

SECRET

24 August 1948

Subject: Grant Mission

To: Major Willis

1. This will confirm that arrangements will be made with the Communications Division in Algiers for the assignment of a Communications Officer with the Grant Mission.

2. I assume also that provision is being made for the mobile units discussed with you and Commander Simpson and for the agents sets which I indicated would be needed.

**Elery G. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUSA
Deputy Director - Operations**

cc: General Donovan

cc:line

SECRET

24 August 1948

Subject: Grant Mission

To: Mr. Shepardson

1. This will confirm that you will consult with Mr. Brennan with a view to selecting an able Italian speaking officer for attachment to the above mission.

2. This officer will have to be properly processed, and time is, therefore, of the essence. I would like to talk with the officer selected and would also like to discuss the situation with Earl Brennan if this meets with your approval.

**Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations**

cc: General Donovan ✓

cc:line

SECRET

24 August 1943

Subject: 8th Army Mission - R and A Participation**To: Dr. William L. Langer**

1. In accordance with conversations with General Donovan in which Mr. McKay and Captain Hughes participated yesterday, I understand:

a. That Mr. McKay and Captain Hughes will proceed as a part of my advance party provided, of course, they can be processed in time.

b. That there will be available in the Theater for our use with the 8th Army at least one representative of R and A especially familiar with the Italian Mainland.

c. That Mr. McKay and Captain Hughes will arrange to bring studies on Italy (particularly Southern Italy), Sardinia and Corsica.

Make! These studies would, I hope, include as much data as possible concerning important personalities in areas of particular interest.

d. That you will direct Mr. Barnes to proceed from London and report to Colonel Eddy for assignment for duty with me, and

e. That if arrangements can be made by General Donovan additional R and A personnel will be available for the 8th Army Mission and for the contemplated Island projects.

2. We are referring to the 8th Army Mission as the "Grant" Mission or Project.

cc: General Donovan

cc: LMS

Elmer G. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

SECRET

24 August 1943

Subject: Grant Mission

To: Mr. Scribner

1. This will confirm the understanding that Commander Breed is to be assigned to me for use in connection with the above named mission.
2. Commander Breed's duties will be such that he will still be useful to SO in the direction of the personnel which has been under his supervision as well as other SO personnel whose services are needed in connection with the activities of the mission.
3. It is my understanding that another officer will be substituted in Commander Breed's place under the movement orders relating to the Bison Group.
4. I assume that Commander Breed is fully processed and can leave on a moment's notice.

Elery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

cc: General Donovan ✓

ech:ms

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 August 1943

*Grant Mission 12,290*** Africa, North*** Personnel*** Fifth Army*** Requirements*Subject: North African Theater - OSS 8th Army Organization
and Program ("GRANT" PROJECT)To: Branch Chiefs - Intelligence, Communications and
Operations

1. I would like to summarize the conversations I have had with all of you relative to the 8th Army project which should be referred to as "Grant".
2. Mr. Shepardson and Commander Halliwell are giving consideration to the appointment of officers to represent their respective Branches as is Major Willis of the Communications Branch. I have not yet been able to talk with Mr. Murphy. Mr. Ed Taylor will represent MO.
3. Matters of training and supply have been tentatively covered as follows:
 - a. Colonel Kenerick has agreed to furnish training officers who with Lt. Crosby and one or two additional training officers from Algiers should be able to carry on any SI, SO and OG training needed at or near "Grant" Headquarters.
 - b. Commander Woolley is prepared to send a group from his Maritime Unit capable of doing Maritime Training and assisting in the planning and execution of operations.
 - c. Commander Halliwell has agreed to divert, temporarily, the Marine Parachute Unit.
 - d. The Communications Branch is providing for Signal equipment and personnel.
4. For actual operations OSS personnel in Algiers (or which can be dispatched from the United States in time) will be used - both executive or staff personnel and operatives. Operations will, so far as possible, be carried on through Algiers (including training and the handling of personnel) and, while "Grant" must have its own communications facilities, the Algiers communications base and personnel will be utilized to the fullest possible extent.

CC-2

SECRET

5. The "Grant" group will be largely a staff group, but this staff must be authorized by Branch Chiefs to call on Algiers for implementation of plans. If C39 activity is required in a given area, Algiers must be prepared to use operatives already in or near such area or, in the alternative, must be ready to do its utmost to see that adequate personnel is inducted into the area.

6. Since the timing of this operation must be measured in terms of days and not weeks, Branch Chiefs are urged to expedite the shipment of bodies and supplies to the North Africa Theater.

E. C. Huntington Jr.
Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

✓cc: General Donovan

Plant Material 12,777

X Operational Camp
X Italy
X 1st Army
X 1st Army

16 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace -

I hope this is what
you wanted.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

x Operational groups
x 9 tabs
x Capt. Henry
x Roosevelt

12 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you show this to the President please.
Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

✓ 1. On the 23rd of September, while with the 5th Army, it was made very clear that little help could be obtained from the disorganized units of the Italian Army. Thereupon I wrote the attached letter to General Clark, suggesting the organization of "operational groups" (such as OSS has) from volunteers of the Italian forces.

2. We have received a cable from Colonel Huntington, who is in charge of our unit with the 5th Army, stating that the plan has been approved upon the following conditions:

- (a) The groups must be non-political.
- (b) Opposition to the King and Badoglio must be carefully avoided.
- (c) The groups must be military organizations headed by Italians.
- (d) Operations will be carried out only if so ordered by the Commander of the 5th Army.

William J. Donovan
Director

Grant Mission 12,777

(25)

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN FORREST B. ROYAL:

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Exd-1
16617 ✓
2. We have received a cable, copy of which I also attach, from Colonel Huntington, who is in charge of our unit with the 5th Army, stating that the plan has been approved upon the following conditions:

- a. The groups must be non-political.
- b. Opposition to the King and Badoglio must be carefully avoided.
- c. The groups must be military organizations headed by Italians.
- d. Operations will be carried out only if so ordered by the Commander of the 5th Army, and these operations must be controlled.

3. Colonel Huntington asks for the use of one of our Italian groups in order that they may serve as a model and as instructors. It may be necessary to obtain assistance in moving a group we have in training to that theater, and I hope you will be able to help us.

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICERS STRATEGIC SERVICES

23 September 1943

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Operational Groups for Employment with Allied Forces.

TO : Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark.
(Thru: Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther)

FROM : William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services.

1. Yesterday, together with Lt. Col. John Whitaker, I talked at Capri with Benedetto Croce--well known Italian philosopher and writer.

2. Mr. Croce, since 1924, has been the most courageous, aggressive and effective opponent of Fascism. By published articles and open statements he has denounced totalitarianism and attacked Fascist rule in Italy. The regime feared to arrest him. He has taken refuge in Capri only at the insistence of the Allies in order to avoid capture by the Germans.

3. In the course of our talk, Mr. Croce analyzed the present psychological state of the Italian people, including their political thinking and their present attitude towards the war. We asked him what he considered the one most important means of facing his people and restoring their self respect.

4. His reply was instant and unequivocal. It is to give them the opportunity to enlist voluntarily in a fighting force under their own flag to fight by the side of the Allies.

5. I respectfully endorse these views and suggest that this would be a means of establishing a focal point for resolving the present difficulties and uncertainties of the various political elements of Italy; would bring to one place the residue of the fighting spirit; would serve to bind the people to the Allies; would give some assurance of earning the right to a free election in the selection of their own government, and would symbolize their consolidated active resistance to Germany and the German Army.

6. In principle, I recommend the following manner of organization:

a. To select a well-known Italian of military background as the titular head, such a man as Maj. Gen. Tedone, a pronounced anti-Fascist with an excellent record in the last world war, and a man of reputation and standing.

b. To provide for the assimilation of those volunteers as a fighting force under the rules of the German Convention.

8. To give these volunteers the right to carry the flag of their own country--Italy.
9. Provide originally for their recruitment in small detachments or "operational groups," such as already exist under direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the case of American citizens of Italian origin. **OSS.**
10. That instructors from G-2 and G-3 be attached to these groups for training in modern methods of desertion and in the tactics of irregular warfare.
11. That for the purpose of obtaining immediate organization and equipment of these groups, the British Strategic Services is prepared to make available such funds as may be necessary, and although I have not had the opportunity of seeing our British colleagues, I believe they would also be prepared.

Respectfully submitted,

William J. Donovan
 Brigadier General USA

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(c) To give these volunteers the right to carry the flag of their own country -- Italy.

(d) Provide originally for their recruitment in small detachments of "operational groups," such as already exist under directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the case of American citizen of Italian origin in OSS.

(e) That instructors from SOE and OSS be attached to these groups for training in modern methods of demolition and in the tactics of irregular warfare.

(f) That for the purpose of obtaining immediate organization and employment of these groups, the Office of Strategic Services is prepared to make available such funds as may be necessary, and although I have not had the opportunity of seeing our British colleagues, I believe they would also contribute.

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Brigadier General, USA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

C
O
P
Y

12 October 1943

WJD
OK
FWB
SECRET

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William J. Donovan
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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
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
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Respectfully submitted,

William J. Donovan
Brigadier General, USA

SECRET





8 December 1943

To: COLONEL BUXTON

Although the attached is dated prior to the cable from General Clark asking for information concerning Col. Huntington, it may throw some light on the matter.

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane

Office of the Secretariat

(9199)

CONFIDENTIAL (4)

GRANT MISSION
WEEKLY REPORTS

GRANT MISSION
WEEKLY REPORTS

GRANT MISSION, WEEKLY REPORTS.

Photostats of all material in this folder appear in *Registry file*
B-010 "Fifth Army, Complete." with exception of
Letter 23 October 1943 from Col. Huntington to
General Donovan.

B-010 includes Intelligence material etc which
does not appear in this folder.

WP
22 June 1945

-2-

SECRET

486.5 -377 Armoured cars(or guns)
 480-337 Field telephone exchange; 15 Germans in charge of it
 463-360 Under a great pine tree field exchange telephone
 423-350 Anti-aircraft battery - heavy guns(6)
 423-349 Petraro- Roadblocks
 388-320 Pozzano's barracks occupied by the Germans.

c. Sheet 185-III SW- ANGRI

469-366 Ammunitions, guns; M;guns dump- motor pool
 469.5-357.5 Tank destroyers-dump
 481.5-382 Twelve guns, ammunition depot in an ochard
 486.52377 Armoured cars
 480-337 Telephone switchboard - 15 Germans
 463-360 Under a big pine tree telephone field exchange.
 423-350 Anti-Aircraft battery heavy guns
 423-349 Petraro-roadblocks- concrete
 388-320 Pozzano's barracks occupied by Germans

d. Sheet 171 -1:100,000 - GAETA

642-934 Two guns of 150 m/m
 On road Gaeta, Naples big traffic of tanks,
 trucks day and night.
 809-933 Minturno bridge mined and guarded by 200 Germans
~~It is~~
 015-745 Cancelllo destroyed, bridge blown up. Depth
 of water in Volturno 2 feet and a half roads not
 mined.

On cancelllo(015-745) road to Villa Literno (004-675) oneastern side
 in shall woods and shrubs number of German Camps (05.06-72-71)
 (06.07-68.69)

07-03-67.5 Under pine trees tanks.
 642-934 Two Germans 150 m/m guns

Great traffic in Gaeta- few tanks seen-
 Minturno bridge guarded by 200 Germans (809-933)
 Cancelllo destroyed - bridge over Volturno river destroyed-
 Depth of water 2 feet and a half . roads not mined- Caserta,
 1:100.000 sheet 172 025-745.

Military camps east of Cancelllo- Villa Literno 025-745.
 065-675 about 50 yards to 250 yards in small woods and bushes
 under cover of pine trees (small woods) great number of
 tanks, armored cars (07-08-675)

3. The above information was obtained from casuals- civilian and
 military. The interrogator is a skilled intelligence officer.
 Rating C-2.

ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
 Colonel, Infantry
 Commanding

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

SECRET

27 September 1943

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report NO. 31

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AC of S G-2, Fifth Army.

1. The following information was received from one of our representatives at AMALFI on the evening of 26 September 1943.

a. At Lubiana Italians and Yugoslavs have fought side by side against Germans. Yugoslav Partisans have taken all Italian arms and ammunition.

b. Railway line Firenze-Rome-Caeta in working order. At Gaeta violent fighting between Germans and Italians.

c. Rail traffic stops at Formia.

d. In orchards round Anagni and main road Anagni-San Antonio de Abate there are no mines.

e. One thousand five hundred Germans in sector of Groganano, Sigliano? Casa della Rocca, Caprile, San Nicola de Miri.

2. The following information is from the same source given by map reference. The reference are to maps not in our possession and coordinates have not, therefore, been checked;

a. Sheet 185-1:25,000 -III SE -GRAGNANO region.

438-359- Tanks, motor pool

445-318- One 105 Battery

444-318- Bridge on river, tanks, motor pool

443.5-319.5- German C.P. of sector

440-309.5- 12/75 Guns and 8/81 Italian Mortars

451.5-327.5- Batteries caliber unknown

437-322.5- Ammunition and food dump

447.5-313- One 150 Gun

Road from Maddalena della Saletta 448-340 to Groganano 440-320 crossing river at 435-30 and railway at 436-328.5 used by German convoys for night traffic.

b. Sheet 185- 1:25,000 III SW- ANGRI

469-366- Ammunitions, armament, depot motor pool

469.5-357.5 - Tanks, self propelled artillery dump

481.5-382- Artillery ammunitions dump in an orange orchard(12 guns)

SECRET

-3-

SECRET

BAY OF NAPLES (cont) Baia torpedo factory
 Silurificio Italiano blown up by Germans.

Baia Naval Arsenal occupied by Germans
 (It is doubted that Baia contained an Arsenal of any size)
 Daily armored patrols between Baia and
 Monte di Procida.

Monte di Procida has about 30 Germans with
 2 77 mm guns and machine guns.

Torre Gavita has very few Germans
 Pozzuoli Arsenal blown up by Germans. 200
 Germans situated there. Oil pipe line destroyed. (judged
 not to have been very important as no refineries or storage near)
 Capomiseno (opp. Procida) to Bacoli less
 than 50 German soldiers, probably stationed in Fort at
 Capomiseno.

PROCIDA Island shelled by Germans on night
 of 21st. Power station hit. On the 26th another shelling.

