

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

13,738

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

13,738

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

24 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

SUBJECT: Activities of the Intelligence Service

1. There are attached hereto a series of memoranda from the members of my staff which outline certain accomplishments, approved and pending projects, etc., designed to solve some problems in the over-all intelligence field of OSS. See memorandum to me by Mr. Montgomery of 21 February, immediately following, which briefs the subjects covered.

2. There are certain inescapable factors which influence the ultimate accomplishments of the Intelligence Service. The more important of these factors will be listed and then discussed in brief. They are:

a. The attitude of the intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and State Department toward the Intelligence Service, OSS.

b. Efforts toward the coordination of national intelligence as reflected by JIC thinking and action.

c. Extreme variations in the types of intelligence activity among the several branches of OSS.

d. The status of the Office of Deputy Director, Intelligence Service, with respect to the several intelligence branches.

e. The relationship between OSS Washington and the Strategic Services offices in the field -- more specifically that between the Deputy Director, Intelligence Service, and the intelligence officers in the field; and between the Branch Chiefs in Washington and the chiefs of their branch activities in the field.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

3. Discussion of Factors a to e Inclusive.

a. The attitude of MID toward OSS was sharply marked by the antagonism of General Strong as long as he was head of MID. During this period effective collaboration with MID on any echelon was practically impossible. Upon the assumption of office by General Bissell, he voluntarily expressed the desire to collaborate and stated that, while anxious to avoid duplication of effort, he was not interested in jurisdictional quarrels. He has, however, been engrossed in his own problems, including reorganization ordered by the Deputy Chief of Staff and now in progress. Consequently he has been disinclined to commit himself either to individual or comprehensive adjustments in line with the JCS Directive. I have the feeling that he has recently been somewhat affected by anti-OSS influences. The future attitude of all echelons in MID will almost wholly depend upon the position adopted by General Bissell.

Our relations with Naval Intelligence are spotty. Admiral Schuirmann has personally been friendly, but generous collaboration has been manifested only in few places in Naval Intelligence.

Our relations with General White in Air Intelligence and his organization are both friendly and cooperative.

Generally our relations with State Department are on a firm basis. There has been a growing appreciation of OSS intelligence in the various offices of the Department.

Fundamentally, OSS Intelligence still is viewed by both MID and ONI as duplicating many of their efforts and as a competitor. The peculiar capabilities of OSS intelligence are neither understood nor sufficiently appreciated among the higher officers. No discipline is exercised on the Joint Chiefs' level to exact compliance with the terms of the JCS Directive. Recognition of gross defects in our national intelligence setup is fairly general. No basic or effective steps are being taken to rectify the faults, other than attempts to bolster up the separate agencies. Their integration in some manner is the only solution.

*MID activities are
said to be duplicated
where a double duplicate
MID has the firm right*

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

b. A tendency is observable in the JIC to face some minor problems which cry for solution. It should be admitted that the constructive impetus comes from the working level of the Joint Intelligence Staff. For example, an effort is being made to transform the JISPB into a joint agency under the Joint Topographical Sub-Committee and to assign it the function of preparing short and intermediate topographical studies as well as the more comprehensive JANIS studies. It is hoped also to have assigned to JISPB the continuing responsibility of forwarding joint topographical material to the theaters. At present there is no joint agency doing this.

The JIC is also considering proposals for strengthening its charter in order to give it additional coordinating and supervisory authority over the intelligence agencies under the JCS.

Meanwhile, a situation unfavorable to the OSS exists in the present procedure of preparing Secret-Security studies in which only "service members" participate. Despite the fact that OSS is an agency of the JCS, it is classed not as a "service member" but as a civilian agency in the same category with State and FEA. R & A has valuable contributions to all Secret-Security studies which at present can be made only through indirect or bootlegging methods. The OSS representative on JIC does not sit in consideration of the papers. OSS should be considered a "service member." If special security measures are required, they can be implemented in R & A as well as in MID and ONI.

c. The integration of intelligence activities in the OSS is complicated by the vast differences in the intelligence operations of the SI - X-2 types and the R & A - FN types. Each operation, such as, collection, evaluation, processing, and dissemination, differs widely. The crystallization of special methods of registry and filing among the several branches was inevitable. Without a fundamental reestablishment of a centralized system of registry and filing, which would be of questionable value even if possible, we are confirmed in an uneconomical compartmentation of intelligence records.

SECRET

SECRET

With respect to functional objectives, it should also be recognized that the Branches differ widely -- both in Washington and in the field. The tendency of Strategic Services Officers to use personnel indiscriminately without regard to branch reflects this lack of understanding of the fundamentals of the several intelligence branches. Except for straight combat intelligence, the several branches must be permitted to conduct intelligence operations in accordance with plans formulated by a trained intelligence hierarchy. Only the intelligence material obtained from such operations is susceptible of being pooled.

At present the mechanics of making available, in orderly manner, to using agencies within the OSS the information which comes from widely varied sources is complicated by an absence of uniformity in method of intake both within individual branches and among them. The same lack of uniformity exists with respect to dissemination, which operation is always most difficult to control. These problems are under study by a special committee but no solution has been reached of the intricate problems involved in orderly intake and dissemination of information.

