



-2-

LONG RANGE INTELLIGENCE

BOURGOIN, A.
 SAVOLDI, Joe Jr.
 ZINNO, William
 DURSO, (Italian Civilian)
 THEODALI, (Italian Civilian)
 ZIGIANT, R. (Italian Civilian)

Commanding Officer
 Administrative Officer
 Clerk
 Interpreter
 Intelligence Asst
 Assistant

FORWARD ECHELON (Contd.)

10TH CORPS

CAGGIATTI, Alessandro
 CALORE, Henry
 NARDI, (Italian Civilian)
 CANDELLA, (Italian Civilian)
 RINALDI, (Italian Civilian)
 COSTA, (Italian Civilian)

Commanding Officer
 Radio Operator
 Assistant
 Assistant
 Assistant
 Assistant

6TH CORPS

HOAGLAND, Herbert
 CONTI

SEVERINI, (Italian Civilian)
 MESSERI, (Italian Civilian)
 FOLSOT, (Italian Civilian)
 RAO, (Italian Civilian)
 TREGLIA, E.

Commanding Officer
 Radio Operator
 Assistant
 Assistant
 Assistant
 Assistant
 Assistant

FORWARD ECHELON

~~53R~~ 3RD DIVISION

GOFF, Irving
 SIGNORE, Domenic
 ROMULUS, G. (Italian Civilian)

Commanding Officer
 Assistant
 Assistant

34TH DIVISION

LOSSOWSKI, Vincent
 FAGA, Anthony
 LAMBERT, Elmo

Commanding Officer
 Intelligence Asst
 Mess

90.011.011-12818-
x 7/11.011.011,
x Huntington
x International Support

OSS FIFTH ARMY MISSION
ROSTER

30 October 1943

4

STATION

BASE

OSS BASE HEADQUARTERS

HUNTINGTON, Ellery C. Jr.
SMITH, Bradish
ROLLER, John S.
CALLANAN, Malcolm W.
BARNES, James
DENSLER, Charles M.
THOMPSON, Peter
SILVANI, Stelvio
GONZALEZ, Louis J.
KERNHERVE, John
MAINA, Sylvester
GLITTON, Paul A.
WILKINS, Woodrow
POLITI, Philippe
MC AVOY, James H.
MC CART, Thomas A.
SEMOLICH, Mario
VASKUKI, Gianni
MASETTI, A. (Italian Civilian)
TOMASST, B. (Italian Civilian)

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adj. Services Officer
Hq Intel O & Asst Adj
Asst Intel Officer
Supply Officer
Liaison Italian OG's
Act 1st Sergeant
Chief Clerk
Driver
General Duty
Clerk
Driver
Civ Intrepreter
Headquarters Clerk
Supply Clerk
Motor Pool
Intelligence Clerk
Intelligence Section
Intelligence Section

BASE HEADQUARTERS (Radio)

JIMINEZ, Mike
MONTI, A.
ST. GERMAINE, Henry
MORABITO, Domenick J.
~~POWERS~~ WALTER, JR.

Communications
Communications
Communications
Communications
" "

~~ADRIATIC~~ ADRIATIC

PACCATTE, Andre
BLEZIO, L.
FERRARA, Frank

Commanding Officer
Assistant
Radio Operator

~~NAPLES~~ NAPLES

NORTH, Henry R. (USNR)

Special Duty

FORWARD ECHELON

LEOYD, Stacey B.
PAVONE Jr. (Italian Civilian)
GROZE, John
DE ANGELES, Nato

Commanding Officer
Intelligence Asst.
Asst Intelligence O
Asst Dispatching O

The full time task of searching out and running down hostile Agents has been assigned, in Fifth Army, to a Section other than CBS.

3. The members of this organization will avoid political entanglements of every nature and at no time will indulge in the promotion of political ideologies. Governmental and political problems are handled, exclusively, by representatives of other departments. This limitation will not restrict our right to deal, impartially, with any and every group or individual who can be useful to us in the cause we are serving. We only need remember that CBS is not a political forum but a military organization.

4. There have been, in the past, no group complaints concerning the extra-territorial activities of CBS personnel. These must cease and our attention must henceforth be fixed on the objectives which have been assigned us.

extra jurisdiction

RE ARMY C HONORARY N 21
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution:
Colonel Howard
Base Headquarters
Forward Echelon (Major Lloyd)
Washington
Algiers
Files

Washington

OSS HEADQUARTERS
SPECIAL ATTACHMENT G-2
FIFTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS

20 October 1943

SUBJECT: OSS Fifth Army Operations - Objectives and scope.

TO: All OSS Personnel (To be initialed by all Officers).

1. Irrespective of the functions of this organization prescribed in basic OS directives, the primary activities of this mission will be limited as follows:

a. Long and Short Range Intelligence activities to meet to the requirements of General or specific directives of G-2 Fifth Army; and

b. Operational programs designed to comply with instructions of G-3, Fifth Army, as given directly by G-3 or through the A. G. of H. G-2.

2. In addition to the foregoing, this organization and its members will assist other departments or Section of the Fifth Army where assistance can be given as an incident to the primary activities above mentioned. OSS should continue to supply CIC, A G-2, PW and other organizations with all information and aid so long as this is done in a manner which neither constitutes an impingement on the functions of these organizations nor a diversion from the principal objectives of the OSS Fifth Army Mission. For example: suspected enemy sympathizers and members of enemy organizations (who come under the attention of members of OSS in the discharge of their normal duties) should obviously be reported and, where circumstances demand, apprehended. They should however if apprehended be delivered immediately to CIC. Arrangements should be made at that time to participate in subsequent interrogations. It should be remembered

B. 50, 60, 61 and 62.

1. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

2. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

3. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

4. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

5. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

6. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

7. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

8. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

9. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

10. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

11. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

12. Special Intelligence - [illegible]

13. Operations:

1. Of [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible]

2. Returned - one of [illegible] teams [illegible]

3. Results - nothing heard from other teams.

4. Mission Activities - Planned.

a. Intelligence:

1. Forward [illegible] - Teams for information on mountain trails between Lake [illegible] and [illegible]

SECRETHEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY
HQ, OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA12, 18
Construction
x 6, 18
Howards
operation report10 Oct 1953
(10 Oct 1953)

MEMO FOR THE RECORD, HQ, U.S. ARMY, 10 Oct 1953

TO: Major I. WILLIAM J. JOHNSON
(THRU: CDR AT 100)1. Organizationa. Advisory Board

1. The Board

2. Board Members

1. The Board is composed of the following members:

2. The Board is organized as follows:

3. Board Functions

1. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.

2. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.

3. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.

2. General Information

1. The Board is composed of the following members:
2. The Board is organized as follows:
3. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.
4. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.
5. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.
6. The Board is to advise the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.

3. Major Activitiesa. Intelligence

1. The Board has been advised by the Adjutant General on all matters relating to the organization and operation of the Adjutant General's Office.

SECRET

RECORD OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED

18 Nov '43

Document Huntington Weekly Report No. 4 - OSS Fifth Army Mission.
 Requested by ABBS Authorization ABBS
 No. of Copies Five Reproduction date 17 Nov '43
 Copy to 1 To Scribner Signature ABBS
2 Lowman
3 Magruder - return
4 Shepardson
5 WATO
Secretariat

-6-

in prior reports and, in addition, may be called upon to furnish a Special Detachment of 500 to carry out the program outlined in OP No. 4. This is a full time job for all of us and represents the first opportunity OSS has had to use operatives with Combat Units. I sincerely hope that, at this stage of the game, this Mission is not going to be asked to turn its attention to matters beyond the scope of what is desired of it by Fifth Army. I see the beginnings of such a program in the making. It has always been true that we have tried to do too much with too little. If this policy is pursued here the results will be disastrous. Any undertakings of a larger of different character than those assigned to this particular Mission should be carried out by other OSS. Units manned and equipped to handle them separately and apart from this Mission. We have, after weeks of struggling, established relationships and an organization and pattern of work, which may produce limited but tangible results if we are not now too much disturbed by the imposition of new demands on our time and continued changes in personnel.

Res. Huntington Jr.
ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding.

-5-

6. Outside Organizations:

We are getting assistance of doubtful value, on which I have commented, from the Favone organization and operational personnel and occasional intelligence from Mondo. Captain Philipson (SIA liaison) may prove helpful in recruiting from among the Badoglio units and we are hopeful of ~~obtaining~~ some intelligence through ~~these~~ contacts.

7. Comments and Remarks:

Mr. Lanza di Trabia arrived yesterday to do OE work despite my prior cables to Algiers on the subject of the nature of the assignments of this mission with Fifth Army. Mr. di Trabia brought with him Carlo Giaroli whose capabilities I know. He cannot be used with this mission but should be valuable to GID to whom I hope to "lend" him. Eusebio Holt (a communications officer) is in Naples but is ill with a cold. It is assumed that he is here to do some preparatory work for OSS Algiers.

I have, on several occasions, stated my position with respect to additional personnel. Our mission is restricted but, left reasonably free to carry it out, we can I think, furnish the Army and its Combat Units with fair intelligence. Since, as pointed out, we are seriously short of transportation and housekeeping personnel, every person sent us creates a diversion which is devastating.

