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A COMMENTARY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY
SITUATION

May 29, 1942

SUMMARY

A belief that German defeat may come much sooner than previously expected explains in considerable measure the current surge of optimism in the United States. Close observers of the German scene view such optimism as unsupported by their estimates of the Nazi domestic and military situation.

Recent studies made in the Coordinator's office reveal that the British bombing campaign will probably have a minor effect this year on the Nazi war effort against Russia; that the German oil position remained substantially in balance even during the invasion of Russia; and that

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optimistic British estimates of German casualties on the Russian front are far too high.

On the home front the alleged differences between the Nazi Party and Reichswehr are believed no longer to be an issue of fundamental importance. Germany's food position is probably eased for through the year 1942-1943. The Nazis are already in possession of a large and significant part of the Russian economy. There is no convincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired.

Recent German peace feelers are probably a sign of strength rather than weakness. In the "occupied countries," as represented by Italy, France, and Norway, the controlling authority (hence Nazi influence) does not seem to be threatened in any serious way.

Finally, a judicious use of propaganda can undoubtedly be effective in widening the fissures in the German home front, once

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the situation has become sufficiently serious.
But for any large scale propaganda assault a
strategic moment should be chosen. That
moment might arrive after important German
defeats in Russia.

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A COMMENTARY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY
SITUATION

May 29, 1942

The past two weeks have witnessed a surge of war optimism in this country. This American "victory panic," as one Swedish correspondent dubs it, reflects various developments--reports on the Battle of the Coral Sea, optimistic American official statements, the Russian "offensive" before Kharkov, and a vague feeling that the Germans are seriously weakening and that the crack-up may not be far off. This vein of optimism has developed despite the warning of the President that the war will be long and that the press should do its part by reducing individual victories to their proper proportions in the larger pattern of the struggle. A high point was reached when Newsweek carried as the title of its lead article: "Chance for Victory in 1942 Causes Allied Hopes to Soar."

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Close observers of the German scene view such optimism as unsupported by their estimates of the German domestic and military situation. The following memorandum makes no attempt to offer anything like a comprehensive picture of the German situation. It has simply chosen certain aspects of the picture to which careful study has recently been devoted by the Coordinator's office.

EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH AIR OFFENSIVE

The press in general has tended to "play up" the importance of British bombing of Germany and the occupied territories. The campaign is spectacular and "newsworthy." It represents the only significant British military effort at the moment. A survey of the evidence by an air expert concludes, however, that, at the present tempo, this bombardment will have but a minor effect on the German war effort against Russia between now and the time when operations are curtailed by the winter.

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It is very easy, however, to exaggerate the amount of damage which would be done even if Anglo-American resources permit a notably heightened tempo of attack. The blitz on Coventry, most successful of all, reduced the town's activity index, based on electric power consumption, to 37 percent of its previous level. But electric power consumption had returned to normal in about five or six weeks. The conclusion is simple: the most damaging blitz of the war must be repeated every few weeks if the industrial activity of the target area is to be kept down to a damaging level.

Bombing operations of this type are, moreover, relatively inefficient. An estimate of British bombardment of individual factories as of the end of 1941 indicates that, of 100 planes dispatched on missions, 60 will reach the target area, 12 will actually find the target, and of the latter 25 percent will deliver bombs on the target. In other words,

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three percent of the bombs dispatched will actually find the target. British experience indicates that 75 percent of the aircraft assigned a bomber command will be fit to fly at any one time, that there will be crews trained to man 50 percent of the total assigned, and that weather will permit bombardment operations on an average of six to seven nights a month. Losses from day bombing are too high to make that a regular practice. One British bombardment group showed a loss of 25 percent per month of its operational strength in daylight operations against Germany.

THE GERMAN OIL POSITION

Commentators and the press generally have indulged in consistently loose talk about the weakness of the German oil position and the "inevitability" of a Nazi military campaign to acquire oil resources in the Caucasus or elsewhere. A current study of the Coordinator's office reveals a very different picture.

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It concludes that petroleum production and consumption were in approximate balance even during the German offensive of last fall, when military oil requirements were at their peak. At most the Nazis made only negligible withdrawals from stocks during that period.

From June to December of last year, petroleum consumption of the German ground and air forces on the Eastern Front probably amounted to about 430,000 tons a month--around 300,000 tons of which were for the ground forces alone. Combat vehicles accounted for about 70 percent of this latter figure, supply vehicles for the remainder. Divisions actively engaged in combat were responsible for more than 90 percent of the ground force consumption. Of the 130,000 tons consumed by the air force, almost all was for planes rather than for the supply service.

During this same period, military consumption elsewhere than on the Russian

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front amounted to about 225,000 tons a month, with civilian consumption 670,000 tons. The consumption total of 1.3 million tons a month was only slightly larger than the estimated production rate. Thus petroleum production and consumption were in approximate balance.

Although this report has not studied the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942, as carefully as the preceding period, it seems unlikely that military consumption of petroleum during the winter amounted to more than 420,000 tons a month. If civilian consumption continued at the rate of 670,000 tons a month, total consumption was approximately 1.1 million tons-- as compared with a production of 1.3 million tons. The conclusion is inescapable that German petroleum stocks last winter were increasing at a rate of approximately 200,000 tons a month.

GERMAN CASUALTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Optimistic estimates of German permanent casualties on the Russian front,

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from British and other sources, run as high as 2,300,000. The estimate of the Coordinator's office, however, is only about 1,250,000. This figure is unquestionably a conservative one. While these higher estimates cannot be summarily dismissed, it is believed that they are based on total casualty figures which are too high and that the breakdowns of these figures utilize percentages of killed, missing, and totally disabled which are too high a proportion of total casualties.

It should be noted that any estimate of permanent losses does not include the important factor of men in hospitals. What may be called the "hospital pool," in a period of large-scale offensive operations such as the campaign of last fall in Russia, probably results in a constant drain of some 600,000 - 700,000 men on the strength of the German armed forces.

One commentary introduces another element of confusion into this picture when

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it refers to the calling up for military service of boys 17, 18, and 19. It adds that these groups are being brigaded with the divisions, and introduce a large new element of relatively untrained men into the army.

No authority can be discovered for this report, and it is not accepted in certain responsible quarters in M.I.S. which have been queried. It is believed that the statement, in so far as it concerns boys 17 and 18, comes from someone who failed to distinguish between military service and Arbeitsdienst. German law makes boys beginning at 18 subject to military training. Prior to their military training, they are obliged to enroll in the Arbeitsdienst for a variable period. In this connection, a Military Attaché report from Berlin, December 5, 1941, states that boys 17 to 19 were in fact called up for Arbeitsdienst to work

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with the Organization Todt in an effort to solve transport and supply problems in the East. But there is no evidence that they were brigaded with the divisions to fight at the front.

PARTY AND ARMY

Certain writers have emphasized what they term a "fundamental opposition" between the Party and the Army. But the old independent Wehrmacht no longer exists. Since February 4, 1938 when Blomberg and Fritsch had to go, the German army has been pretty effectively Nazi-fied from the top downward. For some years now the entire young manhood of Germany has passed through the pre-military training entrusted on January 19, 1939 to the SA. All the younger classes now in the Army are the products of Nazi training and education. Nothing is more certain than that the expansion of the 4000 commissioned officers of the old Reichswehr into the hundreds of thousands of officers of the present army has resulted

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in an immense strengthening of the position of the Nazi Party in the Army. Military Attaché reports agree that all the officers in the grades from major downward are solidly National Socialist.

The higher officers from colonel upward are still in the main the officers of the Reichswehr. Promotion in the German army is slow, even in time of war. Very few Nazis have found their way into the higher and highest grades. The officers of these grades are above all professionals with little or no political tradition behind them. It was only due to the lack of political leadership on the part of Hammerstein, Blomberg and Fritsch that the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air Corps, held aloof from the Nationalist Socialist movement. But such an aloofness as that of the Reichswehr under the Republic was impossible to maintain in the face of a nationalist revolution which in its essence

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was military. Hitler made an end of that aloofness on February 4, 1938, and he did it without resorting to one of Stalin's purges. The hostile officers were pensioned or gradually eliminated. It is safe to say that few enemies of Hitler remain among the higher officers.

This is not to say that there is no longer any irritation between these professionals and the new and more radical Nazi leaders. A General von Kleist might still resign after a quarrel with Sepp Dietrich, the ranking general of the SS-Combat Divisions. It is also quite possible that the SS-Combat Divisions were a minor issue in Hitler's quarrel with the generals last autumn.

Since these SS-Combat Divisions are now being expanded very considerably, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that the high command is reconciled to their existence and special position. They have produced some able officers, among them General Rommel. They

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are now accepted as contributors to the more conservative military journals, especially the conservative Militärwochenblatt. In spite of the persistence of certain irritations among the older army officers, the relationship between the Party and the Army is no longer an issue of fundamental importance, in the opinion of the best informed of our former Military Attachés.

THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION

The April change in German rations gave rise to optimistic comments in the press, even suggesting that Nazi food shortages might soon be serious. A recent analysis of the German food position by the Economics Division of the Coordinator's office, however, suggests a different situation. Germany's food position appears to be cared for through the year 1942-48, on the assumption that the same areas now available to her will continue to be.

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It is only after the end of the calendar year 1943 that the situation may become serious, and to a considerable extent this too may be avoided by a further reduction in rations, particularly rations of fats and oils and, in all probability, of meats. Such reductions might still be made without dealing a body blow to the efficiency of the German military and economic machine.

THE EXPLOITATION OF RUSSIAN RESOURCES

Certain commentators on the Russian front have consistently emphasized the tremendous difficulties the Germans face in exploiting the Soviet economy. This comment generally fails to take into account the fact that the Germans have been in possession of considerable parts of that economy for many months. The Germans actually began their spreading occupation of Soviet territory as far back as June, 1941, and had occupied before the end of November, all the Russian lands that they

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now control. Thus the Germans have already been in command of these conquered resources for from five-and-a-half to eleven months, depending upon the date of occupation, region by region.

After this occupied zone had been somewhat reduced by the winter advance of the Russian army, it still included about 50,000,000 hectares of cultivated land and had had a peacetime productivity very roughly estimated at 18,000,000 metric tons of coal, 16,000,000 metric tons of iron ore, 3,500,000 metric tons of pig iron, 3,400,000 metric tons of steel ingots, 1,000,000 metric tons of manganese ore, and 32,000 metric tons of aluminum. The occupied area also had numerous large electric power plants, as well as the best developed railway net in the Soviet Union.

The peace-time capacity of this zone was, of course, much reduced by Russian evacuation of population, animals, and machinery, by

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CONSIDERATIONS OF GERMAN MORALE

Intimately allied to such considera-
tions as food rationing and bombing is the
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serious cracks have already appeared in the

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deliberate Russian wrecking of equipment and buildings, by damage resulting incidentally from combat activity, and so on. Besides all this, other conditions have operated to prevent the Germans from utilizing to the full the productive capacities that still remained when they took over; among these, the most important are perhaps the continued strain of military activity on this front, and the difficulty of either operating or replacing the collective system of agriculture. Yet there is every reason to believe that long before the end of this year the Germans will have realized very considerable economic gains from the lands that they have already occupied within the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GERMAN MORALE

Intimately allied to such considerations as food rationing and bombing is the problem of German morale. The view that serious cracks have already appeared in the

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morale front and that we can win the war by propaganda is one of the favorite forms of contemporary wishful thinking.

It is unquestionably true that the German people, imbued with the notion that they were embarking on a short war of brilliant but inexpensive conquest, have been grievously disappointed. The reverses and serious losses suffered by the German Army in Russia must have had deep and disheartening effects on all strata of the German population. The prospect of another winter of war, and perhaps still another, is doubtless a nightmare to the great masses of the German people.

On the other hand, there is no convincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired. A recent survey in the Coordinator's office reveals widespread support of the existing regime in word and deed. There is grumbling and some dissidence among the aged, women, Austrians, South Germans,

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ardent Lutherans and Catholics, intellectuals, Jews and certain others. But apparently there is no justification for the view that the organizational efficiency of the regime has been impaired by this dissidence. The widespread fear that, in the event of defeat the German people will reap a peace of vengeance, has undoubtedly contributed to the creation of an attitude of grim determination to see the war through at all costs.

GERMAN PEACE FEELERS

In commenting from time to time on recurrent German peace feelers, certain organs of the press have given the impression that such steps necessarily reflect German weakness--that the Nazis are attempting to escape from the war because it has become unendurable. Here it is important to distinguish between two types of peace feelers--the first arising from confidence and a desire to see a consolidation of the country's war gains; the second

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springing from a conviction of imminent defeat.

In the last war, the outstanding spontaneous German peace offer, that of December, 1916, came when the Central Powers were in a strong position. They had completely crushed the Rumanians. The Brusilov offensive on the Eastern Front had failed. And on the Western Front, the Allied advance on the Somme had in the previous month bogged down in rain and mud.

