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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON D. C.

SECRET

May 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: Whitney Shepardson

Basque representatives of OSS have put us in contact with a person in touch with German intelligence agencies in Spain and the Western Hemisphere. This man has already given us very interesting information on methods, operation and personnel of German Intelligence here and abroad. He has given us likewise some information concerning American convoys. This man should proceed to Cuba to contact German intelligence personnel there. This will permit him, working for us, to penetrate German intelligence activities in connection with American convoys. It is known at the present time that German submarines are active in the Caribbean area and especially off the north coast of Cuba.

It is absolutely necessary for the development and proper utilization of this unique contact that the subject contact German agents in Cuba through whom he will have direct communication with German intelligence in Europe, and through whom he can uncover enemy intelligence in this hemisphere, in the Atlantic, and in the African and European theaters. This operation is of such an international and delicate nature that the direction and supervision of it must be reposed in the hands of a unified control, since it cannot operate successfully unless both the Western Hemisphere and European aspects of it are handled simultaneously and in coordination.

We are at present conferring with representatives of the Navy as to the best procedures to be followed. In addition to this I suggest that all conferences or other means necessary to guarantee that direction and responsibility for this operation be kept under the control of the Navy and OSS be undertaken urgently.

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INTERVIEW WITH THE COLONEL

After an exchange of impressions on irrelevant matters, I indicated my plan of submitting for his consideration some of our points of view in order that our dealings with such other sister [illegible] based on a perfect understanding of our situation as an organization, of our problems and of the spirit [illegible] guides our conduct in our work. I added that since President [illegible] aim to have an interview with the General, I would not touch upon the problem of our collaboration with OSS, but that I would devote myself to other matters, and in particular would give him full information about our plans in the economic field, a delicate question, to which we [illegible] primary importance.

The Colonel went [illegible] to the relation to OSS, and asked me if we were collaborating with this organization and in what way. I answered that I would call in [illegible] to him in [illegible], but that as I had previously pointed out, President Aguirre in his most recent conversation had not felt it necessary to discuss that subject, in the belief that the Colonel had been informed of it, since we supposed that he had been advised that our collaboration with the Military Attaches in South America was [illegible] through OSS; furthermore, I explained that I understood that President Aguirre, in his first interview with the Colonel a month [illegible] ago, had clearly indicated to him that we were collaborating with General Donovan.

I then explained the matter to him as follows:

For [illegible] we have been collaborating closely and officially with [illegible] part of this collaboration, we have set up [illegible] in its ramifications, is in effect in South America and in the Europe Country. The first plan to be put into effect was that which had to do with South America. It started with the President's trip and has been progressing steadily since that time. OSS pointed out to us at the start that South America did not come within the sphere of its jurisdiction, except in very concrete instances which had direct bearing on Europe. They decided, however, to aid our Organization, because they understood that great benefits could be derived for the cause which we are defending, and results have proven this to be so.

I [illegible] with the sincerity which is essential in our dealings with you, I must point out that we have not observed the existence of an exclusive attitude on the part of OSS; from the very beginning they have shown special interest in

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putting us in touch with the Army and the FBI, both of which groups we would serve in South America, just as we have been doing."

The Colonel at first [illegible] did not understand how it was possible, while giving all information to the Army and to the FBI at the same time, to maintain the loyal ambence of the services. I answered that this difficulty had been foreseen, and that the instructions which I had been using my self, as well as those given by Mr. Lourie, were in the following form: all information which the Bolque Services obtain through their own initiative will be given to both the FBI and the Army, so as to enable both agencies to have complete information. All specific missions assigned by the FBI and the Army shall be executed and the results thereof given only to the American service which requested it. I stated that I had had occasion to be [illegible] in [illegible] our people, well understanding the problem, and [illegible] with strict compliance.

Concerning the action in our Country and its ramifications, I told him that the realization of the [illegible] been slower than in South America, because the [illegible] difficulties of the problem have made more detailed studies necessary, a thing that can easily be understood. Some of these difficulties, of a technical nature, are evident -- networks, trips, etc. But I cannot enumerate them in their entirety, since we have not yet begun to investigate them, nor have we asked if this is a field which does not concern us. At the present time action is already under way; the network of which we speak has been carried out in agreement with, and with the aid of, OSS. The financial problem has also been settled according to our requirements, after the situation has been stable, and all aspects of it taken into consideration.

At this point the Colonel received a telephone call in which it was stated that the interview with the President had been postponed to the following week, due to the absence of the General.

The Colonel then asked me if I had spoken with OSS of our conversations with him. I answered: "Yes, Colonel, I have done so. We believe we are obliged to do so for reasons of the same loyalty with which I have spoken to you. We do not consider it indiscreet to discuss such a subject with two official services of the United States." The Colonel added: "Now I understand several terms of the telephone conversation that I did not understand at the time."

The Colonel made clear several times in the course of his conversation that he was ignorant of our collaboration with OSS, which he thought had not passed beyond the stage of exchanges of impressions and of friendly relations in matters pertaining to Europe. It was

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also evident that it had never been its intention to interfere with any other service, least of all in a surreptitious manner. He indicated that perhaps -- he did not make a definite statement -- the matter of choosing one or the other was in the hands of President Quezon, and that probably the General could clarify this problem. I answered that everything possible should be done to avoid this situation, but would hardly be an agreeable one for President Quezon. I stated that our purpose and desire is to aid America, so we [illegible] strongly attached as to our own, and that it is up to the American authorities to indicate to us which [illegible] to be a more opportune. The Colonel agreed pleasantly, [illegible] to see that this situation did not develop, and that our position appeared logical to him.

I also brought to his attention the Colonel [illegible] in a separate note. The Colonel received them [illegible].

I explained fully to him our [illegible] and do not repeat them here, because you know them well. I told him that our propaganda organization [illegible], publishing houses, cultural groups, etc) [illegible] completely [illegible] from the intelligence service. We have decided that the first groups should be supported in each country by gifts from friends. The money obtained for the intelligence service is to be used exclusively for that purpose and for no other, its receipt and expenditure to be controlled with scrupulous care.

In summarizing, following are my impressions of the Colonel: He appears to be thoughtful and considerate person, friendly and tactful. He shows much zeal for the work. Judging by the satisfactory outcome of the interview, he understands the matter under consideration, and has a good memory for details. As the conversation proceeded, he spoke with greater confidence and courtesy, including the period after the telephone call and my complementary and clarifying explanation. I believe that he is convinced that we are handling the matter with due seriousness, with a loftiness of purpose and with a firm desire to serve the cause to the best of our ability.

April 21, 1943

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THE LINE OF THOUGHT SUGGESTED TO THE COLONEL

In the course of our conversation I expressed to him a point of view which is exclusively ours, and which comes from long thought on several aspects of the problem on which we were commenting.

I informed him that in the instructions sent to our Organization in the Basque Country, there was reference to the separation and independence of the two organizations which are in the field of intelligence: the Basque Army and the Civil Organization. This was done to improve efficiency, to eliminate risks, and to ultimately promote the reorganization of our Army, at the same time giving its elements a preoccupation and a practical orientation which would differentiate it from other spontaneous activities not in accordance with the plan which have been outlined.

Given this division, we believe it might be worth while the idea to unite each one of these organizations with the corresponding American group. In this separation we see essentially the advantage of greater efficiency, less risk of division, and a slightly higher degree than with a single network, which might fail because of an accident on the part of the American services or of our own. In addition, we feel that in practice this plan would prove advantageous for all, in the solution of problems which continually present themselves in the operation of the services. I advised him that our concern was not how best to control a set number of agents, but rather how best to organize a whole people for service to the United Nations.

I emphatically called his attention to the following points:

1). It is exclusively our concern. It arises from the consideration of certain aspects within our scope. We naturally do not intrude into the sphere of those who, with more authority and greater knowledge, have a wider outlook on the problem.

2). We are setting forth this, our opinion, so that insofar as possible our way of thinking may be understood. It should not be thought that this is done with any ulterior motive; it is done because our interest lies in the outcome of the work. By no means do we think of obtaining advantages, economic or otherwise. This aspect, like the others, should be treated with absolute clarity.

3). We admit that this way of looking at the problem may not be the right one in the last analysis. His chiefs, together with General Donovan, can decide what they believe to be most advisable.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE April 20, 1943

TO General Donovan

FROM Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT

Supplementing my earlier memorandum of this morning, I have talked with New York again.

What they told me was that the "Colonel" had spoken to the Basques and that the "Colonel" had told them that General Kroner or General Strong might be wishing to see them on Thursday or Friday of this week.

Stupidly I thought that the "Colonel" meant you, though I should have known better. The man referred to is an Army Colonel who has been contacting the Basques and with whom they were scheduled to have had a meeting today, but I understand it has been called off.

The question raised by Mr. A of the Basques, therefore, has more meaning than was apparent at first. He was asking whether, in case he came to Washington, to see General Kroner or General Strong, you would wish to have a first-hand report from him on what took place at that meeting.

The New York office tells me that it is possible that after the Basques have given to the Colonel (he speaks for General Strong) the reply which has been arranged for them to

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give - see Spencer Phenix's memorandum - perhaps there will be no meeting in Washington this week with Kroner or Strong after all.

W.H.S.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Deportation

[illegible]

[illegible]

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April 19, 1943

To General Donovan

From Spencer Phenix

On April 16, 1943 Mr Gregory Thomas was informed that a Colonel Grombach (spelling uncertain) had approached Messrs Aguirre, de la Sota and Irala some three weeks ago with a proposition along the following lines:

General Marshall had asked General Strong to obtain the collaboration of the Basque services and agents in Spain for the purpose of creating intelligence connections to France, Belgium and Italy. Colonel Grombach introduced the above-named Basques at the Athletic Club in New York to a Colonel (perhaps General) Smith who they were told would be leaving for North Africa via Clipper to Portugal and through Spain on April 21 for the purpose of giving final instructions to the United States Military Attaché, Colonel Hohenthal before any change in the present arrangement affecting intelligence in Spain might have been consummated.

Colonel Grombach offered the Basques practically unlimited financial support in exchange for their providing agents now in South America who would be brought to the United States for training in espionage and wireless operation, the sum of $1,000,000 being mentioned in this connection. These agents, the Basques were told, would be transferred to Spain and inducted into the existing Basque services there which would then work under the direction of Colonel Hohenthal. Wireless sets would be provided for the Basque agents in Spain and the United States Army Intelligence would handle communications and transportation.

The Basques to whom this proposition was made did not mention their work with OSS as they wished to consult the desires of General Donovan before giving an answer to Colonel Grombach. They are to meet with Colonel Grombach on Monday, April 19, at which time they are to give him their decision. Colonel Grombach reported to the Basques that his service which is supposed to develop sources of information from the European underground was forbidden by the State Department to have direct dealings with any other underground group than the Basques.

Mr Thomas emphasizes that no action must be taken by OSS which would jeopardize our Basque friends in connection with the foregoing. The information was given to him by President Aguirre with the understanding that it would not be used in any way that might endanger the present pleasant relations which exist between his people and services on the one hand and OSS and certain other Government agencies on the other.

On Saturday morning, April 17, I telephoned Whitney Shepardson a summary of the foregoing. Mr Shepardson said that he agreed with Mr Thomas and me that no issue should be made of this matter at the present time if it could be avoided. He suggested that the position of our Basque friends should be that they came to us because they were in something of a quandary and desired our guidance. He said that he would report the matter to you with that recommendation and would let me know before the end of the day if you wished any different course pursued.

Mr Shepardson telephoned late Saturday afternoon that you were in agreement with the general procedure outlined but that you wished to have it made clear by the Basques in their conversation with Colonel Grombach that they had been dealing with OSS as a recognized agency of the United States Government and that all their relations with us had been of a secret nature which obviously could not be discussed. I reported this to Mr Thomas and he will suggest to the Basques that they inform Colonel Grombach today that his question had placed them in something of a quandary since they had been maintaining close official relations for many months with the OSS, a recognized agency of the United States Government and had received no intimation from the OSS that this close association involving relations of a secret nature which obviously could not be discussed was not to continue. In these circumstances they did not feel they could agree to enter upon any new relationship with the Army or any other agency along the lines suggested without first having the matter cleared with the competent OSS authorities as they were anxious not to do anything that would conflict with their current responsibilities to OSS or give rise to any misunderstanding in connection therewith.

Since writing the above I have learned that Mr Thomas has already informed his Basque friends along the lines indicated above.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE April 16, 1943

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT

1. On March 22nd pursuant to your suggestion, I wrote to J. Edgar Hoover concerning the help they are giving us in our communications implementing the Basque project. (Copy enclosed).

2. Attached is a reply from Hoover, dated April 3, 1943 which though not addressed to me, is responsive to my letter and, I think, indicates a cordial spirit of cooperation. The signature "John" (not "Edgar") is that of Mr. Hoover, I am told by Captain Moore (C.I.) who knows him.

W.H.S.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 3, 1943

Mr. Ernest Cuneo
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ernie:

This will acknowledge receipt of the communication of Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson, dated March 22, 1943, concerning the Basque Intelligence Service.

I appreciate the suggestion of Mr. Shepardson that a second copy of the material received by you from the Basque organization be made available here. However, inasmuch as the Bureau at Washington receives constant reports made by its field representatives, such an additional copy would not seem to serve any useful purpose.

I am glad to find that the Bureau's cooperation in the matter of communications is of assistance to you and trust that it will continue to be so.

Sincerely,

/S/ John

COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1943.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Pennsylvania Avenue at 9th,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

We have just received another communication from our Basque friends below the border, reaching us through the facilities of your people down there. We appreciate, as always, your help and cooperation.

We have instructed our friends that whenever they hand any material to your representatives for transmission, they are to deliver at the same time a copy of the material for your files. It has occurred to me that you might also find it useful to have copies of the material as it arrives here, in addition to the copies delivered to your people in the field. If so, let me know, and I will see that you are supplied.

Meanwhile, I trust that some of the information already delivered to you has been of interest.

Sincerely yours,

Whitney H. Shepardson

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To Mrs Martha O'Donnell

From Spencer Dentz

In reply to [illegible] from the New York office, I [illegible] long more properly in the [illegible] control than in the Bureau. [illegible] for your decision, regarding which [illegible] following documents:

1. An original letter from [illegible] 1949, together with [illegible] copy of [illegible] all dealing with Donald Downs.

2. A collection of [illegible] the New York office with the Washington [illegible] of the officials [illegible] of the [illegible] payments were made it would be most [illegible] of this matter which [illegible] .

3. A collection of [illegible] the original [illegible] requested and [illegible]. The [illegible] given some publicity to an FBI release in which it [illegible] which great credit for [illegible] as a counter espionage agent. Our [illegible] friends were about [illegible] background before the FBI [illegible] making the information [illegible] when the FBI actively intervened and [illegible] of the situation and the individual. If the [illegible] other issues regarding this matter it may be worth [illegible] information to be available to the General.

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May 26, 1943

Basque G Project

Saturday afternoon, May 22, George Dyas telephoned to say that our B friends had developed a very interesting lead and that the information was being incorporated in a memorandum which was to be ready Sunday in time for him to take it to Washington. I suggested that we have the memorandum photostated here on Sunday so that copies would be available. We accordingly arranged to meet our B friend at the office Sunday noon, go over the material with him and have photostats made. The memorandum contained exceedingly significant information and Mr Dyas took it to Washington so that he might discuss the matter first thing Monday morning with Mr Shepardson, Mr Mayer and General Donovan. Meanwhile, it was our understanding that our B friends would take care of G pending a decision as to how Washington wanted to proceed with the affair.

Mr Dyas telephoned me Monday after his discussion there that the General was very much interested in the possibilities and wanted to press ahead with the matter.

I spent Tuesday in Washington and participated in conferences with the General as a result of which the active cooperation of the Navy Department was enlisted and we were assured of Navy support in handling the problem. In the course of the afternoon Mr Dyas was informed from New York that the FBI had questioned our B friends, apparently at the instigation of the Naval officer who conducted the first interrogation of G at Philadelphia. We understood that this questioning was done in a friendly manner and felt no cause for alarm.

This morning our B friend called and discussed with me at considerable length the interview which he and his associates had had with the FBI yesterday. We considered what steps should be taken and I got the impression again that G was being taken care of by our B friends.

Sometime later I had a telephone call from Mr Dyas saying that the General wished us to arrange at once to have G removed from his present abode and taken to some safe place where he would be watched by our B friends until we ourselves could arrange for his protection. I told Mr Dyas that in my talk with the B representative earlier I had asked about the removal of G from his present residence and had been given to understand that our B friends thought this would be a mistaken step. Mr Dyas replied that regardless of their views the General wanted the thing handled that way and gave me several statements to be communicated to our B friend. I was not able to reach him on the telephone and dictated these statements to Miss Kasley who finally got in touch with him and read them to him, as follows:

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"1. Get our friend immediately under our control and protection. OSS will assume full responsibility. Any question raised by the FBI is to be referred to OSS as is any question raised by the Navy.

2. The man is coming up from Washington immediately to share in the protection of our friend.

3. Until our Washington man arrives will Mr I please keep our friend under Basque protection, not letting him out of sight at any time.

4. The Navy headquarters in Washington and OSS want to start instructing our friend as rapidly as possible and that is why we want him in a place where we know he is safe and where there can be no interruptions.

5. Please remove him from his present residence as secretly and as inconspicuously as possible so as not to cause any commotion.

6. We will greatly appreciate it if Mr I could draw up a summary of the questions asked, the answers given and the ground covered in the FBI interrogation.

We know we are giving Mr I a very difficult problem but our very top man wants it done in this way and is confident that Mr I can work the matter out satisfactorily."

Our B friend informed Miss Kasley that he did not believe it possible to check on the whereabouts of G and he asked me to call him, which I did, to learn for the first time that our B friends had not seen G since 4:30 yesterday afternoon when they saw him get into an automobile bound for FBI headquarters in New York. They had reason to believe that he was still in the custody of FBI as late as 6:30 PM but they had no further information beyond the fact that he did not have breakfast or lunch at his usual restaurant where they expected to see him.

After numerous telephone conversations with Washington and with General Donovan in New York I was asked by the latter to get in direct touch with the FBI in New York to ascertain the status of the situation and how soon OSS and the Navy could proceed with their plans for G. After trying to reach Mr Conroy through his Secretary, Miss Tate, I spoke with Mr Woods (Messrs Woods and Matthews were the ones who interrogated our B friends) who said he was not handling the case but would communicate with the man who was and ask him to telephone me. Later Mr Granville telephoned to say he was conducting the interrogation of G. I asked him how soon the

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Navy and we could get in touch with him and he said our Washington office should get in touch with FBI headquarters in Washington to make the necessary arrangements and that upon instructions from Washington he would let us have access to G. I asked him if they were through with their interrogation and he answered in the negative. I asked him if he thought anything had been done which would disclose G's interrogation by FBI in such manner as to "blow" him and was told that so far as the FBI was concerned nothing of the sort had been done. I emphasized the importance the Navy and we attached to this matter and the embarrassment caused us by having our program delayed. Mr Granville indicated that he thought the matter could be promptly cleared in Washington so that we could proceed. I asked Mr Granville if it were necessary for General Donovan to get in touch with Mr Hoover himself and he answered in the negative saying that if our Washington office communicated with one of the Assistant Directors it would be sufficient. I reported this information to General Donovan who asked me to telephone Mr Mayer to arrange to go with Mr Shepardson and the Naval officer assigned in this matter to call on the FBI Washington headquarters and try to solve the problem. General Donovan wanted the representations made in a dignified but strong way pointing out that the Navy regarded the question as of paramount importance to them. I so advised Mr Mayer and was informed later that Mr Shepardson, Mr Dyas and Captain Moore had an appointment with Mr Hoover at the FBI for 3:30 PM Thursday, May 27.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

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Cato Plains

G. Eaglin
Bilbo

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

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

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

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Dimraiyan
Pilojon
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

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HUSTON, TEX
RAMON LARCIA
GREEWOOD, ST. 13
(Comercio)

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Alberto [illegible]
Dr. [illegible] de Jesús
Jara Nicolás
Roberto [illegible]
[illegible]
Isabella [illegible]
Ryuichiro Nagai
[illegible]
Montpetit Jorge
[illegible]
[illegible]

Francisco de la
MORENA
c. BICHINCHA
352, Comercio
Quito Ecuador
[illegible]
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[illegible]
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[illegible]

MONI H^H

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BILBAO A GIJON
SANTANDER-
NORENA GIJON

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15 [illegible] 73

LANG

Mr. Lang is a man of 45 years of age - approximately 5' 10½" tall - dark hair - dark complexion - sort of a round face - straight back - lot of hair - approximate weight 155 or 160 pounds - wears glasses - wears a hat all the time - wears light clothes - mostly gray - carries a brief case along all the time. He gets up in the morning between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock and has his breakfast. He travels quite a lot.

Does he have a car? Yes

What kind? It is an open car.

I understand that he has interchangeable license plates? Yes

Does Lang seem to have a very affectionate sort of life?

Yes, but as a matter of fact, he doesn't visit his family much.

What about Lang's wife? She lives in Madrid.

Does he have children? Yes

Do they live in Madrid? Yes, most of the time, but this winter they were working Christmas time and stayed with him.

Does he live in a house? He changes around a lot. He kept his office at Alemeta #10. Then we moved to Alemeta #1.

When you were in South America did you receive word from him?

Yes, I received one letter that was brought out by ship by a courier.

How were the couriers paid? They would send me all the spending money by courier and I was supposed to be paid on the other side.

Your expense money while you were in South America was sent to you by courier? Yes

In what way did they give you the money? When I started out for South America they gave me $5,000 in U. S. Currency and $4,500 in Spanish bank notes.

This questionnaire with 14 or 15 things Lang wanted you to find out, did you memorize it or keep it in writing?

No, I memorized it.

Whose idea was it that you might go to a village on the Mexican border? Lang's idea.

With what in mind? In order to contact my brother in the United States.

How were you supposed to contact your brother?

I was to write a letter to my brother that I was in Mexico and that I would like to visit him. If it was not possible for me to come to the United States, he thought it would be possible for me to sneak into the United States by the border.

Lang thought the best thing for me would be not to spend too much time in the United States but to return back to Mexico and establish myself in Mexico or where I thought the safest and best place to work.

Didn't Lang feel that your writing your borther might attract curiosity? He told me in writing my brother to mention that I was there and I would like to see him because I didn't see him for a long time.

Did Lang ever suggest that you come to this country in the capacity of a Mexican farm worker? Yes

Was this to be in Mexico? Left at my own judgement.

Any suggestions? He said El Paso, Texas would be a good place to go and some other smaller town in Arizona. A border town in Arizona.

Do you recall the town? I can't say.

Do you know if he ever sold any insurance? No sir.

Is the office located in a business building? It is located in an apartment house.

How many people working in the office? Now there is one man - Jose Rudeer, who takes care of the office. I noticed another young man also in the building. Jose Urrutia really Jose Mendez.

