc. delle basi navali debbono essere razionalmente inutilizzati mediante [illegible] che ne impediscano la rapida ripresa in efficienza.

g)- Basi marittime: dovranno essere poste in stato di difesa onde consentire l'esecuzione dei provvedimenti di cui ai paragrafi precedenti; accordi con i comandi di U.S. responsabili della difesa delle basi.

h)- Reparti vari della R.Marina: ove non impegnati nella esecuzione dei compiti di cui sopra dovranno concorrere ai compiti dei reparti dell'esercito, previ precisi accordi fra i comandi interessati delle due forze armate.

3°)- AERONAUTICA

a)- aeroporti totalmente germanici: debbono essere occupati catturando il personale, distruggendo il materiale di volo nonchè i depositi di carburante e munizioni. Qualora non fosse il caso di mantenerne l'occupazione, detti aeroporti dovranno essere inutilizzati. Per far questo occorrono forze, quindi non sarà ovunque possibile di ottemperare all'ordine.
Dovrà in ogni modo:

- essere data la precedenza agli aeroporti vicini a Roma;

- tendere alla completa attuazione dell'ordine di inutilizzazione.

b)- aeroporti misti: debbono essere occupati catturando il personale e distruggendo il materiale di volo, salvando quando possibile i nostri depositi di carburante. Anche in questo caso gli aeroporti che non si ritiene di dover impiegare saranno inutilizzati.
A tal fine, a caso per caso, in relazione alle caratteristiche di ogni aeroporto, dovrà essere fin da ora gradatamente ed evalatamente disposto il rinforzo del personale aeronautico italiano.
Previ accordi con l'esercito, dovrà essere pure rinforzata la difesa vicina, allo scopo di avere maggior forza per l'azione di che trattasi, che dovrà essere studiata e predisposta in ogni particolare.

c)- aeroporti totalmente italiani: dovrà essere stabilito il numero di aeroporti [illegible]

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le forze aeree italiane (tenendo presente che dovranno affluirvi tutte le forze aeree efficienti attualmente dislocate oltremare); per questo basi si dovrà provvedere alla difesa ed oltremare i rimanenti aeroporti dovranno essere smantellati.

Dovrà essere mantenuto in valido possesso, a qualunque costo, degli aeroporti di Cerveteri, Furbara, Guidonia, Centocelle, Urbe; nascondi con cemento.

d)- forze aeree:

- uccidere tutti gli apparecchi efficienti dovranno affluire agli aeroporti della capitale;

- bombardamento, rifornimento ed assalto: tutti gli apparecchi efficienti dovranno affluire agli aeroporti della Sardegna.

e)- reparti contro aerei serviti dalla D.A.Aeronautica (vedi precedente n.) lettera e.).

f)- nessun apparecchio italiano deve cadere in mano tedesca; in caso di impossibilità si provveda alla distruzione.

g)- siano raccolti fin da ora tutti gli elementi relativi alle opere di difesa terrestre predisposte dai germanici nei loro aeroporti. Analogamente dovrà essere tenuto costantemente aggiornato l'elenco degli aerei tedeschi nei vari aeroporti.

h)- la attuazione dei predetti ordini richiede immediati e completi accordi con l'esercito.

8°)- TARIFFE BAR DA PARTE GERMANICA

Bisogna provvedervi, quindi mettere in efficienza tutti i mezzi disponibili di difesa individuale e collettiva.

9°)- Le direttive di cui al presente promemoria verranno attuate in seguito a dimostrazione del seguente dispaccio in chiaro diretto ai tre Capi di Stato Maggiore, appena di iniziativa, qualora i collegamenti siano ristabiliti e si verifichino le circostanze di cui al n.1

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Della presente memoria che deve essere restituita al latore, ogni Capo di Stato Maggiore delle FF.AA. può prendere gli appunti ritenuti indispensabili, che terrà gelosamente custoditi sulla propria persona o in cassaforte.

Gli ordini relativi alla presente memoria debbono essere impartiti solo verbalmente, norma che vale per tutti i Comandi in sottordine.

Le predisposizioni che, per necessità di cose, dovranno prendere gli enti esecutivi devono essere motivate come preparativi per il caso di attacco anglo-americano.

Le predisposizioni da prendere sono di massima urgenza.

Si tenga ben presente che misure allarmate e sporadiche sono di nessun rendimento, ma che occorre invece coordinamento e preparazione minuta.

8°).- Riserva di ordini per il Comando Gruppo Armate Nord, Egeo compreso.

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SOMMO SUPREMO

P.M., 21 li 6 settembre 1943

SEGRETO

P R O M E M O R I A N°2

1°)- P R E S E N T E.

Particolari condizioni di ordine generale possono imporre di denovare le armi indipendentemente dai tedeschi.

L'esperienza recente insegna che questi reagiranno violentemente.

Non è neppure escluso che possano commettere atti di violenza, indipendentemente dalla dichiarazione di armistizio, per rovesciare il Governo e altro.

Con il presente promemoria vi diamo le norme generali da seguirsi dagli esecutori operativi nelle eventualità di cui sopra (armistizio italiano).

2°)- SITUAZIONE DELLE FORZE GERMANICHE DI CUI BISOGNERÀ ORA TENERE CONTO ALLA DATA DEL 1° SETTEMBRE 1943.

Germania	1 divisione (più 1 div. armata)
Lombardia	1 divisione
Albania	3 divisioni (a portata delle camicie)
Grecia	7 divisioni (di cui 1 aerotrasportata)
Creta	1 divisione e due brigate
Rodi	1 divisione

3°)- OBIETTIVI PARTICOLARI

Gruppo d'armate Nord - (VI C.A., XIV C.A., 9ª Armata)

Concentrare le forze rispettando gradatamente la occupazione sono ritenuto possibile e conveniente, in modo però da garantire, nella posizione peggiore, il possesso dei punti principali e specialmente da Cattaro a Durazzo.

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Egeo

Il Comandante superiore è libero di assumere verso i germanici l'atteggiamento che riterrà più conforme alla situazione.

Ove però fossero prevedibili atti di forza da parte germanica, procedere al disarmo immediato delle unità tedesche nell'arcipelago.

Nel momento in cui verrà ordinata la attuazione della presente emergenza, Rupprecht cesserà di dipendere dal Comando Gruppo Armate Est e dipenderà direttamente dal Comando Supremo.

Grecia e Creta

- E' lasciata libertà al Comando di Armata e delle truppe di Creta di assumere l'atteggiamento generale in confronto dei germanici che sarà ritenuto più opportuno, tenendo presente quanto detto in via di massima nei paragrafi seguenti.

- Dire francamente ai tedeschi che se non faranno atti di violenza armata le truppe italiane non prenderanno le armi contro di loro, non faranno causa comune né coi ribelli né colle truppe anglo-americane, che eventualmente sbarcassero.

  Le posizioni di difesa costiera in consegna alle truppe italiane saranno mantenute e difese per un breve periodo di tempo (da fissarsi dai Comandanti) fino alla sostituzione con truppe germaniche, e queste eventualmente anche in deroga agli ordini del Governo Centrale, sempre quando, naturalmente, da parte tedesca, non vi siano atti di forza.

- Divenire al più presto la forza preponderante nelle zone in prossimità dei porti.

Avviazione

Le nostre forze aeree dovranno immediatamente raggiungere, a seconda della dislocazione, i campi della madre patria, oppure quelli dell'Egeo.

Il materiale e gli impianti a terra dovranno essere distrutti; il personale seguirà la sorte di quello dell'esercito.

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Marina

I mezzi della marina da guerra ed i piroscafi dislocati nei vari porti della Grecia e di Creta dovranno rientrare senz'altro in Patria.

Unità che fossero in procinto di cadere in mano germaniche dovranno autoaffondarsi.

Il naviglio dislocato nei porti dell'Egeo, rimarrà in posto.

Il naviglio in navigazione dirigerà su porti italiani, o dell'Egeo.

Il personale seguirà la sorte di quello dell'esercito.

4°)- Indipendentemente da dichiarazione di armistizio o meno, ed in qualsiasi momento tutte le truppe di qualsiasi forma armata dovranno reagire immediatamente ed energicamente e senza speciale ordine ad ogni violenza armata germanica e delle popolazioni in modo da evitare di essere disarmati e sopraffatti.

5°)- Occorre provvedere a rimpatriare (sotto forma di invio in licenza od avvicendamento) la maggiore quantità possibile di personale non aventi compiti strettamente operativi.

Inoltre in relazione alla prevedibile attuazione di quanto detto precedentemente, occorre ritoccare l'organizzazione logistica per renderla aderente alla nuova possibile emergenza.

6°) - Le direttive di cui al presente promemoria verranno attuate in seguito a diramazione in chiaro del seguente dispaccio diretto al Comando Gruppo Armate Est, al Comando 11° Armata, a Saprregeo, ed pure di iniziativa qualora i collegamenti siano interrotti e si verifichino le circostanze di cui al n.1:

"Appena ricevuta del promemoria n.2 - Comando Supremo"

I Comandi predetti risponderanno telegraficamente:

"Ricevuto promemoria n.2 - ....."

L'ordine di attuazione a Creta sarà dato dal Comando 11° Armata.

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La direttiva generale di cui al n.1, è sempre vigente, indipendentemente da qualsiasi ordine.

7°) - Il presente promemoria viene inviato al Comando Gruppo Armate Est, al Comando 11ª Armata, al Comando FF.AA. Egeo, i quali sono pregati di prendere gli appunti ritenuti indispensabili, che verranno poi solennemente ritirati.

Il Comando della 11ª Armata invierà il promemoria in visione al Comando Truppe Creta, che lo restituirà al predetto Comando di Armata a mezzo dell'Ufficiale Latore.

Non appena presi gli appunti di cui sopra, il promemoria dovrà essere distrutto sul posto.

Gli ordini relativi al presente promemoria dovranno essere impartiti solo verbalmente, norma che vale per tutti i comandi in ogni ordine.

Le predisposizioni che per necessità di cose dovranno prendere gli enti esecutivi dovranno essere motivate come preparativi per il caso di attacco anglo-americano.

Le predisposizioni da prendere sono di massima urgenza.

Si tenga ben presente che ordini elevate e sporadiche sono di nessun rendimento, ma che occorre invece coordinamento e preparazione minuta.

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Tipo	Nome	Stazza Lorda	Data di costruzione	Data di cattura o resa	Annotazioni
M/o.	ARIOSA	6349	11/4/44		
M/To	ARBARIA	3706	24/10/43		
M/To	ACILIA	319	12/9/43		
M/To	AINAIELLA	9959	26/10/43		
M/o.	AIRONA GRIMI	6337	23/10/43		
M/n.	ARGENTINA	9814	3/11/43		
M/To	ARSIA	736	11/11/43		
M/To	ANNA CAPANO	1116	8/10/43	17/9/44	dal 18/9/44 in scritto nel Mar viglio smobilit ric della F.M. rina
M/To	ALBICOLA	4097	20/1/44	3/3/44	
M/n.	MARLETTA (nave smil.)	1974	16/10/43		affondata nel porto di Bari in seguito azio ne aerea nemica il 2/12/1943
M/To	CAMPIDOGLIO	3702	17/3/44		
M/n.	CITTA' DI ALESSANDRIA	1498	26/10/43		
M/To	COSTANTE C.	834	12/9/43		
M/o.	CARBALA	1796	12/10/43		affondata nel porto di Bari in seguito azio ne aerea nemica il 2/12/1943
M/To	[illegible]	1817	15/10/43		
M/To	[illegible]	704			
M/To	[illegible]	1230	21/10/43		
M/To	[illegible]	3834			
M/o.	[illegible]	2446	[illegible]		
M/o.	[illegible]				

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Tipo	Nome	Tonnellaggio lordo	Data del naufragio	Data del ritrovamento	Annotazioni
M/Re	PIEMME (ex greco)	1906	27/12/43	6/4/44	[illegible]
M/o.	[illegible]	1630	8/10/43		
M/Re	OLIMPIADE	358	21/10/43		
M/Re	[illegible]	8308	8/4/44		
M/Re	ZEUS	1918	8/11/43		
M/Va.	[illegible]	1868	1/4/44		
M/Re	LAMPARO	1846	14/11/43		
M/Re	MARINO	9536	12/9/43		
M/Re	LUCIA S.	6183			
M/Re	LUCIA (ex francese)	2456	1/1/44	21/1/44	[illegible] contratto dal governo fascista
M/Re	MIMA	1140	9/9/43		silurato per errore [illegible] alle ore [illegible] 1943
M/Re	MOFIA	2473	8/12/43	8/1/44	
M/Re	MOFIA	2472	10/2/44		
M/Re	[illegible]	795	11/11/43		
M/Re	[illegible]	795	1/11/43		
M/Re	MADRARA	709	27/1/44		
M/Ngh.	[illegible]	1348	15/10/43		
M/Re	MARINO (ex jugoslavo)	1100	15/10/43	4/11/43	requisito al tempo contratto dal governo fascista
M/Re	[illegible]	570	12/9/43		affondato a Pantelleria nel [illegible] 1943
M/Re	[illegible]	5088	11/11/43		
M/Re	[illegible]	649	12/9/43		
M/Re	[illegible]	854			
M/Re	[illegible]	7000	[illegible]		

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Nave	Nome	Numero	Data di partenza	Data di arrivo	Annotazioni varie
M.N. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	8/9/44		In servizio da [illegible]
M/N	[illegible]	1817	18/9/43		
M/N	[illegible]	4740			
M/N	[illegible]	1924			
M/N	[illegible]	1593	18/11/43		
M/N	[illegible]	14470	14/10/43		
M/N	[illegible]	7998	25/1/44		
M/N	[illegible]	793	2/1/44		
M/N	[illegible]	1987	30/1/44	24/3/44	
M/N	[illegible]	1987	1/4/44	? /4/44	
M/N	[illegible]	4198	? /3/44	? /4/44	
M/N.	[illegible]	3484	4/12/43		
M/N.	[illegible]	4078			
M.N. [illegible]	[illegible]	9448	8/8/44		In servizio da [illegible]
M/N	[illegible]	1457	29/10/43		
M/N	[illegible]	997	4/4/44		
M/N	[illegible]	5826	21/10/43		
M/N.	[illegible]	8800	25/10/43		
M/N	[illegible]	403			
M/N.	[illegible]	4073			Sinistrata a largo [illegible] in parte sono pervenuti per [illegible]
M/N.	[illegible]	8116	11/9/943		

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[redacted]- Di abbreviazioni di riferimento alle navi a fiume di classe [redacted]

- m/n. [redacted] motonave
- m/m. [redacted] motore
- m/v. [redacted] motoveliero
- n.c. [redacted] nave cisterna
- n/rim. [redacted] nave rimorchio
- p/p. [redacted] piroscafo
- p/re [redacted] piroscafo

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[redacted]

Marinai d'Italia !

Durante quaranta mesi di guerra avete tenuto testa alla più po tente marina del mondo compiendo eroismi che rimarranno scritti a lettere d'oro nella nostra storia e affrontando sacrifici di sangue che vi hanno meritato l'ammirazione della Patria e il rispetto del nemico.

Avreste meritato di poter compiere il vostro dovere fino all'ul timo combattendo ad armi pari le forze navali nemiche. Il destino ha voluto diversamente: le gravi condizioni materiali nelle quali versa la Patria ci costringono a deporre le armi. E' possibile che altri du ri doveri vi siano riservati imponendovi sacrifici morali rispetto ai quali quello del sangue appare secondario: sappiate che voi dimostrerà te in questi momenti che la saldezza del vostro animo è pari al va stro eroismo e che nulla vi sembra insopportabile quando è destino de l la Patria come in guerra.

Sono certo che in ogni circostanza saprete essere all'altezza della vostra tradizione nell'assolvimento dei vostri doveri.

Potete dovunque guardare fieramente negli occhi gli avversari di 40 mesi di lotta, perchè il vostro passato di guerra vi ne dà pie no diritto.

Ad Cunctos

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Allegato No 18

PERDITE INFLITTE ALLE UNITA' NAVALI ITALIANE DURANTE LE OPERAZIONI
SVOLTE DAL REGIO ESERCITO NEL [illegible] 1941

ALESSANDRIA D'EGITTO

corazzata "Vittorio Veneto" — cap. di fregata Pecori Giraldi
corazzata "Italia" — cap. di fregata Bettiglieri

incrociatore "Eugenio di Savoia" — cap. di vasc. Tallarigo
incrociatore "Duca d'Aosta" — cap. di vasc. d'Aloja
incrociatore "Montecuccoli" — cap. di vasc. Enri Vhaldini
incrociatore "Cadorna" — cap. di vasc. Bongarini

caccia torpediniere "da Recco" — cap. di vasc. Baldini
caccia torpediniere "Velite" — cap. di frag. Baffai
caccia torpediniere "Granatiere" — cap. di frag. Pomas di San Martino
caccia torpediniere "Artigliere" — cap. di frag. Babacchi

MALTA

corazzata "Italia" — cap. di vasc. Rota
corazzata "Doria" — cap. di vasc. Pecorino
corazzata "Cesare" — cap. di frag. Carminati

incrociatore "Duca degli Abruzzi" — cap. di vasc. Battaglia
incrociatore "Garibaldi" — cap. di vasc. Cab
incrociatore "Pompeo Magno" — cap. di frag. Banfi

caccia torpediniere "Legionario" — cap. di vasc. Baldo
caccia torpediniere "Oriani" — cap. di frag. Bonmanco
caccia torpediniere "Ribety" — cap. di corv. Torchiana

torpediniere "Alicco" — cap. di frag. Pecia di Cossato
torpediniere "Audace" — cap. di corv. Cumai

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

torpediniera "Ardimentose"	cap. di corv.	Favara
torpediniera "Fortunale"	cap. di corv.	Castelli della Vinca
torpediniera "Indomito"	cap. di corv.	Perucca
torpediniera "Orione"	cap. di corv.	Barbetti
torpediniera "Ariete"	cap. di corv.	de Grossi Mazzorin
torpediniera "Calliope"	cap. di corv.	Imperti
torpediniera "Libra"	cap. di frag.	Ricardi
torpediniera "Curini"	ten. di vasc.	Barone
torpediniera "Fabrizi"	ten. di vasc.	Pierani
torpediniera "Nesto"	ten. di vasc.	Lenzi
corvetta "Ape"	ten. di vasc.	Falbo di Vimodio
corvetta "Cormorano"	ten. di vasc.	Falconi
corvetta "Danaide"	ten. di vasc.	Falzoni
corvetta "Gabbiano"	s.ten.di vasc.	Perucca
corvetta "Minerva"	ten. di vasc.	Paroglio
corvetta "Pellicano"	ten. di vasc.	Perrah
sommergibile "Alagi"	ten. di vasc.	Puccini
sommergibile "Atropo"	ten. di vasc.	Falsigna
sommergibile "Axum"	ten. di vasc.	Serra
sommergibile "Bandiera"		
sommergibile "Bragadino"	ten. di vasc.	Ciuti
sommergibile "Brin"	ten. di vasc.	Ambrosetti
sommergibile "Corridoni"	ten. di vasc.	Asquini
sommergibile "Galatea"	ten. di vasc.	Crociani
sommergibile "Giada"	ten. di vasc.	Parasmeli
sommergibile "H 1"	ten. di vasc.	Marracini
sommergibile "H 2"	ten. di vasc.	Canessa
sommergibile "H 4"	cap. di corv.	Pedretti
sommergibile "Jalea"	ten. di vasc.	Gigli
sommergibile "Narea"	s.ten.di vasc.	Russo
sommergibile "Nereide"	ten. di vasc.	Mammia
sommergibile "Tricheco"	ten. di vasc.	Celli
sommergibile "Onice"	ten. di vasc.	Bergotta

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cacciamine "Vieline"	ten. di vasc. Petrelli
cacciamine "Sottombrini"	cap. di corv. Fracchia
cacciamine "Spuale"	ten. di vasc. Cirola
cacciamine "Turbine"	ten. di vasc. Parodi
cacciamine "Vortice"	ten. di vasc. Rivadin
cacciamine "Zeno"	ten. di vasc. Bimbi
V.d.S. 201	s.ten.di vasc.Carbone
V.d.S. 204	ten. di vasc. Friedl
V.d.S. 224	s.ten.di vasc.della Zorza
V.d.S. 233	s.ten.di vasc.Bacchini
V.d.S. 237	ten. di vasc. Giambone
V.d.S. 240	s.ten. di vasc.Lum
V.d.S. 241	guardiamarina Brancone
V.d.S. 246	ten. di vasc. Viola
V.d.S. 248	s.ten.di vasc.Bianchi
ausiliaria. "Regina Elena"	ten. di vasc. Bilia
nave A.S. "M. 7"	2° nocch. Sangitano
M.S. 35	ten. di vasc. Notarbartolo
M.S. 54	s.ten.di vasc.Ivanetti
M.S. 55	s.ten.di vasc.Rivalossi
M.S. 56	cap. di corv. Pullina
M.S. 61	s.ten.di vasc.Tedeschi
M.S. 64	ten. di vasc. Luriccia
nave appoggio aerei "Miraglia"	cap. di vasc. Carreale
rimorchiatore "Lipomano"	ten. di vasc. Lombardo

SOMALIA

nave coloniale "Eritrea"	cap. di vasc. Imperiali

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[redacted]

Alassio

M.A.S. 543 — mecch. di 1^cl. Rapacciolo

La Maddalena

nave app. comm. "Fasimeabti" — cap. di corv. Bosco

Luni Santi

corvetta "Ibis" — ten. di vasc. Polli

Luni'Antiani

M.A.S. 505 — ten. di vasc. Zappelli
M.A.S. 507 — mecch. di 1^cl. Arvan
M.A.S. 509 — s.ten.di vasc.Centurione
M.A.S. 510 — mecch. di 1^cl. Cecchini
M.A.S. 541 — s.ten.di vasc.Cevalich
M.A.S. 546 — ten. di vasc. Sanseverati

Sardigni

sommergibile "Dianora" — ten. di vasc. Donato

Sanni

M.S. 24 — s.ten.di vasc.Boiri
M.S. 52 — s.ten.di vasc.Carino
M.S. 72 — s.ten.di vasc.Sanani

Sardegna

M.S. 53 — s.ten.di vasc.Mannucci

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Taranto

cacciatorpediniere FR.I) (ex Pigafetta)	cap. di freg. Fioravanti
cacciatorpediniere FR.II (ex Trombe)	ten. di vasc. Nacchi Ludovico
cacciatorpediniere "Granatiere"	cap. di freg. Fucci Domenico
torpediniera "Aretusa"	cap. di corv. Fucci
torpediniera "Cassiopea"	cap. di corv. Busta
torpediniera "Clio"	cap. di corv. Barletta
torpediniera "Sagittario"	cap. di corv. Cordero di Montezemolo
torpediniera "Sirio"	cap. di corv. Cassaniti
torpediniera "Vincenzino"	cap. di corv. Cheno
torpediniera "Libra"	ten. di vasc. degli Azzoni Avogadro
corvetta "Driade"	ten. di vasc. Michetti
corvetta "Fiamma"	ten. di vasc. Volpe
sommergibile "Bandiera"	ten. di vasc. Turchi
sommergibile "da Procida"	ten. di vasc. Gentili
sommergibile "Otaria"	ten. di vasc. Febraro
sommergibile "Pisani"	cap. di freg. Nesi
sommergibile "Settimo"	cap. di corv. Botta
sommergibile "Speri"	cap. di corv. Erler
sommergibile "CB 8"	guardiamarina Bonaventure
sommergibile "CB 9"	s.ten.di vasc.Lorenzetti
sommergibile "CB 10"	s.ten.di vasc.Perioli
sommergibile "CB 11"	s.ten.di vasc.Rena
M.A.S. 541	s.ten.di vasc.Rhio
M.S. 31	s.ten.di vasc.Scialoia
M.S. 61	ten. di vasc. Fedretti
M.S. 71	s.ten.di vasc.Montezemolo
Incr.ausil. "Barletta"	cap. di corv. Corvino
Incr.ausil. "Messina"	cap. di freg. Albini

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[redacted]

[redacted] "Stromboli" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Partelli

[redacted]

[redacted] "Solgius Africano" [redacted] Cap. di Freg. Pellegrini

[redacted] "Stromboli" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Lupi
[redacted] "Cocoma" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Serventino