Similarly in this war, the only clear-cut German offer of peace came after the whirlwind triumph in Poland. In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, the Nazi radio informally suggested that Britain might as well lay down her arms. Last December, after the disaster at Pearl Harbor (and when the German check in Russia was less serious than many people in this country believed) the Nazis again allowed the impression to get abroad that there was serious dissension

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between the Fuehrer and his generals, and that certain elements in the Reich might be ready for a negotiated peace.

The second type of peace feeler, the "offer of desperation," is exemplified in the initiatives of Emperor Charles of Austria in 1917 (Prince Sixtus affair), or of Ludendorff in the autumn of 1918. There is, however, little apparent indication in any recent Nazi peace feelers that the Germans find themselves in a situation comparable to that of either the spring or the fall of 1918. A more apt comparison would probably be between the present position of the Germans, and their situation in late 1916 or early 1917. And such peace feelers may be just as much a sign of strength as was their offer of December, 1916.

German peace feelers in a period of strength have significant propaganda values. Whatever happens, they tend to confuse and disorganize the Allied powers. If they are

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accepted, they open the way for the consolidation of German gains and the possible renewal of the war under more favorable conditions. If they are refused, they may at least spread the demoralizing conviction that Germany is in a notably weakened condition.

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Recent discussions of alleged German weakness lay considerable emphasis on Nazi difficulties in the occupied territories. The implication is that certain of these countries are already developing within them significant instruments of revolt and that they are, therefore, increasingly ripe for Allied invasion. Three countries are central in this argument: Italy, France, and Norway. In none of them does the controlling authority (hence Nazi influence) seem to be threatened in any serious way.

Italy

The three fundamental forces in Italian life, namely, the monarchy (including

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the army), the fascist regime, and the Catholic Church, appear to be intact and to be united in an effort to preserve the integrity of the kingdom and the power of the present government against foreign and domestic enemies.

The foreign enemies include the nations with which Italy is at war and may also include Italy's ally, Germany, whose increasing power in the peninsula is a matter of great concern to Italian ruling circles. At the moment, this concern takes the form of limiting German control in Italy rather than of repudiating the German alliance which, from many points of view, has proved helpful to Italy (as, for example, in the Greek and North African campaigns). Curiously enough, even in non-fascist or mild anti-fascist circles, Mussolini is looked upon as a bulwark against overbearing German control in Italy.

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The Savoy Monarchy, with its deep roots in Italian life, still has considerable prestige among the people and still commands the unquestioned loyalty of the army. The strongest elements in the army appear to be intact and to be still in Italy. The monarchy and the fascist regime need each other. To be sure, even if the fascist regime should fall, the monarchy could hope to survive because it might be able to count on the army and wide popular support.

The Catholic Church and the fascist regime have been and are on friendly terms. The Church, even more than the monarchy, can pursue an independent policy, even if fascism should fall. It must not be forgotten that the clergy in Italy--including the hierarchy--is predominantly Italian and feels a great sense of patriotism towards Italy.

The fear of national humiliation, of chaos or revolution (communism), is one of the strong bonds which unite the forces of

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fascism, the monarchy and the Church at the present time. No organized anti-fascist movement, strong enough to seize power, seems to exist in Italy today. There appears to be no immediate prospect that the fascist regime will be overthrown.

All the above is subject to qualification dictated by a constantly changing world and Italian situation. The most important qualification is this: the return of Laval to power has created an "opening" which affords the best opportunity for a diplomatic anti-Nazi offensive in Italy since that country entered the war.

France

At least three elements in the current French situation tend to discount optimistic views of the early crystallization of French resistance to the Nazis. First, the political orientation of Laval remains undefined. Anthony Eden believes that Laval is planning to lie low for a time to quiet apprehensions in America as

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well as in France, according to a recent statement. Laval probably hopes to mediate between Washington and Berlin and to acquire enough prestige in the New Order to feather his own nest and that of France. He will do nothing about Vichy warships for a time, Eden indicates, and neither contemplates nor desires allowing Berlin to have them. This point of view receives confirmation from the current rumors that the Nazis, dissatisfied with Laval's failure to plot a clearly collaborationist course, may replace him with some outright pro-German such as Doriot or Déat.

The second factor, a logical result of the first, is a confusion in the minds of the French people themselves. Reports from Vichy suggest that certain French civilian and military authorities, although not in sympathy with Laval himself, are still unwilling to believe that he will play the Germans' game completely. This wishful thinking extends

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apparently even to a belief that Laval is clever enough to be able to double-cross the Nazis. Such a conviction, according to General de Gaulle, may for the present lull the French people into a false sense of security.

The third factor is an apparent disinclination for organized revolt on the part of the French masses. A report from Vichy suggests that the French people will not dare to move until the Americans and British have established a second front in their country. Such a lack of initiative is not unconnected with the food situation on the continent of Europe, where undernourishment induces acute depression, listlessness, and general lack of interest in life. In the opinion of the food experts of the Coordinator's office, persons suffering from malnutrition are not desperate men readily moved to rash activity. Rather they are apathetic and

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indifferent people who accept their lot without marked protest. The United Nations can scarcely rely on such men spontaneously to foment internal revolt on any significant scale.

Norway

It is clear that since February there has been a marked deterioration of the relations between the Quisling regime and the people. Quisling, who is said to have gained the support of a scant one percent of the people, has met mounting hostility since the failure of his February trip to Berlin. This has been sharpened by his recent actions against the clergy and teachers of Norway. Increasing food restrictions and persecution have also increased the provocation to revolt.

There also exists an intelligent, disciplined Underground movement, engaged in disseminating information, planning sabotage, and collecting arms for the day of Allied invasion.

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However, as a recent study of the Coordinator's office shows, all this opposition to Nazi rule and these preparations for armed revolt, do not threaten Germany's present strategy in Scandinavia. It is the Quisling government, not the German occupying forces, which is embarrassed by the uncooperativeness of the Norwegian civilians. The sabotage activities of the Underground are not to be unleashed until Norway is invaded by British or American forces. Norwegians, who six months ago looked forward to such an invasion in the spring of 1942, now hardly dare hope for it this summer. Commando raids, while in theory a reminder to the Norwegians that they are not forgotten, have become increasingly embarrassing to the Underground, since they offer an excellent excuse to the Germans for widespread arrests in reprisal. In any event, they are only local in character and do not afford an opportunity for the Norwegians themselves to hamper Hitler's plans.

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Since February the Germans have increased their forces in Norway to eight or nine divisions. They are steadily improving communications, especially with the far north. They are obviously in a position to tighten up their control of the civilian population at any time, as is seen in reported plans for clearing certain coastal areas. There is, moreover, considerable danger of any action that would prematurely expose the Underground to the Nazi authorities.

In sum, it is clear that Norwegian resistance is stiffening as the pressure increases, and it may be that the deteriorating position of the Quisling regime will bring some kind of a reshuffling in the government; but there does not appear to be any evidence that effective Nazi control of Norway is cracking, or will crack unless there is an Allied invasion or a withdrawal of German forces.

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THE GERMAN SITUATION IN 1918 AND 1942

Historians have long appreciated the dangers of comparing seemingly similar events occurring at different periods. To many observers the last war appears "similar" to this one, and the optimism of the present moment even pretends to see in the events of 1942 a situation not too different from that of 1918.

As a matter of fact, however, conditions on the German home front in 1918 were distinctly different from those at present. The Empire lacked the propaganda-police environment of the Nazi state which has made such strenuous efforts to prevent precisely such a weakening in the home front as finally came in the autumn of 1918. At that time the German government failed dismally in the provision of a propaganda of war aims, whereas the Nazis have built up a resplendent picture of the New Order of the future.

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The food situation in Germany by the end of the first World War had, moreover, become very acute. Normal consumers in Germany (housewives and office workers are examples) were obtaining about 1500 - 1600 calories daily. This is less than the number required to sustain life when no real physical activity is undertaken. About 2400 calories daily is the minimum necessary for this class of consumers, and they are receiving this amount today in Germany. For those who do the heaviest types of work, the minimum standard is usually set at 4500 - 4800 calories. Today these workers in Germany are provided at least 4000 calories daily, perhaps more. Toward the end of 1918 they were receiving some 2300 - 2500.

PROPAGANDA AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE

The remarks above on German morale are not intended to suggest that propaganda may not prove a significant instrument in

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hastening the final collapse of German resistance. Doubtless a real breakdown in the German home front will come this time, as in 1918, as the result of a military defeat. But the fissures in the German home front can undoubtedly be effectively widened by a judicious propaganda assault once the situation has become sufficiently serious. For any such propaganda assault, however, we should choose a highly strategic moment. That moment would come after a serious German defeat, when propaganda would serve to drive home to the Germans the stark reality of widely recognized facts. That moment might arrive when a long campaign in Russia had ended in serious reverse and when the Germans were faced with the approach of another winter. On the other hand, if such a large scale campaign were launched now, it would probably be at once followed by initial German successes in Russia. It would then miscarry and might be difficult to repeat later.

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It is bootless to discuss now the precise character which that campaign should take. It should obviously be designed to take full and precise advantage of the situation then existing. If, for instance, the Russians were at that moment rapidly rolling the Germans back on their eastern frontier, it would be of little avail for the United States and Britain to make promises to the German people unless these were fully concurred in by the Kremlin and adequate guarantees of fulfillment were offered.

Certain generalizations can be made now. Such a campaign should avoid saying what the everyday experience of the German disproves. It should avoid furthering the cause of those elements which would like peace by negotiation in order to stabilize Germany's position for fresh conquests in the future. Such a campaign should probably avoid the Wilsonian technique

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and approach which the Germans have been
taught profoundly to distrust.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
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NEW YORK

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February 20, 1942

SECRET

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, NW
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

With further reference to my yesterday's memorandum, I should like to develop a little further the thought expressed on page 4, paragraph (c). Thinking about this idea last night, it seemed to me that this particular proposal concerning parachute troops in Germany has the merit that it requires practically no cooperation from anybody, and in one version of the project it requires no action that we could not take ourselves. What I mean is this:

1. Suppose we got the War Department to give out, or permit us to give out, a story that a unit composed of German American volunteers is being trained to be dropped at night by parachute in Germany in order to commit sabotage.
2. A little later, the names of some of those who have volunteered are casually given out and references made to the fact that several such units have already been trained and that this is not the first one.
3. An outraged squawk could be arranged from the War Department on the grounds that this information had leaked out. This would insure its being widely discussed in Germany.
4. Through British or our Intelligence, we learn that there has been a train wreck or an explosion somewhere in Germany, although this news has been withheld from publication by the German authorities.
5. We immediately announce that a few days ago American parachutists were dropped over a section of Germany in which we know that this accident has occurred.
6. A few days later the news of the explosion or accident comes out of Germany. If it does not come out, we can plant the story in one of the neutral countries.


7. Two and two make four, and a lot of Germans will believe that German American saboteurs are at work in Germany.

.....

This same scheme could be worked in Italy, or any of the occupied countries.

You remember how effective the stories of a German secret weapon were at the time of the break through in Belgium. There was no secret weapon, but the idea spread terror throughout the world. Thus, in this case there might be no parachutists at all and yet terror - and what is more important, hope - might be spread throughout occupied Europe.

Sincerely,


J. P. Warburg
Advisory Assistant

Warburg - 4322
Political + Psychological
Memorandum
file

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

SECRET

February 19, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, NW
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The more I think about our conversation yesterday, the more it seems clear that what you have now accomplished is a real milestone and enables us for the first time to plan upon a basis of reality. This, plus certain organizational changes which I hope the Roper Committee will recommend, ought to mobilize us in such a way that the only excuse for our failure to do a real job will be our own ineptitude. On February 17th I gave the Roper Committee a written statement of what organizational changes I thought were necessary. Tom Early has a copy of this statement in case you should want to look at it.

The attached memorandum contains an idea - or a group of ideas - which I would like to discuss with you when we meet again next week. It seems to me that we must find a way to overcome the difficulty in which we shall be for at least the next six months - namely, the fact that we shall probably have no successful major actions upon which to hang our propaganda, and that therefore we are likely to be thrown and kept on the defensive. I do not think we need to accept this position, but to get away from it requires a somewhat radical approach.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

J. P. Warburg
J. P. Warburg
Advisory Assistant

SECRET

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

February 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

It is unlikely that for the next six months the United Nations will accomplish any major offensive successes. So far as can be foreseen, the period immediately ahead will be a painful one of defending ourselves as best we can until our strength is fully mobilized. During the next six months in all probability the Germans will resume the offensive in Russia or the Middle East, or possibly Africa, and the Japanese will undoubtedly continue their offensive both toward Australia and India. This will therefore be a period during which it will be difficult to build up resistance in the occupied and so-called neutral countries.

This situation need not be accepted from the point of view of political and psychological warfare.

It should not be accepted, because another six months of defensive political and psychological warfare added to the inevitable six months of military defensive may have disastrous consequences.

Modern warfare differs from warfare in the past in that war is no longer a matter of armies, navies and air forces, nor is political warfare any longer a matter

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of negotiations between diplomats with an occasional full dress performance for the benefit of the general public. Military and political warfare are waged today with practically every man, woman and child in the world sitting in the theater as an audience, watching every detail, applauding when pleased, breathless when thrilled, and ready to throw eggs at the actors whenever bored or displeased.