Is he related to the man you telegraphed to? No

On these radio messages as to wave lengths were you told any particular time these messages were to be sent? Yes, I was told they would be calling most every hour of the 24 hours a day.

I was given the signal that they were using and what I should use - 5 V's interrogation mark for Mundaca - 5 V's exclamation point for Goico.

Do they have safes in the office? Yes they have a heavy safe.

What make is it? I don't remember.

Is it a German make? Yes, Lang bought it on his vacation. It is a lock and combination safe.

Did any agents ever cable to Bilbao when you were there in open messages not code? Not that I know of. Although I knew he was receiving cabled messages, but I never saw them.

You don't know whether they were in code or not? No sir.

Do you know whether Lang cabled to Germany? No sir.

Did Lang ever tell you he knew any German personalities? Yes

Did he ever speak of knowing a man by the name of Canarus? No sir

What people can you recall? He mentioned he knew Hitler personally and Goering also.

Did he ever mention Himmler to you? No sir

I went to the telegraph office and waited for an answer.

You had time in 40 minutes? Yes There was no one there to receive it.

At what time of day were you told when the ship was not going to stop at Cuba? 16th or 17th of April in the afternoon.

What time? Approximately 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

It sailed that night? Yes

How near was the telegraph office to the ship? Just around the pier.

And you were wiring to Bilbao? Yes Addressed to Lang Heros 26

What name did you use? I used some kind of cover name - Jose.

And the name of the family at Heros 26? The telegram was addressed to Julio Martin Heros 26, Bilbao.

By that name they knew who the telegram was for? Yes

Who actually lives there? A family, the young ladys' name Serafina Ellorriga, and her husband's name Francesco Urruita.

Could you have sent that message to any other address? Yes but Lang wouldn't get it right away.

Why would he have gotten it right away when you sent it to this address? They got Lang's telephone number and they connect Lang.

I could have sent it to Cuartel De Lasalve.

Do you think Lang will be surprised if you didn't return on the ship? No, I was told to use my own judgement. If it wasn't possible for me to jump ship at Cuba to wait for a ship to come to New Orleans.

Does Lang pretend that his office is the office of some commercial concern? Yes, I remember he told several different parties he was running a life insurance office.

How would these couriers know it wasn't a trap if you rang up the steamship offices to make the appointment? Would you meet them at the steamship office? Not at the office I would send word to meet him at a certain cafe.

How did they know they wouldn't walk into the hands of the police? They identified me by my picture.

Was there any password? There was no password of any kind.

Did you ever have any personal trouble with Lang? No sir.

Any one in Bilbao who did? No

Did he ever send any one to the United States or South America that he wanted to get rid of? No sir.

Does this man in Cuba communicate with Lang? I guess he does.

Do you know how? No

Does Lang communicate with him? Yes I think he does.

Do you know how? I don't know how.

Am I correct in understanding that you knew the ship would not stop in Cuba before it sailed from Bilbao? Yes sir.

How long? Possibly 40 minutes.

In other words Lang didn't know the ship was coming to the United States? He didn't know.

But you knew 40 minutes beforehand? I was told they were going straight to the United States before going to Cuba.

Did you make any effort to notify Lang of that? I sent an urgent telegram to one of his mail drops. The telegram came back to me.

As soon as you found out the ship was not going to Cuba you wired Lang? Yes

Was the wire received by Lang? No It wasn't received by Lang because there was no one to receive it at the address.

This man Baranga did you ever meet him in South America? Was he got a radio? I don't know although I was told by Lang that there was a radio in Buenos Aires.

Anything more about Baranga? He seems to be an important man in Buenos Aires.

When you were there didyou hear anything about English mines in the Bay of Biscay? Yes I heard that the fishing boats were having a little difficulty getting away from the mines and that one or two were sunk by the mines. I read in the papers that quite a few loose mines were captured.

When you came over this last time how is it you happened to save the notebook with the list of names? I saved it in order to keep a list of the new couriers I was given during the last trip. I couldn't remember it by memory.

Did you buy that notebook before you sailed from Spain? The notebook was given to me by Lang before I went to South America.

How were you to make contact with these couriers?

I was told that when this man arrived, if I wasn't in Cuba, I would have to get in touch with a man on these boats and find out when they arrived . I was told it would be very easy by calling the steamship offices.

If a boat were in and one of the couriers aboard, then what?

I would send word in to have him meet me at a certain place. I would have to name a place and he would meet me there.

Do you think that the couriers knew what they were engaging in? Or did they do it as a friendly gesture? I think most of them knew I won't say all of them, but I remember in my instructions Lang told me this man didn't know anything that was going on.

wherever I was located.

Did Lang seem to feel that he was more interested in getting information from Cuba and Mexico and Latin America in your case or from the United States? He was more interested in getting information from the United States than any other place.

He wanted you to work up to the United States? Yes

Do you know whether he sent any word directly to the man in Cuba to expect you? I could see by the way the letter was written that the man knew some one was coming.

Did Lang express any personal opinion of this man in Cuba? He said that he had a great deal of confidence in the man and that the man could help him any way he needed.

This man was a personal friend of his? Yes

You don't know whether he was a German or not? His name seems to be Spanish - Barclos

Does he have a radio? Not that I know of.

Did Lang ever say anything to you about his opinion on whether or not the Allies would invade Spain or whether Germany would invade Spain? Yes, he made some statements about it. He said there was a chance the Allies would invade Spain and that the Germans would place a million men along the Mediterranean coast in Spain in a short time.

Have you heard anything at all from Lang particularly about numerous German troops stationed along the German frontier - trim young troops or old troops? He told me they had quite a large number of troops along the Spanish border but he never told me whether they were young or old.

Did you have any money when you came here? Yes $50.00 in American money.

Did he ever say anything about the crash of the airplane in Mexico?

No sir.

Did that occur at the time you were still in Spain? Yes sir.

On your last trip over here you had with you under your signature a contract? Yes

It was typed? Yes

Do you know who typed it? Lang himself.

Do you think there are any copies of that? Yes, yes. They always made 2 or 3 copies of the original.

Where would these copies go? I don't really know but I am completely sure some of them were going to Madrid.

Did he know you were carrying the copy with you? He sent it by one of his men.

Expecting you to take it along with you or use it there?

To read it, memorize it and then destroy it.

When you got to Cuba to meet the man how did you make yourself known to him? He sent me an introduction letter to this man Cuba.

How were you to be paid when you were in Cuba and here?

The instructions read that I would be paid $1,000 in U. S. Currency by this man in Cuba. At first I was to take this letter without making any changes and this man was to help me legalize my stay in Cuba for the time being and if necessary, to find me some kind of a small job where I could be covered and also an excuse to be in Cuba. Later on he wanted me to go on to Mexico. He told me I was to get protection at the Basque Delegation in Cuba.

Any further provisions to pay you beyond the $1,000?

Yes, after that my pay was to come by courier to Cuba or the U.S.

Do you have any idea how many men Lang had working for him along those lines, observing fortifications? No sir.

Do you know whether he had any English or American friends? No sir, I doubt it.

Did he belong to any clubs? No sir.

While you were working in Bilbao did you see any American newspapers or magazines? Yes

How were they brought in? Most of the time by Andalenz - from the Spanish ships. He met the fellows in various ports of Spain and on various ships and there were couriers who brought these magazines and letters in.

The couriers, were they paid for the magazines? They werepaid either by Lang or Andalenz.

Any particular magazines that stand out in your memory? Yes sir. Life, Time, Newsweek, and the American magazine.

Did Lang ever express any opinions about the Allies or about the English or Americans? Yes sir. He told me a good many times that the Allies are badly mistaken about this war and that they are going to lose this war.

Did you ever have any conversation with Lang on the subject of death charges? Yes sir, I recall he once told me that the death charges the Germans had were superior to the one the Allies had or something like that.

Did you ever hear Lang make any comment about the German Ambassador Von Moltke? No sir.

Have you ever heard him comment on Franco? Yes sir

Favorable? He was favorable to Franco but not directly to Franco himself,to the Franco regime.

Do you know who they were? I met one superior before I went to Rio.
Do you remember his name? No, I don't remember his name but I know a pretty good description of the man.
Where did you meet him? I met him in Bilbao.
When you came over this last time you had with you various letters?
No, I didn't have anything on me. I did give a letter to the courier to hide for me in case I was found aboard ship. I gave it to him to take to Bilbao because at that time I didn't know I would make it aboard ship.
What did you say in the letter? I told him that I wanted to go back to Bilbao since the shipping communications between Spain and the United States were restored and I thought it would be a lot easier for me to come to United States by Spain and not from South America.
When you cameover here this last month you had certain papers with you? Yes
Did you keep them on your person? No, I kept them pretty well covered in the coal bin, and when I arrived in port I decided to destroy them because I thought they may be discovered and I won't have a chance to explain myself. You were acting as a stoker? Yes
Going back to the question of radio, as I recall the radio frequencies were Mundaca 211515 and 42303 Goico. Mundaca is the town where Domingo lived and most of the fellows called him Mundaca. Goico was a cover word for me to remember a radio wave.
What was that relation to the radio waves? So I would remember the lengths, instead of writing down a wave length I would write down Goico and that would mean something from the air.

What instructions did Lang give you about getting hold of radio transmitters over here? He told me to try to get a radio operator in this country or whatever country I was going to. He told me that if I could not find one here that he would later send me an address of a radio operator in Mexico. You yourself was not taught how to operate a radio? No

Do you know if any men in Lang's office operate a radio? No

Did Lang himself? Yes, I am pretty sure of that, because of the way he spoke about the radio. I questioned him further but he said that I should just give the wave length to the radio operator and he would know what it is all about.

Did he tell you who it would be? No, he said if I couldn't find one myself he would send me the address of one in Mexico.

Do you know whether Lang had any radio communication with Madrid or Berlin? No

Do you know how he communicated with Berlin or whether he communicated with Berlin? No sir.

What relations did Lang have with the German Consulate in Bilbao? I couldn't say but they were very good friends and visited each other quite often.

What information did Lang want to get out of Spain? The information he wanted to get out of Spain was whether Spain was to get into the war and keep a close watch over coastal fortifications. He was also watching the coast pretty closely for a possible landing. There were rumors going on Bilbao that the British would make a landing in the northern part of Spain. I remember he took his car and took me with him and we went to Corez. He went to the highest point there and spent most of the afternoon there.

Will you give us a list of them? Some came from Cuba, Venezuela, Buenos Aires , interior part of South American countries, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Have you ever seen any that came from this country? No sir.

I don't remember seeing any that came from the United States.

While you were in Lang's office in Bilbao did you ever definitely see any radio communications? I did not see any radio communications but I saw a radio set which was brought up while I was in the office consisting of a large wooden case, a reception case and a transmitter. Lang told me he didn't know where to set it up and that he was awaiting orders from Madrid. I asked him about the receiving set and he said we were going to use it right here.

What kind of antenna did they use? Did they have one you could see outside of the house? No, I didn't look for it because the buildings are pretty tall.

How did this box arrive, by express? That's something I couldn't say, I know it was brought up by a truck and I saw two men bringing it up in the elevator.

Coming back to Lang, what would you say in your opinion was his position in the German intelligence service? In my opinion he is a military observer.

Have you ever heard the word abwehr? No sir.

Did Lang ever use the word, Gestapo? No sir.

Do you think that he was near the top of the German organization in Spain or was he one of the less important people? I think he was the head man for the Bilbao branch and he also had superiors in Madrid.

These letters you saw in Bilbao that were written in plain water were they signed? No sir.

In the open text was that signed? Yessir

Do you recall any names? No sir.

These were brought in by couriers on ships? No, they weren't all brought in by couriers because I only saw the paper I did not see the envelopes and I couldn't tell whether it was brought in by ship or not.

Couriers on some occasions did bring in letters to Bilbao? Yes sir.

How did the couriers hide the mail? They would have to use their own judgement, because I don't think Lang would be able to tell them where to hide the letters.

Lang himself didn't give you any instructions how to get the letters on ship? He told me not to keep any letters or possible information on me or in my cabin or any addresses that I thought were from any of the couriers or some other person, that would lead to my arrest.

Where did he tell you to put them? He never told me where to put them.

How many letters did you have each day? I developed approximately 15 or 20 letters all the time.

Were other men doing the same work? Lang was doing the same work and he did quite a lot of work. Most of the time he did a lot of this work himself but I couldn't say how many letters he was receiving, but he did receive quite an amount of mail.

Do you have any idea of the places where these letters came from ? Yes

In the shipping information, the movements of ships, wasn't that all out of date by the time it arrived? Yes sir.

Did Lang think that information was valuable? Yes, he said it had a certain value, because they could judge what the actual shipping in these ports would be and they were figuring something out of that. Nationality of the boat, close description and approximate tonnage of the ship's cargo, nature of the cargo and the destination, of course. Destination most important.

What was Lang's position in your judgement? He would be a military observer.

Has he a military rank? Yes, he told me about his rank. I think he was a Captain in the German army. He did the same work during the Civil War in Spain that he is doing now. He was with the Condor Legion.

Do you think that the British knew about Lang?

I think that it is possible that the British knew what he was doing or they may have been suspicious about his work.

Did you see any evidence of anybody being suspicious of him? I was told by Lang that a person was following him one morning. He told me what he did to get away from this man.

What did he do to get away from this man? He told me a young man was following him and there was apossible chance the man wanted to know where he lived. He said he took a trolley bus and that was the method that he used to get away from him. Instead of coming straight to the office he went around 2 or 3 blocks and he was sure before he entered the place nobody was following him. He also gave those instructions to the other people. I asked him why he didn't take a cab and he said there was a chance that a person could get a license number and then trace the cab.

Does Dona Maria herself work? No, she has another daughter who is attending school and she does her housework.

Were there any other borders at the house while you were there? Yes, there was a brother of hers and one of their cousins also. They just roomed there as they worked outside during the day.

While you were there did you do anything in the nature of espionage, or did you just try to get out of the country?

Yes, I had to keep going. The largest part of the information I got was from the newspapers and I added a lot of it to that.

How many reports did you send to Lang? About 2 a month, although they didn't contain any secret writing or information because I didn't have enough to say.

How many letter did you get back from him? Just one.

How often were you paid? I wasn't paid in Rio.

What other places in Brazil did you visit? I visited Nichteroy.

Did you go down to Santa Catharina province? No, I didn't go outside of Rio.

On your way back on the Cabo de Hornos, except while you were in Trinidad, you were out in the open? Yes, I was with the rest of the passengers.

Did you have a cabin assigned to you? No sir.

Where did you sleep? On board the ship on a deckchair, because it was too warm to sleep in a cabin.

The passengers also? Yes

While you were in Bilbao you used to read communications from other people? Yes

Were they cabled? They were letters which were written in plain water. I used to write most of the shipping information.

with his family and I would have Dona Maria's son to run around with. Was he employed? He was owner of the Cantino.

Where did you meet Dominguez? When I was aboard ship.

He was coming back from Spain? No sir, I believe he said he made a trip in 1932. We found this place and we got talking to him and found out he was pro-republican. He arranged to have an interview with this fellow he called and he came right away. I explained the situation to him and he advised us to remain aboard ship until the last day. Which I intended to do. If I stayed aboard ship the last day, if possible, the last hour, the captain wouldn't have a chance or the time enough to report a missing man to the authorities. We waited in Rio approximately 20 or 25 days, I don't remember exactly. We were to take petroleum about noon and the ship was to sail approximately at 3 o'clock.

You were to load petroleum at Rio? The petroleum was for the use of the ship. We were taking only 300 tons of it, it would only take about 3 or 4 hours to load. At noon time I dressed up and left the ship. I told Dominquez I jumped ship as the ship was to sail in the afternoon. Then he called Cathala that I was there. Cathala said he would be down 8 o'clock that night. He came down. Then he promised me that he will have everything straightened out for me as he was in close contact with the authorities in Rio. Then he said if necessary, to got to President Del Vargas and that the president would let me stay for the duration of the war. Then Dominquez spoke to his aunt about a Spanish refugee being at the place and if she had a place for me he would appreciate it and I appreicated it because it would be better than a hotel.

You first met him in his bar? Yes

Spanish refugees going to Chile and he was told that this man Cathala was the man who straightened out the passports.

Will you tell us what position Cathala had there? He was a representative of the Free French and he also was an importer and exporter in the cement business from South American countries. Mostly from Argentina, Buenos Aires and Chile,

Was his business confined to South America? As far as I know yes.

Did he export to Europe? He said he didn't and I took his word for it.

Do you know the name of the family you lived with in Rio?

The lady's name was Dona Maria Pareillas.

Is she married? She is a widower.

Were you in touch, while you were there with anyone in this country or in Spain. I was in touch with Lang in Spain, outside of that I wasn't in touch with anyone else.

How did you spend your time down there? I spent most of my time down there going around with Dona Maria's son, who owns another bar at the Cantino Carioca. In the morning we used to go to the water front on the beach and stay there until 11 o'clock and about noon we had lunch together at his mother's place and then in the afternoon we went to a theater or took a walk, if it was too warm we went to the beach. Late in the afternoon when he attended his business I went home early and went to sleep about 8:30 pm.

Was this a Spanish, Portuguese or Brazilian family? Spanish

Did you learn to speak Portuguese when you were there? Not very well, but I could get by.

How did you find this family? I met this familythrough their nephew, Antonio Domingues. He told me that I would be a lot better

another man on the other side of the line so I got by easy enough.
I stayed in Trinidad approximately 3 or 4 days.
How many second class passengers were there? About 100
You had plenty of money with you on this trip? Yes, I had about 12,000 pesos in Spanish money.
What was your address in Rio? Barron D Guarativa #10
Was that the place you found for yourself or were you told to go there? I found it myself.
What sort of a place was it? It was a family - as a matter of fact I made friends with one of their nephews who was the owner of the Casa Carioca.
Did this family suspect what you were doing? No, I told them I was a political refugee and I was also asked, how I had so much money. I told them I came from very good family and my mother gave me the money to get out of Spain.
When you were in Rio you met a Frenchman? Yes
Will you tell us how you met him? Aboard the Aldecoa
What was his name? Cathala
On evenings after work on board ship, we found this Casa Carioca belonged to this Spaniard and we began talking to him one day. He seemed to be very much pro-republican that is from the way he acted and talked.
What was his name? Antonio Dominguez.
What was your specific assignment in Rio? What was your work? I didn't work at all. Were you in contact with other people while you were there? I was contacted by Lang, nobody in Rio.
Going back to Dominguez, is he the owner of Casa Carioca? Yes
He told me he has a friend that may do me some good. They had some

trip would be easy and that the stewards wouldn't ask for passports.
Do you remember the names of the other two sailors? No
We all got together as soon as we got aboard ship. There was a Spanish officer aboard ship and there was a table at the gateway. I was told to keep on going when I got on the ship. As I was walking on board to the stern part of the ship, I was stopped by a Spanish officer and he brought me back, just then one of the two sailors said I was a passenger, he let me go and I continued walking. That night I stayed on deck in a deckchair. Next morning when the breakfast bell rang I went down to the mess hall as I was told to do. They placed me with some other passengers, but when I told them I was going to Bilbao, Spain, they placed me at some other table with another fellow who was also going to Bilbao. That was my table until I arrived at Bilbao. The ship sailed out the very same day about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and then we arrived at Puerto Cabello, Venezuela.
What did you do at Trinidad? At Trinidad we were called on the loud speaker to line up. The first class passengers to get on the starboard side of the ship and the second class passengers to line up on the other side and the crew members of the ship to be lined up on the bow part of the ship.
Were you lined up with the crew? No, with the second class passengers. They also said that the passengers should keep their passports in their hand. I lined up with the regular passengers just the same, because I knew the ship would besearched. Two British officers were checking the passports and there was one standing at the table who gave the final O.K. When my turn came I did not wait to be called - there was one man ahead of me and I went around him to stand in front of the other man. I went around

letter - I cannot get the chemicals for the ink, - he would know that that letter came from you?

I wrote to him and told him that I still had some difficulties with my stomach trouble and I couldn't get the right kind of medicine I was using in Spain. He answered that he had been up to Dr. Jorge and Dr. Jorge told him that I shouldn't use that medicine anymore, but to drink plain water - that would be better for me. He wanted me to use water instead of ink.

And you used water instead of ink? Yes and I also obtained the chemical that I wanted.

Is that Tanoftalina a patent medicine? I think it could be used as a physic.

Is it a thing such as ex-lax that you could buy it under?

I believe it is purguen.

The tanoftalina and the purguen are the same? Yes

When you went back on the Cabo de Hornos who brought you aboard?

Bilvio brought me aboard. I told him I would like to go back to Spain. I couldn't obtain a British visa and Iwanted to go aboard as a stowaway. I offered him 1,000 pesetas if he could get me aboard. He said he had a friend of his who may help me. He spoke to this friend and the friend said he would help me.

Do you know the friend's name? No, but I know hewas messboy for the second class passengers. We bought a few things before boarding ship such as cigarettes and other things we needed. We decided that the best time for me to go on board would be at 11 o'clock. When we were going aboard ship we met two other seamen and they told me just as soon as I got on board ship I should go to the stern part of the ship. Iasked if the steward would ask for my passport and about the trip. They thought the

Do you remember the names of any of those couriers? Yes, the one that contacted me. Domingo Bilvio.

He travelled on any particular ship? Cabo de Hornos

How did he conceal these letters in transit? As I was told these letters were given to him by one of the couriers.

How did they get the letters off the boat and the money and so forth without being seen? The letter that he brought to me was in his own pocket.

Did they examine the sailors who were leaving the ship in Brazil? No they didn't.

Did you have some particular place down in Rio or Brazil where you would meet the people? That was arranged by me the first time I talked to this man that I would meet him down at the Florida Bar. I gave this man a letter that didn't have any secret words and the letter that I received from Lang was written on the same terms. He indicated for me to go to Buenos Aires in order to see if I could get a job in one of these South American boats coming into the United States. Instead, I took a boat and went back to Spain.

Did they tell you to see any particular person in Buenos Aires? Yes they did, but I don't exactly remember the fellow. Later I was given the name of a man who I think was Baranga. It was mentioned 4 different times in the letter but they never gave me the address of this man.

You spoke of some catch words in the letter you wrote to Lang? I told him that I couldn't get the chemicals that were needed to mix up my secret ink.

What was that chemical? Tanoftalina

Did you and Lang have an agreement so that when you said in the

INTERROGATION [illegible]
(19[illegible])

When you went [illegible] from [illegible], what [illegible] answers [illegible] orders?

Before [illegible] Captain [illegible] numbers as I was told.

I was told, [illegible]. I [illegible] the Captain [illegible] told [illegible] Office, [illegible] on board [illegible] leaving [illegible] I was told [illegible].

[illegible] Amerika [illegible] Captain's cabin. [illegible] the C[illegible] teeth.