We are still using couriers and pigeons. Out of three radio teams infiltrated one returned from behind enemy lines to obtain parts for their set which had been broken and the other two have not as yet been contacted. They may have been liquidated. It is difficult enough to infiltrate Agents, alone. It is extremely hazardous when they are compelled to carry radio equipment. We are still trying other routes and new methods. We badly need the services of a plane.

We still cannot understand the non-arrival of the Mobile Unit. It has been badly needed from the outset as have the 10 Agents sets originally requested 4 of which we received last week through Captain Atlas and Sgt. Powers.

On the operational side we are proceeding with the recruiting and training of the Six Italian OG's mentioned

- 4 -

2. The training of the first Italian Operational Group was completed and the Group delivered to 3rd Division. The undertaking had an unfortunate beginning, due to incident mentioned above. In addition I have considerable misgivings about the type of personnel furnished by General Pavone. My impression is that the General's contacts are not at all what he represented and that he is not known to Officers and men in the Italian Army. As a result he is simply picking up ragamuffins from the street with which to meet our demands.

3. Operational Plans Nos. 3 and 4 (copies enclosed) were submitted to 5th Army with covering letter (copy enclosed). Actually OP No. 4 was discussed, first, with Col. Kaiser and Col. Langevin of 6th Corps before the matter was presented to Col. Howard, G-2 Fifth Army. Sixth Corps wants a total of 500 men and the job of OSS will be to obtain them and deliver them, with Lts. Goff and Lossowski as Liaison Officers, for the particular operations referred to in OP No. 4. This represents a major undertaking on the part of an OSS Mission which is operating very much on a shoe-string but, given even reasonable assistance from 5th Army on supplies, we will come very near doing the job. Even with respect to supplies we may be able to fill the requirements ourselves as we have found a cache of Italian arms and ammunition on which we can draw. Our recruiting for this assignment would be done by Mr. Peter Thompson rather than General Pavone as we have found from experience, that Mr. Thompson is able, through his own contacts (and when not too hampered by the General) to produce Italian personnel of reasonable quality and competence.

4. Mission Activities - Planned.

This subject is pretty thoroughly covered in preceeding comments.

We are trying, by every means, to infiltrate radio sets. There is no trouble with respect to the operators themselves. We are hopeful, now, of obtaining the use of 6th Corps Reconnaissance Plans to land one man and several sets at a field near Segni.

5. Other Departments

No further unpleasant incidents to report beyond our difficulties with AMGOT over an ancient affair on the Isle of Capri.

-3-

4. Forward Echelon and Forward Stations:

a. Corsica Station was closed out and is in process of moving to Adriatic (where SOE is allegedly making transportation available to us) but prior to leaving Captain Paccatte infiltrated 8 Agents south of Livorno who are to work down to Fifth Army and report.

b. West Coast Fishing Mission: We are now working with fishermen to find soft spots along the West Coast where infiltration can be carried on. This will at best be limited to bodies without sets or other supplies. The West Coast is too closely guarded to permit of getting in with equipment of any kind.

c. Forward Echelon: There were 8 Agents dispatched through 10 Corps near the close of last week not mentioned in Report No. 4. From 6th Corps 2 Agents were sent from Piedelmonte to cover Latino and Gallo. This was at the request of an Airborne Unit. Previous OSS reports had shown small German forces in these towns. Two agents have also been sent to Isernia and Moutaguila. Carrier pigeons were taken by this team. Two additional Agents are being sent each day, with pigeons, to cover the Isernia - Venafro district carefully. This is at the request of the 3rd and 34th Divisions. A radio set and observers are being sent to an advance post 20 miles beyond Allied lines in the mountains west of Lake Matese.

Forward Echelon obtained and gave to 6th Corps special information on the trails between Piedelmonte and Monteroduni. Four guides have been furnished for an Airborne Division Expedition toward Gallo.

5. Long Range Intelligence Section:

No report from Capt. Bourgoin received this week.

b. Operations:

1. The 3 Sabotage teams sent out last week (3 others were given SOE to use with 10th Corps) from 6th Corps have reported: Two teams failed to complete their Mission - the third team completed its Mission exactly as planned but remained an hour and one half to see what happened. A tank or armored car was destroyed. The team then tried to make its escape. When daylight came they continued to travel. They were seen and surrounded by a German patrol of 20 men. Three of the team were shot and either killed or badly wounded. The fourth man escaped and made his way back to our Hqrs. to report as indicated above.

-2-

able to acquire one or two Italian trucks and have pieced - out with civilian cars. We are attempting to ship Italian OGs and civilian operators to the front in automobiles which were never intended for work of this nature. The results are anything but good. We are practically ^{never} able to complete a journey on time and our own prestige, as well as the morale of our operatives, suffer accordingly.

2. Communications:

- a. Total messages to date 489
- b. Operators trained 0.
- c. Operators in training 8.
- d. Stations operating 4.
- e. Agent Operators out 2.
- f. Agent Operators contacted none.

Note: Last survey due to error was given as 519 messages insted of 419.

3. Mission Activities - Undertaken during week.

a. Intelligence:

1. Headquarters Reports - standard for G-2 as follows: Nos. 66 67 67-A 67-B and 68.

2. Special Reports: Total No. submitted 2; covering following subjects: Chemical facilities and mine detection.

3. Special Studies: Concentration of reproduction of maps, target sketches and coordination of intelligence in area covered by OSS Operation Number 3. Working with Italian Secret Service, turning over to them ~~add~~ black lists and OE files, and putting them in touch with our contacts on three islands near Naples and contacts in Naples area. Continued interrogation of fishermen on details of coastal features in two areas specially indicated by G-3 Fifth Army. Turned over to Intelligence Operations Section contacts with fishermen who are prepared to take agents and agent equipment by water behind enemy lines. At University of Naples contact with chemical department, looking for men who would know Italian Army Chemical Warfare work. One professor offered to Fifth Army his laboratory and personnel. Information forwarded to G-2.

SECRETHQ OSS SPEC DET G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

12/2/43
 x T. J. H. G. H.
 x H. W. T. H. G. H.
 x Operations Report
 27 October 1943

SUBJECT : Weekly Report No. 5 - OSS Fifth Army Mission

TO : General WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
(Thru: OSS Algiers)1. Organization:a. Administration.

No remarks.

b. Personnel

1. Captain Atlas came from Algiers to discuss our communications needs which are, indeed, pressing. An E.M. was obtained to assist Peter Thompkins in his recruiting work with the Pavone organization. No other changes military personnel. Roster enclosed showing assignments.

2. Civilian personnel - no changes. Roster enclosed.

c. Supply and Transportation:

1. We have "standardized" supply practices with 5th Army as last reported but the system is not yet working adequately. For example our First Italian Operational Group arrived at the 3rd Division in the rain without shelter halves or mess kits. This made everyone furious and with good reason. We still hope to work out an orderly and effective arrangement with G-4.

2. Four Agents sets were brought by Capt. Atlas and Sgt. Powers. Our deficiency is now 8 sets; five sets might be obtained if heavier equipment were available for replacement.

3. Transportation will be a real problem throughout the campaign. This mission is using a total of 41 vehicles of which only 11 are Army issue. We have been

SECRET

RECORD OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED

18 Nov '43

Document Huntington Report #5 - 27 Oct '43
 Requested By AWB Authorization AWB
 No. of Copies Five Reproduction date 17 Nov '43

Copy No	To	Signature
<u>1</u>	<u>Horibner</u>	<u>AWB</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>Lowman</u> <u>Magurder - return</u>	
<u>3</u>	<u>Chapardson</u>	
<u>4</u>	<u>NATO</u>	
<u>5</u>	<u>Secretariat</u>	

ment as requested.

c. To obtain from 82nd Airborne Division such of the OSS radio equipment as may still be in the possession of such Division.

ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON JR
Colonel; Infantry
Commanding

- 4 -

to be selected by OSS, of radio sets and certain army and other equipment;

2. The following radio equipment to be obtained from the Signal Corps: 3 Type 177 sets or equivalent which will be substituted for OSS Agents sets now in use.

3. The following radio equipment originally given by OSS to 82nd Airborne Division and now in the possession of such Division: 5 OSS Agents Sets,

4. The following equipment to be dropped to Resistance Forces under Operational Plan No. 3:

400 Marlin or Sten SMG or equivalent of 9 m/m calibre (captured enemy materiel acceptable)
80,000 Rds Ammunition for same
2,000 Lbs Plastic or like explosives
500 "Time Pencils" or like detonators

5. The following equipment for the purposes of Operational Plan No. 4:

250 Marlin or Sten SMG or equivalent of 9 m/m calibre (captured enemy materiel acceptable)
25,000 Rds Ammunition for same
500 Lbs Plastic or like explosives
250 "Time Pencils" or like detonators
Rations as required.

9. The effective continuation of the operations outlined herein will require authority to replace personnel and equipment as expended and further authority to recruit, train and employ, continuously, civilian personnel (for whom supplies and equipment, other than rations, are not requested of Fifth Army) in connection with intelligence missions required in the servicing of Fifth Army and its components.

10. Request is hereby made for authority to carry out the foregoing proposals, including authority:

a. To effect all necessary arrangements for the operation of a plane during the next moon period;

b. To draw, from Fifth Army sources, supplies and equip-

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

8. The undertaking and completion of the programs above outlined will require the following supplies, equipment and facilities:

a. For the remainder of 6 Operational Groups nothing further, except as can be supplied by OSS, other than the following to be supplied by Fifth Army:

1. The balance of such equipment and supplies as have already been duly approved and as were requisitioned by OSS on 19 October 1943.