The dissemination of selective current intelligence to specified recipients is now being regularized by checking through a committee consisting of Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Southgate, and Major Gleason.

d. Despite the variation in operation and objectives of the several branches, coordination and some degree of integration of their activities is essential if the OSS Intelligence Service is to bring its capabilities to bear as a unit among other intelligence agencies. This can be accomplished only if the status of the Office of Deputy Director, IS, vis-a-vis the branches is better defined. Such definition has never been made in writing or in conference with assembled personnel concerned. I have been as tactful as possible with the branch chiefs and have attempted to have my subordinates adopt the same attitude. However, when obvious defects in operations are noted and when coordinating measures are essential, I have suggested remedies which in some instances have

SECRET

SECRET

created "hurt feelings." Sometimes improvements result and sometimes not.

A large part of my time and that of my officers is spent in consultation or diplomacy to effect minor changes however clearly indicated. After some months' experience in efforts to accomplish worthwhile results through my personal efforts and those of my assistants, I am convinced that consideration should be given by you to a reappraisal of the logic of the office.

I have consistently urged an administrative set-up decentralized to the extent of a clear-cut intelligence hierarchy in which authority matches responsibility and in which tempered discipline exists throughout each echelon of authority. I am not raising this question here. I do, however, request that whatever degree or type of influence or authority you intend to repose in this office be expressed in such form as to be understood equally by myself, my staff, and the branch heads.

e. This office has taken the initiative in preparing specific recommendations in the form of a draft order designed to define the relationship between OSS organization in Washington and the Strategic Services organizations in the Theaters. The major viewpoints of the key officers in Washington have been reflected; minor divergencies have been composed where possible. I believe that the early promulgation of this order together with a firm statement from you in support of the order would go far in eliminating much existing confusion as to where authority resides. It would solve some of the difficulties which arise over the misuse of personnel which is the principal cause of friction between branches. A lack of uniform understanding of the functions and objectives of the various offices and branches can only be remedied by such an order. Compliance with the order by all concerned, even within reasonable human limits, would vastly improve the present conditions.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

21 February 1944

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

SUBJECT: Activities of Office of Deputy
Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Submitted herewith are several reports prepared by the members of your staff, listing certain activities in the past three months which seem appropriate for the information of the Director, OSS, and, in certain cases, for action. Documents involved are attached as tabs. A brief summary of the more important items (with references) follows:

A. Evaluation of Intelligence.

Evaluation Procedures Officer appointed to secure analysis and comment on SI disseminations from RIA and other agencies (Report No. 1, par. 1).

Report submitted recommending reconstitution of Reporting Board along functional lines (Report No. 1, par. 2).

B. Dissemination of Intelligence.

Dissemination of Situation Reports (formerly "P. W. Roundups") to outside agencies considered (Report No. 1, par. 4).

Selected intelligence transmitted to J.C.S. (Report No. 1, par. 5).

Tentative decisions made on dissemination of intelligence to USSR (Report No. 1, par. 6).

Joint Review Board established by J.I.C. to examine material disseminated by the several intelligence agencies (Report No. 1, par. 7).

Special form of dissemination established for significant "Boston Series" of messages received from Bern (Report No. 2).

SECRETC. Radio Activities.

Radio activities reviewed; radio intelligence activities of Bellmore, Reseda, and DF stations placed under OD Branch; transfer of radio intelligence personnel at Bellmore and Reseda to Washington recommended (Report No. 3, par. 1, 2, 3).

D. Liaison Activities.

Liaison intelligence between OSS and War Department placed under this office; discussions held with State Department to facilitate interchange of intelligence -- State/OSS Liaison Officer appointed (Report No. 3, par. 4, 6).

E. Relations with War Department.

Conferences held with MID to improve relationship with that agency; relations with Order of Battle Branch, Prisoner of War Branch, and the Provost Marshal General's Office maintained (Report No. 3, par. 5, 7, 8).

F. Coordination of Intelligence Operations into France.

Plan prepared in collaboration with SI for coordination of activities into France from Spain (Report No. 3, par. 9).

G. Defects in Handling of SI Operations.

An examination of certain field operations of this Branch indicates an apparent lack of control and coordination, and suggests the need of a Branch Operations Officer (Report No. 4).

H. Organization of Theatre Missions.

Revision of a proposed order covering the organization of Theatre Missions made in collaboration with the Secretariat and branches concerned (Report No. 5).

James A. Montgomery, Jr.
James A. Montgomery, Jr.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

19 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Developments in Dissemination of Intelligence -- November 1943 to Date.

The following major matters have been developed in the past three months:

1. Colonel Forgan's Committee on the Collection, Evaluation and Dissemination of Intelligence Material submitted its first report on November 8. This report, which was approved by the Director, recommended in substance that proposed SI disseminations be submitted to R&A (or, on occasion, other branches) for analysis and comment; also that the SI desks maintain systematic records of evaluations according to sources. Subsequently it was agreed to implement this report by the appointment of an OSS Evaluation Procedures Officer. An Office Order has been issued describing his duties (Tab A). With the approval of the branches involved, Dr. S. A. Callison, the MID/SI Liaison Officer, was chosen to fill this position, in view of his demonstrated judgment and experience. Some difficulty was encountered in securing his release from MID; this, however, was effected within the past week and he has commenced his duties. The initial analyses received from R&A indicate that the plan will contribute greatly to the caliber of the reports.
2. The second report of Colonel Forgan's Committee was submitted to the Director on January 4, and awaits approval. This report recommends in brief that the SI Reporting Board be reconstituted along British lines, with a number of functional evaluating sections headed by experienced chiefs who would expand the practice of securing evaluations from using agencies.
3. The third report of the Committee, in process of preparation, makes certain recommendations to insure a better control and distribution of intelligence material.
4. R&A round-ups have been recast into weekly current situation reports, and certain rules have been established by that branch to insure greater uniformity and objectivity in

SECRET

the presentation of material. Formal request was made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for permission to make a limited outside dissemination of the report. This request was returned to OSS without approval, the evident intent being to place the responsibility for determining whether the dissemination of intelligence reports and general dissemination of certain reports to the State Department for criticism. The State Department has requested that it receive the reports in the future in the matter. A further limited dissemination may be made to agencies specifically requesting the reports. Appropriate steps have been taken for screening the material.