TERRE ANUNZIATA German armored forces camouflaged in
 gardens northeast of town.

for Colonel HUNINGTON

MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
 2nd Lt. N. MB
 Intelligence Officer OSS

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

CAPUA Large troop movements towards South.
City demolished. German bridge (wooden) completed.

NAPLES Dock area:

end of quay. Molo Beverello in good condition except for

From here to San Giovanni semi-circular mine field
Here also cruiser Attendolo sunk.
(this Molo reliably stated as mined)

Molo Luigi Rizzo between here and Calata Italo
Balbo two ships CATANIA and SICILIA sunk.
Between Molo L.R. and Pissacane
the hospital ship LOMBARDIA ~~XXXX~~ sunk.

Dock Meridionale little damage to quay but
railroad out.

Molo Martello German ship sunk

Molo Marinella SS CATERINA COSTA and a
German ship 'blown up' damaging the beach and wharf side.

Bacino Constanze Ciano Italian destroyer sunk.

Quay Vittorio Emanuele SS ENNA sunk and quay
badly damaged.

Bacini of Navale Meccanica ann destroyed either
by Allied bombing, Italian or German sabotage.

Naples Doctor refugee says that cases of typhoid and
Pilo Petacchiiale have appeared and epidemic expected.
Forrigrotte tunnel (to Mergellino under Mt.
Posillipo) heavily mined.

Re-emphasis of SW slope of Vomero containing
German Hq. of colonel Scholl, german barracks and mobile guns
camouflaged in park and alleys right down to the sea.

Italian sailors dismantled guns at San Martino
on top of Vomero and threw them into the sea (practically
impossible) and destroyed stores of food.

Bay of Naples Region Posillipo to Mergellino (proper
spelling) no mines but heavy machine gun concentration in park
facing sea, Villa Nazionale.

Villana (near Mergellino) 4 Italian AA guns
manned by Germans.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

SECRET

27 September 1943

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report No. 30

TO: Colonel HOWARD, AC of S G-2, Fifth Army

1. The following information was received from two OSS agents at Amalfi (other than that of Reports 31 and 32) and from OSS agent in Ischia. Since they came in unclassified as to source or reliability they ~~XXXX~~ were edited and checked at these Headquarters and are being presented together. From radio inquiry it has been determined that this information comes from casual civilian and military transients. Accordingly the classification of C 3 is being given to this material as it has been corrected here. Parenthetical remarks were originated here.

TRIESTE "Conete di Cavour" (badly damaged at Battle of Taranto) and the "Impero" now in German hands.
Six destroyers in dry docks not yet ready to sail. (probably at Manfalcone)

ELBA Portoferraio still in German hands.

Piombino (opp. Elba) Railroad to Grosseto cut two kilometers.

ROME Train tops now at Trastevere being unable to go into city due to bombardments.

SANTA MARIA LA BRUMA 500 yds. west of S. Maria Church and 50 yds. south of small gauge r.r. is heavy A.A. battery.

CASINO Airfield. Many planes destroyed left on part of fields and many others in flying condition camouflaged behind wall shelters.

SAN MARCO DEI CAVOTI (locate on Benevento Map 1:100,000 (r) H 7401) 8 kilometers North of town near a bridge and 500 yds west of road is a German airfield never bombed.

BENEVENTO REGION Germans employing Italian workers to build a strong defense line on North bank of Volturno.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT C-2

SECRET

30 September 1943

Radio Equipment, Supply and Transportation with OSS Mission
Fifth Army:

**RADIO
EQUIPMENT**

- 1 - Radio Transmitter Model MT-8, complete with spares.
- 1 - Radio Receiver Model AR-77 RCA, with spares.
- 1 - AC Power Generating Unit - Model ME-75.
- 4 - Light Duty Non-spill Batteries (15 amp).
- 2 - Light Duty English Field Batteries (15 amp.).
- 2 - Heavy Duty Batteries (120 amp.).
- 2 - Agents Sets (SSTN-1) complete with spares & crystals.
- 3 - Agents Sets (SSTN-1) No spares or crystals.
- 1 - Soldering Iron
- 1 - Typewriter (Remington portable)
- 6 - Crystals (Base station set)
- 5 - Hand Battery Generators (English)
- 1 - Simpson Model 255 Ohm-Volt-Milliammeter.

VEHICLES

- 6 - Jeeps (4x4)
- 3 - 3/4-Ton Weapons Carriers
- 1 - Reconnaissance or Command Car
- 1 - 2 1/2-Ton 6x6 Truck

SUPPLIES ON HAND (other than radio)

Inventory now being taken. Complete report will be submitted
in next weeks Summary.

SECRET

Roster (Cont'd)

- 2 -

30 Sept. 1943

SAILORS

HOAGLAND, Robert
Hadi, Joseph
Rao, Vincent P.
Polsoi, Salvatore
Cerverini, Ferraro
Candela, Luigi
Messeri, Piero

2nd Lieut.
T/4th gr
T/6th gr
Private
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

SECRETCAPT

FACATTE, Andre
MORTH, Henry R.
MURKE
Thompson, Peter
Blesio, Francesco

1st Lieut.
Lt. (j.g.)
Ensign
Civilian
Civilian

ITALIAN GUARD (Sailors)

Cuchetti
Cirronno
De Paoli
Bongiovanni
Pissioni

ITALIAN DRIVERS

Rinaldi, Gaetano
Gentile, Armando
Miansi

The Forward Stations have thirty-six Italian local recruits.

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**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-3**

30 September 1943.

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL**HEADQUARTERS****NAME**

HUNTINGTON, Eilery O. Jr.
SMITH, Bradish
Holler, John G.
CALLAHAN, Malcolm W.
BARNES, James

Colonel
Captain
Captain
2nd Lt.
Civilian

Jimenez, Mike
Jimenez, Jim
Silvani, Stelvio
Gonzales, Louis J.
Kerhervé, Jean
Lambert, Elmo
Maise, Sylvester
Sigmars, Domenico G.
Glistone, Paul A.
Semolich, Mario
Merabito, Domenick J.
Wilkins, Woodrow
Farrara, Frank
Zinno, William
Politti, Filippo
St. Germaine, Henry

Tech Sgt
Tech Sgt
Staff Sgt
Sergeant
T/4th gr
Corporal
T/5th gr
T/6th gr
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Civilian
Civilian

* Plus six Italians recruited locally for truck driving.
ANALYST Kitchen Police and general duty.

ILLOYD, Stacey
HUBBARD, Edward
RUSSO, JOSEPH
CAGIATI, Alessandro
BOURGAIN, Andre
ORRISON, Jeanne
COFF, Irving
LOHNSOWSKI, Vincent
Savoldi, Joe

(French Army)
(French Army)

Major
Commander
Captain
Captain
Captain
2nd Lt.
2nd Lieut.
2nd Lieut.
Civilian

Monti, Anthony
Faga, Anthony
Di Maggio, Luigi
Costa, Marcella
Remulus, Gert
Matagliati, Alfredo
Nigliani, Luigi

Corporal
Corporal
Pvt
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

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SECRET

this Headquarters by radio or courier by the CO, Forward Echelon, before 3:00 p.m. on Friday of each week for the seven days ending Thursday 3:00 p.m. This report will outline, in brief, pertinent facts relating to operations conducted and results, personnel employed and to training and like items. Reports will be consolidated this Headquarters for forwarding to Algiers and Washington.

2. The foregoing shall be effective immediately.

Sc. Huntington
MILITARY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2**

27 September 1945

MEMORANDUM:

1. OSS Fifth Army Mission procedures are established as follows:

a. Communications

1. All communications, messages and reports will be numbered and dated.

2. Communications will be from field stations to this Headquarters. Messages for Algiers, Palermo and other OSS bases will be through this Headquarters.

b. Intelligence

1. Intelligence reports will be evaluated (reliability of source by letters A to E inclusive and of the information by numerals 1 to 5 inclusive). In addition an indication of the source will be given as follows: Agent (meaning an OSS operative or group whether or not locally recruited); Established contacts (i.e., information from underground and like organization with which OSS is cooperating and from other OSS offices); Other Allied Organizations (GIC and other American or British Agencies); Military or civilian casualties (i.e., passers-by who have been questioned by OSS representatives); and Prisoners of War (who have been interrogated by OSS representatives).

2. A weekly "Intelligence Summary" will be submitted this Headquarters by radio or courier by the CO, Forward Echelon, before 3:00 p.m. on Friday of each week for the seven days ending Thursday 3:00 p.m. This report will outline, in brief, pertinent facts relating to the building, extension and operation of the intelligence network. Items of intelligence will not be included. Reports will be consolidated at this Headquarters for forwarding to Algiers and Washington.

c. Operations

1. Programs of sabotage and other action of a subversive nature shall be undertaken only after the approval of this Headquarters; ~~except~~ action directed against enemy personnel and military equipment and supplies which may be undertaken at will.

2. A weekly "Operations Summary" will be submitted

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-8

SECRET

27 September 1943.

SPECIAL ORDER)
NO.....1)

1. The following appointments are hereby made:

- a. Executive Officer - Capt. BRADISH SMITH
- b. Adjutant - Capt. JOHN S. COLLIER
- c. Services Officer - Capt. JOHN S. COLLIER
- d. CO, Forward Echelon - Major STACY LLOYD
- e. Chief of Intelligence - Capt. ANDREW BOULGAIN
- f. Chief of Operations - Commander EDWARD BARNES
- g. Liaison Officer - Navy - Lt. HENRY A. BORTH
- h. Station CO, Lt. ANDREW PACATTE
- i. Station CO, Lt. ALESSANDRO CAMOLATI
- j. Station CO, Lt. HERBERT HOWLAND
- k. HQ Intelligence Officer - Lt. MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
- l. Assistant Adjutant - Lt. MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
- m. Asst. Intelligence Officer - Lt. JAMES CHURCH
- n. Asst. Intelligence Officer - Mr. JAMES BARNES
- o. Asst. Operations Officer - Capt. JAMES RUSCO
- p. Asst. Operations Officer - Lt. IRVING COPE
- q. Asst. Operations Officer - Lt. VINCENT LOSLOWSKI
- r. Asst. Operations Officer - JOSEPH SAVOLLI

HENRY C. HUNTINGTON JR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

SECRET

GEN. ORDER NO. 2

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SECRET

discipline at such stations.

e. The Chief of Intelligence shall be responsible through the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, for all intelligence, counter-intelligence and CI activities of the Mission.

f. The Chief of Operations shall be responsible through the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, for all matters relating to sabotage and like action of a subversive and military or quasi-military nature.

g. The Station Commanding Officer shall be responsible, through the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, for all operational activities of the Forward Station to which he is assigned.

h. The Executive Officer, Forward Echelon, shall be the assistant of the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, and in the absence of the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, shall act in his place and stead.

i. The Headquarters Intelligence Officer shall be responsible for the correlation and dissemination of all items of intelligence received at Headquarters and for liaison with forward stations.

j. The Liaison Officer (Navy) shall be responsible for all liaison with the U.S. and allied Navies and for maritime training and operations.

k. The Communications Officer shall be responsible for all matters of communication relating to the Mission.

l. The Planning Officer shall be responsible for the formulation of plans and projects and the furnishing of statistical data as required for the activities of the Mission.

m. The Training Officer shall be responsible, through the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, for the training of personnel intended for field duty.

n. The assistants to the officers, aforesaid shall, in the absence of such officers, act in their place and stead.

3. The Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, is hereby authorized to establish such forward stations and appoint such Commanding Officers in charge thereof and assign such personnel for intelligence and operational duty thereat as to such Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, may seem advisable in connection with the conduct of the intelligence and operational activities of this Mission.

LEAHY C. MONTGOMERY JR
Colonel, Infantry
Comdg

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**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2**

SECRET

27 September 1943.

GENERAL ORDER)

NO.....2)

1. The following staff positions are hereby created within OSS Fifth Army Mission:

Executive Officer
Adjutant
Services Officer
Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon
Chief of Intelligence
Chief of Operations
Station Commanding Officer (one or more)
Executive Officer, Forward Echelon
Headquarters Intelligence Officer
Liaison Officer - Navy -
Communications Officer
Planning Officer
Training Officer
Assistant Adjutant
Assistant Intelligence Officer (one or more)
Assistant Operations Officer (one or more)
Assistant Services Officer
Assistant Planning Officer
Assistant Training Officer (one or more)

2. Staff duties shall be as follows:

a. The Executive Officer shall be the Assistant and Chief of Staff of the Commanding Officer, and in the absence of the Commanding Officer shall act in his place and stead.

b. The Adjutant shall perform all the duties of Adjutant of the Mission; shall be responsible for all matters of personnel, and in the absence of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer shall act as Commanding Officer of the Mission.

c. The Services Officer shall have charge of all matters of Administration, Finance and Supply.

d. The Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, shall be responsible to the Commanding Officer for all intelligence and operational activities of the Mission, for the establishment of Forward Stations, and for the coordination of intelligence and operational undertakings and the enforcement of

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

SECRET


27 September 1945

GENERAL ORDER)

NO1)

1. Pursuant to cablegram (W6612, August 28, 1945, Cite KAGAR) issued on the authority of the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and to directive of Brigadier General William J. DONOVAN, dated 20 September 1945, OSS Fifth Army Mission (designation OSS Special Detachment G-2) is hereby activated.

2. The undersigned, pursuant to authority aforesaid, hereby assumes command of said Mission.


HENRY G. HUNTZINGER JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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b. To provide for the assimilation of these volunteers as a fighting force under the rules of the Geneva Convention.

c. To give these volunteers the right to carry the flag of their own country - - ITALY.

d. Provide originally for their recruitment in small detachments of "operational groups" such as already exist under direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the case of American of Italian origin in OSS.

e. That instructors from SOI and OSS be attached to these groups for training in modern methods of demolition and in the tactics of irregular warfare.

f. That for the purpose of obtaining immediate organization and employment of these groups, the Office of Strategic Services is prepared to make available such funds as may be necessary, and although I have not had the opportunity of seeing our British colleagues, I believe they would also contribute.

Respectfully submitted,

Sigs - William J. Donovan

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

23 September 1943

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Operational Groups for Employment with Allied Forces.

TO : Lt. Gen. MARK W. CLARK
(Thru: Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther)

FROM : WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, Director of Strategic Services.