2. Explosives, fuses, arms and ammunition as required for operations which may, in the future, be assigned such Groups by 6th Corps or its components.

3. The following items of transportation which are permanently needed in the servicing of recruiting and training establishments and for operational transportation of personnel employed on intelligence and operational missions:

2 - 2 1/2 Ton 6x6
4 - 1/4 Ton 4x4
2 - 3/4 Ton 4x4

1. Except for 2 - 1/4 Ton 4x4 vehicles all of such transportation was originally estimated as required for the purposes of servicing the Operational Groups authorized by the Endersment of 4 October 1943.

2. It is believed that no increase in such original estimate, except as indicated, will be required to enable OSS to carry the additional burdens which will be imposed under Operational Plans Nos. 3 & 4.

3. The progress of work to date under the authorities above cited has been seriously hampered by lack of adequate transportation. Recruiting in distant parts, transportation to training areas and dispatching points at the front and constant liaison with Corps and the Divisions require the minimum additional facilities requested.

b. For Operational Plans Nos. 3 & 4 nothing will be required except as can be supplied by OSS, other than:

1. Such authority and cooperation from the Air Force as may be necessary to permit of the carrying out, during the next near period, of operations for the dropping at points

SECRET

- 2 -

such a Detachment is desired for use by 6th Corps and its components. It has also been indicated that the total number of Officers and men included in such Detachment should approximate 500 rather than the 250 - 300 suggested. It is believed that personnel to such number may be furnished, from Italian Alpini and Demolition Regiments and Battalions, within the period of one week.

6. In accordance with the authorities cited the organization, training, and equipping of 6 Operational Groups, has been undertaken and is in process. One such Group has been sent to the 3rd Division for use on such intelligence and operational missions as may be directed by the Commanding General, 3rd Division. Approximately 100 additional recruits are on hand in various stages of processing. These recruits should furnish one further Operational Group and several Intelligence Teams. The remainder of 4 Operational Groups should be recruited and trained within one week from the receipt of equipment and supplies which have heretofore been requisitioned by OSS.

7. In order to coordinate the programs contemplated by the authorities of 4 October 1943 and 17 October 1943 with those suggested under Operational Plans Nos. 3 & 4 OSS proposes:

a. That it be permitted to continue with the recruitment, organization, equipping and training of the balance of 6 Italian Operational Groups (known as Gruppi Combattanti Italiani) under the authorities of 4 October 1943 and 17 October 1943, for use by 6th Corps and its components and that the sources of recruitment be as may be determined advisable by OSS except as it shall be limited to volunteers of adequate qualifications whose loyalty to the Allied cause has been reasonably established;

b. That it also be permitted to carry out the program for contacting, establishing communications with and equipping certain groups of Resistance Forces as contemplated under Operational Plan No. 3; and

c. That it further be permitted to recruit, organize, equip and train, for such use as the Commanding General, 6th Corps may direct, a Detachment of 500 Officers and men who are or have been members of the Italian Armed Forces, who have the qualifications requisite for operations of the nature contemplated under Operational Plan No. 4 and whose loyalty to the Allied cause has been reasonably established.

It is recommended that the necessary authority be granted to the Commanding General, 6th Corps, to carry out the program for the recruitment, organization, equipping and training of the balance of 6 Italian Operational Groups, for the use of the 6th Corps, and for the recruitment, organization, equipping and training of the Detachment of 500 Officers and men, for the use of the 6th Corps, as suggested in the foregoing.

STENCIL

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
HQ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

SECRET
12/2/43

30 October 1943

SUBJECT: OSS Operational Plans Nos. 3 & 4.
25 October 1943 - Request for Authority.
TO : Commanding General, Fifth Army.

1. Pursuant to endorsement of the Commanding General, Fifth Army, dated 4 October 1943, to OSS Basic Communication, dated 26 September 1943, there has been authorized the organization, training, equipping, and employment of Italian Operational Groups to the number of 15 such Groups of 4 officers and 30 men each, aggregating 60 officers and 450 men.

2. By endorsement of the Chief of Staff, Fifth Army, dated 17 October 1943 there was authorized the immediate activation, training and equipping of 6 Operational Groups for such use by 6th Corps and its components might direct.

3. On 27 October 1943 there were submitted by OSS to A C of S G-2, Fifth Army, Operational Plans Nos. 3 and 4, dated 25 October 1943.

4. Operational Plan No. 3 proposed a program for the servicing of known Italian resistance elements whose assistance may be of aid to OSS in the work it is doing or may be called upon to do for Fifth Army in connection with future intelligence and operational assignments. The work of OSS will be greatly facilitated if preliminary contacts with such Resistance Forces can be made and a net work of communications established.

5. Operational Plan No. 4 contemplates the use of specially selected Italian personnel of military experience in an operation designed to place a Detachment of such personnel behind enemy lines at a point where contact with existing Resistance Forces may be possible, where radio communication may be established and from which Sabotage and like operations, under the direction of the Commanding General, 6th Corps, may be conducted. The personnel readily available for the undertaking proposed in Operational Plan No. 4 has been fixed at 250 - 300 total. It has been indicated by the Commanding General, 6th Corps that

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

c. There is a rumor in Rome that
Marcello CAVALLI has been shot by the fascists.

for Colonel HUNTINGTON

MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
2nd Lt. NMB
Intelligence Officer

C O: Major BLOM, OI G-2
Files

1093
Washington

OSJ SP'CO. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

12816
SECRET

30 October 1943

SUBJECT : Special report MATTEUCCI

TO : Colonel HOWARD, A C of S G-2, 5th Army HQ.

SOURCE : GCI. Evaluation B-3

1. The following information was obtained from General MATTEUCCI of the "Genio Navale".

a. MATTEUCCI, who left ROME on September 28 and came to NAPLES on foot via ROCCASECCA and FROSINONE, says that street fighting in ROME had stopped and that there are many German soldiers in the streets. Certain districts, such as, rione TIBURTINO, TRASTEVERE, are guarded by sentries and the population is not allowed to leave them.

b. On the way to NAPLES he says he heard from a good source who left ROME on October 6 that the Comandante Generale of the Carabinieri had been shot together with his staff.

c. He says he saw a lot of movement of truckborne troops and armored cars especially around FROSINONE. He said there was considerable movement of aircraft on the FROSINONE airfield (G 4639) as well as the ARPINO airfield (G 6738).

d. The food situation in ROME was already very serious on September 28. Bread was being sold on the black market at Lit. 500 per kg. He says he was told that the Germans were taking away objects d'art and gold from private houses and museums. He says that on the North slope of MONTE MARIO as well as around the airfields north and south of it the Germans have built strong fortifications.

-3-

SECRET

B. Contacts indicated in Operational Plan No. 4 are at a standstill due to Fifth Army's deliberation.

C. British relations in X Corps are excellent with fine cooperation on both of our parts.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

a. The flow of information is increasingly good owing to the fact that our situation is better organized. With the advent of personnel mentioned in paragraph 1b(2) above a corresponding improvement should appear.

60 Huntington
JERRY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding.

Incls.:

Copies of OP Plans Nos. 3 & 4

Copies of sample intelligence reports.

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

been submitted.

(4) In addition 7 agents, previously dispatched have returned. Of these 5 had accomplished their Missions.

(5) A team of 2 men and radio operator and a team of three men and a radio operator were dispatched on long range missions.

b. Operations

(1) 10 guides furnished combat units - successful.

(2) Reference paragraph 3b2 of report No. 5 : the 34 men in the first Italian OG have proved useful to combat units on sabotage missions.

(3) Operational plans 3 and 4 (copies inclosed) are still held up by Fifth Army.

(4) 100 mules and donkeys provided by OSS for Army operations.

3. Activities - Planned

a. Intelligence

(1) 9 agents to be dispatched in X Corps area this week.

(2) Parachuting of radios, agents and equipment planned.

b. Operations

(1) Various sabotage targets to be attacked this week.

(2) Bombing targets reported to Air Force.

(3) Organization of resistance groups south of Rome well under way.

(4) A group of 40 trained saboteurs are now available for use. At present they are being used in our training area pending calls from combat units.

4. Outside Contacts

a. The Italian Military organization of General Pavone has proved useless. Relations have been discontinued.

SECRET

HQ OSS SPEC DET G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

3 November 1943

SUBJECT : Weekly Report No. 6

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington D.C. (Thru OSS Algiers)

SECRET

1. Organization

a. Administration - Colonel Fountain has been assigned by Fifth Army as liaison with OSS under the A.C. of S, G-2

b. Personnel

(1) Arrived at Base Headquarters during the week: Colonel Glavin and Mr. Scamparino from Algiers - Petty Officers Moran and Hoppers, photographers from London, disposition made by Colonel Glavin.

(2) Personnel requested for use with mission: 6 officers and 8 enlisted men from OSS Algiers.

c. Supply and Transportation - an increased transportation request was submitted to Fifth Army.

d. Communications

1. Total messages to Date - 568
2. Total OSS Stations (Field Stations in operation - 5
3. Agent Operators Trained - 2
4. Agent Operators in training - 7
5. Agent Operators dispatched - 1
6. Agent Operators contacted - 1

2. Activities - undertaken

a. Intelligence

(1) Reports No. 69, 71 A & B and 72 thru 79 and four special reports (samples enclosed) were submitted to Fifth Army. Strategic Intelligence continues to be sent to Algiers as well as Fifth Army.