5. Arrangements have been made to supply the Administrative Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a limited amount of selected intelligence material. A memorandum outlining in general the types of material to be submitted and the procedure to be followed is attached as Tab B.

6. Preliminary discussions have been had with the branches of the State Department relating to types of intelligence material appropriate for interchange with the USSR, and a selection of material has been made. A tentative memorandum on this subject is attached as Tab C.

7. The Joint Intelligence Committee has established a Joint Review Board to examine all papers published and distributed by the several intelligence agencies, including OSS, and to make recommendations with a view to eliminating duplication. It is understood that this Board will deal not only with periodical publications, but broadly with all studies and reports put out by the several agencies. It is believed that the Board intends to approach the problem in a constructive spirit. Copy of a memorandum referring to the establishment of the Board is attached as Tab D.

James A. Montgomery, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Deputy Director Intelligence Service

OFFICE ORDER

NUMBER: 9

ISSUED: 10 February 1943

EFFECTIVE: 5 February 1943

LISE S.

SUBJECT: OSS Evaluation Procedures Officer

1. In order to implement on Evaluation, Collection, and Dissemination of Intelligence Material, contained in its report of 8 November 1943 and approved by the Director, OSS, the Office of OSS Evaluation Procedures Officer is hereby established.

2. The OSS Evaluation Procedures Officer will have the following duties and functions:

a. He will receive proposed disseminations of appropriate types of intelligence material from the SI Reporting Board, obtain analysis and comment thereon from R&A personnel, and communicate such analysis and comment to the Reporting Board. In conjunction with the Reporting Board and R&A, he will establish appropriate machinery for the execution of this function.

b. When advisable he will, in a similar manner, secure analysis and comment from other branches or persons in OSS having special knowledge of the material involved.

c. He will, through established liaison channels, secure evaluations of SI material, when practicable, from other Government agencies.

d. He will supervise the maintenance by the several SI desks of a uniform system of recording evaluations according to sources. This system will provide for a comparison of the ratings given the source in the field with the evaluations placed on the intelligence by OSS or other interested agencies; a periodic review of the records; and transmission to the field by the desks of evaluation data for guidance of agent personnel.

e. To such extent as is practicable, he will arrange for the institution or expansion of similar procedures in the various field offices.

(32792)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

For convenience of administration, the OSS Evaluation
Procedures Officer will be a member of the Chief's staff. However, appoint-
ments to such position will be subject to the approval of the
Chief, and the officer will be subject to the control of
the Chief in all matters relating to his relationship with that branch
in connection with his duties.

He will be directly directed by the Chief.



John Magruder

John Magruder,
Deputy Director--Intelligence Service

(32792)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1954

MEMORANDUM TO ALL BRANCHES, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

**SUBJECT: Information to be Furnished the
Administrative Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

1. It is desired that certain types of information and intelligence be furnished by the Branches to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Administrative Secretary of the J.C.S.. The purpose of such dissemination is to afford the Administrative Secretariat selected material which may be made available to the personnel in the Office of the J. C. S.. This type of material will not be given dissemination outside of the personnel of the Office without the agreement of the OSS.

2. It should be clearly understood that this automatic distribution to the Administrative Secretary is for purely informative purposes, and the material so distributed is not to include subjects upon which action or reply is expected from the J.C.S.. All matters or subjects bearing recommendations or upon which decisions are expected from the J.C.S. will be forwarded formally by the Director to the Secretary, J.C.S..

3. A high degree of discrimination should be exercised in the selection of material to be distributed. It should be of current interest and confined to important and significant

CONFIDENTIAL

items appropriate for consideration by persons making decisions on matters of major policy. This would include:

a. In the case of DIA, studies having broad implications as to the enemy's capabilities in major fields (e.g., capability estimates, aircraft position); over-all estimates of enemy morale; analysis of important political developments or trends; reports suggesting the application of psychological pressures on a high level.

b. In the case of PM, reports or interviews of a similar character, relating primarily to European politics in its larger phases.

c. In the case of SI, spot intelligence of special significance and novelty, or considered estimates of the situation prepared by experienced personnel in the field.

d. In the case of X-2, significant items of intelligence obtained through its special operations or from corresponding allied agencies, or information on enemy espionage activities of general interest.

4. Material considered appropriate for distribution will be so earmarked and delivered to the Current Intelligence Staff for screening and transmission to the J.C.S. under the general supervision of the Office of the Deputy Director, OSI--Intelligence Service.

January 1944

MEMORANDUM TO ALL BRANCHES, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SUBJECT: Intelligence to be Furnished U.S.S.R.