Hitler understands this. He has made the Nazi revolution and the war a continuing drama. He has made himself the chief actor. He has for six or seven years managed to keep the entire world talking about what he had done, was doing, or was going to do. Since the war started, the British have only on three occasions been able to steal the show: first, at Dunkirk; second, when they won the Battle of Britain in the air; and third, in their first Libyan campaign. But the British have never understood how to make their cause dramatic.

The Russians have come closer to stealing the show from Hitler than anyone else. Even when they were being defeated they managed to make their cause dramatic. It has become doubly so since they succeeded in turning the tide.

Our entrance into the war was largely robbed of its dramatic flavor by the fact that we were attacked and defeated at Pearl Harbor, and have been waging a defensive war ever since. But MacArthur's defense in the

-3-

defense in the Philippines is dramatic and will continue to be so even though it was foredoomed to failure at the outset.

You said to me: "Our trouble is that we think as a big nation. Until we are ready to act as a big nation, we ought to think as a little nation and do the things that a little nation can do."

You were entirely right. What I am proposing now is along the line of your own suggestion.

Our political and psychological warfare, even during the forthcoming defensive period, should aim at dramatizing (1) ourselves, and (2) our cause. In order to dramatize ourselves, we should undertake limited but spectacular adventures which will steal the show and win us sympathy. Such adventures should be designed to demonstrate four things:

(a) That we are on the offensive, are thinking offensively, and are preparing major offensive strokes.

(b) That we are not afraid to take risks, and that the Germans and the Japanese have no monopoly on suicide ventures.

(c) That we are capable of planning and carrying out perfectly coordinated and timed offensive actions in all parts of the world.

(d) That we have only begun to fight.

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Here are some random examples of this sort of action:

(a) A division of American destroyers suddenly appears at Malta - the hot spot of the Mediterranean. It is welcomed enthusiastically by the garrison and the population, who have been under constant attack for two years. Nobody knows why the destroyers went there. Shortly thereafter a squadron of American fighter planes begins to knock down Axis bombers over Malta. It then appears that the destroyers convoyed a ship or ships carrying such fighter planes to Malta and that Americans are now taking part in the defense of this fortress. Why? Just because Americans are going to be wherever the going is toughest. Possible loss: Three destroyers and nine plane crews.

(b) An American submarine division (three submarines) makes its way into the North Sea, bombards a few coastal cities, and sinks a few ships off the German coast. Possibly one of these submarines makes its way into the Baltic and joins the Russian Baltic Fleet. Possible loss: three submarines.

(c) A group of German-American volunteers, specially trained for the purpose, are dropped at night by parachute in Germany to commit acts of sabotage. This one could take either of two forms. It could actually be done, or it could be announced as having been done without anything having taken place. In the latter case, we would

-5-

see that a story got out as a leak saying that this operation had been undertaken two weeks ago, mentioning a few names of the German Americans and suggesting that since nothing had been heard from them, they had either been caught and killed or were still at large in Germany. The Germans would know that they had not caught any parachutists and therefore would begin to wonder whether they were at large in Germany.

Another way to do this would be to wait until through our intelligence we were informed that an explosion had taken place at the X factory in Germany. Immediately upon receipt of this information we would let out our story that a little while ago parachutists had been dropped near X, without mentioning the explosion. When the story of the explosion came out, every one could put two and two together.

(d) A hit an run raid by a fast cruiser and aircraft carrier squadron coming down from the Aleutian Islands upon Japan itself. If only a few bombs were dropped on Japanese cities by carrier-borne aircraft - a few shells pumped into Japanese coastal cities - the effect would be spectacular. Incidentally such a raid might well draw both naval and air forces back to Japan and thus relieve pressure on the East Indies and Australia.

I could go on enumerating such examples, but the four above stated will serve to illustrate the point. None of these adventures except the last one would have any real

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military significance. All of them involve very great risk to limited forces. All of them would accomplish the purpose of dramatizing ourselves.

But it is necessary not only to dramatize ourselves and to steal the show as against Hitler and the Japanese - it is also necessary to dramatize our cause as against the "New Order" in Europe, and "Asia for the Asiatics" in Asia.

This is a subject about which I want to do some more thinking before I make any specific suggestions. What I have in mind is that we must make the cause for which we are fighting something more than a mere defense of the world as it has been and likewise something more than a mere promise of a better world in the future. We must find a way to do what Wilson did in the last war. We must find a way to demonstrate that the four freedoms are real and that wherever we are victorious we shall establish them. To give just one example:

Suppose France definitely goes with Germany. Suppose we then immediately take Martinique and in consultation with the Latin American Republics set up Martinique as a Republic, giving full freedom to the inhabitants and equal suffrage to all, irrespective of color, provided they can pass a literacy test.

This would be a practical demonstration of liberation.

The great mass of people throughout the world

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instinctively think of Churchill as their Defender, but think of Roosevelt as their Liberator. This is perhaps our strongest weapon, but in order to use it we must make a practical and dramatic demonstration.

As I say, more on this subject in a later memorandum.

In considering the question of driving a wedge between the Nazis and their Japanese allies, it is assumed that the main weight - and perhaps all the weight - of propaganda must be directed against Germany since the scarcity of short-wave listening sets in Japan renders broadcasts to that country largely ineffectual.

There are a number of points which might be touched on and which might cause dissension.

1. In general broadcasts to Germany:-

- a) Stress the point that in the event of an Axis victory Japan, with the territory which she will control, and the riches which she will command, will be far better off than Germany, even though the Reich may dominate Europe.
- b) With her command of raw materials, Japan will be able to live on the fat of the land, while Germany will still be a prey to the tyranny of rationing.

While Germany is still experiencing the "benefits" of ersatz materials, Japan will revel in rich supplies of natural rubber, and tin, and will use it for cheap manufactured goods.

- c) However much Germany enslaves the people of Europe she cannot compete with the teeming millions of cheap coolie labour which Japan will command.

However much Germany experiments with substitute coffee, she cannot equal the excellent richness of real coffee which will be among Japan's prizes.

2. In special broadcasts to the German Army:-

- a) A Military tradition exists between Germany and China since 1920. Many German military figures - Bauer, Wetzell and Seeckt - turned to China as a field for their genius. They knew that the threat of Japan to China was a threat to all civilization.
- b) The German Military Mission under Falkenhausen was withdrawn in 1938 only on the demand of Japan. Since when have German soldiers been ordered out of their positions by an alien race?
- c) Ask General von Falkenhausen what he saw at the sack of Nanking, and how it affected him? Ask him why German officers were prepared to wear Chinese uniforms in protest against the barbarities of Japan? Ask him why many of his officers refused to leave with the Mission and remained to fight against the Japanese.

AW March 26th 1943.

Feb. 11, 1942

Copy sent to Ed Taylor

" " " Dr. Langer

Surplus herewith.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Germany
Suggestion

SUGGESTIONS FOR BROADCASTS TO GERMANY

1) Goebbels says: "If we do not win, Germany will be destroyed." Reply: The opposite is the truth. If you follow Hitler to the end, Germany will be destroyed. The Germans who rebel against Hitler will call forth respect for the German people on the part of the whole world. They will show thereby that they are not responsible for the horrible crimes of the Hitler regime. They will show that they have not lost their sense of humanity and justice. The American people and the peoples of the world will deal equitably with a Germany which has liberated itself from Hitler. For the goal of the United States and its Allies is set forth in the Four Freedoms enunciated by President Roosevelt. The American people want friendly relations with a free and democratic Germany. But if the German people are to be freed, Hitler must be destroyed.

2) Neither the American nor the other peoples of the United Nations want a new Versailles. They do not want to dismember Germany. They do not want to do to Germany what Hitler is doing to the other peoples. But the American, British, Russian peoples and their allies are fighting against a thousand times more terrible than the Hitler regime is established. All over the world the peoples are establishing

- 2 -

and frightfully treated as have the French, the Poles, the Greeks, the Dutch, etc., conquered by Hitler. Just as no German wants to witness the national oppression of Germany, so no Frenchman, no Norwegian, no Greek, no Pole, no Russian wants to see his country subjugated.

3) Goebbels lies when he says that the Nazi regime is fighting to prevent a new Versailles. If that's the case, why did Hitler make a sneak attack on the Soviet Union which had nothing to do with Versailles? Why are the Norwegians and the Dutch, who had not even taken part in the last world war, being so cruelly subjugated? Why does Hitler collaborate with Mussolini who certainly did everything during the first World War to involve Italy in war with Germany and who regarded the Versailles Treaty as insufficiently drastic for Germany? Why is Hitler collaborating with the Japanese who were co-signers of the Versailles Treaty and who seized the German possessions in the Far East during the last war?

4) Hitler has pursued an even more insane policy than Kaiser Wilhelm. He launched a treacherous and unprovoked attack against the Soviet Union and subsequently, and without provocation, declared war against the United States. Thereby he welded the two most powerful nations of the world against Germany as well as helped bring about the powerful and invincible coalition

- 3 -

of the twenty-six United Nations. Italy is just as wretched an ally as Austria-Hungary was. The same goes for Japan. Expose Italy's and Japan's weaknesses, as well as the hatred of the Italian people for Hitler Germany. Hitler Germany is already doomed because the most powerful countries of the world have united against the Hitler regime. Recount systematically the armament program and armament possibilities, the human reserves, the industrial and food reserves, the high morale which the United Nations and people have for use against the Nazi regime. And the entire German people should be constantly informed how Hitler has driven the German army into a horrible defeat on the Eastern Front. All the losses of the German army should systematically be made public over the radio.

5) Germany has become bigger but the people are becoming poorer and poorer. Poverty is becoming ever greater and the people are being bled white by the Hitlerite despoilers of the German nation and people. Only the big munition makers, the Junkers, and the Nazi officials profit from Hitler's war. It should be shown how Krupp, Flick, etc., how the Brown rulers, how the Goering trust, are enriching themselves in this war and how they are incorporating all the important industries in the countries occupied by them as their own private property. Never has

- 4 -

such a small upper-cruast made so much from the war as under Hitler. The German plutocrats, the Junkers, together with the Nazi millionaires are robbing the German people in the most horrible manner.

6) Hitler and the Hitler regime have dragged the German name and the great German cultural traditions in the mire by their enslavement of and frightful atrocities against the other peoples. The German people therefore, in its own interest, must help the other peoples to destroy the Hitler regime. Thereby the German people will once again regain respect and the other peoples will know that Hitler has nothing in common with the true spirit of the German people. Effective portrayal should be made of the atrocities perpetrated by the Hitler regime in the occupied territories against the civilian population and the national rights and independence of the conquered nations.

7) Tell why the German-Americans are also for the destruction of the Hitler regime. Not only because they want to defend America's national freedom and democratic liberties, but also because they know from their own experiences how much the atrocities perpetrated by the Hitler regime against the other peoples are besmirching the German name and because they know that the only salvation for Germany lies in the destruction of the Hitler regime.

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8) It is of extreme importance that special appeals should be made to the German working class. Analyze their standards of living, their lack of civil liberties and free trade unions. Remind them of the great traditions and aspirations of the German labor movement.

9) Show that peace could come tomorrow, the German people could have peace tomorrow, the German people can determine their own fate in freedom tomorrow, tomorrow the mothers can breathe freely again, tomorrow justice and sanity can prevail in Germany again -- if the Hitler regime is destroyed. For the central issue in this war is the united and resolute determination of all freedom-loving peoples and nations not to become the slaves of the Brown Shirt barbarians, the Prussian generals, the German munition kings and Junkers.

- II -

The following personalities could be used very effectively for broadcasting to Germany:

1) American labor and trade union leaders from various industries. For example, an American miner could appeal to his German colleagues and explain to them why they have a common interest from the standpoint of the interests of the workers of all countries, in the destruction of the Hitler regime.

could address themselves to the German army and explain that they are not fighting against Germany in order to affect Germany's national independence but only to prevent the peoples of the world from becoming slaves of the Hitler regime.

3) Representatives of the Communist Party, U. S. A., who could explain why they are one hundred per cent behind our government in this just war against Hitler Germany. (It should be borne in mind that in the last free elections in Germany over 6, 00,000 votes were cast for the Communist Party of Germany).

4) German-Americans who would tell that they exercise all democratic liberties in the United States; that they have German Language newspapers and magazines published without interference; that they have German language radio programs and that they can hold German language meetings and can assemble in German language organizations; that they are for the destruction of the Hitler regime not only because they want to defend the democratic liberties of the United States, but also because they know the shame that the Hitler regime has brought down upon the German name and people throughout the world.

5) Protestant and Catholic clergymen who could speak on the question of religious freedom.

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6) Artists, movie actors, journalists, scientists whose names are known in Germany who could speak of their respect for the great German culture which has nothing in common with the Hitler regime.

7) Engineers who could speak factually about the enormous armament industry and the possibilities of war production in the United States.

8) Prominent American women, including some of German descent, who are associated with the labor and progressive movement who could appeal to the mothers of Germany, especially to the housewives and working women. Similarly, it would be also be advisable to utilize some outstanding American youth leaders, representatives of various political tendencies and fields of endeavor, i.e., religious, labor, fraternal, cultural movements.

