REPORT OF CONFERENCES

November, 1941

SITUATION IN DAKAR

Mr. Michalski has just arrived in this country from Dakar, which he left on August 23, 1941. From June 28, 1940, until the date of his departure, Mr. Michalski lived at the Hotel Atlantique, Docteur Thezo St., Dakar, with his 18 year old son. The hotel roof commands a view of the entire harbor, Mr. Michalski says, but he was only occasionally allowed on the roof. He circulated quite freely in the town, however, (except in the restricted areas, which includes all military areas) and had many friends among the French, but found them afraid to discuss military or political matters.

GOLD

Mr. Michalski left France immediately after the Armistice between France and Germany. He sailed from the port of Lorient on June 18, 1940, aboard the French cruiser "Victor Schoelcher", supposedly bound for the United States with $65,000,000 of Polish gold and $240,000,000 of Belgian gold. On the second day out, the cruiser was joined at sea by a squadron of five French auxiliary cruisers all carrying French gold,

and conveyed by four French destroyers. The entire force then proceeded to Dakar, where the French, Polish and Belgian gold was all unloaded. Mr. Michalski has no way of knowing how much of the French gold there was, but from watching it being unloaded he estimates that there was approximately $1,000,000,000 worth.

The entire shipment of gold - $65,000,000 Polish, $240,000,000 Belgian, and approximately $1,000,000,000 French - was then taken from Dakar inland to Kayes, where it was stored. Mr. Michalski heard that the Belgian gold was later taken to Marseilles and turned over to the Reichscommissar for the Bank of Belgium (Mr. Zoltowski says this has been verified publicly), but that as to the disposition of the rest of the gold he is uncertain. He says that in March, 1941, a process of taking small quantities back to France periodically was begun, and that now every plane (there are one or two a week, normally) takes some back with it, but that he has no idea at all how much of the gold still remains in Kayes.

DESCRIPTION OF HARBOR

Mr. Michalski describes the harbor at Dakar, the biggest port in West Africa, as extremely spacious. He states that there are 8 large piers, most of them capable of taking 2 fair sized merchant ships on each side, and with room for several ships alongside the water-front edge running between them. Referring to Plan 4 (August, 1941), No. 42-957, he states that Moles 1, 2, 3 and 8 are completed as shown, and that Moles 4, 5, 6 and 7 are far advanced towards completion, if not completed. He is uncertain on this point, he says, because during his stay in Dakar traffic in the port had dropped to such an extent that all unloading was done at Moles 1, 2 and 3, and in the basins between, and no ships tied up on the far side of the harbor (Moles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) except to await the formation of convoys.

He says there are railroad sidings up to Moles 1, 2 and 3, and that 90% of the loading and unloading done in the port is done in the West and Middle Basins. Before being shown Plan 4, he confirmed the fact shown

by that Plan, that an oil pipe line runs from Mole 8 north to storage tanks, but he was not sure whether oil was taken on or discharged, or both, through this line.

As to cranes, while he is uncertain on this, he believes there were no dock cranes except at the Arsenal (see Plan 4), and that all unloading was done by ship cranes. (He recalls seeing one heavy land crane, used for lowering coast defense artillery into place, which he believes was a railroad crane). He states that within the limits of the harbor there is a large anchorage where easily 30 or 40 ships at a time could be unloaded by lighters, although there are no lighters available in Dakar at the present time.

The entrance to the harbor itself is very narrow - about 300 yards in width - and is thoroughly mined (with contact mines only, he believes), leaving less than one third of the entrance open for traffic. When he left Dakar on August 23, 1941, this opening was next to the south light marking the harbor's entrance. He knew nothing about either guns or nets

directly at the harbor entrance. Nor did he know anything about any mines in any other part of the harbor or bay, except around the Richelieu, as hereinafter described.

Outside the harbor is the Bay of Goree, with the island fortress Goree offshore almost directly opposite the harbor entrance. Mr. Michalski says that there is nothing on Goree other than the fortress except for one printing establishment, and the homes of a few negroes, and that there is no garrison on the island other than the crews necessary to man the guns there (which he could not enumerate). He states that he had lunch on the island recently, and that at that time there were only 4 or 5 officers stationed there. He was told at the luncheon that the guns on the island had electrical fire control, and that they were first-class guns.

Running out from each side of Goree, there are anti-sub-marine nets. One runs from the west side of the island part of the way to Dakar Point, the rest of the way being closed by a partially completed extension of the harbor which now acts as a breakwater.

The other runs, Mr. Michalski at first said, from the east side of the island to Bel Air Point, but on being shown the copy of Admiralty Chart No. 1001, (August, 1941), No. 42-957, he concluded that the net was shown there in its proper position.

He could tell very little more about the nets, except that they were there when he arrived in Dakar in June, 1940, and that there seemed to be permanent openings in each net close by the island on either side, as incoming and outgoing ships passed on either side of the island close in. He did not know whether they were double or single, or whether they were made of steel, but his description of the floats by which they are carried makes it seem likely that no boom defense is included.

He also says that there is a net surrounding the battleship Richelieu, which is tied up at the west side of Mole 2, and that he understood that there were also mines (contact) placed around the ship.

DEFENSE FORCES

(a) **Navy.** When Mr. Michalski left Dakar on August 23, 1941, the following naval forces were stationed there:

1 Battleship	(Richelieu)
3 Cruisers	(Montcalm, George Leygues, Gloire)
3-4 Destroyers	(Malin, Terrible, Fantasque and possibly one other of same type)
2-3 Destroyers	(smaller type)
"a few" Submarines	(medium type)
6-8 Motor boats	(small, non-torpedo)

The Richelieu, which was torpedoed during the British attack on Dakar and settled to the bottom after being brought back into the harbor, has now been repaired and is afloat alongside Mole 2 in the Middle Basin. Mr. Michalski believes that its full efficiency has not been restored, however, and doubts whether it could attain a speed of more than 10 knots.

The three cruisers now stationed at Dakar are those which the British allowed to come through Gibraltar in September, 1940, and of the three, one is always absent on patrol or a run to Casablanca, etc.

Of the 4 to 6 destroyers stationed there, some are also usually absent convoying French merchant ships along the coast of Africa.

As to submarines, he said it was very difficult to

give precise information, but he said there were not more than "a few", and he estimates that they were of medium size only.

The motor boats in the harbor he described as small and carrying only light artillery and machine guns, and no torpedoes. They included the La Garouna and d'Entrecastoux.

He said that there was no fishing fleet at Dakar, but that there was a small one up the coast at St. Louis. The merchant ships at Dakar will be described later.

As to supplies for the naval forces at Dakar, he knew few details. He believes that there is sufficient fuel oil for them stored at Dakar, and he stated that in January, 1941, a convoy arrived from Brest (which must have come with German permission, as Brest is in occupied France) carrying ammunition for the Richelieu.

(b) Army. Mr. Michalski stated that since he arrived on June 28, 1940, there has been a great deal of troop movement through Dakar, and that many of the troops have been sent through Dakar and stationed at

towns in the interior of French West Africa. He could not even estimate how many troops had been moved into French West Africa, and he could not name any specific town to which he knew troops had been sent.

He stated that the garrison at Dakar in August, 1941, consisted of the following, the first two newly arrived (probably from Casablanca), and the latter two composing the regular garrison:

1 battalion, Foreign Legion
1 regiment, motorized chasseurs (4th)

1 regiment, field artillery (6th)
1 regiment, infantry (7th)

The Foreign Legion battalion is stationed regularly, he believes, at Rufisque. He stated that there were few, if any, Germans nationals in the battalion.

The 4th Regiment, Motorized Chasseurs (all white) he thinks is possibly now on the Gambia frontier, at Kaolack. He stated that this regiment in May, 1941, received from France 25 new tanks of 22 tons each, and in addition has armored vehicles.

The 6th Regiment, Field Artillery, (3 to 1 white) he said has 75 m/m guns and 155 m/m howitzers,

and is reported to be a good anti-tank regiment. He did not see any 155 m/m guns. The artillery was motorized, drawn by trucks.

The 7th Regiment, Infantry, is all black, with white officers and non-commissioned officers.

(c) Air Forces. Mr. Michalski said that there are 2 large air-fields near Dakar, one at Ouakam, which was formerly civilian only, but is now civilian and military, and one at Thies (about 70 kilometers from Dakar) which has always been military. He knew of no other fields under construction, and said that the only other possibility for a field is the race course near Medine, which is not very large. When asked whether the rice fields shown on Sheet D28-XIII-4, No. 42-957 could be made into air fields, he said that there were no rice fields around Dakar, and that the map referred to was wrong..

He stated that some planes had been sent from Ouakam to Syria just before the British-Free French attack in that country, and that when he left Dakar there were at Ouakam about 9 Curtiss fighters and 12

Glenn Martin bombers, while there were in all of Senegal, he was told, between 60 and 70 planes, of what types he does not know.

Based in the harbor there were the following; 9 lance hydro planes, carrying torpedoes, and 3 or 4 old pre-war bombers of the large type, one of which flies out to sea each day to look for the American Navy, which they fully expected to appear at any moment.

(d) Coast Defenses. While Mr. Michalski could give few specific details about coast defenses, he stated that they had been greatly strengthened since the September, 1940 attack on Dakar, and that it was now generally believed in Dakar that the city could not be taken by attack from the sea alone.

He also said that in February, 1941, however, there were large scale joint manuevers held, and that an attempted landing was considered successful, much to the surprise of the Naval Commandant. The attack took place at night, and the landing was made on a beach inside the city, Mr. Michalski said. He thinks that the defenses against such landings may have been

strengthened since the date of the maneuvers.

He said that Cape Manuel and Goree Island are the main points of defense, and he thought there was a battery of four 280 m/m guns at each of these points. He stated that new batteries of big guns have been installed since September, 1940, although he is not sure of the precise location or size or number of the guns, and that work was still under way at a number of points when he left - one point being on the west coast of the point just opposite the High School (see 1941 Plan of City of Dakar, Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army). He also said that since the attack, and particularly since February, 1941 (because of Darlan-Abetz agreement at this time) machine gun nests, light gun emplacements, some shallow trenches and barbed wire, had been placed at various points on the shore all around the city - particularly along the beach between Kotu Bay and Bernard Point (see Plan 4, supra). He had no knowledge, however, of any similar defense preparations along the beach between Dakar and Rufisque. The coast line along the north side of the peninsula needed

no fortifications he said, as it is steep and rocky, and it would be very difficult to effect a landing there.

All of the coastal defense batteries are now, Mr. Michalski said, under the command of the Navy, rather than under the command of the Army, as they were formerly. He gave two reasons for this: first, that the loyalty and fighting spirit of the Navy was more highly regarded; and second, that the Army, while excellent with 75 m/m and 155 m/m guns, were unaccustomed to big naval guns.

Point W, Plan 4, is an observation point (one of the highest in Dakar) called Chateau d'Aux, from which the fire of all the shore batteries is directed, according to Mr. Michalski, Jr.

As to anti-aircraft, he could give no precise location, and could not estimate the number or size of batteries, but he characterized their fire during the September, 1940 attack as "quite strong" when the anti-aircraft fire of the Richelieu and the other ships in the harbor was added.

(e) Land Defenses. Mr. Michalski said that once each month the Army holds 3-day maneuvers just outside Dakar (the reserves are also called out, but Mr. Michalski cannot estimate the number of reserves, or describe their equipment), and that from his knowledge of these maneuvers he deduced that there were 3 lines of resistance to the land defenses, as follows:

1. One running from Rufisque almost due north to the coast.
2. One running from just west of M'Bao due north along the 20' line to the coast.
3. One running parallel to and just west of the Hann-Kamberene highway.

Although he had no opportunity to examine these areas carefully, he believes that these 3 lines of defense consist not of regular trenches with barbed wire protection, but of light artillery pieces and machine guns in concrete rests on strategic hills and hummocks, covering the entire area with cross fire. He saw a few quite shallow trenches with some barbed wire in spots, but not many.

A fourth strongly protected point is at the north end of the Arsenal, on the Avenue de l'Arsenal. Here there is located a number of machine guns, protected

by barbed wire, and Mr. Michalski believes 1 or more 75 m/m anti-tank gun, covering the road approaching the Arsenal.

The terrain outside Dakar is sandy, slightly rolling, with small hills, only a few sparse baobab trees, and few bushes. There are few swamps, as the country is very dry except during the rainy season, from July 15 to October 15 each year. Mr. Michalski thinks that the country is good tank country.

(f) General. Mr. Michalski stated that from a military point of view, one weakness of Dakar is in its water supply. Except during the period July 15 to October 15 there is no rainfall, and there are no water storage tanks and very few artesian wells in the city. Water for the town comes from free-flowing springs near Barguy-Gonddon, whence it is carried to Dakar by a pipe-line approximately 2 feet in diameter running parallel to the highway through Rufisque, and buried at a shallow depth about 1 meter north of the road. The water supply is always low just before the rains begin in July, and is usually rationed at that time.