[redacted] "Fenice" [redacted] Cap. di Corv. Paladini
[redacted] "Chimera" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Ivano
[redacted] "Betulatura" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Orsi
[redacted] "Grecia" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Mauber
[redacted] "Stige" [redacted] Cap. di Corv. Vaccarini
[redacted] "Sibilla" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Voglino
[redacted] "Fenice" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Gioli
[redacted] "Palmetta" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Ardemanni

[redacted] "Filicia" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Ercolano

[redacted] "Vespucci" [redacted] Cap. di Vasc. Merlo
[redacted] "Colombo" [redacted] Cap. di Corv. Cerqueti

[redacted] "Amerigo" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Bilotti
[redacted] "Vespucci" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Cavallino
[redacted] "Cristoforo" [redacted] Com. di Vasc. Villoi

M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]
M.A.S. [redacted]

[redacted] Magg. G.F.C. Lombardo
[redacted] Com. di Vasc. Biavati

[redacted] Guardiamarina Antonini
[redacted] Guardiamarina Puga

[redacted]

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nave app. [illegible] "Quarnaro"	1° ten. di vasc. Alinco
nave scorta convogli "Pola"	ten. di vasc. Malfatti
[illegible]	
M.A.S. 321	ten. di vasc. Rosati
[illegible]	
M.A.S. 322	
M.A.S. 345	mecch. di 1°cl. Antovassi
[illegible]	
[illegible]dinare "Euro"	cap. di frag. Mongini
M.A.S. 320	mecch. di 1°cl. Nicolla
M.A.S. 323	2° mecch. Rivano
M.A.S. 334	ten. di vasc. Ballini
M.A.S. 335	s.ten.di vasc.Calabrese
M.S. 11	ten. di vasc. Bacci di Capaci
M.S. 26	s.ten.di vasc.Galati
pescaino "Ario"	ten. di vasc. Cerini
pescaino "Legnano"	
[illegible]	
nave app. scuo. "Volta"	
M.A.S. 536	mecch. di 1°cl. Mascagni
M.A.S. 540	ten. di vasc. Lamburdo
M.A.S. 559	mecch. di 3°cl. Baldelli
M.S. 12	cap. di corv. Marino
M.S. 15	s.ten.di vasc. Rossi
M.S. 23	s.ten.di vasc. Lanzini

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ELENCO NOMINATIVO DELLE UNITA' NAVALI DELLA MARINA ITALIANA
CHE SI RECO ALL'ARMISTIZIO DELL'8 SETTEMBRE 1943

FRANCIA

PORTO MAHON (ISOLA DI MINORCA)

incrociatore "Attilio Regolo"	cap. di vasc. Ratcatbertolo
cacciatorpediniere "Mitragliere"	cap. di vasc. Marini
cacciatorpediniere "Fuciliere"	cap. di freg. Scroffa
cacciatorpediniere "Carabiniere"	cap. di freg. Mongiovanni
motosilurante 780	cap. tenente Pappiano

POLLENZA (ISOLA DI MAIORCA)

torpediniera "Pegaso"	cap. di freg. Imperiali
torpediniera "Impetuoso"	cap. di corv. Cigala Fulgosi
torpediniera "Orsa"	cap. di corv. del Pin

BARCELLONA

motosilurante 778	
motosilurante 800	

N.B. In questo elenco non sono compresi i mezzi che, in seguito alla cessata difesa delle isole dell'Egeo, raggiunsero porti turchi, portati dalle rispettive [illegible]

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Lt. Pittelli:

I am returning herewith the original of Girosi's transmission regarding the Italian Mission to the Balkans. R&A has provided State with the information and has filed the accompanying detailed material in CID for reference.

JM

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : R.P. Stubbins RPS
FOR : R. Hartshorne
FROM : M.B. Ogle, Jr. M.B.O. Jr.
DATE: 23 May 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Economic Mission to Eastern Europe with Russia as a Final Destination

Six copies of Italian Economic Mission to Eastern Europe with Russia as a Final Destination have been prepared as you requested and are attached to this memorandum. Preliminary inquiries on possible State Department interest in this report indicate that Mr. J. Wesley Jones, Assistant Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs would probably appreciate prompt receipt of a copy of the memorandum.

It should be noted that no attempt has been made to date the original report and that the title page is dated 22 May. Since the time factor is of some importance in this case, it might be possible to indicate to State Department officials that the original report was prepared early in April and that the Economic Mission was then expected to leave Italy within a "month or two." Unless changes in the Italian plans have since occurred, the Mission's departure must now be imminent.

Attention of State Department authorities might also be directed to the fact that no corroborating evidence of Italian plans to send an economic mission to Eastern Europe and the Balkans have been received by OSS. In view of the significance of such a mission, this lack of information may be significant; it may indicate: 1) that the Italian Government kept its intentions secret in the belief that British and American authorities in Italy would object. This hypothesis is weakened by the fact that, although British and American authorities might interpose objections they could not forbid departure of an Italian mission to Russia. 2) That the Italian Government believed knowledge of the projected mission would complicate negotiations which are presently being carried on by an Italian Economic Mission in the United States. 3) That plans for the Mission were abandoned before they became current knowledge in Italian Government circles and could be "picked up" by Allied intelligence agencies. This hypothesis appears to be somewhat unlikely in view of the advanced stages of planning indicated in the OSS report. The rather unlikely possibility that the British and American authorities were not informed of the Mission simply because it did not concern them is not considered here because normally so politically significant a Mission receives wide comment both in government circles and the press; this Mission has apparently not been discussed in either.

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(Copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Paolino Gerli to Mr. Marcello Girosi [illegible] Mr. Gerli's views on the matter pertaining to the overall [illegible] Europe)

PAOLINO GERLI
Rooms 1103-04-05 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York 17

Telephone MU 4-3648-1647

6/11/45

Dear Marcello,

OSS, through some of its personnel, has created contacts in Italy with persons who have great influence upon the parties and in several ministries of the Govt.

These contacts are based upon friendships, mutual respect, sympathies of views and aims, mutual confidence in honesty of purpose and decidedly on the highest level of patriotic purpose.

Italy is still in a plastic state of mind politically and otherwise, but inevitably drifting towards a solidification in the near future.

The pressing economic situation is a most important factor in shaping the trend.

The morale being low, all individuals and groups are extremely susceptible to hostile or sympathetic expressions from abroad.

The first aspiration of all Italy is that America show and take some interest in Italian affairs.

Some attempts to elicit an American interest have either been rebuffed or, the future importance of Italy's potentials not having been grasped, they were let fall.

OSS has now come into possession of a documentation which, if carried out, may well have important repercussions in shaping for a long time Italy's affiliations and trends in the International World situation.

Question for America to decide is whether we have an interest in this future trend of Italian thinking and action or not.

If not, we can forget the matter and advise our friends that they may proceed as they think best, even though making some reservations as to the long term wisdom of their actions.

If we do have an interest, then OSS is prepared through its skilled personnel to help guide Italian action into the channels the State Dept. may desire and carry on with from that point.

The decision may well be important and should be carefully weighed.

/s/ Paolino Gerli

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SECRET

5 April 1945

[redacted]

TO: Vincent Scamporino

FROM: M. Cirnei

SUBJECT: Italian Mission to the Balkan Countries and Russia

As reported to you verbally, I am taking back with me to the Washington office complete documentation pertaining to the program, as well as the political, statistical and industrial data, of the Italian Mission which, supposedly, will leave for the Balkan countries and Russia within the next month or two.

Presumably this Mission goes with the approval and under the tutelage of the Russian Government. As I told you verbally, I have no means of evaluating the implication of this move, nor the possible motives of why this material was handed on to me. The apparent reason for doing so has been personal friendship and desire to help Italy by channelling some of the trade possibilities to the States rather than Soviet Russia. The higher echelon in Washington, which possesses all the elements for a secure judgment of the whole matter, will be able to evaluate all this much better than I would be. My main purpose has been to secure all this data, which, regardless of the political implication, may be of some use to our R&A Branch, to the Treasury and State Department, as well as to the FEA.

MARCELLO CIRNEI

MCirnei

cc: R. Massarini

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ITALIAN ECONOMIC MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FINAL DESTINATION

His Excellency Professor Guido Pasvi, former Under-Secretary of Information and twice a Delegate on two successful secret missions to the Western Allies, recently prepared a third mission to Eastern Europe, with Russia as its goal, and to be undertaken officially.

The mission to Eastern Europe, terminating in Russia, and which may possibly take in the Middle East on the return trip, has been accurately and laboriously prepared and completed after four months of work and includes all the documentation taken from the former Fascist Government, covering a five year period preceding the war, as well as some documentation which has been brought up to date, as late as December 1944.

The mission has been approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, De Gasperi, and its aims have been drawn up in full accord and with the collaboration of the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Reale, the Director General of Economic Affairs, Di Nola, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Primas, and with various Ministries, Ministers and interested national agencies.

PURPOSE OF THE MISSION

The general purposes of the Mission are to bind anew Italy's economy to that of the Balkan and Danubian nations, with whom Italy's

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[illegible] needed to balance of [illegible] and also to establish Italy's new economic bonds with Russia and her neighboring countries, from which Italy will soon be able to obtain equally as many raw materials and manufactured goods as can be furnished to Italy by the Western Allies, THUS GIVING ITALY A BETTER CHANCE AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTMENT AND BALANCE; IN OTHER WORDS, STARTING ITALY ON THE ROAD TO A NEW ECONOMY.

Specifically, the mission will deal with the following:

a) The reopening of channels for imports from the Balkan and Danubian countries, especially cereals, legumes, cattle, horses, pigs, frozen fresh meats, preserved meats, poultry - live and dead, eggs, butter, oil seeds, fertilizers, hides, etc., amounting to several billions of lire a year.

b) The renewing of Italian exports of fruits and vegetables, especially citrus and dried fruits, wines, hemp, raw silk, citrus chemical by-products, essences, and tannin extracts, etc., keeping in mind that the Italian fruit and vegetable exports alone used to reach several billions of lire yearly. The greater part of this export trade was absorbed by Germany and, in turn, the latter distributed it among the nations under her influence, such as the Danubian and Balkan nations which enjoyed special treaties and barter agreements. Consequently, Italy's exports of vegetables and fruits, especially citrus fruits, which is the economic mainstay of her

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Northern provinces and of Sicily and which, along with her wines and dried fruits, constitutes her only present exchange value against imports. Such Italian exports could not have any substantial interest for the Allies and Western nations as, in any case, with their "symbolic" exchanges, they have paid prices ruinous for Italian economy, in all fields.

c) The study and restoration of a discreet Italian "petrol" policy", Rumania having formerly furnished Italy with quantities valued at billions of lire, to which Russia's enormous resources may be added. It must be remembered, that owing to the destruction of reservoirs, power houses and electrical installations, Italian industry will be unable to avail itself of electrical power for several years and will have to make use of motors using heavy oil. This will impose a new indebtedness, which would bind Italian economy more and more to the Western nations, in case Italy were unable to create a competitive factor among the Eastern European nations and in this way bring about an economic balance and her own relative autonomy.

d) The sowing of seeds for closer economic relations with Russia which, up to now, had been unproductive and from which it would be possible to expect, within a short time, an exceptional contribution, not only in raw materials such as grains, iron, coal, petroleum, fertilizers, etc., but also in machinery; on the other hand, Italy will be able to furnish, with Russia's help, manufactured goods such as textiles and precision products; she will also be able to

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reopen her own shipyards, working for Russia's account under opportune agreements. (It must also be remembered that Italy, deprived of her own Merchant Marine and, evidently, constrained in her own development, but surrounded by, and bordering with, countries which are in the zone of Russian influence, will be able to effect her own exchanges with Eastern Europe overland, right into Russia. We find a fit example in the ten million tons of coal annually brought by rail from Germany to Italy, which shows how Italy's lack of Merchant Marine can be compensated for. It goes without saying that by Italy's tying in with Eastern Europe and Russia's economy, Russia will bring her own pressure to bear upon the Allies in all decisions concerning Italy);

e) The opening of channels for the emigration of Italians to Eastern Europe and Russia, in view of the large number of unemployed estimated at about eight million, and including tradesmen, farmers and technicians. This policy will open up a source for emigrants' remittances to Italy, with the object of providing another very worthwhile exchange value for payment of imports. Meanwhile, Italy will be relieved partially of her unemployment, thus alleviating her own food problem. In this respect, also Russia, having herself lost heavily in men and through destruction, will be able to help Italy, which has but vague hopes from across the Atlantic. In fact, the United States are giving no assurances whatsoever, busy as they are with their own problems of post-war employment, estimated to run into an impending men, while the South American states allude very

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regards to the eventual immigration of farmers, in order to make use of them in the interior; but, this is in conflict with our own aim, which is to send industrial workers, rather than farmers, since, on account of the destruction wrought by the war, Italy will have more unemployed among the industrial workers than among the farmers;

f) The discussion of our financial and banking situation, as well as that of our clearings, which is extremely confused because of the various three-sided pacts, the joint activities with Germany and the other Axis countries, and finally of the activities of the defunct Republican Fascist Government. Also, the survey, liquidation and setting up on a new basis of the commercial agreements of the National Italian Government with various countries, at least on a preliminary basis;

g) The situation of our Diplomatic and Cons. [illegible] representations, re-establishing them and, at the same time, taking care of the interests of the Italian State and the Italian colonies in various countries with respect to: - Property belonging to hospitals, schools, Italian firms, sea, river and rail transports, etc., as well as private properties.

h) The investigation of the situation of prisoners of war, refugees and interned; obtaining as exact an account as possible; endeavoring to assist them and organize them in the best way possible under actual circumstances; pre-arrange a plan for their repatriation, immediate in urgent cases, and gradual for others; the coordination

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of their situation in various countries, gathering statistical data as to their place of origin and their individual activities, in order to prepare a plan for their eventual emigration to other countries, after a brief repatriation in Italy, or to arrange for their stay outside of the country should they voluntarily elect to do so. These, briefly, are the tasks of the mission, to which others may be added as the circumstances dictate.

CHARACTER OF THE MISSION AND AGENCIES REPRESENTED BY IT:

The Mission has not interest whatsoever in the furthering of any private, industrial and commercial interests; and this, on account of the following considerations:

a) A state of war and of emergency still exist, which will impose for a long time to come economic intercourses only between State and State;

b) All the economic relations of the Italian State under the Fascist and Axis regimes had, for a long time, been effected between State and State through monopolistic Government agencies which operated strictly under the control of Party and Government;

c) The Mission has Russia as its final destination, and it is Russia which will influence the decisions of the different countries placed in her political orbit; and Russia has no private firms to deal with, but only the State and the various Soviet cooperatives in the industry, commerce, banks and agricultural syndicates.

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Once this principle has been established of direct relations between the Italian State and the different Balkan States and Russia, the possibility is not excluded that the Italian State might, at a second time, and with an appropriate internal agency, make contracts also with private industrial, commercial and banking interests; but it would be absurd even to conceive that the Italian State might orient itself, in the present stage of emergency, to an economy based on private, individual or collective interests.

The purposes of the Mission, from the point of view of the Italian economy, have been so conceived as to assist Italy primarily in its food supply exigencies which might be counter-balanced by a real possibility of exports, such as the agricultural items above discussed.

The industrial aspect has not been neglected, that is to say, the essential needs for the reconstruction of Italian industry have been properly surveyed. Simultaneously, the possibilities of Italian exports, in the near future, of industrial products, have also been examined. Naturally, this aspect of the Mission has been conceived in a hypothetic manner because the situation in the North is still very confused and does not lend itself to the proper evaluation of Italy's needs in the industrial field and, consequently, of its productive capacities. At any rate, beside a representative of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, the Mission will take along also a technical expert.

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The following Bodies and Government Agencies are represented in the Mission:-

a) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

b) The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor;

c) The Ministry of Agriculture;

d) The High Commissariat for Food Supplies;

e) The Bank of Italy;

f) The National Institute for Foreign Commerce;

g) The National Federation for Agrarian Consortiums;

h) The Italian Company for Grains, Legumes and similar Products;

i) One great banking institution to be chosen among the

The Bank of Sicily
The Bank of Rome
The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro

j) The General Confederation of Labor;

k) The High Commissioner for War Refugees; the latter to represent also the High Commissioners for War Prisoners and Veterans.

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MISSION OF THE ITALIAN

Head of the Mission, His Excellency Professor Guido Pausi once Under Secretary of Information, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Messina, formerly Secret envoy of the Italian Government in two missions to the Western Allies that terminated happily, promotor and expert for all the agreements, both economic and political with the Soviet Union, from 1941 to the present time, and formerly chief of a mission in the Soviet Union together with the explorer Nansen in 1921. He is on the best of terms with the Soviet Ambassador Kostylev, and with the Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vischinsky, as he had already been with former Ambassador Vorowsky, with Chicerin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he was a member of the Italian Socialist Party in 1920, assailed and persecuted by the Fascists, etc. (See life story attached).

The Italian Socialist Party and the Communist Party agree to give to His Excellency Professor Pausi the rank of Extraordinary Ambassador, as a reward for his previous activity and for the preparation of the present mission. He will be accredited as an Ambassador for the countries he must officially visit as a representative of the Italian Government, and for the complex and delicate tasks inherent in the Mission.

The above mentioned parties demand that such appointment be made immediately so that by such authority His Excellency

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Parri would be able to lend the Mission with highest authority to its technical conclusion.

MEMBERS OF THE MISSION

Luigi Renato Sansone, Attorney at Law. Never became a member of the Fascist Party, a Socialist, reconstructor of the Italian Socialist Party in Naples, and member of the direction of the Italian Socialist Party in liberated Italy. Director of the Food Supply of Naples, and presently Vice High Commissioner of Food Supply and representing the High Commissioner. One of the most competent personalities for the problems of Food Supply and for all the problems relating to the legal and commercial agreements of purchases.

Doctor Vittorio Marsidda. Head of the National Grain Service, and the importation from abroad of the grains for the Italian Federation of Farming Syndicates, Expert for purchases from Russia, Balkan countries, Danubian countries, he has made many contracts of exchange, also for the Ministry for Exchange and Currency, most expert technician also for the Ciscla Corporation. In 1933 became a member of the Fascist Party because of professional necessity, but has never been active, and refused to follow the Fascist Government to the North. During the period of Nazi-Fascist occupation of Rome, and subsequently, has kept alive the Italian Federation of Farming Syndicates, earning the praise of the Allies for this work.

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Doctor Cedrico Grilz. Former head of the Customs Office for Foreign Commerce. Vice-Director General of the National Institute for Foreign Commerce, official of the Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor. In 1936 became a member of the Fascist Party because of professional reasons, he refused to follow the Fascist Government to the North, and never became a member of the Fascist Republican Party -- is actually a member of the Christian Democratic Party, and is a member of the technical commission for the Party as reporter for Foreign Commerce.

Doctor Danilo Gorinaldesi, industrial expert, director of the "Officine Meccaniche Italiane Reggiane", the strongest group of the Caproni Corporation. Especially competent in Industrial Problems because of his business experiences in the U.S.A., and from many missions to France and her colonies, England, the Balkan countries, Turkey and Mediterranean countries.

Constantly opposed to the Fascist regime, he was placed by the authorities at the "Reggiane" as that firm did not wish to lose his technical collaboration. He was put on parole by the Political police of Reggio Emilia in 1940, and admonished by the Fascist Committee of Exile. On the eighth of September he fled Reggio Emilia, as he would not collaborate with the Germans and crossed the lines to collaborate with the National Government. He has been a member of the Italian Communist Party since 1944.

Professor Guiseppe Mirabella. Graduate in Jurisprudence, Philosophy and Political Science, Free docent in Political Economy

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and presently lecturing on that subject at the University of Palermo, author of a number of scientific publications, Vice-Director of the Central Branch of the Bank of Sicily at Palermo. He is just thirty years of age, and most expert in all matters relating to finance, banking and commerce. When he reached the appointed age, he was drafted into the Fascist Party, but he was always a dissident and since the eighth of September has collaborated in Rome with Partisan bands, together with the representatives of the Democracy of Labor Party. He sympathizes with the Italian Socialist Party. (For further information concerning Professor Mirabella, one might enquire from His Excellency Paresce, Under Secretary at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor. In case Professor Mirabella would not be permitted to go, he would be substituted by another official of the Bank of Sicily, Dr. Michele Pottino, who has similar banking and political precedence).

Professor Doctor Luigi Jacchia. Excellent scientific background. Professor University of Padua. In 1932, in order to protect his university career, he was forced to join the Fascist Party to which he had always been opposed, and continues to oppose. Suffered persecution for political and racial reasons, and was compelled to suspend his academic activity. After the armistice, he refused to collaborate with the Germans, and from Fiume, he crossed the Adriatic and joined the Italian Navy as Chief Medical Officer. In liberated Italy he is presently head of the Health

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Service to the High Commission for refugees of the U.N.

Doctor Pino Fresna. Doctor of Medicine and Surgeon, a lieutenant in the Medical Corps of the Air Force, he was a member of the Fascist Party by professional necessity in 1927. Antifascist in the Spanish War, and was part of the underground anti-Fascist Movement at Forli in 1943, also at Rome during the period of Nazi-Fascist occupation. He is a member of the Health Department for the refugees of war. A sympathiser of the Italian Socialist Party.

There will be also two officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who will be named later, one of whom would act as Secretary of the Mission and the other as an interpreter of Slavic languages and a stenographer.

Alternate members: Professor Donini and Dr. Berti. For cultural relations and emigration matters. Both of these persons have suffered persecution and exile for many years in the U.S.A. From there they will join the mission with their families at Moscow. The documents relative to these personalities can be found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the State Department of the United States Government at Washington.

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ITINERARY, FINANCING AND DURATION OF THE MISSION

The mission has Rome as its destination, therefore the whole matter must and has been cleared through the Soviet Embassy at Rome. In transit, the following countries will be visited - Albania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey, Hungary, Austria, liberated Poland, Finland, (Esthonia, Lithuania, and Latvia). If the Western Allies will consent, the Mission will return via Turkey, and if further permission might be obtained from the Allied Commission, they will pass by and visit the Dodecanese Islands, Irak, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt.

From the economic point of view, Italy has particular interest for the importation of cotton, oil seeds, rubber, resins, skins, mineral oils, petroleum, tobacco, coffee, etc. As exports, for the present time, Italy will once more be in a position to ship dried fruits, fresh fruits, eatable oils, wines, and cotton cloth, hemp and silk through a system of commercial barter, particularly with Egypt.

In all the countries of the Middle East, instead, the predominant interest for the Italian State and its colonies are the following: Italian cultural institutions, Italian properties, banking interests, and so forth. The Mission will also go into the question of refugees, internees, and war prisoner camps, besides the reestablishment of all diplomatic and consular representation.

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The duration of the mission is anticipated to be of three or four months, but it might be even longer in the event that the mission might return by the way of the Middle East.

The financing of the mission has been so arranged as to cost practically nothing to the Italian Government, and will be apportioned among the commercial agencies which will act for the Italian State.

The necessary amount of foreign currency has been secured in dollars and the Italian Government will have no other task than fixing the rate of exchange as established by the Allies.

Two million lire have been appropriated equal to $20,000 at the official rate of exchange.

The apportioning of the total expense of the mission will be made amongst Italian Federation of Agrarian Consortiums; Italian Agency for Cereals, Legumes and associated products; Italian Institute of Foreign Exchange (Bank of Italy); Bank of Sicily.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH [illegible] AS FINAL DESTINATION

Complete collection of Commercial Treaties with all European countries;

Special Accounts;

Clearing Accounts;

Payments outside of Clearings;

Advance Payments;

Cash Balances;

Payment Terms with the different Countries, within and outside Clearing Arrangements;

Listing of all the Imports and Exports, with attached Clearing Balances, between Italy and the European countries, but particularly with Eastern Europe.

Sources of this Documentation: Istituto Nazionale per i Cambi con l'Estero, (which is the specialized Technical Branch of the Bank of Italy).

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FINAL DESTINATION

Data and possibilities of Italian exports of Fresh Fruits, Vegetables, Potatoes, Dried Fruits, Citrus Fruits, Wines, etc., in accordance with statistical documentation and previous commercial activities between Italy and Northern and Eastern Europe.