SECRET

1. Types of intelligence material appropriate for interchange with U.S.S.R. will be determined in accordance with this memorandum.

2. In principle, U.S.S.R. may be given intelligence which is of distinctive OSS origin and which will be of aid to that country in prosecuting the war against Germany.

3. The following over-all guides are applicable:

a. Intelligence supplied should be confined to material relating to Germany, satellite countries, and countries occupied by them.

b. Intelligence may be supplied on neutral countries if it deals exclusively with enemy activities in those countries of a political, economic, military or psychological nature.

c. The intelligence should not deal with Allied operations or Allied policy (including policies of particular Allied countries), or with areas under Allied control.

d. Order of Battle intelligence (except for information affecting common action in partisan and guerrilla areas) and other information primarily of a military character is the particular field of MID and should not be distributed by OSS.

e. As noted, intelligence supplied should be of a distinctive OSS character. Mere compilations of material received from other agencies should not be distributed. Reports eligible for distribution are selected ones in which material from non-OSS sources has been interwoven with other material, and where

SECRET

- 2 -

the end-product represents a definite OSS contribution. Reports prepared in collaboration with other agencies (e.g., FEA) will not be distributed without the consent of such agencies.

4. Reports relating to Japan may also be supplied to the Russians if the Russians show a clear intention to deal with us on a reciprocal basis. Information would be limited to that on Japan itself; no information would be provided on the United Nations, Free China, and British and Dutch possessions. Suggested categories of material to be furnished under such an arrangement would include American books and periodicals, certain Japanese published material, basic industry studies (e.g., study on Japanese electric power industry), topographic studies or maps of Japan, and studies on Japanese intentions.

5. R&A will furnish available material regarding the enemy or enemy territory of the following types:

a. Reports on enemy economic capabilities and organization -- agricultural and industrial resources, production, requirements and consumption rates; manpower studies; health and standard of living; housing; over-all studies on bomb damage or conclusions therefrom, etc..

b. Reports on morale and psychological factors.

c. Reports on political developments -- internal controls, party strengths, external policy, etc..

d. Reports on resistance groups; guerrilla and partisan forces.

SECRET

- 3 -

- a. Certain basic descriptive handbooks and guides (e.g., CAD handbooks).
- f. Topographic studies for areas likely to be subject to Russian operations, including information on roads, railways, utilities, terrain, etc..
- g. Maps of a strategic nature.
- h. Photographs (low level).
- i. Enemy newspapers and periodicals received through Interdepartmental Committee.
- j. Reference books and periodicals.

6. SI will furnish available current reports emanating from OSS sources and relating to the subject matter listed in paragraph 5. It is recommended, however, that SI material be carefully screened and coordinated with such R&A material as is supplied, in order to prevent duplication and assure substantial use of the product. At the outset, SI reports distributed would be significant items of spot intelligence or items supplementing R&A studies. Experience would determine whether the Russians would either desire or be prepared to handle the general run of undigested material.

7. X-2 will furnish, on a continuing basis, counter-espionage data obtained from independent OSS sources. This will include information on enemy espionage organizations, personnel, and methods of operation, as well as information on potentially subversive enemy groups and personalities.

SECRET

8. Certain EN reports relating primarily to European political developments may be appropriate for distribution.

9. The selection of intelligence material deemed appropriate for release will be made by the several branches in accordance with the principles stated above. The material so selected will be transmitted for screening to a supervisory committee composed of a representative of R&A, a representative of SI, and a representative of the Office of the Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service.

Policies with respect to contacts to be made with the U.S.S.R. Mission in Washington relating to the interchange of intelligence, and with respect to the methods of transmission, will be fixed by the Washington representative of the Chief of the OSS Mission to the U.S.S.R..

SECRET

10 February 1944

BOSTON SERIES

The name "Boston Series" has been given to the paraphrases of a group of cables coming from Bern. These cables summarize purported messages between the German Foreign Office and German diplomatic, commercial and other representatives in various countries which have been secured by the OSS in Bern through a German named Woods. They are being handled in Bern in collaboration with the British and are sent to London as well as Washington.

When it became clear that the messages dealt with matters of a delicate nature, it was decided that the Boston Series should be disseminated in a very limited way. The main desire at the outset was to test their authenticity. However, it was clearly recognized that even if the messages were authentic, the Germans may have the ultimate purpose of using this channel as a means of bringing about an important plant.

Dissemination outside OSS is being handled in the following manner. The entire Boston Series has been made available to the White House following a conversation between Admiral Leahy, Colonel Buxton, and General Magruder. It is understood that Admiral Leahy has submitted them to Security Control for checking. The Series is also being sent to the Special Branch of MIS, which is the principal agency of the War Department from which confirmation may be obtained. Following a conference with Secretary Hull, the paraphrases are being given to Assistant Secretary of State Berle. Admiral Schuirmann, the head of ONI, has indicated to General Magruder that the Navy has no facilities for using or testing the messages in question.

Within OSS the preparation of the paraphrases is being handled by Mr. Southgate of the Reporting Board, who has been working closely with General Magruder's office. Mr. Mayer of SI has the responsibility for sending follow-up cables to London and Bern and in general taking any steps toward clarification of the material that is received. A representative of X-2 is in constant touch with the Special Branch of MIS, which has assumed the responsibility for deciding when and if a plant is being engineered. The Series is disseminated to Dr. Langer with the understanding that he may make use of the information without disclosing the supposed source to his staff. A complete set has been given to the Director's office.