Mr. Michalski said that when an American attack was expected last July, the people were told to put aside water and food for 3 days.

(g) German forces. Mr. Michalski stated positively that there were no German military men or civilians in Dakar when he left there, and had been none there during his stay except for a small mission which came soon after the armistice with France to take away Germans who had been held there as prisoners, and to attend to the graves of Germans buried at Dakar. The members of this mission conducted themselves badly, he said, and became very unpopular with the residents of Dakar.

Nor were there any German planes, ships or submarines at Dakar at any time during his stay. He repeated the story that some of the Cape Verde Islands are uninhabited, and that it was therefore possible that German submarines fueled there, but he stated positively that none had been seen in Dakar. He said that it was therefore very irritating to the people of Dakar to be told by the British and American radio,

etc., that the place was infested with German subs.

BUSINESS AND TRADE

Mr. Michalski said that before the war, Dakar was one of the busiest ports in Africa, with many ships of all nationalities passing through it. Since the war, the volume of traffic has of course fallen off terrifically. French ships still come in large numbers, although since April, 1941, they have come only in convoys (usually about two convoys a month with 4 or 5 ships in each, and all coming from Marseilles), but ships of other nations are rare. During the 14 months from June, 1940 to August, 1941, the following were the only non-French ships touching at Dakar, so far as Mr. Michalski could remember:

2 American ships, in July - September, 1940, enroute from New York to Liberia, and stopping not to load or unload, but probably for water.

2 Japanese ships, around October, 1940, enroute to South America and stopping for water and oil, a limited amount of which they got after some dispute.

1 Spanish ship, around November, 1940, enroute to South America, with a number of French who had come from

South America to fight in the war and were now returning home.

The above are all of the non-French merchant ships that touched at Dakar. The French ships coming to Dakar brought soldiers, artillery, tanks ammunition and bombs; and vegetables, fruit, milk and drugs. Mr. Michalski was told that 3 oil tankers from France arrived "some time ago" (he could not be more specific on this), but he has no idea as to their capacity, and cannot estimate how many tankers the port could handle at one time.

Mr. Michalski says that an oil pipe-line runs from Mole 8 (see Plan 4) to storage tanks north of Dakar, and he assumes that the tankers discharged their oil through this line. The storage tanks he described as being probably 4 or 5 in number, round, and located about 1 mile north of the harbor and 200 to 300 meters back from the Hann Bay coast. He could not estimate the capacity of the tanks. When shown Plan 4, supra, he verified the location of the Shell Oil Depot, and the tanks shown as just west of the Dakar-St. Louis

Railroad, but he was uncertain about the tanks shown as north of these and along the shore of Hann Bay.

He stated that the stores of both petrol and fuel oil are supposed in Dakar to be rather large. All of the aircraft based at Dakar fuel there (he believes some petrol is brought in periodically from Morocco), as do the Navy ships stationed there, and the French merchant ships calling there. The use of gasoline is restricted to Government trucks and cars in the town, but this seems to be the only evidence of shortage. The precise amount of petrol and oil stocks is, he said, a closely guarded secret.

As to coal, however, the situation is different. There have been only a few shipments of coal received in Dakar since June, 1940, and the stocks there at that time have practically disappeared. Ships can no longer coal at Dakar, although French ships could for some time after June, 1940. The railroad and the electric power plant are also burning wood and peanut shells, and there is no evidence of any present use of coal.

The principal export of Dakar was before the war, and still is, peanuts. Since the Armistice, there has also been exported a small amount of rubber, which is not grown in Senegal but was in stock there.

There have been anchored in Dakar Roads (between the harbor entrance and the nets) for some time a number of interned merchant ships - 2 British, and several Norwegian, Belgian and Greek ships. There were also in Dakar when Mr. Michalski left there in August, 1941, 6 French merchant ships of 6,000 to 8,000 tons, and a few small coastwise ships.

POPULATION, GENERAL CONDITIONS

Mr. Michalski said that the opulation of Dakar now numbers from 15,000 to 20,000 whites, and about 100,000 blacks. All but about 8,000 of the whites represent army and navy people, and their families, who have come from France since the war began. Of the 8,000 pre-war whites, about one-half are Syrian, comprise most of the business element in the town, and have been and are pro-British. There is little or no Jewish population. The rest of the whites are

in large part French military, naval and government people.

The blacks are decidedly anti-German. They remember vividly the German occupation of the Cameroons, when the Germans treated them like slaves, and the resentment engendered then still survives.

There is at present great discontent among the blacks, due to 3 factors; Mr. Michalski, Jr., says:

(1) Widespread unemployment due to falling off of trade in the port;

(2) Lack of rice, the staple food, due to difficulties of importation;

(3) The failure of the French to pay the 1000 franc bonus promised to each demobilized soldier.

As a result of this discontent, there have been several attacks by the blacks in Senegal on the whites - one outstanding one at Bobo - Dionlasso, where the blacks planned to ambush all the whites at a social gathering, and when the party failed to come off shott up a few individually anyway.

Life in Dakar has felt the effects of the War, but is not too hard. There are telephones and electric lights in the town (the power plant burns peanut shells

for fuel). A black-out throughout the town every night is in force. Sugar, bread, milk, coffee and soap is rationed (has been since 1941) and there is no tea at all. Canned foods have likewise been used up and there are plenty of fresh fruits and vegetables only periodically, after the arrival of a convoy from Morocco. There is always plenty of fish (the fishermen are almost all negroes and are given Government prizes for big catches, etc.) and meat, all of the latter coming from the interior. There is a police order restricting the amount of clothing that may be sold to one person. There are 3 movies in the town (which show only very old American and new French propaganda pictures); 3 restaurants and 2 clubs. Only Government and military cars and trucks may obtain gasoline but a few dozen commercial trucks and taxis have been converted into charcoal burners. The civilians ride bicycles, almost all of which are French make and which have risen in price from 700 to 3000 francs. The railroads still run, although they burn wood and peanut shells for fuel. They are the 1 meter guage type, with special engines and cars unlike this country's, all of which appear to be in very good

condition. Mr. Michalski could not estimate how many engines and cars there were available in Dakar or vicinity.

French and a negro dialect, Oulof, are the only languages spoken in Dakar. Mr. Michalski knew of no Americans sent there, even as a commercial representative, would be conspicuous in the extreme. He could not name any particularly pro-American residents, as most of the French were either government officials or members of the services, and are thus pretty solidly pro-Vichy.

There are many French secret agents in Dakar, according to Mr. Michalski, and these keep a close watch on the American consul. He believes there are also numerous German secret agents there, and suggests that they may be Alsace-Lorrainers who can easily pass for Frenchmen.

RADIO, NEWS AND PROPAGANDA

There is only one newspaper in Dakar, and that is controlled by the Governor General, at present Boisson. There is also one radio station, likewise controlled by

the Administration, and devoted to disseminating pro-Vichy propaganda. It is only a small station, and does not reach outside French West Africa.

Mr. Michalski cannot estimate how many persons in Dakar have radio receiving sets. He believes they are largely limited to the whites, however, and says that none have been brought into Dakar since the Armistice, and therefore points out that they must be pretty well limited to the 8,000 pre-war white residents of Dakar. He stated that the army and navy personnel are under orders not to listen to the British radio, and that an interference station has been installed on the Richelieu which "jams" every foreign station which begins to discuss Vichy-German relations, without waiting to hear what is going to be said. The radio reception he described as good, except for the "jamming" and he pointed out that all European radio sets were what we describe as "short-wave" sets.

Mr. Michalski stated that the constant pro-Vichy propaganda, and the lack of any counteraction, was having its effect. He says that the natural instinct

and feeling of the people as a whole is that a British victory would be best for them, but that the results of the British attack (which will be described) and the constant pro-Vichy propaganda have clouded this. He described the people as torn between the conflict of their minds, as affected by the constant propaganda, and their hearts, which tell them that the British cause is fundamentally right. He believes that the natural feeling for a British victory would be greatly strengthened by America's entry into the war.

The navy, Mr. Michalski said, is strongly anti-British, and has very high morale. It would defend itself strongly against British or American attack. The army is much less anti-British, and at the same time has much less fighting spirit. Anti-German feeling among the services and the people generally has increased with the arrival of additional forces from France, probably due to stories of German treatment of the French in occupied territory. What spirit of "collaboration" there is is fairly superficial, Mr. Michalski feels, and he says that the quickest way for

the Germans to turn all of Dakar completely against them would be to send a mission there, or attempt to interfere in its affairs.

He stated that during the time he was in Dakar, both army and navy personnel were constantly subject to strong pro-Vichy propaganda, stressing loyalty to Petain and unity among all patriotic Frenchmen, and condemning those who follow DeGaulle as selling themselves for money now that the fortunes of the French are low. Mr. Michalski felt that this approach was effective, and stated again and again that the proper basis for successful propaganda should be an ideological one, and not a materialistic one. He stated also that (as reported above) the British and Americans should stop saying that there are Germans at Dakar, for the French know there are not, and it simply irritates them.

He stated that it was generally considered in Dakar that if Boisson is removed, it will mean a shift toward closer collaboration with Germany.

ATTACKS ON DAKAR

The first attack on Dakar was made by the British alone, on July 8 or 9, 1940, and lasted only two hours

or so. It was very similar to the British attack at Mers-el-Kabir (Oran). When the British ships were sighted at sea, the French ships at Dakar were ordered out to meet them, but were not anxious to do so. Two destroyer crews refused to take their ships out, and were removed and placed under guard by black troops, which caused much bad feeling all around. And the crew of the cruiser Victor Schoelcher refused to take her out until her commander promised they would not have to go into action, which they didn't. When the French ships finally got out to contact the attackers, a British speed torpedo boat torpedoed the Richelieu, she turned around and headed for home, accompanied by the rest of the French ships, and the British then all made off, all without a shot having been fired by either side.

The second attack was a combined British and Free French attack, and began on September 23, 1940. About 5 A.M. that day, a few DeGaulle planes came over the city and dropped leaflets telling the people that DeGaulle and the British were coming and bringing food

and supplies, and asking the French to give up and join the DeGaulle forces. The planes were promptly fired on by anti-aircraft guns. The radio from the British ships meanwhile stressed the same propaganda, in the name of DeGaulle. Mr. Michalski believes this was fundamentally the wrong approach, and that the appeal should have been on ideological grounds, stressing opposition to Germany and the preservation of the French empire, etc., rather than the material aspects. He stated that when the British and Free French first appeared, there was some indecision among the army people, but that the navy was instantly ready to fight, and when this propaganda approach became apparent, the army joined them wholeheartedly.

In any case the defenders of Dakar first arrested several DeGaulle emissaries who landed in a plane at Ouakam airport, and then fired on and drove off two launches carrying white flags which attempted to approach the city. After the launches returned to their ships, a DeGaulle official issued an ultimatum over the radio to surrender to DeGaulle or be subjected to fire by the British, and the ultimatum was extended several

times, but always ignored. The French were convinced that resistance would in the end be hopeless, but they were determined to fight.

About 11 A.M. the British ships opened fire for the first time while cruising along the coast. The firing did not last long, and was directed at three principal targets: the Richelieu in the harbor, and the batteries on Cape Manuel and Goree Island. Another series of saloos were fired by the British about 4 o'clock that afternoon. Both morning and afternoon, their fire against the coast defense batteries was very effective, and their fire against the Richelieu was very poor (DeGaulle says purposely so). The French fire against the British was not accurate because of a fog offshore, and because they were shooting at moving targets.

Later that afternoon (or perhaps the next day, Mr. Michalski is not sure which), the British attempted a landing at Rufisque. The French had only a few troops there, with two light guns and several machine guns, and all under the command of a non-commissioned officer. The British put off their landing party in a number of

open boats, which approached the shore without a single shot from their ships in support, and without firing a shot themselves. The defenders waited until the boats were only 200 or 300 yards from the shore, and then opened fire, killing several of the British and wounding more. The ships then returned weak fire (but were still not supported by their ships and turned around and fled back from where they came) but departed without further attack as soon as the boats returned.

This was the only attempt at a landing. The rest of the fighting was between the fleets, and the British and the shore batteries. The French at one time seemed to screen themselves behind the interned ships in the Bay, for which they have been critized. The British fire against the Richelieu continued very poor, and in 3 days they scored only 1 hit on her. The French knocked down a number of British planes, while losing only one Curtiss of their own, and one French pilot told Mr. Michalski that the British planes were so old and poor that he felt badly about getting a medal for having

shot one down. On the third day the French knocked down the British plane that was directing the fire of their battleships, and when the fire from the Richelieu, one, if not the, strongest element in the defense, became increasingly effective, the British left. To cap the climax, Mr. Michalski said the British left when the Richelieu had ammunition for only two or three more salvos.