1. Yesterday, together with Lt. Col. John Whitaker, I talked at Capri with Benedetto Croce - well known Italian philosopher and writer.

2. Mr. Croce, since 1924 has been the most courageous, aggressive and effective opponent of Fascism. By published articles and open statements he has denounced totalitarianism and attacked Fascist rule in Italy. The regime feared to arrest him. He has taken refuge in Capri only at the insistence of the Allies in order to avoid capture by the Germans.

3. In the course of our talk, Mr. Croce analyzed the present psychological state of the Italian people, including their political thinking and their present attitude towards the war. We asked him what he considered the one most important means of fusing his people and restoring their self respect.

4. His reply was instant and unequivocal. It is to give them the opportunity to enlist voluntarily in a fighting force under their own flag to fight by the side of the Allies.

5. I respectfully endorse these views and suggest that this would be a means of establishing a focal point for resolving the present difficulties and uncertainties of the various political elements of Italy; would bring to one place the residue of the fighting spirit; would serve to bind the people to the Allies; would give some assurance of earning the right to a free election in the selection of their own government, and would symbolize their consolidated active resistance to Germany and the German Army.

6. In principle, I recommend the following manner of organizations:

a. To select a well-known Italian of military background as the titular head, such as Maj. Gen. Pavone, a pronounced anti-Fascist with an excellent record in the last world war, and a man of reputation and standing.

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SECRET**222X***** * ***

3) The ways and principles concerning the organization of the above mentioned fighting force will be the following:

a. To select a well-known Italian of military background as the titular head, such as General Pavone, a pronounced anti-Fascist with an excellent record in the last world war and a man of reputation and standing.

b. To provide for the assimilation of these volunteers as a fighting force under the rule of the Geneva Convention.

c. To give these volunteers the right to carry the flag of their own country, Italy.

d. That armament, equipment and training would be provided in cooperation with the Allied forces.

With kindest regards

Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione

24 September 1943

Signed - Senatore Benedetto Croce

Signed - Generale Giuseppe Pavone

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To: the Commanding General, Fifth Army.

From: Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione.

1) Following the conversation at Capri between Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services and Senator Benedetto Croce; following also the conversation at Faenza between Gen. Pavone, Avv. Mando and American and British representatives; has been established the Executive Committee of the Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione. The Executive Committee of the Fronte Nazionale is composed of:

Sen. Benedetto Croce

Gen. Pavone

Alberto Tarchiani

Avv. Mando

As soon as contacts will be established the Executive Committee of the Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione will be enlarged in such a way as to include the representatives of all the forces of liberation now existing and organized and those which may arise in various parts of Italy.

2) The Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione is in complete agreement with the ideas expressed by Sen. Benedetto Croce to Gen. Donovan. The Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione believes that the organization of a fighting force under their own flag to fight by the side of the Allies is necessary and urgent.

As Gen. Donovan states "this would be a means of establishing a focal point for resolving the present difficulties and uncertainties of the various political elements of Italy; would bring to one place the residue of the fighting spirit; would serve to bind the people to the Allies; would give some assurance of earning the right to a free election in the future of their own government; and would symbolize their active resistance to Germany and the German army."

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OFFICIAL STRATEGIC SERVICES

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24 September 1943

MEMORANDUM: For Major General Gruenther.

At a meeting this afternoon between Colonel Huntington and myself for OSS - Major Munthe and Captain Sylvester for SCM and General Pavone and Mr. Munde for the Italian Committee of Liberation, it was agreed in principle:

1. That the results in the letter of today to Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark from the Director of Strategic Services relative to the organization and training of "operational groups" was the proper method to pursue.
2. That SCM and OSS would work together in aid of properly constituting an Italian Committee to attain that end - subject to the authorization and approval of their respective military authorities.
3. That General Pavone and his son-in-law, Mr. Munde, would seek to attain the sanction of the committee known as "Italia Libera", and more particularly the aid and assistance of Benito Croce.
4. That all of this work was to be consummated as the free act and will of the Italian Committee acting for their own people, and formal request made in such behalf to the British and American military authorities subject to such terms and conditions as those authorities might impose.
5. Colonel Huntington, Lt. Col. Whitaker and Maj. Munthe were requested to act with Mr. Munde as a Committee of Direction to present these matters to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, for approval and action.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General
Director, OSS

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6. It is submitted that approval of the Croce proposal (as limited as above provided) may be extremely helpful to Fifth Army operations, not particularly because the activities of the proposed Operational Groups will be of great military value but, rather, because in this manner the enthusiastic support of existing Italian organizations (now being used by OSS) will be continued for purposes of intelligence. The consensus of opinion among all Italians consulted is that a continuation of Italian cooperation on the Intelligence side is inevitably dependent upon the possibility of Italian combat participation.

WILLIAM C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2**

26 September 1943

SUBJECT: Organization Italian Operational Groups for Employment with Allied Forces - In supplementation of Memorandum of Brigadier General DONOVAN of 23 September 1943.

**TO : Lt. General MARK W. CLARK
(Thru: Maj. Gen. ALFRED M. GRUNERTHER, G of S).**

1. At the suggestion of General DONOVAN, there is submitted herewith to the Commanding General a proposal (from a Committee formed by Senator Benedetto Croce), asking for authority and assistance in the organization of Operational Groups formed from personnel selected from the Italian Army.

2. In prior discussions between General DONOVAN, Senator CROCE and Major MUNTIE of British SOE it was agreed:

a. That the Operational Groups would be few in number and simply organized; and

b. That OSS and SOE would assist in the training of such Operational Groups and would act for the Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione in forwarding its proposal to the Commanding General, Fifth Army and, if approved by the Commanding General, in obtaining all necessary supplies and facilities.

3. It has been made clear to the Croce Committee by OSS and SOE that the Committee and any organization operating under its direction must be non-political except as they shall be anti-Fascist.

4. The Croce Committee has informed us of its desire to organize, initially, and as a medium for demonstrating its potentialities in connection with current operations, Operational Groups totaling 120 officers and men (25 groups of 4 officers and 30 men each). These groups would be armed with captured Axis materiel and would operate as civilians under authority issued in accordance with International Conventions.

5. It is our belief (based on our experience with language-speaking operational groups selected from the American Army in accordance with J.C.C. directive to OSS) that, within a week after recruitment the limited number of groups indicated might be trained for restricted missions of sabotage, demolition and night ambushing and patrolling.

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c. Conclusion

This report is both more lengthy and more indefinite than I should like. Its purpose, however, is to bring you up to date on our activities during the early stages of the campaign. Subsequent reports will, I trust, be shorter and more factual.

Respectfully submitted,


HENRY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding

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In anticipation of a favorable response to the Croce Committee request, we have gathered a small store of Axis arms and ammunition. The assistance of OSS Algiers in this matter is greatly appreciated. Psychologically, at least, activation of Italian combat groups at this time will be of inestimable value.

6. Estimate of the situations:

a: Operations to date:

We have been working on the theory that the Germans have not been numerically strong but, being completely mobile, have been able to give the appearance of strength. Our information has consistently been that troop and supply movements have been north and that reinforcements have not been furnished. We have also consistently reported that there have, for at least 10 days, been few Germans in Naples and along the coast to the south. All this has been confirmed by recent arrivals from these areas.

Note: The General expressed this opinion when here and can attest that this condition was evident from a visual survey of the area.

On the action side we have done nothing except to furnish "Clearance Patrols" and prepare for action pending receipt of adequate authority.

b. Future Program:

It is our belief that the Germans are still withdrawing northward and are studiously avoiding any firm contact with our forces. This condition prevails at least to the Volturno-Calore line. Information on conditions beyond this line indicate that no serious resistance need be expected here. The movement is still northward. More of a stand may be made on other lines such as _____. On the other hand, German troops in the Rome area are not numerous and no effort is apparently yet being made to bring reinforcements in this region.

The Fifth Army expects to reach the Volturno in about 10 days. It is our belief that it could be there almost as fast as it can march. There are undoubtedly tactical and strategic reasons why a rapid advance may not be deemed advisable.

Note: We examined at this Headquarters, last evening, an Italian Major (Campello) and Captain (Gerulli-Irell) who had just made their way (along the east coast) from Rome which they left on the 15th. These officers are both in the Italian Intelligence service and are on their way to join the Italian 7th Army (now forming near Taranto). They seem to be keen observers and a copy of their reported information is being enclosed. These gentlemen have left a radio operator and set in Rome. Not only do they confirm the observations made above but they have, in return for our meagre hospitality, promised to cooperate with this organization. Their radio, at least, will be useful.

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SECRET**4. Comments and resume:****a. Organization Data**

During the first few days of the invasion there was confusion everywhere. The 36th Division (16th Corps) had been badly landed and weakness had developed on its right flank. This the 45th Division was ordered to cover. In doing so the lines of the 45th became thinly spread. The Germans counterattacked in what, at the time, was believed to be "force" and it was thought that a breakthrough near the Sele river would result. As a result nothing was functioning smoothly - not even OSS - and everyone was under strain.

At this time Colonel Howard of G-2 complained of lack of information from OSS. As a matter of fact there had been little or no time in which to organize for infiltration or even for the interrogation of "casuals" passing through the lines. In addition, Mr. Downes, who was in charge of OSS affairs forward, had found himself the only government representative in the town of Maiori (Ranger Headquarters) and had been requested by the Ranger Commanding Officer to attend to all CIC and Amgot duties there pending the arrival of officials of these branches. This situation was explained to Col. Howard; the OSS Forward Echelon was moved to Amalfi; information (at first largely the result of interrogation) began coming in; we established an OSS Base Headquarters where we began to screen and organize the information being sent G-2; the German counter-attack failed; and, above all, General Donovan arrived. As a result, the G-2 section, Fifth Army, assumed a less critical attitude. Today they went so far as to commend us on the reports submitted and stated that "a good deal of this material" was being included in their daily summaries.

Note: Copies of forms of reports now being submitted are enclosed herewith. These we hope to improve with experience.

b. Operations

We have, as indicated above, furnished some reasonably accurate information to G-2. Our reports on conditions in Naples and concerning the paucity of German units there and along the coast southward have been confirmed. We now have sufficient Agents of our own on hand to begin to give information on which we ourselves can rely.

On the action side, we have furnished only two groups - the "Clearance Patrols" with the Rangers and the 82nd Airborne Division. A considerable number of such groups are now in training and it is our belief that all combat units will soon find a need for these guides and small patrols.

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Notes: In a conference with Col. Howard, 30 September 1943, it was suggested that OSS furnish similar guides and patrols for the 3rd and 40th Division. Col. Howard thought this a good suggestion and it is being discussed with Division Commanders.

4. Outside Organizations and Individuals

a. There are attached hereto copies of a series of papers submitted to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, relating to the organization, training and employment of Italian Operational Groups. The matter is now under advisement. It was presented, originally, by General Donovan to General Clark through General Gruenther. We are conferring on the matter almost daily through Col. Howard, G-2. Some limited activation of the Fronte della Liberazione may be necessary in order to preserve the enthusiasm of the leaders of the movement who are currently assisting on intelligence matters.

Notes: Col. Eddy's cable No. 21 and word from G-2, Fifth Army, received 30 September 1943 (informal only) indicate good progress. It is hoped that if the King and Badoglio are assigned the task of raising a formal army, the Croce Committee may, none the less, be permitted to proceed with the organization of a small number of OG's which would have a position similar to the "Corps Franco". Such a move would go a long way toward satisfying Croce and other liberals and would furnish Italian units for action almost immediately. The situation would be further aided if Col. Whittaker can effect arrangements to publish, for the Committee, and disseminate "Italia Libera". We are collaborating on this now.

5. Operational Activities to date:

a. Patrols and guides have been furnished to the 82nd Airborne Division as indicated. Training of additional recruits is in progress.

6. Planned Operational Activities

a. The furnishing of patrols and guides (referred to by us as "clearance patrols") for other combat units.

b. The conduct of SO operations against general targets (on the informal authority of Col. Howard) such as personnel, dumps and aircraft.

Notes: Specific and utilitarian targets (bridges, railroads, utilities, etc.) are to be attacked only on express direction.

c. The organization and training of Italian OG's under the "Croce Committee" plan.

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b. Other individuals, with what are apparently fair or allegedly fair contacts of limited scope (but good in particular areas) are working with us - notably: General Pavone, Major Costello, the younger Pavone.

5. Intelligence Activities

a. OSS operatives covered the Avellino-Benevento area prior to Seventh Armored Division "breakthrough" on the 28th.

b. OSS operatives also covered Naples itself (from Salerno, Amalfi and Capri) and their reports of conditions in the area have been proven correct.

c. The coast from Castellamare to Naples was surveyed by OSS agents from Amalfi and their reports of absence of Germans except small patrols on the Sorrento peninsula have been confirmed.

d. No information has yet come from the Volturno-Calore river region, nor the territory north of this line except through interrogation and from the "World Group".

6. Planned Intelligence Activities:

a. Coverage of the Area from Naples to the Volturno is under way from Salerno, ~~and~~ Capri and Amalfi.

b. Agents from Salerno and Capri were to have been sent yesterday to work north of the Volturno. One agent with W/T operator.

c. Amalfi and Capri have planned with the World Group, courier service to Rome and it is hoped that a radio may be established there.

b. Subversive and Quasi-Military Actions:

1. Base Headquarters

a. Little SO or OG work done here except general planning.

2. Forward Stations

a. As indicated under "Intelligence" (see above)

3. OSS Operatives and Groups

a. There are in training some twenty native Italians and recruiting is proceeding. Their use will depend on directives from G-3 of the Army. A Group of about six men were used on 29 September 1943 as guides and an advance patrol with the 82nd Airborne Division for the march toward Naples. A total of three officers and fourteen men are now with both the 82nd Airborne Division and the Rangers for like service.

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

2. Staff Assignments: As indicated in Administrative Orders (copies enclosed as aforesaid) all intelligence and subversive operations have been placed in charge of a Chief of Intelligence and Chief of Operations under the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon. Operational staff assignments not covered by Administrative Orders will be made by the Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon. Due to the shortage of experienced personnel it is expected that several officers (such as Lt.'s Goff and Lossowski who are particularly trained on the subversive side) will have to serve in a dual capacity. Recruiting and screening is being done on a collective basis.

3. Operations

a. Intelligence

3. OSS Operatives and Groups

a. Salerno:

I - There are about eighteen operatives now out, six other failed on a mission (two were killed; two were wounded and two withdrew) and nine are about to leave.