The Special Branch of MIS has already indicated that it believes the messages to be authentic. A similar view is expressed by the British, who were approached by our London office. Both feel that the Germans may be employing the technique of disclosing genuine information not particularly harmful to them in order to instill, and later take advantage of, a false sense of confidence. The Special Branch takes the strong position that it and its British counterpart should be the only distributees of this series but acquiesces in the distribution to Berle. In consequence the matter of dissemination to the White House will be reexamined if a new batch of cables is received. The Special Branch objects very strongly to the dissemination in London to Admiral Winant, Admiral Starke, and G-2. This has been communicated to London.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

19 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Developments since November 18, 1943, to Date.

The following major matters have been developed in the past three months:

1. The collection of intelligence through our radio stations at Bellmore and Rasada has been materially improved and regularized. The material is now being received in Washington and processed by the Reporting Board in SI and disseminated by them to all interested branches and to outside Government agencies. A number of visits to Bellmore have been made with other members of OSS to acquaint them with the possibilities of the station and to bolster the morale of the operating personnel which had reached a very low level. SI, NIA, and NSA have all been consulted in order to determine how Bellmore could be used to the best advantage, and a number of suggestions have been made and put into effect.

It is intended that the same thing will be done for the Rasada station as soon as it can be visited and its operations more thoroughly studied.

An arrangement was concluded with the Navy by which they now supply us with certain shipping information which we had been securing at Bellmore. This allowed us to use our operations for duty on other circuits.

2. Conferences have been held with the FCC to determine how our radio monitoring could best be coordinated with theirs. Since every station monitored by OSS is also covered by the FCC it was concluded that we should make greater use of the FCC raw material and should employ our own stations in augmenting and checking the FCC coverage. As the FCC material is not translated or processed in any way, it is recommended that the radio intelligence personnel now at Bellmore and Rasada be transferred to Washington, where all radio intelligence can be centralized in one office.

3. A careful study was made of the radio intelligence activities now being carried on by OSS in this country and abroad. These activities include radio monitoring at Bellmore and Rasada

SECRET

- 2 -

and direction finding in North Africa. It was concluded that these two operations should be brought into a closer relationship and handled in one office. An order was therefore prepared placing the control of all radio intelligence activities in the CD Branch and signed by the Acting Director on 11 February 1944. A copy of this order is attached as Tab A.

4. A study of OSS liaison with the War Department was prepared. In view of the fact that numerous changes in organization and duty have occurred since the inauguration of the Army Service Liaison Section, it was concluded that the intelligence functions of this office should be separated from it and placed under the control of the Deputy Director, Intelligence Service. An order was drawn to this effect and signed by the Acting Director on 19 February 1944. A copy of this study is attached as Tab B.

5. A committee consisting of two members of MID appointed by General Bissell and two members of OSS appointed by General Magruder was constituted to consider ways and means of improving the relationship between the two organizations, and increasing the flow of information between them. One meeting of this committee has been held, and a paper presented by the OSS members showing the ways in which OSS could be of service to the War Department and, in turn, the needs of OSS and the types of information which we would like to receive. This paper was left with the MID representatives for their further consideration, and it is expected that another meeting of the committee will be held some time in the near future. A copy of this paper is attached as Tab C.

6. Conversations looking toward an increase in the flow of material between the State Department and OSS have been held with Mr. Kimbel, OSS Liaison Officer with the State Department, and with Mr. Warren, who has been specifically designated as the State Department contact with OSS. It has been arranged that Dr. Callisen, the newly appointed OSS Evaluation Procedures Officer, will work out with Mr. Kimbel and Mr. Warren a procedure by which material disseminated by OSS to the Department of State can be evaluated. Mr. Warren will make every effort to increase the State Department dissemination of both cables and dispatches to OSS.

7. There has been constant supervision of our liaison with the Order of Battle Branch, MID. It is believed that the caliber of the material which is now reaching OSS from the field has been materially improved by the suggestions and advice sent to them.


- 5 -

SECRET

Weekly lists of OSS personnel attending the German Order of Battle School have been regularly prepared, and arrangements were completed by which a number of OSS personnel was allowed to enroll in a five-week Japanese Order of Battle School which commenced 14 February.

8. A number of OSS officers have been introduced to the Provost Marshal General's Office where they have been allowed the privilege of searching the Prisoner of War records. Numerous conversations have been held with the Chief of the Prisoner of War Branch, MID, and permission secured for the questioning of specific prisoners of war. We have also been able to secure from this Branch fifty sets of their most secret escape material for use by OSS agents.

9. A plan was worked out in collaboration with the SI Branch for the coordination between Algiers, London, and Madrid of our penetration of France from Spain. This plan, known as Medusa, was put into effect with the dispatch of Wailer Booth to Spain and Stafford Reid to Algiers, and is now in operation.


Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, F. A.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

*W B
P
AM*

GENERAL ORDER

NUMBER: 9, Supplement 32
ISSUED: 16 February 1944
EFFECTIVE: 12 February 1944

TO: List S

SUBJECT: Establishment of Radio Intelligence Division Within CD Branch

1. There is hereby established within the CD Branch a Radio Intelligence Division.
2. The Radio Intelligence Division will:
 - a. Supervise and control the radio intelligence activities of OSS known as "Africa 101" now being carried on, both in the United States and abroad, by the Africa Section, SI.
 - b. Supervise and control the collection, processing, and dissemination of radio intelligence received by the two radio stations owned by OSS in the United States, known as the FBQ Company, Incorporated.
 - c. Establish and maintain liaison with Radio Security Service (British) and (jointly with the Executive Officer, Communications Branch) with FCC and War Communications Board (JCS).
3. The activities and the intelligence personnel of the radio intelligence unit (Africa 101), both in Washington and overseas, shall be transferred from the Africa Section, SI, to the Radio Intelligence Division, CD.
4. The Communications Branch shall continue to be responsible as heretofore for the technical operation of the monitoring stations in the United States and the DF stations abroad, and for the recruitment, training, and maintenance of the operating personnel.
5. There shall be established, for the purpose of supervising the radio intelligence activities of OSS, a Radio Advisory Committee consisting of one member each from the following units: Office of the Deputy Director - Intelligence Service, SI, I-2, R & A, Communications, and CD under the chairmanship of the first mentioned member.

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

SECRET

(33229)

SECRET**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR****SUBJECT: OSS Liaison with the War Department****I. The Problem.**

1. Since the founding of OSS there have come into being a number of different liaisons between it and the War Department. Some of these deal with matters pertaining to personnel, supplies, and operations, and some are of a purely intelligence nature. The question now arises as to whether or not those which deal entirely with matters of intelligence should not, for efficiency of operation, administration, and supervision, be brought together into one office of the Intelligence Service.

2. This does not presume that personal connections between individuals, or liaisons established for some specific purpose, such as that between R&A and GAD, or the Map Division and the Army Map Service, or X-2 with the Special Branch, should be disrupted, but deals only with those over-all liaisons for intelligence such as have been handled by the Service Liaison Office.

II. Discussion.

1. General Order No. 9, January 3, 1943, directs that all Liaison, both with official and commercial sources, be established through the Special Relations Office, with the exception of the War and Navy Departments, which will be under the jurisdiction of

"the Service Liaison Office. This office shall consist of an Army Liaison group and a Naval Liaison group, each in charge of a senior officer who shall be responsible for the operation of all liaison activities between the OSS and his respective service in accordance with instructions approved by the Director."

- 2 -

SECRET

On 2 December 1943 Supplement No. 23 was issued to the above order, setting forth in detail the duties of the Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, and stating that among his other duties he should be responsible for liaison activities with the War Department.

(b) Liaison activities between OSS and the War Department, and the Army. Besides those duties regularly required by virtue of his position as Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, it was necessary that this officer be responsible for such varied liaison duties with the War Department as those involving problems of personnel with G-1, priorities with OPD, supplies with G-4, and intelligence with G-2 and other intelligence branches of the War Department.

3. The Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, found it impracticable to himself maintain the liaison required by this position, and so placed another officer in charge of these functions of his office.

4. On 28 August 1943 the Army Personnel Procurement Branch was activated by Supplement No. 12 to General Order No. 9, and the above-mentioned officer was made Acting Chief of the Branch. As the problems of this new office were more pressing and more interesting to the officer in charge than his intelligence duties, they became more and more routine or were absorbed by other offices of OSS.

5. When Supplement No. 18 to General Order No. 9 was issued on 24 November 1943, establishing the Personnel Procurement Branch, the Branch Chief was assigned no intelligence liaison functions, and another officer was specifically recruited and assigned the duties of liaison officer for intelligence with the War Department. At the same time this officer was charged with the responsibility of maintaining liaison with A-2, the officer who had theretofore occupied this position having been recently transferred. Shortly thereafter, the above-mentioned officer in turn requested that he be relieved from his assignment in OSS because of lack of work, and liaison with both G-2 and A-2, which had originally been the duties of a Colonel and a Major, are now being fulfilled by one 1st Lieutenant.

6. Due to the location of the War Department's Liaison Office in Que Building, which makes it readily accessible to the majority of its customers, and to the aggressiveness and ability of the officer in charge, the major portion of the intelligence liaison between OSS and the War Department has come to be handled by the War Department's Liaison Office rather than by the Service Liaison Office of OSS.

SECRET

III. Recommendations.

In view of the fact that Dr. Callison, the War Department Liaison Officer with OSS, has presented his resignation, and that Colonel Hoag, Government Liaison Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, has been transferred to overseas duty, it will be necessary for both OSS and the War Department to examine their liaison officer. This would appear therefore, to be a most opportune time to strengthen the OSS liaison for intelligence with the War Department, and in order that this may be accomplished it is recommended that the following General Order be issued:

"1. The following supplement is hereby issued to General Order No. 11:

"(a) Liaison for intelligence between OSS, the War Department, and the Army shall be the responsibility of the Office of the Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service.

"(b) The Personnel of the Army Section, Service Liaison Office, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, now engaged in intelligence liaison activities between OSS, the War Department, and the Army, are hereby transferred to the Office of the Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service.

"2. All existing orders are hereby amended to conform to this order."

John H. Mauder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

SECRET

14 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis

1. PURPOSE.

1. The functions of OIS are set forth in J.C.S. 118/12/1. They are as follows:

"a. **Research and Intelligence.** OIS is authorized to "collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in all areas other than the Western Hemisphere by means of espionage and counter-espionage, and to disseminate such intelligence to authorized agencies. Its function is the function of the IX Branch, counter-espionage, the function of the I-2 Branch.