(2) Information of special nature supplied upon request to several agencies. Set up a group for running study on Rome for location of mines, useful people etc.

(3) 15 agents dispatched during the period - of these 7 have returned, been interrogated and reports have

SECRET

RECORD OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED

18 Nov '43

Document Huntington Weekly Report Nov 6-9 Nov.
 Requested By AWS Authorization AWS
 No. of Copies Five Reproduction date 17 Nov '43

Copy No	To	Date
<u>1</u>	<u>Corihner</u>	
<u>2</u>	<u>Lowman</u>	
	<u>Magruder - return</u>	
<u>3</u>	<u>Shepardson</u>	
<u>4</u>	<u>NATO</u>	
<u>5</u>	<u>Secretariat</u>	

-5-

7. Much of the planning of this Detachment is based on the assumption that an OHH plane will be made available for parachute operations so that communications equipment, clothing, arms and other supplies may be dropped at designated points. It is becoming increasingly difficult to transport material - especially radio sets and explosives - through enemy lines.

ELMER C. HUTTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding.

Distribution
G-2
Washington
Algiers
Files (2)

-4-

Once radio communications are established arrangements can be made to supply and employ, in operations, known Resistance Groups which are located in Areas in front of Fifth Army close to the German Rear.

It is assumed that the Special Detachment of Italian Soldiers (desired by 6th Corps and authorized by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, 6 October 1943) may be dispatched overland to the Cassino - Antina Sector for the purpose of contacting known Resistance Forces in the Colle, Anagnino and Abbruzzo regions.

2. Within Combat Zone

It is proposed to maintain our liaison and forward coordination at 6th Corps. Our representation (one officer and 3 assistants with approximately 10 operators) will be continued at 3rd Division. Like representation will be established with the 45th and the 34th Divisions.

An Interrogation Section will be established. To do this our Liaison Officer with 10th Corps and his assistants must be withdrawn. The move seems worthwhile since such good information is now being lost to the Army by reason of the fact that there is no systematic interrogation of the hundreds of Italian casualties who are constantly seeping through the "soft spots" in the German Lines.

c. Training and Holding

This Section will, as indicated, be made mobile and will be kept reasonably near Base Headquarters. It will serve as a "pool" as well as a Training Base. By operating a pool at this Area it will be unnecessary to maintain, as suggested above, more than approximately 10 operatives with each of the Combat Divisions since replacements will be readily available.

Near the Training Section will be established an Area for the six Italian Operational Groups (authorized by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, 4 October 1943) which will be drawn from regular Italian Forces (authority of the Commanding General, 6 November 1943). Personnel heretofore recruited for Operational Group purposes and members of special Intelligence Teams will be reduced to a total of approximately 40 and will be employed on missions requiring particular capability and experience.

6. The foregoing program, as will be observed, contemplates only limited Long Range Activities and the servicing of Sixth Corps and the three Divisions mentioned. Existing facilities will not permit of continuing our present liaison with 10th Corps nor maintain representation with 2nd Corps or its components.

-3-

Training Center but also as a Holding Area from which operatives and agents can be drawn as needed. This will not only enable OSS to render service to an additional number of "hot" targets but will, also, it is believed increase "security" both of military operations, and, also, of the individuals concerned.

4. The personnel and facilities required for the reasonable functioning of the organization above-mentioned have, however, of course, been present in this "test" in which was established informally and without benefit of a definite directive or of adequate Tables of Allocation or Basic Allowances. The result has been that we have been compelled to seek assistance from Fifth Army particularly in transportation - in order to extend, even modestly, the scope of our activities. We have requested transportation as listed in Schedule "a" attached hereto. This we deemed the minimum required to enable us to render the services contemplated under the authorities of the Commanding General of 4 October 1943 and 6 November 1943. We have actually received transportation to the extent shown in such schedule. Our real deficiency, as indicated in the schedule, is in small vehicles without which our activities will necessarily be restricted.

5. We have now made a survey of the potentialities of this Detachment based on facilities now in hand. This survey has convinced us that our activities must be limited as follows:

a. Long Range:

Nothing beyond the projects outlined in Schedule "a" will be undertaken. Our endeavor will be to establish communications centers with Resistance Groups and at other important points from which intelligence net works may be organized and, as ordered by Fifth Army, Sabotage and other post-military operations may be conducted. In order to insure that planned projects may be carried out, in part at least, parachute operations will be supplemented by land and sea infiltration and by the continued use of couriers.

b. Short Range:

1. Beyond 10 mile zone

Radio Teams with organizers are now on their way to the Areas indicated in Schedule "a". Efforts to establish at least two communications centers at from 25 to 35 miles beyond the front will be continued. Previous efforts to infiltrate teams on foot have failed. New attempts are now being made and a Short Range parachute operation will, we trust, be made shortly. The practice of dispatching one team daily to "make the circuit" or to establish themselves and report by courier will be carried on pending the establishment of Radio contact by one means or another.

which are in any work behind enemy lines.

b. Forward Echelon

At this point is located our Liaison Officer with the Corps and Divisions. Here too short Range projects (limited to Areas with 10 to 30 miles from the front) are coordinated, all overland dispatching is directed and the interrogation of casualties conducted.

Our Forward Stations (representation with Divisions) operate under the direction of the Forward Echelon. The functions of the Forward Stations are limited to Combat Intelligence Activities, carried on under the direction of Division G-2s, Short Range Sabotage missions and assistance in long range overland dispatching. Combat Intelligence - i.e. missions carried out within the 10 mile limit - were never visualized by G-2 as a part of its necessary services to Fifth Army. This is likewise true of casual interrogation. Since however, the Combat Divisions seem to consider these services useful - especially the purely local intelligence work done by members of the so-called Italian Operational Groups assigned to the Divisions - they will be continued within the limits of the facilities available to G-2 within the Theatre.

c. Training and Holding Areas:

All of the operational personnel used by G-2 in the current campaign has been locally recruited. While most Italians are reasonably familiar with enemy methods and organizations their knowledge is very general and a reasonable amount of training is required before operatives can be sent on even the simplest of missions. Furthermore there is a vast difference in the type of personnel and technique required on short range and local missions. Short Range and local projects call for quickwitted operatives and of the "Saboteur" type. These are younger and more vigorous individuals than those who are employed on long range missions where executive experience and extensive contacts are the criteria. In the interest of intelligent selection, therefore, and of giving some basic instruction, G-2 has established and conducted a Training Station at which, already, nearly 100 individuals have received instruction of a sort. The Training Center, however, is now too far both from the front, where the services of most of the trainees are required, and from Base Hqs. where planning is controlled. Plans are in preparation for moving this Section further forward. It will be placed under command so that it may remain reasonably mobile. It will serve not only as a

SECRET

SECRET

HQ USMC 5th Army
11 FEBRUARY

11 November 1943

SUBJECT : GDS Operations - Interim Report - Status of
Current Activities - Limitations imposed by
lack of Personnel and Facilities.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Army

1. An outline of the activities of this Detachment to date is appended hereto as Schedule "A".
2. Schedule "B" contains an outline of our past and planned activities.
3. The physical organization of these activities, which experience indicates as essential if the work is to be effectively done, is about as follows:

a. Base Headquarters:

Base liaison with G-2 Section, Fifth Army, is centered; supplies, finances and other services and all information matters are handled; planning is supervised; and our headquarters Intelligence Section, which consolidates and coordinates intelligence submitted to Fifth Army and supervises the preparation of special studies (such as those furnished on roads, coastal topography etc), is maintained.

Under the supervision of Base Headquarters are two sections which, for the moment, because of the nature of their work, are necessarily established in Naples, viz.: The Long Range Activities Section and the Recruiting Section.

Long Range Activities involve the recruitment and training of limited but specially selected personnel (which is now obviously most available in the Naples Area) and the use of facilities, such as Air and Sea transportation, in the employment of which Naples, for some time to come, will be a convenient base.

The Recruiting Section is charged with the task of selecting and screening personnel of all categories - whether for short or long range projects and whether for use on intelligence or operations side. This section is also charged with the procurement of special supplies such as Italian shoes, clothing and like material (of which about 4 tons are now on hand) all of

-3-

(2.) Difficulties are being encountered in arranging for Reception Committees and our liaison with Algiers is not sufficiently good to insure complete understanding of all requirements.

4. Outside Contacts

a. Operational Plans 3 and 4 have been approved by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, (copies of Basic Communication 30 October 1943 and authority 6 November 1943 enclosed). The facilities required to service the Plans have not been provided by the Army as requested.

b. The Italian Army may also furnish the balance of personnel for Operational Groups authorized 4 October 1943.

c. STM, the Italian SI, have agreed to furnish us with their daily report and are taking some part in furnishing us with recruits for intelligence missions.

5. Remarks:

The interim report (copy enclosed) to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, gives a fair resume of our activities to date and of some of our problems. It also indicates what experience has proven to be some necessary revision organizationally.