II - About eleven operatives are completing training.

b. Amalfi:

I - One team in Naples (prior to Allied entry). Also courier service Naples and beyond through Mundo (known as "World" group).

II - Some thirty recruits in training.

c. Capri:

I - One team in operation. A second team (with native W/T operator ready).

II - Number in training unknown but believed to be at least six.

4. Outside organizations and individuals.

a. OSS is getting considerable assistance from an underground-labor group through one Mundo (so called) son-in-law of Benedetto Croce. This contact is being expanded and solidified.

Note: Mr. Mundo was delivered to OSS by U. S. Military authorities. His existence was discovered by SOE which, we regret to report, seems to be making a studied attempt to enlist his services to the great detriment of OSS.

SECRET

SECRET

2. Equipment is inadequate without a "stand by" arrangement which we hope to receive through General MORGAN of the Signal Corps.

3. The number of messages received and sent since September 22, 1943, totals approximately 140.

4. Courier service has been established between this Headquarters and Headquarters Fifth Army, and between this Headquarters and Amalfi and Salerno. This will facilitate the transmission of lengthy and longer range reports and will clear the wires for urgent tactical items. There is some doubt that this service will be maintained.

b. Forward Stations:

1. OSS Stations are in operation at Amalfi, Salerno, Capri and Ischia. The station at Ischia has been abandoned and consolidated with that at Capri. This will release an operator who is badly needed.

Note: Due to the withdrawal of enemy forces, arrangements are now being made to move all forward stations. Sites are in process of selection.

2. Agent Stations are not as yet in operation. No radio personnel, qualified (or willing) to operate behind enemy lines, appears to have been included in the personnel assigned this Mission. We have, however, begun recruiting W/T operators from among Italian naval and railroad personnel. One operator has been trained and sent forward; another is in training and we hope to have others shortly. It is fairly easy to "infiltrate" W/T operators without sets. Our problem will be to have sets "dropped" after the operators are established.

Note: One small plane (a Piper Cub for example) would aid materially.

3. Operations

a. Intelligence

1. Base Headquarters:

a. Here information is checked, digested, geographically classified and put in report form. Lt. Callanan, assisted by Mr. Barnes, is doing a fine job of this.

2. Forward Stations:

a. Established: Amalfi, Salerno, Capri, Ischia and Procida. (See Note 2-B - 1 above)

b. Under consideration - Foggia or other suitable spot for "back" infiltration.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

SECRET

1 August 1943

SUBJECT: Weekly Report No. 1

(as at 3:00 p.m.
Thursday, 30 September
1943.)

TO : General WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
(Thru: Col. WILLIAM A. EDDY)

1. Organization

a. Administration

1. There are enclosed herewith copies of General Orders Nos. 1 and 2 and Special Order No. 1, covering the technicalities of organization. Additional appointments to Staff and Executive positions are about to be made and will be included in further Special Orders. The aim is to assign specific duties to all Executive Personnel.

b. Personnel

1. There is also enclosed a roster of all personnel (by stations) as at the hour of this report exclusive of operatives and recruits (numbering approximately 60 at this time).

2. Additional personnel (referred to in Cable 124 to Colonel EDDY and in his cable No. 13) will be most helpful. We now have great need for German-speaking operatives.

c. Supply and Transportation

1. Enclosed is a list of the more important equipment and transportation facilities now on hand.

d. Finance

1. Funds on hand for administrative and operational use appear to be approximately as follows: Mr. Downes \$50,000; Captain ROLLER 110,000 Lira.

Note: Presumably Mr. Downes's funds will be delivered to Captain ROLLER when Mr. Downes leaves.

2. Communications

a. Headquarters Station

1. The volume of traffic is increasingly heavy. It is being handled by Sgt. Mike Jimenez and his brother, Jim, and by Frank Ferrara and St. Germaine.

SECRET

By 24th Army
 Hq. 088 - Dec 9 - 1/2

12,818
 Grand Army
 x T. J. L. C. M. A.

SECRET

operations reports
 to be sent

30 Sept 48.

Subject: Report No 1. 0885A Mission
 To: General Donovan.

1. Our first report is enclosed.
2. We are to day moving forward
 Naples. Communications will be open
 here to morning.

3. Major Floyd is now in control.
 Mr. Dawson leaves Tuesday - staying this
 long simply to facilitate "turn over" to
 Major Floyd. The organization is beginning
 to function as such.

My heart and I
 hope to demonstrate progress on your
 return.

Very -

SECRET

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
-2-

1. Officer of Italian Navy, formerly asst Port Officer. Sent by this Det. to Naples to assist with restoration of Port facilities.
1. Italian Cavalry Officer. This Det. made arrangements to fly him to Brindisi.
- 1 Italian Enlisted men sent to camp at Pontecagnano.

3; Disposition such as described in paragraph 2 is at present extremely difficult with the limited authority and food and transportation facilities at the disposal of this Detachment. It is hoped that some solution, such as the attached outline, will quickly reach the reorganized Italian Army or a service of Allied Armies which can usefully employ them.

For Colonel HENTINGTON

MALCOLM E. CALLANAN
2nd. Lt. NMB
Intelligence Officer



PROPOSAL FOR THE RECEPTION OF

ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ITALY

In order most usefully to employ the personnel and intelligence of former officers and men of the Italian Army who are in large numbers crossing enemy lines to join the forces of the United Nations it is proposed that:

- a. Separate Reception and Control posts be set up directly behind the 8th (American) and 5th (British) Armies to receive all volunteers for Allied forces.
- b. All American and British units to direct all Italian officers and men to such posts without delay.
- c. These posts to be manned by joint Italian and Allied reception committees who will promptly recruit all desirable men, detain all suspects and release all those who are undesirable.
- d. Tactical intelligence from such men to be obtained at these reception posts and forwarded to the proper local authorities.
- e. The reception posts to decide to which of the Allied Armies the desirable officers and men should be sent (Air Corps, Engineers, etc., Italian Army, etc).
- f. Transportation to be arranged for recruits for new Italian Army or armed groups to reach training or assembly areas. This transportation should be Italian vehicles with Italian Army drivers using fuel and facilities supplied by British and American Armies.

4. W.P.
033 1300 000 0-2

OS'S SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
FIFTH ARMY

2 September 1943

SUBJECT : Civilian and Military Refugees

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AC of S G-2

1. In the past week this Organization has been receiving officers and men of the Italian Army. We have interviewed and employed those who would be useful to us, but have had to turn many back. Evidently the Fifth Army has made no arrangements for the disposition of these men, and this Detachment has neither the authority nor the facilities for such disposition. Accordingly, a proposal for the solution of this problem has been attached. It is suggested that this proposal should be addressed by the Chief of Staff, Fifth Army to the Italian Government through the Allied Military Mission.

2. The following Italian Civilian and military personnel sent here by G-2 have been taken care of by this Detachment.

- 2 Italian Staff Officers from Rome - sent by Italian truck and driver of this Detachment to Brindisi.
- 2 Civil Engineers - taken by this Detachment to Naples to aid Engineers in re-establishing light and water system.
- 3 Officers of Italian Air Force - retained by this Detachment to be sent to proper American authorities.

SECRET

-4-

German AA defense of Europe and Italy (both theory and actual system).

Specific AA defense of Rome and Milan Regions (the Colonel is the only Italian who knows these defenses in detail, having been in charge of both).

Estimate of aeronautical situation in Germany and Northern Italy.

New German aircraft types.

Details of AA devices (the Colonel's adjutant knows particularly the new radio locator devices).

Factors concerning airports in North Italy and Germany which might ordinarily not be obtainable.

German air training methods and centers (for fighter and dive bomber training only).

German cartographic theory and methods.

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

WUP
MALCOLM W. GALLANAN
2nd Lt; NAB
Intelligence Officer

07: Colonel WOODS A-8, Fifth Army
Colonel GALLOWAY G-8, 6th Corps
Major Blom CI G-8
OSS Algiers
OSS Washington ✓
Files

S E C R E T

a. The DIVISIONE CENTAURO formed by and of Fascists was the only division he heard of who refused to fight the Germans when ordered to. Most of the Officer and Non Com Cadres of this division are ardent Fascists. Its commander was a son-in-law of the King, Count Calvi Di Bergole, a non Fascist who gave the order to resist the Germans, but whose troops refused to obey him.

b. The following men in aviation definitely acted in a manner contrary to the proclamation of Badoglio and in order to assist the Germans thus (because of their commanding position) preventing the escape of large numbers of planes and pilots.

Generale ALDO URBANI
Head of the Cabinet of Ministry of
air.

Generale MARCELLO PERUTI
Commandante Centro Naz. Aviazione
Di Caccia.

Colonello TONDI
Air Adjutant to Mussolini, and
commander of Guidonia Airport.

Generale JULIAN LONGO
Chief of SAS (Special Air Transport
Services).

Dossiers are being compiled on these men by this Detachment which will be forwarded to CI, G-2 when completed.

2. The following is a list of the information which could be obtained from Colonel M. and his adjutant who in many cases were the only men in Italy close to this information. Steps are being taken by this Detachment to see that the proper services are notified of the Colonel's presence and to make him available to these services.

S E C R E T

He says there are a great many resistance groups in Northern Italy, and literally thousands of armed men are hidden in the hills and mountains, many of them well organized.

In Rome there was great resistance to the Germans. Due to the lack of orders their resistance was disorganized but resulted in serious losses to the Germans as to the Italians. The Polizia AOE and several regular Army units held points of resistance all through the city. As of the 12 September, the PIAVE Division which had shut itself up in the Villa Borghese (one of the largest parts of the great Park Villa Urbane) was still defending itself. (for counter-intelligence implications see below on Intelligence General)

The weakness of German air power in Italy is due to many factors, particularly losses of fighter planes against the heavily armed Flying Fortresses and Liberators and losses due to planes bombed on the field. Also the Colonel pointed out that today Germany is in the process of adapting totally new designs for fighter and pursuit planes, many from Italian plans; and as yet has not received these new models from the factories.

Intelligence General: The Colonel's estimate of the general situation corresponds with all our previous information: morale of the people is high, very pro-American and very anti-Fascist. He feels that counter-intelligence is extremely important, and that he hopes the Allies see to it that men whose conduct was pro-German during the period from the armistice till today will at least be mobilized during the period of military activity in the region. He adds this specific information.

SECRET

ONE SPAC. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

6 October 1943

SUBJECT : Special Intelligence Report

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AG of S G-2, Fifth Army Hq.

1: The following is a report on an interview with a well known Italian Air Force Colonel, who crossed the lines on the 30th of September. The local tactical intelligence he obtained was turned over to the division which received him (he thinks it was the 45th, but is not sure. The name of the interpreter for the American Colonel who did the interrogating is Lt. VELLA AUS). Following is a summary of the strategic military intelligence he obtained and of general intelligence. Due to his unfamiliarity with land warfare these opinions must not be valued highly. At the end of this report is a recommendation as to obtaining his valuable fund of aeronautical intelligence.

Intelligence. Strategic Estimate of situation in Italy: Colonel H. says that the Germans have 15 to 20 incomplete divisions in Italy including the 16th and 29th Panzer Divisions which, at least two weeks ago, were south of Rome, and two SS Divisions in Northern Italy. He says the concentration of troops in Northern Italy is very great. The Germans might defend a Monte Amiata (S. of Livorno)-Ancona line, but their fortifications and big defense will be north of the Po. He heard officers in Rome discussing the strategic value of the river itself in winter time and of the value of the plains for mobile warfare. Colonel H. emphasizes his contempt standing with regard to the above statements.

SECRET

f. The Germans are moving the bulk of their material to Rome along the road which turns west at 143-946 on Sheet 172.

g. Some supplies probably for a delaying action, are being transported along the road leading north from 143-946 on Sheet 172 and are being stored at Cassino 856-213 on Sheet 160, Frosinone 461-375 on Sheet 159, and Ferentino.

h. Only supplies to fill temporary requirements have been left in the area near Capua.

i. North of the Volturno among vines and trees in the general region of 172-946 on Sheet 172, there are at least ten batteries of Artillery, also unknown but perhaps 180mm. These are coupled to prime movers for immediate evacuation.

for Colonel "B" "THIR"

W. C. R.
And Lt. W. C.
Intelligence Officer

CC: Colonel GALLOVAY
Algiers
Washington /
Files

0.5 SPIG. INT. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

6 October 1943

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report No. 40

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AG of G-2, Fifth Army Hq.

1. The following report is from OGS agent who returned from operation in enemy lines.

Agent left Salerno on the 29th of September and travelled north to Capua. He was north of the Volturno as far as 145-835 on Sheet 172. He states that he was taken into custody by the Germans three times, but was released because of a crippled knee. He left this area on the 3rd of October and reported back at Amalfi at 1700 hrs, the fifth of October.

a. Cattle are being slaughtered by the Germans in the general area (around Casserta and Capua).

b. Some indiscriminate killing of Italian civilians is taking place. Italian men of 18 to 45 years are being rounded up and interned at Speranise (Sheet 172 876-825).

c. Railroad bridge at Capua (Sheet 172 070-781) has been destroyed.

d. Two bridges, one very narrow, at Capua, (Sheet 172 175-885), and one at 210-811 on Sheet 172, are still intact, but are heavily mined.

e. Two airfields at Capua, one at 155-723 on Sheet 172, and the other just Southeast of the village have been abandoned.

for

-3-

At Grumo, there is a small machine gun nest with ordinary field fortifications, no concrete, across the rail-road line. On the fourth of October at 1400 hrs. he saw several German tanks (medium size), with 47mm canon between Grumo and Cassandrino. This morning, October 5th, the German 75mm battery fired a salvo and at 5-o'clock in the morning retreated northwards.

Our Informant states that the Germans between Allied lines and the Volturno are very few in number.

(Note agent covered only territory as far east as Aversa and from thence to the Volturno).

for Colonel HUMPHREY.

mead
LADYON W. GALLOWAY
2nd Lt. NMB
Intelligence Officer

OO: Colonel GALLOWAY
OSS ALGIERS
OSS WASHINGTON
File

-2-

From Aversa the informant went to Friagnano where the traffic is less important than the other road although there are lots of small trucks using this side road. The railroad track is blown up at Friagnano and the railroad bridge at 152-682 is mined. Once blown up it will cut the road between Aversa and Friagnano. The road Friagnano to Albanova is not mined. There is very important traffic going north consisting of small trucks.