9) German emigres whose names have standing in Germany; for example, a person like Heinrich Mann. It would be useful to establish an advisory committee for broadcasts to Germany in the German language which would include a number of reliable and authoritative German anti-fascist emigres, representative of all political tendencies.

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10) It should be noted that there are a whole number of German emigres in Mexico who have had much valuable experience with radio propaganda to Germany since they spent years in Republican Spain working on radio campaigns against the Hitler regime. Also some have had considerable experience with the illegal German radio stations.

To: Colonel C. E. Duxton
From: C. D.
Subject: Suggestions for Broadcasts to Germany
8/7/42

Handwritten: 8-7-42

I have not heard any of the American broadcasts to Germany. However I am taking the liberty of recommending a number of points and items which in my opinion should be considered as subject material for broadcasts and other American propaganda activity directed to the German people. Also I've included several tentative proposals regarding certain types and personalities who might be utilized for radio activity.

1.

1) Goebbels says: "If we do not win, Germany will be destroyed". Reply: "The opposite is the truth. If you follow Hitler to the end, Germany will be destroyed. The Germans who rebel against Hitler will still fight for the German people on the part of the whole world. They will show thereby that they are not responsible for the horrible crimes of the Hitler regime. They will show that they have not lost their sense of ~~humanity~~ humanity and justice. The American people and the peoples of the world will do it scathingly with a Germany which has alienated itself from Hitler. For the goal of the United States and its Allies is set forth in the Four Freedoms announced by President Roosevelt. The American people want friendly relations with a free and democratic Germany. But if the German people are to be freed, Hitler must be destroyed.

2) Neither the American nor the other peoples of the United Nations want a new Versailles. They do not want to dismember Germany. They do not want to do to Germany what Hitler is doing to the other peoples. But the American, British, Russian, people and their Allies are fighting against the thousand times worse Versailles which the Hitler regime is establishing all over Europe and which to establish over the whole world. Germany has never been so cruelly and spitefully treated as have the French, the Poles, the Greeks, the Dutch, etc., conquered by Hitler. Just as no German wants to witness the national oppression of Germany, so no Frenchman, no Norwegian, no Greek, no Pole, no Russian wants to see his country subjected.

3) Goebbels lies when he says that the Nazi regime is fighting to prevent a new Versailles. If that's the case, why did Hitler make a sudden attack on the Soviet Union which had nothing to do with Versailles? Why are the Norwegians and the Dutch, who had not even taken part in the last world war, being so cruelly subjected? Why does Hitler collaborate with Mussolini who certainly did everything during the last world war to involve Italy in war with Germany and who regarded the Versailles Treaty as insufficiently drastic for Germany? Why is Hitler collaborating with the Japanese who were co-signers of the Versailles Treaty and who seized the German possessions in the Far East during the last war?

4) Hitler has pursued an even more insane policy than Kaiser Wilhelm. He launched a treacherous and unprovoked attack against the Soviet Union and subsequently, and without provocation, declared war against the United States. Thereby he voided the two most powerful nations of the world against Germany as well as helped bring about the powerful and invincible coalition of the ~~36~~ United Nations. Italy is just a wretched ally as Austria-Hungary was. The same goes for Japan. Beyond Italy's and Japan's weakness, as well as the hatred

The American Broadcasts to Germany

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of the Italian people for Hitler Germany. Hitler Germany is already doomed because the most powerful countries of the world have united against the Hitler regime. Recount systematically the armament program and armament possibilities, the human reserves, the industrial and food reserves, the high morale which the United Nations and people have for use against the Nazi regime. And the entire German people should be constantly informed how Hitler has driven the German army into a horrible defeat on the Westernfront. All the losses of the German army should systematically be made public over the radio.

b) Germany has become bigger but the people are becoming poorer and poorer. Poverty is becoming ever greater and the people are being bleached white by the Hitlerite despoilers of the German nation and people. Only the big munition makers, the Junkers and the Nazi officials profit from Hitler's war. It should be shown how Frups, Flick, etc., how the big industrialists, how the Goering trust, are enriching themselves in this war. How they are incorporating all the important industries in the countries occupied by them to their own private property. Never has such a small upper-crust made so much from the war as under Hitler. The German plutocrats, the Junkers, together with the Nazi millionaires are robbing the German people in the most horrible manner.

c) Hitler and the Hitler regime have dragged the German name and the great German cultural traditions in the mire by their enslavement of and frightful atrocities against the other peoples. The German people, therefore, in its own interest, must help the other peoples to destroy the Hitler regime. Thereby the German people will once again retain respect and the other peoples will know that Hitler has nothing in common with the true spirit of the German people. Effective propaganda should be made of the atrocities perpetrated by the Hitler regime in the occupied territories against the civilian population and the national rights and independence of the conquered nations.

d) Tell the German-Americans and also the German people of the destruction of the Hitler regime. Not only because they want to defend America's national and democratic liberties but also because they know from their own experiences how much the atrocities perpetrated by the Hitler regime against the other peoples are hamstringing the German people and how they know that the only salvation for Germany lies in the destruction of the Hitler regime.

e) It is of extreme importance that special attention should be made to the lower working class. Analyze their standards of living, their lack of civil liberties and free trade unions. Remind them of the great destruction and exploitation of the German labor movement.

f) Show that peace could come tomorrow, the German people could have peace tomorrow, the German people can determine their own fate in freedom tomorrow, tomorrow the nations and free people will in, tomorrow justice and unity can prevail in Germany again -- if the Hitler regime is destroyed. For the central issue in this war is the united and immediate determination of all freedom-loving peoples and nations not to become the slaves of the Brown Shirt barbarians, the Hitlerite Junkers, the German munition kings and Junkers.

Re American Broadcasts to Germany

11.

The following personalities could be used very effectively for broadcasting to Germany:

- 1) American labor and trade union leaders from various industries. For example, an American miner could appeal to his German colleagues and explain to them why they have a common interest, from the standpoint of the interests of the workers of all countries, in the ~~destruction~~ destruction of the Hitler regime.
- 2) An American officer and a private could address themselves to the German army and explain that they are not fighting against Germany in order to affect Germany's national independence but only to prevent the peoples of the world from becoming slaves of the Hitler regime.
- 3) Representatives of the Communist Party, USA, who could explain why they are 100% behind our government in this just war against Hitler's Germany. (It should be borne in mind that in the last free elections in Germany over 6,000,000 votes were cast for the Communist Party of Germany).
- 4) German-Americans who would tell that they exercise all democratic liberties in the United States; that they have German language newspapers and magazines published without interference; that they have German language radio programs and that they can hold German language meetings and conferences in German language organizations; that they are for the maintenance of the Hitler regime not only because they want to defend the democratic liberties of the United States but also because they believe the place that the Hitler regime has brought down upon the German people and people throughout the world.
- 5) Protestant and Catholic clergymen who could speak on the question of religious freedom.
- 6) Artists, movie actors, journalists, scientists whose names are known in Germany who could speak of their respect for the great German culture and find something in common with the Hitler regime.
- 7) Engineers who could speak factually about the enormous amount of machinery and the possibilities of war production in the United States.
- 8) Prominent American women, including some of German descent, who are connected with the labor and progressive movement who could appeal to the women of Germany, especially to the housewives and working women of Hitler. It would be also advisable to utilize some outstanding American youth leaders, representative of various political tendencies and spheres of endeavor, i.e., religious, labor, fraternal, cultural movements.
- 9) Well known persons whose names have standing in Germany; for example, a person like Heinrich Mann. It would be useful to establish a variety of committees for broadcasts to Germany in the German language.

Re American Broadcasts to Germany -4-

which would include a number of reliable and authoritative German anti-fascist emigres, representative of all political tendencies.

10) It should be noted that there are a whole number of German emigres in Mexico who have had much valuable experience with radio propoganda to Germany since they spent years in Republican Spain working on radio campaigns against the Hitler regime. Also some have had considerable experience with the illegal German radio stations.

(If my friends or I can be of any assistance in connection with any of these proposals, please inform me).

G. D.

477 JA

TO:

.....
COLONEL DUNG V. N.
.....

June 1, 1966

The attached is sent to you
for such interest as it may present.



Colonel: John C. Wiley
Father L. Bern

FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

German newspapers - 6661
 x von Hentig
 x "After Hitler -- What?"
 June 1, 1942

PW

"AFTER HITLER -- WHAT?"

An important contributor to the democratic Neue Volkszeitung of New York is Dr. Hans von Hentig, who is now engaged in legal research at the University of Colorado. He was formerly professor of law at Bonn University in his native Germany. Thoroughly "Aryan," he nevertheless migrated to the United States in 1935 because of profound disagreement with the Nazi regime. He had not previously been active in politics. In the United States he feels it to be his duty, his friends say, to assist in the anti-Hitler campaign and to support the most clearly anti-Hitler German newspaper. A well-informed fellow-German describes him as a "moderate democratic conservative, a convinced German, even if not nationalistic."

Dr. von Hentig contributed to the May 9 issue of the Neue Volkszeitung an article entitled "After Hitler -- What?" The following is a full translation:

"There is no doubt that the deflation of Hitler has begun. The Hitler myth -- a form of power -- is breaking down. The belief in Hitler has not led to a land where milk and honey flow, not to a happy future but to a dung heap.

"He is still there, a shadow Fuehrer. But like Samson with his hair shorn, his strength has departed -- the strength which came from the trust of millions and from his trust in himself. Even his own big words stand against him: 'Good is what benefits the German people.' Nothing would benefit Germany more than

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June 1, 1948

peace. Between the German people and its welfare stands Hitler, the false prophet.

"This internal decline is only the first step. Up to this moment it has been taking place only in peoples' minds; no one can see it. How far Hitler's self-destruction has progressed is shown by his last speech: confused stuff, anxiety covered by threats, depressed and senseless in every snarling word. However, thoughts are only one stage of the process. The police machinery of compulsion still functions; the army is still outwardly intact; commando raids in the grand manner are still being staged overnight and technically are being carried out completely.

"Nevertheless there are good grounds for assuming that the European collapse is coming, perhaps before the first snow of this year. As in 1918, the little fellows will fold up first: Finland, Rumania, and Italy. And then at one crack the most fantastic reports will pour out from the radio towers to America. Berlin, Paris, Rome, Madrid will rise. Among bloody and painful miseries a new Europe will be born.

"What may happen in France, Spain, Italy, and other lands doesn't matter to us for the moment so much as what will become of Germany. Those Germans in America who still have not forgotten political interests and ideals of Germany do not -- quite naturally -- think entirely alike about the future of their country. And why should they -- why should those around Grzesinski, those around Rosenfeld, the Catholic and other groups

June 1, 1942

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think the same thing when they don't desire the same thing? All that can be said is that perhaps one or the other comes nearer, in his ideas, to the true balance of power. But even that is unsafe ground; for it is probable that the so-called true balance of power will develop and become consolidated only after a series of convulsions.

"There seem to be good reasons for the State Department and -- in a different way -- the Foreign Office in London to adopt toward these groups an attitude that outwardly is relatively passive. There has never been a more variegated emigration or one more difficult to evaluate. It was 80-90 per cent Jewish. Only a few of these wanderers think of returning. Only gradually could they be integrated again into European art, science, and business by an enlightened administration. Moreover, the non-Jewish emigrants are without money. There is an abyss between them and the honorable voters of the German-American population. Aside from the Catholic refugees, the emigrants are without group support -- a situation which is quite different from that in the case of any monarchistic, or purely aristocratic, or capitalistic emigration. The emigrants don't count because they have nothing but their convictions.

"Perhaps one thing has been overlooked by Washington and London: No emigration in history was more powerful so far as the written word is concerned. These fighters are now for the most part dumb. But when Hitler no longer exists, they will produce a good part of the world's literature, poetry, films,

-4-

June 1, 1942

history, and biography. What would the Medicis have given to draw to their court this world force of the mind and to bind it to themselves? Or Frederick the Great, or Napoleon, or (quite certainly) Hitler, if only he could have held on to these minds and talents!

"If we have very different convictions on the future organization of Germany, it is no wonder that in a great coalition the most varied plans, still unpublished, are being proposed and very secretly discussed. The Versailles model is entirely useless. Only a portion of the global war will be liquidated with Europe. The first English elections will result in no khaki majority. No Clemenceau will preside at the conference table. Russia's word will weigh just as heavily in the balance as its sword will have done. All, all will be different from what it was in the unholy year of 1919....

"After Hitler, what? No one knows what will happen. No one knows what and who, in elections or battles, will struggle to the top and stay at the top. I don't regret that neither in England nor in the United States has an organized and recognized German opposition 'government' been able to develop. That is a proof that in London and Washington they do not doubt our integrity and our German attitude -- the same characteristics which led us to fight Hitler tooth and nail as a threat to Germany and Europe. For us and for the future, I see wisdom and intelligence in this attitude of the Anglo-Saxon Governments. For after Hitler's fall the German masses will turn only to those who have completely

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June 1, 1942

preserved their independence. The Bourbon kings who in 1814 came back to their capital and their country on the field-kitchens of foreign regiments sealed thereby their political fate."