E. C. Huntington Jr.
ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding.

Incls.
Sample Intelligence reports
Target Maps
Letter to G-2 Fifth Army

+2+

(4.) An operative upon whom great reliance was placed for the organization of large resistance groups was wounded before his mission was complete. A substitute has been dispatched, but the operation delayed as a result.

(5.) A total of 22 agents dispatched this week. 15 of these have returned, only three having failed to bring information of use to the combat troops. These missions were all of a short range nature since Commanders even up to the Army are interested primarily in combat intelligence.

(6.) 2 agents dispatched last week returned, mission accomplished.

b. Operations

(1.) Organization of resistance groups has taken definite shape, particularly with the contact mentioned in paragraph g Note which services a large group that we have been encouraging.

(2.) Until the mission receives air transport for dropping no effective operations can be carried out. Some minor sabotage efforts have been made at the request of Fifth Army and 6th Corps.

3. Activities - Planned

a. Owing to the fact that this mission has insufficient transportation and equipment to service as wide a field as it is now attempting it is considered advisable to withdraw all personnel from the 10th Corps (British) and to plan no operations for the 2nd Corps when it comes into the line (See enclosed letter).

b. It is contemplated that the training and holding area for special agents (heretofore near Naples) will be set up further forward about the 15th of this month.

c. A rest camp for operatives is being established in the vicinity of Pozzuoli.

d. Intelligence

(1.) Arrangements have been made to infiltrate by way of the Adriatic from the vicinity of Brindisi.

(2.) Arrangements have been made to use fishing fleets on the west coast for infiltration.

(3.) Three agents are ready to be dispatched using these routes.

e. Operations

(1.) Three sorties for dropping have been set up for this moon period.

SECRETOSS SPEC DET G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

10 November 1943

SUBJECT : Weekly Report No. 7

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.
(Thru OSS Algiers)1. Organization

a. Administration, no change
 b. Personnel: Arrived at Base Headquarters during the week: Brig. Gen. MacGruder and Major Williams for a visit, Lt. Gabriel and Sgt. Palosky for duty.

c. Supply and Transportation

(1.) Lt. Gabriel assigned as Assistant Services Officer.

(2.) A requisition to Fifth Army for eight vehicles was cut by the G4 to four vehicles thus making necessary a corresponding decrease in our operational plans.

d. Communications

Total messages for the week 103
 Total OSS stations (Field stations in operation) 7
 Agent operators trained 5
 Agent operators in training 5
 Agent operators dispatched 0
 Agent operators contacted 2

Note: One of these operators is not OSS dispatched but is working for a resistance group with whom we are in contact. His set is entirely home made and he is using a provisional cypher arranged by our Communications Section.

2. Activities - undertakena. Intelligence

(1.) Reports number 79 thru 89 and Special reports 9 thru 13 were submitted to Fifth Army. These reports include information of value from the OSS agents on Corsica and the Adriatic. Sample copies inclosed.

(2.) Target maps worked up and reproduced from information. Copies inclosed.

(3.) Geographic section continues on special studies for the Fifth Army. Air checks on these reports have indicated a high degree of accuracy to date. Full map coverage of Northern Italy has been obtained.

RECORD OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED

Document Huntington Weekly Report - No. 7
Requested By AWA Authorization AWA
No. of Copies _____ Reproduction Date _____

Copy No 1 To First 14 papers to: Director Signature
2 Lowman
Magruder - return
3 Shepardson, including original
4 NATO intelligence reports.
5 Secretariat

(9549)

Schedule "A"Interim Report 15 November 1943(1) Transportation FacilitiesVehicles in use 11 October 1943

Total Number	-	41
Army Vehicles	-	10
Italian Vehicles	-	31

Vehicles (Army) Requested:

Authority 16 October 1943	-	6
Authority 6 November 1943	-	4

Vehicles (Army) Received:

Authority 16 October 1943	-	4
Authority 6 November 1943	-	0

Deficiency in Vehicles (Army) Requested - 10 +

+ 4 of the required vehicles are jeeps.

Schedule D

Interid Report 14 November 1944

Planned Activities

Short Range

Daily Infiltration: for courier service covering area before Fifth Corps.

Combat Intelligence: As ordered by Divisions.

Radio Team: Three Agents and an Operator (with set) near Cassino.

Long Range

Parachute Operations:

No. 1 - Colle San Magno (Two teams)

No. 1A - Segni (Two teams)

No. 2 - Sabini (Two teams)

No. 3 - Poggio (Three teams)

Seaborne Operations

No. 4 - Alghero (Two teams)

Note: Another team must be sent to Colle San Magno (making two). Two teams are on the way to Segni. The Poggio and Alghero Teams will be dispatched shortly.

Courier Service:

Six teams of two officers each to Rome and other Northern points.

-4-

(Mission 1 November 1943) and instruct Agent No. 12, PT operator (Pereira) to contact
Pereira. - Agent No. 12, PT operator (Pereira) to contact
(with radio) to Colle San Angelo to work the PT operator
Forces in Abruzzi mts.

-3-

11 November 1943 (week)Forward Echelon

2 Agents-Roccaseo
 2 Agents-Capriati-
 Castel San Vincenzo
 Cassino
 2 Agents-St. Elia (with
 pigeons)-captured but
 were able to liberate
 pigeons without detec-
 tion and later escape.
 1 Agent-Isernia-San
 Vincenzo
 1 Agent-Alfadena

3rd Division

5 Combat Mission of
 2 men each reported
 (verbally) as having
 been dispatched-1 Team
 captured-one man lost
 arm as result mortar
 fire but both escaped.

Long Range16 October 1943

Three agents and one Radio operator
 (No. 5 and Vittorio) with radio to Rome- Contact established but
 not yet clear. A second contact (fairly clear) established with
 operator using "home made" set.

22 October 1943

Two Agents (No. 10 and 11) - one
 Pesca for Resistance Force Contacts; One Rome (and South) courier
 service.

24 October 1943

One operator (No. 7) Frosinone.

1 November 1943

Three Agents (Carlo, No. 12, No. 13)
 and WT operator (without set) to Colle San Magno and Segni to con-
 tact Resistance Forces. Carlo wounded by mine. No. 12 returned.
 Others continued.

11 November 1943

Forward Echelon dispatched two Agents
 to Rome. They will return couriers daily. In Rome they will pre-
 pare information on mined buildings. - One Agent Bologna -
 Courier Service. - Agent No. 7 to Colle San Magno-Segni and Pal-
 ombara (Sabini Mts.) to contact Resistance Forces at these Points

-2-

12-15 October 1943Sixth Corps

Patrol high ground
North of Volturmo
One Agent Pontelondolfo
Morocone
4 Agents - Radio Opera-
tors (with mile & Radio;
to Isornia

16 October 1943Forward Echelon Agents-Interno

1 Agent-Crazzanisi
2 Agents-Frosinone
2 Agents-Isornia
1 Agent-Tastelpetrosa

23-30 October 1943Tenth Corps

1 Agent-Auruna-Rocca-
montina
1 Agent-Venafro
5 Agents-Combat Intell-
igence.

Forward Echelon

4 Guides for Lago di
Catese-Latino-Gallo-
Roccamondolfi Area
3 Agents to Montaguila
Monteroduni-1 killed
1 wounded and captured
1 escaped.
1 Agent-Sparanise
1 Agent-Montaguila-
Monteroduni
2 Agents-Milignano-
Vairano

3 November 1943 (week)3rd Division

8 Missions-Combat Int-
elligence only

Forward Echelon

5 Guides for 504 Air-
borne Regiment
5 Guides- Mt. Alto
10 Agents-Venafro-Isornia
3 Sabotage Teams-
2 Teams Failed in Mis-
sion. One team success-
ful-3 men killed one
escaped and reported.

Tenth Corps

6 Agents dispatched on
Combat Intelligence
Missions.

Schedule AInterim Report 12 November 1943Activities to dateShort Range9 September 1943Ischia Station

Five teams (2 men each) to Naples - 3 teams successful

2 failed to reach

mainland.

One team (2 men) Ave-

llimo-One team (6 men)

Aveillino-One man killed

3 wounded (one man

later died).

Note: During the period to October there

were other sightings from Ischia, Salerno and Ischia but no adeq-

uate records were then being maintained, and no mention of such

island, therefore, included.

1 October 1943Salerno

3 teams (2 men each)

to Naples

1 team (3 men) to

Volturno (Capua)

1 team (2 men)

Campobasso

1 group (14 men)

Naples

1 team (2 men) to

cover Volturno-Mond-

ragone-Castel Volturno

2 Agents-Ischia

2 Agents-Aversa

2 Agents-Capua

3 Agents-Brigit

2 Agents-Mondragone

3 Agents-Aversa

3 Agents-Casale

1 Agent-Montecassino

1 Agent-Casale

9 October 194331st Corps11 October 194310th Corps

4. When the mission is completed the Mission Report (being sent under a Mission Report) should be completed setting forth all intelligence etc. and copies distributed as in the case of the Mission Report. If the Mission is lost or not heard from within a reasonable time a Mission Report to this effect should be filed.

4. The Interrogation Section will report (using its own form dated and consecutively numbered and indicating areas concerned) to Base HQs. through Forward Echelon. Forward Echelon should be sent 3 copies, 1 for Forward Echelon, 1 for the Corps or Divisional G-2 concerned and 1 for Base HQs.