Mr. Michalski said that everyone, from the Commandant on down, was sure that the British would take Dakar - that the land batteries would be silenced, the Richelieu put out of commission, and an effective landing force sent. He stated that on the second day of the attack a large crowd of women gathered at a hotel and were planning to go to the Governor General to plead with him to surrender. But when the British failed to make a real attack and carry Dakar, the French became even more bitter against them than ever, arguing that they had come in and shot up the town and killed many of its defenders seemingly for no good purpose whatsoever.

Consequently, Mr. Michalski believes that if America should attack Dakar, the first blow should be a sharp, heavy one, from sea, land and air. He said that the French are expecting such an attack, and have built a large number of air raid shelters to prepare for it. Many, indeed, are expecting the attack at any moment. When Mr. Michalski left Dakar in August, one French Squadron Commander asked him why he was going to America when in a few weeks the Americans would be there. Some have reached the state of mind, Mr. Michalski said, where they regard it as inevitable, and are, therefore, in a way anxious to get it over with. They would fight if attacked by America, he stated, but they are more sympathetic to Americans than to any other people today, and this plus the futility of resistance which an all-out attack would make apparent might bring a fairly quick surrender.

Mr. Michalski stated that the attack would have to be made by air, sea and land to be successful. He believes an attack from the Gambia frontier should be made at the same time, and stated that the road from Dakar to

Kaolack to Bathurst suitable for them except during the rainy season. He stated that the roads to St. Louis on the north were also fair during the dry season, and that the defenses at St. Louis were small. He was there in May, 1941, and said there were no planes or ships there, and he feels sure no coast defense guns.

Mr. Michalski feels that if Dakar falls, all of French West Africa will capitulate, unless the Governor General goes into the interior to organize further resistance. It might also be necessary to take Bamako, he stated, but this should give control of the whole territory.

Two statements by Mr. Michalski, written by him in Polish and translated into their present form, are attached hereto.

A further statement by Mr. Michalski, signed by him and written in English, is attached hereto in its original form.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN DAKAR

1) The Defenses

Immediately after the English attack on Dakar on September 23 to 25, the work of strengthening the defenses of the town itself as well as the whole peninsula was undertaken. Yet it was not until the summer of the year 1941 that this work was pursued with feverish haste: around the town on the shore were built a series of artillery and machine-gun nests with shelters constructed for the attendants. In a number of places there are built entrenchments, protected by two or three rows of barbed wire. Much of the work was devoted to the strengthening of the promontories of Cap de Manuel and Hamel together with the islands of Goree which commands the entrance into the harbor. Formerly, at these points, were situated widely scattered batteries along the shore. New batteries (220 mm.) were constructed on the western shores of the peninsula, on the heights of van Vollenhoven. At least by April all the areas near the artillery positions were closed to the public, and it was difficult to obtain information concerning the progress of the work.

Since autumn of last year, the shore artillery was no longer commanded by marine officers, since the naval officers were not familiar with heavy artillery. I was informed that there was a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the shore artillery.

On the continental side, as far as I know, there were prepared three lines of defense: one on the heights of Rufisque—a little village located 25 km. from the center of the town. It is

located at the entrance of the [illegible]. The [illegible] line extends at least 10 km. from Rufis[illegible] toward Dakar. The third line of defense extends about 6 km. from the [illegible] to the high benches of Hour. As far as I know, the [illegible] consist mainly of machine-gun nests and batteries placed on the hillocks which dominate the roads leading to the town. There is no continuous line of defense anywhere. However, at certain [illegible] there are small separate trenchworks strengthened by two or three lines of barbed wire.

Finally, at the entrance of the town from the land side there are located shelters and individual ramparts next to the naval arsenal and the magazine for naval armaments. In the same place there is constructed a large number of very strong shelters alike for the administration and the command, and for the white civil population. These shelters are placed very near each other and one must admit they are very strongly built. In spite of everything, according to public opinion, the number of shelters is not great enough to accomodate all the white inhabitants.

Quite often there are ex-raises for the defense of Dakar involving the calling up of reserves. The drill takes place on the Hour line, the line between Rufisque and Dakar.

It should be emphasized that during maneuvers for the defense of Dakar from the sea, the pretended attackers disembark at an unperceived point.

2) The Navy

The naval fleet in Dakar is made up of the following units:

1) The Richelieu, a battleship of 35,000 tons, unfinished. During the July attack it was torpedoed by the British. It returned to the port under its own power but there it settled to the bottom. At the time of the attack on Dakar it played the role of a land battery. During the winter of 1940-41 it underwent repairs and now can move; however, her speed is only ten knots per hour. In July, 1941, the Richelieu changed its position and was stationed in the harbor at the second pier. Apparently it cannot be moved from its present position, as long as it remains surrounded by nets as protection against mines. Its ammunition supply, which, after the English attack on Dakar was completely exhausted, was replenished by ships from Brest (this information is certain!).

It may be emphasized that during the attack on Dakar one of the guns (380 mm.) burst, and up to now has apparently not been replaced.

A change in the command of the Richelieu took place in March: the commander of the battleship, his aide, and commissioner were replaced. The former command was rabidly anti-English, even pro-German; however, this change, I am informed, has no political significance.

A squadron of three cruisers is assigned to Dakar: the George Leygues, the Montcalm, and the Gloire. Two of these are stationed

in Dakar, th third is either in [illegible] end of July, 1941, th [illegible] cleaned in dry-dock. The officers of the [illegible] that in the near future it [illegible] fitting a rest.

Three or four destroyers [illegible] assigned to Dakar. But since the, are used for t [illegible] of convoys between Dakar and Casablanca, and bet [illegible] colonies to the south: Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, [illegible] one rarely sees many stationed there.

At Dakar one also finds some submarines, [illegible] used for convoying.

In the port is also a number of auxiliary vessels.

The naval fleet engages in intensive drilling. [illegible] every week, the naval vessels go out to [illegible] for riveting gunning practice, which often lasts for two or three days.

During manoeuvres, the whole naval fleet, the service artillery, and the land troops all participate; the air lines also participate both on land and sea.

On the way to New York, the author learned on good authority that the Victor Schoelcher, which after being disarmed at Dakar became a merchant vessel, has [illegible] been armed at [illegible] rescillos. During wartime it had seven 140 mm. guns, four others (two 37 mm. and two 75 mm.) together with installations for depth bombs.

3) Aviation

The aviation in Senegal is based on three airdromes: At Ouakam 3 km. from Dakar, at Thies 80 km. from Dakar, and the third

in Dakar, the third is either in Casablanca or Oran. At the end of July, 1941, the Montcalm was in Dakar. It had been cleaned in dry-dock. The officers of the Georges Leygues expected that in the near future it would be sent to Casablanca for refitting a rest.

Three or four destroyers and two torpedo boats are also assigned to Dakar. But since they are used for the protection of convoys between Dakar and Casablanca, and between Dakar and colonies to the south: Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Dahomey and Togo, one rarely sees many stationed there.

At Dakar one also finds some submarines, which are likewise used for convoying.

In the port is also a number of auxiliary vessels.

The naval fleet engages in intensive drilling. Practically every week, the naval vessels go out to sea for rigorous gunning practice, which often lasts for two or three days.

During maneuvers, the whole naval fleet, the shore artillery, and the land troops all participate; the airplanes also participate both on land and sea.

On the way to New York, the author learned on good authority that the Victor Schoelcher, which after being disarmed at Dakar became a merchant vessel, has again been armed at Marseilles. During wartime it had seven 140 mm. guns, four others (two 37 mm. and two 75 mm.) together with installations for depth bombs.

3) <u>Aviation</u>

The aviation in Senegal is based on three airdromes: At Ouakam 3 km. from Dakar, at Thies 80 km. from Dakar, and the third

in Bamako, the capital of Sudan, 1,100 km. from Dakar. The greater part of the air fleet is stationed at Thies.

In November, 1940, a large part of the air fleet was moved deep into the continent, i.e. to Bamako and even to Gao; however these were subsequently withdrawn and returned to Thies and Dakar.

During the Syrian war in 1941, some squadrons were transferred from Senegal to North Africa, from whence they were quickly sent to the Near East. It was said in Dakar that the French air fleet suffered very heavy losses in Syria, both in men and materials.

In July and August, 1941, the squadrons returned to Senegal.

Because of these transfers it is very difficult to determine how many squadrons there are in Senegal. A [illegible] source puts the figure at 60 to 70 machines including auto[illegible] equipment.

In Dakar are stationed perhaps one or two squadrons of nine planes each, all of the type Curtiss P. 36. The presence of the Sioux squadron was noted at one time. Which one is there at present, I do not know; there is a Glen Martin type of two-engined light bomber: one squadron of 12 machines.

Training of pilots was held every week from January to June, 1941, on Tuesday. I never noted more than 12 airplanes in the air.

In the local papers there were accounts of three or four fatal landings.

Naval air fleet:

In Dakar there are 1 or 13 hydroplanes. In the waters in front of the cemetery of Bel-Air, they are grouped in a single line formation. Of these 1 or 13 airplanes, there is one squadron of nine hydroplanes of the ty lance-torpille (they carry one torpedo) which came after the defeat in Syria; and 3 or 4 planes of greater range, acting both as observation planes and bombers. While I was there, one of these latter planes could leave every day before dawn on an observation flight and return between seven and eight o'clock in the morning.

In August, 1941, there came to Dakar a boat bringing 200 airplane pilots and 9,000 aerial bombs.

4) The land troops

The Dakar garrison consists of the sixth artillery regiment armed with 75 mm guns and perhaps one battery of 155 mm guns. This regiment is motorized and is trained in anti-tank warfare. It is made up chiefly of white men: The seventh regiment is infantry: the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers are white, the rank and file consists of negroes.

They are stationed around the airports. Besides, there are some small infantry detachments.

In the spring of 1941, there arrived one battalion of Foreign Legionnaires. It was stationed at Rufisque.

There are four African motorized artillery regiments equipped with twenty-five 22-ton tanks which were brought from France. At the end of June these were sent into the interior. They were ob-

served between Thies and Kaolack. They were probably stationed near the latter place on the border of Gambia. All the machine guns which were observed in Dakar were mounted on small tanks, as motorized artillery.

Besides the above-mentioned 45 tanks, which came to Dakar in May, there probably arrived another convoy of tanks, but I was unable to ascertain either the number or kind. It is possible that this report was not accurate.

A great deal of munitions have entered Dakar. Existing magazines are not able to provide for the storage of the ammunition. A considerable portion of the arms and ammunition has been sent to the colonies to the south, principally Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, and Dahomey.

Privates, mostly negroes, accompanied by a large number of officers and subalterns have arrived in Dakar from France by way of the sea. Some of the privates were discharged, others were sent into the interior of the continent.

The importation of a large number of French officers and subalterns points to the fact the plan of war is to mobilize quickly Senegalese and Sudanese soldiers in case of a threat of attack.

November 15, 1941.

served between Thies and Kadack. They were probably stationed near the latter place on the border of Gambia. All the machine guns which were observed in Dakar were mounted on small trucks, as motorized artillery.

Besides the above-mentioned 25 tanks, which came to Dakar in May, there probably arrived another contingent of tanks, but I was unable to ascertain either the number or kind. It is possible that this report was not accurate.

A great deal of munitions have entered Dakar. Existing magazines are not able to provide for the storage of the ammunition. A considerable portion of the arms and ammunition has been sent to the colonies to the south, principally Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, and Dahomey.

Privates, mostly negroes, accompanied by a large number of officers and subalterns have arrived in Dakar from France by way of the sea. Some of the privates were discharged, others were sent into the interior of the continent.

The importation of a large number of French officers and subalterns points to the fact the plan of war is to mobilize quickly Senegalese and Sudanese soldiers in case of a threat of attack.

November 15, 1941.

THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN DAKAR

News of the conclusion of the Franco-German armistice reached us aboard the French military [illegible] on the way from Lorient to Dakar. Consternation reigned among the officers. Up until the last moment it was believed that Petain would not sign the armistice. They pointed to the fact that although her land forces were defeated, France had retained intact the full strength of her navy, possessed an air force, and had a great colonial empire in reserve. Dismay gave way to the fear that since England was continuing the struggle, the armistice would lead to an Anglo-French war. Bombardment of France, sea communications interrupted by the blockade--all this would be caused by the continuation of the conflict, which under German pressure would transform itself into a clear and open Anglo-French conflict. They listened attentively to all French communications from London. It was continually expected that the relatively little known General de Gaulle would proclaim the name of a prominent politician, admiral, or general who would then support the idea of the continuation of the war to a final victory. That name never came.