"b. **Research and Analysis.** In this field the Director provides:

"a. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

"2a. Office of Strategic Services will (1) furnish essential intelligence for the planning and execution of approved strategic services' operations; and (2) furnish such intelligence as is requested by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed services and other authorized Government agencies. To accomplish the foregoing no geographical restriction is placed on the research and analytic activities of the Office of Strategic Services, and the following specific activities will be performed:

"3. Accumulation, evaluation and analysis of political, psychological, sociological, economic, topographic and military information required for the above.

"4. Preparation of such studies embracing the above as may be required.

"5. Preparation of the assigned sections of Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), together with such maps, charts and appendices as may be required to accompany these studies.

SECRET

... of such staff, clerical and other personnel as may be requested by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Chief of Staff and authorized agencies of the War and Navy Departments.

These functions are the responsibility of the Research and Analysis Branch.

... with Foreign Intelligence Groups. (a) In addition, in consultation with the State Department, the Research and Analysis Branch will maintain contact with foreign nationality groups and individuals in the United States for the purpose of obtaining information on their activities. These duties are assigned to the Foreign Nationalities Branch.

... These include morale subversion (which involves the spreading of false rumors and disaffection, organization of fifth column activities, etc.), and sabotage subversion (which comprises sabotage, support of guerrilla forces and underground resistance groups, and the conduct of certain special operations not assigned to other Government agencies). The functions referred to in this paragraph are the responsibility of 10 (Morale Operations), 11 (Sabotage Operations), 12 (Resistance Units), and 13 (Operational Groups).

... of Research and Equipment. CAS is given the responsibility for developing special weapons and equipment for special operations not assigned to other Government agencies. These functions are performed by the Research and Development Branch.

... In order to accomplish the functions set forth above, paragraph 10-g) of the directive provided:

"The Military Intelligence Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Intelligence Service, Office of Strategic Services, will provide for the complete and free interchange of information, evaluated as to creditability as appropriate, required for the execution of their respective missions."

SECRET

II. THE NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE DIVISION (NSD)

- 1. The NSD currently provides NSD with the following:
 - a. Reports from intelligence agencies with which NSD has cooperative relations. Reports are automatically disseminated to NSD. (NSD will determine the scope of NSD's interest in reports originating from SI and other branches of the Intelligence Community.)
 - b. Special Liaison, working on the most intimate and cooperative basis, is maintained with the Office of Public Affairs. All information received by OPAA is delivered each day to the Liaison Officer.
 - c. Studies and reports prepared by the Research and Analytical Branch. Those which are considered of interest to NSD are automatically distributed to NSD.
 - d. Reports prepared by the Foreign Nationalities Branch are distributed currently to NSD.
 - e. Survey of Foreign Experts Reports. The Survey interviews persons coming to the United States, listing their qualifications and preparing reports on subjects of special interest. Intelligence reports prepared by the Survey, and lists of individuals interviewed or available for interview, are furnished to NSD as a matter of course.
 - f. Maps and photographs. Exchanged with NSD under the provisions of a Joint Memorandum dated February 10, 1943.
 - g. The X-3 Branch maintains close liaison with the Special Branch, NSD, on matters relating to counter-espionage.
 - h. Biographical Records Section of the Research and Analytical Branch maintains personality files on individuals outside the United States.

SECRET

III. **OPERATIONAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION**

1. The following are suggested specific ways in which the intelligence of intelligence between OCS and OAS should be improved:

a. **Personnel** - Permission for an officer or alternate from the OCS to visit the OAS Liaison Office, OAS, to visit the OAS Liaison Office, OAS, and attend presentations. OCS will welcome an officer or alternate from OAS at the OCS Liaison Office presentations. OCS will also accept reports desired for OCS at OAS presentations.

b. **Information** - Permission for an officer or alternate to attend the daily brief in the Disinformation Unit of OAS and secure for OCS such necessary scientific and military emergency reports and other material of value to OCS, including specifically any material from those areas from which OCS has heretofore been excluded by geographic considerations, i.e., Latin America and the Caribbean area.

c. **Publications** - Permission for an officer or alternate to pass through OAS daily cables received by OAS and filed in the Liaison Office, dealing with those subjects which are of value to OCS.

d. **Reference** - A more comprehensive distribution of press releases and other information, contained in the OAS and by the Liaison Office of OAS, including OAS, in OAS and by the Liaison Office, dealing with those subjects of value to OCS.

IV. **ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION**

1. The following are suggested specific ways in which the administrative of intelligence between OCS and OAS should be improved:

a. **Personnel** - Permission for an officer or alternate from the OCS to visit the OAS Liaison Office, OAS, to visit the OAS Liaison Office, OAS, and attend presentations. OCS will welcome an officer or alternate from OAS at the OCS Liaison Office presentations. OCS will also accept reports desired for OCS at OAS presentations.

b. **Information** - Permission for an officer or alternate to attend the daily brief in the Disinformation Unit of OAS and secure for OCS such necessary scientific and military emergency reports and other material of value to OCS, including specifically any material from those areas from which OCS has heretofore been excluded by geographic considerations, i.e., Latin America and the Caribbean area.

c. **Publications** - Permission for an officer or alternate to pass through OAS daily cables received by OAS and filed in the Liaison Office, dealing with those subjects which are of value to OCS.

d. **Reference** - A more comprehensive distribution of press releases and other information, contained in the OAS and by the Liaison Office of OAS, including OAS, in OAS and by the Liaison Office, dealing with those subjects of value to OCS.