5. It should be borne in mind that there is constant messenger service from Divisions to Corps and between Corps and other Corps and Army. Envelopes should be addressed to the respective G-2 sections. Attention: (the name of the G-2 Officer concerned).

ALL BY 1. 1000 1000
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution
Forward Echelon (Various sections)
Mr. Barnes
Captain Bourgeois
Mr. Tompkins
Lt. Hurle
Washington
Algiers
Files

W. C. P. D. G. M. T. G. 2
P. 212TH AN Y

16 November 1941

SUBJECT : Forward Echelon - Organization and Procedures
TO : Colonel Gumble

1. Upon the arrival of additional personnel, expected momentarily, 6th Fifth Army element, Forward Echelon, will be organized as follows:

a. Sixth Corps Liaison Office: under the charge of the CO, Forward Echelon with two assistants.

b. Division Sections: which for the moment will be at the 3rd (or 16th), the 49th and the 14th Divisions.

c. Interrogating Section: which will move about to "soft spots" interrogating and advising Forward Echelon on dispatching areas.

2. Orders will be issued in due course indicating assignments in connection with the foregoing.

3. Forward Echelon procedures should be substantially as follows:

a. Dispatching: will be done by the respective Division until an agreed dispatching area for operations for the Division or Corps. Requests for the dispatching will be made by Base Hqs. to Forward Echelon which will then assign a Division Section to take charge. Members of such sections will be sent direct to Divisions from Training and Holding Areas. Final briefing will be done by the CO's of Division Sections.

b. Maintenance of Records

1. The Recruiting Officer will prepare for each recruit an "Agent's Record" which will be, in effect, a personal history statement and will bear an assigned number. One copy will be kept by the Recruiting Officer, one copy will accompany the man wherever he goes, and two copies will be sent to the Base Hqs. one of which will be given to the Hqs. Forward Echelon.

2. The Training and Holding Section will prepare a record for each agent. This "Agent's Training Record" will be a complete record of training received and proficiency in each subject. Each record will contain a remark on the Agent's all-around attitude and spirit, and will bear the same number as does the Agent's Record. One copy will remain with the man wherever he goes and two copies will be sent to Base Hqs. one of which will be given to the Headquarters Forward Echelon.

Weekly Report No. (Cont'd)

3. Operations

(1). Definite arrangements for dropping of equipment to resistance groups set up. The weather is the only cause for delay.

(2). Dropping operations have been somewhat hampered by the difficulty encountered in packing since the equipment comes from here but the packing is all done in Algiers.

(3). The acquisition of some time pencils and some more plastic has made it possible to start advanced plans and training in our school for a more effective sabotage program.

4. Outside contacts

The SIM have sent a formal liaison mission to us consisting of a Lt. Col. DeMarco and three assistants. We are not greatly impressed with the former so far and have arranged to keep the whole group away from our own areas of importance. They are at present at the Supreme Command in Brindisi arranging for the importation to the mainland of Italian troops for use with the Army.

E. C. Huntington Jr.
EMERY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Inclosures - 2

Incl. No. 1 - Letter of Organisation

Incl. No. 2 - Intelligence Reports

HEADQUARTERS
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH ARMY

19 November 1943

SUBJECT: Weekly Report No. 8.

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

THROUGH: OSS, Algiers.

1. Organization

- a. Administration - See Inclosure No. 1
- b. Personnel - None
- c. Supply and Transportation - Received delivery on two (2) 2 1/2 ton trucks.

d. Communications

Total messages for the week - 79
Total OSS stations in operation - 7
Agent operators trained - 6
Agent operators in training - 11
Agent operators dispatched - 1
Agent operators contacted - 2

2. Activities - undertaken

a. Intelligence

(1). Regular reports numbers 90 thru 102, Special Reports numbers 3 thru 6, and extracts from Intelligence Reports numbers 14 thru 21 - see inclosure number 2.

(2). Agent mentioned in par 2, a. (4) of last week's report as wounded has been able to reach our contacts in Rome and will still be of use to us.

(3). 10 agents dispatched, 2 returned because of the disappearance of one of their party. The story is now under investigation.

b. Operations

(1). British requested to drop equipment for resistance groups. result as yet unknown.

(2). See last week's report re air transport.

3. Activities - planned

a. Intelligence

(1). Date set for infiltration of bodies via the Adriatic with British cooperation.

(2). SIM reports and information will be routed to us in the future.

(3). Missions for all units of the US VI Corps prepared to operate.

(1)

Transmitted 12, 8/11
12-7-63

RECORD OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED

12 - 7 - 63

Document Operations
Weekly Report No. 2 - Huntington

Requested By AWA Authorization AWA

No. of Copies _____ Reproduction date _____

Copy No 1 *First 2 pages* *Signature* *Edward K. ...*
 To Director *AWA*

2 Lowman

3 Magruder - return

4 Chapman

5 Shepardson - orig. intell. signature

6 NATO

7 Secretariat

(9549)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
 OSS, SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2
 APO 464, U. S. ARMY

25 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Weekly Report No. 9.

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.
 (Thru: OSS, Algiers)

1. Organizationa. Administration - no change

b. Personnel - Reported for duty Lts. Abrighani, Hollingshead, Zurlo and Levengood; enlisted men, S/Sgt Flynn, S/Sgt Boissiere, S/Sgt Beane, Sgt Gamble and Pvt Bonafede. Colonel Huntington relieved by Colonel John Haskell.

c. Supply and Transportation - no changed. Communications

Total messages for the week - 108

Total OSS stations in operation - 5

Agent operators trained - 7

Agent operators in training - 11

Agent operators dispatched - 0

Agent operators contacted - 0

2. Activities - undertakena. Intelligence

(1). Regular reports numbers 108 thru 113, special reports numbers 7 and 8, and extracts from Intelligence reports numbers 22 thru 27 submitted to G-2, Fifth Army, see inclosure number 1.

(2). 15 agents dispatched, none of which have as yet returned. Five agents returned from previous missions of which two had failed on their mission. These two are at present under undisclosed investigation.

(3). Consistently good information has been received from the radio contact established with the OSS agent in Rome.

b. Operations

(1). Frequent attempts to drop equipment as called for in OPA 2 have failed due to the weather which has been most inclement.

(2). The establishment of a packing shed near here would eliminate a great deal of the difficulty encountered in getting our equipment dropped to resistance groups.

SECRET

- 1 -

Document Weekly Report No. 9 - NATO.
Requested By AWB Authorization AWB
No. of Copies nix Reproduction Date 12-18-61

(9549)

SECRET

- 18 -

internal organization is better and the preliminary work more effectively done. More difficult because the enemy is both more numerous and more firmly installed. In any event, the job can be done and OSS should have a part in it. A little rank, acceptability to the native leaders, a reasonable knowledge of the language and a fair understanding of what is required in operations of this kind are prerequisites. The undertaking should be organized on a "Group" basis - a leader, adequate assistants for instruction and planning, and ample communications. This is an assignment which OSS can plan and execute either alone or with its British friends. It is not so difficult as to be impossible nor so dangerous as to be foolhardy, and, properly conceived and carried out, it could result in more benefit to an invading Army than any other single thing - or perhaps, even, than all the other things - which OSS might do.

Ellery J. Huntington, Jr.
Ellery J. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry.

SECRET

SECRET

- 15 -

centers or the supplementing of existing centers.

d. The contacting, supplying and direction of Resistance Groups with a view:

1. To furnishing additional information; and
2. To carrying out planned and coordinated operations in the enemy rear.

Note: Experience indicates that sabotage targets should be limited to communications, minor facilities of transportation, road mining and supply dumps. Other objectives - except certain marine and industrial targets - should be left to the Air Force.

15. The most important single job which OSS can do for any Army is to make available to it the Resistance elements now existing, and which, during a campaign, continue to form, behind enemy lines. It would have been possible in Italy, as late as about December first, to have dropped, at certain points, Liaison Units of American (or British) Officers and Italian Officers for the purpose of planning and supervising the execution of operations calculated to disrupt enemy communications and supply. These operations could have been timed to coincide with Army action and, given reasonable plane facilities to insure arms, explosives and radio and other equipment, could easily have resulted in completely demoralizing the enemy at one or two vital points.

This same program could and should be carried out in advance of any "large scale" invasion of Western Europe. It will, there, be both easier and more difficult than in Italy. Easier because the

SECRET

SECRET

- 14 -

be confined to "Combat" planning - to cover a zone extending 10-15 miles behind enemy lines; "Short Range" planning - 15-45 miles; and "Long Range" planning - from 45 to 150 miles or to the limit of the Army objective, whichever is the lesser. More distant planning should be directed from Theatre Headquarters.

k. Careful consideration must be given to the amount and type of material and equipment required for the campaign. The OSS Mission must be prepared to "shift for itself" except for the drawing of rations and ordinary quartermaster and Ordnance supplies. Transportation and communication needs must be carefully gauged and will always be found to be greater than anticipated.

14. OSS activities with an Army (exclusive of Morale Operations and Counter-intelligence work which were not, in Fifth Army, functions of OSS) based on Fifth Army experience should contemplate:

a. Combat Intelligence work, Reconnaissance Patrolling and local sabotage carried on by OSS Divisional Units composed, in part, of OSS Operatives and members of Operational Groups and, in part, of personnel locally recruited and trained.