Sources of this Documentation: Italian Federation of Agrarian Consortiums; Compagnia Nazionale Esportatori-Importatori Prodotti Ortofrutticoli, Ente Vini.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FINAL DESTINATION

Real situation of Italian Industry in Liberated Italy, (and presumed situation of Northern Italy, recently liberated). Survey of Present Necessities.

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Sources of this Documentation: All the Italian Ministries and Economic Bodies, through the coordination of the Reconstruction Committee.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FINAL DESTINATION

Italian Imports of cereals, dried beans, and similar products, especially from Eastern Europe; and Italian Imports of live stock, meats, eggs, chickens, from Eastern Europe.

Sources of this Documentation: National Federation of Agrarian Consortiums, (which is the economic body enjoying the full confidence of the Allies in Italy); Compagnia Italiana Scambi Cereali Legumi ed Affini; Compagnia Italiana Esportazione Importazione Commercio Prodotti Avicoli ed Affini; Societa Anonima Importazione ed Esportazione Bestiame.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN TRADE IN EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FULL DESTINATION

Statistical Data on Exports and Imports between Italy and the Balkans, the Danubian and Baltic Countries, Russia, and Central European Countries.

Source of this Documentation: National Institute for Foreign Trade, (controlled by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSIONS IN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA	
Italian Missions in Europe with Russia	
ACTUAL DESTINATION	
Actual Destination	

Italian Food Needs for the three months period from August to October 1945; Italian Petroleum Interests in Eastern Europe.
Italian Food Needs for the three months period from August to October 1945; Italian Petroleum Interests in Eastern Europe.

Trade with Egypt.
Trade with Egypt.

Source of this Documentation: High Commissariat for Food; Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (Agip); Azienda Petroli Italo-Rumena; Camere di Commercio.
Source of this Documentation: High Commissariat for Food; Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (Agip); Azienda Petroli Italo-Rumena; Camere di Commercio.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.
Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA

AS FINAL DESTINATION

- Survey and Analysis of Cost of Living in Italy -

(Black Markets)

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA AS FINAL DESTINATION

Prisoners of War; Civilian Internees.

Interests and various Ownerships of the Italian Government in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East.

Sources of this Documentation: Italian Foreign Ministry; Italian Navy Ministry; Italian Ministry of Transports.

Original Documentation: Secret, never released.

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ITALIAN MISSION TO EASTERN EUROPE WITH RUSSIA

AS FINAL DESTINATION

Additional Documentation: Data on the Debit and Credit of the Italian Trade Balances with different countries for the five-year period 1939 - 1943.

Survey of immediate needs for the first phases of Italian Industrial Reconstruction.

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This Survey is the one prepared also for the Italian Economic Mission to the United States, which is presently in Washington. This Report is divided for the different Branches of Italian Industrial Economy.

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15 May 1945

[illegible] the Italian Government [illegible]

[illegible] information which recently came into the possession of the OSS representative in Italy indicates that the Italian Government has projected plans for an economic mission to Rumania with which to attain its objective.

The general purpose of the mission is to make Italy's economic ties with the Balkans and Danube countries and to establish economic relations with Russia and her neighboring countries. In addition, however, it is hoped that as a result of the mission Italy will again be able to obtain as many raw materials and manufactured goods from Eastern Europe as can be furnished to Italy by the Allies, thus providing Italy with an opportunity to maneuver in the economic field and thereby attach the Italian people on the road to a new autarchy.

Specifically, the mission will be concerned with the [illegible] of Rumania for Liberia from the Balkan and Danubian countries, especially seeds and food products reviving Italian exports of fruits and vegetables to Eastern Europe obtaining petroleum exports from Rumania and Russia in order

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to avoid unduly influence in the Italian internal situation, should appear concerned exclusively with Russian aspects of problems for the solution of Italians to Italian people and should be sure that Italian employment situation is improving and re-establishing the economic equipment of the National Italian Government with the various countries to be visited; and alleviating the situation of Italian prisoners of war, refugees and internees.

The Italian Economic Mission claims to have no interest whatsoever in the furthering of any private, industrial or commercial interests and is proceeding on the premise that for the present at least economic intercourse is possible only between State and State. Of great importance, however, is the consideration that the Mission has Russia as its final destination, and realizes Russia will influence the decisions of the other nations of Eastern Europe. Russia, of course, has no private firms with which to deal, only its Government controlled cooperatives and syndicates.

A list of the Italian Government agencies representing in the Mission is attached hereto.

William J. Donovan
Director

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Government agencies requested to be represented at the meeting:

a) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

b) The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor;

c) The Ministry of Agriculture;

d) The High Commissariat for Food Supplies;

e) The Bank of Italy;

f) The National Institute for Foreign Commerce;

g) The National Federation for Foreign Commerce;

h) The Italian Company for Grain, Legumes and Similar Products;

i) The grain handling institutions to be chosen among the

Bank of Sicily
Bank of Rome
Banco Nazionale del Lavoro

j) The General Confederation of Labor;

k) The High Commissioner for War Refugees, the Italian Representative and the High Commissioner for Displaced Persons and Veterans.

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

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24 May 1941

The Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmie:

I believe the Secretary of State will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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[illegible] FOR THE ECONOMIC AY 1948

Considering [illegible] the possibility of an oil expenditure in Iran [illegible] that the Italian Government has completed plans for an economic mission to Eastern Europe with funds as its ultimate objective.

The general purpose of the mission is to [illegible] contacts with the Italian and Eastern [illegible] and to establish economic relations with Russia and its satellite countries. In addition, however, it is hoped that as a result of the mission Italy will soon be able to obtain as many raw materials and manufactured goods from Eastern Europe as can be furnished to Italy by the Allies, thus providing Italy with an opportunity to maneuver in the economic field and thereby steer the Italian people on the road to a new autonomy.

Specifically, the mission will be concerned with the [illegible] of channels for imports from the Italian and Danubian countries, especially those most productive of vital Italian exports of fruits and vegetables to Eastern Europe; obtaining petroleum exports from Rumania and Russia in order to [illegible] urgently [illegible] of the Italian [illegible]

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[redacted]

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major General William J. Donovan
Director

FROM: Marcelle Giraud

Pursuant to your verbal instructions, I transcribe herewith part of a report which I filed with the SI Italian Desk in Rome as of 20 February 1945:

"From an authoritative source I learned that some British emissaries had been talking to Italian motion picture producers here in Rome, who own the largest studio and motion picture production equipment, with the purpose of interesting them in a possible combination with British film interests.

With this cover and taking advantage of the eagerness of the Italian groups to enter into some kind of combination which would secure for them some post-war work, Italians have supplied the British with all inventories of their equipment, blue prints of plants, studios, etc. It is my informer's point of view, however, that the British, with all this information on hand, plan to take over stock and barrell the whole thing and list it as post-war reparation.

Whether or not the above information proves to be correct, its implications as far as American interests are concerned, are only too clear, as most of the 'dubbing' of American films for the Italian market and possibly the Spanish and other Mediterranean markets was, and will be, made in Italy.

Shouldn't the American motion picture interests be already on the job to secure whatever advantages will have to be derived by the post-war Italian situation!"

At a later date and from the same source — the most important motion picture producer in Italy — I learned that Russian emissaries were very busy securing leases on, or in some instances buying outright through friendly Italian groups, motion picture theaters throughout Italy, including the North of Italy, not yet liberated at the time.

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Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan -2- 17 May 1945

Always, according to this informer, the aim of the Russians is to reach a total figure of 500 theatres for a Russian sponsored chain of motion picture houses.

May I be permitted to state again that I did not have at my disposal the facilities to check as the accuracy of the above information. Of one thing, however, I am sure and that is that in Rome it was current talk in film circles that both the Russians and the British were very active in the fields of future Italian production and of exhibition of their respective film output. The British were already installed under P.W.B. sponsorship in the Scalera Studios, the best equipped motion picture house in Italy, second only to the Government controlled "Cinecitta".

Respectfully submitted,

Marcello Girosi

Marcello Girosi

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Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan

Strange, according to this informant, the idea of the Russians re. [illegible] ... official figure of 500 theaters for a Russian [illegible] ... hundred.

May I be permitted to state again that I did not have at my disposal the facilities to check on the accuracy of the above information. However, I am sure that what is true. In fact, it was current talk in [illegible] circles that both the Russians and the British were very active in the field of future Italian production and of exhibition of their respective film output. The British were already installed under P.W.B. sponsorship in the Eumiere Studios, the best equipped motion picture house in Italy, second only to the Government controlled "Cinecitta".

Respectfully submitted,

Marcella Citroni

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

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Lt. Col. Charles K. Thayer

SUBJECT: Situation in Venezia Giulia

DATE: 1 May 1945

1. It is the long established policy of our Government to permit of no action with respect to the 1939 frontiers of Europe which would prejudice the disposition of disputed areas by an eventual peace settlement.

2. One of these disputed areas is the so-called Venezia Giulia province including Istria, Fiume and Trieste, lying between Italy's 1939 Eastern frontier and the Isonzo River.

3. Tito has repeatedly given assurances that he will take no final action to incorporate any territories into Yugoslavia until the peace settlement. He has, however, publicly laid certain claims to the disputed area in a statement issued in Moscow last month and in numerous press articles. Furthermore, he has set up in most of the towns and villages in the area local administrative committees composed of his own adherents. He has recently suggested to F. M. Alexander at Belgrade in February, 1945 that in any Allied occupation of the area his local committees be used by the Allied Military Government for administrative purposes. He has also been active with his 9th and 11th Corps against both Germans and the Italian Partisans.

4. Although on the surface these steps do not constitute annexation of the area, there is not the slightest doubt that the continued presence of his troops in the area or the employment of

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his committees for local administration are prejudicial to the eventual disposition of the area, and consequently are not in accord with U. S. policy.

5. Judging from past experiences in liberated Yugoslavia, it is practically inevitable that backed by Partisan forces in the area, the committees which are appointed and not elected will immediately seize control over all local administration, will energetically proselyte the inhabitants by every sort of propaganda and will eliminate by various means all elements opposed to Tito. As a result, an eventual plebiscite would be a foregone conclusion and any decision on the disposition of the area unfavorable to the Partisans would be extremely difficult to implement without the use of force.

6. In taking his stand, it is most probable that Tito has the support of the Kremlin. This is indicated not merely by the fact that he and his leading followers are devoted adherents of Stalin, but specifically by the statement he issued in Moscow after conversation with Stalin.

7. The issue, therefore, is hardly an Italian-Yugoslav dispute, but a basic and clear-cut U. S.-Soviet conflict involving the extent to which Soviet dominated areas are to be allowed to expand into Western Europe.

8. In this conflict the United States holds very good cards: our basic policy is sound and cannot legitimately be attacked as anti-Yugoslav or pro-Italian; there is an overwhelming superiority of Allied troops in the area.

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9. Against the [illegible] Allied armies, the [illegible] employ not more than 200,000 well-equipped Partisan troops. Having free [illegible] they will not endeavor to oppose the Allied troops if they act firmly and with determination. It will, however, almost certainly [illegible] a small show of physical force which may involve a little bloodshed. If in such a test we halt or retreat, he will be encouraged by diplomatic means, not only to push us out of the area (with the exception, perhaps, of the port of Trieste and the North-South lines of communication), but also to occupy areas in Northern Italy and Austria which, until now, have not been under dispute. Furthermore, the effect of any weakness in this area on our over-all policy of firmness with Russia will be anything but helpful.

10. As to the eventual disposition of the area, even if it should go to Yugoslavia, it would be most unfortunate if it were to go by default and not be used as a bargaining point at the peace settlement.

Charles W. Thayer
Lt. Col., AUS

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11 Dec 1953

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Dear Mike Cassidy:

I am attaching a memorandum which I
think will be of interest to the President.
Will you please see that it reaches
his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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31 May 1949

Dear Mr. Chamberlain:

I attach a copy of a memorandum sent to me by our U.S. representative in Austria [illegible] Austrian attitude to file.

Our representative - Lt. Colonel Harry [illegible] graduate of West Point, a member of our diplomatic service and is experienced in Russian matters. He returns to Austria and [illegible] and is now to head our OSS unit in Austria.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

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[illegible] Trieste, [illegible]

[illegible] to Mr. Charles P. Noyes

Subject: Situation in Venezia Giulia

1. It is the long-established policy of the United States Government to refrain from comment on the [illegible] of [illegible] which could prejudice the definition of [illegible] which may eventually be set forward.

2. One of these disputed areas is the so-called Venezia Giulia province including Istria, Fiume and Trieste, lying between Italy's 1939 Eastern frontier and the Isonzo River.

3. Tito has repeatedly given assurances that he will take no final action to incorporate any territories into Yugoslavia until the peace settlement. He has, however, publicly laid definite claim to the disputed area in a statement issued in Belgrade last month and in numerous press articles. Furthermore, he has set up in most of the towns and villages in the area local administrative committees composed of his own adherents. He has recently suggested to F. M. Alexander at Belgrade in February, 1945 that in any Allied occupation of the area his local committees be used by the Allied Military Government for administrative purposes. He has also

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[illegible] with the [illegible]

[illegible]

4. Although in the [illegible] statute [illegible] of the [illegible] doubt that the [illegible] or the [illegible] are prejudicial to the [illegible] consequently are not in accord with U.S. policy.

5. Judging from past experiences in [illegible] Syria, it is practically inevitable that backed [illegible] forces in the area, the Communist Chinese and [illegible] elected will immediately seize control over all [illegible] tration, will energetically proselyte the [illegible] by [illegible] of propaganda and will eliminate by various means all [illegible] ceased to live. As a result, an eventual [illegible] must be a foregone conclusion and any decision in the direction of the area unfavorable to the Partisans would be practically impossible to implement without the use of forces.

6. In taking his stand, it is most probable that [illegible] has the support of the Kremlin. This is indicated not [illegible] only by the fact that he and his leading followers are

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[illegible] of Stalin, [illegible]

[illegible]

7. The Soviet, therefore, is hardly a [illegible] Trieste [illegible] U.S. Soviet [illegible] the extent to which Soviet [illegible] are to be allowed to expand into Western Europe.

8. In this conflict the United States holds very good cards; our basic policy is sound and cannot legitimately be attacked as anti-Yugoslav or pro-Italian; there is an overwhelming superiority of Allied troops in the area.

9. Against the 5th and 8th Allied Armies, Tito can employ not more than 200,000 ill-equipped Partisan troops. Judging from his past performances, Tito will not endeavor to oppose the Allied troops if they act firmly and with determination. He will, however, almost certainly test out their firmness probably by a small show of physical force which may involve a little bloodshed. If in such a test we halt or retreat, he will be encouraged by diplomatic means not only to push us out of the area (with the exception, perhaps, of the port of Trieste and the North-South lines of communication), but also to occupy areas in Northern Italy and Austria which, until now, have not been under dispute. Furthermore, the

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either of my members [illegible] on the ground [illegible]
of [illegible] in regard [illegible] be worked out [illegible]
[illegible] to be [illegible] position of the area,
even if it should go [illegible] it would be worth con-
sidering if it were [illegible] and not be used as a
beginning point at this [illegible] meeting.

/s/

Charles P. Cabell
Lt. Gen., USAF

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NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	RELEASED INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1. [illegible]						
2. [illegible]	[illegible]					
3. [illegible]	Col Brayton					
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
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10.						
11.						

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Form No. 5 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 18 MAY 1945

FROM

TO VICTOR SAN FRANCISCO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

X PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 13399

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

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TOP SECRET

#0699. WOLFF FROM KENT.

1. TITO ADVISES SUBASICH AND ZUJEVICEN (ZHUJEVICH ?) TO COME HOME.

2. VELEDIT ADVISES GREECE SHOULD BE REPRESENTED WITH SAME RANK AS YUGOSLAVIA IN THE CONTROL COMMISSION FOR ITALY.

3. SUBASICH INFORMS HOME GOVERNMENT THAT AT THIS TIME WE (YUGOSLAVIA) MUST OBSERVE CASERTA AUGUST 1944 AGREEMENTS AND THOSE WITH ALEXANDER FEBRUARY 1945 TO THE LETTER. EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF SQUARE BRACKET JOINT SQUARE BRACKET OCCUPATION IN WHICH YUGOSLAV ARMY HAS SAME RIGHT AS AN ALLIED OPERATIONAL FORCE AND STAYS IN LINE WITH PAST COMMITMENTS. ADVISE THAT OUR PRESS PLUG OUR SAD EXPERIENCES AFTER LAST WAR--ESPECIALLY WITH D'ANNUNZIO.

THESE ARE PARAPHRASES OF ROUGH TRANSLATIONS. HIGHEST SECURITY MANDATORY ON SOURCE. SEE NO REASON, HOWEVER, WHY IF CONTENT IS HEDGED AS A JUDICIOUS GUESS OR PROGNOSIS CANNOT BE USED IN SITUATION REPORT.

TOP SECRET

TOR: 1348 18 MAY 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20 N.Y.

8 May 1945

To: Major General William J Donovan

From: John C Hughes

I return herewith memorandum from Southgate which you handed me when in this office yesterday. I have discussed this with Mr DeVecchi and we have made a copy of it for future reference. I find that, as a result of Southgate's previous talk with DeVecchi about his brother-in-law, DeVecchi and I have an appointment this coming Wednesday to discuss some plan with Albert Spalding involving the use of Colletti-Perucca in connection with Italian matters.

JCH

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major General William J. Donovan DATE: 2 May, 1945

FROM : Richard Southgate RS

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL

My brother-in-law, V. Umberto Coletti-Perucca, an Italian citizen, has just arrived in the United States from Florence. He has never been a Fascist and has been through many ordeals which it is not necessary to describe here. I put him in touch with de Vecchi in our New York office, where he has, I believe, given a certain amount of helpful information.

My brother-in-law made one suggestion, however, that I thought might be worth your consideration. He is a rather scholarly man, formerly a writer and publisher. He says that the Italians are hungry for American scientific and literary periodicals, as Italian scholars, medical men, engineers, etc. have been completely out of touch with American thought in these fields for a long period of years.

It just occurred to me that in connection with our collection of documents, etc. in Italy, it might be helpful if we sent over, for the present at least, a stream of such publications which would certainly arouse interest in Italy, would be most gratefully received and might facilitate some of our own efforts.

Possibly this might be the function of some other agency of the Government, but I thought you ought to have a chance to consider the suggestion in the first instance..

c.c. Mr. Richard Hartshorne

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(OFFICIAL DISPATCH)

DATE [illegible] 1944

FROM CAIRO/Army Flash

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION IN DUPLICATE

FOR ACTION FOR INFORMATION

Director SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER AMOUNT

#19354. 109 from Todd or Dickens. Re your #14954. SECRET

Following today copy of final agreement between CMH dele-

gates and SACMED.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SPECIAL DISPATCH

REC'D 12/30/44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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Would like copy agreement referred to in your #20504 sent to Washington station as possible.

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INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

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5x1 Form 1044

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FREE

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Letter
Memo
Cable

TO:

DATED: 17 Nov 64 (18 OCT)

FROM: Paraguay Desk

TO:

SUBJECT: Situation Report

ORIGINAL FILED IN: DCI 0.C.

TITLE #: 14,777-D

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director, OSO

FROM: Earl Brennan

DATE: November 11, 1948

SUBJECT: Malvina Reports

In accordance with your request which has been transmitted to me by Col. Joseph Rodrigo, I forward herewith for your attention Reports 13 through 19, dated 22, 23 and 24 August 1948 on the Malvina Project.

E.B.

Attachments as described above

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OSS Form 4001
(Rev 7/27/44)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

DATE 2 2 45

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	J. J. Monigan	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
	R. Thrum	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Aschinoloss	
	W. B. Kastick	WBK
	W. H. Miley	
	P. F. Pigliese	
	A. W. Galloway	
	W. B. Donovan	
	A. W. Dulles, Jr.	
	A. L. Dirt	
	H. H. Hamilton	
	L. R. Houston	
	C. S. McClelland	
	J. L. McDonnell	
	J. R. Schoener, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files M.O.D.	
	O. G. C. Files	

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OSS FORM 1001

SECRET

Date 18 November 45

To: General Donovan

With reference to Mr. Wilson's final recommendation, you will recall that you have distributed a cabled summary to Mr. McCloy.

SECRET

Office of the Secretariat

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING GROUP

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: General Donovan

DATE: Nov 20, 194

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

SUBJECT: Bilone reports

With reference to the attached correspondence, I make the following observations:

1. The most of these documents seems to have been already forwarded by you to the President on October 23, 1944.

2. In respect of Part I, there seems a dual purpose in this war in the minds of many Americans and many foreigners. One purpose is to beat the Germans; the other purpose to remake the social structure of Europe. I do not know where our Government's policy has declared it a national purpose to remake that structure, however advantageous it might be to do so. I question deeply whether we could remake the social structure of Europe in our own model even if we so desire.

3. Part II. I am much more deeply impressed with Part II particularly after a talk with Minifee who emphasized the footers contained in paragraph 3.

Unless he has already done so, I suggest you get him to show you the points which Commodore Stone urged him to bring to the attention of appropriate American

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authorities. The situation in Italy looks indeed serious unless we can enable them to help themselves, particularly by the release of necessary transportation whether trucks or coastal boats. From Minifee's account, it looks as if this problem is even more pressing than the importation of food and would be of more immediate aid to getting the Italians started helping themselves than any other one step we could take.

As to Parts 3 and 4, my knowledge is not wide enough to speak. Whether Alexander issued appeals for uprising prematurely or not, it is lamentable that the Partisans believe that he did so. It may well be that the difficulties of weather, scarcity of transport, etc. disheartened the Partisans again and again and that this accounts for their state of mind afterwards.

4. McCloy has taken a deep interest in this type of matter and I wonder whether it would not be a good idea to bring this report, particularly Part 2, as well as Minifee's report, to his attention.

HHRW

Enclosures.

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

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 1 November 1944

TO : General Donovan

FROM : John E. O'Gara

SUBJECT: Attached report from Scamporino

Referring particularly to paragraph 1 part 1 in the attached, this is a very disturbing report.

I have submitted it to Colonel Buxton to sound him out with respect to it being disturbing and to ask how we should go about to inquire what can be done. He suggests that all three of us might discuss it.

J. E. O'Gara

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, OSS
THROUGH: Chief, SI

DATE : November 1, 1943

FROM : Earl Brennan

SUBJECT: The Silone Report

In response to a request from Mr. Sullivan, I forward herewith for your information and retention the report on the present situation in Italy which was prepared for OSS by Ignazio Silone and which was referred to in cable 1598, from Caserta (IN 23280).

O/S.
E.B.

Attachment as described above

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9 October 1944

TO: Director, OSS
Attention: Maj. Ryman
Chief, Italian Mission, A.F.

FROM: Vincent J. Schaefer
Chief, Italian S.I.

SUB. JECT: Milone Report

J-10092. Attached you will find part I and II of a report prepared by Ignazio Milone exclusively for this organization.

J-10092. Parts III and IV are in the process of preparation and will be forwarded within the next few days.

For Colonel QUINN:

Vincent J. Schaefer
Chief Italian S. I.

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10 October 1944

Subject: Allied Moves

In this connection I propose to discuss briefly the following points:

I. The contradictions of Allied policy in Italy and in the other countries of the European continent.

II. The special difficulties of the birth of democracy in Italy.

III. The political scene shifting in Northern Italy.

IV. The shortcomings of Allied activity in Switzerland with regard to Italy.

Point I

1. The Allies are showing themselves to be incapable of leading the democratic revolution in Europe. By democratic revolution we mean such structural changes in the political and economic order as would guarantee the establishment of free and peaceful democracies in the major countries of Europe. Allied policy is composed of such contradictory trends that it is systematically neutralizing and destroying whatever amount of good the Allies themselves succeed in doing. If the main distinguishing mark of a just policy be the appropriate relation of ends to means, we are forced to conclude either that the Allies do not know what they want, or else that they do not know how to set about getting what they want, leaving as they do full license to their different services (military, diplomatic, etc.) to fight among themselves.

2. Roosevelt's statement on the extension to Europe, and especially to the German I.G. Farben, (German chemical trust) of the American anti-trust law, appeared to us as a ray of light in the midst of this confused and contradictory policy. To our surprise, we noticed that the American propaganda services have given very meagre publicity to this extremely important statement.