Shortly after our arrival in Dakar, there took place a conference of naval officers. On the basis of later reports, it can be judged that opinion was sharply divided, with the majority leaning toward cooperation with de Gaulle and the English. The officers of the battleship Richelieu, however,

were decidedly anti-English and even pro-German in attitude. On June 28, 1940, the English aircraft carrier Ark Royal and some small vessels were still in the harbor. Two days later, they received an order from the commander of the port instructing them to leave Dakar.

As a result, it could be observed that the political situation was quickly ripening in favor of the English.

Some days later came the news of the battle between the French and British fleets at Mers-el-Kebir. French opinion was sharply divided in regard to this incident. On the one side it was stated that because of the armistice the English were forced to destroy the French fleet, which might eventually be used by the Germans against the English. On the other hand it was stated that an attack on ships moored in their ports was not fair, and the loss in men and material inflamed public opinion. The latter feeling prevailed with particular strength among French naval men.

After the first news of Mers-el-Kebir, an eventual attack upon Dakar was expected. Almost of the whole civil population and the land forces, as well as a considerable portion of the navy, felt that Dakar ought to join the forces of deGaulle and the English. On one side it was generally stated that the English could not ignore the strategic importance of Dakar (one of the most important ports on the western coast of Africa between Casablanca and the Cape); on the other hand it

was said that Dakar was in a position similar to that of France--that it would be condemned to destruction if it did not enter the orbit of England.

On the seventh of July a British squadron appeared before Dakar and issued an ultimatum similar to the one at Mers-el-Kebir, demanding that the French naval vessels either come to an English port or transfer themselves to the French Antilles under the control of English naval officers, or be sunk. The admiral refused and the French naval vessels, including the battleship Richelieu, four torpedo boats, and auxiliary cruisers emerged from the harbor. But this did not occur without incident. The crews of two destroyers refused to go out to sea and take part in a war with the English. The sailors were arrested and taken to Thies under guard of black troops. The crew of the ship Victor Schoelcher refused likewise to take part in a war with the English, and in full agreement with the commanding officers of the boat it was agreed that she would go out of port, but would not fire a shot at the English.

In the early dawn of the following day, the Richelieu was torpedoed, and having lost its maneuverability, it returned to port. The English did not fire upon the other ships, and set sail immediately after the torpedoing of the Richelieu.

It is evident that the English at that time made no actual attempt to occupy Dakar. It is too bad that, after damaging the Richelieu, the English did not press the attack.

They could have taken the whole of Senegal with the enthusiastic reception of all when they could have concentrated. At that time the Governor-General Boyd apparently expected this outcome of the attack, for in front of his house [illegible] seen small tanks and cars lowered down in readiness for evacuation.

As a result of the attack, the English General Cadogan was asked to leave Dakar.

After this incident, the conditions in Dakar became chaotic. Two English attacks on French sailors evoked great [illegible]. The news coming from France revealed that the Germans were conducting themselves properly, that they did not [illegible] the people, that they paid [illegible] for [illegible], [illegible] the occupation authorities limited themselves strictly to military affairs. It was declared that France [illegible], that she had no means of defending herself. [illegible] news of details of the war in France and Belgium [illegible] which indicated that the French army had not fought [illegible] all its strength, that the soldiers did not want to fight. In Dakar, among the soldiers, and especially among the sailors, there was utter demoralization and lack of discipline. Together with the Moors, they would debate on the streets in greater and smaller groups. After a few weeks, it was expected that at any moment there would be an outbreak and a complete disintegration of the colonies.

The Vichy government asserted its authority in Dakar. Admiral de la Ca de was put in place of [illegible] who was not sufficiently reliable. In the [illegible] of August, the easy-going Governor-General Cayl was [illegible] to Madagascar, and in his place came M. Boisson, an officer during the difficult battles at Verdun. M. Boisson was very energetic and sour geous, and besides was entirely devoted to Petain.

With the strengthening of the governmental authority and the passage of time order was gradually restored in Dakar. The discipline of the soldiers and subsequently of the sailors reasserted itself. Among the native population, where revolt had threatened, there was a return to the daily occupations. Shops which had been temporarily closed, resumed business.

The town, on the whole, was well provisioned. As the Chief distributing point for the whole of French West Africa, Dakar was very well supplied with food and goods: enough to suffice for some months. However, some discomfort was felt because of a shortage of butter, fresh vegetables and fruit, which had to come to Dakar by sea.

There was no rationing of goods. There was only the police ordinance which forced the store to sell only one piece of the same kind of goods to one customer: for example, one suit of clothes, one shirt, one cravat, one toothbrush, etc. The purpose of this was to check the hoarding of goods.

A great number of [illegible] a large [illegible] of [illegible] circulated through the [illegible]. [illegible] quality could be bought. [illegible] of the [illegible] of duties on cars and the [illegible] of gasoline, [illegible] the [illegible] mileage of the railway tracks in the high [illegible] of the colony, automobiles were the most popular [illegible] of locomotion.

As order and prosperity returned to [illegible], the government propaganda began to take effect. The slogan was [illegible] the unity of the Empire, preserve it intact for France, collaborate with the Germans in order to better the condition of the prisoners of war and secure conditions allowing France to live. The other line of propaganda centered around the personality of the marshal, Petain, the great patriot and the greatest French leader. At the time of the Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar incident, the government propaganda [illegible] to anti-English feeling. This propaganda had [illegible] on the naval men, who had a traditional antipathy for the [illegible]; it greatly increased the solidarity of the navy. It was not so much due to the general propaganda, but to [illegible] conditions within the navy, that the anti-English feeling prevailed among the naval personnel in Dakar. The followers of de Gaulle tried to counteract this propaganda, but unfortunately they did not possess a unified organization, and they lacked leadership which would command authority and which would devote itself to the task with energy, courage, and decision.

Governor Boisson himself did not count upon another attack by the English. When I visited him on August 1°, 1940, he answered by questions as follows: There is no German supervision in West Africa under the terms of the armistice, and he does not expect the arrival of any German commission. He likewise felt that Dakar could not be taken by the English, because the English are trying to maintain correct relations with France.

The arrival of two strongly armed cruisers from France made a deep impression. Public opinion, which still expected an eventual English attack upon Dakar, could not understand why the English would permit the cruisers to pass through Gibraltar. It was a blunder which weighed decisively on the future course of events, one which was officially confirmed by the English.

The Attack on Dakar

At dawn on September 25, 1940, General de Gaulle, who had come to Dakar with a French squadron accompanied by a British squadron, appeared before the town. At six o'clock in the morning he demanded that the Governor-General allow his troops to land at Dakar, and declared that he had the unconditional support of the powerful British squadron and the numerous British army. A few minutes later airplanes began to drop leaflets, calling upon the people and the armed forces to adhere to de Gaulle, declaring that he was bringing ships

with him [illegible] the [illegible] of the town. At the same [illegible] two air bases with a very [illegible] with full [illegible] to negotiate landed [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]. These, however, were [illegible] by the local [illegible]. Also two vedettes containing [illegible] of the [illegible] and the harbor, but when they [illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] other emissaries, they backed away to the boat and [illegible]. In spite of the fact that they carried white flags, they were fired upon by machine-guns from the shore. According to other [illegible], some of the men in the boats were killed or wounded. Among the killed was the head chaplain of the de Gaulle [illegible], and among the wounded was a grandson of Foch. Finally, more fire was de Gaulle's ship Savorgnan de Brazza which [illegible] to enter the harbor. General de Gaulle sent other [illegible] to the Governor-General, one at 6 o'clock and [illegible] at 9. He warned that if Dakar does not surrender, which, according to his convictions, was the wish of the entire garrison, the powerful fleet of the Allies would go into action.

At nine o'clock, the shore batteries opened fire on the British squadron which had tacked relatively near the shore. The English admiral ordered them to cease firing, threatening to return the fire.

As a reply, Governor Boisson ordered the English fleet to withdraw twenty nautical miles from the shore, or else the firing would continue.

At eleven o'clock de Gaulle again implored the Dakar government not to interfere with the landing of his troops and warned that in case of refusal the armed forces of the Allies would return the fire. M. Boisson refused. At eleven o'clock the bombardment of the port and some of the batteries began. Since these points were almost entirely located in the town itself, the civil population was made to suffer the first bombardment.

At fifteen o'clock de Gaulle again turned to the civil [illegible] with summons to join the Free French movement, accusing the Dakar command of standing alone in its opposition to the adherence of West Africa to his movement.

At sixteen o'clock began the bombardment of the island of Goree which guards the entrance into the harbor and is strongly fortified.

At seventeen o'clock a landing was attempted at Rufisque, a little town lying 23 km. from Dakar, where there is a little harbor. It may be emphasized, that at dawn of that day - except for a small detachment of infantry there was no organized defenses at Rufisque. Not until later in the day were some heavy machine guns and perhaps two light cannon under the command of a young ensing. The latter did not reveal his position until the last moment and opened fire until the moment when the boats carrying the attackers were within 200 meters of the shore. As a result of the surprise firing, the

soldiers on the be[illegible] undoubtedly suffered severe [illegible] as. The ships of de Gaulle, [illegible] from [illegible], withdrew from Dakar.

In the course of the afternoon, the Dakar [illegible] last the submarine "Perseo" and the [illegible] "[illegible]".

During all this time I [illegible] from a terrace on the roof I could observe [illegible] of battle. In the same hotel there was in the basement a shelter of very doubtful value. On the other side of the street there was, [illegible] administered by the local economic cooperative [illegible]. Early [illegible] day, therefore, I [illegible] in the midst [illegible], among whom were many officers, [illegible] their stations [illegible] the duties [illegible] was almost impossible therefore to observe [illegible] time of the bombardment. Already [illegible] the [illegible] began, a spontaneous demand in the crowds assembled in the shelters that the women should form a delegation and go to Boisson with the demand that the inhuman [illegible] bloodshed should cease. The English have halted thus for some hours; or does not Boisson realize that he is defending Dakar for the Germans? But apparently, as usually happens under such circumstances, it all ended in idle talk.

Pro-Gaulle organizations, of which there were some in Dakar, and who, I was told, maintained contact with each other, withered completely.

Around 7 o'clock in the morning, when de Gaulle's airplanes began to scatter leaflets over the town from his airplanes, I met an acquaintance, an especially energetic young man, who belonged to one of the de Gaulle organizations. He asked me if I knew what was the [illegible]. He was surprised that the de Gaulle organizations were not used for internal activities. It was his honest opinion that it should begin with the arrest of Gov. Boisson and all the military commanders. He asked me whether in my opinion this should still be done. I replied that apparently, at the present moment, it is incomparably more difficult if not impossible to individually attempt such a plan without possessing an energetic and bold leadership and 50 to 100 people determined to risk all.

It is true that de Gaulle's emissaries were in the town the preceding night, but they were unable, or did not decide to carry out an attempt upon the Dakar command. If only the telephone wires to Thies, where was located the principal military airdrome, had been cut; also the telephone wires of the town. But alas, only the civilian wires were cut—the military lines remained undisturbed. It was the result of carelessness.

The night of 23 to 24th of August passed quietly. At nine o clock in the morning of August 24 some bombs were dropped on the Richelieu without effect, however, and at the same time there began again a continuous bombardment, especially of the

port, the shore batteries together with the islands of Gorea. A very intense bombardment lasted for half an hour.

At 13:30 o'clock the English admiral issued an ultimatum. In this ultimatum he announced that the firing on de Gaulle's troops, and English ships, forced him to the conclusion that any moment Dakar might be surrendered to the common foe; because of the importance of this town and naval base for the future course of the war; and also because the seizure of Dakar by the enemy would bring about the persecution of persons who are allies honoring their obligation of undertaking all necessary measures designed to prevent this eventuality. General de Gaulle ordered the withdrawal of his troops, not wishing to permit fighting among Frenchmen. "C'est a nous maintenant de parler". Finally, the admiral announced that if before six o'clock in the morning of the following day, the authority in Dakar was not handed over to de Gaulle, the powerful forces at the disposal of the British admiral would commence operations. "Once this action begins, it will be continued until all the fortifications of Dakar are completely destroyed and Dakar is taken".

At the same time, in several radio broadcasts, General de Gaulle urged the town to surrender and to undertake action against the local authorities, who are leading the town, the harbor, and the navy to destruction; and in consequence, leading the occupation of this key point in the South Atlantic by the Germans and Italians. In answer to the telegram of the British admiral, M. Boisson replied: "La France m'a confie Dakar—je defendrai Dakar jusqu'au bout".