*Planning
Lute*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Germany 4910
X Propaganda
X Political Treatment
X Wilson
X Leigh

March 27, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, NW
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Wally Deuel has referred your memorandum of the 23rd and Hugh Wilson's memorandum of the 17th to me. The idea of convincing the Germans that defeat does not mean utter destruction should to my mind be the central aim of our propaganda. I have been writing memoranda about this since last fall; it is an integral part of our German Plan which you have seen; and two weeks ago I gave Bob a specific suggestion for a press conference question to be asked the President along this line.

I am thoroughly convinced that the German people are no longer held together by any other idea than the fear of defeat. They are no longer fighting for something but only against the calamity which they think will befall them if they are defeated. If we can convince them that they have a hope of a tolerable future; in fact, more of a hope through defeat than through perpetuation of the Nazi regime, I think we shall have broken their will to continue the war.

Sincerely,

J. P. Warburg
J. P. Warburg
Advisory Assistant

X
X Wilson
March 23, 1942

Memorandum for Mr. Hugh Wilson:

I am much interested both as to the content and manner of treatment of your memorandum regarding the political treatment of Germany. I agree with it. We have been trying to grope along the path and the underlying theme I have tried to state in various places, particularly with the British. I will take this whole matter up with you further.

WJD

Germany 9910
 X Propaganda
 X Political Treatment
 X Wilson
 X High

March 23, 1942

Memorandum for Mr. Deuel:

Here is a memorandum from Hugh Wilson. The underlying idea of this I have already discussed with Taylor and the Committee. However, I am most anxious to have your appraisal of it. Naturally I am thinking of the immediate effect in order to aid the war effort. I have just reread the One Man Propaganda Attack by Woodrow Wilson on the German people. I know we must avoid the danger of the last war when the German people did see their troops and fought until the last moment and then threw up their hands and cried "comrade". We have got to have aid to our military effort in breaking their will to fight. It is not helpful to force them to a position where their leaders can say that there is no hope anywhere and that they must fight to the bitter end. Somehow or other there must be a

-2-

a way out. That is our immediate target. For the future I think you and I both agree that some kind of scheme must be worked out to have us all live together.

WJD

Germany - 4910 -

Propaganda -
credibility features

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

x 1
x 2
file

March 17, 1942.

Dear Bill:

I am attaching herewith a memorandum dealing with certain thoughts as to the political treatment of Germany. These thoughts have been in my mind gradually solidifying for months and are the result of innumerable discussions which I have had with other well-qualified people on the subject.

I also attach a short memorandum concerning offer of services by W. Colston Leigh of New York.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh R Wilson

Enclosures.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

The memo on Germany is telescoped for the sake of brevity, one could write a book about it. I hope it remains clear. H-RW

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING W. COLSTON LEIGH

Mr. Leigh has been my agent for lecturing in the past year and his organization has been extraordinarily efficient in arranging travel and other details of a tour.

Mr. Leigh tells me that he would ask nothing better than to turn his entire efforts to the service of the nation without compensation. I am convinced that whether for your organization or for the whole Government service in organizing tours, they could not be in more efficient hands than in those of Mr. Leigh.

You may feel that this suggestion offers something of interest to COI; if not, you may think of another organization in the Administration to which this might be of interest.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 1942.

Propaganda, in the sense of the forceful presentation of new ideas, seems to be effective only in periods of defeat and discouragement. I do not know of a case in the past where a people have revolted against their government when the forces of that government are on a victorious march.

The Japanese, therefore, would not seem to be in a mood at present where propaganda could be effective. Furthermore, the characteristics of that people are so immutable that it is difficult to believe that alien thought and argument can ever make their appeal.

In Germany, on the other hand, the ground would seem to be much more fertile. First, the German people are highly mystic; they readily accept new ideas. They have no brakes in humor or common sense on the reaches of their ideas, so that their resulting philosophy frequently develops into the grotesque of exaggeration. Thus they fluctuate more widely in the pattern of their philosophy than any race I know of. Second, they have encountered a severe military check in Russia. Their losses have been heavy and they have given considerable ground. Further, Hitler has assumed supreme command at just this moment and thus has made himself responsible for military results, and responsible before a warrior race who have held their General Staff almost in reverence for hundreds of years. To such a race, it must be staggering to have a lance-corporal move in on the supreme technical command.

It would appear, therefore, that it is essential at the moment to expend our greatest effort in propaganda on Germany, and only secondarily and in anticipation on Japan.

- 2 -

For such purpose, we must have a thesis, and one which has a chance of being tempting to the German people. We can beat Germany -- of this I am convinced -- but we can accomplish this in a much shorter time if we have the help of some of the German people. Twenty-five years ago, President Wilson developed a philosophy which was worth several army corps to us in breaking down German morale. In other words, in giving the German people an alternative to dying, to the last man, for the Kaiser. Up to this moment in the present struggle, we have done nothing nor suggested anything, I feel, which has alienated one German in Germany from Hitler, nor have we offered any alternative to the Germans which was better than a struggle to the death to preserve his nation. Knowing something of the Germans, I feel sure that "access to raw materials," fair field in international trade, even democracy and individual rights, bulk far less largely in their imagination than the future of the race -- Germany's place in the family of nations; Germany's pride and prestige; Germany's desire to be not only one of the great powers but to be consulted and treated as such.

To my mind, nothing offers such brilliant hope for the future as the Anglo-American cooperation which the President initiated with Mr. Churchill. It is exactly the type of thing to carry into the future. It is without rigid form, hence pragmatic and able to follow the method of trial and error, so dear to the Anglo-Saxon. While the newspaper headlines have labelled the collaboration as a "alliance," both Chiefs of State have scrupulously refrained from use of the word, and with profound wisdom. An "alliance" no matter how powerful invariably sooner or later calls into being somewhere in the world a hostile and counterbalancing force. A "collaboration" is under no such inexorable condition.

- 3 -

"Collaboration," intimate as it may be between two parties, is a fluid thing and has no need to be exclusive. It can and doubtless will call into conference or even to collaboration, states which have a like purpose. The only yardstick for admitting the collaboration of a state would be its determination to maintain peace and order. Form of government would not matter -- certainly we will have to collaborate with a victorious Soviet Union through reconstruction days and thereafter. Our only criterion, it seems to me, will have to be "does this state want to help to keep the peace?" If it does, we must work with it and admit it to our councils, no matter what its form of government. To do otherwise would be to ensure a repetition of a world struggle.

If such is our philosophy, there would seem to me every reason to say so, and to say so formally and emphatically. Some genius may find a better approach to German thinking, but my mind cannot conceive of anything so effective. Such a declaration would mean to the Germans that once they had thrown out Hitler and his gang and had convinced the Russians, the British and ourselves of peaceful intent, they could begin to collaborate with the Great Powers for the maintenance of peace, for great projects of development of backward areas, etc. Their "place in the sun" would still be theirs, and they would not necessarily be condemned to another generation of humiliation through their exclusion from the councils of the world. As suffering and fatigue wear them down, so more and more the Germans will be groping for a way to end the struggle. If it can be indicated that the way is in their own hands, the war may be immeasurably shortened. If it is felt that Germany must be punished, and it may well be advisable, then let her be punished. The punishment may be formidable, but it must not be enduring. The Germans themselves say, in their fluc-

- 4 -

tuating philosophy, recognize the necessity of punishment, but they will recognize it the more readily if they see light beyond, if they can be convinced that when they have purged themselves, their place as a great people is awaiting them.

It would be fascinating to explore this thought further, as to its influence in a post-war world, but this organization is dealing with the present only. Hence I am treating the subject from the propaganda phase only. I cannot refrain from adding, however, that I have been convinced for years that there is no enduring peace without German participation, that even an overwhelming victory would demand from the victors a sustained ruthlessness of which they are incapable, if they attempt to set up a post-war organization for peace without the collaboration of Germany.

Certainly such a declaration as I suggest would have to be most carefully phrased. It could not be put as an obvious appeal to Germans to revolt against their leaders. The memory of the fourteen points and their reception at Versailles are still too vivid in the German mind. It would have to be done cautiously and by inference and the repetition of the thought would not only make it penetrate, but also might well, after a period of time, cause a belief in its sincerity.

I doubt whether we could count upon much help from the English in this connection. I have only met Mr. Churchill, but have read him deeply. I could imagine him showing great generosity to a conquered foe; however, I could not imagine his bellicose nature paying great attention to subtle means of wearing him down. Mr. Eden, on the other hand, I know intimately. I am sure that his is not the type of mind to

- 5 -

deal with matters of long range effect. His mind grasps and clings to the problems of today. President Roosevelt, however, might be deeply interested in such a thought, both from the point of view of strategy and for the future. If he were interested, he could carry out the program consummately well.

ARW

Stoyanov file

*Germany, 2992
* newspaper
* Grundschau
* exploitation of the...
* Albert
P.W*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William D. Langer

DATE: February 14, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT:

Supplementing my memorandum of yesterday, relative to Joseph Lindenschuh's article of November 16, 1941 in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, I am now pleased to attach a memorandum containing some comments on this article by Dr. Walter L. Dorn, Chief of our Central European Section.

William D. Langer
William D. Langer
Director of Research

attachment

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO
~~INTEROFFICE MEMO~~

FROM: Walter L. Dorn

DATE February 14, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Joseph Windschuh's Article of November 16, 1941 in the
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

General remarks. Joseph Windschuh does not always hew closely to the Nazi party line anymore than Admiral Lütgens does in his military broadcasts. Both play a mediating role between the old German Nationalists or Pan-Germans and the Nazi party. Windschuh in particular is making strenuous efforts to reconcile industrialists, who want nothing so much as free enterprise, with the controlled economy of the Nazi regime.

This article appeared shortly after a speech by Dr. Funk in Königsberg on November 7, 1941. Funk's speech was equivalent to a German solution of the Eastern problem: The Ukraine is an area for German exploitation, a source of raw materials; it is to constitute the basis for a large-scale migration of German industry from the Rhine to Silesia and to serve as a hinterland for the German Baltic ports, Danzig and Königsberg.

Windschuh could not have been ignorant of Funk's speech when he wrote this article. The body of the

- 2 -

article may be considered under two heads: German policy toward the East and the relation of the United States to the New Order.

I. German policy toward the East. Windschuh speaks of a common participation of the countries of Europe in the exploitation and development of the East as a substitute for colonial expansion overseas.

There is literally nothing in past Nazi practice that justifies the suggestion that this now is or is likely to be Nazi policy. The New Order is merely a propuganda screen designed to conceal the brutalities of Nazi military economy.

a. They are using their currency control not to stabilize the currencies of the conquered countries but to undermine them. Local currencies are constantly being subjected to German pressure.

b. In the East and South-east of Europe Germans have largely bought out French, Belgian and Dutch interests. This applies to banking, insurance, and all varieties of industrial investments. German economy has been emancipated from outside control, while Germans

- 3 -

have filtered into the economies of all other peoples to an unbelievable degree.

c. The trade of all countries has been made to center in the Reich. All imports - textiles, food, raw materials - come from Germany, and all exports go to Germany. Total trade has everywhere declined, while trade with Germany has constantly increased. In all countries Germany is primarily concerned in supporting those industries which are working for the German war machine.

All other interests, including to a large extent Italian, have been excluded from the Balkans. Already the Hermann Göring Werke is being groomed to operate in the Ukraine, and Windschuh is, to my knowledge, the only German journalist who speaks of "common participation". Dr. Funk makes no reference to it.

II. Whatever Nazi agents may have said in the United States before the war, no American should forget that in the Nazi system foreign trade is and is likely to remain an instrument of warfare. This is an integral trait of the system, not merely a matter of policy. Already Nazis boast of having made within the past

- 4 -

two years the most comprehensive analysis of the Latin American market yet undertaken. There are German military men and economists enough who believe that the final test will be between German-controlled Europe and the United States. What is really significant in Windschuh's article is the fact that now even he subscribes to this doctrine.

STAT 399
x Atherton
x German newspaper

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

On the possibility that it may not have come to your attention I am transmitting herewith a copy of a significant article which appeared in the November 16, 1941 issue of the authoritative Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Berlin, which article might have some value from a propaganda viewpoint.

It appears to me that as of the time this article was written the Nazis considered the Russian campaign as virtually completed and were planning for post-war developments in which they would treat the conquered territory as a colonial satrapy. In the set-up envisaged in this article the United States, of course, was to have been isolated from all participation and Europe under the New Order was to have been a closed compartment to American trade.


This

Colonel William R. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
144 Apex Building,
Washington, D. C.

-2-

This picture, of course, is wholly at variance with the propaganda disseminated in this country by Nazi agents to the effect that the United States would have been the recipient of a huge amount of trade from Germany had we remained neutral.

Sincerely yours,



Ray Atherton
Acting Chief, Division of
European Affairs

Enclosure:

Copy of article from
Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung.

(COPY:Eu:EMD)

"GERMANY"EXPLOITATION OF THE EAST: A TASK FOR ALL EUROPE

"(1) In an article in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 16.11.41., Josef Wenschuh discusses what the newly conquered territories in the East will mean to Europe economically. The destruction of Bolshevism and the progressive conquest of the Soviet space and opening up on Germany's and Europe's door a large expanse of land for settlement colonisation and investments, where the surplus energies of Europe's industries and trade and its surplus population will be able to find employment.