3. When we say that the democratic European revolution must be given an aim and a clear, concrete content, we are thinking, not of a radical and total form of Socialism, but of a series of structural measures analogous to Roosevelt's above-mentioned anti-trust measure. As long, however, as some American representatives in Europe keep on working for democracy and others for the Crown, some for a republican form of government and others for constitutional restoration, some for freedom of thought

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and others for the Catholic clergy, the result is going to be a chaotic chaos, propitious to the birth of future Fascism.

4. Before leaving Switzerland I discussed these problems with the leaders of the Swiss Socialist Party. Both the Swiss and the Italian Socialists are going to insist that the British Labour Party call a conference of all Western European Socialist parties in order to confront public opinion openly with the problem of the democratic revolution in Europe.

PART II

1. The fate of democracy in Italy is closely bound up with the trend of the labour movement. Should the Italian labour movement fall entirely or mainly into the hands of the Communists, the already sparse hope of a political democracy in Italy would vanish altogether. With this country in its present state, it is no exaggeration to say that whoever holds the labour movement will hold the power.

2. The Communist monopoly of the labour movement can be checked mainly by a truly democratic Socialist Party and only secondarily by other parties such as the Catholic, Democrat, etc. This situation endows the Socialist Party with very exceptional importance. A fusion of the Socialist Party with the Communist Party would represent such a mighty concentration of forces as to imperil all hope of a democratic regime. In my opinion it is perfectly possible to save the autonomy of the Italian Socialist Party and to maintain it on a broad democratic basis. The danger of a Socialist-Communist fusion which seemed imminent in August of last year has now faded into the distance.

3. It is nevertheless essential to keep clearly in mind that the fate of Italian democracy is bound up with the concrete realization of a certain number of indispensable measures guaranteeing work and bread to the masses. The propaganda of freedom rings ironical when it is addressed to homeless and starving men and women. I do not think that allied relief is, in the long run, the best solution to these elementary needs. The Italians should rather be given the legal possibility of helping themselves. The Italians have always shown excellent qualities in local self-government. It would be wise to promote, even before the elections and the formation of the Constituent Assembly, a widespread administrative autonomy of the different regions, provinces, and townships. The future democratic State would thus arise from the foundations, built by a new political class singled out for its capacity in local government.

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21 October 1944

TO: Director, OSS
Attention: Karl F. Lehman
Chief, Italian Section, SI

FROM: Vincent J. Scamporino
Chief, Italian SI

SUBJECT: Silone Report

1. Attached you will find Parts III and IV of a report prepared by Ignazio Silone exclusively for this organization.

2. Parts I and II were forwarded to you on 19 October 1944.

For Colonel GRAVELY

Vincent J. Scamporino
Chief, Italian SI

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HEADQUARTERS [illegible]
267 TM [illegible] GHQ (PROV)
APO 534 U.S. ARMY

20 October 1944

Subject: SILONE REPORT

Part III

THE POLITICAL SCENE SHIFTING IN NORTHERN ITALY

1. In Northern Italy, the region which is politically and economically decisive for the life of the entire country, the Socialist, the Catholic and the Democratic forces were very considerable up to a year ago, and were able to keep Communist action in check. In the course of this last year, as a result of the serious disappointments that the Partisans have had to put up with from the Allies, the influence of the Communists has been steadily increasing and has now reached such proportions as to render extremely difficult the reunion of Northern Italy with the rest of the country after it has been evacuated by the Germans.

2. The following is a true if somewhat brutal idea of the state of mind that has been gaining ground among anti-fascists in Northern Italy. The Allies, both publicly and by secret means, urged us to prepare a general action of insurrection for the Ides of March. Despite the German occupation, on March 15th we organised a general strike in Northern Italy, but the promised Allied military help and the promised general offensive failed to materialise. We had to bear the entire brunt of the terrible losses which the Germans inflicted on us. The Socialist and Democrat movement in Northern Italy was decimated, with irreparable losses, as a result of the strike of March 15th.

3. Since then, General Alexander has issued numerous separate appeals inciting the Partisans of the various regions of Northern Italy to armed insurrection behind the German lines, to be linked up with imminent Allied offensives on the Italian front. The Partisans and the Italian Liberation Committees have acted on these appeals; they have done all they could every time; they have suffered tragic losses; but the heralded Allied offensives have failed to materialise.

4. Thinking that the lack of help from the Allies was due to insufficient information, delegations from all the centres of Italian resistance in the North arrived in Switzerland in the course of this last year in order to establish contacts with the qualified Allied representatives. These delegations gave an exact account of their conditions and their possibilities, and they asked for help which was formally promised them, but in the vast majority of cases the Allies have not kept their promises.

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J 1609a

SILONE REPORT

PART III

5. That which from the very beginning had been an insinuation, and later a refrain of Communist propaganda, is now the universal conviction of all anti-fascists in the North: - "The Allies urge us on to action and then refuse us the means of putting up an effective fight against the Germans, with the deliberate intention of letting us be butchered by the latter; the Allies are behaving towards us exactly as the Russians behaved towards the insurgents of Warsaw."

6. The Socialists, the Catholics and the Democrats are no longer able to refute this kind of statement, especially since they themselves now think the same thing. The state of mind prevailing among the Italian resistance movements of certain regions of Northern Italy is consequently one of extreme exasperation with the Allies, and, by an understandable psychological reflex, in favor of Russia. The direct result of this state of mind has been a vast increase in the strength of Communist influence.

PART IV

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ALLIED ACTIVITY IN SWITZERLAND WITH REGARD TO ITALY

1. A reflection of this two-faced Allied policy towards Italy can be observed fairly clearly in Switzerland, where, side by side with the representatives of the Liberation Committees of Northern Italy, the Italian diplomatic and consular representatives of the Mussolini epoch still continue to flourish as formal representatives of the government of Rome. These diplomatic representatives are not only Fascists, they are out-and-out ultra-fascists, originally sent to Switzerland because of their fidelity to Fascist ideas. Their acceptance of the change of regime in Italy is opportunist and insincere. Some of them are still on the best of terms with the German diplomatic and secret services. Others are busy preparing, among the Italian military internees in Switzerland, groups of action which are going to be the nuclei of Italy's future Fapoism. The polemic between these Italian authorities and the Italian anti-fascists in Switzerland is being carried on publicly.

2. It was with stupefaction at first, and then with sadness, that the anti-fascists learned on what very cordial terms the Allied representatives stand with these relics of Fascist diplomacy. From the Italian Legation in Berne come the suggestions inciting the Allies to refuse arms to the Partisans, on the pretext that the latter would make use of them again tomorrow in order to impose a Communist regime on Italy. If, up to the moment when Southern France was liberated, there was the technical difficulty of replacing the Italian diplomats and consuls in Switzerland with more trustworthy elements, that difficulty no longer exists. If no change is made, it is only natural that the anti-fascists will attribute it to Allied ill-will.

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

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2 October 1944

Dear Judy

The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Judy:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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22 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in a summary of a report which was prepared by Ignazio Silone, [illegible] Italian Socialist leader who has just returned to Italy. This summary which was forwarded to me by our representative in Rome, reads as follows:

"1. The Allies are showing themselves incapable of establishing free and peaceful democracies in Europe.

"2. Roosevelt statement repudiation of anti-trust measures to I. G. Farben is ray of light [illegible] confused and contradictory policy. Press has given little publicity to it.

"3. Democratic European revolution must be given aim. This does not mean radical and total form of socialism but series of structural changes analogous to Roosevelt anti-trust measure.

"4. American representatives in Europe for democracy, trusts, republican government, monarchical restoration, Catholic clergy. Result will be chaos

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 10, 1944

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
EXPEDITE

IN 23400

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION) INFORMATION

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23404. To 100 and 110 from OSS.

Siena exclusive report to OSS enroute states:

1. Allies showing selves incapable to establish free and peaceful democracies in Europe.

2. Roosevelt statement to apply anti-trust measures to I. G. Farben is ray of light amidst confused and contradictory policy. Press has given little publicity to it.

3. Democratic European revolution must be given aim. This does not mean radical and total form of Socialism but series of structural changes analagous to Roosevelt anti-trust measure.

4. American representatives in Europe for democracy, trusts, republican governments, monarchical restorations, Catholic clergy. Result will be chaos and birth of future Hitlers.

5. Swiss and Italian Socialists will insist British Labor Party call conference of all western European Socialist parties to confront public with problem of democratic revolution in Europe.

6. Fate of democracy in Italy bound in labor movement. If movement falls mainly in Communist hands, hopes for political democracy will vanish.

7. Fusion of Socialists and Communists would imperil hope of democratic regime. Danger of fusion has now faded.

8. Work and bread to masses indispensable. Freedom propaganda to homeless, starving men ironical. Allied relief not best solution to alimentary needs. Italians must be given legal possibility

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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FROM

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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to help solve.

9. Prompts before elections and formation of constituent assembly, widespread administrative autonomy of different regions. Future democratic state will then arise built by political class with capacity for local government. More follows.

ACTION COPY

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TOR: 10/19/44 8:38 PM

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

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HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT
HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT
2677th Regiment, OSS (Prov.)
A.P.O. 534

25 August 1944
23 August 1944

Subject: Malvina Project, Report #13
SUBJECT: Malvina Project, Report #13
TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs. 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US ARMY
TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs. 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US ARMY
FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.
FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.

ITALIAN DIPLOMATS NOW IN CAIRO
ITALIAN DIPLOMATS NOW IN JAPAN

1. [illegible], Mario--Ambassador. Born 3/4/88. Entered the service 15/1/13. Appointed [illegible]. Mario--Ambassador. Born 1/4/88. Entered the service 16/3/11. Appointed 22/1/40. In Tokio since 8/7/40. Married.

2. [illegible], Pasquale--Secretary of the Legation, 1st Class. Born 10/1/90. Entered the Service 21/7/25. Appointed 31/12/35. In Tokio since 3/3/41 by decree dated 26/4/41. Bachelor.

3. [illegible], Enrico--Secretary of the Legation, 1st Class. Born 3/11/02. Entered the Service 16/7/25. Appointed 1/1/39. In Tokio since 28/8/37 by decree dated 22/6/37. Married, one child. 21/12/36. Went to Tokio 28/8/37 by decree dated 22/6/37. Married, one child.

4. [illegible], Ettore--Consul, 2nd Class. Born 21/7/05. Entered service 1/1/31. Appointed 15/6/39. In Osaka-Kobe since 1/9/42 by decree of 22/7/42. Married, one child (male).

5. [illegible], Renato di Quattromo Conte Girolamo--Vice Consul--1st Class. Born 10/1/11. Entered Service 15/6/37. Appointed 22/1/40. Tokio since 23/1/41 by decree of 24/12/40. Bachelor.

6. [illegible], Diego--Vice Consul, 2nd Class. Born 26/1/14. Entered service 1/6/39. Appointed 16/10/40. Tokio 23/1/41 by decree of 24/10/40. Bachelor.

7. [illegible], Alfredo--Consul, Interpreter-Commissioner, 2nd Class. Born [illegible]. Entered Service 2/6/24. Appointed 23/11/26. Yokohama since 1/12/24. by decree 10/10/24. Married, one son.

8. [illegible], Aldo--Vice Consul, 2nd Class. Born 17/3/95. Entered service 2/7/28. Appointed 30/3/28. Tokio 18/11/40 by decree of 26/10/40. Bachelor.

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[illegible] Crystal [illegible] (Capt) [illegible] 1st Class. Born 4/8/20. Entered service 2/4/41. Appointed 2/7/41. Table since 4/11/44 to Lieut 12/7/49. Married, one son.

Japanese attache in Italy.

Before the fall of Rome, practically all of them were invited to go to Venice.

[illegible]
FRANK PURTELL/sc
Captain, U.S.C.

cc: Major Bloom

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BRENNAN

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J-829

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HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2677th Regiment, O.S.S. (Prov.)
A. P. O. 534

1 SEP 5 1944

24 August 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Project, Report #14.

TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs., 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US ARMY

FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.O.

Fusion of the Liberal Democracy Party with the Liberal Party.

The fusion of the two parties has not produced the practical results expected. In fact, this fusion has determined incidents and aroused uncertainties within the Directorate of the L. Party and in circles close to Gen. Croce. The fusion had to some effective only among the leading elements of both parties, but it seems not to be very efficient among the majority of their members, especially in Bari. Political Circles of the Puglie and Potenza regions were not well impressed with the fusion.

THE SITUATION IN BARI.

Political activity is enjoying a lull except those circles controlled by the British. The youth of Bari, for the most part, are decidedly against actively participating in political affairs. The best elements of the leading class are reluctatively awaiting developments, and for the moment are passive.

The agrarian class, from latifondo-owners to proletarians, is seriously worried about the present economic situation. The present Government does not in the least enjoy its confidence. The clergy of South Italy is decidedly anti-Bolshevik. In Naples a clergyman who had written several articles in a pro-Communist newspaper, perhaps trying to form a group similar to the Catholic-Communists, has been dismissed "a divinis" (not permitted to say Mass) by Cardinal Ascalesi.

According to reports concerning the financial situation, a bill is about to be introduced relative to the transferrance of 50% of land revenues to the State, starting from a base value of 100,000 lire. That is whoever has 100,000 lire or more has got to turn over half of it. It is thought that this would be the only way to annul the Italian National Debt for the most part. The national debt amounts to about 900 billions lire. Hon. Bonriello will arrive in Rome shortly to discuss this.

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Concerning the work of the Movimento Democratico.

a. The necessary steps for an eventual fusion of all the conservative parties have already been taken, and meetings have been held with all the conservative groups, the agrarian associations, and also with representatives of Soldiers and Disabled Veterans.

b. All the provincial and regional branches of the various Associations have been inspected and they have shown their perfect efficiency and splendid organisation.

Frank Fortunato
FRANK FORTUNATO
Captain, Sn.C.

cc: Major Ilicca

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Date Rec'd. Date Sent Comments

1158

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...be drawn across sheet under each comment.
...dispositions should be used in To column.
...ment should be routed (sufficient) before further routing.
...reasons for holding taken should be indicated in Comments column.
...ments should be typed in triplicate by Registry.
...ments handling only one copy of dispatch sheet.

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HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2677th Regiment OSS (Prov)
A. P. O. 534

22 August 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Report, August 22

TO : Intelligence Officer, 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov) APO 534, U.S. Army

FROM : Special Agent Farnsworth

In Neapolitan circles, which has been for days, has been observed a very significant change in the attitude of the British towards the Russian Communists. It is felt that for the British, the activity of the Russian Communists could be dangerous for British interests in Italy. It is thought this is the first step towards an anti-Bolshevik campaign in Europe, and especially in Italy, the control of which is so preserving to the British. It is further thought this attitude was suggested by a member of Churchill's party. It is not clear however, just what attitude the British have assumed. At the same time, these circles note that the Americans are not actively intervening. It is felt that the only time the U.S. will do something is when the question has been solely economic ones. It is thought that Mr. Murphy and Mr. Taylor are the persons who would intervene.

The situation in Naples.

The situation in Naples is serious and preoccupying. The declaration of the Central Commission (Alto Commissariato) sic, of Algiers seems not to have been opportune. As it is well known, the Commission informed the King that it would not guarantee the King's personal physical security so long as he remained in Naples. This piece of news serves to arouse the whole Italian court and the Republic element of Southern Italy. The king had asked all the civil and military authorities of Naples area for the necessary "authorizations", that had been immediately granted accompanied with the expressions of the deepest satisfaction. Afterwards, however, came the information from Algiers.

It is said in many circles that this incident is the first symptom of the new difficulties which the Allies intend to establish in Naples. They are, therefore, asking the following questions:

a. Why does Naples not yet passed under the administration of the Italian Government?

b. Why is there such severe censorship in Naples, limiting the liberty of press and speech?

c. Why has the most severe police system ever seen in Italy, been re-established in Naples?

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d. Why do the Allies refuse to clarify the Neapolitan situation, especially in the light of the [illegible]

e. Why have such very large [illegible] of construction begun in the Naples harbor [illegible]

f. Rumors have spread that the city of Naples would be [illegible] power (which power unknown people say) will have these quarters [illegible]

g. Why is Naples being changed into a new Shanghai?

h. Why is the population of Naples subjected to such cruel treatment under the Anglo-American regime, equivalent to third degree methods used in Nazi-Fascist days, all of some pretense [illegible]

i. The Neapolitans now have the net impression that they are to hope for nothing from the Allies [illegible]

Reliable information also reveals the fact that in some parts of the capital, [illegible] section, people have given expression to [illegible] the appearance of enormous circulation of money has produced the result corruption [illegible] Italy has ever known [illegible]

[illegible]
ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE
Caserta, Italy

Major Rizza

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HEADQUARTERS DETATCHMENT
2677th Regiment, O.S.S. (Prov.)
A. P. O. 534

SECRET

SEP 5 1944

24 August 1944

SUBJECT: Salvina Project, Report #16.

TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs., 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US Army

FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.

1. Parodi-Delfino and his intimate friends have contacted British industrialists and have consummated industrial contracts with them. Intermediary--Avv. Serrao.

This same group has been negotiating for the eventful formation of a Franco-Italian Society, which has for its purpose industrial-economic exploitation. However, Naldi and his inner circle are the principles in this deal.

2. Section D, PWB, Naples and Rome offices (British), maintains continuous liaison with Benedetto Croce, the latter having placed a liaison agent in either office. In Naples, the meetings occur in Viale Colleoline and in Rome at the Albergo Ludovisi.

3. Practically all the requests of the Partito Liberale are unconditionally approved by PWB; circulation and curfew permits, etc.

FRANK FORTUNATO
Captain, Sn.C.

cc: Major Ricca

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[illegible] RECORD SHEET

Accession No. [illegible]

Date Rec'd. [illegible]

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
REHMAN	[illegible]	9/5	9/2	[illegible]	
	1133				

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HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

2677th Regiment, O.S.S. (Prov.)

A. P. O. 534

24 August 1944

SUBJECT: Malvina Project, Report #17.

TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs., 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US Army

FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.

Premier Churchill arrived in Vatican City at 10:45 A.M., 23rd August, in the company of an Admiral, the Ambassador, a Captain, and secretaries.

He wore an elegant morning suit, with an Orleans coat. These details should be remarked upon since it would have been necessary to pay more attention to Vatican etiquette.

Only Churchill was received by the Pope. He remained forty-five minutes with him. According to reliable Vatican circles, Churchill at first was reticent about seeing the Pope.

It would seem that Churchill asked the Pope not to discuss peace terms.

Towards evening of the 23rd, Churchill left Rome by plane.

Frank Fortunato.

FRANK FORTUNATO
Captain, Sn.C.

cc: Major Ricca

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

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HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2677th Regiment, O.S.S. (Prov.)
A. P. O. 534

SEP 5 1944

24 August 1944

SUBJECT: Melvina Project, Report #18

TO : Intelligence Officer, Hqs., 2677th Regt. OSS (Prov.) APO 534, US Army

FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.

The Situation in Vatican City.

Following the coronation of Pius XII, the aspect of internal and foreign policies of the Holy See changed remarkably.

Pius XI had brought under his control many Vatican activities. Pius XII, on the other hand, assumed direction only of Foreign Relations, diplomatic affairs and audiences.

Political international affairs are committed to the Secretary of State. Its members, which constitute one group of Vatican personalities, are headed by Mons. Montini, rather than Maglione (now deceased). Mons. Montini is very intimate with the Pope and is very influential.

The Commission of Cardinals, which handles the administration of the Holy See constitutes the second group headed by a desanctis president, Card. Canali. His collaborators, ing. Galeazzi and Mr. Calabresi, are the effective directors of the Administration of the Holy See.

It is remarkable that the Vatican's traditional nepotism, eliminated by Pius X, seems to have reappeared, although it is excused by the present circumstances.

At present the activity of the Cardinals is limited to the direction of the various "Congregations", which have no particular influence upon general affairs and foreign policy.

H. Em. Card. Tisserant, known among the soldiers of the French Army of Liberation under the name of "Cardinal De Gaulle", is on the contrary the most typical representative of the pro-Allied Cardinals which constitute the third group. Card. Tisserant, a man of rare talent and culture (sometimes referred as the Black Pope) is Secretary of the Oriental Congregation. Formerly, he did not enjoy great favor.

A fourth group, in the process of formation, is inclined to a policy of collaboration. Its leader is Car. Salotti, who, after assuming an "on the fence" policy, seems to have reached a more decisive attitude.

The really new personality, however, in Vatican City is H. E. Mons. Montini, probably future Secretary of State, a man who lived and lives very close to

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the Pope, and whose unconditional favor he enjoys. He personally takes care of the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors confined in Vatican City under strict surveillance.

The importance and influence of Jesuits in the Vatican City are remarkable, although, since some of them have been supporters of a Catholic-Communist Movement, Father Lo Zeppo of Avv. 227, to Ascalesi dismissed as director of Civiltà for writing pro-Communist articles).

The general orientation is decidedly anti-Nazi. Concerning Solidarità N, an attitude of mistrust may be remarked.

In Vatican circles, people look at a lasting re-establishment of the Monarchy in Italy with optimism.

The Vatican Press, strictly controlled by the Secretariat of State has lost two of its collaborators; Dr. Gennella, at present editor of the "Papelo" and Dr. Giordani, editor of the Quotidiano. Count Della Torre is still the editor of the Osservatore Romano, but he does not enjoy the sympathy of Vatican circles and perhaps will be substituted by his chief-"redattore", Dr. Lelli. Count Della Torre has assumed an attitude of the utmost reserve, limiting the activity of his paper to "ethical" topics exclusively. The control of the Vatican Press is committed to Mons. Martino Bohen, who may eventually be appointed Special Secretary for Catholic Press.

FRANK FORTUNATO
Captain, Bn.C.

cc: Major Riess

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

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SEP 5 1944

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HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2677th Regiment, O.S.S. (Prov.)
A. P. O. 534

29 August 1944

SUBJECT: Malvina Project, Report #19.

TO : Intelligence Officer, Hq., 2677th Regt. OSS Prov., APO 534, US Army

FROM : Captain Frank Fortunato, Sn.C.

COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ITALY AND JAPAN IN 1940.

1. In 1940, some time before the intervention of Italy in the war, a commercial agreement was stipulated with Japan for a sum amounting to about 400 millions lire. This agreement had to last a year. Payments were effected with the same values derived from the reciprocal exports of both countries, so that, if one of the two countries suspended or relaxed its exports, the agreement would have ceased to function automatically.

The most important goods Italy had to import from Japan consisted of:

1. Soya seeds in very great quantity
2. Fish oils
3. Camphor
4. And other goods of less importance.

Italy had to export into Japan:

1. Engines for civilian & military use forming the great majority of the exports
2. Artificial silk
3. Sulphur
4. Plaster
5. Wine
6. And other goods of secondary importance.

It was impossible to put this agreement into effect because of Italy's intervention in the war; it was, however, neither suspended nor dissolved, on the contrary it was renewed at its maturity, in spite of the fact that it was not activated.

2. After Italy's intervention in this war, an agreement of secret character was made between two banks appointed by the respective governments. Through this agreement an exchange of goods was planned for a sum amounting to 125 millions lire. The imports were effected through Germany when the war against Russia had not yet been declared and afterwards by means of ships.

Copper, tin, wolframium and gum had to be imported in change of exports of

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[illegible] and war materials.

[illegible] of the commercial exchanges was greatly reduced owing to the [illegible] increasingly strict blockade made by the Allies.

3. The purchases and sales made by Japan both in Italy and all the other [illegible] countries, and the [illegible] Japan, as the most important of these [illegible] Germany, as the most important of the Japanese [illegible] Those Germanies is really frozen for the [illegible] Government.

Frank D'Amato
Frank D'Amato
Captain, S.C.

Major Riesa
Major Riesa

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CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]
A. P. O. #[illegible], U. S. Army

27 [illegible] 1944

[illegible]: Participants Conference.

: Colonel Galahan Carter,
Executive General Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

As per our conversation, the enclosed report is forwarded for your [illegible].

A. M. Lynch
Lt. Col. F. A. C.
Asst G-3

[illegible]:
Incl #1 - Memo - "Lessons Learned in Combat by 3/4th Division, from 7 - 8 November 1943 to September 1944."