About 14 o'clock (October 24) there began a new and very heavy bombardment of Dakar. Some of the bombs burst in the city. Among both the white and black population, complete panic reigned. The authorities in Dakar began feverishly to organize the evacuation of the town. On the single railway line which leads out of Dakar into the country in the direction of Bamako and St. Louis, there passed train after train carrying women and children, civilians, and to a certain extent, uniformed men who had succeeded by force in getting places in the cars. For the evacuation, there was also mobilized every available wagon and automobile. By evening, the town was entirely deserted.

On the following day (October 25th) about nine o'clock in the morning, there began a very sharp and intense bombardment. On this day, fortune did not especially favor the English. Of two powerful English battleships, one, the "Resolution", suffered a torpedo hit from the French submarine "Beno lers"; the other, the "Barham", was hit by a shell from the "Richelieu", suffering considerable losses in men. A short time before the English airplane directing the fire from the "Barham" was hit by French fire. The last two salvos from this battleship of 380 mm. caliber fell in the midst of the town 50 to 200 paces from the hotel where I was staying.

The general bombardment was followed by a short pause; whereupon there began a general attack on Dakar. But late in the evening came the news that the English in order to avoid the shedding of French (???) blood had evacuated Dakar.

To climax the fatuousness which prevailed throughout the whole operation it may be added that—as I was later recently informed—the " Richelieu", the most powerful defense of Dakar in face of the shattering of the shore artillery had only enough ammunition for two more salvos when the British fleet departed.

For several days thereafter the Dakar authorities were alarmed that it was only a temporary lull, after which the English would return in greater strength and renew a genuine attack.

Therefore many days passed before they could allow the evacuated persons to return to the town. Two weeks passed before conditions returned to normalcy.

According to official communiques, and three of dispatches in my report, the losses at Dakar were as follows:

			Totals
Europeans:			
	Wounded--	Soldiers 6	
		airplanes 2	
		sailors 81	
		civilians 18	107
	Killed--	soldiers 2	
		sailors 82	
		civilians 8	92
Negroes:			
	Wounded--	soldiers 53	
		sailors 1	
		civilians 179	233
	Killed--	soldiers 12	
		sailors 2	
		civilians 60	74

The total losses were 340 wounded and 166 killed. Besides submarines and torpedo boats Dakar lost one Curtiss airplane. Those are the official figures from Dakar. It may be

added that the batteries on Gorée and Cape Manuel were destroyed. In the town a few buildings were destroyed. The relatively small casualty among the civil population and small number of houses destroyed was due to the fact that the English used anti-battleship bombs.

According to the French communiqué English losses were as follows:

They lost 8 airplanes: 5 at the hands of fighters and 3 by anti-aircraft fire. The naval losses of the English included: 2 cruisers of 10,000 and 6,000 tons were hit during the first day and left Dakar; one English cruiser was hit by aerial bombs of 250 kg.; the battleship "Barham" was hit by shells from the "Richelieu", and the battleship "Resolution" was severely damaged by submarine torpedoes.

According to official (French) estimate the English lost 1,000 dead and wounded.

In evaluating this incident, it may be stated that the operation was completely lacking in preparation and careful planning, and was undertaken frivolously. An observer may readily judge that the English completely failed to take account of the fortifications at Dakar and were convinced that it would be sufficient to frighten the defenders of Dakar with the mighty English squadron in order to take the town.

At that time there were in Dakar two strong cores of opposition; Governor Boisson, who was a man of strong individuality and great decision; the other was the navy, which had a great faith in its own strength and a strong sense of honor to-

gether with an old animosity for the English navy.

Besides these two corps were motivated by a fear of English domination. But another factor is far more important. It is the deep-rooted peculiarity of the Frenchmen who have their revolutionary verve. The only thing that could weaken it is a very strong German pressure which does not exist in Dakar. Even the enthusiastic elements, grouped together in secret pro-Gaulle organizations, showed that they were not capable of independent action.

Demonstrations of this fundamental inaptitude were revealed in a whole series of blunders:

De Gaulle did not prepare the action from within. A paralysis of the command would have been relatively easy in October when it was weakly supported. The penetration of the town before the attack would not have been very difficult.

Later, instead of making a full-fledged attack, General de Gaulle issued "moving patriotic" radio proclamations. In that way he gave the defenders of Dakar time to man their defenses (cf. Rufisque).

It was a mistake that the attack of the first two days of the war was not pressed to the limits of its possibility, an eventuality which the Dakar command greatly feared (news from authoritative sources), beside the weak attempt at a descent on Rufisque.

A psychological mistake in de Gaulle's propaganda, both before and during the action was his over-emphasis on material

advantages (approved imports...making trade possible—officers to share the position of British officers) which created a very bad impression and was subsequently exploited by Vichy counter-propaganda.

The mistakes of Anglo-Gaullist propaganda were persisted in for a long period of time, even during the Syrian campaign, I was told. It is necessary to make very clear that to French officers, going over to the De Gaulle or English forces is formally treason to the "legal" government of Marshal Petain and to one's own immediate superior. Only pure idealism can lead him to take such an important step, whose consequences cannot be foreseen. De Gaulle must depend only upon the best, most patriotic element in the French army. The introduction of materialistic elements is not only ineffectual but harmful.

Mistakes of commission in preparation and in execution of action accompanied lack of good fortune: The firing from the battleship which shot at the "Richelieu" was scattered. In spite of the fact that it fired very heavily, the shells fell around the "Richelieu", and only one hit the battleship; but unfortunately this hit a spot where no damage was done and the armor was not pierced. The other battleship directed a concentrated fire against the shore batteries and destroyed them.

In the course of a few hours on the third day of the war the French torpedoed one of the English battleships and hit the other. It this at the moment when the ammunition of the Richelieu was practically exhausted.

One of the naval officers assigned to one of the shore defenses of Dakar told me a few weeks after the attack that he could not yet understand how it happened that the English failed to take Dkar.

The unsuccessful attack was the turning point in the history of Dakar. Vichy's propaganda exploited that attack very intensively. An attempt was made to make the whole disposition of public opinion of Dakar itself, as well as the whole of the rest of France, anti-English. Airpilots were sent from Morocco or Tunis to bombard Gibraltar as a reprisal for Dakar; they were told that the whole town lay in ruins. The population was asked to collect all photographs of ruins in Dakar taken during the war, and these were later displayed far and wide in magazines and the movies.

Immediately after the attack political repression began. Gaullists and those soldiers and civilians who during the time of the war demonstrated their sympathy for the Free French movement or the English were arrested. A very large number of persons received orders to North rn Africa or France. I heard of an instance in which the denunciation of a stupid Moor by vengeful persons was sufficient grounds for his arrest and deportation.

Former lukewarm adherents of the English suffered the same fate as the rest. Breaking up of the Gaullist organizations, political pressure and interested propaganda did the rest. One of the most important officials of the office of the Governor-General

told me that he hates the English more than he does the Germans--an unheard of thing before the Dakar Incident.

In order to strengthen it political influence the Council in Vichy proclaimed that it will buy up the whole crop of Arabian nuts--the chief export product from Senegal (over 500,000 tons), and took upon itself all the risks of transportation by sea. The promise was kept and the nuts were shipped to France.

The Vichy Government gave great publicity to the defense of Dakar. From all sides in France and the colonies congratulatory telegrams poured in upon Governor Boisson, and the high command, and the soldiers and sailors were showered with decorations.

Anti-English propaganda continued to gather strength. All possible kinds of arguments were manufactured, historic examples were cited,--particularly Napoleon and Joan of Arc.

The Meeting of Petain and Hitler at the end of October 1940 was announced with a note of optimism. Honors were rendered the Marshal, great publicity was given the meeting; it roused the vanity of the nation and roused the hope that France was beginning to recover from her defeat and was already regaining her former position.

The speech of General Weygand to the reserve officers added greatly to the consolidation of public opinion in Dakar. It was delivered on November 16, 1940. He started by saying that as a result of his long association with the British army he had many acquaintances among its leaders; the speech was devoted to an

interpretation of the causes of the defeat, which he attributed to the remarkable behavior of the English army. In resounding accents he invoked loyalty to the government. He ended b calling for unity around Marshal Petain: "Il est porte-parole de la France; ce sa part il n'y aura jamais rien d'injuste ni d'indigne------nous devons tous marcher derriere nos chefs comme je marche moi-meme derriere nos chef (Petain)."

Weygand did not speak f collaboration with the Germans. However, the Frenchmen who arrived from the metropolis spoke of it with a great deal of optimism.

The thesis of French politicians was as follows: the war between Germany and England will end up in the exhaustion of both sides. Thanks to collaboration with the Germans, a regenerated and stronger France will be able to play a decisive role in the peace conference. As if to confirm this thesis, a continually augmented flow of transports bearing soldiers and arms arrived in Dakar.

Not until the whole Laval incident in December, 1940, the annexation of Alsace, and the settlement of Germans in France did the illusion of the possibility of collaboration disappear.

There came a time of hesitation in connection with these stories. Rumors arose about the possibility of the breaking of the armistice terms by Marshal Petain, as a result of the continued German pressure, of the separation of General Weygand and the African colonies from the Vichy government, etc. During that period Marshal Petain greatly strengthened his position when he

was able to oppose the German demands, get rid of Laval, and conduct a purely French policy, independent and honorable.

During the time of rumors and talk about the breaking down of the armistice, dictatorial powers were concentrated in the hands of Darlan. The semi-official communique published in the monthly magazine, the Paris-Dakar, on March 11, 1941, declared that the time of trial and error has passed and the conversations of Darlan with the Germans will be the first step on the path which the Petain government has decided to follow.

The proclamation of the government caused more and more talk about the possibility of a war with England. A great impression was made by Darlan's speech, delivered around May , 1941, in which he declared that an English victory would be a misfortune for France; under the most favorable circumstances, it would mean the domination of England, and France cannot passively await such an eventuality.

In Dakar the political situation is aggravated. Officially forbidden English broadcasts are listened to, the Richelieu interferes with the reception of French broadcasts from London, and New York, particularly when Franco-German relations are touched upon. It has gone so far that even in private homes political rights are anxiously discussed, at least within the framework of community government.

The defenses on the border of Gambia are being strengthened, so that not even Negroes were allowed to cross it.

Moreover, the fortifications of Dakar have been continually strengthened. The work of fortification together with the construction of a great many shelters for the civilians has been going on night and day. Arms flow in from France in such large quantities that there is a shortage of warehouses for their storage.

Naval ships, airplanes, and land troops are constantly engaged in target practice.

Because of the influx of officers there is a housing shortage; government officers therefore are provisionally settled in some government buildings.

Because of some incidents with the English on the [illegible], since spring, ships from Casablanca and Marseilles have been convoyed by naval vessels. There is some kind of [illegible] storing of armaments and soldiers to the colonies located south of Dakar.

The order has gone out that rather than holding back, ships should shoot; and rather than calling for an English boat in case of distress, the Catain should run the ship ashore.

As interest in the totalitarian state and cooperation with the Germans in the war constantly increased, the propaganda took on an anti-American tone: For example, it is a fact that speeches in the local lyceum and local garrison are devoted to a discussion of Anglo-Saxon policy. The import of these speeches is that Anglo-Saxon policy is hostile in its realtions with Europe, which is seeking to unite and to work with the Germans, in order to protect their own vital interests.

In the last weeks before my departure, there was increasing

talk about a possible attac upon Dakar by the Americans rather than by the English. There were rumors about an American squadron located not far from Dakar.

Apparently the government officials were preparing for the eventuality of either an English or American attack when in July the administration decreed that the people should see to it that they have a three-day supply of water on hand together with a food reserve.

In the last weeks before my departure there were two false alarms in Dakar. After the attack of the English and De Gaulle upon Syria, public opinion was very much roused and pride was felt for the relatively protracted defense of Syria.

Excitement was once more aroused when the news came of the concessions to Japan in Indo-China. It was generally felt that the pearl of the French colonial empire had been lost. It resulted in a severe decline in the confidence felt in Marshal Petain, who had always proclaimed that his first and chief duty was to keep the French colonial empire intact.

Political calm had been restored in Dakar at the time of my departure. I affirm that on the whole the government is firmly in control of the situation. No de Gaullist organizations exist. The majority of the white inhabitants respect the political formulas stereotyped by the Vichy government and its propaganda is on the whole passively accepted. They follow everything that the Vichy government preaches. Nevertheless there is an undercurrent of feeling that the interest of France lies with the victory of England

and her allies. There are not many who would follow themselves to be called Anglophiles (there are more of these than de Gaullists) but that only as the surest way of keeping free from oppression.

The decisive group consists of the navy which obeys Darlan. It is true that many of the naval officers are not shaken in their faith in what Darlan stands for, but they judge him a man who defends the interests of the French navy in both domestic and foreign affairs.