There are practically no Germans in Albanova. The road from Albanova (is not mined) to Villa Litterno. Two kilometers west of Albanova, exit on the Villa Litterno road, there are about 100 Italian vehicles burned. Further west, about 2 kilometers there are about 30 medium tanks (German) with 47 mm cannon hidden under the cover of a big trees along the road. At Villa Litterno the informant found dispersed German soldiers hidden in the middle of the fields. The road from Villa Litterno to Cancelli Arnone is not mined. Cancelli is completely destroyed but the main bridge from the Volturno River is intact and used by the Germans. From the left bank of the river there are road blocks. At Grazzanise, map 100,000, at 088-770, the Germans have built a bridge extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to find from a very short distance. At Sparanise the Germans have built a concentration camp where all of the young Italians are kept before being sent up north.

Along side of the Volturno River our informant saw no fortifications and not a single barbed wire entanglement. He also spoke to several peasants who know the other side of the river and confirmed the statement. During his trip in the German lines our informant has not been able to see a single anti-tank gun. On what he gathered the Germans are prepared to resist in the mountain north of Mondragone map, 100,000, 910-790.

OSS SPEC. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

6 October 1943

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 41

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AG of S G-2, Fifth Army Hq.

1. The following report was received night of October 5-6 from OSS Naples. It contains information by one of our agents who crossed enemy lines as far as the Volturno River. It is evaluated at A-2.

2. Informant left Naples October 2 early in the morning. Last Allied troops seen at 8-0'clock at Quadrivio Di Arsano. He followed the road to Melito to find that all trees had cut across the road. He arrived at San Antimo 206 600 (Napoli 1-50, 000), 1 kilometer from the German line that passed through at Cassandrino. At 260-598 a 75 mm battery under American and Allied fire was moved 300 meters towards San Antimo.

Informant presented himself to a German officer to enlist in the new Italian Army.

From Cassandrino he went to San Antimo where he located 2 half tracks at the north exit of Cassandrino 208-593 on the line.

The German line is very weak in depth but is spread in one line across the country in a fluid fashion. Informant passed Grumo and Frattamaggiore where he found Germans digging machine gun positions. At San Antimo he estimated that the German forces were approximately an infantry company of 250 men in Palazzo Municipale and Castle.

The road San Antimo-Cesa 195-625 is good and not mined and has no road blocks. The railroad bridge is not mined. Between San Antimo and Cesa there are no Germans.

He arrived at Aversa where he found the road to be free and not mined. There are very few Germans at Aversa. This is a very important traffic route between Aversa and Santa Maria di Capua. This road is the main axis of the German retreat and a great many trucks are using it constantly. He observed the retreat as being made in great care leaving nothing behind them.

SECRET

-3-

2. About 3 Km. northwest of COLONNA there is a factory called BRUDA where Italian arms are made.

It is heavily mined.

There are batteries across the street from the factory and anti-aircraft guns around it.

A railway station is right next to the factory.

for Colonel HUMPHRIES

MALCOLM W. CANNAN
2nd Lt. HRP
Intelligence Officer

G.C. : Colonel LANGVIN, G-2, 6th Corps.
: Major BLOM, G-2, 5th Army.
: OSS, Algiers
: OSS, WASHINGTON. ✓
: File.

-2-

2a. Beach near 170-000 on sheet 170 may be mined but the rest of the beach from TERRACINA to CHAZO is not mined.

2a. Near 137-249 on Sheet 161 along secondary roads tanks are concealed by parking alongside houses under a covering of branches.

2a. In an olive orchard from 095-285 to 111-265 on sheet 161 there is a line of tank troops 3 m. wide, 2 1/2 m. deep and 90 cm. across at the bottom.

The ditches and at the tanks of the VOLTURNO are covered with branches.

2a. All the bridges across the VOLTURNO are mined.

2a. Gasoline, ammunition, food and anti-tank guns well scattered in the forest of CERQUETO (Sheet 161 089-229). Command post in TAVERNA di PRIVERNO (081-272).

The houses on this part of the road are full of military supplies, repair depots, and equipment.

2a. Road from 118-240 to 140-280 on sheet 161 is mined with holes on each side of the road. The holes are 30 cm. in diameter and 180 cm. in depth and are spaced every 600 to 700 metres.

2a. At FROSINONE there is an airport still in use.

2a. Powder plants at AHAGNI and GUGNI are to be blown with the mined road. These plants are very well camouflaged.

03. 1170. 111. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

12 October 1943

SUBJECT : Intelligence report No 49

TO : Colonel HOWARD, A.C. of U. G-2 5th Army Hq.

1. The following is a report from our courier returning from Rome.
Evaluation G-2.

All grid references are from maps 1:100,000 of Italy.

1a. ITXI (171 606-988), main road narrow with mountains on both sides, tank troops, artillery and machine guns in this area.

2a. FONDI (Sheet 159 520-069), road is mined from several kilometers on both sides of the town.

3a. MONTE CASSO Railway Tunnel (Sheet 159 402-059 to 342-109) is mined.

4a. TERNACINA (Sheet 170 370-990) has not been fortified.

5a. Road from TERNACINA to CIETTERA is mined all bridges are mined but the country alongside the road is very flat allowing automobiles to pass easily.

6a. In the 10000 at PADIOLONE, a forest (Sheet 158 environs of 900-950) is a fairly large tank troop, well hidden, about 3 m. wide and 2 1/2 m. deep.

- 2 -

4. The steps already taken represent, of course, only a beginning and since there is much yet to be done by us jointly in order to make the contemplated program a useful and effective one, we would suggest an early conference. Our Base Headquarters was moved only last evening to Naples which accounts for our delay in communicating with you. For the time being we are using the address of our Forward Echelon Headquarters - 71 via Crispi.

WILLIAM H. HUNTINGTON JR
Colonel - Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

8 October 1943.

SUBJECT: Italian Operational Groups - Organization pursuant
authority Commanding General, Fifth Army (approval
of 4 October 1943, based on basic communication of 26
September 1943).

TO : Major MALCOLM DUNHAM, HQ.

1. Pursuant to the above authority of which you have a copy GSS is prepared to receive with the cooperation of "OP" (covered by the memorandum of General Donovan of 24 September 1943, prepared after the conference between yourself, Captain Sylvester, General Pavone, General Donovan and the undersigned) is assisting General Pavone in organizing and training Italian Operational Groups.
2. In the interest of expediting the organization, training and equipping of the Groups we have taken the liberty of:
 - a. Bringing General Pavone to Naples where he is now engaged in making preliminary contacts and arrangements.
 - b. Selecting and requisitioning a hotel in Naples sufficiently ample for all necessary officers and to furnish billeting and mess facilities for transient personnel.
 - c. Selecting and requisitioning an area (north of Naples) where training may be undertaken.
 - d. Assisting in providing personnel, supplies and transportation in connection with the foregoing; and
 - e. Taking steps to provide communication facilities, arms, ammunition and clothing for SIC officers and men.
3. Under the authority of General Clark, GSS and GOF are directed to give all necessary aid to General Pavone and his Italian associates. This, we assume, will require the furnishing of an instructional staff (to assist Italian instructors) in addition to providing equipment, and we have assigned competent instructors who will be available for this work.

-2-

operations will be undertaken by the groups except by direction of the Commanding General, Fifth Army.

3. Since time is of the essence in connection with this undertaking OSS has undertaken to procure food, arms and equipment, office and housing facilities, and a training area. OSS will provide such funds and such instructors and advisers as may be necessary in making effective the program approved by the Commanding General. OSS has assigned Commander Breed and Mr. Sawaldi to your staff in order to insure that its cooperation may be made effective.

4. In accordance with the understanding arrived at between OSS and SOF (conference 24 September 1943 at OSS Base Headquarters, Facetini, between General Pavone, Mr. Munde, General Donovan, Colonel Huntington, Major Munthe and Captain Sylvester) we have this date notified SOF of the steps which have been taken as above outlined, and anticipate a favorable and cooperative response from such organization.

5. In view of the foregoing we respectfully suggest:

a. That you establish at once an office and recruiting center in Naples at the Hotel Mueller which has already been requisitioned for your purposes and where housing and messing facilities are being provided.

b. That you visit and approve the training establishment which has been selected or reject the same and make a new selection;

c. That your staff be immediately chosen (to include appropriate quartermaster, communication, transportation, finance and medical personnel) and that a program be at once instituted calling for the recruitment and training of 3 Operational Groups composed of personnel particularly familiar with the area between the Volturno and Rome which lies before the Fifth Army, including one group especially familiar with Rome and its environs; and

d. That, through your appropriate Staff Officers, you indicate at the earliest possible moment your requirements of supply and transportation and such estimate of expenses as you are now able to furnish.

WALTER C. HUNTINGTON JR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
 MILITARY OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
 (Villa Maria)

8 October 1943

SUBJECT: Italian Operational Groups - Organization.

TO : General Guiseppe Pavone

1. My communication from the undersigned to you, dated 5 October 1943, you were advised that the Basic Communication dated 26 September 1943, of this office to General Clark, Commanding General, Fifth Army, outlining a proposal for the organization and use of Italian Operational Groups, had been approved for the Commanding General by endorsement dated 4 October 1943, subject to certain conditions.

2. For your information the authority, as set forth in the Basic Communication and Endorsement provides, substantially:

a. That Italian Operational Groups (units of Italian officers and soldiers organized in groups consisting of 4 officers and 30 enlisted men each limited, initially, to 15 groups) be organized under the direction of the Committee of which you and Signor Benedetto Croce are members.

b. That you will be the Military Member of the Committee in charge of such organization assisted by a staff of subordinates to be chosen by you with the approval of the Committee.

c. That supplies, transportation, training facilities, arms and equipment will be furnished through the efforts of CGA and POW.

d. That such expenses as may be necessary in connection with the undertaking shall be borne by CGA and POW; and

e. That the following conditions shall apply:

1. Such operational groups will be non-political in character and not identified with any political group.

2. Care will be exercised to prevent any effort, military or political, being made to the opposition of the Italian King and Badoglio government.

3. The groups will be organized under Italian leadership and will be strictly military in character.

4. The operations of the groups will be completely under the control of the Commanding General, Fifth Army. No

G 2 2 X

155
2004

AG CLARK

1st Ind.

WHR/WFO/efp

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY, A. P. O. #464, U. S. Army, 4 October 1943.

To: Colonel Milroy C. Huntington Jr, Chief of Office of Strategic Services.

1. Your plan as indicated in basic letter for the organization and employment of Italian Operational groups is approved with the following conditions:

a. Such operational groups will be non-political in character and not identified with any political group.

b. Care will be exercised to prevent any effort, military or political, being made to the opposition of the Italian King and Fascist government.

c. The groups will be organized under Italian leadership and will be strictly military in character.

d. The operations of the groups will be completely under the control of the Commanding General, Fifth Army. No operations will be undertaken by the groups except by direction of the Commanding General, Fifth Army.

By command of Lieutenant General CLARK:

(signed) M. T. GRANT

/s/

M. T. GRANT
Colonel, A. O. S.
Adjutant Gen.

4 incls.

Incl 1 Memo 24/9/43 Donovan to Gruenther
Incl 2 rpt on Journey to Capri
Incl 3 Ltr from Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione
Incl 4 rpt on Activities of A.O.S.

A TRUE COPY:

JOHN S. ROLLER,
Captain, A. O. S.
Adjutant.

Opl Frank Ferrara
Mr. L. Blasio

Radio Operator
Assistant

Combat Station (10th Corp)

Lt. A. Gagliatti
Pvt M. Calore
Opl B. Treglia

CO
Radio Operator
Assistant

Combat Station (6th Corp)

Lt. M. Waagland
Conti
Civ Candella
Civ Severini
Civ Messeri
Civ Volodi
Civ Rao
Civ Nardi

CO
Radio Operator
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant

Training Area

Lt. V. Lossewski
Civ G. Romulus
Civ R. Sigliani
Opl Elmo Lambert
Opl Domenico Signore

CO
Assistant
Assistant
Mass
Assistant

Operatives

Radio Operators
In field
In training

3
5

Intelligence Agents

In field
In holding
In training

5
8
0

Combat Personnel

In field
In Holding
In training

0
12
20

Personnel lost to Mission

Capt J. Russo - hospital
Sgt Jim Jimenez - evacuated (illness)

To be discussed:

C. Carta
A. Minaldi
Carbonare

I. Goriani
L. Costa

M. Diaccone
A. Gentile

NSS
1/10/43

**ONE FIFTH ARMY MINTON
POSTER**

8 October 1943

STATION	DUTY	ATTACHED TO
ONE BASE HEADQUARTERS:		
HUNTINGTON, Ellery O. Jr.	Commanding Officer	
SMITH, Bradish	Executive Officer	
ROLIER, John S.	Adj.-Services Officer	
GALLANAN, Malcolm W.	Hq Intel O & Asst Adj	
BARNES, James	Asst Intel Officer	
THOMPSON, Peter	Liaison Italian CG's	Gen. Favone
Simone, Mike	Communications	
Silvani, Stelvio	Asst 1st Sergeant	
Gonzales, Louis J.	Chief Clerk	
Kerherve, John	Motor Pool	
Mains, Sylvester	General Duty	
Glattne, Paul A.	Clerk	
Samolich, Mario	Motor Pool	
Morabito, Domenick J.	Cipher Clerk	
Wilkins, Woodrow	Driver	
Politi, Philippe	Interpreter-Civilian	
St. Germaine, Henry	Civilian - Communications	

FORWARD POSITION:

Major E. S. Lloyd	CO
Major Jansen	Combat Liaison
Cap. A. Bourgois	Intelligence Officer
Lt. Irving Goff	Dispatching Officer
Lt. John Crane	Asst Intelligence Officer
Commander B. Breed	Finance Officer
Mr. J. Savoldi	Administrative Officer
Lt. Henry R. North(USNR)	Special duty
Sgt. Noto De Angeles	Asst Dispatching Officer
Cpl A. Faga	Intelligence - Assistant
Pvt. L. Di Maggio	Intelligence - Assistant
Pvt. William Zinno	Clerk

Cpl. A. Monti	Mess Officer	Mr. Savoldi
Civ A. Maltagliati	Interpreter	Mr. Lloyd
Civ A. Durao	Intelligence Asst	Major Lloyd
Italian Civ Mr Favone Jr	Intelligence Asst	Major Lloyd
" " " Theodali	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ C. Bongiovanni	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ D. Ciaviano	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ W. De Paoli	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ M. Pigne	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ N. Cocchetti	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ O. Curatello	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ A. Aspiroella	Guard & gen duty	Mr. Savoldi
Italian Civ M. Mosca	Administration Asst	Mr. Savoldi

Combat Station (Capri)
Capt. A. Facatte

CO

- 9 -

Lt. Carriate (good with an SI background) are as busy on the action as on the intelligence side. In other words directives, as received, are carried out under the supervision of the area OSS officers whether action or intelligence is the objective. Training, briefing and the type of personnel involved may differ but the problems of infiltration and communication are fundamentally the same. The basic requirements - as for an OSS Officer personnel is concerned - are: common sense, initiative, education and a general background of association with the business of OSS. At least 75 % of the Executives assigned to a Mission must also have reasonable language qualifications. They should know the country and at least have a working knowledge of the language with its political and economic implications. The Mission, obviously, must be established with the Government of the country in which it is operating.