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[illegible]

... the military standpoint, they have been of ... The Partisans are ... [illegible] ... for our division. They advise the ... [illegible] ... Allied Military Government in the future ... [illegible] ... guides and ... as interpreters. [illegible] ... In [illegible], for example, the ... small and ... squads. [illegible] ... our infantry squads to mop up remaining German elements. ... Partisans ... constantly, bring to us many ... escaped Allied prisoners of war.

[illegible] ... can be outlined as follows:

a. They are not highly organized so far as delegation of power to ... [illegible], their leaders do most of the work.

c. They are usually poorly clothed.

d. For tactical missions they are inadequately armed and generally short ... [illegible]

e. Their food supply is inadequate to maintain their organization. ... [illegible] ... their leader explained to us on 9 July that the organization ... [illegible] ... of men but because they had no food source.

f. The tactical information they bring to us is often tardy. This may be ... [illegible] ... of communication facilities or ... The lack of transportation ... [illegible]

g. ... leaders of the Partisans and CLN are not accustomed to evaluate ... information, ... [illegible] ... eager to help us and their people they ... [illegible]

h. The fact that ... hold civilians as hostages is a deterrent to the ... [illegible] ... of the Partisans. For example, in [illegible] the Germans massacred ... [illegible] ... the dead and ... from ... section ... [illegible] ... photographed the dead, ... have a record of the same."

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"Organization of Reconnaissance Groups"
from Col. Glavin, 16 Aug 44

Distribution List - 26 Aug

1 IG: Coll. Carter

2 MedTO: Mr. Dodd

3 SO: Lt. Col. Hoffmann

4 SSO: Col. Migelow

5 IS: Col. Sands

6 X-2: Maj. Pfaff
SI: Mr. Foster
MO: Lt. Col. Mann

7 Planning Group

8 Planning Staff

9 Secretariat

10 Files

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HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
2677th REGIMENT OSS (PROVISIONAL)
APO 534 U.S.ARMY

16 August 1944

SUBJECT: Organization of Resistance Groups

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C. - Attention: Secretariat

1. Enclosed is the agreement requested in your cable #54028(4). Also enclosed are the minutes of the conference held on 3 July 1944 in Rome to discuss the problem.

2. These papers were withdrawn from the Operations files of our OSS-AAI Detachment.

Edward J. F. Glavin

EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

(WJ)

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SECRET

Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

AC/G (Ops)

22 June 44

A.M.G.	(5)
Army Sub-Commission	(5)
Fifth Army	(100)
5th Fifth Army	(5)
Eighth Army	(100)
5th Eighth Army	(5)
Polish Corps	(20)
A.M.G.	(5)
No. 1 Special Force	(5)
A.M.G.	(5)

At a meeting held at ACC in ROME 21 June, it was decided that the following bodies responsible for the organisation of partisan groups, namely:

OSS
No. 1 Special Force.
National Committee of Liberation
and Italian Military Organisation for Central Italy,

will send liaison representatives to go forward and attach themselves to AMG with both Fifth and Eighth Armies. These representatives will be given passes by this H.Q. authorising initially to report to AMG. Thereafter, armies will issue the necessary passes so that they can circulate freely within the army areas.

These representatives will act as Liaison Officers between AMG and the resistance group leaders. It is not possible to disclose the names of the resistance group leaders before the territory is liberated by the forward troops, firstly, as matters of security, and secondly, because in many cases they are only known by code words. The representatives, however, will be able to establish contact directly, and this will lead to the identification of the sub-leaders in the various districts.

AMG, working through AMG with both armies, will be responsible for all contact with resistance groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops. In principle, AMG will use the existing resistance group organisation to gain their cooperation in handing in their arms and equipment, and to their normal life in liberated Italy. Troops will be instructed, except in cases of necessity, not to disarm the patriots or to have direct dealings with them. They should be directed to contact the AMG organisation.

AMG, in conjunction with PW, will arrange for the production of suitable documents to be given to the patriots, thanking the patriots for the good work they have done to hasten their liberation, calling upon the leaders to contact AMG, giving instructions about arms, and when to hand in their arms so that they may be put without delay on other patriots in the North to carry on the struggle.

AMG will provide a suitable receipt document, thanking the patriot for his services and giving details of the receipt for the arms he hands in.

Most patriots will wish to return to their normal occupations. They should be encouraged to do so. There will be some, however, whose homes are in Northern Italy and who will remain underground. These will be directed by AMG to camps to be established by AMG in the East and West sectors.

/2.....

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You will, of course, be made by military personnel of any information which the patriots can give, but military personnel will not employ patriots in any fighting rule once they have been liberated.

It is emphasized that military personnel must not become involved in problems raised by resistance group leaders or patriots, and no promises will be made to them. They will in all cases be referred to AMG with whom the representatives of the various organizations will be working in close touch.

AJ Hayes

Lt.-Gen.,
Chief of General Staff.

FHQ/AG

26 June 44

I personally attended the meeting and helped formulate the above directive.

Col. AAC
Comdg. OSS - Italy

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	O.S.S.
[illegible]	Region IV
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Mal. Special Force
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	O.S.S.
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Mal. Special Force
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

Detailed instructions to be sent to AMS at [illegible] by Detailed [illegible] of M.C. & M.A. Section.

2. [illegible] For this purpose [illegible] select a few [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible] (C.L.H.) respectively.

........../.......

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Preliminary action in countries.

6. The poster prepared by PWB for Gen Alexander's signature was approved subject to an additional clause appealing for the gathering of the harvest. This poster is to be pasted in forward areas, and the contents put in Italian newspapers and broadcast by PWB.

(a) i.e. (b) is called instead to be sent to AFHQ Armies by patrols through C.A.O. H.Q. Berlin.

7. The surrender of arms must be justified by law and not on grounds of military expediency i.e. the statement that arms will be returned to Northern Italy.

8. The time of handing in arms to be at the discretion of C.A.O.s who may use patrols for temporary police work if necessary.

9. Arms must be handed in to AMG and not be accumulated though the latter may handle the collection thereof. Receipts for arms should be given and should be signed by C.A.O.s.

Detailed instructions to be sent to AFHQ Armies by patrols through C.A.O. H.Q. Berlin.

Certificates of merit.

10. After discussion it was decided not to issue collective certificates of merit since this would be most difficult to administer and would certainly cause ill feeling.

11. It was agreed that the only certificates of merit to be issued to Italians (apart from those given to persons who have helped escaping prisoners of war) should be to members of reorganised fighting bands who have carried arms, carried out demolitions or engaged in sabotage. It will be the duty of C.A.C.s helped by their Patriot Reps to adjudicate in doubtful cases.

12. The certificate will be signed by General Alexander in facsimile, and will also be endorsed by the local Patriot leader and an Allied officer.

(a) P.W.B. (b) Detailed instructions to be sent to AFHQ Armies by patrols through C.A.O. H.Q. Berlin.

13. Regional officers will take over from departing Army C.A.C.s the responsibility for the issue of certificates.

Subsequent employment of Patriots.

14. It was suggested that the problem of finding employment for patriots should be handled by a committee in every provincial seat of government reporting to the province and the AMG representative. In rural areas the men can usefully be employed on agricultural work on the clearance of debris and the secondary reconstruction of roads and demolished buildings. It is essential to find work to absorb the patriots otherwise militant political parties would concentrate.

Brief proposals to be put up by Patriots present.

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15. The A.A.G. M.M.I.s. stressed that as Italian conscription law extended into AMG territory, patriots of military age were liable for service. In practice it would take a little time to establish the machinery for registration etc. in forward areas. Pending further notifications patriots of military age should therefore be encouraged to act on a temporary basis in the same way as those of other age groups.

Persons who have assisted Allied P.O.W. to escape.

16. A scheme of aid is in operation for people who have assisted Allied P.O.W. to escape. This was discussed and it was decided that no further action could be taken meantime.

C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriot Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

All Allied members present.
A.A.I Army (4)
A.A.I Army (3)
Liberian Subcommission (1)
Spares (10)
File (1)
War Diary (1)

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13 Oct

DRAFT

1. In any plan for Italian-Swiss SI or SO operations it must be understood that no activities may be undertaken that will jeopardize or even embarrass the position of the Chief of OSS, Berne.

2. All operations must be explained fully to 110. His advice on methods of procedure should be considered and discussed from the military angle and, where practicable, accepted.

3. The operations of agents Cesaini, SI, and Como, SO, should at all times be maintained as separate entities, under the control of the respective officers with whom each works as an individual; their activities within Switzerland should be under the supervision of 110 at all times.

4. As Cesaini and Como, both extremely valuable agents, are affiliated with different political parties, and because their personalities are known to clash, it is suggested that they do not meet or confer any more than is considered absolutely necessary.

SUGGESTED PLAN FOR CORRELATION OF SWISS-ITALIAN OPERATIONS, SI

1. It is suggested that Cesaini, who is at the present time in touch with 110, Berne, be set up as the representative of Italian SI in Switzerland. In this capacity he will come under the over-all supervision of 110, but will receive his operational orders from the Italian SI Operations Section.

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the intelligence items will report to CSI daily according to predetermined signal plans.

d. It is clearly evident that on the basis of the military urgency for this intelligence, the traffic will be substantial and cultural circulation essential. It is urged therefore, that the CSI communications officer be consulted regarding the establishment of an AI daily section for the exclusive handling of this traffic during the military emergency, the time factor alone in receipt and dissemination would warrant such a section.

e. AI daily will make the facilities of this proposed area section available to SO daily for the receiving and dissemination of operational intelligence and will continue to furnish them with diplomatic and general intelligence.

4. General :

a. The work and needs of ILN and CSI should be checked carefully by ILO and AI daily and the issues of assistance, financial or operational, to be rendered either of these organizations should be decided jointly, based upon the reliability of the information at hand and load which is provided.

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

Director's Office

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Registry Office

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Col. Mann					Kom
2. Exec. Director					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Abbreviations should be used in To column.
Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Reasons or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Declassification see separate sheet.

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TO: The Director, OSS

FROM: X. D. Nann

Through: Deputy Director, MO

SUBJECT: The "Apple Mission" to Crete

PERSONNEL OF MISSION

Lt. Col. Grady O. McGlasson - in command-MO

Mr. John Moatsos - Political Adviser, MO

Lt. Nikolaos Lampathakis - Aide (Greek Army) - loaned

Jackie - Radio Operator

Nick - Radio Operator

The "Apple" Mission, the first all-MO mission was built around the unique personality of Cretan-born John Moatsos, its political advisor, who was an original supporter of ex-President Venizelos, as well as an assistant and courier to General Plastaras, and was therefore held in great esteem by the Greeks.

PURPOSE

1. To determine whether or not the entire German garrison in Crete, whose strength was originally estimated to be 28,000 to 30,000 (British estimate) would surrender and under what conditions.

2. To bring the guerrilla leaders together so that they would agree not to annihilate the Germans from whom the "Apple" mission eventually hoped to effect a surrender through MO tactics.

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2. To procure information on all order of battle of the German garrison and compile exact data on the Luftwaffe (ground) basis.

3. To document all quisling activities in Crete.

4. To impress intelligence on the morale of both enemy and Andarte forces.

MI WILL CONCERNED WITH "APPLE" MISSION

Because:

The basic plan for the Mission originated in MO Branch Washington, and was finally staged in the field in order to explore methods by which MO tactics might encompass the surrender of the German garrisons in Crete.

TIME-TABLE OF MISSION'S ENTRANCE AND FINAL EVACUATION FROM CRETE

Accompanied by Lt. Col. Hoppin, the "Apple" Mission left Cairo May 31, 1944 and proceeded to Tobruk. From there, via British Royal Navy, it proceeded to a predetermined pin-point on Crete. Contact was established with Andarte forces under Colonel Petakis June 7, 1944. Escorted by thirty guerrillas the Mission proceeded to its permanent base in Khania District (where all intelligence was gathered). The Mission was evacuated July 3, 1944 to Cairo via RAF plane from Tobruk on July 5, 1944. Approximately a month was given over to the project.

SPECIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS ACHIEVED BY THE MISSION

Three ways were discovered which could have brought about the surrender of the German garrison as a result of the Mission's findings.

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First Recommendation: Not adopted but [illegible]
chief of the guerrilla army himself.

No assistance of Greek personnel was desired [illegible]
except the German garrison, enough group was at present used for arms and munitions.

Second Recommendation: To arrest Andartes with small Allied force under the command of an Army Officer with arms and ammunition which would inspire the Andartes fighters.

Third Recommendation: If the Allies refused to arm the Andartes they should at least

a. Equip them

b. Land a small force

as, possibly the German garrison might surrender to a small Allied Mission provided guarantees of safe evacuation from the Island were made, since the German garrisons feared guerrilla reprisals if they surrendered to Cretan forces.

The Mission agreed that success was remote and that the preparation of a propaganda campaign necessary for surrender would take so long that

a. To equip the guerrillas

b. To land a small force

was their considered recommendation. They further advised that the present MEA-133 policy of attempting to foment a mutiny was impossible.

THE PLAN TO LIBERATE CRETE WAS CONSIDERED INADVISABLE BECAUSE:

1. It was concluded by the members of the "Apple" Mission that the problem was not military but political.

2. That the British, in spite of their traditional

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[illegible] from the Greek Army [illegible]

[illegible] that [illegible] to prepare the [illegible]

[illegible] personnel as an [illegible] in Britain

[illegible] policy.

3. That all Britain did was merely a show [illegible]

[illegible] grounds to choose their own time of [illegible]

4. That higher British-American [illegible] the treaty

[illegible] penetration of Crete produced [illegible] attack

[illegible] hampered its work in a serious way.

[illegible] ARE THE ALIES' CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS

BASED:

1. General information and data on Cretan politics, economics, crops, wages, food costs, radio, supplies, livestock, money value, etc.

2. Thorough Order of Battle intelligence on every troop strength, including revision of the original estimate (British) of German garrison numbers from 10,000 to 12,000-15,000 -- a 50% reduction after information gathered from Ultra intelligence.

3. Fullest statistics on military and operational intelligence of the 7,000 Axis troops with facts on their disposition, organization, equipment and supplies, especially of those forces under General Meindl with added details (former Colonel of the Greek Army) concerning the regiment and guards to which the Allies' attention was attached.

- 4 -

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3. Information that the two leaders of the Greek forces [illegible] will become quisling Quisling Greek governments were ready to [illegible] co-operation at [illegible] to hold parleys with the Nazis and German members of the Allied Mission.

4. Important information pertaining to the morale of the enemy and the guerilla forces revealed the low point of morale of the enemy, thus leading the "Appse" Mission to conclude that not more than 5,000 of the 15,000 in the German garrison would resist while the remainder would surrender immediately.

IN CONCLUSION:

A Brief of John Hoskings' Report on the Mission

1. That the Islanders protected the British officers in Crete as Allies, considering it their patriotic duty, but as passionate Democrats they opposed any Royalist regime which the British appeared to be sponsoring.

2. That "the entire population showed sincere love for the American Republic and were eager to see an American mission established on the Island in every way possible".

3. Failing any immediate help in the way of a mission or forces, Mr. Hoskins urged that arms, clothing, footwear and medical supplies which were badly needed should be forthcoming promptly.

Brief of a Report from Lt. Col. Brigs D. Hoskins on the Subject of British Aid to the Island

1. He stated that the British acted firmly when threatening-ly warned the American mission enroute to the Island

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A P P E N D I X

Names and Brief Personalities Involved with
Missions of "Apple" Mission Series

Major Alexander Fielding:
British officer and agent in Crete. According to General MacLusen's report, this British officer caused much political trouble [illegible] was roundly disliked by the Cretans.

Lt. Jeff Barkham:
British agent and officer working in Khania area.

Lt. Frazier:
British officer and agent working under Major Fielding.

Lt. Peacock:
British officer and agent, working under Major Fielding. Overbearing personality who caused American Mission much trouble.

Jim Jackson:
Half Greek-half English, in pay of British. Collaborated with Germans and caused Cretans to be murdered. Outlawed by guerilla bands.

Lt. Tavernarakis:
Greek officer who worked with Lt. Peacock. Cretans claim him to be a British sub-agent. Is informed German Gestapo and Greek Security Battalions of presence of "Apple" Mission.

Sgt. Pavlos Vernadakis:
Greek and a trusted member of British Agent, Lt. Barkham. This sergeant was capable and anxious to cooperate with the American Mission. He was the source of valuable information.

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[illegible]

To: [illegible]

From: [illegible]

Through: [illegible]

Subject: The [illegible] Mission to Crete

PERSONNEL OF MISSION

Lt. Col. [illegible] - In Command

Mr. John [illegible] - Political Advisor, [illegible]

Lt. [illegible] - [illegible]

[illegible] - Radio Operator

Dick - Radio Operator

The "Apple" Mission, the first [illegible] around the unique personality of [illegible] John [illegible], its political adviser, who was an original supporter of [illegible] Venizelos, as well as an assistant and courier to General Plastiras, and was therefore held in great esteem by the Greeks.

PURPOSE

1. To determine whether or not the entire German garrison in Crete, whose strength was originally estimated to be 25,000 to 30,000 (British estimate) would surrender and under what conditions.
2. To bring the guerrilla leaders together so that they would agree not to annihilate the Germans from whom the "Apple" mission eventually hoped to effect a surrender through its tactics.

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4. Information that was picked up [illegible] that German garrisons [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on the [illegible] and [illegible] Mission.

5. Important information was [illegible] pertaining to the [illegible] and the [illegible] forces [illegible] of the enemy, thus leading the [illegible] conclude that not more than 1,000 of the [illegible] German garrison would resist while the [illegible] surrender immediately.

III. CONCLUSIONS:

A. Brief of [illegible] Report on the Mission

1. That the Islanders preferred the British officers [illegible] as Allies, considering it their patriotic duty, but as passionate Democrats they opposed any Royalist Regime which the British appeared to be sponsoring.

2. That "the entire population showed sincere love for the American Republic and were eager to see an American mission established on the Island as soon as possible".

3. Pending any immediate help in the way of a mission or [illegible], Mr. [illegible] urged that arms, clothing, footwear and medical supplies which were badly needed should be forwarded promptly.

B. Brief of a Report [illegible] on the [illegible]

1. He stated that the British acted firmly, even threateningly against the American mission en route to the Island

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and already objected to such persons. Nevertheless they attempted to block the instruction of the Greek Army on a number of the Kleist's bases of political views.

8. It reported that the British attempted to initiate the members of the "Apple Union" by stating that Greece would not welcome them and would never shall for the cold they were carrying on.

9. The final, the British policy was to establish building in Greece and invariably occupy the Island after the evacuation of the Germans and that the Greeks like the Andartes disturbed the British because they employed former guerillas and tried to buy Italian people in order to make them go along with the British policy.

In conclusion, from a digest of the full report, it would appear that the major reason for the failure of the "Apple" Mission to create is realizing its objectives was British chauvinistic motives.

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

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OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OSS ONLY

Italy
X Title
X Pol. Sec.
X Mil.
X Econ.

TO: Director

THRU: Chief, SI

FROM: Chief, Italian & Albanian Section, SI

SUBJECT: ITALY and ALBANIA
Report on Operational Activities
and Political and Economic
Intelligence

Period Covered: 1 to 31 August 1944

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OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OSS ONLY

12 [illegible] 74

TO: Director

THRU: Chief, SI

FROM: Chief, Italian & Albanian Section, SI

SUBJECT: ITALY and ALBANIA
Report on Operational Activities
and Political and Economic
Intelligence

Period Covered: 1 to 31 August 1945

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

4 September 1945

The following represents a full report on OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES, POLITICAL and ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE for ITALY (including SICILY) and on POLITICAL and ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE for ALBANIA for the period 1 to 31 August 1945, as prepared by the Italian & Albanian Section, SI.

Earl Brennan
Chief, Italian & Albanian Section, SI

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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SECRET CONTROL

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ITALY

I. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. POSTWAR OSS REPORTS

1. Rome Office:

The Italian Division, SI, reports office was set up in Palermo in November 1943, under the direction of Vincent J. Scamporino. This unit split six weeks later and one section proceeded to Naples where the main headquarters of the Italian Section was established. Steps were immediately taken by the staff to establish sources of political and economic information, and Captain Joseph J. Caputa was placed in charge of reporting the intelligence. This office functioned during the period December 1943 to June 1944, and then moved to Rome, where a permanent Italian Section, SI, headquarters was established.

The office was located for two months in a building previously occupied by the Croatian Embassy staff, as part of the OSS, Rome, headquarters. This headquarters was for a time under the command of Lt. Col. Torrielli, who established a separate reporting section with the idea of centralizing all intelligence units, such as SO, R&A, SI, et al. This plan was approved in theory by the various branch heads, but in practice it did not prove feasible, and in September of 1944 the reporting section established by Lt. Col. Torrielli was combined with the personnel of the Italian Section, SI, and a new reporting board was

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formed as part of the Italian Division, with Captain Caputo as Reports Officer.

In early May of 1945 the personnel of the Italian Division was reduced. Mr. Lawrence H. Battistini became Reports Officer, and Mr. James Franklin continued his duties as Assistant Reports Officer. Mr. Franklin is signalled out in this report for special commendation for the exemplary manner in which he performed his duties.

The sudden recall to Washington on 22 May 1945 of Vincent J. Scamporino (Chief, Italian Division, SI) and Major B. M. Corvo (Chief Operations Officer) presented many problems and difficulties, all of which, however, have been successfully handled. Mr. Richard Mazzarrini became Chief of the Division, and, acting on direct orders, immediately proceeded to curtail the Division's activities with the end of terminating all activities by 15 July.

On 29 May 1945 Captain James Montante and his unit moved from Caserta to the Rome office. Captain Montante had served for fifteen months in Algiers and Caserta headquarters of OSS as rear echelon officer of the Italian Section. Upon his arrival in Rome Captain Montante immediately assumed the duties of Executive Officer of Mr. Mazzarrini.

Beginning in early June the net of outside agents and informers was contracted, but despite this the Rome office continued an extensive coverage of political and economic matters. The Italian

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government crisis was covered in detail, and the rapid sequence of events which took place in northern Italy following the liberation was reported on extensively by the Turin and Milan units.

On 15 July the Reports Section of the Rome office officially ceased operation, and members of the editorial staff were released.

The activities of agents and informers of the Rome office were brought to an end on 15 July; where applicable agent releases were obtained and made part of the record. Certificates of Appreciation were presented to the agents and informers who had performed meritorious service to the Division.

Acting on direct orders the Italian Division turned over the Vessel source of information to X-2. All other information contacts were terminated.

Eighteen Italian SI agents were recommended to the Italian government for awards in acknowledgment of outstanding work in the field. Four of these agents were also recommended for awards by the United States government. The recommendations made to the Italian government were in the form of a citation giving a resume of the outstanding work done by the agents. The recommendations made to the United States government contained a briefly written history of the particular mission. These recommendations were forwarded to the Regimental Awards Board for action.

Detailed statements concerning agents lost in the field or still missing were also prepared and forwarded to Regimental Claims Board

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for the settlement of insurance benefits in the case of deceased agents, or for further investigation of those whose fate is still unknown. Letters of condolence to beneficiaries, signed by Col. Olavin, were also sent to the Claims Board. This matter was handled by Major Clemente assisted by Capt. Samuel M. Frauling.

Captain B. Q. Daddario and Lt. Aldo Icardi, together with the members of their units, reported to the Rome office on 19 July. Mr. Joseph F. Russo, accompanied by his staff, arrived in Rome the same day.

Under the direction of Captains Montante and Passanesi the enlisted personnel indexed, filed, and crated all material of value for shipment to Washington.

Personnel was released and despatched to Caserta as soon as each individual had discharged all obligations to the Section. All remaining personnel was scheduled to be in Caserta by 30 July, with the exception of Mr. Mussarrini and Capt. Daddario, who were to remain to clean up unfinished business.

During the last two weeks of intelligence gathering and processing, the Rome office despatched 13 intelligence cables to Washington totalling 700 words, of which 10 were Vessel cables of 400 words. During the same period a total of 68 reports was processed and

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disseminated with the following breakdown: 32 Vessel reports, 25 JR reports, and 5 JP reports. A very large amount of material was shipped in the raw to Washington, as the reduction in personnel did not permit its processing in Rome. The large amount of intelligence material submitted by the Turin and Milan units was also screened, edited, and disseminated.