[illegible]

[illegible] introduced me, and himself [illegible] Martin, and told the Captain [illegible] to receive me. [illegible] asked the Captain [illegible] anything to say for [illegible]. The Captain answered that it would [illegible] aboard ship, as he was not allowed to receive any [illegible].

Why did [illegible] unnecessary?

[illegible] was not allowed to take any money from the passengers, so referred them to the Steamship office to pay. This was Saturday night, and the captain told them he would like to meet him [illegible] steamship office, [illegible] agreed to do so. [illegible] there by 10 o'clock, and the next time for him to go there with [illegible] was Monday. The Captain said he would like to have some [illegible] from him before he could let them go. After he left [illegible] told him [illegible] and that I was. He told him [illegible] officer [illegible] said he would [illegible] see the governor [illegible] and have everything fixed up [illegible] the ship.

Didn't he show any credentials?

The Captain didn't ask for any. The Chief just took his word [illegible] left the ship. Later [illegible] gave him a sort of written note that [illegible] possible [illegible] account of me, etc.

Did the captain ever [illegible] said No.

Were all [illegible] to show any credentials? No.

What was the Captain's name?

His first name was John. [illegible] don't remember the second name. Possibly Roach?

So then you [illegible] off the ship Monday?

I got off on the [illegible] 12th, when I went ashore to the Civil [illegible] with him.

The next day in Bilbao, what happened after that? ~~Did you get any instructions in secret ink?~~

~~No.~~ He kept me busy answering questions.

Did you get any instructions in secret writing at any time between then and coming to this country?

No, he did that before I went to Rio.

Can you tell us who Mr Peisco is in Aurora is?

I have an idea this was the address given to me at Lanza's office, before I sailed to Rio, or in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He is some kind of a business man, I don't [illegible] kind of business or what type. If I [illegible] right, that was it.

You were to get in touch with [illegible]

Yes. If I went to Argentina, I was told I would get some kind of a report on my arrival or afterwards in Argentina, that [illegible] pro-A is, as I was told.

Can you tell us anything about Juan Garcia [illegible]

[illegible] smuggling contraband [illegible]. [illegible] Aurora [illegible] also, too?

[illegible] Garcia? He [illegible] to be [illegible] over [illegible] English [illegible] as this [illegible] in Buenos Aires [illegible] Argentina, I said.

You did not receive any [illegible] from him.

No, sir. I said I handle them himself.

[illegible] not them?

I took [illegible] in his office but [illegible] not.

[illegible] were [illegible] delivered?

I don't know. I think he got them from some other sources. He was called [illegible] often, especially to #18 Colon de Larreatequi.

Who is Aurelia Canales?

She was one of the mail drops during the time I was in Rio. She lived at Moros #26.

Was it the same address where you sent the telegram?

Yes, it is an apartment house. This was to the left. The telegram I sent to the right.

Can you tell us some more about depth charges? What did you have to say about them?

In talking about depth charges, they said they heard rumors the U.S. Navy department was dropping quite a lot of them off the coast, in the North Atlantic, just because the people thought they could see there is a secret arge airplane. [illegible] deeper [illegible] the water [illegible] depth charges [illegible]...

How deep did they say that was?

If I remember right, he said 100 metres. The submarine could [illegible] the [illegible] function for maximum effect at 60 or 80 metres.

[illegible] you know about depth charges since you came back?

I learned that after I came back from Rio. Of course, I wanted to get further information if they have made any improvements. It would be quite important.

Did he think they made further improvements?

He didn't know at the time, but thought they have before long.

[illegible] I am going over there now more to find a radio operator if possible. Have you [illegible] that?

I don't have the different idea, since I didn't have any [illegible] of doing my work in favor of the Germans in the U.S.

[illegible] you expect to do?

[illegible] what I was to do, but I was too to offer myself above everything, but I was too to tell the U.S. or an allied government.

What did Lang expect you to do?

Lang [illegible] after I jumped ship, if I did, [illegible] contact my brother in the [illegible] if possible go back to [illegible] where I would be less molested.

Didn't Lang give you any [illegible] to get [illegible] what kind of [illegible] to look for, [illegible] to him?

No, he never said anything like that. I was [illegible] because I knew the work was very dangerous, [illegible] the other side of the coast to judge [illegible] situation was.

The organization [illegible] people you were warned about, [illegible]

I was warned to be very careful to write two or three [illegible] before I sent the original one, to concentrate myself [illegible] by the same, [illegible] it very carefully.

He wanted you to write several messages, ordinary ones, before you wrote your information?

Well, [illegible] told me it would be a good idea to send some letters like that, but what he was referring to was that he wanted to be sure that the letter with a secret message written in certain terms so she would be sus- [illegible] it wouldn't be visible to the naked eye.

[illegible] for secret writing? or the cover letter?

The cover letter was to be written in careful terms also.

Did you get any instructions for the cover letter?

I was to write the letters, for example, like from one member of the family to another, although it might not really be from one member to another, to use those ethics.

Any other type of letter you were to write for spyer? Did the cover letter vary according to the secret writing? No, sir, it didn't.

He told me to only write [illegible] before from [illegible] to another.

What type of letter?

He to give anything important, [illegible] just g[illegible].

How were you to sign the letters?

I was to sign the letters with any [illegible] I [illegible] in the country, [illegible] all.

Do. could you be sure this letter was from [illegible] or agent we had?

He never told me anything about that, but he kept all my letters separately I noticed when I went back to [illegible].

Did you ever sign the secret part of the letter? No.

Was there ever any indication in the secret letter as to what part of the country it came from? No.

How could you tell if Bilbao where letters came from?

We could only tell by the cover writing, date, and so on, so all we could tell.

Could you give us from memory a couple of typical secret letters such as you developed in Bilbao?

I'm afraid I couldn't remember all of it.

As to what is attempt to reproduce one or two?

Very glad to, but afraid it wouldn't be much good. I knew the terms letters were written in.

Let us hear that.

The letters were most of them written in sort of telegram message-like,

i.e.,"two ships left Buenos Aires today, route certain" and also said, "Buenos Aires Brazil involved in war within a certain date." I remember reading about that before I went to sleep a few days. All writing was short telegraphic style. The cover letters always seemed to go from one member of the family to another, though some of them vary from one kind to another. I remember reading one letter from one friend to another, but most were from one member of a family to another, at least 95% of the cover I recall.

Now then, you said in the letter [illegible] to stand [illegible] according to this country for the Germans. When did you get to feel that way?

All the time since I met Lang. I thought it would be good for me, would lead me back to the U.S. and that is where I wanted to be.

Did you have the same feeling in South America?

Yes. I had the same feeling there.

Did you [illegible] about it--get in touch with Americans or British [illegible] there?

No, I didn't because I was alone. I didn't know what to do then, but I thought that maybe I might go [illegible] I learned the shipping lines between were ~~back~~ less regular as they [illegible] be, and thought by going back to Lima I would get further instructions and be sent to the U.S. as I was planning to, and be a lot safer to do that there than in S.A.

Why?

I didn't know anyone I could confidentially talk to in S.A., although I remember meeting a British secret agent. I don't remember his name.

How did you know he was British?

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time.

D[illegible] [illegible] that [illegible].

If I remember right, [illegible] [illegible].

Did you work for [illegible] any time?

No, sir, I was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]; [illegible] the next str[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], because I was afraid [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a statement. [illegible] [illegible] friendly terms with [illegible] [illegible] arrangements [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Did Dominique Villa go to Spain yesterday relative to this [illegible]?

No, sir. He was relative by marriage to my father. He married [illegible] before the Civil War and afterwards in the Army. He started as a [illegible] and finished for France. He was discharged from the Army just shortly before he went to [illegible] Airways [illegible] Post Accounting Unit.

This matter of couriers after [illegible] over here this time [illegible] supposed to see [illegible] with the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Hermogenes [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] these people are:

Admiral [illegible]?	[illegible] not.
Abwer?	[illegible] I don't know him.
[illegible]?	[illegible] sir.
[illegible]?	[illegible]
[illegible]?	[illegible] I don't remember him either.
Carrole?	[illegible] Mr. I don't know him.
Walter Beisers?	No, I don't think I remember him. I started to say he would be the man in Mexico I was told to see, some or something like that.

I was told [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] to him.

[illegible] told you, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Canaris was [illegible]

[illegible] know.

[illegible]

[illegible] significant [illegible]

[illegible] the ship.

[illegible] wouldn't be the Spanish officer [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] on some occasions [illegible] probably [illegible]

[illegible] remember.

[illegible] wouldn't be the ex-President of [illegible]

[illegible] in Spain. He is a business man.

What else do you know about [illegible] I don't know a thing except [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] about [illegible] No, sir.

Can you tell [illegible] whether [illegible] visited those places or went to [illegible] Elferol? [illegible] No.

What connection?

[illegible] connections, [illegible] several [illegible] ago.

Any idea for that reason?

[illegible] told [illegible] in connection with some other officer [illegible] Elferol.

Did he [illegible] other [illegible] Lem, Wilkens?

No.

Lidorum [illegible] first time.

[illegible] his friends, [illegible] working with [illegible].

[illegible] Bilmet [illegible] I couldn't say.

[illegible] brought anything back from the trip with him.

[illegible] briefly [illegible], so I don't know.

[illegible] nervous, worried or excited or [illegible] returned?

I can recall [illegible] time he was quite [illegible] about his trip. [illegible] feeling like that I didn't care [illegible] happened, [illegible].

[illegible] ever make a trip to the Azores? No, sir.

Canary Islands [illegible], sir, no trips made that I know of, but I recall he talked to them and a radio station in the Canary Islands. As a matter of fact, the wave lengths were given up in those small pamphlets he left on the boat. They were about 1" and 1½", containing

photographs [illegible] instructions [illegible] two [illegible] ones and several [illegible] under [illegible].

Pictures [illegible] sitting.

[illegible] pictures from [illegible] under [illegible].

Microphotographs? [illegible] or six instructions [illegible].

Negatives or positives.

They were positives.

Did you ever [illegible] information [illegible].

Yourself? [illegible] but [illegible].

[illegible] about it?

I don't recall what [illegible], but the [illegible] British troops [illegible] Lisbon [illegible].

Spain, or merely passing through? Don't [illegible] to be worried.

Spanish forces or Tangier?

Never made any trips to [illegible] part of Spain since they had their headquarters at Barcelona and Salamanca.

Irun? Several trips to Irun.

Cross the border into France? Yes. He showed me a fictitious passport used for that purpose.

Spanish, German or French passport?

It was from the Spanish government.

Asked to recall what name is it?

Georg [illegible] second name that sounded like Lang, but had an F or S in the middle of it, but it sounded like Lang.

What was his destination in France?

No, I don't know.

Didn't you whether [illegible] to Barcelona?

No, sir, we didn't [illegible].

[illegible] mention Burlat?

He mentioned it quite a few times, [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible] stuff. I don't remember what for, but I [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] tell me anything important.

Bordeaux? No.

Toulouse? No.

Recordin? No, I [illegible] never [illegible].

Ever hear it [illegible] yourself?

I never's the last time [illegible] it could be, but [illegible] close to the Spanish border in the Basque territory.

Lizarras? Familiar, but don't know where I heard the name. If I remember right, it is located toward the northern part of Spain, on the mainland of Europe.

Lisbon? [illegible] several occasions [illegible] conversation, [illegible] relaxing.

Did he [illegible] mention [illegible]?

No until the last day did he [illegible] anything [illegible] since we told everything would be wrapped down and [illegible] hour.

[illegible] Bourgendieu? No.

Long ago we a friend who was a major in the German Army who died just north of the Spanish frontier in France?

He mentioned on several occasions he had lost several good friends in this war, but never mentioned where it occurred or anything like that. His father died last summer.

[illegible]?

[illegible] made several trips [illegible] with gifts [illegible] friend.

[illegible] any reason for [illegible]?

I have a relation [illegible] connected [illegible] there.

[illegible] address of [illegible]?

It is located [illegible], being a sort of [illegible] or [illegible].

[illegible] Central?

[illegible] stories [illegible].

[illegible] the following significance [illegible] have [illegible] ever [illegible]:

Deuxieme Bureau? [illegible] Sir.

Direction General? [illegible] I [illegible],

[illegible] the Chief of [illegible] Police.

Criminal Police?

[illegible] headquarters of [illegible] Police, [illegible] the Secret Police headquarters.

[illegible] worked with that organization or [illegible] superiors, [illegible]

[illegible] friend of [illegible], the Chief. He secured [illegible] document [illegible] I shouldn't be molested while driving the car, or when I was [illegible] some place [illegible] without [illegible] knowledge.

What nature of card?

It was [illegible] sheet of paper, with a black line all around it, [illegible], [illegible] Madrid, seal, and letters referring to the [illegible] of the Document.

Picture or photo?

Fingerprint?

Physical description:

[illegible] Plant.

[illegible] place set for them [illegible].

[illegible] mention it

[illegible] there?

[illegible]

[illegible]

interest?

the Abteilung [illegible]?

[illegible]

[illegible] "[illegible]

[illegible]?

[illegible]?

A [illegible] Transatlantica [illegible]

[illegible] Bilbao, [illegible]

A [illegible] Transoceanica [illegible]? No.

[illegible] No.

[illegible] Division?

[illegible] Yes.

[illegible]

Yes, [illegible] itself is [illegible] it was doing a good work, [illegible] said on one occasion that the soldiers were for the greatest percentage Pro-Franco soldiers, so it would be dangerous to keep them in Spain. Also, he said it would be a good place for them between two fires with nothing left for them but to fight. Even if [illegible] good to Germany

attitude towards the war [illegible]

would be war between [illegible]

mention any not vity [illegible] connection with [illegible]

[illegible]es. [illegible] this was called for volunteers in [illegible] just pulled out a list of [illegible]

Colonel ~~Arnaldo~~ Ansaldo? [illegible]

[illegible] ever [illegible] guard? [illegible]

Officers all the time.

[illegible] in the organization.

[illegible] about [illegible] Colonel? [illegible]

[illegible] Barcelona, but [illegible]

First Officer [illegible] conversation with [illegible]

[illegible] with the First Officer [illegible]

[illegible] could speak [illegible] interpreter for the [illegible]

[illegible] interpret.

[illegible] officers [illegible] went to Justice [illegible] Office with the Second Officer and ship's doctor was the Third Engineer. Aboard ship I acted as interpreter for the First Engineer, giving descriptions of the ship and all provisions needed. With the First Mate account ship and some work. Later on I was on the upper deck most every day to act as

Interpreter [illegible] officers came [illegible].

[illegible] Guay [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible]. The bigger ship don't [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible] you [illegible] will from Spain [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the ship was not going to Cuba, [illegible] attempted to tele[illegible] [illegible] telephone?

I thought a telegram would be faster [illegible] [illegible] the telephone.

[illegible] long line?

[illegible] sometimes [illegible] [illegible] hours [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] to [illegible] a little [illegible] about the telegram. [illegible] messages, [illegible] in this country.

[illegible] the telegram [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] was called to Cuba [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

I [illegible] Jones [illegible] told [illegible] [illegible] direct [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]?

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] wait for [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] I was.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] evening [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] telephone [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] necessary [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] you [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] same afternoon.

[illegible] it announced [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to see.

Previous to [illegible] last [illegible] [illegible] over here, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] said [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] ports.

[illegible].

[illegible] joined the ship at Gibraltar

[illegible] sailed from Gibraltar [illegible]

[illegible] sent the telegram to [illegible]

[illegible] started from Gibraltar

[illegible] you think at the time it left Gibraltar [illegible]

or the Gulf of [illegible] was Kuwait?

In my opinion, it told to Iraq, [illegible]

No other ports touched afterwards?

[illegible] place at all.

[illegible] convoys [illegible]

[illegible] one of the [illegible] ships, [illegible] towards [illegible]

ship going towards Portugal [illegible] three [illegible] about 500 miles [illegible] the Allied war ships.

[illegible] this ship attempt to [illegible]

[illegible] officer [illegible] Eastern.

[illegible]

[illegible] see any. [illegible] stars [illegible] see none.

[illegible]

[illegible] we arrived at the Bay of Italy.

[illegible] names of any other officers?

No. I don't remember the names of officers. As I told you, I addressed them as First, Second and Third.

Any of them working for Iraq?

No, I have no reason to believe they were working for anyone, but I was told in Philadelphia that the Second Officer was watched by the U.S. author-

[illegible]

[illegible] this fellow Francisco [illegible] the aboard ~~boat~~ [illegible] apprentice engineer. He told me that I should [illegible] something for me from Lang, as

they were coming from Bilbao a few days after [illegible]. I [illegible] have something so I went [illegible] some other [illegible], Urrutia and Angelez. I told [illegible] asked me if I had a note with [illegible] had some things with [illegible] told [illegible] I was told to watch [illegible] to give me instructions, [illegible] might have a chance out [illegible] I told [illegible] [illegible] anything about it in [illegible] secret writing [illegible] use. [illegible] there was an old method that could be used [illegible] lest the Allies won't be suspicious [illegible] lemon juice.

I told him I didn't know anything, so he told me [illegible] everything [illegible] written in capital letters, and [illegible] write some [illegible] [illegible] it appears to be writing to deciphered. I told him I [illegible] remember that [illegible] further in the details. I [illegible] that they would like not to get for information while going to the U.S. [illegible] and back. [illegible] the most important information they would like to get from sailors working aboard ships was description [illegible] everything as to ships just as closely as one could, even to the [illegible] of the ship's quarters, [illegible] and guns, size of ship and description of ship if possible, the navy-yards and everything about their construction. [illegible] if I had [illegible] many money. I still [illegible] gave me a few dollars, [illegible] said I would buy some American newspapers and magazines [illegible] bring them back, [illegible] do with all of them. He gave me all those

instructions which [illegible] to that, but [illegible] at I am.

When this [illegible] to the [illegible] room, [illegible] we went [illegible] together [illegible] over [illegible] reading [illegible] of the sailors [illegible] little before [illegible] and they told [illegible] they were sailing for [illegible] after [illegible] report [illegible] first instructions [illegible] time [illegible] [illegible] work [illegible] that.

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] train. [illegible] trip. [illegible]

[illegible] round trip [illegible] [illegible] his work [illegible].

[illegible] round trip.

I [illegible] address. [illegible] told [illegible] [illegible] in the war.

[illegible] give this address?

[illegible]. I think [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] express [illegible] opinion about [illegible]?

[illegible] to [illegible] very [illegible].

[illegible] silver [illegible]?

[illegible] straight man, [illegible] told [illegible] likes every- [illegible] straight [illegible] on time, and they thought [illegible] was quite a good [illegible].

Q. [illegible] of the names of people aboard ship we haven't mentioned

yet?

No, I don't remember any at this moment. At just first [illegible], and the second [illegible], like I have said before.

Have ever talk about [illegible] army or navy?

[illegible] Israel forces [illegible] pretty strong [illegible] in the world. The [illegible] just as good as the [illegible], but because of those two, he didn't think there would be [illegible] in the world.

Did he [illegible] Israeli?

He mentioned [illegible] being one of the best in the world.

Ben Gurion? No.

Dayan? No.

Any naval officers or [illegible] or any submarine commanders?

I don't remember their names. I didn't speak [illegible] even during the two or three times it [illegible] before.

German [illegible]?

He said there were 500 new submarines out this spring, but [illegible] other.

[illegible] receive army training?

I don't know.

Was he taken on a visit?

I think [illegible] been in Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France (he spoke good French) and that was all, I guess.

How was his Spanish?

He spoke good Spanish.

Was the th sound?

[illegible] did, but he also had a very distinct German accent, as in R.

[illegible] in his speech to [illegible] that [illegible] is some other country than [illegible]?

No.

I think [illegible] a member in one of the [illegible] Spanish [illegible] time.

[illegible] pilot?

[illegible]

[illegible] commercial [illegible] while [illegible] they were removed [illegible] Bilbao.

[illegible]

[illegible] Could it have been a [illegible]

[illegible] certainly [illegible] It seemed like a [illegible], and I was pretty sure it was '31.

[illegible] Aires, [illegible]

No.

[illegible] other [illegible] Aires is divided into postal districts.

[illegible] don't know that.

[illegible] No.

[illegible]lberto Gorgeda?

[illegible] was purser aboard the Cob[illegible] [illegible] Estrella, [illegible] the [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

Did Co[illegible] [illegible]?

[illegible] entire [illegible]

[illegible] have [illegible]

I [illegible] afraid to [illegible] so, I [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] names [illegible] close [illegible]

[illegible] railroad station [illegible].

[illegible] No.

[illegible]

[illegible] be [illegible] I'm pretty sure all those couriers' names, [illegible] mentione[illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] correct spelling?

[illegible] (S.M) [illegible] Guavativa, First Floor.

[illegible] the whole house?

[illegible] the resident.

Did [illegible] ever [illegible] of Vidal y Guardiola? No.

[illegible] there were some 16" coastal defense guns along the coast. Did you see those yourself?

Yes, I saw them one day when I drove with Lang. Lang told me they were 16" guns. We could see them from a short distance.

Could you see the entire barrel?

The canon part of it was covered.

Covered with mats, or a small shed?

I remember just the barrel part was covered.

Set in cement?

Yes, mounted in cement.

In circular cement pit?

Couldn't say that.

How far from the ground was the muzzle of the gun.

The muzzle, level, or front was about level, 5' above the ground.

Looking at the gun diagram.

Yes, we went around it.

Did you see it from the rear [illegible]

I saw it both ways, and from the rear.

[illegible] was the breech at the maximum above the ground

about 3', or something like that.

Iron platform that looked like tracks it moved with the gun.

Don't remember that detail.

Looking to the ~~finger~~ muzzle of the gun, did it look about 16"?

I couldn't judge it, it was covered, and I couldn't see it.

Was it covered with the same of canvas?

Yes, olive canvas, the same color as the guns were painted.

Any small sheds near the building?

Yes, sort of underground and right close to the guns.

Don't say whether the ammunition was stored in underground sheds near there?

Being said the underground place was for ammunition, and for the men to stay.

Circular iron rail around the gun? Yes.

Did it look as though it would have to be raised up before firing?

Well, sir, I didn't get [illegible] idea on that line. [illegible] I had the idea that it would be operated up [illegible] down.

Could you have had [illegible] coast, or straight [illegible]

I was told [illegible] 1 [illegible].

[illegible] or east?

[illegible] it [illegible].

[illegible] 14', 5', 10'?

[illegible] 14' to 17' long.

[illegible] observation [illegible] it could shoot?

[illegible] 30 miles, [illegible] better than that.

Did he describe the calibre of the gun in inches or millimetres?

[illegible].

[illegible] they moved it?

[illegible].

Any electric [illegible] that you could see?

[illegible] I could see.

[illegible] Diesel motors around?

There were [illegible] a few [illegible] working around there that day, and they were using gas motors or something like that.

Did you say the gun came from the Maginot Line?