The navy office wields in Dakar the same influence it does in all of France.

The army is anti-German, but the officers, with very few exceptions, obey all the commands of the government. The whole administration, i.e. the officialdom, is entirely in the hands of the government.

Only a very smallportion of the population generally desire an English victory, but it is weak and small in face of the influx of sailors and soldiers into Dakar to play any kind of role.

Those who are strongly pro-English are either in jail or stay strictly away from politics, pursuing their own affairs.

The Moors recall the German administration of Togo and Kamerum with aversion, but they do not belong to any organized movement. The last riot among the Moors took place because of rice shortages. The worst riots were in Bobo Dioulasso, five hundred km. southeast of Bamako, where there were five killed and fifteen injured.

Because of the cutting of communications with the Near East, the problem of pacifying the Moors may become much more serious in the near future.

Up to the time of my departure there were no Germans in Dakar, either in the form of an official mission or in a camouflaged form; and it is not supposed that more will come in the near future; since it would cause a complete change in the attitude of the sailors and soldiers. Governor Boisson has firmly stated that he will allow neither Germans nor Englishmen in Dakar, that even a small German mission would be feebly excluded on the grounds that it would be a provocation for an English or American attack.

However, the manner of completing the fortifications together with the hints dropped, I am under the impression that the Vichy government would welcome an attack on Dakar by the English, or even better, by the Americans because of the inevitable consequences in the form of obligations, or because of the concessions which could be gained from the Germans.

November 15, 1941

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170002-4

In my opinion, when working out a plan of attack on Dakar, the following points should be taken into consideration:

1) Dakar will strongly resist. The defense of the coast is strongly reinforced and the artillery fire, due to constant practice, can be very effective. The entire coast artillery is controlled by the Navy Officers, who have shown great military valour. Consequently, an attack only by sea could expose the attacking forces to serious loss.

2) Disproportionately large amount of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and ammunition would indicate that the Commandment of Dakar intends, in case of an attack, to recall the demobilized colored soldiers. In this manner the garrison of Dakar could be greatly increased, should Dakar have sufficient time to mobilize itself.

3) In September, 1940, the occupation of Dakar could have sufficed to induce the submission of the entire Senegal and Sudan. At present, even after the occupation of Dakar, there can be formed centers of important resistance in the interior of the country. Such battles could be so much greater in the event that Governor Boisson would be at the head of the resisting forces in the interior of the country in the case of the fall of Dakar.

4) The first blow should be so strong and so rapid that it would increase the feeling of hopelessness and aimlessness of resistance, which feeling already exists in Dakar.

5) In this colony there are many provisionsal airports. Completely equipped airports are located - as I am informed - outside of Dakar also in Thies, Bamako and Gao. In the north are located hydroplane bases in St. Louis and St. Etienne. These airports could aid in the effective resistance of this colony.

In view of the above remarks, in my opinion it appears necessary that a concurrent attack by land and sea must be made upon Dakar, from English Gambia. The French border of Gambia is strongly reinforced, especially in the Kaolack region. Despite this the attack should be so strong that in the shortest tune Kaolack would be taken and the roads and railroad line operating from Dakar to Bamako be severed. In this manner it would be impossible to reinforce the garrison of Dakar with mobilized colored soldiers. The second attack should be directed at Tambacounda and along the railroad line and road leading to Bamako, so that the Commander of the Army

would have no time to organize an effective resistance. In the event that the land attack would prove successful and the occupation of Dakar would require a great deal of sacrifice, the possession of these inland points would enable the attacking forces to reduce itself to a lengthier beslege of Dakar.

While spreading propaganda before the attack emphasis should be placed on the ideologic aims and not on the materialistic gains.

Furthermore, no statements which are unconfirmed regarding Dakar or Senegal, such as the Germans are there, should be issued over the radio, since this shatters confidence in all declarations or statements given over the radio.

Itappears to me that dropping pa phl ts would prove more effective than making statements over the radio, which is little listened to.

(REV. 1/4/45)

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

Prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

DESCRIPTION	
SOURCE: WJD	ACCESSION NO.: DOCS 055
ADDRESSED TO: FDR, State, JCS	
DOCUMENT DATE: 27 Mar. 45	ACCESSION DATE: 28 Mar. 45
DOCUMENT NO.: 16,107C COPY NO.:	OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O.
NO. OF PAGES: 36 ATTACHMENTS:	LOGGED BY: MJS

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO						
2.		M. J. Stone	3/28	10:00	MJS	3/28	1:00
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the Salmon Routing Sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

(41557)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

27 March 1945

General Donovan:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These memoranda deal with approaches from Austrian and Bavarian Nazis, and are based on the following Bern cables: #6097 (2/28); #6209 (3/2); #7037 (3/15); #7589 (3/24); #7569 (3/23), and #7639 (3/26).

RUSH

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.
per JH

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

(86361)

OSS FORM NO. 4005
(REV. 1/6/45)

TOP SECRET

ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: WJD	ACCESSION NO.: [illegible]
ADDRESSED TO: FDR, State, JCS	ACCESSION DATE: 28 Mar. 45
DOCUMENT DATE: 27 Mar. 45	OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O.
DOCUMENT NO.: 16,1070 COPY NO.:	LOGGED BY: MJS
NO. OF PAGES: 36 ATTACHMENTS:	

ATTENTION:
The attached TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred into the temporary custody of the TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER listed below who is charged with full responsibility for this document until receipt is obtained from another TSCO. According to OSS TOP SECRET REGULATIONS, the first TSCO to receive a TOP SECRET document must accession it on his TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, OSS form 4056c and prepare at once this Routing Sheet. This form must remain attached to the document at all times to serve as a record of its movement between Offices or Branches within OSS. Each TSCO who receives or releases this document will sign below and add the date and time. It must be transmitted between TSCOs only by Officer Courier. Regular Courier Receipts will be used.

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASE		
	BRANCH	SIGNATURE OF TSCO	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	
1.							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.							

This sheet, together with the subject document, should be returned as soon as possible to

(ORIGINATING TSCO)

TOP SECRET

(41457)

Germany 16,107 C

TOP SECRET

x Austria
x Romania

27 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence transmitted by our Bern representative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

27 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, summarizes approaches by Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Tab A), Chief of the Nazi Security and Police Service, and by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp (Tab B), Reichsstatthalter (Governor) of Bavaria.

Through two emissaries, Kaltenbrunner reports the existence of an opposition group within the Austrian SS which is anxious to liquidate the Nazi Party in Austria and to arrange for the orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This group is apparently anxious to gain some immunity from the Allies by serving as a "transitional regime" instead of joining the Nazi die-hards in a last-ditch struggle in the German "redoubt". The Kaltenbrunner group claims to have established contact with worker and Catholic opposition groups in Austria.

Von Epp, through his emissary, claims that he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battlefield and, when Nazi controls break down, intends to assume executive power in Bavaria with the help of [illegible] commanders.

TOP SECRET

Certain striking similarities are apparent between these two approaches and those of Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff with respect to North Italy, reported in previous memoranda. Whether these are independent, spontaneous efforts of dissident Nazis to save themselves, or whether Himmler is behind these moves and is, himself, preparing to desert the Nazi die-hards, remains an open question.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cables: #6097 - 2/28/45)
#6209 - 3/2/45)
#7037 - 3/15/45) - Kaltenbrunner Series.
#7589 - 3/24/45)

Bern Cables: #7569 - 3/23/45)
#7639 - 3/26/45) - Von Epp Series.

TOP SECRET

APPROACHES FROM KALTENBRUNNER GROUP

On 21 February the OSS representative in Bern reported that he had been approached by an Austrian industrialist with whom he had had previous contacts. The Austrian declared that he for several years had been acquainted with Hoettel, a Viennese SS chief, who knew vaguely that he had indirect contacts with Americans in Switzerland. Prior to the industrialist's departure for Switzerland on 18 January, Hoettel informed him that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security and Police Service, wished to see him.

The Austrian industrialist saw Kaltenbrunner, who told him that he, Kaltenbrunner, and Himmler were very anxious to end the war and as a first step were contemplating the liquidation of "war mongers" within the Nazi Party, especially Martin Bormann, Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party. Kaltenbrunner also said that he and Himmler were very anxious to establish contact with the British and Americans and planned to send a high SS official to Switzerland to speak for them, if a contact could be established. Kaltenbrunner asked the Austrian industrialist to do what he could to establish such a contact.

TOP SECRET

The industrialist claimed that he had suggested to Kaltenbrunner that Alfred Potocki, brother of the former Polish Ambassador to Washington, should be allowed to go with him to Switzerland, since he felt that Potocki had good contacts with the British. According to the industrialist, Kesztel immediately arranged for an exit visa for Potocki, who expected to proceed first to Liechtenstein. [Potocki apparently never arrived there.]

After further conversations with the industrialist, the OSS representative on 2 March reported that other good sources tended to support the industrialist's claim that Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and certain other high SS officials might abandon the die-hard Nazi fanatics like Hitler and Bormann, and (instead of joining them in the German "redoubt") might try to gain some immunity by serving as a "transitional regime".

(The OSS representative commented that so long as such Nazi leaders as Himmler and Kaltenbrunner believe that it might be possible to obtain some immunity from the Allies, an opportunity may be offered to drive a wedge into Nazi leadership and thereby reduce the effectiveness of German "redoubt"

plans. The representative said that through indirect channels he was arranging for Hoettel to come to the Swiss frontier where a trustworthy intermediary would see him.)

On 15 March the OSS representative reported that Hoettel had told the intermediary that the SS contained a so-called Austrian opposition represented by Kaltenbrunner, Hermann Neubacher (the former Plenipotentiary to the Balkans), and himself. This opposition group, Hoettel declared, had been responsible for saving many people from SS persecution. Hoettel also said that he was responsible for the transfer of Karl Seitz (the former Lord Mayor of Vienna) from a concentration camp in Silesia to Bavaria and now hoped shortly to free Seitz. Hoettel said that previous to his present assignment [apparently as Kaltenbrunner's right-hand man in Vienna] he had acted for Kaltenbrunner in supervising the activities of Edmund Veesenmeyer, the German Plenipotentiary in Hungary. He added that he had recently been assigned by Kaltenbrunner to establish contact with opposition groups in Austria.

On 24 March the OSS representative reported that Hoettel had made a second trip to Switzerland and declared that the majority of the Austrian SS, most of whom are Austrian

nationals, wish to liquidate the Nazi Party and to arrange for an orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This plan, Hoettel declared, would involve the elimination of those SS elements favoring a continuation of the war, especially the supporters of Bormann and a number of the Gauleiters.

(The OSS representative, on 24 March, also reported that the Austrian industrialist, who had seen Kaltenbrunner between Hoettel's first and second trips, had declared that Hoettel's second trip was made at Kaltenbrunner's special request. The industrialist supported Hoettel's statements.)

Hoettel declared that Kaltenbrunner had assigned him to contact Austrian opposition groups in order to support anti-Communist elements. Hoettel said he was selected for this task because he is a Catholic and because his father is a Social Democratic school reformer.

OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Karl Hoettel, a teacher for many years until 1934, served on the Vienna Board of Education. He was last heard of in 1941, when he was still living in Vienna and anti-Nazi. He is now about 60 years of age and has a son, about 30.7

Hoettel said his task had been facilitated by the anti-Communist leanings of Austrian workers. Hoettel claimed that he had established contact with anti-Nazi worker leaders in Steiermark, Wiener Neustadt and Vienna, and with Catholic opposition groups. He cited the name of a Catholic leader, which already had been supplied the OSS by representatives of the Provisional Austrian National Committee (POEN), but claimed he knew other opposition leaders only by their cover names.

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: POEN representatives reported to the OSS representative in Paris recently that they had established contact with some of the higher SS offices in Vienna./

Hoettel promised to return to Switzerland with certain of these opposition leaders, and hinted that he might even bring out the former Lord Mayor, Seitz, as well as representatives of the workers and Catholic opposition.

(According to the Austrian industrialist, a meeting in Salzburg, to discuss Hoettel's second trip to Switzerland, was attended by Kaltenbrunner, Neubacher, Lieutenant-General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau (the former liaison officer for the German Army with the Croatian Government), Neustaedter-Stuermer (?), and Hoettel.

(In September 1944, the OSS representative reported that Glaise-Horstenau had, following his removal from his liaison post, sent a message to the representative indicating his desire to work with the Allies for the liberation of Austria. The OSS representative then commented that Glaise-Horstenau apparently wished, through his friends in Army circles, to open to the Western Allies the route to Vienna via Zagreb in the hope of avoiding a Soviet occupation of the Austrian capital.