From October 1943 to June 1944 the combined number of reports processed by the Palermo and Naples offices amounted to more than 1,000. During the thirteen months of operation at Rome, the Reports Section processed well over 2000 reports, more than half of which were JR reports; the others were Berne reports, Company "D" reports (strictly military), Vessel reports, Special reports, Giuliana Project reports and JP reports.

A constant effort was made by the Italian Division to service the customers in the Italian theater of operations who could make use of the intelligence items processed. The principal agencies serviced follow:

American Embassy
American Political Adviser
Allied Commission:
Admiral Stone, Chief
Economic Section
Political Section
Medical Section
Information Division

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AMG:
Gen. Peletti
Political Section
Economic Section
Medical Section
MAAG, G-2
Lt. Col. Fischer, Intelligence Officer
G-2, Fifth Army
MAAG - Public Relations Officer
NIO-8 SUTLOI (Office of Naval Intelligence)
Eighth Army - Intelligence Section
G-2, AFHQ
G-5, AFHQ
Economic Advisory Board
UNRRA:
Economic Section
Medical Section
JICA
15th Army Group, G-2
G-2, 10 (3-Forces)

In addition our reports received a wide distribution within OSS, in the theater, Washington, and other countries.

Intelligence processed by Italian Division, SI, dealt mainly with political and economic developments in Italy. However, much information concerning countries scattered all over the world was processed. Special mention should be made of the very large volume of Far Eastern and Japanese intelligence processed and edited, together with an even larger amount of material which was forwarded to Washington in bulk. In addition to screening and processing intelligence, the Reports Section disseminated material received from Washington - such as Foreign Nationalities reports, biographical reports, and special intelligence received from the Italian Section, Washington.

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During the thirteen months of operations the Italian Division despatched to Washington more than 500 intelligence cables totalling more than 50,000 words.

From time to time the Italian Division undertook special assignments for OSS Washington, the American Embassy (Rome), the Allied Commission (Rome), AMG, AFHQ (G-2, G-3 Sp Ops, G-5, Ampelad), 15th Army Group (G-2), NAA, X-2, MO, Field Photo Unit, R&D, the American Consul in Sicily, CID, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. These assignments were performed in addition to our normal duties, and in almost all instances Italian Division efforts in this direction were favorably commented on.

Arrangements have been completed to turn over all vehicles, office equipment, operational equipment, and all miscellaneous property now on hand. Complete financial reports have been submitted by those officers who had advances outstanding.

2. Turin Unit:

The Turin detachment under the command of Lt. Aldo Icardi began operations in the Piedmont area on 15 May 1945 and terminated its operations 15 July. During this period six chains of informers were set up in the various provinces of the region, each chain instructed to concentrate on the most important and significant type of information available in its assigned area. In Aosta, Torino, and Cuneo provinces the Trinca maneuvers received primary attention; in Vercelli province

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attention was centered on industrial intelligence, particularly concerning the large Biella woolen mills; in Novara province emphasis was given to the political maneuvers of the Strong Communist following headed by the partisan leader Vincenzo Moscatelli; in the provinces of Alessandria and Asti the agricultural problems were closely watched; and in the city of Turin industrial developments, particularly the activities of the Fiat group of corporations, and labor problems and the stock exchange were also carefully covered.

The Turin unit has been highly commended for its complete coverage of the French maneuvers within the Italian border regions. Realizing the seriousness and the importance of the French maneuvers, Lt. Ricardi assigned fifty per cent of his personnel to collecting information on French battle order and watching the machinations of the French in Italy, particularly in the regions of Val d'Aosta, Val di Susa, Val Nervia, and Val Roia. Cells of the Turin unit penetrated beyond the Italian border into France to obtain battle order intelligence on the French troops deployed in those areas. Agents operated in the Val d'Isere and in the Costa da Nice. When Reuters despatches stated that the French had moved out of the Italian border valleys, the Italian Division Unit reports insisted that the French had not left the valleys and that the attitude of the French was not that which Reuters published.

All intelligence collected was distributed to the military commands in the Piedmont region, AMG headquarters, IV Army Headquarters, the Fifth Army, and AFHQ.

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A large volume of information of a political and economic nature, together with reports on French battle order, was forwarded to the Reports Section in Rome of Italian Division, SI, which was processed and given a wide distribution. A large number of cables was also despatched to Rome, and these were likewise given a broad dissemination.

Between 10 and 15 July the Turin Unit completed its closing out operations. The activities of all agents and informers were terminated, records and documents were packed for transfer to the Rome headquarters; and the members proceeded on 16 July to Milan to join Captain Daddario's unit traveling by convoy to Rome.

3. Milan Unit:

The activities of this unit began on 26 April 1945 when Captain Daddario moved into Italy from Switzerland on orders received from Major B. M. Corvo, Chief Operations Officer, Italian Division, SI. From that day until the arrival of Major Corvo on 30 April 1945, Captain Daddario worked in Milan with headquarters at the Albergo Milano. During this period Marshal Graziani (Commanding General of the Liguarian Army and Minister of War for the Republican Government), General Sorrentino (General Graziani's Chief of Staff), and General Bonomi (Head of the Republican Air Force) had all been taken prisoner and turned over to Lt. Gen. Willis Crittenberger, Commander of the IVth Corps. Other important political prisoners were also kept under Patriot guard at the

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hotel. Among these prisoners were Ministers Buffarini and Tarchi of the Fascist Republican government, Max Knipping of the Laval government, and many other less important personages.

When Major Corvo arrived in Milan he took over active command of the SI unit and immediately dispatched military and civilian personnel to obtain documents known to be located at certain targets. He also obtained from Buffarini and Tarchi information giving the location of documents relating to the Fascist Ministry of Interior which the various Partisan bands were attempting to obtain. Major Corvo was in charge of all intelligence activities of the unit until 22 May 1945, when he was recalled to the United States. Under his supervision a network of informers was established which supplied information to the Milan Unit until liquidated on 30 June 1945. The information obtained through these channels provided excellent coverage on industrial, economic, and political matters. Information was also obtained at the request of G-2, IVth Corps on Partisan activities which described their strength and activity and furnished the location of hidden arms.

The Milan detachment of the Italian Division, SI, was established during one of the most fluid and elastic moments of the Italian war. A transition from war to peace brought with it all the problems of political, economic, and emotional disturbance which had long been expected. Partisan groups which had been armed by the combined efforts of the Allies were ordered to turn in those arms and any others which had

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been obtained by them. A great many of these arms were turned in; yet rumors persisted that less than fifty per cent had been reported and trucks were identified as taking arms to the mountains. The story behind these arms and the reasons for which they were being hidden could only be surmised so that the definite planning behind them, the shifting of facts from rumors, the tracking down of undercover agents, could only be ascertained by careful and precise planting of informers.

This the Milan Unit was unable to do since the program of liquidation took precedence and only the surface of the movement was scratched. Enough information was obtained, however, to foresee that there was trouble ahead. There was too much behind this underground movement to write it off as rumor.

The last two weeks of activity consisted mostly of personal visits to many of the former agents of the Italian Division, SI. These personal visits combined with a two week visit by the debriefing board, headed by Captain Di Cicco, did a great deal towards cementing our relationships with these agents, and closing out activities in the proper manner.

On 16 July 1945 the SI detachment left Milan for Rome, thereby terminating SI activities in that city.

4. Palermo Office:

In early September of 1943 Mr. Joseph P. Russo arrived in Palermo from Algiers to resume his activity with Italian Division, SI, and reported to Mr. Vincent J. Scamporino for assignment as political

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intelligence agent. Shortly after, when the field operations branch moved into Italy, the command of the Palermo station and its personnel was turned over to Mr. Russo, and the office continued to function as a political and economic dissemination center until it was closed out on 15 July 1945.

During the 22 months of operations the Palermo station collected much documented intelligence, such as the regular monthly or interim reports of the Commanding General of the Royal Italian Carabinieri, British Political and Counter-Intelligence reports, reports of the High Commissioner of Sicily, reports of the Questores of the two most important provinces (Palermo and Catania), reports of AMG, ACC, AC, etc.

In April 1945 Mr. Russo penetrated the province of Reggio Calabria in Italy and by means of a special agreement with a high official in the office of the provincial Prefect secured a series of secret documents covering political and economic matters. These documents were disseminated to Hq. Det. 066, Rome and to the Consul General in Sicily.

The Palermo office has given the Consul General complete coverage in the political and economic fields. Copies of these reports were forwarded to the Rome office, and many of these reports were reproduced and given a broader distribution. Detailed coverage was also given to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Close relations were

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maintained throughout with the Consul General's office and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

During their stay in Sicily CIC, AC of S, G-2, 7th Army, AC of S, G-2, Island Base Section, PWB (ONI) were also fully serviced. Mr. Russo was frequently called in by these agencies for special conferences.

The goodwill and close relations which existed between the Palermo office and various officials of the Italian government proved to be of great value in increasing the efficiency of the Palermo office.

On many occasions the Palermo office was constrained to set aside its regular duties to devote its complete attention to the screening of applicants for passports made to the American Consul General. In the past six months a total of 600 applicants was screened and reported on by the Palermo office to the Consul General.

At least seventy-five per cent of the reports forwarded to the State Department in Washington by its representatives in Sicily were based on reports furnished by the Palermo office.

The Separatist movement and the activities of the High Maffia were reported on in detail. A complicated network of informers was established throughout the island.

In closing out the Palermo office releases were obtained from all paid agents and informers. As far as was possible, all contacts were personally visited by Mr. Russo.

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B. Review of SI Operations

SI operations of the Italian Division were planned and carried out under the direction of Major D. M. Corvo, who acted as Operations Officer of the Division. These operations covered the entire Italian Campaign, and began in Sicily in July 1943 and were completed with the liberation of all Italy by the Allied forces in early May 1945.

During the Sicilian Campaign the first operations were so broad in scope that they covered SO and CO activities as well as SI activities. Notable successes during this period were the capture of the German-Italian garrisons on the Pantoteno Islands by Italian Division SI, personnel commanded by Major Frank Tavallo, the taking of the Lipari Islands, and special missions to German-occupied sections of Sicily and Sardinia. These operations were all planned by Major Corvo and Captain Passarelli accompanied a mission to Sardinia by sea that took 28½ hours and proved to be the longest PT voyage on record at that time.

In November of 1944, following the liberation of southern Italy, the Operations Base of the Division was transferred to Brindisi under the direction of Major D. M. Corvo and Capt. N. Q. Maddaric. It was from this Brindisi base that the major part of all SI missions was infiltrated into the field by plane, submarine, and MAS boat. These missions usually consisted of three men including a radio operator. The missions at first made direct contact with the SI base at Brindisi, but as the volume of intelligence increased radio contact was transferred to the G2G Radio Base Station at Bari.

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Soon after the liberation of the Florence area the activities of the Brindisi base were partially transferred to Siena under the direction of Major J. H. Clements, who was appointed Intelligence Officer for the Division. In February 1945 the complete operations of the Division were transferred to Siena under the direct control of Major Corvo, assisted by Captains Seb. J. Passanesi and Samuel Frasilino, who were put in charge of training and preparation of personnel for the field. Many missions were sent to the field from this base by air.

The activities of the Bastia (Corsica) base and the Italian Division unit established at Guillestre under the command of Major Bonfiglio have been covered in detail by previous semi-monthly reports. In this closing out report, however, Major Bonfiglio's units are signalled out for particular commendation and mention should be made of the fact that the Air Force valued highly the intelligence gathered by Major Bonfiglio's units, much of which furnished excellent bombing targets.

The intelligence gathered by the missions of the Italian Division, SI, covered all aspects of enemy activity. Valuable reports on troops, locations, strength of forces, and identification of units were constantly received and were highly rated by AFHQ. Intelligence gathered on the transportation facilities of the enemy was very reliable and proved to be of great value to the AAF in preparing targets. Many useful reports were also obtained from the field on the political and economic situation in Northern Italy.

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In addition to the complete coverage of strategic intelligence, which was the primary mission of the Division, information of a tactical nature was also received and included in all reports prepared for the attention of the various Allied commands. (J-COD-[31])

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II. [redacted]

A. [redacted]

1. On [redacted]:

The Vatican learned from the Apostolic Delegate to Cuba that representatives of the Arab countries of the Middle East had come to Addis Ababa to confer with Haile Selassie and to invite Ethiopia to take part in the commercial and political orbit of the Arab countries. (AP-3385)

2. On Argentina:

The Apostolic Nuncio to Buenos Aires informed the Vatican that financial experts from Argentina and from Spain had conferred in Buenos Aires to plan financial collaboration between the two countries and other Spanish-American countries. The Nuncio stated that German financial representatives were also present at the conference. (AP-3346)

3. On the Christian Left:

The Pope recently stated that he had no prejudice against the party of Christian Workers (as the Christian left is known in northern Italy), but that he desired to see its program stated in precise terms. If such a program is presented and meets with the Pope's approval, it is said that the party will be able to develop without danger of condemnation by the Holy See. Nevertheless the attitude of the Vatican, in general, remains favorable to the existence of but one Catholic party in Italy, the Democrat-Christians. The Holy See seems to have nothing against the

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leaders of the Christian Left in the North, of whom Benedetti of Turin is the most important; but it has doubts about the sincerity of the Roman leaders, particularly Franco Rodano, who continues to have close relations with the Communists. (P.P. Report #180)

b. Interview with the Pope:

According to a source who recently interviewed the Pope, the latter was in excellent spirits, and rumors of his serious illness are false, although he is very tired. The Pope spoke of Cardinal Hlond who had just returned to Warsaw. Many persons, including Maritain, are indignant about the Cardinal's violent talks against the Russians and his advocating war against them. The Pope indicated a certain reserve in speaking of Cardinal Hlond, and it is believed that this is because the Cardinal left his diocese during the war. It is known that in the early part of the war, Cardinal Hlond had left Rome to come to the United States, but was stopped in France by the Pope's order, probably because of his outspoken attitude toward the Russians. Before Cardinal Hlond returned to Poland, he made a solemn declaration at the Holy See that he was returning for strictly ecclesiastical purposes. The Pope also spoke of his recent discourse on the anniversary of his coronation, and said that in speaking against the Nazis, he had added details learned from Schmidt (Mayor of Vienna), Schuschnigg, and Mgr. Neuhausler. He also discussed Communism, and remarked that the Russian Communists were even more nationalistic and more brutal than the Germans. (P.P. Report #189)

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5. The Vatican and Italian Foreign Policy:

The Pope and Mgr. Montini are opposed to present Italian foreign policy and maintain that it is excessively pro-Russian. They have brought pressure on Foreign Minister de Gasperi not to consent to the appointment of the Communist Eugenio Reale, present Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as Italian Ambassador to the new Polish government. Mgr. Montini has declared: "We must not deceive ourselves; Catholic Poland expects from Italy a policy of understanding and of help, and it would be absurd to send a Communist as Ambassador. A Christian Democrat should be sent." Nevertheless, it is believed that the choice of Reale is more than probable. It is difficult to oppose the request of the Communists since, unlike the other parties, they do not yet have any diplomatic post. (Tarchiani, Actionist, is in Washington; Saragat, Socialist, at Paris; Carandini, Liberal, in London; Martini, Christian Democrat, in Rio de Janeiro.) (P.P. Report #194)

B. POLITICAL PARTIES

1. Communists:

a. Togliatti as Minister of Justice:

It is said that Togliatti has not up to now shown great activity in his position as Minister of Justice. His propaganda work is very slow, and only of intellectual character. Five women of proved Communist belief work in his office. Togliatti has not confirmed the collaborators of the former minister in their posts, but they have so

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far remained at their places. For the moment, Togliatti does not seem to exercise any influence; but it is thought probable that the propaganda effort will appear at the moment of the Constituent Assembly, when Togliatti will be able to use his department as the basis for a wide electoral action. (P.P. Report #181)

b. Official Directive:

A mimeographed directive for distribution to a very restricted group of Communist leaders was recently obtained by a priest who has wide connections in Rome. The directive states that the workers participated in the war effort with the national aim of liberating the country, and the particular aim of establishing the recognition of the directive function of the working class, and forming a democratic regime based on the CLN. This aim has not been realized as yet. The general premises for the reconstruction of the country are: independence of the country, punishment of those responsible for the national catastrophe, a popular democratic regime, and economic reconstruction. The National Constituent Assembly is the essential object at this moment. It should destroy the monarchy, feudal survivals in the country, the political predominance of financial and industrial monopolies, and the old reactionary centralised state structure. The work of reconstruction must also be started in the economic field, and there are only two ways of carrying out this reconstruction. The first is socialism, which it is impossible to follow; and the second is the democratic way, the way of

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national solidarity. Private initiative must have a part in the reconstruction of the country. However, the great monopolistic enterprises (telephone, electricity, etc.) should be nationalized, and there should be an agrarian reform against the great landowners. There should be popular control of the market and production. The organs for reconstruction, lacking any other democratic mechanism, are the CLNs. Up to the Constituent Assembly, they have the function of representing the new type of democracy which has come out of the war. There should be a kind of federation, not a fusion, of the Socialist and Communist parties, and preparation for a fusion. A unified party would be that of the Italian workers, including all those who adhere to the program of the party without being motivated by Marxist ideology but who are ready to build on the party's program. The directive states that the Communist Party has been accused of wanting to establish a dictatorship to realize socialism, whereas what it really wants is a progressive democracy and national solidarity. An added note explains that the unified party will not be the Communist party, but one which will unify all the Marxist and non-Marxist working class forces to fight for progressive democracy and socialism. Within this party, the Communists and Marxists will be the central and most advanced elements, and will not renounce their ideology; the most advanced democrats will also be qualified for this work.

(P.P. Report #192)

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C. PARTISAN ACTIVITIES

1. CVL Formations in Piedmont:

A lengthy report in Italian, entitled "Origin and Activities of the CVL formations of 'Giustizia e Liberta' of Piedmont" has been received. The report was prepared by Captain de Leva and Lt. Vanzetti, both members of Italian SI team "Orange"; Commander Giorgio Nolli; and Carlo Mussa, Political Commissar. The report includes a list of names of the military commanders and political commissars of the various divisions.

(I-1261)

D. TRIESTE QUESTION

1. Tito's Forty Day Rule in Trieste:

A lengthy handwritten report in Italian on the situation in Trieste in July 1945 has been received and processed. The sub-source is a former Italian Naval Officer who is well informed on the Venezia Giulia problem and who was in Trieste at the time of the events recounted in the report. This officer states that on 28 April, when the first rumors of the rapid Allied advance were received, the bulk of the German forces began to pull out of Trieste. The next day armed groups of citizens attempted to seize isolated German vehicles speeding toward the German command posts and garrisons within the city. Their efforts failed and most vehicles reached their destination safely. These groups of citizens had been hastily called together and organized by a CLN which also had formed hurriedly. The Committee was headed by Lt. Col. Carlo Fonda, also

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known as Zacie. His assistants were Dr. Colletti, Chief Inspector of Special Police, Captain Bruno Valmarin, and a few others. Many of the men were recruited from the X Flotilla MAS, and Black Brigades. The main activity of these groups consisted in rounding up and imprisoning all known fascists and pro-Germans, ransacking their homes, and taking everything of value. Late in the afternoon, the Bishop of Trieste, Mgr. Antonio Santin, spoke over the radio, telling the people of recent events and begging them to remain calm. On 1 May, the 9th Corps of Tito's 4th Army, together with some special detachments, entered the city from three directions. There was no resistance of any kind, and General Dusan Kveder, leader of Tito's troops, immediately assumed command of the entire city. He first installed a CLN, composed of Dr. France Bevk, Dr. Bogdan Brecelj, Dr. Stoka, and Major Jakentich; then he formed the so-called People's Guard, which was largely composed of men who had been released from prison that same day by the Yugoslav troops. When it was seen that the German garrisons intended to resist, the intervention of the Bishop was requested, and Mgr. Santin appealed to the Germans, who replied that they were ready to surrender to regular Allied troops. The next day the New Zealanders arrived and disarmed the German garrisons. As soon as hostilities ceased, General Kveder issued various orders to the population, and his troops began a systematic pillaging of property belonging to the State, city and private citizens. A total of 120 million lire was taken from

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various banks, and all cars found in good running condition were seized. About 12,000 Italians were arrested, accused of Nazi-Fascist sympathies. The fate of most of these remains unknown, but a few are said to have been interned in Ljubljana, where they received very bad treatment. The Yugoslav Commander also disbanded and disarmed the Trieste CLN. Following the agreement with the Allied Command, Yugoslav troops withdrew to pre-arranged lines. During this operation a few hundred more persons disappeared from Trieste. It is reported that the Yugoslavs arrested large numbers of Italians in the Istrian hinterland, and many refugees poured into Trieste every day. (J-1260)

2. Conditions in Trieste:

A report in Italian on conditions in Trieste has been received and is being processed. It includes a letter from "Renato" to "Giorgio"; and information on the interrogations of prisoners by the German SS in northern Italy. This information was prepared by Marcella Tonio, secretary at the SS Command. The report refers to the interrogation of Parri, and of Franchi, leader of a British mission. (J-1262)

3. Reports on Trieste:

A series of nine reports in Italian by Col. F. Santini (Hq. of the Royal Air Force) has been received and is being processed. Included are reports on the situation in Gorizia, and Trieste from 15 June

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to 25 June 1945; the situation in Yugoslavia, learned through questioning of persons coming from that region; Yugoslav questions; and the constitution of the CLN in Trieste. Also included are reports on the evacuation of French troops from Val d'Aosta, Val di Susa, Valli del Cuneese, Liguria Occidentale, Valle Stura di Demonte, Valle Vermenagna, and Valli Roia, Nervia and Crosia; the situation in Rumania; and the situation in Albania.

(J-1264)

4. Italians in Dalmatia:

A report in Italian on Italians in Dalmatia has been received and is being processed. It concerns the atrocities committed by Germans and Yugoslav Partisans against Italians in Zara. The information was gathered from refugees in Northern Italy, and compiled by Dr. Cesare Damiani.

(J-1270)

E. FAR EAST ACTIVITIES

1. List of Persons Available as Agents:

A report in Italian on persons residing in the Far East who might be available as intelligence agents has been received and is being processed. The report cites Amleto Vespa, who is of Italian birth but a Chinese citizen. Vespa was a Japanese agent for a time, but is esteemed by Chiang Kai-Shek, and would probably now be willing to help Italy. Another person cited is a Mrs. Ella Mary Robertson, a Eurasian who owned a radio station in Shanghai. It is thought that she could and probably

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would organize an intelligence service. The De Santis brothers are mentioned, as well as Father Gerni, a Jesuit, operator of the Observatory of Zikawei (Shanghai). (J-1270)

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III. ECONOMIC

A. INDUSTRY

1. Reports on I.R.I.:

Two reports in Italian on the I.R.I. (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) have been received and are being processed.