Note: German speaking personnel would be largely useful for sabotage and demoralisation, particularly at the very outset.

b. The establishment of "Short Range" (10 miles to 55 miles behind enemy lines), Radio Intelligence net works - designed to move back with the enemy.

c. Like establishment of "Long Range" communication

SECRET

SECRET

- 18 -

e. Intelligence and Operational Work beyond the "Combat" zone (i.e. beyond ten miles for "Short Range" and thirty-five miles for "Long Range" activities) should be directed by the Chief of Mission and his Planning Officer through the Chief of Intelligence or Chief of Operations as circumstances may require.

f. Corps Liaison Officers should be the media for coordinating OSS activities carried on for Divisions (or Components) within the Corps. Divisional activities should be supervised by OSS Corps Headquarters. Directives should flow from Corps (with advice to OSS Army Headquarters) or, at times, from Army.

g. The Mission should likewise include a Training Officer, and Assistants, and an appropriate liaison with air corps units assigned to OSS operations.

h. Provision should also be made for attaching to or putting at the disposition of the Mission, initially, a reasonable number of "native" operatives, capable of doing intelligence work, and language speaking "Operational Group" personnel to the extent, at the outset, of approximately twenty to thirty per Division.

i. Existing OSS networks within the territory assigned the Army to which the Mission is attached should be delivered to the Mission.

j. OSS planning should be done on the basis of reasonable knowledge of Army objectives. It should obviously be done as far in advance as possible. Army Mission planning should

SECRET

SECRET

- 12 -

information), introduced my successor and asked if further reports were required. The answer was "No".

15. The experiences of our Fifth Army Mission left definite impressions with respect to the organization of OSS Detachments destined for service with Armies in the field:

a. The "Mission" must be organized well in advance of "D-day" and should be given ample opportunity to work and live as a unit so that when the time for action arrives, it will function as a team on which each player understands his assignment;

b. There should be a responsible Chief of Mission whose headquarters should be always at or near Army Headquarters.

c. The Mission Chief should be assisted by a Staff consisting of an Executive Officer, a Chief of Intelligence in constant contact with G-2, a Chief of operations on the G-3 Staff, a Planning Officer, a Services Officer, and a Communications Officer. These Officers, with adequate assistants and clerical aids and with a Signals Detachment, should constitute the OSS Headquarters Staff.

d. In addition to the Staff and Signals Detachment above mentioned, the Mission should include Corps and Divisional Representatives. These Officers and their Assistants (commissioned and enlisted) should be language speaking and should be qualified not only to carry on adequate liaison work with the forward units but, also, to supervise the conduct of local intelligence and sabotage operations.

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

have been disturbed, if not harassed, by an attitude of proprietorship on the part of this organization, I concluded that British concern with our operations stemmed from this source. I hasten to add that I had no dealings with SIS or its representatives although I was conscious of their widespread activities.

Our relations with SOE and British Tenth Corps were most friendly. The latter, in fact, used one of our Combat Teams almost continuously and objected strenuously when, by reason of increasing demands from Sixth Corps, we indicated a desire to withdraw this Team.

Irrespective of the reason or the source, the pressure finally became so serious as to lead me to request the transmission to you of the contents of a certain order (directing me to report all activities to Brindisi) and of my suggestion that a "relief" for me be dispatched at once.

I should point out that General Gruenther, Colonel Howard and my own Executive Officer were opposed to this move although they shared with me, to a certain extent at least, my feeling that OSS was being "shot at". My reply to General Gruenther was that, while the local situation might be handled satisfactorily, OSS relations elsewhere might well be adversely affected if (with the help of the Army) we made issue of the things to which I was objecting. I informed General Gruenther that if I left, the opposition would, I was sure, come to an end, temporarily at least. Experience indicates that a change in personnel is always beneficial in cases of this sort. Such, in fact, proved to be the fact. Colonel Glavin, on his way to relieve me, stopped at Brindisi, made a report of OSS Fifth Army activities (concerning which he had only fragmentary

SECRET**SECRET**

SECRET
- 10 -

too persistent to be ignored, however, and I am still positive that my analysis of the situation - set forth in my letter to you of 17 November 1943 - is substantially correct.

I cannot explain the attitude of certain British officials (nor the reason the activities of OSS appeared to be of interest to them) except as these officials were being "prodded on" by others. We were, perhaps, too "secretive". It is understandable that SIS should wish, if it could do so, to dominate, or at least be able to follow closely, the development of intelligence networks anywhere on the continent. British interests in Europe transcend our own and there are few Americans, indeed, who would not aid, in every reasonable way, in the extension of British influence in a manner calculated to contribute to world stabilization. Many of us might even agree to as ambitious a program as that which was finally documented (New York Times Sunday December 12, 1943) by Marshall Smuts. Our own country, on the other hand, and our own OSS have "come of age". We are entitled to know, it would seem (through our own organizations and by our own methods) what is going on in the world - particularly in that part of the world which the enemy still controls. This is especially true if we are to be committed, in coming campaigns, to anything like the proportionate risks and losses which it is now evident (New York Times December 26, 1943; New York Herald Tribune December 28, 1943) are to be allotted us.

I have recorded, in the letter above mentioned, what I sensed of the situation as it evidenced itself in connection with our work with Fifth Army. Perhaps I have done SIS an injustice but knowing how, in other places and under other circumstances, both SOE and ourselves

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

work. Captain Andre Bourgein, who came to OSS from the French Intelligence Service by way of G-2, Fifth Army, did a loyal, painstaking task in organizing and operating our Interrogation and Long Range Intelligence Sections. He was ably assisted by another French officer, Lt. Crose. Captain Paccatte and Lts. Goff, Losowski, Cagiali, and Hoaglund were almost continuously with "Combat Teams" at the front doing the work which proved to be our real "entry ticket" to the Fifth Army show. Sergeant Jiminez (whose commission has, I trust, by this time been issued) acted as our "Communications Officer" - an undertaking for which he is well qualified. Other officers who came to us later, as well as our enlisted and civilian personnel (after eliminations) all performed their assignments willingly and well. Special commendation is due Civilian Peter Thompkins, who did an exceptional job of liaison, and Civilian Joe Savoldi who discharged, faithfully and ably, an unpleasant administrative function. No Commanding Officer could have asked for greater loyalty or finer cooperation than was given by this organization.

12. It was scarcely to be expected that "Life with Fifth Army" would prove to be a sinecure for OSS. It was not easy nor enjoyable, for instance, to be compelled to make continual demands on G-4 for facilities and equipment which, it was felt at times, we should have had the foresight to provide for ourselves. Even so we were, in these instances, dealing with Officers who were thoroughly sympathetic to our needs and we obtained, in the end, our fair share of all that was available.

Our real difficulties came from outside the Army. These difficulties were insidious and, for the most part, not too serious. The source was obscure and the "arrière pensee" not always clear. They were

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

care.

Colonel Howard, AC of S, G-2, and Lt. Colonel Welle, his assistant, became our good friends and loyal supporters. Both of these officers were ready to put aside, at any time of day or night, whatever they were doing in order to discuss OSS problems - no matter how trivial. Colonel Galloway, G-2 and, later, Deputy Chief of Staff, Sixth Corps, and Colonel Keiser, who became Chief of Staff of the Corps under General Lucas, as well as Colonel Longevin, G-2, and Lt. Colonel Weber, assistant G-2, of the Corps were always friendly and interested. So, too, were General Lucas, himself; General Truscott, Major Wilson, G-2, Major Scott, assistant G-2, and Lt. Colonel Golden, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, of the 3rd Division; General Middleton of the 45th Division and his Staff - especially Lt. Colonel Wrightman, G-2; and General Ryder of the 34th Division and his G-2, Lt. Colonel Dimerale. There were many more officers who aided us in various ways (as General Brandt, G-3 of the Army; General Moran, Chief Signal Officer; Colonel D'Arcy of the 12th Air Support Command; and Colonel Tate, G-4) but those mentioned were particularly helpful and especially concerned with the things OSS was doing or trying to do.

11. I cannot commend too highly our own OSS personnel. Major Lloyd, who came down from London, proved to be invaluable and did just the kind of thorough, intelligent and courageous job which any of us who know him would have expected. Captain (now Major) Bradish Smith was and is as fine an executive officer as could have been selected. Captain John Roller did an outstanding job as Services Officer and Lieutenants Callanan and Barnes handled, to perfection, our "Headquarters Intelligence"

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

Fifth Army could, in due course, have been persuaded to accept OSS Groups for the purposes outlined above. This would have represented a logical expansion of the work of the "Combat Teams" although different personnel would have been required. I do not know that the possibilities have, as yet, been presented to Fifth Army, but a program of this nature should, in any event, be included, in the plans of other Army Missions.

10. Relations between our Mission and the Army and its components could not have been better. So far as my own position was concerned, it was, following your trip of last September, well-nigh perfect. I arrived, of course, unheralded and pretty largely unwanted. Only General Gruenther (I did not see General Clark during the first few hectic days) seemed glad to have me there. You changed all this overnight, and from the moment of your arrival, our OSS Detachment became an organic part of Fifth Army. I shudder to think of what the situation might have been had you failed to come. Because of the steps you took, we were not only able to begin to function in an orderly way but doors were opened to us which would otherwise have remained closed for many weeks.