Most of it comes apart before it is installed. It was brought from Dorlingo where the military [illegible] is. Was brought there in all sizes and

clouds.

The gun was painted blue.

Yes.

Are there lines along there straight or a [illegible] protected [illegible] pools-[illegible]?

It is located on a [illegible], rock, point, on a sort of V projection.

First one gun?

On the [illegible] little [illegible] the hill.

Can you [illegible] about any more?

[illegible] I saw a whole [illegible]

[illegible]line. I took [illegible] look [illegible]

[illegible] if I had to [illegible] look, so I just took [illegible].

There was a [illegible] with a circle where it [illegible]

proper place [illegible] remember it was located between [illegible]

[illegible] close to [illegible]. [illegible] is a town.

Are there any on the beaches there, or slightly back?

[illegible] barbed wire [illegible] used during the Civil War. [illegible]

[illegible] I couldn't see [illegible]. It was all in rolls.

[illegible] protected by anti-aircraft guns that [illegible] spoke of? No.

Any [illegible] boats. No, not [illegible].

Was [illegible] upset at any particular time?

I noticed on several occasions he was quite worried. Several times before I went to [illegible], he didn't seem to be in a very good humor.

Have you ever seen him going around with other people than Germans or [illegible]? Or [illegible]? Or Americans?

Any foreigner [illegible] I was always told was a German, and they spoke

in German.

You asked about Colonels before. I remember he mentioned something about the Colonel of the Civil Guards, Negudi, was a good personal friend of his, and I saw him in a car with Dena several times.

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May 27, 1943

A Spaniard, hereinafter identified as ABC, was deported from the United States in the Fall of 1941 and subsequently recruited in Bilbao by the German Intelligence Service. Contact with that Service was established through Valeriano Peña who was the barber on the steamer "Marques de Comillas" and also a German secret agent. Peña is about 42 years old, 5' 11" in height and ABC explained his situation to him and expressed pro-Franco sympathies. After interrogation in Bilbao by Sr Cabezas of the local police who consulted a Sr Aparicio, the Chief of the Bilbao Police, ABC was called on the telephone at his hotel by an individual who said he wished to speak to him about being an information agent. Although this individual's Spanish was good, his accent indicated that he was not a Spaniard. Ten minutes later ABC was visited by a man who said he had been in touch with the police who had interrogated him and that he wished to make his acquaintance himself. This visitor introduced himself under the name of Emilio. He said he was a Swiss national and that he was in the service of the Germans. He asked ABC for information regarding conditions in the United States, etc. and then suggested an appointment for another day at which time Emilio suggested that ABC join the German Intelligence Service, a suggestion which was accepted. Emilio expressed a desire to meet ABC's family and at this meeting Emilio was accompanied by three men, one an apparent German whose name is not known and the others, Jose Gallego, 24 years old, dark with black hair, 5' 7 1/2" tall, and Alejandro del Carmen, 6' tall, blonde, moustached, 32 years old, weighing 75 kilos, both men belonging to the Spanish Secret Police.

ABC accepted the proposal made by Emilio and the latter suggested he go to Madrid to meet his superiors and to arrange for instruction. He went to Madrid where he stayed at the Hotel Alcoriza, Avenida Jose Antonio No. 20 or 22. Arrived at the Hotel he was called by telephone from Emilio's home, and appointments were arranged discreetly in various places where he saw various Germans who submitted him to several interrogations on different subjects. The location of the office of the German organization in Madrid was not disclosed to him. ABC seemed useful to the German leaders and they approved him. After ten or fifteen days he returned with Emilio to Bilbao to begin his studies as agent. He lived with Emilio at Calle Aguirre No. 1, 3d floor, right, and commenced his studies. He was given free use of Emilio's automobile which had a large collection of license tags from different parts of Spain which were changed almost daily. He received 2,000 pesetas a month in addition to the meals which he had in Emilio's home where he lived.

The German identified as Emilio is said to be a Chief of the Gestapo in Spain in charge of the Bilbao district. His real name, or at least that under which the Germans know him, is Jorge Lang. He is a man 5' 10 1/2" tall, dark with black hair combed back, weighs 72 kilos, 41 years old, and married to a Spanish woman, Antonia (?) Crespo, daughter of the well known monarchist of

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that name, a good-looking woman. His home in Madrid is at Infantas 13, 2d floor. Emilio (or Lang) uses currently for mail addresses, etc, the name of Emilio Martincho and also uses a card with the name of Julio Martin. The Bilbao office where Lang carried on all his work is located at Almeda Mazarredo No. 10, 3d floor, right, telephone 13391. It is a large apartment which is cared for by a woman with two daughters whose names are not known. Five or six Germans work regularly in this office. There is one room which is kept locked and in which it is supposed there is some technical apparatus or other things of value and where it is believed there is also a radio transmitter. A radio receiving set has been seen in another room. The Germans receive correspondence for the office in the hotel Excelsior in the names of third parties and very frequently in the name of Emilio Martincho, Julio Martin and likewise in the name of Varicieta (last name unknown), Calle Colon de Larreategui (number likewise unknown) who serves as intermediary.

It is believed that Lang has some sixty agents in Bilbao and its vicinity some of whom, or a considerable number of whom, work in various ships. For example, Francisco Montes of Valladolid, 41 years old, 5' 5 1/2", 130 pounds, dark, machinist's assistant in the "Monte Contes"; Pablo Moreno, agent in the "Cabo Hornos", occupying various positions in that boat, 5' 6, 150 pounds, 28 years; also a man called Luis whose first name is not known, likewise an agent in the "Cabo Hornos", 5' 4 1/2, 130 pounds, dark, Galician, 22 years old. One of the most experienced agents in the same vessel is Dr Torres, the second surgeon of the ship, 32 years old, 5' 11", 70 kilos, dark. In addition, Rafael Gutierrez Questa who lives in Madrid, Calle Grados 13, who spent four months in Buenos Aires returning to Bilbao in November, 1942, 5' 10", chestnut hair, 150 pounds, 35 years old. Another is Benardo Bonillo who lives at Calle Sendeja 7, Bilbao, and who was a Lieutenant of Franco's during the Civil War, 5' 7", chestnut hair combed back and hair on his temples, 140 pounds. The engine room steward in the "Manuel Calvo" previously was in Cuba where he carried on active totalitarian propaganda; he is another agent as is the "Agregado" of the same ship one Emilio Pis (?) who frequently visits with German agents in San Sebastian and Bilbao.

ABC was sent to Brazil about a year ago with instructions to make his way to the United States from that point. He was shipped as a member of the crew with false papers. Finding it impossible to reach the United States from Brazil he communicated with Lang and was instructed to return to Spain. He stowed away on the "Cabo Hornos" and went through the Trinidad Control without being discovered. His success in getting safely back to Spain made a great impression on Lang and a considerable intimacy developed between them while Lang completed his technical instruction. This instruction included the use of codes and secret writing, as follows:

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Secret Writing

Five methods of secret writing were described; water, lemon, urine, "Purguen" or "Tanoftalina" and Pyramidon. In using water [illegible] written with pencil on dry paper over a sheet of iron paper fastened to a mirror. [illegible] dried the dampened paper remains with no marks whatever [illegible] and the message impressed thereon is disclosed by dampening it a second time. Lemon juice and urine are known. To disclose the secret ink written in those media use a hot electric iron until the paper turns yellowish. The method for using "Purguen" or "Tanoftalina" is to take a cup of alcohol of not less than 42 degrees, the cup being the size of a liqueur glass of .05 grams and dissolving the substance therein without changing the color. Writing is done with a broad pen so as not to scratch the paper. The message is written lengthwise of the paper, the covering writing being placed in the other way; namely, crosswise. To disclose the message [illegible] dissolve in water, using a large amount of soda, and a wad of cotton dampened in this [illegible] is rubbed over the hidden text which then comes out in red. [illegible] be used successfully if the ammonia is pure. In the Pyramidon [illegible] gin of the best quality is taken in the same amount as indicated [illegible] liqueur glass holding .05 grams) and in this a tablet is dissolved. The writing one uses a toothpick placing cotton at the end to carry as [illegible] of the moisture. The writing is done with the least possible pressure on the paper and the paper is then dried for not less than thirty minutes and preferably for an hour. After being dried the paper is immersed in a bath of gin in a clear glass dish and is then dried again between magazines and ironed with a weight. When dry two sheets of the same kind of paper are taken and the paper bearing the message is placed between them and then rubbed on both sides until it looks entirely normal. The covering text is then written on the paper. The developing process is the same as above, namely, soda or ammonia.

In order that the recipient of a letter containing secret writing may know that secret writing is to be found therein certain signs are indicated. When the water process has been used the date of the letter is written at the end. When the lemon juice or urine processes are used the date is written in the middle of the sheet of paper at the top of the letter. When the "Purguen" or "Tanoftalina" or Pyramidon method is used the date appears at the top of the letter at the right.

While in Bilbao, Agent ABC was employed in deciphering communications arriving there. Such communications consisted always of letters or other written matter originating in various places. No telegrams were received. The letters contained cipher and hidden writing and came from Bilbao or other places in Spain, originating in Buenos Aires, Cuba, Santos (Brazil), Montevideo and to some extent from Mexico. Some communications written from the Natal district were very definite on matters relating to the movement of American ships and Lang frequently praised the Agent who furnished that information and expressed regret that he had been eliminated through Allied intervention. One

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of the receiving stations in Bilbao for correspondence from America was Jose Mendez (he used the name of Jose Urrutia) whose address was C. de la Calva, Bilbao, which means "Cuartel de la Salve". Mendez is a Sergeant of the Civil Guard, is 6' high, weighs 70 kilograms and has chestnut hair. He seems to be a sort of sub-chief under Lang's orders. Ana Amelia Zamalea used also to receive correspondence. She was 32 years old and lived in Bilbao at Calle Heros 28, 4th floor, but later instructions were given that correspondence should not be sent to that woman.

Messengers used for transmitting letters were said to be aboard the Spanish ships "Monte Amboto", "Monte Albertia", "Monte Izaguirre", "Monte Igueldo", "Marques de Comillas", "Cabo de Hornos", "Villa Real de Alava", "Josefa Cabo Huertas" and "Magellanes". The method of using the messengers on these boats is as follows: In general it is believed the messengers do not know the nature of their mission or the contents of the messages. The outer envelope is addressed "Para Joaquin (Fernandez)". This was the Civil Guard living in Plencia for many years and well known there. Within this envelope there is another on which is the name of Martinez or another of Lang's aliases. The outer envelope must be stuck along one edge to the inner envelope so that it will be known if it has been opened. The messenger to whom the letter is given is asked to be good enough to deliver this letter to Joaquin "so he may pass it on to my family". Joaquin Fernandez meets all the ships arriving from America and has free access to them since he wears the uniform of a Civil Guard. He has direct relationship with Lang. Two of the agents of Lang are an Emilio Anton who was a member of the crew of the "Magallanes" and probably the boatswain (Contramaestre) of the same vessel.

When Agent ABC's instructions were completed he was entered again on a Spanish vessel with directions to establish himself in the Western hemisphere and develop a network of sub-agents. He was told that when Spain entered the war he should send all his reports by letter or radio to Doña Maria Pereira Do'Ceu, Rua Coheiho da Rocha 82, 1st floor, Lisbon.

Ciphers and Codes

The basis for coding telegraphic and written communications is a letter square containing 25 spaces and horizontal and vertical columns affixed thereto containing the 10 digits in two columns of 5 digits each. The placing of the letters and digits is determined by the date (or day of the week) of the communication. The specimen used in this memorandum is based on the date May 31.

		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	T	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	HI	J	K	L	N
9	6	P	Q	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square contains Q)

		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	T	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	H	I	J	K	L
9	6	N	P	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square omits Q)

SA/LE / UN / CO/NV/OY / DE / [illegible] /ET/A [illegible] Y/OP/KK/
GO/KF / ZH / FM/JZ/YO / FD / HT/[illegible]/T [illegible] A/IS/KK/

S	A	L	E	U	N	C	O	N	V	O
64	32	54	43	71	55	41	34	55	72	34

Y	D	E	N	U	E	V	A	Y	O	P	K
33	42	43	55	71	43	72	32	33	34	63	53

1. Code words for English, German, Spanish, Portuguese and French.

2. Divide [illegible] into groups of 2 letters. If last group has only one [illegible] letter again.

3. [illegible] are omitted [illegible] ing used for Q and ch for [illegible]. [illegible] appear in separate squares.

[illegible] only let[illegible]

[illegible] diagram.

[illegible] squares

[illegible] filled in by beginning with [illegible], or less frequently, the [illegible] was written and continued [illegible] of the alphabet in the [illegible] rial and error meth[illegible]

		0	9	8	7	6
		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	7	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	HI	J	K	L	N
9	6	P	Q	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square contains Q)

		0	9	8	7	6
		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	7	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	H	I	J	K	L
9	6	N	P	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square omits Q)

SA/LE / UN / CO/NV/OY / DE / NU/EV/A Y/OR/KK/
QO/KF / ZH / FM/JZ/YO / ED / HZ/DW/Y A/YS/XX/

S	A	L	E	U	N	C	O	N	V	O
64	32	54	43	71	55	41	34	55	72	34

Y	D	E	N	U	E	V	A	Y	O	R	K
33	42	43	55	71	43	72	32	33	34	63	53

1) Code works for English, German, Spanish, Portuguese and French.

2) Divide message into groups of 2 letters. If last group has only one letter, write that letter again.

3) For radio use M and Q are omitted K being used for Q and nh for M. When [illegible], H and I appear in separate squares.

- [illegible] letters use only letter square.

- [illegible] numbers use whole diagram.

[illegible]ter square:

[illegible] square are filled in by beginning with [illegible]th, or less frequently, the day of the week, [illegible] was written in; continues with the remain[illegible] of the alphabet in their normal order. In [illegible]ial and error method will show which sys-

b) If name of month or of day of week has a repeated letter or letters, all repeated letters are dropped; thus ENERO becomes ERO, and SABADO becomes SABDO.

c) The vertical and horizontal squares containing numbers are filled in as follows: The unitary digit of the date appears above the first letter of the name of the month and the tens digit appears directly at the left of such first letter. From the unitary digit the numbers are written in ascending order to the right, then up and to the left.

From the tens digit the numbers are written in ascending order downwards, then to the left and up. When the date has but a single digit, write this digit above the first letter of the square, and put zero to the left of this same letter, in the right hand vertical column.

7) To enchipher with letters:

a) Locate positions of the 2 letters of the first group of two, and regard them as situated at diagonally opposed corners of an imaginary parallelogram.

b) The 2 letters at the other diagonally opposed corners of this parallelogram, will be the first 2 letters of the enciphered message. The first letter written is the one on the same horizontal line as the first letter of the text group of 2 letters.

c) If both letters of a group appear in the same vertical or horizontal line, the cipher text would be the same letters, written in reverse order.

d) To decipher, reverse procedure.

[illegible] with numbers:

[illegible] not divided into groups of [illegible] letters.

[illegible] digits appearing in the columns immediately ad- [illegible] cipher square are used.

[illegible] letter in the square, then find and put down [illegible] left in the same horizontal [illegible] put down the first number appear- [illegible] in the same vertical column [illegible] digits for each letter.

[illegible] the procedure.

Concealing cipher text in innocent message.

The basic squares are constructed as follows, the one on the left containing Q and the one on the right omitting that letter. In general M and q are omitted and nh and k used instead.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	HI	J	K
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	I	J
3	K	L	M	N	O
4	P	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

S	A	L	E	U	N	/	S	A	L	E	U	N
43	11	31	15	45	33	/	43	11	32	15	45	34

QUER	IDO	/	H/E	RMA	N/O	/
4	3	/	1/1	3/1	1	/

1) The two digits representing a letter are determined by selecting first the digit horizontally opposite it and then the digit vertically above the letter in question.

[illegible] cipher values are concealed in the innocent text by leaving [illegible] between them, if 43 is to be concealed in "Querido" [illegible] with a break, as inconspicuous as possible, [illegible] between the r and the i: Querido

[illegible] last letter of a numerical [illegible] in with any letters from the [illegible] and with an upward stroke,

[illegible] joined with letters from the [illegible] group, then the letter ending [illegible] i, e, g, a etc.

José [illegible], natural de [illegible] (Vizcaya), vivió en Butrón [illegible] fami[illegible] la capital en la actualidad. Llegó a [illegible] de 1[illegible]. Residió en el Oeste de U.S.A. en [illegible] Salt City, Utah. [illegible] de los E.U. el 5 de noviembre de 1[illegible] el 16 de mayo de 1[illegible] con el vapor "Manuel Calvo" al puerto de Philadelphia. [illegible] el tiempo transcurrido de su salida de los Estados Unidos hasta su actual llegada ha estado en comunicación y [illegible] con los alemanes en España, con quienes ha actuado como agente. Su nombre de agente es "G" que corresponde a la primera letra de la palabra Guernica. Tiene 36 años.

INICIACION: José Laradogoitia por motivos y circunstancias que precisaremos al final y que la Delegación Vasca conocía al detalle, fué expulsado de los Estados Unidos. Antes de la salida del país permaneció en Ellis Island durante algunos días. De allí fué trasladado al "Marqués de Comillas" para ser enviado a España como pasajero de turista por acuerdo de las autoridades americanas. El barco salió del puerto de New York el 6 de noviembre de 1941.

Laradogoitia con el fin de asegurarse su situación ante las autoridades de Franco, comenzó a hacerse pasar en el barco como amigo de Franco y de ideas totalitarias. Después de varios tanteos, dió con Valeriano Peña, pescero del barco, 42 años de edad, 5' 11", con quien trabó cierta amistad. Valeriano Peña es un agente secreto en el barco. Este informó a la llegada a Bilbao de las condiciones en que Laradogoitia salía de los E.U. y de la posición ideológica que él había manifestado. El "Marqués de Comillas" llegó a Bilbao el 13 de noviembre del mismo año. A la llegada le interrogó el jefe de policía local Sr. Cabezas quien consultó el caso con el Jefe de la Policía de Bilbao Sr. Aparicio. Ambos creyeron de interés la forma en que se manifestaba Laradogoitia y decretaron que podría actuar con libertad de movimientos, dejándole sin tomar medida policiaca alguna. Laradogoitia fué a Bilbao donde se instaló en el hotel Excelsior. El mismo día de la llegada al hotel le llamó por teléfono un individuo que le preguntó si tenía inconveniente en hacerle alguna declaración que le interesaba pues decía ser un agente de información. Por el acento, aún cuando el castellano del interlocutor era correcto, Laradogoitia comprendió que se trataba de un extranjero. A los diez minutos de la conversación telefónica se presentó en el hotel un señor que manifestó había estado en contacto con la policía que le había interrogado en el puerto y que deseaba conocer personalmente sus impresiones. El visitante se presentó bajo el nombre de Emilio. Le dijo que era Suizo y que estaba al servicio de los alemanes. Le pidió una declaración de lo que sabía Laradogoitia sobre la situación de los E.U. etc. Emilio al final de la conversación le preguntó si tendría inconveniente en tener relación con él y le citó para otro día. Laradogoitia acudió a la cita y Emilio le pro[illegible] en trabajos de información para la causa que él representaba [illegible] perseguía un bien para España. Laradogoitia no se negó [illegible]. Emilio expresó el deseo de conocer a la familia de [illegible] Urduliz, familia a la que [illegible] la familia; de parte de [illegible], que debía ser algún ale[illegible] hermano, dado lo moreno, 5' 7½"; [illegible] de unos 75 kilos: ambos de la [illegible] oposición con su padre [illegible] actúe entendien[illegible] buenos de defensa personal y [illegible] técnicas.

[illegible] datos no supone el se[illegible]. Los indicamos aquí para mejor [illegible] Gestapo en España a cuyo cargo [illegible] nombre o por lo menos el nombre [illegible] Lana, de 5'10½", moreno, pelo ne-

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oficiales [illegible] Como [illegible] muy numerosas y como la cantidad de [illegible] estimaban, no podía [illegible] cuenta de su situación. Su madre además [illegible] la forma, la entregaban todo el dinero que necesitaba para sus gastos personales. A los jefes al mando le pareció utilizarla Laradogoitia y así lo acordaron. Después de pasar 10 [illegible] días volvió con Lang a Bilbao para comenzar la instrucción de agente. Vivía con Lang en el primer domicilio que antes hemos señalado en la calle Aguirre y comenzó a instruirla en diversos aspectos de la labor de espionaje. Laradogoitia hacía uso libre del coche de Lang que estaba provisto de una completa colección de placas de diferentes puntos de España que eran cambiadas casi diariamente con el fin de despistar. A Laradogoitia le entregaban dos mil pesetas al mes, aparte de las comidas corrientes, etc., que tenían lugar en el domicilio de Lang con quien vivía. Como primer paso Lang le propuso la entrada como intérprete en el Consulado americano de Bilbao en donde estuvo desde diciembre de 1942 hasta febrero de 1943. Laradogoitia no puede precisar de que medios se valió Lang para que el Consulado Americano le admitiera como intérprete. Supone que Lang tiene una influencia decisiva por algún medio. El Consulado Americano no conocía ni sospechó la relación de Laradogoitia con los alemanes. (Este hecho confirma lo acertado de la sospecha que la Organización Vasca por cursó en su día sobre el consulado americano de Bilbao.)

PRIMERA SALIDA DE LARADOGOITIA: A los alemanes les interesaba que Laradogoitia con su conocimiento del inglés y del pueblo americano podría trabajar en América, y a tal fin el 2 de mayo le embarcaron en Bilbao a bordo del buque "Aldecoa" con destino al Brasil a fin de que allí procurara llegar a los E.U. Fué embarcado como paleros bajo el nombre de Antonio Casares Oyal, natural de Soores, Bega de Liebana, provincia de Santander.

El barco recibió órdenes de ir a Pernambuco en vez de Río de Janeiro para poder comprobarlo. El 14 de mayo llegó a Pernambuco y más tarde a Río de Janeiro. En Río de Janeiro Laradogoitia desertó del barco conforme al plan previsto y comenzó a preparar la llegada a E.U. Se puso en relación con elementos [illegible] España republicana y con el jefe de los franceses libres que [illegible]. También se puso en relación con la Delegación Vasca en New York, [illegible] Manuel de la Sota, quien le facilitó la documentación vasca. [illegible] aquel entonces no había servicios [illegible]. Laradogoitia vió que dada las enormes dificulta- [illegible] llegar a los E.U. y como ésta era su fi- [illegible] se ante las autoridades ame- [illegible] ciones que le fueron propuestas [illegible] Lang explicándole cual era su [illegible] Río de Janeiro en el "Cabo [illegible]". En aquel mismo barco [illegible] alemanes marinos del "Graff [illegible] el "Cabo Hornos". En Trinidad [illegible] barco, visto el antece- [illegible] descubierto. Llegó a [illegible] venido de policía [illegible] de la Delega- [illegible] aparición de los alemanes y estos [illegible]. Con este motivo aumentó la [illegible] aprovechó el viaje en el "Cabo [illegible] que le rodeaban. Al llegar a [illegible] de ellos, a quienes descubrió [illegible] información de Laradogoitia, confirmó y com- [illegible] obtenido: con anterioridad los hemos consignado

/9.