(J-1265)

B. HEALTH CONDITIONS

1. Malaria in the Veneto Region:

The prevalence of malaria in the Veneto region must be attributed primarily to the geographic configuration of the coastal plains with their extensive lagoons, swamps, salt-marshes, rice-fields, fishing reservoirs, canals and rivers partially blocked by sand dunes. Malaria is endemic in the estuary of the Po between the Adige and the Po di Goro. The population of the whole region is poor and the standard of living is further depressed by insufficient housing and a poor water supply. There is little malaria along the Venice lagoons, but the situation is grave between the Brenta and Adige and the Sile and Tagliamento, and even more serious in the reclaimed lands around Caorle. In some areas, malaria is fostered by the poorly cultivated lands which are rich in stagnant waters; in other areas, the problem is aggravated by the meeting of sweet and salt waters. The situation has also been aggravated by war conditions. Malaria and reclamation are synonymous wherever salt-water soil is being redeemed and

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drainage is insufficient. In the Veneto there are over-crowded malarial breeding places along the river deltas, lagoons, and imperfectly drained salt-water swamps. The area of endemic malaria forms an uninterrupted strip from the Po to the Isonzo, following the border of the old lagoons. Before the war, malaria had been considerably reduced in the Veneto provinces, and in 1939 the lowest number of both primary and recurrent malaria cases was reported. In 1940 there was already an increase in the number of cases, beginning with the drafting for military service of the technical inspector and malariologists of Udine, Rovigo and Venice, which caused a slackening in the vigilance of the various committees. In 1941 malaria incidence was still increasing, especially in the province of Venice, as lack of control and services was persisting; and the situation continued to deteriorate after that time. Data concerning the last months of the war are scanty, but from unofficial sources it appears that during April 1945 there was a heavy increase of malaria incidence. The Institute Antimalarico Interprovinciale was created to control malaria in the Veneto area and to coordinate antimalaric activities of lesser organizations in the neighboring regions. Its central office is located in Venice. It has an administrative and a technical staff, the latter including Prof. Giovannardi and Prof. Sepulcri, both of the University of Padua. The Institute receives contributions from the State and from agencies in charge of the reclamation of malaric areas, but it is limited in its

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activities by insufficient funds. Since there are no active reclamation projects at present, four-fifths of the expenses of the Institute fall on the State, through the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. The Institute has created diagnostic centers in the most malarious areas, and has also acted against the vehicle of infection, although it has been forced to limit the latter activity to disinfectation during the inter-epidemic and epidemic seasons. With greater financial help and the elimination of illogical administrative red tape, the Institute could concentrate on prevention rather than control of malaria. (GB-5118, GB-5119)

2. German Laboratory Train:

A German laboratory for malaria research was installed in four railroad cars, with additional cars used as living quarters. This laboratory had thoroughly modern equipment. The train remained in the area around Venice up to the spring of 1945, at which time it was blocked in Tarvisio, since the railroad line leading to the Veneto had been damaged. The source does not know what happened to this train later. The staff was composed of a commanding officer, an assistant commanding officer, two malariologists, three entomologists, three technicians, and two prisoners of war, one an entomologist and one a technician. The railroad cars contained a small library; an entomological laboratory with four drawing tables; a parasitology and microscopy laboratory; and a bacteriological laboratory. Additional cars were used as living quarters, dining room,

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kitchen, supply room, and generator. The function of this laboratory was the study of malaric fauna and of the terrain in malaric zones; the study of the splenic and parasitic index in the areas most interesting from a military point of view; the study of prophylaxis of soldiers in malaric zones; and the distribution of mosquito nets and supervision of mechanical antimalaric precautions in military barracks. The laboratory established fixed antimalaric stations in areas of military interest; employed 100 antimalaric workers and some inspectors, all engaged in small reclamation projects in areas of military interest; and maintained reclamation canals in malaric areas. This latter work was financed by the Magistrato delle Acque (the agency in charge of all canals and rivers) which obtained six million lire from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. An insecticide called GIX was used by the laboratory train for experimental work. It was said that it could not be produced on a large scale because of lack of raw materials, but that it would be thrown on the market at the end of the war at a price lower than that of the usual disinfectants.

(GE-5120)

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SICILY

I. POLITICAL

A. SITUATION IN SICILY

1. Report of High Commissioner:

A copy in Italian of the political-economic-social intelligence report of the High Commissioner of Sicily for the Ministry of the Interior has been received and is being processed. (J-1267)

II. ECONOMIC

A. INDUSTRY

1. Arenella Chemical Plant:

A report in Italian on the Arenella Chemical Plant has been received and is being processed. This report covers the history of the development of the company, and statistics from 1909-1945.

(J-1268)

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ALBANIA

I. POLITICAL

A. [redacted]

1. Partisan Torture Methods:

It is reported that a person recently released from the Berat prison bears evidence that some Partisans are employing methods reminiscent of those used by the Nazis and Fascists for eliciting information. When this person arrived at Tirana a few days ago, he was minus his fingernails and bore several body-scars.

The person told source that he and his family as well as several other families from Argirocastro had been taken to Berat because some of their immediately relatives had deserted the Partisan ranks and fled to Greece. He added that in the past few days members of the Xorce Greek Organization who were arrested had also been taken to Berat.

2. Congress of Liberation Front:

It is reported that the inauguration of the first Congress of the National Liberation Front was held on 5 August 1945. 3110 selected delegates of the 10 prefectures and all government officials were present as well as representatives of all Allied missions.

3. Albanian Occupation of Saseno Island:

It is reported that last October, forces of the 12th Brigade landed on the island of Saseno and raised the Albanian flag.

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A messenger who has just returned from Durres; states that 498 men of the 17th Brigade landed on the island as reinforcements.

4: [illegible]:

An agreement on UNRRA relief for Albania has finally been reached and the document signed by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha and Governor Keyserling. The number of UNRRA personnel to be admitted into Albania has been set at 48:

5: Maleshova Lectures:

Dr. Seiffullah Maleshova, Minister of Propaganda and former professor at Moscow University, is giving a series of lectures during evenings to about 100 selected Communist youths. The lectures are held in the 4th Technical School in Tirana; and according to sources, the program, which has been in progress for over a month, appears to be very successful:

6: ITALIAN ACTIVITIES

1: Italian Military Mission:

It is reported that an official Italian Military Mission, headed by Col. Mussetti, arrived in Tirana on 26 July 1945:

II: ECONOMIC

1: WHEAT SUPPLY

1: Situation in Albania:

A telegram message from Koritza reports that the wheat [illegible] will be increased by two-thirds:

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When the Kosova area was liberated, subsource states that there was enough wheat stored to supply the needs of that area for two years, but that the Yugoslav Army has taken over practically the entire amount.

In an attempt to calm the fears of those who believe a bread crisis is due this winter, local officials are claiming that wheat will be forthcoming from Yugoslavia, source states. However, on the basis of subsource's information, coupled with recent statements by the Russian UNRRA representative, it seems that Albania will not be aided to any great extent by the Yugoslavs.

According to source, Enver Hoxha and his cabinet are deliberately misleading their people on this issue.

In an attempt to control the rising prices of wheat, the Minister of Economy has issued an order which fixes the ceiling price of wheat at 7 Albanian francs in the markets of Scutari, Tirana, Shijak, Kavaje and Lesh. Violators of this order are to be published as saboteurs, source states.

B. FINANCIAL

1. Currency and Prices in Albania:

The official currency exchange rate fixed by the Minister of Finance as of 16 June 1945, is 25 Albanian paper francs to 1 American dollar. On the black market, the dollar is exchanged at 30 Albanian

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francs. No distinction has been made between the gold and the blue seal bills.

As set by the government officials, the premium rate of local currency to the gold napoleon is 30 3/4 Albanian paper napoleons.

Other rates of exchange:

Gold sovereign	@	38 2/5	Albanian paper napo.
Turkish gold lire	@	33 4/5	" " "
American gold dollar	@	7 3/5	" " "

2 1/3	Yugoslav dinars	for 1 Albanian franc.
450	Bulgarian leva	for 20 " "
100	Italian lire	for 14 " "

By decree, only the Albanian State Bank is authorized to exchange gold and all foreign currencies including American dollars, for the Albanian currency. Bank officials have stated to source that Albanian currency has no value to Greece.

Source has been reliably informed that the present circulation of Albanian francs is at 325 million, in comparison to 250 million francs in circulation as of 24 March 1945.

The State Bank of Albania has already issued provisional check currency to the amount of 3,500,000 paper francs in 100, 200, and 500 franc denominations. They have the same value and guarantee as the regular paper franc and will be used only by the bank to redeem or exchange old mutilated paper francs and to carry on its legitimate business.

To source's knowledge, there is not, nor was there ever, any counterfeit money in Albania.

SECRET CONTROL

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According to source, the FNC Government is financing itself by the proceeds from the Kucova petroleum plants and by such taxes as on tobacco, salt, cigarette paper, war profits, etc.

Prices in the Tirana market on 26 July 1945:

Wheat	50	napoleons per quintal
Corn	40	" " "
Barley	30	" " "
Oats	35	" " "
Wheat flour	50	" " "
Corn flour	35	" " "
Butter	50	francs per kilo
Cheese	30	" " "
Olive oil	26	" " "
Beef	22	" " "
Veal	22	" " "
Lamb	20	" " "
Pork	None available on the market	
Potatoes	7	francs per kilo
Onions	5	" " "
Tomatoes	3	" " "
Eggplants	6	" " "
Peppers	5	" " "
Milk	12	" " "
Soap	24	" " "
Wheat bread	25	leks per kilo
Corn bread	35	" " "
Charcoal	7	" " "
Eggs	5	leks each
Coal	45	francs per quintal
Wood	3	napoleons per mule load

Daily wages in Tirana as of 26 July 1945:

Unskilled worker:	20 to 30 francs per day
Skilled worker:	60 to 80 francs per day.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APO 777, U.S. ARMY
R & A BRANCH

30 May 1944

SUBJECT : First part of a report on economic conditions in German occupied Italy.

TO : Dr. William L. LANGER, Director, R&A Washington

1. Bread and Pasta Rations.

As of 20 April, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that the daily bread ration of the normal urban consumer would be increased by 50 grams, so that the prevailing rations are as follows :

CONSUMER	DAILY RATION (grams)
Normal Consumer	200
Children 9-15	275
Light Workers	375
Heavy Workers	475
Very Heavy Workers	575

At the same time it was announced that the basic pasta ration would be augmented from 2 to 3 kilograms a month (i.e., 10 grams a day) of pasta or rice.

The ministry made a special concession to farm workers. Instead of receiving a ration card for all foodstuffs, they would be permitted to retain 32 kilograms of wheat for themselves and 25 kilograms for each member of their families for May and June. This would amount, for a family of five, to a daily ration of 440 grams per person.

Obviously the rural population will secure its rations, if not more, but the evidence suggests that in urban centers the rations actually available are considerably less than those officially fixed.

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CITY	BREAD RATION	PASTA/Rice Ration	DATE
Rome	150	Irregularly distributed	May
Pisa	150		
	250	No distribution	May
	300		
Fiume	75		May
Casoli (Atri)	150		April
Sulmona	150		March

Bread rations thus appear to be somewhat less in German-occupied than in Libefated Italy, where the city ration is roughly 200 and that permitted farmers about 550 grams.

2. Other Food Rations.

Other foodstuffs-meat,vegetables,sugar- appear to be more generally available on the free markets of urban centers than is the case in southern Italy. From Bologna it was reported in February that one could buy everything to which one was entitled by the ration card. In March the Germans boasted of having not only supplied Rome with sufficient meat but of having secured a more abundant supply of vegetables than had been available for several years.

It seems likely, of course, that in towns near the fighting lone, distributions of foodstuffs other than bread would have been most irregular. Sulmona has had only one ration of wheat and only one of sugar. At Chieti, on the other hand, distribution appears to have been regular and severely controlled. Generally speaking, scarce items are those normally imported in quantity from the south. Salt has had to be rationed at 500 grams a person per month, tobacco at 40 grams a week, the latter being sold only to males over 18 years of age. Olive oil and fruit are rare. It goes without saying that, in the country-side, there is a relative abundance of most staple foodstuffs.

3. The Development of Black Market prices.

The following table is meant to give a general indication of the development, during 1943, of black market prices in that part of Italy now occupied by the Germans and in the

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Neapolitan area. The comparison can only be tentative, inasmuch as the evidence is very difficult to marshall. The figures for occupied Italy are averages covering the urban sites of that area on a particular day and come from a source interested in presenting the situation in the north in a favorable light. The Neapolitan figures, on the other hand, are monthly averages. The official prices are those for German-controlled Italy as of the date given. Prices are in lire and, unless otherwise indicated, per kilogram.

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Commodity	Bread	Pasta	Olive oil (litre)	Dry Cheese	Table cheese	Potatoes
Legal price	2.60	3.10	15.60	24		2
Price averages for Italy now in German hands 31-I-43	18	23	40	45		6
Monthly averages Neapolitan area I-43	15	17	50		30	[illegible]
Price averages Italy now in German hands 31-VIII-43	25	28	60	50		7
Monthly averages Neapolitan area VIII-43	27	29	90		55	3
Price averages for German occupied Italy 31-I-44	30	40	100/200	55		9
Monthly averages Neapolitan area I-44	110	235	150		200	43

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The table would indicate that in January 1944 prices in Naples were somewhat higher than those obtaining at the time of the invasion, while prices in northern Italy had reversed the relationship and were somewhat lower than those in Naples and that, finally, black market prices in Naples were roughly three times those in Germany. These conclusions are borne out by the fact that northern and central Italy have remained subjected to the absorbent effect of the European Axis economy and Italy on the other hand, was not only largely cut off from its larger economic whole but to a considerable extent broken down into regional economies.

6. Comparison of black market prices in Naples and Rome.

The statistics available for more recent prices are hardly more satisfactory. Prices at Rome and Naples, the two most difficult alimentation problems on either side of the line, are available only for different time periods. Prices are in lire, and, unless otherwise indicated, per kilogram.

Commodity	Naples Prices as of early III-44	Rome Prices as of 31 III-44	Naples Prices as of early V-44
Bread	132	25-30	120-160
Pasta	238	50-90	260-400
Flour		45-50	180-200
Potatoes	35	18	42-60
Beans	187	40-120	175-250
Meat	190-295	130-250	300-350
Fish		100-200	150-400
Milk(liter)	25	30-40	40
Cheese	350	140-350	
Eggs(each)	20	12-15	15
Olive oil(liter)	190	400	230-260

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Fats	306	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dried Fruit		30-40	90-100
Apples	20	250	
Salt		90-140	15-40
Sugar	250	300-400	220-400
Coffee		1200	900-1500

Thus the black market price level in Rome would appear to be roughly 10-15 per cent less than that at Naples. It should be noted that only for five commodities- milk, olive oil, fats, apples and salt- are the Roman prices higher, and that in the case of bread and pasta they are noticeably lower. The only May prices available for Rome, however, indicate that the price of bread had advanced to 45 lire the kilo and that of olive oil to 750 lire the kilo.

5. Comparison of prices in Rome with those Prevailing Elsewhere in Occupied Italy.

Price data for German Italy outside Rome are extremely scattered and of varying dates and even cover different types of economic areas. The following table represents an attempt to piece together information from cities, towns, provinces, and regions in order to make possible some broad generalizations. Where available, prices from places in southern Italy other than Naples are also indicated. The Roman numeral in parentheses which follows each price indicates the month for which the price was quoted. Prices are in lire and, unless otherwise indicated, per kilo.

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PLACE	BREAD	FLOUR	POTATOES	BEANS	BUTTER	MILK	CHE
ROME	45(V)	100(IV)	18(III);	40-110(III)	500(III)	30-40(III)	14
MILAN	25(III)	40(II)			300(III)		
BOLOGNA	90-95(II)	100-115(II)					250
GENOVA	30-35(I)						60-
FIUME	400(III)						
TURIN		20-25(II)					
CHIETI	100-140(II)	200(III)					
BOLOGNA		80-90(III)	16-20(III)	60-100(III)			80(
CASTELVECCHIO				17-20(III)			
ABRUZZI	20(III)	30(IV)	13(III)	12(IV)		6-7(IV)	120
MARCHE		6-8(III)					800
TUSCANY					100(III)	5(III)	30-
FRIULLI					100(III)		150
SAN SEVERO	30(V)	35(V)	30(V)	40(V)			
LECCE						10-12(V)	140
BALKANO						30(V)	75(

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BUTTER	MILK	CHEESE	EGGS	MEAT	OLIVE OIL	SALT
III) 500(III)	30-40(III)	140-350(III)	12-15(III)	130-300(III)	750(V)	90-140(III)
300(III)			6-8(II)	100-125(III)	120-30(III)	
		250(II)		200-210(II)		
		60-70(I)		17-14(I)		
				40-50(II)	100-200(II)	
				70-100(IV)	200-300(III)	
II)		80(III)	13(III)	80-120(III	250-400(III)	150(III)
II)					270-80(III)	60-100(III)
)	6-7(IV)	120(III)	6-15(IV)	70-100(IV)	150-200(III)	90-140(III)
		800-100(III)	3-4(III)	25-30(IV)		
100(III)	5(III)	30-35(III)		40-50(III)	200(III)	50(IV)
100(III)		150(III)		80-100(III)		
			13(V)	90(V)	90(V)	
	10-12(V)	140(V)	14-15(V)		30-40(V)	
	30(V)	75(V)	20(V)		140(V)	

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Study of these figures would suggest the conclusion that prices in Bologna and Fiume and in smaller cities near the front are in the range of the Roman level. The figures also suggest that prices in other large cities, such as Milan, Genova, and Turin, and in towns yet removed from the fighting, are considerably lower than those in Rome. The price level in Grosseto in Maremma was reported as half that obtaining in Naples. Comparison of 11 foodstuff prices indicate that Roman prices are roughly 1½ times higher than those prevailing in Milan and approximately three times those in the Abruzzi, which latter are higher than those prevailing in the Marche. From these last two regions other reports confirm that there is a relative abundance of food, as also appears to be true of Friulli, Istria, and Venice in general.

b. Clothing.

In general, the clothing situation in northern Italy appears to be poor. Textiles are difficult to obtain and progressively worse in quality. Underclothing is rationed and shoes as well as most clothing are unobtainable on the free market. Wholesales are not to be had; repairs are made with pieces taken from discarded shoes. Clothing prices as of 31 March were as follows:

COMMODITY	ROME	MARCHE	TUSCANY	MILAN
Raincoats	2000-3000	1200-1300		
Wool Suit	5000	2000	5000	
Ordinary Suit				500
Silk tie	80-100			
Man's Socks	30-50			
Sheer stockings (women's)	200-300		300	
Military shoes	1500-2000			
Women's Shoes	1300-3000			
Men's Shoes	3000			
Re-soling	300	300		
Leather (kg)		350-400		
Linen Sheets(meter)	1000			
Clipped Wool (kg)		200		
Woolen yarn(kg)	1000-1300	250		
Pure Parachute silk (meter)	500-600			
Antarchic cloth(meter)	200-250	150		
Rayon covers(meter)	300-350			
Thread Bobbins (50 yds each)	80-100			

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A report from Turin dated February suggests that clothing prices there are lower, a man's suit costing, at that time, 1000 lire, and a pair of leather shoes 600-1000 lire. Comparable statistics for Italy are unfortunately not available.

7. Food control/German policy.

German policy varies with the military significance of the area concerned. In Rome and the regions close to the front German agricultural officials have been attached to the armed forces and these have complete control over Italian food authorities. It is reported that in these regions supervision of distribution is extremely strict, though this does not prevent the looting of front-line towns, Sulmona for example, by the troops. Nevertheless, where the Germans have assumed direct control, the legal rations are regularly available, whereas where food administrations have been left in Italian hands distribution tends to be irregular. This feature is probably more deeply impressed on the public mind than the actual difference would warrant, since the Germans have adopted a policy of hiding behind the Italian authority when the situation is bad and intervening openly when concessions have to be made. Provincial prefects tend to cooperate with the local German commanders and to disregard the orders of the Fascist central government. It does seem to be true that the Germans have brought in small quantities of wheat to relieve critical shortages in the large cities, especially Rome. Up to 31 January 23,000 tons of wheat were brought in and distributed by the German command. The increase in bread rations announced on 20 April by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was officially explained as partly the result of trade agreements with Berlin. That such imports represent a net gain for Fascist Italy is not at all clear, since in the areas north of Rome the Germans are requisitioning grain as well as other foodstuffs. In some places where the troops have not received their rations, they have appropriated the wheat and exchanged it with the local population for other foods. In other places grain is bought by the Germans from the distributing agencies at the legal price and then sold on the black market. In Venice the occupying authorities often require farmers to hand over a certain portion of their livestock on the excuse that the meat is required for the Italian troops interned in Germany.

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8. Public kitchens.

A significant recent development in food distribution has been the establishment of public kitchens in some of the larger cities. Meals are served to the poorer elements on the basis of legal cost - soup in Rome is 2 lire - and apparently a ration card. There were in the capital, as of March, 41 such kitchens administered by the National Fascist organization for Well-Being and feeding 16,000 people. This figure apparently does not include kitchens installed in 33 schools which were serving 11,789 meals a day. The idea has also been adopted in Milan and Turin, where communal feeding centers were to be established to provide for the employees of industries too small to have their own kitchens. The families of the workers were also to be fed and the food could be eaten at the center or carried home. This development, while meant in part to deal with the refugee problem, will also contribute to keeping prices down.

9. The Refugee Problem.

The problem of displaced persons has reached serious proportions in German-occupied Italy and contributes greatly to the urgencies of the food situation. The problem will grow in proportions as the Allies move northward. In Rome, the number of refugees is estimated at 600,000, this aside from the fact that a large part of the normal population of 1½ million is unemployed, and the number may well be augmented if the capital is made an open city. Further immigration has been prohibited and efforts have been made to provide north-bound transportation for civilians. That this is inadequate is shown by the fact that crowds of several thousand persons have collected on the outskirts in an attempt to hitch-hike their way north. Fascist sources assert that now for the first time emigration exceeds immigration. Food imports into the city have had to be increased considerably, from 2100 quintals of wheat a day to 3200, not to speak of a daily requirement of 345 head of cattle and 27,000 sheep. The situation is further complicated by the fact that for months there has been a serious shortage of gas, electricity, and water, and that venereal disease is widespread. Special administrative measures have had to be adopted. On 9 May the appointment of a High Commissioner for Rome was announced. The new official will have the cabinet rank of undersecretary in the Ministry of the Interior so that the city will be under the direct control of the Fascist government. The problem is not peculiar to Rome,

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however, the population of Chieti has increased from [illegible] to 45,000, and the Germans have evacuated the civilians from the Chieti region and have ordered the civilian population out of Genoa, Rapallo S. Margherita, Portofino, Sestri, Levante (as of 20 May) and other places.

10. Police Measures.

Police measures include the closing of all so-called luxury restaurants, the use of heavier penalties against [illegible], and in one instance at least, surveillance of roads. In late April the Ministry of the Interior ordered that all luxury restaurants, including those connected with hotels of the first class, were to be closed. The measure was apparently dictated in part by political considerations, since the order threatened other establishments with closure if the behaviour of their patrons was not satisfactory to the police. Penalties have become increasingly severe. Fines have reached 500,000 lire (Price Commissions of Turin, Apulania) and refugees report farmers shot for illicit slaughtering. At Rome the Special Military Tribunal condemned three men to death for having been concerned in the forgery of 1 million ration cards. At one time contraband transport on the roads to Rome was met by daily raids and the confiscation of merchandise. These, and other goods so acquired, were distributed gratis to the population of the poorer quarters. In March, however, existing imports restrictions were modified to permit private individuals to bring foodstuffs into the city by bicycle, cart, and donkey. Since the truck columns which bring in the city's food supply carry only the minimum required for official distribution, this would suggest an effort to create a greater availability of goods on the black market. In this connection, it was reported from Rome in March that the official price of eggs had been raised to 4 lire each - in contrast with the black market price of 12 lire. The report states that this change caused Rome to be "inundated" with eggs.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
X-2 Branch
Allied Armies in Italy
APO 794 U.S. ARMY

8 April 1944

To: SAINT, Washington

From: GBOOI

Subject: German Intelligence Activities, Italy, March 1944.

Submitted herewith report written by GBOOI on German espionage and sabotage activities in Italy during March, so far as they are known to Allied agencies.

Information contained herein is based largely on interrogations by S.C.I. (formerly SI (b)) [illegible] and CIC. Detailed reports should already be in your [illegible] This report is an effort to summarize and interpret them.

March was a month of many interesting espionage and sabotage cases, indicating that the German intelligence services are continuing a steady, and probably increasing work of recruitment, training and dispatch of agents.

The most spectacular -- and unsuccessful -- operation was the sending of three sabotage agents of the Sicherheitsdienst from Rome to the Anzio beachhead ostensibly to blow up the house in which Generals Alexander and Clark were supposed to live.

The three were:

Michele COPPOLA
Mario TRESIRO
Ernesto CATANI

It is interesting that Lt. Col. KAPPLER, head of the S.D. in Rome, personally gave the directions for the mission, and that Major HAAS, his assistant, was sufficiently interested in it to accompany the group personally to the starting point along the front.

The total failure of the mission was due to the fact that COPPOLA was already working for the anti-Axis intelligence organization of Admiral MAUGERI in Rome, and that the other two apparently had little inclination to carry out their instructions.