E. S. Huntington
 Director, Intelligence Division
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D. C.

P.S. Intelligence Report # 29 also included.

complaints are being received from the Italian side, and the Italian side is not yet ready to move out of the places and we will not begin to do so until for several days.

It is gratifying to have direct requests for action including a specific assignment (as soon as possible) for at least one Italian Operational Group for which G-2 has asked.

Fifth Army Operations: Two days of heavy rain, heavy forces at Volturno still not conducting sizable and signs of continual withdrawal possible.

B. General Remarks:

Last week's report (No. 1) was hurriedly done and somewhat scribbled but its intent was clearly shown. We will, hereafter, presumably, follow the form of this Report No. 2.

We are at a loss to know why Alcide has not responded to our cables calling for radio sets, asking for Capt. and requesting Lt. Subiel to assist Capt. Rollin. It is possible that it is considered that earlier cables covered these points. "The field" is always inclined to be over-enthusiastic since, whether rightly or wrongly, we all acquire the feeling of being an orphan child. This is decidedly the point of view of the Fifth Army Mission.

It can be seen that our Mission or Liaison - perhaps because we are so short of useful manpower and modern equipment - is shaping itself as follows:

A Base Headquarters where contact is kept with the Army we are serving, where intelligence is coordinated, advice problems handled and where questions of general policy are settled. Dealings with other American and Departmental and with outside organizations are, likewise, centered here.

A Forward Echelon which supervises all operations, does "Long Range" planning and infiltration and coordinates the activities of our Combat Stations.

Combat Stations: which deal directly with the Corps and their subordinate units on "Short Range" requirements.

A Training Center which acts, also, as a "Holding" Area.

Our operations are purely on an "OSS" basis and branch distinctions have been forgotten. To purpose of designation - we have set up an adequate system for allocation and reporting information as received. As a matter of fact Lt. Callanen - whose training in Washington was essentially SO - is spending his entire time on Intelligence whereas Major Eli and

2. On the

- 5 -

They will locate and report to SOE, Rome, as soon as possible.

b. Subversive Action:

1. "GI" name: "Fascist" 6th Company, ready for action. The availability of the guides for night work seems to be one of the main points of discussion and subversive action. The availability of these guides is being discussed.

2. "Italian Operational Groups" (IOG) of three, for the present, will be sent to the Valturmo and Rome will be on his list. One of the IOG's North of Naples is in a school (the school is nearby school where the Italians will be housed) to carry out an IOG training without interfering with the IOG. General Pavone is on his way to us. The IOG's will be obtained about to notify British SOE and ready for their cooperation.

3. IOG's

2. Schettino Terra (or) (or) of 4 in each one of the groups to carry out specific IOG's to cut railroad communications between the Valturmo and Rome.

6. Outside Organizations and Individuals:

a. The Croce Committee:

1. Mr. Mundo, who is the 1st member of this Committee has returned to us with promises of assistance from his anti-fascist underground and labor organizations. He has been asked for guides, contacts and safe houses for subversive undertakings.

2. The Committee is establishing its headquarters (Hotel Mueller, Naples) from which the activities of the Italian IOG's will be directed. (Enclosed are copies of a letter to British SOE and a memorandum to General Pavone which will indicate action taken to date).

b. Rebecchi:

1. This man is just out of Rome and is in touch with officers and soldiers there having access to arms and ammunition, it is reported. If this is a fact this contact will be used for a project in which Italian IOG's may be used.

c. Theodoli:

1. Son of Fascist Senator but himself a socialist.

The War of Mexico (1846-1848) was a conflict between the United States and Mexico over territorial disputes. The war resulted in the United States gaining significant territory, including California and New Mexico. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) ended the war and established the current borders of the United States.

[illegible]

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

Active on the left side of the political spectrum, he has been active in the "Left" movement since the late 1960s. He was a member of the "Black Panther Party" and the "Weathermen" group. He was also a member of the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA) and the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA). He was also a member of the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA) and the "People's Liberation Army" (PLA).

Notes Copy of entertainment enclosed.

4. Operational Activities:

5. Intelligence

1. Advance to Maricao - well covered by the 114th Recon
troop sent ahead by Lieutenant (now Captain) Paul J. Brown to the
island of Capri on 10 June 1941. The 114th Recon was not
however, informed of the presence of the 114th Recon.

-2-

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11 October 1967) and...
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2. Communications:

1. Headquarters Station:
 1. The...
 2. The...
 3. The...
 4. The...
 5. The...
 6. The...
 7. The...
 8. The...
 9. The...
 10. The...

2. Training: We have...
 3. Observational: The...
 4. Forward Station: The...
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Two are trained and five in progress. This work is being done by Col. Mike Jimenez with improved...
 3. Observational: The...
 4. Forward Station: The...
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effectively at Amalef. The...
 4. Forward Station: The...
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1. Forward Station:

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Note: An additional...
 at the Training Area...
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3. The...
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3. Operations - General Comment:

a. Intelligence:

1. Base Headquarters:

2. Considerable...
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 9. The...
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Grain mieten 12,818
x Füllkorn
x Heuberg
x Operation des Korns

HEADQUARTERS NORTH ARMY
HQ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SECURITY
STRATEGIC SECURITY DIVISION 2-2
(OFF NORTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS)

(Received at 3:00 pm 7 October 1967)
Vol : ...
Should be ... 1 October 1967.

SUBJECT: Weekly Report No. 2

TO : General William J. Donovan
(Through: Col. William A. Tamm)

1. Orientation:

2. Admission of students:

1. Orders of General Order No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 8

1. Power on 7:

1. A report of person 1, dated 1/1/68, is attached to No. 1. The report states the person was born in the United States and is a member of the Communist Party. The report is enclosed.

only. distribution. even though the...
 alone, recently...
 first and the...
 and Intell...

2. The following members of the OGC (Office of
Military Operations) are of no use, will not (or
cannot) do executive work and are entirely out of the
line of this type. They are: (a) [Name], (b) [Name],
(c) [Name], (d) [Name], (e) [Name], (f) [Name],
(g) [Name], (h) [Name], (i) [Name], (j) [Name],
(k) [Name], (l) [Name], (m) [Name], (n) [Name],
(o) [Name], (p) [Name], (q) [Name], (r) [Name],
(s) [Name], (t) [Name], (u) [Name], (v) [Name],
(w) [Name], (x) [Name], (y) [Name], (z) [Name].

Supply and Transport Mon:

1. No change in amount of equipment
2. Lack of vehicle is paralyzing to

2. Radio equipment is still badly needed as are

-2-

LONG RANGE INTELLIGENCE

BOURGOIN, A.	Commanding Officer
SAVOLDI, J.	Administrative Officer
ZINNO, William	Clerk
DURSO, A. Italian civilian	Interpreter
THEODALI, Italian civilian	Intelligence Asst.
ZIGLIANI, R. Italian civilian	Assistant

FORWARD ECHELON (cont.)

10TH CORPS

CAGGIATTI A.	Commanding Officer
CALORE H.	Radio Operator
NARDI, Italian civilian	Assistant
CANDELLA, Italian civilian	Assistant
RINALDI, Italian civilian	Assistant
COSTA, Italian civilian	Assistant

6TH CORPS

HAGLAND, H.	Commanding Officer
CONTI	Radio Operator
SEVERINI, Italian civilian	Assistant
MESSERI, Italian civilian	Assistant
FOLSOI, Italian civilian	Assistant
RAO, Italian civilian	Assistant
TREGLIA, E.	Assistant

FORWARD ECHELON

3RD DIVISION

GOFF, Irving	Commanding Officer
SIGNORE, Domenic	Assistant
ROMULUS, G. Italian civilian	Assistant

34TH DIVISION

LOSSOWSKI V.	Commanding Officer
PAGA, A.	Intelligence, Assistant
LAMBERT, Elmo	Mess

OSS, FIFTH ARMY MISSION ROSTER


20. October 1943

STATION	BASE
OSS BASE HEADQUARTERS	
HUNTINGTON, Ellery C. Jr.	Commanding Officer
SMITH, Bradish	Executive Officer
ROLLER, John C.	Adj.-Services Officer
CALLANAN, Malcolm W.	Hq Intel O & Asst Adj
BARNES, James	Asst Intel Officer
DENSLER, Lt.	Supply Officer
THOMPSON, Peter	Liaison Italian OG's
SILVANI, Stelvio	Act 1st Sergeant
GONZALEZ, Louis J.	Chief Clerk
KERHERVE, John	Motor Pool
MAIZA, Sylvester	General Duty
ALLOTTONE, Paul A.	Clerk
WILKINS, Woodrow	Driver
POLITI, Philippe	Interpreter-Civilian
MC AVOY, James H.	Headquarters Clerk
MC CART, Thomas A.	Supply clerk
SEMOLICH, Mario	Motor Pool
VASKEKI, Gianni	Intelligence Clerk
MASETTI, A. Italian civilian	Intelligence Section
TOMASSI, B. Italian civilian	Intelligence Section
 BASE HEADQUARTERS (RADIO)	
JIMINEZ, Mike	Communications
MONTI, A.	Communications
ST. GERMAINE, Henry	Communications
MORABITO, Domenick J.	Communications
 CORSICA	
PACCATTE, A.	Commanding Officer
BLEZIO, L.	Assistant
FERRARA, Frank	Radio Operator
 ADRIATIC	
NORTH, Henry R. (USNR)	Special Duty
 FORWARD ECHELON	
LLOYD, S. B.	Commanding Officer
PAVONE, Jr. Italian civilian	Intelligence Assistant
GROZE, John	Assistant Intelligence Officer
DE ANGELES, Noto	Asst. Dispatching Officer

SECRET

-2-

From DRAGONI agents proceeded southward along main road to CAIAZZO. Along this road less traffic than along Route No. 6 mentioned in above paragraph, but still some evidence of German movements. German vehicles along this road bore one of the following markings:



HERE ILLEGIBLE PRINTING

c. About 3 1/2 kilometers north of VOLTURNO river behind the first range of hills from CAIAZZO eastward along the valley was a German mobile artillery unit of medium calibre.

d. Report received of German supplies evacuated from South being temporarily stored for German forward units at FRANCOLIS and SPERANZA. Other supplies and material being removed to CAIAZZO and DRAGONI.

e. SUMMARY : No evidence of any strong German forces in high ground north of VOLTURNO River in arc CAIUA-PIGNATARO-DRAGONI-CAIAZZO.

Note from OSS Agent: "This information delayed because returning agents were arrested by British and held for two days prior to our effecting their release".

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

M. W. C.
MALCOLM J. CALLAHAN
2nd Lt. WMB
Intelligence Officer

Washington

OSS SPEC. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

14 October 1943

SUBJECT : Intelligence Report No. 52

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AG of S G-2, Fifth Army HQ

1. The following is a copy of a report received from an OSS agent and delivered to 6th Corps G-2.
Evaluation B-3

a. From Capua agents crossed VOLTURNO by small row boat. Bridges all blown up. Saw only small groups of German soldiers. At the North edge of CAPUA on Route No. 6, one anti-tank gun. Traffic along this road almost exclusively northbound. German military vehicles seen along this road bore one of the following:

b. From CAPUA agents proceeded along Route No. 6 to PIGNATARO, crossed mountains to FORMICOLA, thence northeasterly to DRAGONI. Through these mountains saw only small scattered German forces. Germans burning certain Italian stores and supplies which they were unable to transport with them- offering general evidence of withdrawal from this sector.

-4-

the seaplane base ^{1. SEATTLE, WA.} ~~base~~ which is situated 800 yards west of
CAPO EL FARO. The Germans are utilizing

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

M. W. C.
LAWRENCE M. C. HUNTINGTON
2nd Lt. WLB
Intelligence Officer

OO: Colonel LANGEVIN
Major BLON
OSS Algiers
OSS Washington ✓
Files

SECRET

-3-

f. NAVAL MINE FIELDS : Informant states that he can give exactly the location of all the mine fields on the French border on VARENNES to LA CROIX. He can give also the channels to get through the mine fields. The principle mine fields in front of LA CROIX are situated at about 12 kilometers off the coast. The mines are at 2.50 meter under the water level. All these mines are percussion mines. Informant states that the mine field about 500 yards wide. The distance between each mine varies between 25 to 50 yards.

g. COASTAL DEFENSE : All along the sides of the coast from French border to LA CROIX are very strong barbed wire entanglements, retreating trenches, machine gun positions, artillery batteries and land mines. The coast is heavily guarded, and informant estimates that all landings are impossible. Even a small party with a flaming boat.

h. CIVILIAN FORCE : Italian civilian population has pro-Allied sentiments for the greatest part but the population has no weapons at all and could not be able to help any Allied operations in the region.

i. SHIPYARDS AND WORKS : The shipyards which are situated west of the old port DE LA CROIX are working at full speed for the Germans. The ANSALDO works of GENOVA are making heavy tanks for the Germans. ANSALDO employees approximately 10,000 workers. The works are 1200 meters long and 300 meters wide. They have not been touched by all the ALLIED bombings of GENOVA. Location: 1200 meters east of the mouth of VARENNES River and finishes at 1700 meters west of CASTELLARAGGIO.