[illegible]

[illegible] tura oculta. [illegible] en correspondencia [illegible] número 2.

La escritura [illegible] orina; "purpuea" o "tenoftalina"; piramidón. [illegible] lápiz en un papel seco [illegible] papel mojado queda sin nada si [illegible] vuelve a rojo. Limón y orina [illegible] cretos emplear una plancha eléctrica [illegible] de color marón.

"Purpuea" "tenoftalina". Utilizar [illegible] media copa de alcohol, copa tamaño de licor para [illegible] no cambia de color. Se escribe con [illegible] papel. Se escribe en sentido transversal al papel, poniendo la escritura [illegible] te de cobertura en el sentido ordinario. [illegible] empleando mucha cantidad de [illegible] cima del texto oculto [illegible] color rojo. [illegible] buenos resultados si la [illegible].

procedimiento Piramidón. [illegible] de la mejor, la misma cantidad señalada con anterioridad para [illegible] y se [illegible] forma [illegible] con más dificultad [illegible] un pelillo (modo [illegible]) [illegible] fuente. [illegible] con la [illegible] sobre el papel. [illegible] papel [illegible] papel se [illegible] escrito [illegible] [illegible] normal. [illegible]

[illegible] resulta que se emplea. [illegible] el mismo. [illegible] procedi- [illegible] de la parte. [illegible] se escribe la [illegible] ser utilizados [illegible] resulta [illegible] [illegible]. Los alemanes son [illegible] los sencillos proce- [illegible] se estiman deshecha- [illegible] la fecha les ha dado [illegible] robado en la oficina al mismo

[illegible] que les interesa a los

[illegible] tipos de armas, modelos.

2. [illegible] ejército [illegible]. (Mucha información de ésta [illegible] las instrucciones de los alemanes.)

3. Situación [illegible] del ejército e instalaciones propias que utilizan dichas unidades.

4. Cuantas divisiones especiales se preparan y existen para desembarcos.

5. Dependencia del Presidente Roosevelt respecto al Estado Mayor y en que forma, cuando y cómo, el Estado Mayor le manda al Presidente Roosevelt en tiempo de guerra.

6. Número de barcos que forman los convoys que salen de los E.U., los puntos de partida. Destino de los convoys, armamento de cada buque y composición de la escolta.

7. Nombre y el mayor detalle posible sobre los generales destinados a diversos países.

8. Información sobre el espíritu del país y tensión de guerra en la población.

9. Pérdidas navales y bajas del ejército. Tipos de aviones americanos, armamento, capacidad de vuelo, etc., pérdida de aparatos.

10. Situación alimenticia y productos para uso de la población civil señalando lo que abunda y lo que escasea.

11. Vías de comunicación dentro de los E.U.

12. Situación exacta de cualquiera fábrica que trabaje en asunto de armamentos. Señalar puntualizando la diferencia, situación, etc., de las fábricas de armas pequeñas: fusiles, ametralladoras, etc., de las fábricas de gran calibre: tanques, cañones, etc.

13. [illegible] del radio de acción de los submarinos americanos y capacidad de [illegible].

14. [illegible] de [illegible] profundidad, fuerza [illegible] de las mismas. (Según Larado- [illegible] anteriores pues alcan- [illegible] que los americanos llegan [illegible] de la fotografía publi- [illegible] 17 de julio de 1941. En la fotogra- [illegible] a los alemanes y las explica- [illegible] mismo lo que la misma re- [illegible] división de 35 mil

[illegible], pesados y medianos.

[illegible] Larrañagoitia recibía la [illegible] tenían en la oficina traba- [illegible] llegaban. Los comunica- [illegible] escritos procedentes de diversos [illegible]. En esas cartas se barajaban

las clave [illegible] a que anteriormente nos hemos referido. Las cartas llegaban de Bilbao y otros puntos de España procedentes en último término de Buenos Aires; Cuba; Santos (Brasil); Montevideo; y muy pocas de México, por ser éstos los centros de recepción de los trabajos en América. Laradogoitia dice que no eran informaciones de asuntos muy importantes. Algunas comunicaciones que procedían de la zona de Natal eran muy precisas en asuntos de movimiento de barcos americanos. Su jefe alababa frecuentemente a un agente que actuaba por allí y un día se lamentó de que le habían eliminado por intervención aliada.

Uno de los centros de recepción de correspondencia de América en Bilbao es José Mendez (se pasa por el nombre de José Urrutia) y la dirección es C. de la Salve, Bilbao, que quiere decir "Cuartel de la Salve". El tal Mendez es un sargento de la Guardia Civil que forma parte de la plantilla de ese cuerpo en Bilbao cuyo cuartel está en el lugar apuntado. Es de 6' de altura, 70 kilos, pelo castaño. Viene a ser una especie de subjefe a las órdenes de Lang. Anteriormente recibía también correspondencia Aurelia Canales de 32 años, domiciliada en Bilbao en la calle Heros 28, cuarto piso. Ultimamente dice Laradogoitia que se ha dado órdenes para que no se envíe correspondencia a esta mujer.

SITUACION Y MISION ULTIMA DE LARADOGOITIA: Después de la preparación intensiva y minuciosa a que nos referimos, los alemanes dieron por fin con el medio para que Laradogoitia pudiera cumplir la misión para la que había sido preparado. Los alemanes le prepararon embarque en el vapor "Manuel Calvo" como fogonero y a nombre de Gregorio García Ortiz, natural de Guecho, Vizcaya, de 33 años, datos que constan en la cartilla de navegación que le fué entregada y que está en poder del capitán de dicho barco hoy en el puerto de Philadelphia. El barco partía desde Gijón para Cuba y New Orleans. En esta creencia estaban los alemanes hasta última hora. El día antes de salir por motivos y órdenes que Laradogoitia ignora el "Manuel Calvo" le cambiaron la ruta y le señalaron el ir directamente de Gijón a Philadelphia. Días antes de salir, estando ya Laradogoitia en Gijón para hacerse a la mar, los alemanes le dieron las últimas instrucciones en la creencia de que el barco tocaba Cuba, y en Habana comenzara la realización del trabajo previsto. Las notas que los alemanes le hicieron llegar el momento de la salida contenían las siguientes partes: Lista de Carteros. Contrato de Laradogoitia. Carta de presentación para Hermógenes Martín Badillo, Barcelona III, Garage, [illegible], Cuba. Claves, escritura secreta, e instrucciones complementarias. [illegible] Laradogoitia todas estas notas eran bastante extensas y detalladas con datos precisos. Venía ser un resumen muy bien hecho de las advertencias y lecciones que le habían ido dando a fin de que fijara los puntos y no los olvidara. [illegible] anteriormente hemos señalado diversos aspectos de las instrucciones que [illegible] y que Laradogoitia nos ha dicho antes de llegar a este [illegible], solamente indicaremos lo que sirva de información complementaria.

[illegible] la relación de los agentes nazis trans-
[illegible] en diversos barcos que vienen a puntos
[illegible] los barcos que recuerda Laradogoitia de
[illegible] "Monte Isabela", "Monte Iciar",
[illegible], "Villa Real de Alaba", "Josiña", "Cabo

[illegible] carteros y los apuntó en un cuader-
[illegible] de Philadelphia y del que tiene
[illegible] circunstancias que más adelante explicare-
[illegible] es la siguiente: En general cree Lara-
[illegible] también al corriente de la misión que desempeñan
[illegible] el contenido de las misivas. En los puntos de A-

mérica donde llegó [illegible] carta que en el sobre no dice más que "Para Joaquín (F [illegible]". [illegible] Guardia Civil que reside en Plencia, Vizcaya, desde hace muchos años y muy conocido, a quien se le denomina en el pueblo por el apellido "El [illegible]". Dentro del sobre hay otro en el que se pone el nombre de Martincho u otra de las denominaciones con que se le llama a Lang. El sobre externo debe estar pegado a lo largo de un borde con el interno para que se note si ha sido violado. Al cartero de que se trate se le indica: "Hace el favor de entregar esta carta a Joaquín "El Andaluz" de Plencia para que se la haga llegar a mi familia". Joaquín Fernandez acude a la llegada de todos los barcos que vienen de América en los que tiene entrada libre porque va vestido de uniforme de la Guardia Civil cosa que le permite actuar sin limitación alguna. Para ciertos órdenes que de España deben venir a América se utiliza el procedimiento inverso y es Joaquín Fernandez el encargado de realizarlo. El se relaciona directamente con Lang.

En el vapor Magallanes recuerda Laradogoitia que al Contramaestre actual se le pueden hacer entregas diciéndole lo siguiente: "De parte del mutilado de guerra que entregue la carta al banquero suizo amigo del mutilado". Este mutilado de guerra es un tal Emilio Antón que fué tripulante del barco y hoy se halla separado por enfermedad. Este es un agente de Lange y por la fórmula que es preciso emplear, dice Laradogoitia, que el Contramaestre es otro agente pues debe estar directamente relacionado con Lang.

2. Contrato. En este documento se estipula la relación económica y primeros pasos de Laradogoitia. Ya hemos dicho que Laradogoitia como agente alemán lleva el nombre de la letra G correspondiendo a Guernica. Laradogoitia recuerda de memoria el texto del contrato que él ha referido de la siguiente manera. "G tratará de desertar en Cuba y acto seguido se presentará con la carta de presentación a Hermógenes Martín Badillo, Barcelona 111, Garage, Habana, Cuba. Se prevee que nuestro amigo Hermógenes le preste a Guernica toda clase de ayuda y protección necesario para trabajar en Cuba satisfactoriamente. Es preciso que para el tiempo que permanezca en Cuba, Hermógenes le ayude a legalizar su situación y también apoyarle con los recursos necesarios para camuflarle debidamente en un trabajo normal. Acto seguido G tratará de obtener informaciones que nos interesan. Una vez establecido el servicio entre ambas partes y siendo satisfactorios los resultados que obtenga G se le facilitarán mil dólares para nombrar algún colaborador si él lo ve necesario. Siendo preciso que G se entrevista con su hermano en los E.U. con el fin de que sea instruído en los métodos aplicados a G, se le enviarán mediante uno de nuestros carteros [illegible] suma de dinero en dóllars. G obtendrá ayuda de la Ca[illegible] preciso, para ir a México, donde en un pueblo de la [illegible] se verá con su hermano a fin de instruirle en la forma in[illegible] de radiotelegrafía por si se hiciese con [illegible] entregará a su hermano mil dóllars con [illegible] en los E.U. Si G viera necesario o conve[illegible] en Cuba, su hermano mandará todos los informes [illegible] directamente a G bien por radio o [illegible] transmitirá por la vía más rápida po[illegible] por Buenos Aires. En caso [illegible] las cartas por vía aérea a [illegible] Aires de donde Beranga los re[illegible] recoveremos. Después de [illegible] la línea está establecida [illegible] oficina fondos ilimitados [illegible] recompensas pagadas a G [illegible] probado de que el asunto mar[illegible] Aires de G a donde G también

"escribirá al [illegible] compañeros o amistades personales en los "barcos españoles [illegible] de sus padres de donde nosotros nos ocupamos "de recogerlas. A G se le entrega de momento contra recibo el máximo permiti-"do, cincuenta dólares y 25 mil pesetas a sus padres". Esta comunicación era copia. Parece que el original fué mandado a los jefes de Lang y cree que otra copia a Berlín.

3. Carta a Hermógenes. Esta era una carta redactada por Lang en términos familiares para el agente de Cuba presentándole al portador G. La trató de primo a Hermógenes. El contenido no tiene importancia. Dice Laradogoitia que la destruyó antes de desembarcar en Philadelphia. Los otros papeles fueron destruídos con anterioridad salvo el cuaderno al que anteriormente hemos hecho referencia. Más adelante aclararemos este punto y el hecho de que aparezca en la nota de Lang el hermano de Laradogoitia.

4. Claves y escrituras ocultas. Era un resumen de lo que anteriormente hemos referido sobre el particular y a los documentos que adjuntamos explicativos de las claves.

5. Instrucciones complamentarias. En las instrucciones complementarias también había según Laradogoitia algunos a título recordario que hacen referencia a asuntos tratados ya. Las instrucciones a que aún no nos hemos referidos son

a) A G se le mandará más tarde, en caso de que él no haya resuelto el problema, el nombre y dirección de algún telegrafista para que transmita sus mensajes a España.

b) La Onda tiene que ser de 42303 m. y 211515 con señal de llamada "v v v v v ?". La contestación será "v v v v v !". El servicio alemán estará a la escucha 24 horas llamando de vez en cuando. Para el uso de la clave por radio se suprimirán las letras h y la q usando la nh y la k para reemplazarlas.

c) Cuando España entre en guerra, G mandará todos sus informes por carta escrita o por radio a Doña María Pereira [illegible], Rua Cohelho, Lisboa. (Fijaremos el número de la [illegible] que está en el cuaderno depositado en la Aduana de [illegible].)

[illegible] ESTADOS UNIDOS: El vapor "Manuel Calvo llegó el 1? [illegible] no había sufrido control alguno por el cami-[illegible] revisión a bordo ante la cual Laradogoitia [illegible] su carta en la cartilla de marino, sin dar [illegible] que traía para Cuba dirigida a Her-[illegible] [illegible] a los papeles que le envió Lang a [illegible] la preocupación de que si la carta a [illegible] declarado a las autoridades e-[illegible], se la podrían haber derivado [illegible] anteriores le hubieran servido [illegible] adecuadamente su asunto, [illegible] en que se llevaban los inte-[illegible] José María Arriandiaga, segundo [illegible] y que por sus antecedentes [illegible] persecución y postergaciones de par-[illegible] simpatías y adhesión a la causa vasca.

[illegible] José María [illegible], éste [illegible] manifestó [illegible] estar [illegible] un Lieutenant del Navy llamado L. H. Harper. Laradogoitia le [illegible] lo presentaría, y [illegible] aceptado José María la proposición [illegible] con el mencionado Lieutenant a [illegible] tres horas sesión [illegible] el [illegible] gran parte de lo que en este escrito dejamos relatado. El Lieutenant L. H. Harper manifestó que el asunto lo pondría en conocimiento de sus superiores y que quedaría en libertad para hacer lo que quisiera. Seguidamente vino a New York y se puso en relación con nosotros que era lo que deseaba de de el primer momento.

EXPLICACION DE LARADOGOITIA DA A SU ACTITUD: Laradogoitia manifestó que dada la forma indefensa con que fué expulsado de los E.U. y puesto a la disposición de las autoridades de Franco debía acogerse como protección a las ofertas que le propusieron los alemanes, aceptadas las cuales esperaba sacar de ellos beneficios e incluso conseguir llegar a América, dar cuenta a las autoridades americanas de datos que le podrían interesar y de esa forma ser admitido normalmente en el país. Laradogoitia tiene un hermano llamado Antonio residente en Emmett, Idaho, de oficio pastor, y él aprovechó esta circunstancia para hacer ver a los alemanes lo bien que podía realizar un plan de acción en combinación con su hermano y alcanzar los objetivos que aquellos persiguen. Para ser lógico con la forma en que salió de los E.U. y el mal ambiente que él manifestó tenía en este país, el plan lo proyectó de forma que el no viniera a los E.U. y que lo desarrollaría desde Cuba o México. Este plan lo concretó después de su vuelta de Río de Janeiro. Antes dado su interés de llegar a América les propuso el viaje a Brasil pues que de otra forma no veía posibilidad de llegar hasta aquí.

NUESTRA IMPRESION: Nosotros conocemos de antes de su salida de E.U. a José Laradogoitia y a su hermano Antonio. Este último, Antonio, es muchacho que siempre ha sido de entera confianza, buena conducta personal, y totalmente unido a nuestro ideología, cosa que ha demostrado en repetidas ocasiones con toda clase de pruebas. José Laradogoitia ha tenido fama entre los vascos del Oeste de persona poco seria, en contraste con la conducta recta e íntegra que llevan en general los vascos en aquella parte de los E. U. Los vascos le llamaban "Joesuzirre" palabra vasca que significa "José el de las mentiras" por los abundantes narraciones y extravagancias que solía habitualmente contar a sus amigos. Llevaba una vida irresponsable [illegible] joven despreocupado y libre. En cierta ocasión fué llevado a la cárcel [illegible] por haber extendido cheques sin disponer de fondos por [illegible] mil dólares. [illegible] la cárcel de Boise fué trasladado a [illegible] por gestiones nuestros se consiguió [illegible] de la cárcel. Todo esto era consecuencia de [illegible] las autoridades americanas le [illegible] irregularmente sin cumplir [illegible] entre los vascos por no ser amigos [illegible] la reputación que públicamente [illegible] y un detalle de toda esta situación [illegible] oportunas. La Delegación [illegible] para que no fuera expulsado del [illegible] había traído a New York. José Lara[illegible] de los E.U. Las gestiones [illegible] suficientemente rápido para impedir [illegible] Vasca le escribió a José Lara[illegible] ya había sido puesto abordo del [illegible] principio hemos relatado. A Laradogoi[illegible] en días separados. El primero [illegible] relatara con espontaneidad sus impre[illegible], haciéndole preguntas intencionadas para [illegible] de la gran cantidad de asuntos y detalles

de que [illegible] incurrir [illegible] remendando [illegible] se le [illegible].

Personalmente da la impresión de ser inteligente, muy [illegible], con apariencia de [illegible] cosa, pero con gran dominio de los asuntos en que está mezclado y con aparente tranquilidad de conciencia, como [illegible] no actúa con segunda intención sino con lealtad al servicio de un interés vasco [illegible] democrático.

Dado el espíritu avent[illegible] de Laradogoitia y teniendo en cuenta la situación difícil en que se [illegible] al encontrarse en el "Marqués de Comillas" para ser puesto en [illegible] parecía que iba a ganar la guerra, [illegible] que al principio Laradogoitia tuviera idea de ponerse al lado de [illegible] propio y situarse en posición sólida ante el futuro. [illegible] que más adelante pensando la cosa, se habrá conducido de [illegible] con las manifestaciones que hace ahora. Nos parece difícil que en éste, su postura, haya adoptado la posición de abrirse ante nosotros para mejor servir a los alemanes. De todos modos sería preciso el estudiar bien toda esta relación, medirla y observar sus movimientos y reacciones en el futuro. Por sus antecedentes, relaciones y ambiente creemos poder asegurar que en Laradogoitia no han cabido ni caben hoy simpatías por Franco y menos por los alemanes.

IMPRESIONES VARIAS DE LARADOGOITIA: Nos ha proporcionado algunas impresiones sobre asuntos diversos.

1. El Jefe Lang es persona inteligente, hábil, de gran energía en el trabajo. Se pasa meses enteros sin ver a su señora que vive en Madrid. Es de conducta austera y rígida.

2. De los alemanes [illegible] le rodeaban ha captado las siguientes informaciones. Que Alemania tiene actualmente 50 mil aviones en línea y 75,000 en reserva para los que no [illegible] gasolina. Se muestran confiados en el fin favorable de la guerra para ellos. Durante el próximo verano esperan que Alemania [illegible] fuera de combate [illegible] la que a su fuerza atacará al Japón por Siberia. Laradogoitia agrega [illegible] los alemanes se esforzarán en darle buena impresión con el fin de que no [illegible] en la misión que le encomendaban.

3. [illegible] cantidad de aviones creía [illegible] contestó que 60,000. El jefe alemán afirmó [illegible] a esa cifra. [illegible] de 45,000 aviones.

[illegible] son los absolutos dueños de España. [illegible] como si fueran los soberanos [illegible] del Ejército Español si les [illegible] a Alemania. En varias ocasiones [illegible] un millón de hombres en [illegible] la cuestión de la restauración [illegible] referencia alguna. Delante [illegible] el ambiente del país Vasco [illegible] Unidas.

[illegible] Lang un mapa con las fortificaciones [illegible] cantábrica. Las obras las realizan [illegible]. Las fortificaciones se extienden

por todos lo[illegible] [illegible] fálicos de la costa y están hechos a base de emplazamientos fij[illegible] [illegible] de defensa. Al no visto en el acto de Gorliz (Vizcaya) que [illegible] emplazamientos de piezas de 15 y medio, lo mismo en Bermeo y en el [illegible] Mediterráneo. En estos dos últimos lugares piezas de mayor calibre que 15 y medio. Como prueba de la precisión con que llevan estas operaciones señalo que llamó la atención el hecho de que en el mapa que examinó había una observación sobre una playa desierta entre Gorliz y Bermeo, playa de peña y por él desconocida a pesar de ser casi vecino, en la que se señalaba "Playa pequeña pero apta para desembarcar para su configuración y fondo. Está bien defendida."

6. Cuando Laradogoitia estuvo en Brasil se enteró de la salida o paso de un convoy americano de Natal con destino al desembarque de Africa. Dice que por esta referencia él se supuso la operación que se proyectaba pero no la comunicó a los alemanes porque pudiera haber sido de graves consecuencias. La referencia la obtuvo de unos soldados americanos. Dice que estos eran inofensivos.

7. Al Lieutenant L. B. Harper me dado una información sobre la existencia de una base submarina alemana en la costa del Brasil entre Santos y Río de Janeiro, a unas 4[illegible] millas de éste último lugar, en unos bajos de arena. La referencia la obtuvo de un agente alemán en el Brasil.

NOTA FINAL: Salvo el párrafo en que damos nuestra impresión, todo lo demás lo hemos trascrito según la referencia de Laradogoitia sin añadir por nuestra parte nada. Hemos cambiado en algo el orden de su expresión para darle una unidad a nuestra nota.

Dado el conjunto del problema planteado por Laradogoitia, creemos existen firmes posibilidades de descubrir una red numerosa de agentes alemanes en el Continente Americano si a Laradogoitia se le permite seguir su misión decididamente controlado y por pasos previstos y estudiados. Como su colaboración con los rusos está recomendada por Lang, creemos que nosotros podríamos dirigir las maniobras sin riesgo para la misión, además de contar con la Organización Vasca en los países sudamericanos y de estar compenetrados con la mentalidad de Latino América. Nos nos figura de urgencia el adoptar una decisión sobre el caso.

Nueva York, [illegible]

Texto a de cifrar en cifras y letras

	0	9	4	7	6
	1	2	3	4	5
2	S	M	A	Y	0	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	H	J	K	L	N
5	6	P	Q	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

Texto del decreto:

S A/L E/ U N/ C O/N V/O Y/ D E/

N U/E V/A Y/O R/K K/

Texto cifrado en letras:

Q 0-K F-2 H-F M-J 2-Y 0-E D-H 2-D W-Y A-Y S-K K-

Texto cifrado en números:

S A . . . . .

. 4-3 2-5 4-7 9 . . . . .