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[illegible] ...ities of Dr. Giovanni [illegible] BIANCHINI, [illegible] ...kind organizer of all [illegible] ...was [illegible] ...next [illegible] ...sabotage school at [illegible]

The [illegible] nature of [illegible] ...in keeping with [illegible] ...previously indicated by his [illegible] ...route of loyalty and [illegible] ...TARCHI and CATANI, [illegible] ...sabotage agents [illegible] ...may be expected [illegible]

This sabotage [illegible] ...gence effort known to [illegible] ...front to date. [illegible] ...drawn but it is only with the greatest difficulty that the Allies have been able to put through a few agents some of whom were shot at and wounded on their return.

The total evacuation of the civilian population now in progress, may bring a few black sheep out from the folds however. AMG officials have been ordering the evacuation zone by zone, but it is noticed that only a minority of the population of a particular zone is being rounded up. This indicates that those who want to escape being evacuated are moving to other zones. Eventually this evasion will become impossible, and it is thought that in the last several groups to be evacuated there may be found some sharp agents.

On the Fifth Army front in March, the Abwehr pushed through three agents, equipped with wireless sets, by handing them by flashing boat from Gaeta to Kondraone. They were:

Giovanni MERICHELLI
Placido IRRERA
Oreste LEMMA

The first was to go to Naples, the second to Messina, the third to Palermo. They were to report back to Rome each independently of the other.

MERICHELLI turned himself in almost immediately after crossing Allied territory and offered to work his way back to the Germans. His acceptance to work for Allied agent carries with it natural suspicions.

Likewise suspect is the fact that the Abwehr sent all three together and equipped each one with a wireless set. In the ordinary course of daily communication with Abwehr headquarters, an agent would logically spend his whole time establishing his link, hiding his equipment, doing his

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[illegible] for replies, [illegible] and replies, only
[illegible] have no time to gather the [illegible] to be sent.
This fact may justify the thought th[illegible] the Abwehr wanted
[illegible] became sought and the act worth [illegible] book up [illegible]. A curious
operation would be [illegible] small have called [illegible] a pair of two hands
to [illegible] rubber, one for the task of [illegible] information,
and the other for the task of communicating it to headquarters.

The agents [illegible] compared [illegible] large sums of
money at this time, however, nearly $5,000 in American dollars,
and several hundred thousand lire.

They disappear [illegible] interesting fact namely, that
on January 24, when the Allies [illegible] had [illegible] the Abwehr
breaking [illegible] in Paris, including [illegible] VALENTINI and
[illegible], already known to you, [illegible] in hurried and secret
to Florence. This is probably a [illegible] of what may be ex-
pected of Abwehr German intelligence officials when the Allies
approach Rome.

An instructive case in the Fifth Army front is
Report [illegible] that of Virgilio SCARPELLINI, who [illegible] with
Karl POLTRONIERI. The interrogation was interrupted for
two reasons:

a. This was one of the few agents caught
who admitted having made previously successful missions.
He had completed three and had been caught on his fourth.
The great majority of agents apprehended in Allied
Italy are arrested on their first trip to this side.
Karl KLEIN revealed that the Germans treated him
well during intervals between his trips abroad the
idea, permitting him to spend several weeks each
time with his family in the North. However, the total
amount of money paid him for his trips -- not much
more than $110. -- was considerably under compensa-
tion.

b. Scarpellini disclosed that a new Counter-
Intelligence activity operating close to the German
Intelligence headquarters while dispatch agents.

His [illegible] information to what seems to be a
German [illegible] before sending them
across the lines -- [illegible], to give them a mission on the
German side so that [illegible] Allied progress is having
[illegible] and is still [illegible]. Apparently this is a
test both of their loyalty and of their ability.

The case of Mario [illegible], who was captured in February,

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[illegible] provided an illuminating [illegible] in the course of [illegible] partner's interrogation during March.

[illegible] concerned Sergt. STRODIN, mentioned in [illegible] reports, who was turned over by the French, [illegible] Italian interrogation, it developed, that [illegible] had left behind in Italy, on the eve of [illegible] and told them all he knew so that [illegible] knew about them and their methods [illegible] offensive agents.

In consequence, CANLI revealed, STRODIN had become a specialist of minor rank in Abwehr II [illegible] Captain BERGER, and was being used by them as an instructor [illegible] agent-students, teaching them how to avoid being caught in Allied territory.

The return of the French agent or Italian origin Ridio LUCCI, to this also proved of considerable interest to this office because of the light it threw on German knowledge of OSS operations and agents. LUCCI, captured by the Germans on a mission for the French S. R., was thrown into the cell at SANT ELPIDIO, there he came into contact with five OSS agents who had been captured.

He was also asked by the Germans concerning Captain Tomkins and Captain Bourgoin, of OSS, and certain villas such as Roda and Rela, which are used as OSS training camps in Naples.

It was evident from the questions asked him, however, that the Germans' knowledge of Allied Intelligence operations was not limited to OSS. The Germans also knew much about the French S. R., and the British S.O.E.

A further indication of the poor type of humanity so often used in German agents of Italian origin was given in the case of Raffaele CAVALLO, taken into custody outside Naples. CAVALLO was only 15 years old, had gone as far as the third grade, and had remained there for three years without being able to win promotion to the fourth, whereupon he left school. Yet, he apparently had a mission to gather military information, although he could not remember even the password that had been given him.

A significant development in German recruiting for espionage services in Italy came with the capture of Francesco MASSINI and Domenico LORENZANI, in St. Andrea di Vorrate, Macerata, on the Fifth Army front. They revealed that they had been recruited in Athens, Greece, following the liquidation of the Italian Army in Greece.

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They were recruited for a special mission in Italy, which was to take place after they had completed a two months course of instruction at [illegible]. They were sent, however, to Vienna, thence to Munich, thence to Florence and [illegible], where their recruitment was completed. However, they [illegible] to training until they were sent to Arpino, near the front.

The importance of their disclosures rests in the fact that many more young Italian soldiers have been recruited in Greece for espionage work in Italy. Some 30 of these recruits accompanied MAZZINI and LORENZANI from Greece to Italy. Consequently, many of these may be expected to cross the lines in the next few weeks.

On the eastern side of the Apennines the principal German emphasis was on sabotage. Among the saboteurs caught in March were:

Girolamo AGATI
Mario BERNE
Elio VINCI
Vito BARTOLOZZI
Antonio GUICCIARDINI
Aristide GIOVANELLI
Venanzio CRIPPA
Alfredo CALLIGARO
Lt. Domenico DONNINI
Giulio SEBASTIANELLI

The three last named were sent over near Forli del Sannio to blow up the oil pipe-line reported to run between Manfredonia on the coast and Foggia, air bombardment headquarters. This was the initiative of Major VON THUN, of Abwehr II, with headquarters at Carpena. Interrogations reveal that about 30 agents are gathered at Carpena in preparation for coming to this side. These are young men who have had considerable training as shock-troops, demolition engineers, parachutists, or human torpedoes.

The rush of enemy agents to this side, beginning in December, has resulted in the piling up of many cases in the AMG courts. No new executions were noted in March on the Fifth Army front, but PALESSE, TEDESCO and TAPOLI, mentioned in previous reports, were convicted and sentenced to be executed, as was likewise Valerio RAVERA, who was arrested on March 6 after crossing the lines near Venafro.

DE SANTIS, COVELLA, MONTALDI and PUCCIA, previously mentioned, were sentenced to 20 years. BALDI AND RICCI, previously mentioned, have been interned in North Africa for the duration.

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Thus the right hand of [illegible]. There is little doubt but that the various German intelligence services will continue to send agents to Allied Italy. Along-lines and spring-ass at least arrived, and impeded terrain will permit easier crossing of the lines. It is also evident that they are preparing small stay-behind parties for the time when they will be forced to retreat toward the North, but still more important backlog of information is being accumulated on German intelligence activities, and the Allied counter-espionage agencies hope to be able to cope with whatever moves are made.

cc SAINT, London.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy

Attached herewith is copy of a report from Major Berding in Italy which you may find of interest.

J.R.M.

CC: General Magruder
Mr. Shepardson

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10 March 19..

SUBJECT: OSS and Italian Army

1. Following information, from Angelo Lanza, civilian member of this Branch, is forwarded:

2. "A few days ago I was notified that Avv. Antonio Capasso, whom I know well, had been arrested by the Carabinieri, apparently because of his anti-monarchic attitude.

3. "I called on General Sannino, Carabinieri commanding officer, asking him as a favor to me to release Avv. Capasso immediately, which he consented to.

4. "Further investigation brought to light that Avv. Capasso had been arrested on the charge of inducing an Italian officer to desert. The arresting officer was Maj. Pecorella, acting on orders of General Basso.

5. "Avv. Capasso was working, in fact, with Carbonaro and Politi of OSS (Capt. Pacatte), and had been approached by an Italian officer who had expressed the desire to offer his services on the side of the lines. He had begged Avv. Capasso - since Carbonaro and Politi thr[illegible] to call [illegible] prison to get him out of the way. [illegible] used to acknowledge position [illegible] OSS and to listen to explana[illegible] the case.

[illegible] De Cand[illegible] with the Americans, that OSS would abstain, from Colonel [illegible] sting or [illegible]ming in service Italian now on, from [illegible] army personnel.

8. "General Basso wanted to get to the bottom of things" and therefore ordered the arrest of Avv. Capasso whose relations with the Italian officer preceded the agreement mentioned above."

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy

I am attaching copy of a memorandum from Major Fenning, N-2 representative in Italy, which you may find of interest.

J.R.M.

CC: General Magruder

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6 March 1944

TO: Colonel A. D. Reutershan

FROM: OSS - X-2

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Natale SANFT.

1. The following information comes from above-named subject, evacuee from the ANZIO bridgehead area, who spent two days, January 16th and 17th in ROME.

2. "PAI (Polizia Africana Italiana), which is engaged in the policing of ROME, is anti-German. Members of the PAI are awaiting the arrival of the Allies and the opportune moment to turn against the Germans. Each member is armed with a 9 calibre Mitra-Berretta (machine gun); Berretta 34 pistol and blackjack.

3. "Numerous Italian army officers are hiding in ROME, disguised as Priests. The necessary documents to cover their disguise are furnished by the Vatican. These officers are also awaiting the opportune moment to turn against the Germans.

4. "General CARACCIOLO, leader of a partisan group, was shot by the Germans sometime during December, 1943, after his hiding place in a ROME convent was discovered.

5. "Germans are reported to have set up machine gun emplacements at all the principal road and street intersections in the city."

6. Interrogation conducted by Lt. Paul J. Paterni.

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To: General Donovan

From: Donald C. Stone

17 March 1944

Subject: The Italian Political Situation as of March 1, 1944.

The Churchill speech of February 22 came as a bombshell in the Italian political scene. It cast doubt on the ability of a government of the Six Parties to give the Allies adequate military support, and it gave the Badoglio government and the King a new lease of life by postponing the decision on a new government until Rome is taken. It caused dismay among all those Italian political leaders who hoped that Victor Emmanuel was about to be removed and the basis laid for a new regime under Humbert with liberal guarantees.

About mid-February we were informed through a trustworthy source that General Mason MacFarlane had asked the leaders of the Six Parties to state on what conditions they would accept Humbert as monarch. We were told that the leaders proposed to reply that they were now ready to accept Humbert provided his coming to the throne was surrounded by full guarantees that the Italians would be given a liberal regime of their own choosing. With this reply in hand, it was said that General MacFarlane was prepared to try to secure a settlement along these lines in London and Washington.

On February 20 a separate demarche was made by certain liberals, who sent one of their number directly to the King, who received him without the knowledge of Badoglio (this information was given me on February 29 by Count Sforza, who asked

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me to carry a letter to Mr. Berle containing the same information and who enjoined me to say nothing about it until I reached Washington). This liberal leader explained to the King the seriousness of the situation, the importance of his withdrawing, and finally repeated the words Sforza had used November 9 in refusing the premiership, in substance that, if the King did not withdraw he would endanger not only the monarchy but his own person. The King agreed, not to abdicate, but to withdraw and permit Humbert to become Lieutenant General of the realm. The King asked that the liberal leader prepare at once a suitable proclamation which he would sign. The only conditions the liberals posed were that there should be a thoroughgoing purge of Fascists in the administration and especially in the army.

The Churchill speech changed the whole situation. When the proclamation was sent for the King's signature, nothing was heard of it. Badoglio at once began a campaign to strengthen his position, above all by undermining the parties by drawing prominent party members into his government. So far as I know, all those approached refused except Zanibon, who became minister with the function of purging the Fascists and who was promptly read out of the Socialist Party. The speech has also caused some rift between the three "left wing" parties, (Communist, Socialist, Action) and the three "right wing" (Democratic Labor, Democratic Christian, Liberal), the former parties being ready for somewhat more radical resistance

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a prompt and proper exploitation of the situation:

(Note on the six parties: It has been alleged that the six parties are not "representative" of Italian opinion:

have lost all the advantages which we could have drawn from

we be much to the liberals; but that by that time we would

support the Badoglian party until the logic of events forced

the same mistake in Italy as in North Africa; that we would

friends may then be feared that the United States would make

and a man of moderation and wisdom; said to me in a most

city of Naples, Minister Head of the Action Party in the South;

preserve the debris of Fascism: Omodeo, Rector of the Univer-

not the monarchy (which the parties are perfectly ready to

has now gotten himself into a position where he is defending,

with full political guarantees as the solution: Churchill

is a tremendous liability and also view the coming of Umberto

articulate Italian political opinion all feel that the King

the parties; responsible Allied officials on the ground and

opposition is strong toward Communism by middle of the

have little reason to doubt it since this was precisely what

had been predicted if the Allies persisted in supporting the

King and Badoglio in Italy:

The situation is apparently now one in which the

attitude even so: Sforza told me that the speech had thrown

the six parties will remain very adamants in their

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It is to be noted that there is nothing to prevent other parties, representing other shades of opinion, from coming into existence. Certain small parties have appeared, but both in the south and in the north the Six continue to dominate the scene and are the parties whose representation is considered essential in the formation of the local "Committees of Liberation". The mass of Italian opinion is quite naturally politically inarticulate; the situation is one in which the articulate minority has chosen to organize along the lines of the Six Parties and has done so in central and northern Italy at the peril of its members' lives).

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The United States cannot repeat the mistake of 1918-19.

The first World War showed - and the present one shows it even more clearly - that a great power like the United States cannot confine itself to a foreign policy limited to the American continent. The world is too small to permit such isolationisms.

The United States must follow at all cost in the future a world - wide policy.

It must have in the various continents some areas where it can count on secure predominance through mutual interest, which could be used as bases of operations in case of conflict.

Now it is obvious that if American policy coincided with British Empire policy during these last two wars, because German imperialism was becoming too dangerous, as soon as a true peace will be attained, the two policies will resume again their absolutely independent courses.

England will link itself all the more closely to France, because there are no longer any territories where they would come in contrast. There will be then in Europe an Anglo-French and a Russian-Balkan nucleus.

If the United States wants to have a base in Europe it has no choi but Italy, as Spain is spiritually linked with South America. Italy offer also the advantage of having a very important position in the Mediterranean basin. Italy has many of her people in America-which creates also a sentimental link.

But a base must be strong and stable.

In my opinion it is in the interest of America to have Italy retur as soon as possible to full efficiency; this cannot be attained without direct intervention and help from the United States.

England instead has an opposite interest: not to have a strong power in the Mediterranean. This explains Queen Victoria 's policy, which was always opposed to the constitution of an Italian Kingdom.

The so - called traditional Anglo-Italian friendship is true only if Italy is a negligeable quantity. Present British policy demonstrates

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this clearly crazy action on the part of British authorities during this period is directed towards increasing the confusion in Italy rather than towards helping to decrease it.

The United States should take back into its own hands the direction of Mediterranean affairs, and, when war is over, it should remain in Italy, reducing British intervention to the minimum.

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Martini Plan for the Formation of the Garibaldi Volunteer Corps.

DISTRIBUTION LIST 2-1-44

1. Maj. Chapin
2. Mr. Scribner (for appropriate SSO heads)
3. Gen. Magruder
4. Col. Onthank
5. Mr. Shepardson

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MARTINI

PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF THE GARIBALDI VOLUNTEER CORPS

Today we find an Italy which is in a complete state of dissolution insofar as her national forces are concerned, a condition which finds its origins in the political dynasty of the House of Savoy beginning in 1870 and its completion in the final enslavement of Italian industry to German capital for purposes of the present war; the intermediate cycle of this process is characterised by the creation of Fascism at the beginning and recently by the Badoglio requested Armistice, the flight of the King and Badoglio towards Anglo-American lines, and the creation in occupied Italy of a soi-disant Republican Fascist Government, and was accelerated by the creation of a minority so-called Fascist aristocracy which tended to create an Italian imperialism which had no reason to exist.

Italy, with the remnants of an army forced to lay down its arms at the orders of Badoglio and other leaders and which has lost all faith in its military chiefs who abandoned it to its own devices, with a population extremely diffident of its political heads whose policies have always been along personal rather than national lines, finds herself in a state of chaos without a flag or a government around which to rally.

Owing to the impossibility of reconstructing Italy on the vestigial political and military views of the past which would mean only re-creation of an Italy with all the faults which have already dragged her people into an unwanted war, an Italy doomed before her rebirth, it is necessary to turn to Italian spiritual forces which have maintained their integrity, refusing to lend themselves to the devices of the so-called rebuilders of recent Italian history.

Chief among such forces is the Garibaldi spirit which has always retained its democratic nature, has always struggled for the rights of nationality, the defense of the oppressed, for the rights of free determination of form of government, the same principles which have called the Allied armies to European soil

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PARTISI

PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF THE GARIBALDI VOLUNTEER CORPS

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to fight German imperialism.

The Italian people would find their greatest incentive to national reconstruction in the Garibaldi spirit. The importance of this spirit is proved, if this is necessary, by the appeal made to it at different times and with varying motives by the radio broadcasts of Badoglio organizations, of the Fascists, and of London, the United States, and Moscow. Monarchical governments as well as Fascist ones, completely aware of exploiting him to gain political or partisan ends, have always opposed the Red Shirt who, once the battle was finished, has always returned to his farm, his factory, his shop, once again to take his place in private and national life without demanding special privileges of any government. This tradition of service with complete lack of ulterior personal motive has attracted to the Garibaldino a universal sympathy which is one of his greatest strengths.

In view of the present situation General Giuseppe Garibaldi has again assumed command and has sent out the call to all the healthy forces of the nation, those who intend to enter the battle-field for the purpose of driving from Italy the Fascist remnant which has attempted to seize power through a Republican government created by Mussolinian decree, together with the German forces which support it. In response to his call Rome political groups having armed groups, at present dispersed for obvious reasons, have placed themselves at his orders; the Associazione Nazionale dei Combattenti (Veterans' Association), the members of the Nastro Azzurro (holders of gold and silver medals), and the Associazione Nazionale dei Mutilati (Association of War-Wounded) have done the same.

The Vatican Secretariat of State has been contacted in order to formulate an accord with the clergy; agreements have been reached with the Communists and other political parties; and all are in accord with the principle that all political controversies are to remain dormant until victory has been won, leaving, however, to each group complete doctrinary freedom once this primary objective has been obtained.

Following transmission of his plan to Anglo-American representatives at the Vatican who promised that it would be forwarded to the Allied Military command, General Garibaldi ordered me to reach the American or English lines in order to establish with Allied military authorities agreements for Garibaldian cooperation.

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OSI SECRETARIAT ROUTE SLIP

Date

To	Name	Initials
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	F. J. Ball, Jr.	
	D. G. Lee	
	P. F. Dugliess	
✓	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	P
	A. W. Dulleway	
	Files	
✓	Mrs O'Donnell	

The following action was taken on a request of this date

1) Funds Plans memo was prepared

2) Cable was sent to Argus outlining Hugo Communications and advising that he will be [illegible]

(8397)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

23 September, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Message from Ambassador Hayes

Attached hereto for your information is a paraphrase of a message dated 20 September, 1943 to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Hayes at Madrid.

For THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

C. R. PECK
Colonel, G.S.C.

1 Incl.
Message from
Ambassador Hayes

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[redacted]

[redacted] September, 1943

[redacted] FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Message from Ambassador Hayes

Attached herein for your information is a paraphrase of a message dated 20 September, 1943 to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Hayes at Madrid.

For THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

L. R. PECK
Colonel, G.S.C.

1 Incl.
Message from
Ambassador Hayes

abz

Distribution:
Col.Quigley
Records Room

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Yesterday, while [illegible] in search of one [illegible] told me that [illegible] of the OSS reporting and that they are well aware that it [illegible] to be [illegible] in the diplomatic posts and that they are [illegible] in [illegible] service. This latter circumstance is the reason why many [illegible] will no longer work for OSS. A widely known agent who was [illegible] is now Legal Attache [illegible] has already incurred on [illegible] a close friend of his. Irresponsibility, [illegible] and [illegible] have characterized the agents who are invariably enlisted by the OSS. The job of getting these agents out of difficulties is handled by [illegible] and [illegible] hands on my chair. Colonel Dickey, Dunn, Wilson, Peoples, Hillenkoetter and Donovan have been successively withdrawn. Major Grenard and Commander Rose [illegible] cannot return to Spain. Indiscretion, irresponsibility, immorality and lack of cooperation have characterized Whitell operations and he is temporarily in charge of the OSS in Madrid. Grave wastage of public money as well as breaking down of the character and morals of many of the agents has been the result of persons to unlimited funds by these agents. With the possible exception of Booth and Steele, there is not a single agent in Spain who can be trusted and who can take charge even temporarily. We are bringing Steele to Madrid to be placed temporarily in charge of the [illegible] Booth has declined this position with the private opinion that he is fed up with the organization and wants to get out of it. I repeat that to my knowledge OSS constitutes the greatest menace to our relations with Spain. While the successive heads of OSS have talked to me in big but vague terms of the valuable service OSS has rendered the war effort, they have been completely unable to present any convincing evidence of their worth. From my own personal knowledge there can be no doubt that they have done our Government more repeat more harm than good in Spain. I strongly recommend that in the event you have any good reason to think that our relations in Spain will be subjected to unusual strain in the future, I urge that you arrange that OSS cease operating in Spain. In any event, its withdrawal would

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Copies to:

(1) Secretariat

(2) Mr. Alexander

(2) Secretariat

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July 6, 1942

[redacted]

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Mr. Taylor

SUBJECT: Role of Intelligence in shaping propaganda policy

In addition to the intelligence required for its own psychological warfare activities the OSS has an obvious interest in supplying the foreign branch of the OWI with intelligence of various types. By doing so, the OSS can exercise an indirect influence over the policies and operations of OWI, which in the long run, may prove even more effective than direct instructions. The following suggestions are offered for the exploitation of OSS intelligence material to influence OWI policy:

1. Special liaison on intelligence directly between R and A and OWI. The OSS liaison officer with OWI should, however, be in constant contact with the R and A men assigned to this task.

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2. In addition to [illegible] intelligence [illegible] currently flowing to the CNI through [illegible] channel indicated above, it might prove advisable from time to time to prepare [illegible] special reports or summaries of intelligence material pertaining [illegible] in-[illegible] desired. [illegible] ch the CNI planners [illegible] on bi[illegible] VI. These [illegible] [illegible] ing inter[illegible] liaison officer should be closely [illegible] preparation of these special reports. [illegible] possess [illegible] greater facilities [illegible] collection [illegible] association of intelligence, it [illegible] gradually take over more [illegible] [illegible] by or projected [illegible] function.

by the CNI intelligence service. While we still in an embryonic state it should be easy for CNI to establish its superior facilities for intelligence work. Great tact must be exercised in approaching this whole question. The CNI intelligence men must be given no pretext for feeling that an attempt is being made to restrict their

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not [illegible]. The restriction of OWI intelligence activities must be voluntary, arising solely from a realization that the OSS intelligence services are doing a better job for OWI than any [illegible] OWI itself could get [illegible].

4. It [illegible] to establish in London a psychological [illegible] intelligence unit working with [illegible] division of OWI and both [illegible] would concentrate on the [illegible] required chiefly for guidance of radio propaganda: Analysis of the enemy's domestic propaganda policy, fluctuation of morale, zones or areas of ignorance among listening groups on the Continent, etc.

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