"Wenschuh says that a 'little' solution of the Eastern problem is imaginable, working with traditional conceptions, methods and tempi, and a 'great' solution, radical in its methods, planned on a world-wide scale and passionate in its attitude. There can be no doubt that this great solution is the one which must be adopted.

"Such a turning to the East implies a lot more than just a geographical extension of Europe, with the continent's centres of gravity and of energy remaining the same. When towards the end of the Middle-Ages the New World was discovered, Europe's face turned towards the West. The colonisation of the East ceased, the forces of the East became hostile to Europe, the West became great. Europe's energies flowed out into the wide world and were lost to Europe. The shifting of Europe's centre of gravity to the East means for a start that Europe must emancipate itself from the world outside. Next, it means that Europe as a whole participates in the construction work in the East and that Germany neither desires nor is in a position to revitalise the East by herself.

"The Eastern territories will see a similar deployment of European energy as the New World did when the white races penetrated North America. The East will become the melting pot of Europe, and a new colonising race will grow up there.

"The New Europe was helped into the saddle by three factors: the common conduct of the war against Bolshevism, the British blockade which forced the continent to become self-sufficient and the hostile tension between America and Europe. Even when the first named two factors have ceased to exist, the tension between America and Europe will remain for a long time to come. One may even state that Europe needs this tension in order to endure and to shape its new structure. Let us assume that the war were to come to an early end and trade and shipping were to start once more: in that case many European countries would probably gladly return to their economic dependency on overseas. The outside world would again entice them. Europe's participation in the construction work in the East counterbalances the tension between America and Europe.

The

-2-

The slogan in many cases will have to be: Either return to overseas or turn to the East; that is, share in the raw materials and food surpluses of the East as well as in the investments for constructive purposes which the East will require in a large measure.

"Naturally the undertakings and possessions of the Soviet State will, to begin with, be taken over by the State, but there can be no question of Eastern economic forms influencing the Reich, for instance in the shape of increasing nationalisation of industry, but on the contrary, our energies and our forms must influence the East. Before the World War, Russian shares were greatly valued in Paris and everybody on the Stock Exchange knew the name of Kriwoi Rog. Why should not the same thing happen again under different auspices. The periodical, Europa-Kabel, Amsterdam, recently advocated the introduction of Eastern shares (Ost-Aktien) on the German Stock Exchanges in order to alleviate the shortage of shares on offer (See Digest 666, 17.11., A I -5). This seems to dispose of French hopes that French holders of Imperial Russian shares may now get their money back - See Digest 633, 9.10., F III - 15., - Ed.). The reform of the conditions of property and industrial initiative in the East would have important results in many directions, thus one need only mention the effect which the reprivatisation of property in the East would have on the indebtedness of the Reich. Sums amounting to milliards of marks could be mobilized in this manner.

"The 'great' solution of the Eastern problem is above all a question of transport. The West, the North and the South of Europe are hinterlands to great sea ports relying on the cheap freight rates of sea shipping, but in the East gigantic distances must be overcome by land transport. Indeed, the transport problem is decisive as far as the exploitation of the East by Europe is concerned in competition with the attractive offers of overseas trade."

As a post script to the Horst Wessel Lied idea, an Austrian Jewish friend of Mrs. Morris's who had been told about this idea, said that she thought that it was psychologically quite wrong, because party members would simply be infuriated at hearing their song used, and nothing could be done anyway in winning party member away (?), and for people who were not a hundred per cent with the party the tune of the Horst Wessel Lied would have too many terrible associations. I think this may be more the exiled and persecuted German's reaction perhaps, than the reaction of an ordinary citizen of the Reich.

Mrs. Marketa Morris.

Mrs. Morris is Czech by birth, and came from Prague. She is married to a German Jewish doctor of psychology, and is herself a psychoanalyst of the Jung school, I think. She left Germany shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933, and then lived in Italy, then France, and lived through the fall of France in 1940, and has been in the United States now for several months. She lives at 605, West 113th New York City (telephone, University 4-5931). She speaks German, French, Czech, but her English is not yet very good. She has made special studies, in the past, on the use of mass suggestion by the Nazi propagandists, and of the power of the unconscious in masses and national groups. She carried on over a period of about two years (1933-1935) a correspondence with a woman in Germany, after she herself was living in Italy, in which she pretended to be an unhappy, exiled Nazi, asking for information from a Nazi friend in Germany as to how to deal with the criticisms of the German government that she encountered among foreigners. Sometimes she was answered by the German censor as well as by her friend. She was expelled suddenly from Italy, but she could never find out if it had anything to do with ~~these~~ these letters. Later she met the friend with whom she had corresponded in Prague and learned that her reports of the criticisms of people living in the democratic world had had great effect not only on this woman who had received the letters but also on a group of people to whom she had read them. She said, in carrying on this correspondence, she learned a great deal about the Nazi beliefs and psychology, and feels that she could put some of it to use. I think she would like to work in some sort of advisory capacity, or on general ideas, within a propaganda organization.

Notes on a conversation with Mrs. Marketa Morris.

Specific Ideas.

- 1) To approach the German youth, particularly children, in propoganda broadcasts, to try and counteract the effect of the education they receive in the schools and in the Hitler Youth, which is concentrated entirely on the preparation of the child to be a Nazi---i.e., they are educated to fight from the earliest moment, to believe only in the German race, and to fight for the supremacy of the German race. They are appealed to, in the Nazi educational system, by way of their emotions, therefore propoganda to be effective should also approach them through their emotions---same methods but different matter.
- 2) To have a good song for the German propoganda broadcasts, which would capture the imagination of the German people, a song they would find themselves humming as they did their work. In a suggestion made later, she says that the Horst Wessel Lied, which has a fine, swinging tune, could be used with different words, and it would have the advantage of being a tune which when heard hummed or played could not immediately be labelled as a rebel song, in fact it might cause infinite confusion and embarrassment to the Nazis, because they would never know which words were being thought if a person whistled the Horst Wessel Lied, and if they forbade its use it would be a big blow to the Party. She encloses some words written by her husband for this new version of the Horst Wessel Lied, and asks especially that it shall be noted that where the Nazi song says, "Die Fahne Hoch" (the flags high) this version says "Die Herzen Hoch", one a material object being lifted as a symbol, and the other a spiritual idea. You will see by her attached letter that this song has been sent by her husband to WRUL as an entry in the competition for a German Song of Freedom asked for by WRUL.
- 3) In a more general sense to carry on a propoganda to Germany that is based on an emotional appeal, appealing to the sentimental and the mystic side of the German race. Logic is no good, because they have been utterly confused for too long by the tortured logic of Mein Kampf. Hitler has known how to communicate to their unconscious, he has asked them to "think with their blood" and it is only through the same sort of approach that new ideas can be got across to them. Give them strong, emotional, meaty stuff, and they understand that sort of language; give them reasonable, friendly, quiet chatty statement of facts and everything that they have been filled up with about the soft, sloppy democracies who do nothing but talk will be uppermost in their minds, and they won't accept anything they hear thus presented.

General Ideas.

Generally speaking Mrs. Morris discussed at some length the whole subject of the use of the unconscious on masses. She thought that for someone who understood the American people, as she said she did not as she was a newcomer here and did not speak good English, that the same sort of thing could be used to bring the war home to them, as could be used in propoganda to Germany, adapted of course to the American character. She felt that the only thing that a European could do in America itself and to Americans, is try to impress on them the seriousness of the totalitarian menace---the actual truth of the world conquest idea, the fact that you can trust ~~the~~ Hitler as you can hardly trust anyone else to go through with what he has said he intends to do. To make that true to Americans.

Mrs. Marketa M. MORRIS
 605 West 113th Street, Apt. 83
 New York City
 Phone: UNiversity 4-5931

le 16 mars 1942.

Chère Madame,

je vous envoie ci-joint une chanson de mon mari. Il l'a faite déjà en France où elle aurait dû être utilisée pour les émissions en langue allemande de la T.S.F. La défaite de la France empêche la réalisation de ce projet.

Mais cette idée est vraiment actuelle, dans l'opinion aussi des instances compétentes. Preuve: le fait que WRUL, German Section, nous envoie - juste dans ces jours - a call for a German Song of Freedom. On commence donc à comprendre l'importance de l'élément émotionnel dans la propagande - et particulièrement dans celle qui s'adresse aux Allemands.

Nous regrettons cependant que ce concours de WRUL fixe the deadline pour les contributions pour le 1er mai. Nous sommes consternés qu'on croit avoir tant de temps et qu'on puisse retarder l'action tellement urgente de plus de ^{deux} mois.

Il faudrait accélérer la réalisation de cette idée qui est bonne. Qu'est-ce que vous en pensez ?

Mon mari a envoyé sa chanson à WRUL pour ce concours (avec indication de son nom dans une enveloppe cachetée). Et ci-joint une copie de sa contribution. - Mais nous préférierions si l'en ne voulait pas tarder trop longtemps.

Some notes about a German Song of Freedom .

This song should become the National Anthem for all those ~~whom~~ ^{who} - either inside Germany or abroad - are fighting for the destruction of the Nazi regime and for the establishment of a democratic order.

It should be broadcast as often as possible - and particularly whenever the program is intended for an emotional appeal and not only for mere information. Sometimes the broadcasts should be devoted especially to a presentation of this new anthem.

By choosing the melody of the "Horst Wessel Lied" as the musical and rhythmic basis, we facilitate the infiltration of the new song among the German masses. The first words of the text in referring back to the opening words of this Nazi-song show the contrast between the totalitarian and the democratic way of life. "Die Fahnen hoch" of the Horst Wessel Lied is a military order and has to do with the lifting of an external object - "De~~r~~ Herzen hoch" is an appeal to our inner being and summons us to the exercise of free cooperation.

We recommend that the text be spoken first by one person and then by a chorus, accompanied by soft music. Later on, the anthem should be sung by a chorus, with full accompaniment.

If not all verses can be sung, choose either

no. 1,5
or no. 1,3,5
or no. 1,3,4,5
or no. 5,6

A German Song of Freedom .

Ein deutsches Freiheitslied .

(zu singen nach der Melodie des "Herbst Wessel Liedes")

Die Herzen hoch! Nicht Furcht mehr oder Zittern
Vor Schreckensherrschaft und vor Tyrannei
Soll unsere Lebensfreude uns verbittern.
Auf! Dass der Mensch nun wieder glücklich sei.

Wir Männer, Frauen, Kinder deutscher Sprache
Sind einig gegen Lüge, Hitlerei.
Wir kämpfen für des ewigen Deutschlands Sache.
Wir woll'n ein Deutschland hilfreich, edel, frei.

Schluss mit dem Kriege! Schluss mit allen Qualen,
In denen heut Millionen untergehn.
Die schuldigen Männer sollen es bezahlen!
Das deutsche Volk wird würdig auferstehn

Und wird sich mit den andern Völkern einm
Im Kampf für Freiheit und soziales Recht.
Die Welt hat Raum für alle - sie wird keinen
Verachten, weder Rasse, noch Geschlecht.

-2-


Germany at the new ration levels reveals that the present consumption pattern or one not appreciably inferior to it can, in all probability, be maintained through the crop year ending on August 1, 1943, and perhaps through calendar 1943. For the Old Reich, such a program will require approximately the following domestic production in the three basic food groups: breadgrains, 10,000,000 metric tons; meats, 2,300,000 metric tons; fats and oils, 1,000,000 metric tons. It will also require the importation of small additional supplies of these products, particularly if the Germans envisage military activity after 1943.

4. Such production and import prospects still seem to be attainable, even granting credence to the reports of adverse crop conditions and the unavailability of seed. Actually, careful examination of current crop reports indicates that the damage may well be less severe than these reports suggest. Total output in Europe need not be appreciably below that of 1941. It is thus significant that production requirements estimated above are well below pre-war normal levels in the Old Reich, and even below the subnormal production of the crop years 1940-41 and 1941-42.

-3-

5. Analysis, therefore, supports the conclusion that the Nazi war effort will not be appreciably interfered with by lack of food during the coming year.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0



GRANT MISSION

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0

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GRANT MISSION

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0

Major Scaife *File with Joint Memo*

Mark Perry
...

SECRETARIAT

1944 APR 20 AM 9 19

We are advised by
Mr. Thrun that the dissemina-
tion of this memorandum in its
edited form is in accordance
with General Donovan's
instructions.

088

A. W. Sulloway

File
To SIT -
Not London
in desk
Scarf at
of - *PT*

SECRET

Form 2202

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

4, 57

Tarrant

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
Chaf		MAR 31 1944	APR 1 1944	HW	
Scap		APR 1 1944	APR 17 1944	amb	# 2
Scap					This is comprehensive
Brooks		APR 17 1944	APR 17 1944	AM	Sum of hairs and unschooled in same respects. It is also interesting, the further you go. from WJL spec
					find out if his copy can be
					out to hand a full
					study et. desks, and photos for use
					in schools, as recording machine.