(OSS Washington Comment: Neustaedter-Stuermer cannot immediately be identified. The well-known Austrian Fascist, anti-Nazi and leader of the Heimwehr movement, Ode Neustaedter-Stuermer was reported to have committed suicide in Budapest when Austria was occupied by the Nazis.)

With regard to the general situation, Hoettel declared that the Nazis expect and wish to exploit a wave of anti-Communism in the Balkan area. For this reason, he said, despite the pressure on other fronts, SS divisions had been kept on the Lake Balaton front in Hungary, and von Weich's army held relatively inactive in Croatia. Hoettel said that the Alpine "redoubt"

would be finished and stocked in about three months. The Eisenwerke, he said, is already underground, producing such defensive weapons as Panzer Faustis. The Nazis intend to take Wehrmacht as well as SS units into the "redoubt", he added, and even the families of the troops.

With respect to the situation within the Nazi Party, Hoettel said that the split between the western and eastern oriented groups was becoming increasingly apparent. Robert Ley and his followers in the Labor Front, plus Bormann and many of the Gauleiters, he declared, belong to the Eastern orientation, while Kaltenbrunner and his followers belong to the western-oriented group. Hoettel predicted a kind of Tauroggen movement in which the Western Front would be opened, the troops would be marched towards the East to fight as free corps bands, while the government of Germany would be left to the Western Allies.

(The OSS representative comments that there are other indications that certain SS elements are trying to save themselves by turning to the West, by ignoring or even favoring local anti-Nazi movements, and by preparing to avoid a last ditch "redoubt" struggle with the die-hards. The representative points to the similarity of these activities inspired by

Kaltenbrunner, efforts by Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff to arrange a surrender in North Italy, and a recent approach by von Epp with respect to Bavaria, summarized in Tab B.

APPROACHES FROM VON EPP

On 23 March, the OSS representative in Bern reported that Heinz Adolf Heintze of the German Foreign Office arrived in Switzerland with a message from Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, Lieutenant-General, retired, the Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria. Von Epp declares that, although he has served the Nazis, as an old-school Bavarian officer he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battleground. When central Nazi government controls break down, he intends to assume executive power in Bavaria, aided by several Wehrkreis commanders in charge of Bavarian reserve units. The most energetic of these, he says, is General Kriebel, commanding Wehrkreis VII. Von Epp and these Wehrkreis commanders believe that the troops under their command would follow orders to take action against Himmler and the SS.

Von Epp declares that he has acquainted Cardinal Faulhaber and other Bavarian Catholic leaders with his plans and had tried to contact the Vatican through Faulhaber. This contact could not be safely established, he claims, because the Gestapo is represented in the Cardinal's entourage. Von Epp apparently asked his emissary, Heintze, to find out whether

his appearance at the head of a Bavarian anti-Hitler movement would tend to prejudice the movement in Allied eyes. in view of his own Nazi background and the fact that he had remained in office under Hitler.

(The OSS representative comments that this group may not have sufficient energy and determination to carry through its plans.)

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Von Epp, now 76, has been a confirmed Nazi ever since he joined the Party in 1923. He was instrumental in Hitler's rise to power and delivered Bavaria to Hitler on 9 March 1933. Following World War I, he founded the Epp Free Corps and put down the revolt in the Ruhr in 1919-20, then returned to the German Army until his retirement in 1923. He became Reichskommissar for Bavaria in March 1933 and was made Reichsstadthalter the following month. In recent years he actually has been subordinate in power to the Gauleiter. He is anti-Communist and probably pro-monarchist at the present time./

TOP SECRET

27 March 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

The enclosed memorandum, based on information forwarded by the OSS representative in Bern, will probably be of interest to the Secretary. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

27 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, summarizes approaches by Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Tab A), Chief of the Nazi Security and Police Service, and by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp (Tab B), Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria.

Through two emissaries, Kaltenbrunner reports the existence of an opposition group within the Austrian SS which is anxious to liquidate the Nazi Party in Austria and to arrange for the orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This group is apparently anxious to gain some immunity from the Allies by serving as a "transitional regime" instead of joining the Nazi die-hards in a last-ditch struggle in the German "redoubt". The Kaltenbrunner group claims to have established contact with worker and Catholic opposition groups in Austria.

Von Epp, through his emissary, claims that he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battlefield and, when Nazi

TOP SECRET

controls break down, intends to assume executive power in Bavaria with the help of Wehrkreis commanders.

Certain striking similarities are apparent between these two approaches and those of Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff with respect to North Italy, reported in previous memoranda. Whether these are independent, spontaneous efforts of dissident Nazis to save themselves, or whether Himmler is behind these moves and is, himself, preparing to desert the Nazi die-hards, remains an open question.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cables: #6097 - 2/28/45
#6209 - 3/2/45
#7037 - 3/15/45
#7509 - 3/21/45
- Kaltenbrunner Series

Bern Cables: #7569 - 3/23/45
#7639 - 3/26/45
- Von Epp Series

APPROACHES FROM KALTENBRUNNER GROUP

On 28 February the OSS representative in Bern reported that he had been approached by an Austrian industrialist with whom he had had previous contacts. The Austrian declared that he for several years had been acquainted with Hoettel, a Viennese SS chief, who knew vaguely that he had indirect contacts with Americans in Switzerland. Prior to the industrialist's departure for Switzerland on 18 January, Hoettel informed him that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security and Police Service, wished to see him.

The Austrian industrialist saw Kaltenbrunner, who told him that he, Kaltenbrunner, and Himmler were very anxious to end the war and as a first step were contemplating the liquidation of "your managers" within the Nazi Party, especially Martin Bormann, Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party. Kaltenbrunner also said that he and Himmler were very anxious to establish contact with the British and Americans and pl[illegible] SS official to Switzerland to speak for th[illegible] be established. Kaltenbrunner asked [illegible] what he could to establish [illegible]

The in[illegible] to Kaltenbrunner that [illegible] Swiss Ambassador to [illegible]

him to Switzerland, since he felt that Petecki had good contacts with the British. According to the industrialist, Hoettel immediately arranged for an exit visa for Petecki, who expected to proceed first to Liechtenstein. [Petecki apparently never arrived there.]

After further conversations with the industrialist, the OSS representative on 2 March reported that other good sources tended to support the industrialist's claim that Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and certain other high SS officials might abandon the die-hard Nazi fanatics like Hitler and Bormann, and (instead of joining them in the German "redoubt") might try to gain some immunity by serving as a "transitional regime".

(The OSS representative commented that so long as such Nazi leaders as Himmler and Kaltenbrunner believe that it might be possible to obtain some immunity from the Allies, an opportunity may be offered to drive a wedge into Nazi leadership and thereby reduce the effectiveness of German "redoubt" plans. The representative said that through indirect channels he was arranging for Hoettel to come to the Swiss frontier where a trustworthy intermediary would see him.)

On 15 March the OSS representative reported that Hoettel had told the intermediary that the SS contained a so-called Austrian

opposition represented by Kaltenbrunner, Hermann Neubacher (the former Plenipotentiary to the Balkans), and himself. This opposition group, Hoettel declared, had been responsible for saving many people from SS persecution. Hoettel also said that he was responsible for the transfer of Karl Seitz (the former Lord Mayor of Vienna) from a concentration camp in Silesia to Bavaria and now hoped shortly to free Seitz. Hoettel said that previous to his present assignment [apparently as Kaltenbrunner's right-hand man in Vienna] he had acted for Kaltenbrunner in supervising the activities of Edmund Veesenmeyer, the German Plenipotentiary in Hungary. He added that he had recently been assigned by Kaltenbrunner to establish contact with opposition groups in Austria.

On 24 March the OSS representative reported that Hoettel had made a second trip to Switzerland and declared that the majority of the Austrian SS, most of whom are Austrian nationals, wish to liquidate the Nazi Party and to arrange for an orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This plan, Hoettel declared, would involve the elimination of those SS elements favoring a continuation of the war, especially the supporters of Bormann and a number of the Gauleiters.

(The OSS representative, on 24 March, also reported that the Austrian industrialist, who had seen Kaltenbrunner

between Hoettel's first and second trips, had declared that Hoettel's second trip was made at Kaltenbrunner's special request. The industrialist supported Hoettel's statements.)

Hoettel declared that Kaltenbrunner had assigned him to contact Austrian opposition groups in order to support anti-Communist elements. Hoettel said he was selected for this task because he is a Catholic and because his father is a Social Democratic school reformer.

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Karl Hoettel, a teacher for many years until 1934, served on the Vienna Board of Education. He was last heard of in 1941, when he was still living in Vienna and anti-Nazi. He is now about 60 years of age and has a son, about 30./

Hoettel said his task had been facilitated by the anti-Communist leanings of Austrian workers. Hoettel claimed that he had established contact with anti-Nazi worker leaders in Steiermark, Wiener Neustadt and Vienna, and with Catholic opposition groups. He cited the name of a Catholic leader, which already had been supplied the OSS representative by representatives of the Provisional Austrian National Committee (PCNC), but claimed he knew other opposition leaders only by their cover names.

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: POEN representatives reported to the OSS representative in Paris recently that they had established contact with some of the higher SS offices in Vienna./

Hoettel promised to return to Switzerland with certain of these opposition leaders, and hinted that he might even bring out the former Lord Mayor, Seitz, as well as representatives of the workers and Catholic opposition.

(According to the Austrian industrialist, a meeting in Salzburg, to discuss Hoettel's second trip to Switzerland, was attended by Kaltenbrunner, Neubacher, Lieutenant-General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau (the former liaison officer for the German Army with the Croatian Government), Neustaedter-Stuerzer (?), and Hoettel.

(In September 1944 the OSS representative reported that Glaise-Horstenau had, following his removal from his liaison post, sent a message to the representative indicating his desire to work with the Allies for the liberation of Austria. The OSS representative then commented that Glaise-Horstenau apparently wished, through his friends in Army circles, to open to the Western Allies the route to Vienna via Zagreb in the hope of avoiding a Soviet occupation of the Austrian capital.

(/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Neustaedter-Stuermer cannot immediately be identified. The well-known Austrian Fascist, anti-Nazi and leader of the Heimatwehr movement, Odo Neustaedter-Stuermer was reported to have committed suicide in Budapest when Austria was occupied by the Nazis./)

With regard to the general situation, Hoettel declared that the Nazist expect and wish to exploit a wave of anti-Communism in the Balkan area. For this reason, he said, despite the pressure on other fronts, SS divisions had been kept on the Lake Balaton front in Hungary, and von Weich's army held relatively inactive in Croatia. Hoettel said that the Alpine "redoubt" would be finished and stocked in about three months. The Steyrwerke, he said, is already underground, producing such defensive weapons as Panzer Faustes. The Nazis intend to take Wehrmacht as well as SS units into the "redoubt", he added, and even the families of the troops.

With respect to the situation within the Nazi Party, Hoettel said that the split between the western and eastern oriented groups was becoming increasingly apparent. Robert Ley and his followers in the Labor Front, plus Bormann and many of the Gauleiters, he declared, belong to the Eastern orientation, while Kaltenbrunner and his followers belong to the western-oriented group. Hoettel predicted a kind of Tamroggen movement in which

the Western Front would be opened, the troops would be marched towards the East to fight as free corps bands, while the government of Germany would be left to the Western Allies.

(The OSS representative comments that there are other indications that certain SS elements are trying to save themselves by turning to the West, by ignoring or even favoring local anti-Nazi movements, and by preparing to avoid a last-ditch "redoubt" struggle with the die-hards. The representative points to the similarity of these activities inspired by Kaltenbrunner, efforts by Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff to arrange a surrender in North Italy, and a recent approach by von Epp with respect to Bavaria, summarized in Tab B.)

APPROACHES FROM VON EPP

On 23 March, the OSS representative in Bern reported that Heinz Adolf Heintze of the German Foreign Office arrived in Switzerland with a message from Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, Lieutenant-General, retired, the Reichsstatthalter (Governor) of Bavaria. Von Epp declares that, although he has served the Nazis, as an old-school Bavarian officer he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battleground. When central Nazi government controls break down, he intends to assume executive power in Bavaria, aided by several Wehrkreis commanders in charge of Bavarian reserve units. The most energetic of these, he says, is General Kriebel, commanding Wehrkreis VII. Von Epp and these Wehrkreis commanders believe that the troops under their command would follow orders to take action against Himmler and the SS.

Von Epp declares that he has acquainted Cardinal Faulhaber and other Bavarian Catholic leaders with his plans and had tried to contact the Vatican through Faulhaber. This contact could not be safely established, he claims, because the Gestapo is represented in the Cardinal's entourage. Von Epp apparently asked his emissary, Heintze, to find out whether his appearance at the head of a Bavarian anti-Hitler movement would tend to prejudice the movement in Allied eyes, in view of his own Nazi background and the fact that he had remained in office under Hitler.