[illegible]:

[illegible] en letras se [illegible] sol-
[illegible] adelante en el [illegible]
[illegible] en números el cifrado in-

[illegible] continúa [illegible] trascurse
[illegible] el nombre del mes en que
[illegible] se trata. Si el nombre
[illegible] M, se suprime la se-
[illegible] escribirá: 0000. El
[illegible] con la fecha del des-
[illegible] hecho a base de la fe-
[illegible] no tiene [illegible] que un nu-
[illegible] de la [illegible]
[illegible] cifrada el [illegible] dro
[illegible] HI [illegible]

Letras para cursar una comunicación, oculta entre el texto de una carta ordinaria.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	J	K
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

(S A L E U N . . . . .
43

Querido Hermano
4 3

Observaciones: Un número en vez de una letra, en el interior de una palabra. Si el final de una palabra debe unirse con la palabra siguiente, la última letra también es cifrada horizontal: [illegible] la letra o ó si la última letra es final de [illegible] número, el signo será vertical: [illegible] la letra o ó

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/16 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100220005-5

ALGUNOS DA[illegible] LA NO[illegible]

[illegible] Como pr[illegible] absoluta con [illegible] Laredogoitia el siguiente [illegible] Los alem[illegible] por autoridad superior del Ministerio de [illegible] trata Laredogoitia era el Sr. Caballero [illegible] ordena categóricamente que el portador [illegible] de agente de autoridad le podrá molestar [illegible] de estos le entregaron a Laredogoitia, [illegible] con ocasión de un accidente de automóvil [illegible] parte.

América del Sur. En Argentina tienen con seguridad una [illegible] que funciona normalmente. Cree que probablemente también en [illegible] Aires debe ser un agente de importancia con mucha [illegible] ha instruido por los alemanes antes de la guerra y con mucho [illegible] el garage es un negocio de cobertura. En Argentina, Uruguay, Chile [illegible] alemanes que no necesitan nuevos agentes porque los asuntos [illegible]

Desembarco en Africa. Dice en el momento del desembarco en Africa [illegible] nes tenían 400 mil hombres en Noruega, lugar por donde creían los [illegible] lizado. De la misma opinión era el representante de los franceses [illegible] Río de Janeiro, José Cathala, quien le señaló a Laredogoitia la fecha de [illegible] de octubre, como fecha del desembarco en Noruega. José Cathala se manifestaba con demasiada libertad, hablando mucho a [illegible] Airecciones ideológicas [illegible] sas.

Claves. El párrafo del documento [illegible] la nota que dice: "Si la fecha no tiene más que un número ..." debe decir: Si la fecha no tiene más que un número, éste se coloca encima de la primera letra y a la izquierda de ésta se coloca el número 0 para seguir hacia [illegible] el 1, 2, 3, etc.

El cumplimiento [illegible] puede comenzarse a trazar no sólo con [illegible] sino con las letras del día [illegible] al comienzo de la comunicación [illegible] que se señale en [illegible] fórmulas, [illegible] al desarrollo se [illegible] aumenta la complicación [illegible]

[illegible] utilizar el mi[illegible] Laredogoitia [illegible] estudiadas [illegible] penetración en el [illegible] que las que comprendían [illegible]

[illegible] 1943

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

SECRET

[illegible] December [illegible]

Mr. James C. [illegible], Director
Office of [illegible]
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmie:

I thought you might [illegible]

[illegible] action [illegible] memo [illegible].

Sincerely,

William J. [illegible]
Director

Incl.

SECRET

SECRET

15 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

The Spanish situation at this particular moment offers an opportunity for constructive statesmanship. The question is whether the United States must maintain a completely aloof attitude or whether it should endeavor affirmatively to facilitate a peaceful transition from the Franco dictatorship to a democratic form of government.

It is generally agreed that the Franco regime is tottering but unless appropriate steps are promptly taken, its fall can be the signal for civil war, chaos and anarchy. Such a development would not only have serious repercussions in Latin America but its effect might well be catastrophic to the cause of popular government in Europe particularly in the light of recent disillusionments in Belgium, Italy and Greece. Given the power, influence and prestige of the United States as a democratic nation it is arguable that we have a certain responsibility in seeing that democratic movements are not crushed between dictatorship and Communism. Although the incredible complexity of the Spanish political problem may make it impossible to reach a peaceful solution, if it is agreed that an effort along such lines should be made, the Office of Strategic Services is in a position to carry out for the President and the Secretary of State (unofficially and secretly so as not officially to compromise the Government of the United States) a definite program for the development within Spain of a movement for the creation of a democratic Spanish government.

For nearly three years certain members of the OSS organization have as you know cultivated intimate friendly relations with the Basque Delegation for intelligence purposes. With the aid of the Basques in Spain intelligence chains have been maintained across the Pyrenees and information regarding enemy activities on the Continent has come to OSS from such sources and also through the Basque organization in South America which maintains direct secret communications with its fellow countrymen. This collaboration has been very valuable and has resulted in the development of an atmosphere of mutual trust and esteem. We feel confident that our relationship can be developed to include active cooperation for the establishment of a democratic government in Spain.

The Basque people are adent democrats and lovers of liberty. They are religious, idealistic, well disciplined and fanatically loyal to their leaders. Because of their solidarity and their devotion to their President they offer the strongest and most effective single nucleus for any pro-democratic movement in Spain. Their President, Jose Antonio de Aguirre now lives in New York. He is highly regarded

by liberal democrats everywhere and it would seem that he if anyone can play a vital part in the recreation of democracy in Spain. He is the unquestioned leader of his people and it is our information that important colleagues of his have recently arrived from Mexico and that another is due shortly from the Argentine to discuss the Spanish situation with him.

Meanwhile, President Aguirre keeps closely in touch with his colleagues in Paris and tries to do the same with Madrid but communication difficulties are much greater. We have learned from a confidential but entirely reliable source that he recently sent special instructions both to Paris and to Madrid regarding the efforts of Miguel Maura to promote a peaceful transition from Franco to democracy and we understand that these instructions contemplated Basque cooperation with the Maura movement. More specifically the Paris Basque organization has been authorized to inform Maura that the Basque Committee is able to maintain order in the Basque provinces and will guarantee to do so by organizing the country and occupying key posts in the local government thus helping bring about the peaceful transition which Maura is attempting. If complete local authority cannot be given to the Basques at first the Paris group is authorized to agree with Maura on the nomination of four Basque governors to take charge of public order and to prepare for the transition to a popular legitimate government. Since the Maura movement may not succeed the Basques are taking the greatest possible security precautions lest their people suffer reprisals. In general the position of the Basques seems to be that since their people are united behind their President they should wait for the union of now divergent Spanish groups and then to join in the formation of a single constitutional Spanish government. We have also learned from unimpeachable sources that President Aguirre holds himself in readiness to leave at any moment for France and that his Paris colleagues are taking steps to obtain a french visa for him.

We thus have ready to hand a strong and functioning Basque organization composed of energetic, courageous and competent people unselfishly devoted to the cause of democratic government and alive to the dangers of Communistic machinations and we believe that with appropriate support and guidance this group can play a possibly decisive role in the present critical chapter of Spanish history. The opportunity for constructive collaboration seems great. Ambassador Armour has had personal and intimate knowledge of Basque activities in Buenos Aires and has, we understand, a high regard for the Basque representatives there. We know for a fact that the Basques themselves regard Ambassador Armour very highly and have great confidence in his ability and sympathetic understanding of the Spanish problem and their

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part therein. OSS has as its representative in the Iberian Peninsula a man intimately acquainted with leading Basque personalities in the United States, in France and in Spain and a man of unusual experience in and capacity for the discreet manipulation of circumstances for a desired political end. We have in New York a firm basis of cooperation with President Aguirre and his immediate associates. We have offices in Paris which are in frequent and direct contact with the Paris Basques. You yourself are well acquainted with President Aguirre and his high regard for you will be an invaluable asset in any program of cooperation. If the White House and the State Department should agree that the United States should take affirmative steps looking to the peaceful creation of a democratic regime in Spain to take the place of the Franco dictatorship it seems clear that OSS can render invaluable assistance. If this policy is determined upon the OSS representative in the Iberian Peninsula should be instructed to prepare plans and to discuss them unofficially with Ambassador Armour immediately upon his arrival. The general program having been approved by the President or the Secretary of State, the greatest care must be taken in its execution so as not to involve the United States in diplomatic embarrassment. The OSS and OSS personnel in this particular set of circumstances seem admirably qualified for the actual implementation of such a program.

In conclusion it should be stated that there is no guaranty that such a program will succeed. On the contrary, it is almost too much to hope that any basic Spanish political problem can be solved peacefully. But the consequences of a hands-off policy could be so disastrous not only for Spain but also for the cause of democracy and liberty in other parts of the world, that the seizing of even a forlorn chance would seem worth while.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

9 December 1944

To Lt (jg) - J Pulzoli, Jr

From John C Hughes

As per telephone conversation, I am sending you herewith photostatic copies of the material we discussed.

JCH

NOT TO BE [illegible]



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SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible] 1944

[illegible]

[illegible] of Transit, the New York office [illegible] other its relations with the [illegible] would be to lay [illegible] groundwork [illegible] in [illegible] with existing [illegible] information inde- [illegible] of the Hispanidad [illegible] network covering [illegible] through both Lisbon [illegible] network and would [illegible] under Argus would [illegible] would afford a practical [illegible] lines under existing con-

[illegible] leaders are loyal [illegible] for collecting [illegible] messages re- [illegible] from Paris [illegible] Avenue Mar-

[illegible] ted,

[illegible] Hidalt,

[illegible] by [illegible] physi- [illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible] of Mother [illegible] "great [illegible] lamenting [illegible] that she

SECRET

again turns [illegible] where her seeds have borne [illegible]

President [illegible] in personal touch with his [illegible] and we are told by our British friends [illegible] in Washington has called London strongly [illegible] for a visit. According to information given Argus by the State Department, the latter has no objection to such a trip. Another member of the Basque Delegation in New York wants to go to France as soon as possible to re-establish direct relations with his colleagues there.

In fact [illegible] separate with the Basques [illegible] seems clear that [illegible] and facilitate President Aguirre's trip to Mexico as well as his trip to South America, and that we should also [illegible] the trip of his colleague to France if [illegible] should prove practicable. He should attempt to [illegible] qualified to cultivate our Basque friendship [illegible] to Washington the secret intelligence [illegible] for example, reports on Communist movements, [illegible] original sketches of [illegible] underground [illegible] in Barcelona [illegible] should be able to finance [illegible] to have [illegible] committee [illegible] of [illegible]

April 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: DIRECTOR, SI

FROM: FERDINAND L. MAYER

Attached is the translation of a report made by one of our principal Basque representatives, on the results of his recent trip around the Caribbean. I believe that there is considerable here of interest and significance. As you know, similar activities are under way in other parts of Latin America under the same projects.

Mr. Dyas will be very glad to explain, or to enlarge upon, any aspects of this report that you may find of interest. I have attached several copies with the thought that others might likewise be interested. I am sure that General Donovan would like to see one, as he has been concerned about the state of our relations with the F.B.I.

F.L.M.

Attachments

ES

yas:nnd

April 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: DIRECTOR, SI

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F.L.M.

Attachments

FGDyas:nnd

I left Miami on the 8th of March. I stayed in Venezuela 9 days and 10 in Havana. The trip was prolonged some days more than expected by delays in the airplane service, and other details of no importance. In Santo Domingo where I stopped en route, I talked during the stop with our Delegate, Senor Galindez.

VENEZUELA

Situation of Basque Service -

I sought to inform m/self concerning the state of our Services, work already accomplished, present activities, and future prospects, in order to coordinate the efforts with a view to their perfection and more perfect execution.

Antecedents -

In one form or another, the Basque Services have been functioning since the start of the war in Europe. At the beginning, contacts were had exclusively with English Agents. The Chief of the latter stated repeatedly that at difficult moments such as Dunkirk, when discouragement was wide-spread and friendships were strained, the Basques were the only people who stayed at their posts with unswerving loyalty and enthusiasm to carry out whatever should be asked of them. Without going into the details of the many and constant activities, we point out two outstanding facts: When the attack on Pearl Harbor

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tion of the Spanish Legation and the obtaining [illegible] secret [illegible].

At the present moment the Basque Service [illegible] a [illegible] number of agents in the capital and at [illegible] significant points the interior and on the Coast of Venezuela.

Upon my arrival in Venezuela I found myself [illegible] with a delicate problem which it was necessary to resolve [illegible]. It concerned a search in the Spanish [illegible] matter of the jewels, of which we shall speak further on, [illegible] the seal of the diplomatic pouch, and of obtaining [illegible] cipher corresponding to the Circular Telegram [illegible]. Immediately after this it was planned to make a careful search of the diplomatic pouch which would be carried from Caracas to La Guaira to board the Spanish ship which left this port on the 15th of March. The most minute details of the two operations had been studied [illegible] planned out so that it might be done successfully and without risk. Through the searching of the pouch we could have closer up definitively the matter of the jewels, and in addition acquaint ourselves in detail with the activities of the German agents, since we are assured that his communications are sent by means of this Pouch. Before my arrival in Venezuela, the Chief of the Basque Service discussed the problem with the Chief of the English Chief. The former two wanted to carry out the process - their inclusion in the scheme was necessary for technical reasons; obtaining photographs of documents, and so forth. The English Chief was opposed; he wasn't inclined to run the risk of destroying previous successes still continuing to give results at the present time. The Basque Chief, in view of the disparity of opinion, decided

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to go there with the undertaking. Only information [illegible] projects, [illegible] and I realized that this operation [illegible] the advantages that are probable [illegible] interest in all these matters taken [illegible] measure of prudence. Later events [illegible] since then. [illegible] to Madrid and that he was [illegible], also [illegible] Spanish ship sailing March 28th. It app[illegible] been chosen to represent Spain in [illegible]. [illegible] same and perhaps even greater possibilities [illegible] most -described operations [illegible]. Furthermore, the first steps have been [illegible] possible to obtain the ciphers of the [illegible] arrives there. I [illegible] is best [illegible] Venezuela.

Our knowledge of the texts of ciphered telegrams from the Spanish Legation permits us to direct our work [illegible] with [illegible] results. The FBI submits them to the Chief of the Mission as soon as they are received. Some of the more outstanding [illegible] are as follows:

> The intervention of Senor [illegible] to support the conversion into the money of this country (Venezuela) of a considerable sum in dollars, which was brought into Venezuela by the Japanese and which came apparently from the American money which the Japanese seized in the Philippines.

The personal intervention of [illegible] in support of the activities of the [illegible] Braun, in the matter of the Caracas - Valencia Railway, with German capital, but under the cover of a Spanish corporation domiciled in Madrid. The German, Braun, proposed [illegible] his sale to the Venezuelan Government of [illegible] reputed to be the quantity of [illegible] on which he hoped to realize [illegible] in cash.

The activities of the German [illegible], in which he does not additional [illegible] with the Berlin wave-length on which [illegible] messages because it is not being received with clarity. In the telegram [illegible] sets forth the characteristics of this wave-length which may [illegible] resulting in its [illegible] interrupted.

In activities [illegible] of the image [illegible] that the [illegible] of the airborne, [illegible] negotiations [illegible] interfere in [illegible] may [illegible] authority over [illegible].

[illegible] disturbing:

[illegible] knowledge [illegible] jewels [illegible] quantity, to the point that their sale in [illegible] almost [illegible] of the original. We have been able to obtain some [illegible] details of this scheme. There have [illegible] jewel technicians from Spain. Senor Sangroniz spends [illegible] apparently without any preoccupation, a fact which gives us assurance that he is profiting from these operations. It is [illegible] that he arranges the exportation of pesetas [illegible] convert them into bolivares at official exchange rates.

The fact that in the forwarding of these jewels to Spain, the Diplomatic Pouch is most certainly made use of gives one good grounds to suspect that quite above and beyond any profit to Senor Sangroniz there is in all this business a further interest redounding ultimately to the benefit of the German war effort. In the near future we expect to receive a detailed report on this question.

I do not believe this occasion opportune for setting forth in too minute detail the activities which the Basque Service has carried out in connection with the above-indicated matters and with the innumerable details which investigative activities demand, whether they be labors undertaken on our own initiative or work entrusted to us by our American friends. Concerning counter-espionage, the Service has operated with success in searching the homes of Germans and in intercepting their correspondence--taking as a base of operations houses and hotels in which Basque Agents have means of penetration.

Right at this moment we are about to achieve the penetration of the Swiss Legation where we have every right to suspect we shall find matters of interest concerning the protection which that Legation gives to Italy and perhaps through the latter to the other Axis countries.

Our agents along the coast and in the interior act generally on the basis of specific missions which are given to them by Basque headquarters and others in furtherance of the American Services. For our communications we use the American interior pouch along with the air service.

SECRET

Expeditions have been organized to the German towns of the interior in an effort to locate secret radio transmitters. We used physicians in our organization for this purpose. The undertakings were, unfortunately, quite without success. It is generally conceded to be practically impossible to locate these sets because of the nature of the terrain. There are enormous expanses of territory completely isolated and covered with jungle.

For the future -

If the activities of the Basque Service in Venezuela have given good results on the whole, our work nevertheless suffers from two considerable defects: The lack of an office to enable us to pursue with any degree of system all our activities; regular communications with New York concerning our undertakings and the results that are being obtained. Certainly these deficiencies are not imputable to the Services per se: the absence of precise instructions on the one hand and the lack of financial means on the other which would permit those responsible for the direction of activities to dedicate themselves exclusively to these activities have been the principal reasons for this situation. Since the Chief and the other agents are obliged to work for a living and to dedicate themselves to the work of the Service only during the time they have free, results have not been as perfect as otherwise they might have been.

On our part we have sought to give precise instructions on the form of organizing our work for the future, and to aid them financially in the manner known to you.

SECRET

Mission of Letamendi -

My arrival coincided closely with the departure of the ship for Spain. His (Letamendi's) departure and cover had been perfectly worked out in such a form that neither the Spanish authorities nor, indeed, the Basque colony in general had the slightest suspicion. His negotiations with Senor Sangroniz were handled with great tact and cleverness to the point that Senor Sangroniz himself took charge of the details and red tape involved. As they were leaving to go on the same boat, it is quite possible that the greatest protection conceivable will be found in Sangroniz himself, and that Letamendi may well obtain information of interest to us. He is a great friend of the daughters of Senor Sangroniz with whom he is also travelling.

It was possible for me to give him his instructions with the greatest tranquility and precision, and all in the most discreet form. I do not believe that it could have been possible to arrange everything any better in a matter of this nature. All in all, the situation has been, up until the present time, most favorable. My arrival in Venezuela, I am sure, was well covered by the nature of the work in which I engaged during my stay there. However, in order to short-circuit the consequences of the always possible risks, despite the apparent normality, I gave strict orders to Letamendi that under no circumstances whatsoever was he to contact any American Agent or sub-agent. I cannot do less than stress the magnificent spirit of Letamendi. He is giving up in Venezuela an excellent position, he has refused also to accept the money which has been assigned to him upon his arrival and is going to limit himself solely to what is absolutely necessary for him.

SECRET

SANTO DOMINGO

It was not possible for me to stay in Ciudad Trujillo more than the short space of time that the airplane stops there. I spoke with our Delegate who is also the Chief of our Service there. From him I learned that he keeps up a close collaboration with the American authorities. At the period of my interview with him they were busy in making a complete investigation into the retinue of President Trujillo and of his brother, for the purpose of getting at the bottom of an accusation attributing to the brother of the President the protection and concealment of two German agents disembarked from a submarine on the island. As of the day of my visit no results had been obtained.

CUBA

Upon my arrival in Havana I was summoned by the Ambassador of the United States. He received me in company with his Secretary, Mr. Joice. He was under the impression that I was Jose Maria de Lasarte, whose arrival had been announced to him some time before. I explained to him about Senor Lasarte's trip and the reasons for which I was substituting for him in the Carribbean countries.

The Ambassador made the statement to me that he was the Chief of all Information Services. From the questions that he asked me I deduced that he was trying to coordinate them to a common end

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but that each service was continuing to preserve its own personality. He proposed to me an interview to work out details with Mr. Joice, the local Chief of the FBI - Mr. Ledy - and a certain Senor Duran, a Spaniard and Partisan of the Republic who had reached during the Civil War the rank of General of Militia, and who is today an American citizen. This interview took place in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality, speaking in general terms.

With the Chief of the FBI, I had two long private interviews. He stated to me that he was most satisfied with the collaboration which the Delegate and the Chief of the Basque Service had rendered him. I indicated to him that our activities in Cuba had been practically nil, not through any fault of the organization in that country, but rather because it had been impossible for us to give them any aid. The FBI Chief declared in turn that collaboration with our organization had begun only very recently because since he had received the corresponding instructions he had been away a considerable time and it had not been possible for him to do as he might have wished. He considered that our people had demonstrated sufficiently their efficacy in work already done and that is described ~~he states~~ in the note recently received from Cuba (that work surely is related with the Santo Domingo matter which I mentioned above).

We exchanged impressions of the problems of Cuba in order to arrive at an agreement as to the line of work to be followed by our people in the future. I indicated to him my points of view as follows:

(1) As concerns what goes on in other South American countries and

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as for information obtainable in Cuba, I do not feel that any concern is indicated in connection with the Falange-Espanola and the old organization of the Partisans of Franco. The South Americans who gave their names to said organizations did it for utilitarian and opportunistic reasons. In general, they are excessively selfish people lacking in sufficient spirit of sacrifice to be able to take part in any work as risky as espionage; that, although I did not believe that they indulged in espionage as an organization, this did not mean that they did not do so as individuals and as agents paid by the German services or the Spanish Embassy. Questions of propaganda and psychological warfare are another matter; (2) That we consider that communism maintains in Cuba a true central headquarters for all of America. We know that from Cuba there sailed for the Spain of Franco communist agents proceeding from other countries, including Chile. The communists maintain suspicious relations with Cuban elements of a significant pro-Franco tendency, and by making use of threats and promises they obtain from these people significant benefits, not the least of these being economic. The communist organization is expanding rapidly in Cuba. They have strong groups and recently have acquired a radio broadcasting equipment.

****

I proposed to him the following line of action: (1) In order to locate Axis Agents, instead of shadowing all known pro-Franco people or persons with totalitarian tendencies or contacts - an idea which has

SECRET

been proposed by some American agents, but which would constitute an interminable labor - rather to dedicate ourselves with all vigor to turning up some of their activities in order to penetrate thus into the center. Among these approaches may be: clandestine radios, personal tie-ups with Mexico, Santo Domingo, Venezuela, and the United States, the Spanish Embassy. It will be perfectly feasible for our organization to work on these personal contacts through Venezuela, Santo Domingo and Mexico. I asked him if he had penetrated the Spanish Embassy and he said no. I asked him if he had the list of the Embassy personnel and he answered that he would facilitate our obtaining it. (2) We could work into the communist organization following up independently the Spanish and the Cuban ones, both in the capital and in the provincial towns. (3) We would have the means for making a special study on the situation of the clergy and the Catholic world in Cuba, utilizing Priests from among our own people in whom we repose complete confidence and who are ideally situated. (4) Organizing the personnel which is at our disposition on various vessels which ply between the Antilles and which have Cuba as their base. (5) A study of the Cuban press based on: the organization of each newspaper, the economic situation and financiers; editors and collaborators showing marked personal inclinations and ideologies; influences emphasized by each newspaper.