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

D-10 please attend
HW

SECRET

Intelligence
March 1st 1944
Abnco launch

"Confidential"

March 1st 1944

MEMORANDUM TO

Colonel GLAVIN,
Commanding Officer.

-----000000-----

According to your instructions, upon arrival in Italy on January 20th, I reported to Colonel REUTERSHAN, Commanding Officer of O.S.S. Special Detachment G 2 - 5th Army.

As I arrived they day after the Anzio landing, everyone was keenly interested in the development of operations at the beachhead. Captain GROZE had been ordered from the "Forward Echelon" to cover these operations and in view of the work to be done for the 34th, 36th Divisions and contacts to be made with the French Expeditionary Corps (CEF) I was ordered to go to the front as soon as I had familiarized myself with the organization of CASERTA Headquarters and with the Intelligence and Operations Sections in particular. Owing to the friendly assistance of the Officers in charge of these Sections, I was able in a short time to get a fairly accurate picture of the situation.

The various activities of our organization are so interesting that it would be difficult not to be "sold on O.S.S." after one has understood the work in itself and obtained confirmation that the information desired is appreciated and relied upon by Allied Forces. The above is referred to because we have been given the opportunity to register the appreciation of parties who at the

2

beginning might have been skeptical about our ability to do so. In addition to U.S. FORCES, other ALLIES in spite of their experience in G 2 work, have expressed their interest and taken measures on their part of the front to help O.S.S. carry out its activities. This is the case of the French Expeditionary Corps who has given our Officers a permanent pass requesting all French Commanding Officers and Units to give us every possible assistance whenever we might need it. This is not on account of existing good relations between O.S.S. and the ALLIED FORCES but because O.S.S. represents something new, adapted to circumstances, the value of which might have been questioned by our associates in the war until they were convinced and became our best supporters.

Examination of Intelligence collected for instance from September 25th to date is most illustrative because the quality and precision of the information indicates the growing efficiency of the work performed, this being equally true for topographical and combat intelligence as well as for political and contact intelligence. While O.S.S. activities are happily not limited to Intelligence and are often exteriorized by operations planned and carried out by us, their nature obviously cannot be discussed here.

The attached notes are therefore based on simple experience which is of course open to criticism.

J. E. PONIATOWSKI
Liaison Officer

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British MOST SECRET

O. B. S. SPECIAL DETACHMENT 02 - 7th ARMY

For the purpose of the work to be undertaken and because Colonel REUTERSHAN thought it was the means of gaining interesting experience I spent part of the time in Italy at the front. Before going forward, Colonel REUTERSHAN when I approached as an outsider did everything possible to assist me to obtain a proper perspective of the Unit under his command and particularly of the Intelligence and Operations Sections.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

I had the opportunity to see the manner in which material in the Intelligence Section is coordinated by the Intelligence Officer and the preparation of reports for following distribution:

- a) Combat and Topographical Intelligence
- b) Political and Contact Intelligence
- c) Security

according to their nature given out to 02-7th Army, O. G. S. Algiers, ANOOT, SR and SIN, etc.....

These reports are as follows:

← A. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (reproductions of Agents Reports, ~~are~~ re-written only if necessary):

a) Reports of Agents received through "Forward Echelon (SEI)" only when of interest to HQ Special Detachment 02-7th Army for redistribution, because in practice 75% of SEI information is for and gene-

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rally utilized by units in the combat zone.

b) In particular, information received from Long Range Intelligence (LRI) Agents, This information is general as well as detailed and while evaluated as to source and reliability, no discrimination is made on the nature of the subjects concerned.

EXTRACT OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS which are condensed from reports received in many cases from O.S.S. Algiers, also other sources. These extracts are very appreciated because they summarize the situation over a period of days and give precise information in a nut-shell.

TOPOGRAPHICAL REPORTS made from charts and reports of eye witnesses and which are of great importance when source of information is reliable and recent.

SPECIAL REPORTS which are written by Intelligence Officer whenever a particular request has been received on a certain subject and whenever he considers that intelligence available will be of special interest to one of the parties to whom Intelligence Reports are distributed. For example a special report will be made on 1.... The Political situation in Italy....or the Food situation in Rome... Black market prices in x.... region.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA requests from our own services (SRI-LRI etc..) Intelligence wanted for the Vth Army or giving latter by Memorandum information requested on a precise matter.

The difference with Special Reports is that these Memorandums are inter service matters.

While the Intelligence Section of O.S.S. takes no direct action on information received and sent, the efficiency of this section fills many gaps and in particular informs operations of real conditions which permit them to build military organization.

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OPERATIONS AND LONG RANGE INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The Executive Officer with whom I worked showed me how operations pending had been prepared and were to be carried out. It would be improper to detail these in this report.

Operations and Long Range Intelligence work not only requires full knowledge of the situation, sound planning and executive talent, but also requires men of experience and courage. The dispatching of what may seem the simplest mission, for instance parachuting or landing of Agents with their radio operator, a type of work with which we are familiar, requires perfect coordination in order to reduce as much as possible unforeseen circumstances. Therefore the work of the Supply Officer of operations who has to see that Agents are equipped with things varying from civil clothes and underwear manufactured in the country where they will operate... to hand grenades or plastic etc... or the Transport Officer who makes all arrangements and ensures the safe landing of the men, or the Dispatch Officer who checks that nothing has been omitted and is responsible for the final phase of the operation, each in their way are as important a factor to the success of the operation as is the work which precedes the planning. I have seen an important operation postponed because in one instance the appropriate civil clothing bought at the black market was not available in time to take advantage of the last day of the moon period even though everything was set and the "reception committee"

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alerted. In another instance one of the motors of the plane failed through ignition trouble. Persons familiar with operations know the sometimes absurd and tragic side of their work because they constantly worry and live with it.

Executive talent is most necessary in a type of work where each "operation" to be carried out is different because circumstances are seldom the same. War work in a territory where war is going on, automatically eliminates elements which are not adaptable to changing situations. The remaining personnel, directed by an able chief at its head naturally represents a "first class outfit."

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VII OPERATIONS SHORT RANGE INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As stated previously most of the time was spent at the front with the "Forward Echelon (SRI)".

Approximately 90% of the activity ~~there~~ is necessarily physical because when Agents are not infiltrated through enemy lines it is necessary to keep close liaison with units in the combat zone and "SRI" must therefore take advantage of all facilities that its autonomy and independence confers on it. The remaining 10% represents coordinating activity, initiative, organization and command.

A. The OBJECT of Short Range Intelligence is to obtain information of military value to operations, by means of specially trained Agents, sent out or patrolled through enemy lines or dropped in enemy territory. It also obtains information through questioning of civilians and prisoners of war.

B. The ORGANISATION of Short Range Intelligence under the command of a Commanding Officer, assisted by one or two other officers according to the importance of the set-up required, comprises: One non-comm off. for clerical work who can also assist in matters of intelligence, interrogation of Agents upon their return, interrogation of civilians, drafting of reports, he also takes care of supplies, civilian clothes etc... One radio operator and one mechanic for the vehicles and transportation. The organization also includes one or two former

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Agents who are maintained at "SR" because of past services and because of their knowledge of the country and our particular type of work in general.

The INFORMATION is required by G 2 of Army Headquarters as well as from Division, Regiments, right down the scale (see chart attached) and therefore covers intelligence of general as well as detail importance, whenever long range patrols of units in combat or air observation have not been able to gather same. Experience however, has shown that "SR" work is most effective at the echelon Corps or Division because the information obtained is generally on a scale in harmony with operations they act upon. "SR" is obtained within a range generally not exceeding 25 miles from enemy lines and therefore does not interfere with the work of Long Range Intelligence. The distribution of intelligence to parties other than the above mentioned is decided upon by HQ Special Detachment G 2-Vth Army in agreement with Intelligence and Operations Officer.

Permanent LIAISONS are established as follows :

1) HQ OSS Special Detachment G2 for all matters of general interest, sometimes with other allied outfits engaged in similar work (example : Forward Echelon of SR) in order to set up duplicate missions or at other times to prevent duplications. Of course cooperation implying obtaining special photographs, maps etc... which we might need for a mission, is handled through HQ OSS.

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2) with G 2 Army Headquarters in order to be constantly informed on the situation at the front as a whole along with G2 and G3 Division Staffs in actual combat (example: the 34th and 36th) for more detailed data which may have a bearing on decisions to be taken in connection with accomplishment of Missions.

3) with Units actually engaged in combat (example : x... Battalion of x... Regiment) or with Commanding Officers of outposts when necessary to patrol Agents out, or making arrangements to ensure safety our own return when Agents infiltrated without assistance of unit in combat, arrangements for pass words for our Agents if we should be unable to pick them up upon return, also temporary custody of civilians for interrogation and interrogation of prisoners of war.

~~It goes without saying that~~ all these LIAISONS are established by direct contact and the development and maintenance of friendly relations between ourselves has helped to make the work much simpler.


As practically all the work is of a physical character it goes without saying that the men belonging to SRI must be in good physical condition, and if in many cases they were not picked for their experience in combat work, they lose no time in becoming acquainted with it. The results of a mission depends on its proper planning and execution

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from the security point of view. The risks involved are also of a different nature than combat work in a regular unit because the work must be undetected and while retaining the knowledge at the same time that chances to pull through are meagre if strong opposition is met. For this reason when our officers effect these infiltrations, they carry no compromising papers and whenever possible wear a private's uniform as it is a question of "do or die".

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Circulation of Intelligence



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IV FEW WORDS ON THE SUBJECT OF SHORT RANGE
 INTELLIGENCE AND BRIEFING OF AGENTS

In order to obtain the best results for Short Range Intelligence Work, the ideal would be to have at our disposal well trained, capable Agents and be able to brief them thoroughly before they are dispatched. While this matter is in the mind of all persons interested in the work, the following observations were put together while taking part recently on a few operations and set forth for what use if any they may be.

Short Range Intelligence (SRI) could be summarized by the words "PRECISION IN SIMPLICITY" but even this is difficult for two reasons: 1) on account of the training Agents receive at the school and the fact that gaps in their knowledge cannot always be filled afterwards.

2) the class of the Agents employed whether peasants, workmen, high class civilians or former army officers.

It is most important that the Agents should be fully briefed before being sent out on a mission and that their personal ability as well as their physical fitness for a determined mission should each time be taken into consideration. These moral and physical factors contribute greatly to the results of a mission and with this in mind the Commanding Officer should assign missions according to the personnel's capacity. Not following this elementary principle would be to work against the desired goal.

II

The present situation makes it possible to find Agents among patriots whose sole interest is to work for the liberation of their country. An Agent who therefore thinks and acts like a soldier is at the present time preferable to a man who is naive.

Recruiting is a very important task which requires lots of care. The choice of Agents should be influenced more by the source of recommendation than by the apparent sincerity of the recruit himself. No recruit should be contacted before the officer in charge has judged of his qualifications -- one should obtain manifest proof of his good will before mentioning the type of work with which he might be entrusted. It goes to say that private lives of Agents, and their inclination for indiscretions or drink have been carefully checked, but officer in charge should know about the former life of these men whenever possible. If any indiscretion has been committed one must immediately get rid of him and follow up his former contacts.

At school Agents have received : 1) a basic instruction which is function of their mission and which includes the knowledge of the enemy, of the country and of the particular region where they will operate.

2) a practical instruction which is more or less complete and depends on whether they operate with a specialist or alone. But there are also other matters in which they should perfect themselves. In particular, observe -- write and send their information -- organise their mission -- ensure the success of their mission as well as its security. All

~~this is done~~

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In the case of mediocre Agents it would be useless to verbally request information on too many subjects, but for good class men the desired Intelligence can be summarized (on tissue paper for instance which can easily be swallowed if Agent is caught) and any locations mapped out which will help the Agent as well as ensure precision of the information.

Many Agents do not appreciate the importance of certain intelligence because it may not have been made clear to them. A few hours of additional practical training is necessary to confirm their knowledge of basic intelligence such as : Identification of units by their uniforms and badges, types of tanks, types of guns and their calibre, and all vehicles used etc.... their direction of movements, whether loaded or not, pillboxes, fortifications etc.... orientation and map reading.

Even for first class Agents it is necessary that research of information should be made with preciseness and discipline.

The nature of information required from an Agent depends :

- 1) ~~of~~ the Agents personality (intelligence -- memory -- gift of observation -- general education -- particular knowledge due to his profession
- 2) ~~of~~ the particular need of HQ Commanding at a determined moment:-- for example in x..... region, possible indications of an attack or withdrawal of troops.

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3) ~~of~~ the geographical location where Agent is infiltrated, in an industrial region, research will also include information on war production in particular ~~in a port~~, movement of troops etc; ~~er~~ in area liable to become combat zone, ~~and~~ offensive or defensive works.