SECRET

-2-

c. On the eastern side of the third pier is an armored MONITOR armed with two guns of 105 mm. and four guns of 76 mm. A.A.

d. GERMAN BATTERIES: Twenty-four 88 mm. German guns installed in concrete trenches not covered, but probably camouflaged with special nets. These guns are dual purpose guns-A.A. and for Naval warfare. These guns are located at 400 yards east of the mouth of POLICIVIER River. The guns are 15 yards apart and 15 yards approximately from the edge of the quay. East of that battery, are two automatic A.A. guns of 37 mm. On the first pier which is perpendicular to the coast, three buildings are used by the Germans for barracks. A second battery of eight guns of 88 mm. is located east southeast of the old port called BARRIO. At 700 meters as the crow flies from the light house which is located at the extremity of the entrance pier of the port, on the eastern side of the old port. The same battery is on a concrete platform with parapets built in a sandy and filled with sand. A third battery is situated at 2500 yards east of the BARRIO mouth at a place called Villa Azaola. The same battery is 500 yards west of the BARRIO church. The calibre and number of the guns is unknown.

e. GENOA FORTS: At Fort SPEDALE, north northeast of GENOA, alt. point 409 is a powder house in the hands of the Germans. At Fort CASTELLACCIO; alt. point 197, and one hundred yards west of the fort is a second powder house called SAN MAURIZIO in which the Germans keep reserve of naval artillery ammunition. Hundred yards south of the same fort is a powder house called SAN BAMBABA in which A.A. ammunition is stored. All the GENOA forts are armed and the calibre or number of the guns is unknown.

The A.A. defenses of GENOA is located on the top of all the mountains surrounding the city. Information extends that the defenses of the city against air raids is very strong.

SECRET

C.S.S.
WashingtonOFFICE OF THE
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

14 October 1944

SUBJECT : Intelligence Report No. 51

TO : Colonel MORANO, AG of 5 G-2, Fifth Army H.

1. The following is a summary of information received from an OSS Agent.

(G-2)

A Petty Officer of the Royal Italian Navy gave us the following information on G-2 : (Evaluation of source C 6) . This N.I.O. has served ten years in the navy and lived in GENOA since 1930 to the 14th of Sept. 1943.

a. The airplane carrier "AQUILA" of 30,000 tons which is the ex Transatlantic liner "ROMA" is in excellent condition and ready to take off. She was not armed on the 8th of September, but all A.A. defenses were in place. 10 planes on board. This ship is moored to a pier which is perpendicular to the coast between the river POSCHIERA and CAPO D'ANTONIO. The name of the locality which is right behind the ship is called SAN PIER D'ANTONIO. Near the airplane carrier on the other side of the same pier is moored a destroyer which is under repair being "D-100".

b. The Transatlantic liner "AUGUSTUS" is moored east of the second pier which is itself east of the river POSCHIERA. This liner has been damaged and is presently under repair. The Germans are taking off the ship all the superstructures in order to transform her to an airplane carrier.

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-3-

From time to time these submarine dumps change their anchorage and communicate their new position by radio to the other submarines.

h. German Communication Lines: The excellent results obtained by strafing and bombing the German convoys by the Allied Air Forces have induced the Germans to abandon the main roads for smaller types of roads parallel to the highway. It is then necessary, states the informant, to search particularly well the small country roads where the traffic is much more intense than the main ones.

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

M. W. C.
MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
2nd Lt. RMH
Intelligence Officer

C.O: Colonel LANGRISH
Major BLOW
OSS, Algiers
OSS, Washington
Files.

SECRET

-2-

In the neighborhood of the main roads these bivouacs are sometimes scattered in the country with anti-air raid shelters, consisting of holes dug into slopes of the neighboring hills.

3. Abuse of Red Cross Sign : In three cases, FISCIANO PONTE SAN SEVERINO MOGA and SAN NICOLA di SERAIA the Germans have been seen putting their radio transmitting stations near field hospitals. The special auto-transported radio units must be very valuable equipment of the Germans since they are abusing the Red Cross sign and putting themselves in its shelter.

4. German S.S. : It has been reported that in the zones which are occupied by our troops, the Germans have left a certain number of S.S. agents in civilian clothes who are terrorizing the civilian Italian population and imposing on these people for food and shelter for themselves.

5. BALOGNA : The Germans have installed on a railway flat car an A.A. battery which travels along and defends BALOGNA railway station.

6. German Land Magnetic Mines : Informant had a talk with the Lt. HEICHL of the 24th German Armored Corps, and this officer told him that the Germans invented a new type of land magnetic mine which explodes when in contact with metallic masses of a certain volume, i.e. tanks, locomotives, etc. These mines are also provided with delayed action fuses.

7. Special German Submarines : Informant talking with a German Navy Officer reports that the Germans have a new sort of submarine which is generally moored on the outside of the lines frequented by Allied shipping convoys. These submarines act as fuel dumps and spare parts ammunition depots for the fighting units of the German submarine corps.

093
Washington

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OUT OFFC, DKT. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

14 October 1943

SUBJECT : Intelligence report R* 54

TO : Colonel HOWARD, AG of G-2, Fifth Army HQ.

1. The following is a summary of information received from an OSS agent.

a. German ciphering. Our informants report that the cipher service of the German Army is in charge of special units assigned to the Pioneer Corps depending themselves on the signal corps. The ciphering of the telegrams and their transmission is made by one unit and the ciphering consists in a code made 50% letters, 50% figures. Non-commissioned officers and specialized privates are assigned to the small units. They follow two years of training in a special school and are tied by special oaths to the secret of their job.

b. German camouflage system. The German camouflage system has been since these last months employed with the maximum of efficiency especially in utilizing the natural colors of the places where they are bivouaced, and changing these colors if necessary in order to match the shades and general colors of their next bivouac area. We have seen trucks, for example, utilizing the slopes of a hill, and following the course of the day, the shadow zones. From experience in occupied territory, the Allied Air Force very seldom hits these targets because the German forces are hiding their trucks inside of houses and in the middle of small streets of Italian villages instead of scattering their trucks in small woods like the Allied Forces do on the other side of the lines.

*OSS
Washington*

OSS SPEC. DEP. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

15 October 1945

SUBJECT : Addition to Topographic Intelligence

TO : Colonel HOWARD AG of S G-2, Fifth Army HQ

1. Topographic report was prepared by Captain BOURGOIN of OSS Forward Echelon in contact with the director of the University of Naples.

2. Additional report is being prepared by OSS Italian Desk .

for Colonel MUMFORD

M. W. Callahan
JALBORN W. CALLAHAN
2nd Lt. NMB
Intelligence Officer

CC: Colonel LAROUVIN
Major BLOW CI G-2
OSS Algiers
OSS Washington ✓
Files

A narrow strip along the coast northwest of SABOUDIA is artificially drained by 4 drainage swamps. It has a maximum width of only 3 kilometers but with the four lakes of POOLINO, MONAGI, CAIROU and PULO forms a continuous strip over 30 kilometers long.

5. RAINFALL : Approximately 4 to 5 inches of rain fall in these lowland areas in each of these two months. Except for all but about 4 rainstorms monthly, the water is immediately absorbed by the soil. Streams which cross the area, however, are likely to be in flood because such large amounts of rain fall in the mountains to the east. Lakes, swamps, streams and ditches all have their maximum amount of water at this season.

For Colonel HUMPHREY

M. W. C.
2nd Lt. NAB
Intelligence Officer

OO:

Colonel LANGVIN
Major BLOM OF G-2
OSS ALGERIA
OSS WASHINGTON
Files

-3-

1. FLOODING BY ENEMY ACTION : See paragraph 4 below.

1. CLIMATE : See paragraph below.

3. The drainage and irrigation ditches which are very numerous south of LITTORIA especially in the PONTINE Marsh area and along the coast northwest of SABODIA, have been described as follows :

a. CONSTRUCTION : Dug out of earth which is heaped on sides to form parapets; sides have a slope of approximately 45 degrees; concrete is used only at the entrances to and exits from pumping stations.

b. SIZE : Vary from 50 CM. deep, 50 CM. wide at bottom and 150 CM. wide at top to 4m. deep, 4m. wide at bottom and 12 m. wide at top.

c. WATER CONDITIONS : The height of the water is now at its maximum and the ditches are filled to the top.

d. GENERAL : Parapets at the sides are usually covered with trees or thick hedges.

4. Flooding by enemy action: Two large areas would be flooded almost immediately if the pumps were stopped. It is reported that the Italian government had already prepared for this possibility.

a. The area behind the coast from TERRACINA to TORRE VITTORIA reaching inland almost to SEBASTOPOLIS is artificially drained by 15 drainage pumps and one irrigation pump. It has a maximum width of over 10 kilometers and is over 30 kilometers long.

-2-

2. Volcanic soils- cover the area inland from PONTINA, LITTORIA, APRILIA and POMEZIA.

3. Red Clayey Sands- east of the PONTINE Marshes.

4. Clayey Sands- cover a strip just seaward of the volcanic soils.

5. Light Sands and Red Sands- a long strip 3 to 10 kilometers wide usually not far from the shore.

g. LAND UTILIZATION : The area is divided into many small holdings. Agriculture is very diverse being devoted to regular crops such as wheat, maize, and vegetables; specialties such as hemp, sugar beet and cotton; various forms of fruit crops; and livestock raising. Irrigation is used in part and terrace cultivation is practiced on the lower mountain slopes to the northeast. Dry stone walls support the terraces. Mechanical equipment (tractors etc.) has been used in the lowland areas.

f. ROADS : The Via APPIA is reported to be in good condition but heavily mined. The secondary roads are reported to be in a very bad state due to the lack of repairs for 3-4 years. The roads are invariably bordered by ditches, trees, and hedges.

h. TANK DEFENSES : Fairly large tank traps, 24 m deep and 3m wide, well hidden in the forest, has been reported in the BOSCO DI PADUOLIONE. Another tank trap has been reported at GECCHINA.

i. DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION DITCHES : See paragraph 3 below.

C.S.S.
Washington

035 SING. ST. 7-1
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

15 October 1943

SUBJECT : Topographic Intelligence on Area Southeast of Rome
TO : Colonel MCARDLE of 1st Cavalry Division, Fifth Army

1. The following is submitted in reply to your memo of 9 October, 1943, ARB/TSC/hh.

2. The following points may assist in determining whether large armored forces can move over the area in question :

a. RELIEF : The essential flatness of this area offers no obstacle to movement.

b. DRAINAGE : The area is crossed by many small streams flowing at right angles to the coast. These streams are in flood at this season and the larger may prove to be serious obstacles. There are a number of permanent lakes and swamps, especially in the higher ground between the PONTINE Marshes and the sea. Drainage is better north of ANZIO.

c. VEGETATION : Three wooded areas exist in this area : (1) North of MONTE CICERO, (2) Northeast of SABAUDIA, & (3) North of ANZIO. There are some fairly large, closely spaced trees in these areas, but much of the growth is the thorny thicket type.

d. SOIL :

1. Water logged peat- prevails in the PONTINE Marshes proper and in a coastal strip 1 Kilometer wide and 20 kilometers long extending northwest of SABAUDIA.

C. S. Washington

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 2. 2. 2. 2.

16 October 1943

SUBJECT : Railroads in Allied Occupied Italy

TO : Colonel HOWARD AC of 2 G-2, Fifth Army

1. This Detachment is in contact with former heads of State Railway system in Central Italy. An excellent Railroad map has been obtained together with the following information.

a. Railroad BENEVENTO to FROSINONE is completely undamaged from BENEVENTO to CIVITAVECCHIA, three fourths of the line, and only slightly damaged from CIVITAVECCHIA to FROSINONE.

b. Railroad from AVIGNONE to ROMA TERRACINA is in fair shape. Can be repaired easily.

c. The chief engineer can indicate the quickest and easiest way to reestablish service on these lines. He also said that if given the authority he would see to it that the lines were reestablished as they always had the money, the men, and the material.

3. It is suggested that this proposal be brought to the attention of the former Italian authorities.

For Colonel HUNTINGTON

m. W. C.
 MAJOR W. C. CALLAHAN
 2nd Lt. N&B
 Intelligence Officer

CC: Colonel GALLOWAY, G2, 6th Corps
 Major BLOX, Asst. AG of 2 G-2 SA
 OSS Algiers
 OSS Washington
 Files

-2-

G. SOAURI : 749/952 A few German patrols are taking all Italian civilians in order to transport them to FORMIA for fortifications work. FORMIA is entirely destroyed by the aerial bombing.

H. GUARIGLIANO : Between the river and the Via APPIA 822/840-933, German Batteries were seen in action, calibre is reported to be 120 m/m and 88m/m. The main road "Via APPIA" is entirely destroyed by the Germans and by the Allied fire, informant estimates that it would be impossible to use it.

Bridge at 809/931 is destroyed. Germans cross the river with boats and rafts.

The beaches of Minturno 787/938 and MONDRACONE 895/790 are mined. The mouth of the Guarigliano river 800/901 is also mined.

On Monte D'ARCENTO 790/930 Germans have installed M.G. and A.T.G. holding, south of the Guarigliano, the "Via APPIA" under fire.

At Monte SOAURI 741/945 same disposition as above main road and railroad track being under fire.

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

M. W. C.
 MAJCOL. W. OALLANAN
 and Lt. NMB
 Intelligence Officer

CC : Colonel LANGOVIN G-2 6th Corps
 Major ELOM O I G-2
 Files

*515P
Washington*

MEMORANDUM
ONE SP40, DET. 0-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

17 October 1943

SUBJECT : Intelligence Report No. 27

TO : Colonel HOWARD AG of 5 AG, Fifth Army HQ

I. The following is a summary of information received from ONE Forward Echelon, mission executed in German lines by an Italian Civilian agent.

a. PIETRAVAIANO : 105/020 Hill about 980. Germans are putting up field fortifications with machine guns and anti-tank guns.

b. FOITE : 068/132 The Germans are building a dam at Ponte Reale bridge on the VOLTURNO River in order to submerge the VULturno plain.

c. FOITE : 1043/170 at Villa I. V. T. 111, very large building, covered with a red tile roof, surrounded by olive orchard. Germans have a motor pool and gasoline depot. Armed sentries forbid anybody to pass by. Ammunition and food supplies are also stored in that place under the cover of the trees.

d. IDENTIFICATION : Signs of German tanks in that district were seen with the following sign on side of turret :

e. CARPINONE : 252/325 On the Carpinone/Ischia road 1 kilometer west of town of Carpinone at a bridge on RIVER CARPINO. South of that point at 251/317 is a wood in which a very important depot of Gasoline has been spotted by our informants. A great number of sentries watch the place, a sabotage action would have no chance of success.

f. LINTURNO : At 785/938 in the elementary school, called "PUBBLIC" is a German G.P.