The Chief of the FBI was interested very particularly in the Spanish ships which touch at this island. I indicated to him that since these ships touch also at the United States ports, there was a question

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of its being handled from here. I added that in the United States the matter had already been ~~brought~~ considered, insofar as it concerned us, but that the ultimate solution was still pending.

Relations with the American Services - FBI -

The impression which I received of the collaboration of our Services with the FBI could not be better. The personnel of this American Service with whom I spent considerable time in Venezuela and Cuba, had a great affect on me: young men who were meticulous in their obligations, dignified and affable, it is evident that they are subject to rigorous discipline which they accept with enthusiasm and even affection for the cause which they serve. In their relations with our people they have arrived at a perfect degree of mutual understanding and confidence as a result of which the Basque Agents have been delighted. The same satisfaction was manifested to me by the American Agents concerning everything having to do with our men. From this mutual intelligence will be derived good and increasingly better results. All of this is being carried out with the greatest ~~discretion~~ respect on the part of each one for the sphere of action of others.

The FBI has been helping the Basque Service in Venezuela with a thousand bolivares a month, apart from expenses and specific missions entrusted to our people. In Cuba they have reimbursed us for expenses and missions which likewise were entrusted to us, and according to what the Chief there stated to me, they are disposed to supply the money which would be necessary on a permanent basis to

SECRET

permit the Basque Agents to devote themselves to intelligence work without other preoccupations. We knew before that that the same offers were made in Santo Domingo. I indicated in Cuba and in Venezuela what the desires of President Aguirre were concerning the payment of money to the Basque Service. We have already laid down the general regulation that our agents shall not accept money and I added that President Aguirre is trying to take care of our Service according to the necessities of each locality to the best of his ability. Within a few days we shall transmit to Venezuela the order to stop receiving the monthly sum above-mentioned.

American Military Organization -

Upon arriving in Venezuela I was acquainted with the fact that due to President Aguirre's not having seen the Military Attache, the Basque Service had not maintained relations with him. On my own initiative I visited him twice - the first time to inform him of our orders, that the Basque Service should hand him all the information it obtains, and the second time to present to him our Chief in order that the contact should continue in the future. On my first visit I presented our apologies for the fact that the contact had not been made before, explaining that this was not due to a lack of attentiveness on our part towards him, and less to the American institution which he represents. At the same time I expounded to him in general terms the work which had been done in Venezuela.

The Military Attache asked me the following: If we were

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collaborating with any other American agency; if we received any financial remuneration; how many agents we had in Venezuela. I answered: that the Basque Service maintained relations with the FBI; that the general order of President Aguirre to all our organizations is that they are not to accept financial remuneration of any sort; that the principal agents in Venezuela number some 15, but that the actual number of agents is much greater and that they are utilized according to the exigencies of our work. The Attache stated that he was familiar with our collaboration in Naval matters with the Naval Attache with whom he is in close touch. He accepted the arrangement that we should deliver information to him.

In Cuba I also visited the Military Attache. Our Delegate maintains direct contact with him and quite a close contact with his Aide, Captain Roger. I gave an account to him of the reasons for which we had not accomplished any great work in Cuba and indicated our desires of doing everything possible to increase our output, solving the problems which to date have impeded us in fulfilling our mission as we should desire.

April 5, 1943

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C

March 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: COL NEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM: WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON

Following is a translation of information supplied through Basque sources, which may be of interest to you:

"ENGLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

[this note which is dated August, 1942, reads as follows:]

The intelligence services have broken down in Spain and in France. We are sure of this fact. Don Juan Bandres from Tolosa, a Republican and former resident of Bordeaux, has just arrived from Laburbi. He is an agent of the Intelligence Service to which he has rendered services of some importance. This person has been perfectly well-known to us since before the Civil War. He fought as a major in the Basque Army, and later in that of the Republic with a combat car unit. He has invented a port or sight (mirilla) for tanks, and embrasures (troneras). He crossed the Pyrenees and stayed in the Basque country - Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Pamplona - for several weeks, protected by Basque nationalists, Requetes, who are increasingly more united and confident among themselves - he affirms - against the Falange. He embarked for England from Gibralter. His brother is staying on in Madrid at the direct service of the British Embassy. He may perhaps leave for America. The confidential information which he has supplied to us reveals that the British services in Spain have broken down. British agents are followed by the Gestapo, which operates from the direccion general de Seguridad (general directorate of security). The Belgian, Czech, and Polish organizations, which operate in Western Europe, have been likewise disseminated. Under these circumstances, and in the face of the peremptory necessity of working out new means of penetration and information, the elements responsible for carrying on warfare, the armed forces, are again looking toward the Basques. Senor Bandres has declared to his superiors that his actions can in no way supplant official Basque actions, which would be splendid."

W.H.S.

cc. to Mr. Bowden

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

November 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM: H. GREGORY THOMAS

SECRET

Attached I am sending you a translation of that part of the Basque President's report which refers to the organisation of the Basque Intelligence Services. Another part, which contains AGUIRRE's reactions to the persons and situations encountered in the course of his trip, will follow within a few days.

You will note that PRESIDENT AGUIRRE speaks of the liaison through the United States Military Attaches. In view of the certain lack of cooperation in this field, arrangements have been made for communications from the Basque representatives to us, for our purposes and for AGUIRRE, to be forwarded through the local representatives of the F.B.I., instead of through the Military Attaches. This new arrangement is possible through plans made by MR. BOWDEN.

There has been a regrettable delay in implementing the plan which concerns the operation of the Basque Intelligence Services in cooperation with us. The details for immediate action along the lines discussed in the attached and previous memoranda have now been elaborated, and I am doing everything possible to secure speedy and fruitful results.

HGT

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SECRET

November 11, 1962

ORGANISATION OF SPECIAL BASQUE SERVICES DURING PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S TRIP

One of the purposes of President AGUIRRE's trip was to establish a network between the Basque organisation and the American services, specifically with the Military Attaches named by the American Army in the different Embassies of South America, as was agreed upon.

The network was established in those countries in which it was possible to meet the attaches.

When the presentation of the Basque Delegate in each country was made, PRESIDENT AGUIRRE made the following observations:

1). The Basques carry out the orders of their Government, which considers itself at war. They are not, therefore, individual agents with personal motives and a desire for gain, but rather they are part of a loyal organisation which is friendly to the Allied cause.

2). The services will be developed in each country, and the results will be put in the hands of the Chiefs of the American Service.

3). The Basque organisation is disposed to work on all the aspects which might interest the American Services. The Chiefs will indicate to the Basque Network what interests them most at every moment or what it is most urgent to verify or obtain, whether it be information, negotiation or action.

4). PRESIDENT AGUIRRE asked the American representatives to accept from the Basque Delegates, or to deliver to them or to the persons designated by them, such communications as the Delegates might not consider suitable to be sent by ordinary mail, because of their secret nature.

5). He announced to the Attaches the coming visit of DR. LASARTE, informing them of his identity and of the purpose of his trip, which would be none other than to organise the Basque Services so that they might be of the greatest benefit, mobilising in each country the Basque forces.

The visit of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE was necessarily limited to the presentation and endorsement of the Basque Delegates for these Services, and the explanation of the general plan. Later, DR. LASARTE will come to perfect the plan and to work it out in detail.

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The following contacts were made:

Mexico.

DR. FRANCISCO DE BELAUSTEGUIGOITIA was designated as Chief of the Basque Services in that country and as contact with the Military Attache of the Embassy. DR. BELAUSTEGUIGOITIA is a person of high moral reputation and of solid economic and social position. The Basque colony in Mexico is not large, although it represents several thousand persons. It is well proven and scattered throughout the Mexican territory; organised for these particular purposes, it is able to render worthwhile results. There are organisations in the capital and in the coastal cities.

Panama.

The Delegate, PROFESSOR JUAN MENDOZA GARRAYALDE, who after being a Professor at the University, was named by the Minister of Public Instruction for certain confidential duties, has been put in charge of the contacts and services. Among other tasks, he has the responsibility of organising student groups of Panama to guard the coasts and and roads, using boys for this work.

The Military Attache was not in Panama. DR. AGUIRRE visited and had a long conversation with the Ambassador, MR. WILSON, to whom he presented the Basque Delegate. He also took advantage of his visit to bring to his attention the case of DR. VILLALAZ, Minister of Panama in Berlin. DR. VILLALAZ, who is now in Switzerland, is in the unpleasant position of having had his diplomatic status taken away from him by the present Panamanian Government. DR. VILLALAZ spent twenty four years in Berlin, married a German woman and became related by marriage to several generals of the German Army. When the previous situation in Panama -- President Arias -- occurred, he was accused of being a Nazi. This is not true; he is not a Nazi. DR. AGUIRRE pointed this fact out to the present President of Panama. On the contrary, DR. VILLALAZ was the one who aided DR. AGUIRRE to escape from Berlin, guaranteeing his false Panamanian personality. During his stay in Berlin, DR. AGUIRRE spent much time with DR. VILLALAZ and knew his anti-Nazi sentiments. DR. VILLALAZ could be an observer of unusual importance in Switzerland, if he had a diplomatic status which would protect him from persecutions and trouble. It would be helpful to obtain it from Panama and to establish contact with him. His knowledge of Germany, his contacts, and his observations from Switzerland could be most useful. AMBASSADOR WILSON took note of the case, being very grateful for the visit of DR. AGUIRRE.

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There is a very small number of Basques, but they have prestige and they are hard workers, having accomplished useful services. Up to the present time they have not had contact with the American Services, with the exception of LUIS GOMEZ LEKUBE, called "lame Gomez," a relative of the President, who is adventuresome in spirit, efficient and daring. The American Services know a lot about him. He will always obey the orders of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE, for whom he feels veneration. At present he is in Colombia, where he went by way of the coast of Panama on an intelligence mission. All of the Panamanian - Columbian coast is dominated by his organisation.

It would be convenient for the Basques to be able to work in the Canal Zone. If this restriction were removed, the Basques would be able to render interesting services in this zone. This is the opinion of our Delegate, who has requested the removal of this restriction from the American authorities. It would be wise to support his petition.

Colombia.

The Basque Delegate, DR. FRANCISCO DE ABRISQUETA, is in charge of the contacts and services with the Attache of the Embassy, to whom he was introduced. DR. ABRISQUETA is a young man and enjoys high prestige in Bogota. He is a professor of the University, a specialist in matters of state, and a consultant for several South American governments. He might have to go to Washington to work with the Pan-American Union. In that case, D. ANDRES DE PEREA, who is at present a high official in the Ministry of the Interior of Bogota, would be in charge of the Basque Services.

The Basque colony in Bogota is not large, but of very high quality. In Colombia, as well as in Ecuador, there are groups of Basque clergy exiled by Franco who have performed services, but who are able to render still more, if there were adequate means of organising them. There are vast regions in Colombia and Ecuador, in which there are only Basque clergy, on the one hand, and Italian and German clergy, on the other.

Peru.

Because of the pressure of time, it was not possible to establish any contact. The Delegate, D. RAFAEL DE ORBEGOZO, manager of one of the most important enterprises in Peru, was given the responsibility of visiting the Attache. The Basque colony is also small in number here, but is well established socially. There are about a hundred Basque monks and priests.

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Chile.

The Delegate, D. PEDRO DE ARECHABALA, was introduced to the Military Attache in Santiago. Because of special circumstances, the services have not yet been adequately organised, although there exist groups which work along these lines. Because of the large number and firm economic and social position of the Basques in Chile, it can be expected that their work will be effective. The principal groups are in Santiago and Valparaiso.

Uruguay.

Both the Delegate, D. RICARDO DE GUICASOLA, and the Secretary, D. AITOR ORMAECHE, were presented to the attache.

In Uruguay the principal interest of the service is in the frontier, and the country in general is perhaps the most closely attached to the Allied cause. The route of the German agents who are fleeing Brazil for Argentina is through the Uruguayan-Brazilian frontier. The colony is made up of fine members, some of whom are situated on the Brazilian frontier.

Argentina.

The Basque Delegate in Argentina is DR. ALDASORO, Minister of the Basque Government. He and D. ENRIQUE DE ABAROA, manager of Massey, Harris, Ltd., are in charge of contacts with the Attache of the Embassy. Both were presented to the Colonel.

Argentina is the country of South America, in which there are the most Basques, and also the country in which the Axis forces are working the hardest.

The services are well organised, and they may become most effective, if the necessary means for carrying on work on a large scale can be granted. They maintain contacts with the Basque Country, which, although they are reliable, suffer from lack of speed, because of the use of communication by ship.

There exists a telegraphic code agreed upon among them for use in certain situations, so that changes in the secret code and orders may be sent at any time to ships under the Spanish flag. These codes may be obtained again with relative facility, provided that photographic apparatus may be placed at the disposal of the Basque Services at any time.

The brother of MR. ABAROA, a high employee of the port of Rosario, is in charge of interviewing and questioning our agents on Spanish ships on their arrival at that port or at Buenos Aires.

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At the present time this work is carried out in Rosario preferably, since the ships come into that port. It may be said that they control perfectly all the ships, since our agents sail on them, and our agents are numerous, well disciplined and well disposed.

The basic Basque organisation is in Buenos Aires, and extends through the principal cities -- Rosario, Cordoba, Bahia Blanca, Tandil, Salta -- and through all the Argentine countryside, where there are scattered groups.

The numerical importance, the social prestige and the contacts that the Basques in Argentina have, constitute an element of primary importance if their work is taken advantage of. To do a good job, it is indispensible that the Basque organisation in Buenos Aires be supplied with rapid means of communication.

Venezuela.

A good service is in operation here. The Delegate is D. JOSE MARIA DE GARATE and the Chief of the Services, D. JUAN DE OLAZABAL. Both were put into contact with the Military Attache at the Embassy.

The Basque colony is made up principally of elements which have recently become refugees from Spain. They have achieved a great prestige, and because for the most part they are young and hardened in battle, they have enthusiasm and have performed notable services.

During the time that DR. AGUIRRE was in Venezuela -- from October 5 to October 8 -- the Basque organisation obtained the entire Spanish secret code, the one with which one Embassy in America communicates with another, as well as the one which Madrid uses to communicate with them. The agents of the F.B.I. intervened finally, since they were the only ones who had the use of adequate photographic apparatus. It was a question of a notebook, 30 by 20 centimetres, which contained all the codes. In the presence of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE and by his order, the sealed envelope which contained the supplementary code was opened by MR. OLAZABAL. It had not been opened before his arrival, so as to get his opinion before doing so. The intelligence work had been accomplished several days before. The opening of the envelope was witnessed by DR. AGUIRRE, the Secretary of the American Embassy in Caracas, two young agents of the F.B.I. who arrived in Caracas a month ago, and MESSRS. GARATE and OLAZABAL. A pledge was given DR. AGUIRRE that Washington, specifically MR. HOOVER, would send him a copy when he asked for it.

The organisation in Venezuela also has contacts with

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Spanish maritime trade, which, as is common knowledge, is directed almost entirely by Basque officials.

Porto Rico.

As this country is a territory under the control of the United States, there is no network there. It could, nevertheless, be established, if it would be of interest. The Basque colony is very small, but there are several very worthwhile members.

The Basque Delegate is DR. JUAN ANTONIO DE IRAZUSTA, Basque Deputy in the Spanish Cortes, at present Colombian Consul in Porto Rico. He is a person of great prestige and consideration in official and social circles.

Santo Domingo.

The contact between the Military Attache and the Delegate, MR. GALINDEZ, professor at the University and official of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Santo Domingo, was established. PROFESSOR GALINDEZ is a young man of good repute, who can furnish fine services. The remainder of the Basque colony is small and can be divided into two parts: The sailors of some age, in whose charge were the Dominican ships which were torpedoed, and their families. These men enjoy great prestige; the other part is made up of the most displeasing element of the Basque emigrants -- in general the most extreme elements, who live almost in misery, and who are not reliable for use in delicate missions. There are among them some decent persons, who, if they were to be removed from their present situation, could be useful.

Cuba.

Contact was established between the Military Attache of the Embassy and the Delegate, JOSE LUIS DE GARAY.

The Basques in Cuba constitute a very select and worthwhile colony, although they do not attain the numerical importance of the South American countries. Some work has been done; if they were adequately organised, they would be able to do much more.

Cuba is at this time the central location of the Spanish Communist organisation with views to action within Spain. From there go out persons of this ideology on "missions of service," as they call this kind of activity. Several have been captured and shot when they reached Spain. There exists also a strong group with totalitarian tendencies.

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IMPRESSION OF THE AMERICAN SERVICES.

PRESIDENT AGUIRRE got the impression that the American services had not penetrated the mind of the South American peoples, because they do not use those elements who are familiar with the soul of these peoples, and because they move in circles quite separate from the psychology of the South American peoples.

When one of the Military Attaches asked SENOR AGUIRRE if the Basques, and specifically PRESIDENT AGUIRRE, were friends of Franco, it is easy to understand how with this question alone a lack of adaptation to his surroundings was made evident. The results of technical perfection will be insufficient, if one does not know the land in which one works. In general, almost no one had taken account of the repercussion which DR. AGUIRRE'S trip made on public opinion, or of its spiritual meaning and its value for penetrating enemy centres. Another had on the table a clipping of a photograph of DR. AGUIRRE, which had appeared in the press of the day, and which he was regarding attentively as proof of the identification of his visitor, and there was no other clipping of the many which had appeared in the newspapers.

He does not mean that their work is not successful. He wants to make it clear that something very important is lacking, namely, a knowledge of the spirit and reactions of the South American peoples, which is the basis for any efficient action whatsoever.

Almost none of them had instructions to facilitate the use of the diplomatic pouch for the work that the Basque Delegates would complete.

On the other hand, DR. AGUIRRE was received with great sympathy by the Military Attaches, who were very grateful for his visits, some of them, as the one in Santo Domingo, inviting him to dine at his home. In other places it was not possible to accept their invitations for lack of time. DR. AGUIRRE believes that a thorough penetration of Basques and Americans will result from our common task.

This sharp impression is summed up by the statement which the Cultural Attache of the American Embassy made to PRESIDENT AGUIRRE: "Washington has not succeeded in understanding this situation; there is no direction or orientation. I do not understand why they sent me here."

SENOR LASARTE'S TRIP.

DR. AGUIRRE was hoping that DR. LASARTE would be able to carry out immediately his anticipated trip, the object of which was,

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as was agreed upon, to perfect as rapidly as possible the organisation of the Basque Services from New York to Paris, passing through South America, Africa, Spain, the Basque Country, and Occupied and Unoccupied France. Difficulties which we know have impeded this trip, which is of such great necessity and urgency.

Each of the points treated above will be developed by SEÑOR LASARTE. It is necessary, for this reason, that he be able to leave as soon as possible to carry out his assigned task.

URGENT NECESSITIES.

1). To definitely unite the American Service with the Basque organisation in South America, which shall have as its duty to maintain the contact and to collaborate.

2). To determine how the Basque organisation may send its written communications and confidential telegrams, which are made necessary by the work which they are doing. Slow communications make results impossible.

3). Facility in material means, including the economic. The Basque Delegates have solved the problem of earning a living by working. We have already said that it is not a desire for gain which motivates their activities. Up to now it has been their private funds which have taken care of the expenses involved by the service. This imposes a permanent restriction. If this concern were to be removed, the results would be much greater. It will be possible to reach higher spheres than it has been possible to reach up to the present time, because of the above reason.

HGT.

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THE BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

New York, August 9, 1942.

ORIGINS

The Basque Intelligence Service began to operate during the Spanish Civil War. At the start it was necessary to struggle with enormous difficulties, because everything had to be improvised, there having been no Basque Intelligence Service prior to the Spanish Civil War. To complicate matters even further, the Basque capital was only forty five kilometres from the battlefront. The Intelligence Service was one section of the General Staff of the Army of Euzkadi (The Basque Army).

The loss of the territory of the Basque Country and the subsequent settlement of the Northern Republican Front (Santander and Asturias) provoked the transfer of the Basque Government and a part of its people to France and Catalonia. At this time, the Basque Service was reorganised and from then on depended directly on the orders of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE. Since that time (August 1937) this Intelligence Service has expanded rapidly.

PERIOD OF THE CIVIL WAR

The double principle which guided the work of the Service was:

1. While the Basques were fighting for their national liberty and for universal democratic ideals, they adhered to a program of full collaboration with the Republican Anti-Franco Front.

2. The conviction that the Spanish War was nothing more than a battle in a World War which would soon become general.

In agreement with these basic principles, the work to be done was two-fold:

1. An immediate intelligence activity necessary for the conduct of the war.

2. The organization of a political network so as to cultivate the Basque political mind and to convert it into an instrument for action.

This organization had as its mission:

A. Propaganda

(a) Positive: The spread of Basque political ideals and the aims of the Republicans by word of mouth and in writing through broadsides, folders, books, etc.

(b) Negative: Against dictatorship, against German intervention and all collaboration with the Axis, against racial persecution, etc.

(c) Indirect: The cultivation of all themes which might split the various groups supporting Franco, for example, defense and apology of Falangism against the conservatives, and vice-versa; the same thing for Carlism against Falangism, and vice versa; Falangism against the Army, etc.

B. Action

In the military field, through the formation of shock troops and sabotage agents; preparation for the restauration of the military front of Euskadi (the Basque country), etc.

These aims were being attained following the loss of the war in the Basque country until the end of the Spanish War in

January 1939, constantly in a more satisfactory way.

The importance of the Basques in religious, social, economic and political life of the Peninsula rendered it easy for them to receive daily detailed intelligence concerning the development of the Francoist regime in all its aspects.

As a curious indication, although it is certainly not a matter of supreme importance, it will suffice to note that the Basque Service always knew in its smallest details and sometimes even before acts were committed every successful manifestation of Franco's persecution against the Basque people: prisons, shootings, etc. This allowed the Basque government to conduct a diplomatic and press campaign which enabled it to avoid the deaths of many of its adherents.

In military intelligence, the Basque program enjoyed notable success. The fact that numerous Basque elements were on the 19th of July 1936 on the side led by Franco and that others who had been taken prisoners were later incorporated in his army permitted the Basque government to have an endless reservoir of agents who provided important strategic information concerning the composition and orders of the Franco army, including its plans, its offensives as they were being prepared and during their development.