Therefore in each case advisable to study qualifications of Agents --- regions in which they will operate --- particular requirements of Headquarters --- geographical location --- thus drilling for each particular case. ~~However~~ a questionnaire applying to each particular case can be of use for good class Agents only. During the instruction of Agents and afterwards in conversations, check ~~that~~ they know the basis of it by heart. Of course items of this questionnaire are only theoretically classified since order of importance should be modified whenever necessary. Agent should be made to realise that it will often ^{be} difficult to satisfy all the requirements of the command. They will therefore deal with the essential first, as the general questionnaire only constitutes the frame in which they operate. Directives they will receive ~~are~~ unexpected luck and their own judgement should help them to make the necessary selection and modifications on the order of importance of the questionnaire ~~and~~ ^{it} should therefore be considered as first adaptation of matters in general to the Agents particular case. So while reminding

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Agents that characteristic of their work is "Precision in Simplicity" they will appreciate that complete information on a few essential points is preferable to a quantity of varied information on too many subjects. As regards a questionnaire applying to the Agents particular case it would include in particular demands of the Command (example : composition of x... unit not yet well known ---traffic in particular on a certain route etc..), precise questions of geographical locations (factories, communications, ports etc..) which may have been transferred in view of their re-attestation. (Questions inspired by Agents particular ability. Special questions required by OSS (for instance: rules of circulation in x... town, papers required, delimitation of zones etc..).

Type of GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE

(theoretical and to be modified for each particular case)

1) MILITARY SITUATION AND OR

Emplacement of PG's --- Units
 Identification)
 Composition)
 Importance)
 Armament)

2) MOVEMENT AND EMPLACEMENTS

Movement of troupes
 (road - rail - sea - air) (Identification
 (Importance
 (Destination

Movement of Material (Identification
 Importance
 (Destination

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3) MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TERRAIN

Camps --- barracks
 Defensive works --- trenches --- pillboxes --- mines ---
 abris --- blockhaus.
 Depots --- stocks --- (ammunition, gasoline, cars, food)
 Important railroad stations --- railways (tracks) roads
 and their condition -- if derived -- being repaired -- or
 constructed.

4) ANTI-AIRCRAFT

Emplacement of batteries -- strength -- calibre.
 Measures taken by civil authorities etc.. blackout..
 Effect of bombardments -- where fell if possible.
 Effects from industrial point of view.
 Red cross services

5) MARITIME SITUATION

ships war & merchant
 characteristics -- names -- size
 situation -- armed -- being repaired and type of repair.
 convoys -- importance -- protection (armament & quality)
 areas mined -- dates.
 survey of coasts -- patrols etc
 defense of coasts -- batteries -- positions -- fortifications
 ammunition dumps -- roads

6) AVIATION

organisation and OB
 airfields occupied -- units -- number -- type of planes.
 losses
 effect of bombardments on airfields --
 conditions of landing fields

7) INDUSTRY

Emplacement of factories for war production -- output --
 nature -- importance

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8)

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Cost of life -- salaries.
 Black market situation.
 Rationing -- foods taken by occupying authorities.
 Health situation.
 Production essential foods -- stocks

9)

POLITICAL SITUATION

Resistance.
 Attitude occupying authorities.
 Public opinion.
 Manifestations.

The Agents cover story should be carefully planned and based on the latest available information. Therefore while reliable directives should be given as to best cover, on no account should this cover be left to the Agents own initiative, as cases have occurred where those who had not been briefed before hand did not return. Agent must be convinced of importance of his mission and it is ^{be} ~~is~~ shown that bravery consists in respecting the rules of security. He may otherwise not only compromise himself but the men who are with him. The Agent must always know by heart his cover story in order to prevent contradictory answers in the course of his questioning and cross examination. His cover story must be simple and based on facts which can be controlled, otherwise it must be entirely uncontrollable. The Agent must never retract, even if the people questioning seem to

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have personal information contrary to the cover story he has just given. He should never give credit to the so called signed confessions of third parties even if they have worked with him as they may be false. In the course of his interrogation the Agent must not give details which are not asked him and if possible he will make short and ambiguous answers, not employing words like "yes" or "no" in a categorical way otherwise than to deny accusations against him. He must not forget that the enemy will use all methods: promises, amabilities, menaces and brutality. If Agent goes in a cell beware of the "sheep" and do not communicate anything even to a known enemy third party about the questioning etc....

As regards the commanding officer of "SRI", he must check any feebleness on the part of his Agents and show them that he has guts and a full knowledge of each operation he plans. Commanding officer must definitely know what is wanted and the instructions he has given must never be modified if a discussion occurs with an Agent.

Of course the work that can be expected of "SRI" is dictated by the nature of the country and the situation of the battle front -- it goes without saying that in a mountainous region, where the combat line cannot be continuous, the problem of infiltrating men through enemy lines is considerably simplified. For instance, at the beginning of February at Cassino it was difficult to undertake any

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work with assurance of success because of the hand to hand fighting and heavy artillery fire there, and on the other hand the Agents infiltrated behind enemy lines a few days before at the same place were unable to return for the same reason. During the same period and only some ^{a few miles} ~~10 miles east of Cassino~~, we were able to infiltrate Agents on another mission with a minimum of risk, but these could not have fulfilled the original mission because of the high mountains and the lack of communications between the two points. Under such circumstances the interrogation of Ps/Ws¹ may bring in more immediate information. While the length of a mission depends on the distance and difficulty of the terrain, SRI missions do not exceed 5 days, as it would otherwise fall under the scope of Long Range Intelligence (LRI). No rigid rule can be applied however, as this argument can work both ways since it may occur that LRI is not always available (for instance impossibility of parachuting men sufficiently close to the area etc..). ^H The example given ^{below} at the following page is that of a typical SRI mission which was recently carried out and successfully fulfilled.

The reading of these notes may seem a bit confusing because they cover varied details all of which do not hang together, but it must be remembered that never two occupations are alike and that it is therefore difficult to lay down a general rule.

EXAMPLE

The request given herebelow as example was made verbally at 10pm on the 6th of by the Chief of G2 of x... who stated that it would be very important if information could be obtained for the 8th of..... in the evening.

We infiltrated one of our Agents in the early hours of the 7th, ^{July} and picked him up on the 8th with the information made available at the required time and greatly appreciated. We were told later that our information confirmed information previously obtained which had been requested in connection with a planned advance in this sector to enable long range guns to annihilate German batteries at ~~SAN DONATO, SOTTORATTI, PICINISCO, VILLA LATINA~~ and allow us to shell supply roads leading to AFINA.

VERBAL REQUEST MADE TO SRI AT 10PM ON THE 6TH OF.....

- 1) Heavy firing from quadrangular figure of : ~~San-Donato-Sottoratti, Picinisco-Villa-Latina-AFINA~~

Check : Battery emplacements -- ammunition dumps -- gasoline dumps -- circulation (in what direction heavier traffic) confirm identification of units.

- 2) AFINA very important center as roadknot supplies to Torcia, via Subate and Picinisco... it would seem important to have permanency of artillery fire.

if hospital which previously at etc. what do people say if

2

- 3) ~~Mountain~~^{C.F.} if there is mountain artillery there -- identification
- 4) ~~Mountain~~^b is mountain artillery still there.
- 5) between ~~area~~^H and ~~area~~^G indicate importance of artillery.
important for mission return at latest wednesday afternoon.

Actually information was given at 7.30pm that afternoon.
(on many of these missions a few agents never return some missions
are unsuccessful because of unexpected resistance etc....)

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Secret Mission Dec 27
Report to Col. Haskell fm Facette
10 Dec. 're, re Mission X9

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CSS 8720, INT. G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

Grant Mission 13.599
Mission X-9.
10 December 1943

TO : Colonel MARELL
FROM : Captain Facette
SUBJECT : Mission X9

Thru Lt. Commander HILARY SCOTT, clandestine transportation was arranged with the Italian Navy in Brindisi.

The British indicated a landing point below the 44° parallels, however for security reasons we decided to land in slightly different sector.

The party was composed of 15 agents, of which six were radio operators. I took command of the party and assigned agent Colombo as my assistant. The submarine is the "AXUM" of the 600 tonnes class. The staff is composed of the following officers:

Commandante GIOVANNI, Sorrentino
Assistant Lt. ANFERDO, Pericli
Chief Engineer Capt., SINO, Sitsia
Navigations Officer Aspirant, LIGO, VESSI
Assistant - Aspirant ZVORINIRO, Calcochira
Assistant - Lt., LILVIO, Vessi
The crew is composed of 44 men.

The officers and crew cooperated marvelously - sharing their meager sleeping quarters with our men, giving them their cognac, ration and Italian food. At all times they kept the moral of the men and when under danger they acted coolly and efficiently. The party left Brindisi on Nov. 30th at 1650 hours, traveled on the surface thru the night and went under during the day. The landing point was reached on Dec. 3rd at 0500 hours. The sub was about 20 miles from shore. During the day the sub went up twice to observe our landing point. The weather was bad, the sea rough. We remained immobile and on the bottom of the sea from the morning of the 3rd to the landing of Dec. 5th at 0035 hours.

During the night we observed the coast for several hours and moved to a few miles from shore. Finally on the night of Dec. 4th we moved to about 500 meters from the beach. My assistant and I inflated the 3 rubber boats and prepared the details of the landing. At 0035 hours the first party of four departed. Their instructions were to land and to act as a scouting and receiving party for the other two groups. The second group left at 00:35 and the third at 00:45.

The weather was perfect for the operation i.e., it rained, the moon was hidden by low clouds and the sea was calm enough to allow easy rowing. We waited 30 minutes and heard no shots, no disturbance of any kind and assumed that the landing was successful.

SECRET

We returned and arrived in Brindisi on Dec. 7th at 19:00.

During the operation the morals of the men was very high and the officers of the sub acted very efficiently, particularly the Commander who took personal charge of navigating the sub to within 500 yards from shore and of the Chief Engineer who very skillfully took control of the machinery so that we could have complete silence.

It is evident that much was learned from such operation and the main points are that much can be accomplished by using subs. It has been learned that the Italians have 6 small special subs, 40 feet long, which could land anywhere and even penetrate mine-fields. However, it would be advisable to have a sub of the type used in this mission attached to the OSS on a more or less permanent basis, so that the officers and crew can be trained in certain methods of landing and that our agents also can be trained in landing operations. One of these subs could be used both on the east and west coast of Italy - it only takes 3 to 4 days to go around southern Italy. The smaller subs could be used for courier service and the larger one in conjunction with large operations.

Reports are indicating that the penetration of enemy lines thru the front is becoming daily more and more difficult and that the only way of transporting agent across is either by sea or by air. The penetration by sea is better because it does not demand of agents any long training course nor any special type of physical fitness besides the operation is much safer by sea than by air.

A. E. L. PACATTE,
Captain, AUS.

SECRET

OSS SPEC. DET. G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

10 December 1945

TO : Colonel HASKELL.
FROM : Captain Pasatto.
SUBJECT: Mission 10.

SECRET

Third Lt. Commander HILARY SCOTT, clandestine transportation was arranged with the Italian Navy in Brindisi.

The British indicated a landing point below the 46° parallel, however for security reasons we decided to land in slightly different sector.

The party was composed of 15 agents, of which six were radio operators. I took command of the party and assigned agent Colombo as my assistant. The submarine is the "AXUM" of the 600 tonnage class. The staff is composed of the following officers:

Commandants GIOVANNI, Sorrentino
Assistant Lt. ALFREDO, Portoli
Chief Engineer Capt., SIRO, Stazio
Navigations Officer Aspirant, LIGO, VESSI
Assistant - Aspirant ZVORINIRO, Calcochira
Assistant - Lt., LILVIO, Vesel
The crew is composed of 46 men.

The officers and crew cooperated marvelously -- sharing their meager sleeping quarters with our men, giving them their cognac, rations and Italian food. At all times they kept the moral of the men and when under danger they acted coolly and efficiently. The party left Brindisi on Nov. 30th at 1650 hours, traveled on the surface thru the night and went under during the day. The landing point was reached on Dec. 3rd at 0800 hours. The sub was about 20 miles from shore. During the day the sub went up twice to observe our landing point. The weather was bad, the sea rough. It remained immobile and on the bottom of the sea from the morning of the 3rd to the landing of Dec. 5th at 0600 hours.

During the night we observed the coast for several hours and moved to a few miles from shore. Finally on the night of Dec. 5th we moved to about 500 meters from the beach. My assistant and I inflated the 3 rubber boats and prepared the details of the landing.

At 0025 hours the first party of four departed. Their instructions were to land and to act as a scouting and receiving party for the other two groups. The second group left at 00:35 and the third at 00:45.

The weather was perfect for the operation i.e., it rained, the moon was hidden by low clouds and the sea was calm enough to allow easy rowing. We waited 30 minutes and heard no shots, no disturbances of any kind and assumed that the landing was successful.

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It is evident that much was learned from such operation and the main points are that much can be accomplished by using subs. It has been learned that the Italian have 6 small special subs, 40 feet long, which could land anywhere and even penetrate minefields. However, it would be advisable to have a sub of the type used in this mission attached to the OSS on a more or less permanent basis, so that the officers and crew can be trained in certain methods of landing and that our agents also can be trained in landing operations. One of these subs could be used both on the east and west coast of Italy - it only takes 3 to 4 days to go around southern Italy. The smaller subs could be used for courier service and the larger one in conjunction with large operations.

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A. R. L. PACATTS,
Captain, USN.

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