There never was a time when General Clark or General Gruenther seemed disinterested in our little undertakings and, busy as they were, they gave the same careful and considerate attention to our small activities as to those of the units at the front. This was an inspiration to all of us in the Detachment and the best possible evidence of their personal affection for you. These two are a grand team; and they will lead well and intelligently any Army which is entrusted to their

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

a shift from the unorganized Anti-Fascist Pavone contingent to the previously pro-Axis but, following the Invasion, thoroughly accepted "Regulars". Marshall Badaglio had agreed to the program but, as I left, it was still "bogged down" at 15th Army Group Headquarters. It is my hope that the proposals have, by now, been approved. News items of December 15th last indicated that something akin to the plans mentioned had been set in motion.

9. In the course of time other operational work (in addition to that mentioned above) could and should have been undertaken by OSS for Fifth Army and its components. One of the possibilities we had visualized was the special employment on combat assignments of language speaking personnel of the United States Army - something with respect to which OSS had already taken the necessary preliminary steps. There can be no doubt, for example, that the efficiency and security of almost every "Reconnaissance Patrol" sent forward by Combat Units of Fifth Army would have been increased had three or four Italian speaking soldiers been included. Language speaking groups frequently could have penetrated enemy lines more easily and effectively than did our English speaking youngsters who were able to obtain information from friendly civilians only through the use of the "sign language". Personnel conversant with German would also have been useful, although maximum effectiveness could have been obtained only if such personnel would have been willing to operate in enemy uniform. For a limited time and in particular Sectors the employment of our own men in German dress would have been reasonably safe (due to the highly nomadic defense then being used) and could have been thoroughly devastating. **SECRET**

SECRET

- 5 -

certain of our Long Range projects from those involving work with Resistance elements. It must be remembered, however, that there was, behind enemy lines, no existing OSS organization on which we could call for aid (or if there was or is such an organization, its existence was never made known to our Mission), nor had we, at any time, received trained personnel which could be employed in operations of this type. Ours was essentially a job of "pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps". Every Agent and wireless operator used up to the moment I left Fifth Army had been recruited and trained "on the spot" and a good deal of the equipment employed in our operations (including radio material of all kinds) had been locally acquired or made. For these reasons it was inevitable that our program should fall short of the ideal.

8. The strictly "operational" side of OSS activities was not overlooked in our planning:

- a. A definite program for cooperation with known Resistance Groups had been devised and set in motion; and
- b. Specific proposals for the use of operational units (see Operational Plans 3 and 4 previously submitted) had been approved by the Commanding General and a series of three minor operations (desired by G-3 of the Army) had been undertaken - with indifferent success.

The proposals contained in Operational Plans 3 and 4 envisioned the use of officers and enlisted men supplied by the Italian Government. The proposals were based on tactical needs which were then apparent. They were intended, at the same time, as a medium for effecting (for political reasons)

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

at points approximately thirty-five miles behind the front. At the time I left, teams for this use, including radio operators locally recruited, had already been trained and were ready to go across the lines. One team (at Segni) was, in fact, then available. Only parachute operations (the details of which had been arranged) were required so that radio sets and supplemental equipment might be dropped at agreed points. This service, if now installed (as it should be), will supplement and may supplant our other "Short Range" work.

7. We had, prior to my departure, completed "Long Range" plans which were sufficiently broad to cover the requirements - not only of the immediate objectives of Fifth Army but, also, to a limited extent, operations north of Rome. As the reports indicate, we had established two radio communications with Rome and had placed, in Rome, some stout-hearted and intelligent representatives. We had sent to other points Agents who had completed preliminary arrangements for dropping operations (Radios and supplemental equipment only) at Segni, Pescara and Sabini. Preparations had also been made for two seaborne operations designed, largely, to infiltrate personnel from landing points near Ancona. One of our representatives (an able young Italian officer) had gone as far north as Pescara and had, just before I left, reported back on the program he had perfected. All of these operations have, I assume, been completed.

8. The Long Range plans last mentioned, were designed in such a way as to afford us not alone distant and movable communication centers, but also direct contact with known organized Resistance Groups. Had there been sufficient time and had the personnel and supplies been available, we would probably, for obvious security reasons, have separated

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

attention of such Units and to generate, among the Staffs of these Units, a real desire for our personnel. The Divisions, in fact, came to consider our OSS Detachments (our so-called "Operational Groups" consisting of Italian Officers and Soldiers who were trained to carry out both Intelligence and sabotage assignments) as a necessary part of their own organization. So much so, indeed, that, as our reports have shown, a controversy developed between the 3rd and 45th Divisions (over Lt. Caff's Detachment of thirty-four officers and men) which was settled only after we were able to convince the Chief of Staff of the Army, G-2 of the Corps and the Commanding General and Staff of the 45th Division that we could supply this Division with a Unit comparable, in every particular, with that which had theretofore been attached to the 3rd.

5. Despite the fact that we concentrated on "Combat Intelligence" we gave as much attention as our limited personnel and facilities would permit to:

a. An enlargement of "Short Range" intelligence activities;

b. The development of "Long Range" centers of operation; and

c. The contacting of Resistance Groups through whose aid, it was expected:

1. Intelligence networks, combining both radio and courier services, might be established; and

2. Sabotage and like operational activities undertaken.

6. The "Short Range" program envisioned the establishment of two movable communications centers, with courier networks, operating

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

confined to those which, it was believed, might be accomplished within a limited period of time without assistance from outside the Mission. The impelling desires were, at all times, to use our Fifth Army association as a means of making OSS known to Combat Units in the field and of demonstrating to these Units that OSS could contribute to their efficiency and was, therefore, properly and necessarily an organic part of the Army Forces. We did not, of course, know (at the outset, at least) just how the desired results were to be obtained, but we assumed that somewhere - in our work with inexperienced but eager and intelligent officers and men - opportunities to render useful and, perhaps, important services were certain to present themselves.

4. As is evident from the reports which have been submitted, our big opportunity to make OSS known to the Army and our chance to render badly needed services, came from contacts we established with units at the front. With the cooperation of these units we were able to install "Operational Groups" which were recruited and trained to carry out "short range" or "combat" Intelligence missions and local sabotage operations where needed. We found, as a matter of fact, that the Divisions and their components were not equipped to organize, supervise or carry out even the most rudimentary programs of "Combat Intelligence". It was to this, therefore, that we gave most attention. The Divisions, the Corps and even the Army were primarily interested in what lay immediately ahead and, while they encouraged our operations of longer range, they were appreciative of even the most fragmentary information about the active front. Our operations were never, of course, extensive. They were, however, sufficiently useful to Combat Units to bring OSS to the

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

25 December 1945

Subject: OSS Fifth Army Mission - Final Report.

SECRET

To: Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director.
Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. The regular weekly reports forwarded to you by the Mission during the period of my command (including weekly Report No. 8 of 19 November 1945), and the special reports and particular communications submitted by me (including a copy of the Interim Report of 12 November 1945 to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, a copy of a memorandum dated 17 November 1945 to Col. Edwin B. Howard on the "Character and Scope of Activities" and the letter to you, with attachments, of 17 November 1945 on the question of "Interference", have chronicled most of the activities of the Mission and have served, as well, to highlight organizational and operational problems as they arose.
2. In view of the detail contained in these communications, this "Final Report" will attempt to do no more than underline the results of some of our Fifth Army Mission experimentation in the hope that future similar Missions may benefit from our experience.
3. Due to the fact that the Fifth Army Mission was pretty much improvised on the spot and had to conduct its work without the benefits of specific directives or advance preparations, the objectives of the Mission were deliberately restricted. Our activities were

SECRET

Handwritten: 10.215
2 Fifth Army
P.O.
10.215
2 Fifth Army
Huntington Col 8
10.215
P.O.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

January 8, 1944.

Col. G. Edward Buxton,
Room 110,
Administration Building,
35th and E Sts., N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Buxton:

Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. has asked
me to forward to you via Courier the attached Final
Report of his OSS Fifth Army Mission.

Very truly yours,

Handwritten: Dorothy B. Wentworth
Dorothy B. Wentworth.

OAS FORM 4001A

SECRETDate **10 Jan. 1944**To: **Col. Buxton.**

Attached is a final report, forwarded from our New York office, by Col. Huntington on the activities of the Fifth Army Mission.

Col. Huntington's reports are normally circulated to Mr. Scribner, Gen. Magruder, Mr. Shepardon, the North African Theater Officer and the Secretariat.

It would seem advisable that the final report be given the same distribution and that copies be made available, in addition to the Planning Group and the Planning Staff.

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane (S)

Office of the Secretariat

SECRET

Transmitted 12/26/55
SECRET

OSS Fifth Army Mission - Final Report
x Handed

- 1 Mr. Scribner
- 2 Gen. Magruder
- 3 Mr. Shepardson
- 4 NATO Attn: Mr. Lord
- 5 Planning Group: Col. Onthank
- 6 Planning Staff: Lt. Omdr. Winks
- 7 Secretariat

GRANT MISSION, WEEKLY REPORTS.

Photostats of all material in this folder appear in *Registry file*
B-010 "Fifth Army, Complete." with exception of

Letter 23 October 1943 from Col. Huntington to
General Donovan.

B-010 includes Intelligence material etc which
does not appear in this folder.

WP
22 June 1945