SECRET

a. It is recommended that the following will be held separate in the performance of their functions and enhance the value of their intelligence efforts.

b. In addition, it is suggested that a separate unit be established for the purpose of...

c. It is suggested that a separate unit be established for the purpose of...

d. The main suggestions and specific requests by the Intelligence Committee for the purpose of...

e. In general, it is believed that the encouragement of a close working relationship between...

SECRET

8 February 1944

OPERATIONS OFFICER IN SI

It is believed that with the rapid increase in the number of intelligence projects for the penetration of Europe and with the contacts which are being developed, particularly through Switzerland, with high political figures of German satellite nations, there is need for an Operations Officer in SI. These projects almost always involve several different sections and desks and there is danger that without some person having the necessary authority to pull these different people together and to push whatever is required to be done, the project may well encounter unwarranted obstacles and delays.

Two current projects afford examples of this:

1. The first is called "Sparrow" and involves the penetration of Hungary through a high-placed Hungarian general. The general idea of penetrating Hungary by establishing relations with high political or military figures without the use of large numbers of our own agents was developed as far back as September. This was suggested by the intimate relationship which exists between our Bern representative and the Hungarian Minister to Switzerland. It was made clear by us that our purpose was to obtain order of battle information, intelligence on transportation along the Danube, and other intelligence of a military nature. However, it was recognized that important political overtures might result and the State Department expressed its enthusiasm for the plan.

In November our Bern representative had already taken the matter up with the Hungarian Minister, who in turn had corresponded with the Prime Minister. The latter showed great reluctance to undertake the project and it was necessary for the Minister to Switzerland to assert considerable pressure. The Hungarians were adverse to the idea of parachuting an agent but willing to work with one who penetrated through Croatia. In the middle of December two meeting places were suggested with the necessary pass words, etc. and the Hungarian general had been named. Bern urged speed. The following day the project was referred by us to Algiers for action.

Algiers proposed a native-born Hungarian-Jewish radio operator as our agent. When they realized the delicate nature of the project, they agreed with Bern that such a man would be unacceptable. At the end of December Bern again urged speed, emphasizing the great difficulty that had been encountered in setting up the project and the reaction which failure to take advantage of the opportunity would bring about. On January 1, Algiers cabled Bern that they did not have a suitable man immediately available and would not have in the near future. On January 12, Bern protested vigorously to General Donovan and Mr. Sheperdson over the delay and the candidates suggested by Algiers and urged reexamination of the entire project. As a result Colonel Duke was nominated on January 17, and is now endeavoring to secure transportation.

This project did not involve the Swiss Desk because the desk turned it over to Mr. Mayer. It did involve Algiers because Algiers was called upon to carry the ball. It also involved the Labor Section because the candidates

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

proposed by Algiers were men belonging to that section. Apparently the South-eastern European Section was not consulted.

2. The second project is called "Red Bird" and concerns the penetration of Austria through contact with labor groups there. It does not involve as much delay yet as "Sparrow" but perhaps illustrates better the number of desks and sections which can be concerned with a project. It was originally broached to our representative in Istanbul who went so far as to supply a code to the Austrian emissaries and dispatch radio equipment, which was held up in Sofia. Then the same group got in touch with our Bern representative at the beginning of December and proposed dropping a radio transmitter at a place already previously agreed upon in connection with the Turkish negotiations. The exact meeting place and methods for fixing the date had been worked out through Bern by December 21.

This office felt it would be impossible to drop a radio set and at first proposed dropping a man, now in Italy, along with the set. Later it was decided that the operator and set should go to Austria through Partisan territory. Cables early in January indicated that Algiers was having a great deal of trouble in finding an operator owing to a number of projects for which they were committed. Recent delay has been due to the fact that the representative of the Labor Section, now in Italy, has been unable to reach Yugoslavia. Once he does so and makes arrangements for passage of the radio operator the man can be supplied.

This project had its genesis in Istanbul. Later it became the concern of Switzerland. Finally it was transferred to Algiers for action. Mr. Mayer has had little connection with it, feeling as he does that his authority does not permit him to guide or push operations. The North Central European Section, which includes Austria in its jurisdiction, has never had any knowledge of the project. The Swiss Desk felt that it was a special project and believed that it was being handled by Mr. Mayer. The matter has been handled largely by the Labor Section. Until recently at least, this section did not feel that it had clear authority to act as the focal point here for staying on top of the project and pushing the necessary action in the field through its own representatives there.

SECRET

SECRET

February 1944

ORGANIZATION OF THEATER MISSIONS

A proposed order regarding Theater Missions was prepared in this office last October and revised recently at the request of Colonel Doering. Since then certain changes have been agreed upon with the Secretariat and the order is now on Colonel Suxton's desk for signature.

It deals with the setting up of a typical Theater Mission and sets forth in considerable detail the duties of the Strategic Services Officer and the principal officers. An important provision gives the Strategic Services Officer complete power to run his office subject always to the superior authority of the Director and to the control exercised by the Theater Commander. However, it is provided that in the case of disagreements between the Strategic Services Officer and any principal officer either or both may appeal the matter to Washington.

The Strategic Services Officer is required to abide by assignments of personnel made by Washington (except in emergencies) and may not undertake permanent changes without first placing the matter before the Director.

SECRET