(The OSS representative comments that this group may not have sufficient energy and determination to carry through its plans.)

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Von Epp, now 76, has been a confirmed Nazi ever since he joined the Party in 1923. He was instrumental in Hitler's rise to power and delivered Bavaria to Hitler on 9 March 1933. Following World War I, he founded the Epp Free Corps and put down the revolt in the Ruhr in 1919-20, then returned to the German Army until his retirement in 1923. He became Reichskommissar for Bavaria in March 1933 and was made Reichsstadthalter the following month. In recent years he actually has been subordinate in power to the Gauleiter. He is anti-Communist and probably pro-monarchist at the present time./

TOP SECRET

27 March 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Approaches From Austrian and Bavarian Nazis.

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, summarizes approaches by Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Tab A), Chief of the Nazi Security and Police Service, and by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp (Tab B), Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria.

Through two emissaries, Kaltenbrunner reports the existence of an opposition group within the Austrian SS which is anxious to liquidate the Nazi Party in Austria and to arrange for the orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This group is apparently anxious to gain some immunity from the Allies by serving as a "transitional regime" instead of joining the Nazi die-hards in a last-ditch struggle in the German "redoubt". The Kaltenbrunner group claims to have established contact with worker and Catholic opposition groups in Austria.

Von Epp, through his emissary, claims that he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battlefield and, when Nazi controls break down, intends to assume executive power in Bavaria with the help of Bavarian commanders.

TOP SECRET

Certain striking similarities are apparent between these two approaches and those of Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff with respect to North Italy, reported in previous memoranda. Whether these are independent, spontaneous efforts of dissident Nazis to save themselves, or whether Himmler is behind these moves and is, himself, preparing to desert the Nazi die-hards, remains an open question.

William J. Donovan
Director

Bern Cables: #6097 - 2/28/45
#6209 - 3/2/45
#7037 - 3/15/45
#7589 - 3/24/45
- Kaltenbrunner Series

Bern Cables: #7569 - 3/23/45
#7639 - 3/26/45
- Von Epp Series

APPROACHES FROM KALTENBRUNNER GROUP

On 26 February the OSS representative in Bern reported that he had been approached by an Austrian industrialist with whom he had had previous contacts. The Austrian declared that he for several years had been acquainted with Hoettel, a Viennese SS chief, who knew vaguely that he had indirect contacts with Americans in Switzerland. Prior to the industrialist's departure for Switzerland on 18 January, Hoettel informed him that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security and Police Service, wished to see him.

The Austrian industrialist saw Kaltenbrunner, who told him that he, Kaltenbrunner, and Himmler were very anxious to end the war and as a first step were contemplating the liquidation of "war mongers" within the Nazi Party, especially Martin Bormann, Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party. Kaltenbrunner also said that he and Himmler were very anxious to establish contact with the British and Americans and planned to send a high SS official to Switzerland to speak for them, if a contact could be established. Kaltenbrunner asked the Austrian industrialist to do what he could to establish such a contact.

The industrialist claimed that he had suggested to Kaltenbrunner that Alfred Potocki, brother of the former Polish Ambassador to Washington, should be allowed to go with

him to Switzerland, since he felt that Potocki had good contacts with the British. According to the industrialist, Roettel immediately arranged for an exit visa for Potocki, who expected to proceed first to Liechtenstein. [Potocki apparently never arrived there.]

After further conversations with the industrialist, the OSS representative on 2 March reported that other good sources tended to support the industrialist's claim that Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and certain other high SS officials might abandon the die-hard Nazi fanatics like Hitler and Bormann, and (instead of joining them in the German "redoubt") might try to gain some immunity by serving as a "transitional regime".

(The OSS representative commented that so long as such Nazi leaders as Himmler and Kaltenbrunner believe that it might be possible to obtain some immunity from the Allies, an opportunity may be offered to drive a wedge into Nazi leadership and thereby reduce the effectiveness of German "redoubt" plans. The representative said that through indirect channels he was arranging for Roettel to come to the Swiss frontier where a trustworthy intermediary would see him.)

On 15 March the OSS representative reported that Roettel had told the intermediary that the SS contained a so-called Austrian opposition represented by Kaltenbrunner, Hermann Neubacher (the former Plenipotentiary to the Balkans), and himself.

This opposition group, Hoettel declared, had been responsible for saving many people from SS persecution. Hoettel also said that he was responsible for the transfer of Karl Seitz (the former Lord Mayor of Vienna) from a concentration camp in Silesia to Bavaria and now hoped shortly to free Seitz. Hoettel said that previous to his present assignment [apparently as Kaltenbrunner's right-hand man in Vienna] he had acted for Kaltenbrunner in supervising the activities of Edmund Weesenmeyer, the German Plenipotentiary in Hungary. He added that he had recently been assigned by Kaltenbrunner to establish contact with opposition groups in Austria.

On 24 March the OSS representative reported that Hoettel had made a second trip to Switzerland and declared that the majority of the Austrian SS, most of whom are Austrian nationals, wish to liquidate the Nazi Party and to arrange for an orderly transfer of administrative functions to the Western Powers. This plan, Hoettel declared, would involve the elimination of those SS elements favoring a continuation of the war, especially the supporters of Bormann and a number of the Gauleiters.

(The OSS representative, on 24 March, also reported that the Austrian industrialist, who had seen Kaltenbrunner between Hoettel's first and second trips, had declared that

Hoettel's second trip was made at Kaltenbrunner's special request. The industrialist supported Hoettel's statements.)

Hoettel declared that Kaltenbrunner had assigned him to contact Austrian opposition groups in order to support anti-Communist elements. Hoettel said he was selected for this task because he is a Catholic and because his father is a Social Democratic school reformer.

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Karl Hoettel, a teacher for many years until 1934, served on the Vienna Board of Education. He was last heard of in 1941, when he was still living in Vienna and anti-Nazi. He is now about 60 years of age and has a son, about 30./

Hoettel said his task had been facilitated by the anti-Communist leanings of Austrian workers. Hoettel claimed that he had established contact with anti-Nazi worker leaders in Steiermark, Wiener Neustadt and Vienna, and with Catholic opposition groups. He cited the name of a Catholic leader, which already had been supplied the OSS by representatives of the Provisional Austrian National Committee (POEN), but claimed he knew other opposition leaders only by their cover names.

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: POEN representatives reported to the OSS representative in Paris recently that they had established contact with some of the higher SS offices in Vienna./

Hoettel promised to return to Switzerland with certain of these opposition leaders, and hinted that he might even bring out the former Lord Mayor, Seitz, as well as representatives of the workers and Catholic opposition.

(According to the Austrian industrialist, a meeting in Salzburg, to discuss Hoettel's second trip to Switzerland, was attended by Kaltenbrunner, Neubacher, Lieutenant-General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau (the former Liaison officer for the German Army with the Croatian Government), Neustaedter-Stuermer (?), and Hoettel.

(In September 1944, the OSS representative reported that Glaise-Horstenau had, following his removal from his liaison post, sent a message to the representative indicating his desire to work with the Allies for the liberation of Austria. The OSS representative then commented that Glaise-Horstenau apparently wished, through his friends in Army circles, to open to the Western Allies the route to Vienna via Zagreb in the hope of avoiding a Soviet occupation of the Austrian capital.

(/OSS Washington Comment: Neustaedter-Stuermer cannot immediately be identified. The well-known Austrian Fascist, anti-Nazi and leader of the Heimatdienst movement, Ode Neustaedter-Stuermer was reported to have committed suicide in Budapest when Austria was occupied by the Nazis./)

With regard to the general situation, Hoettel declared that the Nazis expect and wish to exploit a wave of anti-Communism in the Balkan area. For this reason, he said, despite the pressure on other fronts, SS divisions had been kept on the Lake Balaton front in Hungary, and von Weich's army held relatively inactive in Croatia. Hoettel said that the Alpine "redoubt" would be finished and stocked in about three months. The Steyrwerke, he said, is already underground, producing such defensive weapons as Panzer Faustes. The Nazis intend to take Wehrmacht as well as SS units into the "redoubt", he added, and even the families of the troops.

With respect to the situation within the Nazi Party, Hoettel said that the split between the western and eastern oriented groups was becoming increasingly apparent. Robert Ley and his followers in the Labor Front, plus Bormann and many of the Gauleiters, he declared, belong to the Eastern orientation, while Kaltenbrunner and his followers belong to the western-oriented group. Hoettel predicted a kind of Tauroggen movement in which the Western Front would be opened, the troops would be marched towards the East to fight as free corps bands, while the government of Germany would be left to the Western Allies.

(The OSS representative comments that there are other indications that certain SS elements are trying to save themselves by turning to the West, by ignoring or even favoring

local anti-Nazi movements, and by preparing to avoid a last ditch "redoubt" struggle with the die-hards. The representative points to the similarity of these activities inspired by Kaltenbrunner, efforts by Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff to arrange a surrender in North Italy, and a recent approach by von Epp with respect to Bavaria, summarized in Tab B.)

TOP SECRET

APPROACHES FROM VON EPP

On 23 March, the OSS representative in Bern reported that Heinz Adolf Heintze of the German Foreign Office arrived in Switzerland with a message from Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, Lieutenant-General, retired, the Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria. Von Epp declares that, although he has served the Nazis, as an old-school Bavarian officer he wishes to spare Bavaria from becoming a battleground. When central Nazi government controls break down, he intends to assume executive power in Bavaria, aided by several Wehrkreis commanders in charge of Bavarian reserve units. The most energetic of these, he says, is General Kriebel, commanding Wehrkreis VII. Von Epp and these Wehrkreis commanders believe that the troops under their command would follow orders to take action against Himmler and the SS.

Von Epp declares that he has acquainted Cardinal Faulhaber and other Bavarian Catholic leaders with his plans and had tried to contact the Vatican through Faulhaber. This contact could not be safely established, he claims, because the Gestapo is represented in the Cardinal's entourage. Von Epp apparently asked his emissary, Heintze, to find out whether

TOP SECRET

his appearance at the head of a Bavarian anti-Hitler movement would tend to prejudice the movement in Allied eyes, in view of his own Nazi background and the fact that he had remained in office under Hitler.

(The OSS representative comments that this group may not have sufficient energy and determination to carry through its plans.)

/OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Von Epp, now 76, has been a confirmed Nazi ever since he joined the Party in 1923. He was instrumental in Hitler's rise to power and delivered Bavaria to Hitler on 9 March 1933. Following World War I, he founded the Epp Free Corps and put down the revolt in the Ruhr in 1919-20, then returned to the German Army until his retirement in 1923. He became Reichskommissar for Bavaria in March 1933 and was made Reichsstadthalter the following month. In recent years he actually has been subordinate in power to the Gauleiter. He is anti-Communist and probably pro-monarchist at the present time./

OSS Form No. 4006

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

Description	Registry
Source: Col. Pfaff	Accession No. X-2 T-2TS 476-315
Addressed to: WJD	
Document date: 15 March 45	Accession date: 13 Mar. 45
Document No. 16,107A Copy No.:	Office or Branch: D. O. (X-2)
No. of pages: 7 Attachments:	Logged by: MJS (Madge Stein)

ATTENTION:
The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO	W. J. Donovan / W	3/17		WJD	3/17	3:20
2.		R[illegible]	17 Mar	1520	RS	17 Mar	1655
3.		Pritchell	20/3	9a	[illegible]	20/3	[illegible]
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, tear off this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the attach routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No. _____

TOP SECRET

OSS FORM NO. 4005

TOP SECRET
ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: [illegible]	ACCESSION NO.: X 2 TS 476-315
ADDRESSED TO: General Donovan	
DOCUMENT DATE: 3-15-45	ACCESSION DATE: 3-15-45
DOCUMENT NO.: 2092 COPY NO.: 1	OFFICE OR BRANCH: X 2
NO. OF PAGES: 7 ATTACHMENTS: 0	LOGGED BY: Eleanor Madge Stein

ATTENTION:
The attached TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred into the temporary custody of the TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER listed below who is charged with full responsibility for this document until receipt is obtained from another TSCO. According to OSS TOP SECRET REGULATIONS, the first TSCO to receive a TOP SECRET document must accession it on his TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, OSS form 4053c and prepare at once this Routing Sheet. This form must remain attached to the document at all times to serve as a record of its movement between Offices or Branches within OSS. Each TSCO who receives or releases this document will sign below and add the date and time. It must be transmitted between TSCOs only by Officer Courier. Regular Courier Receipts will be used.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
BRANCH	SIGNATURE OF TSCO	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1. X-2	J R Baird	3-15-	1420	JRB	3/15	1400
General Donovan						
3. (Copy per Telephone)						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						

This sheet, together with the subject document, should be returned as soon as possible to

_____
(ORIGINATING TSCO)

(4154) TOP SECRET