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The payment supply and equipping of these groups offer some ~~serious~~ problems with which we are now struggling.

In connection with our GCI contacts (through General Pavone) it should be recorded that we are selling on the General for Intelligence and sabotage Teams as well as strictly combat personnel. We are attempting in this way to concentrate recruiting in one place - particularly that related to "Short Range" requirements.

Our operational arrangements include those made with SOE pursuant to which SOE handles 10th Corps requirements and OSS those of 6th Corps. Tenth Corps Intelligence is still an OSS function. OSS receives all directions from Fifth Army and conducts all liaison with General Pavone. SOE's assignments and "bodies" are, therefore, actually furnished by OSS. This seems to satisfy SOE who have not of late seemed particularly interested in Pavone or his connections - for reasons which can be understood. SOE likes its important contacts to be kept exclusive.

Estimate of the Situation:

Military movement forward is still slow and will probably continue so. Pressure on the German left flank is such now as to compel withdrawal from the Valturmo area.

OSS

OSS will have increasing demands for sabotage groups and for more combat intelligence than has heretofore been furnished. Our ability to fulfill these requirements is dependent, largely, ~~on~~ on the receipt of supplies - particularly radio equipment and plane service.

E. C. Huntington
BILLY C HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution:
Washington
Algiers
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partially met through the use of civilian cars. Sea transportation to assist in operations has several times been requested of our own and the British Navy. All applications are, as a matter of fact, referred to the British who, up to the moment have been polite but have furnished nothing. They have, at the same time, given SOE exclusive use of a boat by means of which SOE has been able to carry on successful coastal (and lateral) infiltration. An airplane for dropping operations is sorely needed. We understand that one may be furnished soon. This would multiply our efficiency tenfold.

Intelligence

Operations

The primary function of this Mission is on the Intelligence side. Our general information has been good but we have failed to furnish the volume of combat intelligence which is readily available. One of the first tasks of Major Lloyd will be to increase this volume at once.

We are just beginning to receive military and quasi military assignments. Operational Plan No; 1 is in process of execution. In this undertaking we were compelled to recruit; train, group and dispatch within 4 days. Furthermore, having neither boat nor plane all materials are being transported overland by the members of the groups. The materials themselves are inadequate as this Mission has no special SO Stores. This assignment therefore, a most difficult one.

On the military side we have been able to persuade Col Kaiser (New Chief of Staff 6th Corps and known to the undersigned) and the G-2 section of the 3rd Division to try out six of the Italian O G's (which are now called GCI's Gruppi Combattanti Italia). General Greuther, Chief of Staff, Fifth Army, said in approving our request " If these groups accomplish anything at all we may have a really important undertaking for them later on".

-7-

Forward Echelon Headquarters is with or near 6th Corps and from this point Major Lloyd as CO Forward Echelon, directs all intelligence and operational activities. He should be assisted by one officer who would deal exclusively with intelligence activities and another who could supervise all work of a military or quasi military nature. Lacking these assistants he is working directly with the officers in charge of Forward or Combat Stations. The Long Range Section will probably remain in Naples for some time due to the fact that both recruits and the facilities of transportation are more easily obtainable at this point. The work of this Section is directed by Captain Bourgoine. It consists not only in detailing Long Range projects involving OSS net works and personnel but, also, in dealing quite separately and apart with outside organizations particularly those through which Resistance Groups may be contacted.

COMMUNICATIONS

Our communication problems remain as acute as ever. They have been pretty thoroughly covered in cables Nos. 127 130 137 154 171 174 177 179 189 and 193 to Algiers. Many important operations are being held in abeyance for lack of Agents sets and much work has been inefficiently done or not done at all by reason of our dependence on courier communications. We are subjected to kindly but persistent chiding because our information, though good is largely "cold" and operational programs, as can be imagined, are most unsatisfactory where radio direction cannot be established.

The failure of the Mobile Unit to arrive from Palermo has thrown a larger burden on our Base Station than be carried when an agent contacts increase. We are training our own operators but we cannot construct equipment they need.

Transportation

Land transportation with of servicing and the personnel. The deficiencies are being

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As a result of the situation above outlined we are continually improvising assignments in an attempt to meet our Mission requirements as we see them. In part, too, we are attempting to build an OSS Field Mission which will be so organized and standardized that future Missions may profit from its experiences and experimentations.

Our problem is not one of numbers. We have too many men for the work involved. The deficiency is in quality and experience. Four good officers - two Lieutenants to handle infiltration for combat intelligence, one Captain to correlate combat intelligence and one Captain to supervise operational programs plus the mobile communications crew (and unit) would meet our requirements.

A chart of our latest plan of organizations and operation is enclosed. The following notes are given in explanation even though somewhat repetitious:

Base Headquarters is operating, as it has in the past, as a service station and the point of contact with Fifth Army. At Base Headquarters Fifth Army direct was; whether relating to Intelligence or Operations are received, analyzed and put in form for implementation through Forward Echelon. From this Base, also, all Intelligence is distributed.

Forward Echelon Headquarters is our operational Branch. It is now divided into Sections as follows: A Long Range Section now in Naples handling programs dealing with activities directed at points or areas more than 25 miles beyond the front. Two Forward or Combat stations handling intelligence contacts and "Short Range" (within 25 mile limit) infiltration for intelligence purposes; two independent Forward stations for lateral and back infiltration (whether for Intelligence or Operations) and for handling, at the same time, both Long and Short Range intelligence assignments; and two Forward Stations (one with each operating Division of 6th Corps) which direct operational plans of a Tactical nature and assist in infiltration for whatever purpose.

-5-

for intelligence and all dealings are maintained separate and apart from other OSS activities. We are not unmindful of the political and security problems which are involved.

7. Comments and Resume:

Organization

We are still trying to solve organizational problems by attempting to utilize personnel which is unqualified for the tasks at hand. There are actually in the mission, officers or civilians have the competence to handle executive responsibilities (particularly as they relate to the functioning of an OSS Mission), officers who are well equipped on the operational side and two more officers (obtained here) who, while unfamiliar with OSS objectives and practices, are; nevertheless proving very useful in liaison, supply and other duties of this nature. We have, in addition, two officers working on special intelligence who are competent in this field and one civilian who is doing an excellent but restricted administration job. Of the foregoing five are Officers and two are civilians who were not a part of this Mission as originally conceived.

Important intelligence and operational work - especially that which is closely related to the needs of combat units - is suffering badly. Enlisted personnel assigned to services is reasonably efficient though insufficient in number. We are in the process of "filling in" some blank spots from the Fifth Army Replacement Center.

The so-called civilian operatives (many highly paid) who were or are a part of the original mission have, the whole, proved of little value or a direct liability. ~~Captain~~ ~~As~~ has been indicated, of this personnel has been returned to Algiers. Three individuals have been dismissed on the spot. The remainder who have been retained are not, on the whole, thoroughly useful or perhaps entirely trustworthy. None of them appear to be able or willing to act as Agents. They are not being used and cannot be used for the work for which, we understand, they were recruited.

-4-

Groups for Short Range activities are being recruited for attachment to Forward Stations. About 15 individuals are now available at the stations. Their efficiency will be increased as soon as radio communication can be provided.

B. Operations

Additional sabotage teams are being recruited for future emergency use. Groups are being prepared for dispatching to several points where there are "Resistance" organizations. These undertakings can be made effective only when supplies can be dropped by plane at various prearranged points.

5. Other Departments:

We are continuing through the Headquarters Intelligence Officer, to furnish CIO and other Agencies with valuable information and assistance. Our contacts with PWB are close and friendly largely due to the presence there of Col. Whittaker. Relationships ~~some~~ ^{are also} where are not always as friendly as they should be. This is especially true of CIO with which Agency, however, there seems to be difficulty on the part of others than OSS.

Note:

Col. Porter (General Greuthner's ^{Asst} ~~and~~) complained on Sunday last, that CIO ~~was~~ ^{just} inclined to impinge on the functions of other Agencies. He also indicated, politely, that OSS had also been guilty in this direction in the past.

6. OUTSIDE Organizations

Contacts with Italian Glandestine societies are being developed directly (by Captain ~~and~~ ^{and}) and through the Pavone-Mundo organization (Mr. Peter Thompson). We are now working with two ~~organizations~~ ^{of} the Italia Libera party, the local Communist representatives the Free Masons and members of the SIM (Italian Deuxieme Bureau). SIM has been directed by the King to cooperate with OSS and are to send a Liaison Officer to us (Major Compello) who is known to this Headquarters. Our contacts ~~with these~~ outside organizations are being used solely

-3-

obtain special data on territory south of Rome in compliance with Fifth Army request; one map to Castelpetrose on reconnaissance preparatory to sabotage mission; a team of two (including WT operator) to Rome overland; and another team of four (with radio) to Rome by sea.

b. Operations-

Six teams of Saboteurs were requested by G-3 for use against special targets. The assignments were to be carried out at once. The personnel (Italian officers and soldiers furnished by General Pavone) were recruited and trained within 4 days. Two additional days were lost in an attempt to obtain and improvise transportation and material. Three teams were delivered to SOE for use in 10th Corps Area (infiltration by sea) and three have infiltrated overland by OSS (for use in 6th Corps Areas) since no other method of transportation is available. Such projects, due to a lack of adequate supplies and transportation facilities, are decidedly "half-baked" and have small chance of success. We received little or no help from Fifth Army principally because its supplies and facilities are decidedly limited.

A special trip was made to 6th Corps with a view to presenting there the use of some Italian OGS (now referred to as GGI's-Gruppi Combattenti Italiani). Col. Kaiser, Chief of Staff 6th Corps and Major Scott G-2 Third Division, gave us an order for 6 Groups. We are now in the process of trying to obtain supplies and equipment for these 24 officers and 180 men- so far a most difficult task. The assistance of the Chief of Staff, Fifth Army, has been requested and obtained and it is hoped that these groups may soon be operating with combat units.

4. Mission Activities - Planned

a. Intelligence

Four teams with radio operators, have been recruited and are awaiting WT sets before being dispatched on Long Range Missions.

-2-

ever apparently considered for this mission.

~~4~~ We are being called upon continuously for Sabotage and quasi-military work and personnel is ample. Results will continue to be negligible until we have adequate material, radio equipment and air and sea transportation.

~~2~~ No radio equipment has as yet arrived and until it does our intelligence work will not be of great value. Courier service is much too slow.

~~2~~ Land transportation facilities are being augmented by the use of civilian cars—a poor substitute for Army vehicles.

2. Communications

Total recorded messages handled outgoing and incoming by the Base Station to date are 452 in number. We have in operation 6 stations. Two agent operators are out but no contact is as yet established.

Five agent operators are in training (ready for use) awaiting sets. Missions for these operators are prepared and the personnel is on hand.

✓ The Mobile Unit is still badly needed. Why it has not arrived from Palermo is still an unsolved mystery.

3. Mission Activities - Undertaken During Week

a. Intelligence

Some 26 reports were submitted by the Hqrs: Intelligence Officer to G-2, Fifth Army. Copies of Reports 53; 54, and 57 and 4 Special Reports are enclosed by way of illustration.

The Forward Echelon completed the following missions: Two men to M. I. Turno to secure information for 82nd Airborne Division as per request; one Agent to Giozzonisi to secure special data for 10th Corps; a team of two to Frosinone for information as per request G-2 Fifth Army; two agents to Isernia to

KGB

Grant Mission - 125
 X Fifth Army
 X Huntington, Co.
 X Operation Report

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
 HQ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
 (OSS FIFTH ARMY MISSION)

16 October 1943
 (as 15 October 1943)

SUBJECT: Weekly Report No. 3-OSS Fifth Army Mission

TO: General William J. Donovan
 (Thru: OSS ALGIERS)

1. Organization
 a. Administrations

1. We have been compelled to rearrange the organization somewhat in an attempt to increase production. An outline of the existing structure (in short form) is enclosed. Our next report will contain a memorandum indicating assignments.


b. Personnel

1. Three civilians were returned to Algiers last week. A fourth, Carbonare, was due to be returned but took leave in Naples and has not yet been located. CIC have been asked to apprehend this man. He is not believed a menace to security and is distinctly Anti-fascist. As a matter of fact consideration was originally given to his dismissal here as was requested by him. A fifth man was returned to his home in Salerno. There are other civilians, whose usefulness is still doubted, concerning whom action may be taken in the future.

Captain Russo and Sergeant Jim Jiminez appear to be definitely lost to this mission. Both have been hospitalized due to Malaria.

c. Supply and transportation

1. Operational requirements are being met through improvising "gadgets" from material furnished by the Ordnance and Engineer Corps. No SO supplies were



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very able, his special intelligence system etc. We have "filled in" by using natives of ability - MONTE (R. Mondo Gervera) and the younger Favone. Joe Favone is proving to be a good administrator and is invaluable on services. We have about four additions (a supply officer and some clerks) from the Replacement Depot. We are beginning to function. I am trying to get rid of some "dead wood" and live down the dirty-very dirty - mess we inherited of which there were serious repercussions only yesterday. I hope the organization will not now be disturbed and I will, therefore, await your instructions about Stacy.

The Mondo organization contacts are beginning to produce. Naturally they lead as far as well as near. They cannot in Mondo's mind - be separated. Donald Downes let Mondo get away from us twice after I had recovered him. He was with the British. He is now with us in the main (he certainly does not have time for much else) although he is a clever politician who plays no favorites.

Any "Long Range" contacts I can make are naturally not for Fifth Army Mission account but for OSS. Bill Wady's Agents will never see nor know the people with whom we are working. Why he should not want the help these other organizations may be able to give us is more than I can understand. They will be his alone when we reach Rome and, I think, make use of that value. They will certainly be of value so long as they believe it to their own interest to work with us. Will you let us go on this point?

My very best to you, Ned Burton and all the rest.

Leery

WILLIAM C. HUNTINGTON JR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Please excuse charges. we have no facilities

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