The Basque Service worked throughout this period in close relations with the services of the Republican General Staff with the Minister of State, the Minister of National Defense, and without fear of contradiction it may be said that none of these were more efficient.

The political network expanded rapidly through all the Basque provinces and reached into the most important vital centers of the Peninsula. It acted with positive results in the fields of propaganda described above, strengthening Basque and anti-Francoist opinion, and opposing one to the other the various elements of the new regime that Franco was endeavoring to implant following his victory in the Civil War. Several times Franco's government was obliged to make declarations against trends of public opinion which, starting from groups favorable to the Mouvement, disturbed the Francoist rear-guard. These trends had their roots in the Basque Services.

Concerning the preparation for war-like action, pre[illegible] was also made within the limits imposed by the need fo[illegible] and care. There was a time when serious preparations [illegible] the opening of a new war front in Euskadi (the Basq[illegible]

through a landing to be made from France, near the town of Santofia, but unfortunately international circumstances and the unfavorable development of the Spanish Civil War prevented the realization of this project.

With the definite triumph of Franco's army, the entire organization, the intelligence, and other similar services which were working for the Republic collapsed. Only the Basque Service remained in operation and continued to develop in a direction of increased activity, intense work and greater fruitfulness.

PERIOD FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR

The Basque government foresaw the World War. On several occasions, but particularly on December 22, 1938, President Aguirre in a broadcast speech announced the approach of war and pointed out the role which would be played by Franco's Spain. The Basque delegations in France and in England never ceased calling attention to the danger and pointed out the necessity for making preparations with regard to Spain, with full knowledge that this country would sooner or later adopt an attitude of collaboration with the Axis, which would be more or less active according to the moment and the opportunities afforded. These cries of alarm were not heard as they should have been by the British and the French politicians. However in France the General Staff was aware of this threat to the degree which shall be seen, and it was from this that there grew the close relations between the Basque Intelligence Service and the Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff. These relations, begun before the World War, were intensified at its outbreak and grew steadily closer as their usefulness became more evident as the war developed.

The aim of these contacts between the two services was for France the obtaining of valuable military intelligence. The classic rivalry between military and diplomatic services prevented the Deuxième Bureau from giving the fullest support to the Basque plans for the organization of a political network for extensive action throughout the Euzkadi (the Basque country) and Spain. According to the line of thinking previously outlined, with the allegations that France's foreign policy must be one of reconciliation with Franco, the French political organization prevented the adequate preparation for direct action, without understanding that Spain's attitude would be against France insofar as Franco had always played the part of a collaborator with the Axis, and notwithstanding, that the Basque Services were completely underground and offered guarantees that France should never appear to be publicly compromised. Unfortunately, the French diplomatic services prevailed, and although the Deuxième Bureau was obliged to relinquish its timid position in face of the positive results secured by the Basque Intelligence Service and in view of the unfavorable development of the war, it was never able fully to accept openly the hypothesis that the war could lead to an open declaration of collaboration between Franco and the Axis.

The French obtained important results from the Basque Intelligence Service. Two years have passed since this collaboration has been suspended, and without having the archives in front of us it is difficult to give a graphic view of these specific results. However, we give some of the subjects concerning which the French Deuxième Bureau was informed with regularity and preferred attention:

1. Military garrisons in the Basque country.
2. Periodic situation of army corps and, in particular, of divisions and brigades obtained in the Central office of the army post organization.
3. Military movements and strategic works in the Pyrenees zone.
4. Commercial and military movements in Basque ports and the other important ports of northern Spain.
5. Axis activities (certain special results can be indicated, such as the spying on the Italian cartographic center at Victoria; procurement of the most recent military studies on the construction and operation of the Heinkel prototypes which were used in the Civil War; the supply of German submarines and bases on the Cantabrian coast, etc.).

6. War industries.

7. Secret archives of war inventions from the War Ministry (from this we obtained plans and memoranda explaining a model for a flame-thrower and a new machine-gun).

8. Counter-espionage.

9. Political situation of the Franco government.

10. Political situation of the high military command and of the Falangist and Carlist groups.

11. Hispano-American plans and their connection with Axis penetration of the American hemisphere. This subject was studied in all its aspects since the year 1937, and was the subject of various reports.

This data was obtained from specialized agents entrusted with particular subjects or particular geographic points, and in obtaining it these agents were helped by the other members of the political organization of Basque public opinion. The work of these agents depended on their individual initiative within the framework of the general instructions periodically given them by the chiefs of the Service and the questionnaires prepared by the Deuxième Bureau.

The relations of the Basque and French Services were normally carried out in Bayonne (Basses-Pyrénées) in the French Basque region, where the headquarters of the Basque Service was located, and where the French established a liaison office in charge of several high French army officers. The headquarters of the Basque Service, which had an interior organization similar to a General Staff, was operated on the financial basis of 75,000 francs per month, to which were added from the middle of 1939 the subventions paid regularly by the Deuxième Bureau in compensation for the work conducted there.

The relation of the French and Basque Services was very close and daily interviews were held between specially designated agents for the liaison between both Services.

The strategic information obtained by the Basque agents which reached the headquarters of their Service through a system of communication links after having been submitted to study and analysis, were rapidly transmitted to the French Service with a note indicating the evaluation of reliability, following an agreed system and indicating the background of the agent, in accordance with a nomenclature which also had been the subject of mutual understanding. The quantity of material and the speed of communications permitted us to provide the Deuxième Bureau with several notes each day. The French received these Intelligence bulletins with great interest and were quite frank in stating that they were in many cases from original sources concerning matters and places to which they had no access and they had found these reports valuable and always truthfully as represented.

The communications with agents who were operating in Euskadi (the Basque country) and in Spain were assured by land across the Pyrenees and by sea. It is important to note that the Pyrenees in their western half which was the most accessible constitute the historic road for invasions. Both sides of the mountains here are inhabited by Basques and for them, far from being a frontier between France and Spain, the Pyrenees become the backbone which join the Basques of Spanish citizenship with those who are French citizens. The Pyrenees for the Basques are not an insurmountable difficulty but rather an attractive base for operations and the scene of countless smuggling adventures. The same can be said of the Cantabrico Sea or the Bay of Biscay. The Basques with their century-old sea-faring traditions break through any obstacles which are placed in their path on the high seas. The Basque communication system, which included a black chamber for coding operations using the necessary technical means, was so secure that never in the three years past was any of their communication disrupted nor any secret pouch containing information from its agents discovered, although this pouch crossed the frontier several times each week.

At a time when the French Service was particularly cautious of the Spanish danger several short-wave sending and receiving transmitters of the latest model used by the French army were made available to the Basque agents. These transmitters were introduced into the Basque country and located at certain strategic points. As soon as everything was arranged (operators, codes, keys, etc) to begin the operation of this sytem of communication, the events which we will describe later occured and because of them the Basque Intelligence Services were suspended.

We have already said that in the opinion of the Basque Service, intelligence work was a part of the total operation which was principally dedicated to the organization of Basque opinion, with the aim of creating a fifth column for agitation and military action.

Then as now, the Basque Service was convinced that it can be an important support to the democracies at the very moment when Spain enters the war.

With this thought, and in spite of the lack of understanding shown by the French but in due honor to the truth, with the knowledge and agreement of the Deuxième Bureau, the Basque Services operated during this entire period. Here follow the results obtained in the fields of propaganda and organization.

It is not necessary to insist on the German control of all the propaganda means at the disposal of Franco's Spain. The press, the radio, and all publications in general, as they continue to do today, were then exclusively dedicated to the propaganda lines dictated by the Germans. As an answer to this state of affairs, the French and British showed too much weakness. Rather, they gave no answer to it. The Basque Service, putting into practice the attitude of the Basque government which declared itself not neutral but belligerent in favor of the Allies, undertook this work and effected an intense propaganda campaign over its underground network with this double object:

(a) Positive: To spread Allied information about the progress of the war, the aims of the democracies in fighting the war, etc.

(b) Negative: In combatting the German directives and declarations, in exposing the dangers of a German triumph for Spain, and stressing the incompatibility of the German character with that of the Spanish people, etc.

This propaganda was realized by the spoken word and in writing (distribution of broadsides, pamphlets and books, newspapers, French and English publications, etc). The Basque Service was a tenacious instrument for propaganda war against Germany and Spain. Franco's followers, instigated by the Germans, called on their friends in France to unleash a persecution of the Basques in an effort to break up their organizations. In this sense, the rightist deputy, Xavier Valat, present commissioner for Jewish questions in the Vichy government asked a question in the French parlement urging the government to take steps against the Basques. He was not followed on that occasion, but the Francoists did not admit their defeat and later took advantage of the French Minister, Ibarnegaray, to consummate the persecution to which we will refer later.

The design to make of the Basque opinion an instrument of war which would be, at the necessary moment, at the disposition of the Allied High Command, was in the process of elaboration until June 1940. The headquarters of this organization was located in Bayonne and operated alongside of the headquarters of the Basque Intelligence Service. It was organized as a General Staff with various sections, and had in command of each a Basque chief from among those who had commanded in the war in Euskadi (the Basque country). These headquarters were divided into regional sections, a chief for each Basque region, Navarre, Guipuscoa, Vizcaya, and Alava, and local sections with a chief for each locality, including each of the Spanish cities where any substantial Basque colony was to be found.

The body of this organization was composed as follows:

1. Organization of prisoners
2. Emakumas
3. Amarrekos
4. Eusko-Gudarostea

Organization of Prisoners - The triumph of Franco scattered outside of the Basque country through the various Spanish prisons of Burgos, Santoña, Puerto de Santa María, Astorga, Alcalá de Henares, etc. a great number of political leaders, chiefs and soldiers of the Basque army, intellectuals and priests who were taken prisoner. At the start their number was in excess of 30,000. The Basque Service created a complete organization for the spiritual and material aid to these prisoners and to maintain communications with them. Probably because they were a selection of the best Basque patriots, these prisoners have been and are an inexhaustible fountain of anti-Totalitarian energy. These prisoners were organized in each prison and they occupied their posts in the "Amarrekos" as they were progressively liberated.

Emakumas (Patriotic Women) - This branch of the organization which joined together women patriots had as its function appropriate activities such as collection of money for the victims of persecution, commissions within the country, etc.

Amarrekos - This was the name given to groups of ten men under the command of a chief imbued with the spirit of sacrifice for the fatherland and with full military discipline. The Amarrekos were the arm of the organization. The basis for these societies was the former "Gudaris" (soldiers of the Basque army during the Civil War). They organized themselves independently in Amarrekos of "Gudaris" on sea and on land, and they were extended throughout the entire country.

The action of these Amarrekos directed towards becoming an instrument of the Allied war aims was held back for two reasons:

Chiefly since they did not wish to provoke, without necessity, a premature suppression which would kill or grievously wound the organization, and secondly the lack of means, money, arms, etc., since you will have noted that the French Service, which knew and which was interested in these plans, could not lend them the aid which it would have desired and which was necessary, because of political, diplomatic, etc. obstacles which were placed in its path.

In spite of this, several acts were carried out with complete success. These can be considered as training. They were the pasting of Basque flags and slogans in the streets; the sending to Franco of letters and manifestos from President Aguirre; the organization of patriotic gatherings which had as their pretext acts of religious cult or folklore festivals; the presentation of petitions to foreign commissions visiting the country, etc. To summarise, they were all acts none of which had any great importance, but all of which served to draw attention to the continued existence of the Basque country.

With the greatest and most extraordinary difficulties, they also began to build up arsenals of weapons and munitions.

Euzko-Gudarostea - With the "Gudaris" who had escaped to France certain bodies of the "Euzko-Gudarostea" (the Basque army) forming them into groups which lived together in hide-aways, principally in the French Basque region, in the foothills of the Pyrenees. All these refugees were organized along military lines without the slightest external indication thereof. From this and what we have said previously, it will be seen that the French government gave no help in the formation of these units, nor took into consideration their position, etc. These battalions were destined to enter into the Basque country through the Pyrenees at whatever moment the Allied Command should decide, and they would serve as a framework to guide and employ the organization of "Amarrekos" described above.

In spite of the lack of understanding on the part of the French government for the aims of the Euzko-Gudarostea, it went on training and perfecting itself until such a time as the French government destroyed all its plans by the means which we will set forth later.

Thus, we have described the Basque organization which, with its system of communications and its intelligence agents, completed the Basque Intelligence Service.

The British Services learned of and used the Basque works through the French Service. The Basque Service had some contacts with British agents, and in the spring of 1940 was beginning to work directly with them on matters of naval intelligence.

SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE

The French Government against the Basques

On May 3, 1945, the Basque Service obtained information from a person close to the Franco Government. This report announced that the German Government had indicated to SERRANO SUNER that he should take steps against the Basques in France, in order not only to persecute the persons who adhered to the Basque Movement, but also to attack their honor and public reputation. SERRANO SUNER forwarded the necessary instructions to AMBASSADOR LEQUERICA in Paris, who failed to take the desired steps against the public reputation of these individuals, since he believed it inopportune in view of the general esteem which was enjoyed by the leaders and people of the Basques in exile. SERRANO SUNER insisted and would admit of no discussion, because the Basques in Spain, in France and in America were hindering the development of important political plans. These indications were given in Paris on May 5 to the French Service and the Official Centres of authority.

On May 6 the newspaper "Paris Soir" published certain declarations of MR. YBARNEGARAY, who had just become a Minister in the French Cabinet. In these declarations MINISTER YBARNEGARAY inveighed against the Basques, announcing that they were about to be interned in concentration camps, and he then calumnied the Basque leaders, accusing them of being in possession of the sums proceeding from the sale of stolen jewels. In his reviling he did not even allow the universally acknowledged prestige of PRESIDENT AUBIRIE to stand in his way. He twisted the well-known fact that PRESIDENT AUBIRIE had been caught by the German invasion when he was visiting his family in Belgium, accusing him of having gone there with the express intention of placing himself at the service of the Germans. The threats of YBARNEGARAY bore fruit, and thus the German will was done.

All the Basques were carried off to concentration camps without any consideration or distinction of age, snatched from their homes by the military authorities. It is important to note that among these Basques many were working in the French war industries. Persons who were occupied in the Intelligence Services suffered the same fate, even though the Deuxieme Bureau did everything it could to avoid this sorry event. As at other times, it was not able to overcome the political powers of the Paris Government, and thus was accomplished the shameful persecution of people who were working unselfishly for the cause of France.

ERNEST PEZET, Deputy and Vice-president of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, and Secretary-General of the French Section of the INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE OF THE FRIENDS OF THE BASQUES, undertook the defense in this matter, which would certainly have had widespread political repercussions, if the French State had not collapsed,

bec use of the previous, good of infiltration of German informers. One of the person lied to [illegible] injustice [illegible] M [illegible] IN. It is to him then [illegible] me to [illegible] possibilities of the [illegible] from concentration [illegible].

Important Elements of the B[illegible] Service Destroyed in Madrid

The headquarters of the B[illegible] Service [illegible] to the time [illegible] its members were killed in concentration [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible] in [illegible] in [illegible] order [illegible] that the [illegible] of [illegible] archives with every security. He had been [illegible] to wait for the storm of the German invasion, but unfortunately the French debacle had not yet [illegible] in [illegible] results for [illegible]. The German [illegible] seized in order [illegible] France [illegible] in the following months. Many agents of the B[illegible] Service [illegible] in the B[illegible] Country. Everything led to the belief that the German [illegible] like [illegible] with the information [illegible] in the French archives, in which there was much material supplied by the B[illegible] Service. The [illegible] material by technicians [illegible] the subsequent action by the [illegible] police led to a large number of arrests. Our impression [illegible] arrests, which were simultaneous with [illegible] of [illegible] of the French Service, were attributable to the seizure of French archives and correspondence. In December 1941 [illegible] the French B[illegible] Colonel, [illegible], Military [illegible] of the French Embassy at Madrid when [illegible] IN [illegible] there, and [illegible] the present time on the Military Staff of the Marshall. As a result of these arrests, the trial before [illegible] Court of [illegible] the leaders of the secret organizations [illegible] in Madrid. All of them, including clients and women, were condemned to death. [illegible] from the intervention through the competent representatives of several countries, the sentences were commuted and the sentence was revised. To [illegible] the [illegible] revision by the court.

Since the [illegible] of 1941 B[illegible] elements [illegible] in Occupied France have been requested to renew the relations between the B[illegible] Service and the Deuxieme Bureau. They have not agreed to do this, since they do not trust the Armistice Police of the French Government, in spite of the fact that there [illegible] presented to them in the [illegible] of being influenced by anti-German sentiments.

PRESENT STATE OF THE BASQUE SERVICE

From all that has been said, it is easy to see what is the present situation. The collapse of France with its serious repercussions for the Basques which have already been related, forced the Basque Service into a period of difficulty. This does not mean that the organisation has died; on the contrary, the determined will to win has shaken off the momentary demoralisation which events brought about, and under these hammer blows a new determination has been born which will intensify the close relations which exist between the Basque Government and its people in France.

The sentiment of Euzkadi (The Basque Country) is as always solidly attached to the cause of the Allies. The elements which had participated in the organisation of the Basque Services still exist and operate even within prison walls. In spite of the arrest of many of its known leaders, there still remain others who are at liberty.

There still remains in full operation the organisation of the EMAKUMES and the prisoners' organisation.

The organisation of AMARREKOS is awaiting orders which may be sent to it.

Numerous intelligence agents are at their posts. All of them regret that there has been a break in their ties with the Allied High Command and that as a result their work has now lost its efficacity. It is necessary to point out that sometimes difficulties arise where they are least to be expected. Thus, for example, according to our best information, which however we must express with reserve, we know that our agents do not trust the United States Consul in Bilbao (not the present Consul, but the preceeding one), and a certain employee of the Consulate.

In France there are outstanding Basque elements in both the Free and the Occupied Zones. In the Free Zone there are two members of the Basque Government. In the Occupied Zone, there is a group of military chiefs and of secret agents of the Service, who used to work in Bayonne, and who today are in the neighborhood of Dax. Among those who are under German domination, we feel that we must point out that there is a group in contact with the Germans with the aim of gathering information for the Basque Service. We point this out so that there may be no false interpretation of the position of these agents, should doubts arise in the future.

In French Morocco there are also certain Basque elements, who have escaped from the Germans. Many of them are in a pitiful situation in forced labor battalions, but there also exist some who are at liberty and who could do useful work.

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[illegible]
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Basque Patriot
frequently visits
MR. BIENER, Gover
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the Basque Services.

Although it is an
it offers great advantages f
present time an agent recentl
in Buenos Aires to convey orde
Basque Country, when PRESIDENT
through South America.

...coming voyage

Practical Conclusions and Present Considerations

1). The Basque Intelligence Service began their work during the Spanish Civil War and developed progressively until the collapse of France.

2). For the reasons described in this report, the overthrow of France by the German invasion and the persecution of the Basques disrupted the progressive work of the Basque Intelligence Service, and its organization and activities were deprived of active leadership.

3). Today all the elements of the Service are establishing and coordinating while awaiting for positive instructions to begin operation.

4). The efficiency of this Service has been proven by experience through its activities in collaboration with the French Deuzieme Bureau.

We must draw your attention to the possibility that affords itself in DAKAR, which because of the importance of its position and the circumstances which surround it, needs some explanation. MR. MONZON, Minister of the Basque Government, in coming from France to America, was forced to spend half a year at this place. During this time he established intimate relations with MR. CHIRAMBERRO, Chief of Police at Medina, a small town six kilometres from DAKAR. We have the following information concerning CHIRAMBERRO. He is an enthusiastic Basque patriot; a determined and intelligent man; he knows intimately and frequently visits the several French authorities of Senegal, especially MR. BIENES, Governor of DAKAR; he has a close friendship with the principal French Naval Authorities stationed in DAKAR. At the time of the invasion of France, he championed the continuation of the battle from the colonies, but the Battle of Dakar aroused his animosity against the British. He has feelings of friendship for the Americans. This information dates from October 1941.

Concerning the present vitality of the Basque Service, it is possible to get some indication in the American Hemisphere. Basque elements aboard Spanish ships are constantly reaching American ports, principally in South America. These have already rendered important services. Aboard these ships, principally those which call at Buenos Aires, are to be found the key figures in the communication system of the Basque Services.

Although it is an incomplete and slow means of communication, it offers great advantages from the point of view of security. At the present time an agent recently arrived from the Basque Country is waiting in Buenos Aires to convey orders from PRESIDENT AGUIRRE back to the Basque Country, when PRESIDENT AGUIRRE undertakes his forthcoming voyage through South America.

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3). Today all the elements of the Service are establishing and coordinating while waiting for positive instructions to begin operation.

4). The efficacity of this Service has been proven by experience through its activities in collaboration with the French Deuxieme Bureau.

5). The power of the Basque Service is derived from the expression of a force organised before the War, the force of the Basque people. This instrument that the Basque will and PRESIDENT AGUIRRE are now offering to the Allied High Command, if it is to be useful in the line of the prosecution of the War, must receive necessary instructions and means corresponding to such aims as will be determined.

6). The problem of the invasion of Europe presents under another aspect the importance of the Basque Service. The Basque Country is one of the possible points for such an invasion. It will suffice to look at a map to be convinced of the necessity of studying and preparing for such a possibility. Euskadi represents:

a). An important and strategic position (between France and Spain), the principal and easiest means of communications between the two countries running through its territory.

b). A people ideally prepared, firmly democratic, and attached to the cause of the Allies.

c). A country which is organised from within to aid in every military way possible any invasion forces for the liberation of Europe.

It has already been stated twice that a plan for the invasion of the Basque Country from France has been studied and prepared. Under the first plan, the offensive would have as its first objective to seize a stretch of the coast by landing in Santona and the Bay of Laredo, so as to spread the bridgehead into the Province of Burgos, and to infiltrate from the sources of the Ebro, following its course, and leading to the uprising of the entire country. In the second, the centre of the offensive was the Pyrenees. The march of the invasion would spread out through the regions of Guipuzkoa and Navarre.

These plans, together with all of our secret archives are still hidden in France; therefore, we are not able to present them at the present time. However, we believe that what we have said on this theme is sufficient for the purposes of the present report, which can be amplified in detail at the proper time.

7). The most urgent need at the present moment is to better the communications between our agents here and the organisation which is now working in the Basque Country.

a). For the present we enjoy communications by sea which will improve as more Spanish ships come to America.

b). It would be advisable to prepare for communications by radio, at least in the form of a dispatch of messages

from America, so that as was previously arranged, they may be received in the Basque Country.

c). Another practical advantage would be the use of the means at the disposal of the American Service. With this aim in view, it is recommended that some contact in the Basque Country be established between a representative of the Basque Service and an agent of the American Service there.

BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

On the eve of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S departure for South America, it is premature to speak in precise terms of the organization of the Basque Service in America, which will be the object of detailed study upon PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S return from this trip, but at this time and within the scope of this report, it will appear desirable to make the following declaration on two points:

1). The Basques are especially fitted for the task of realizing an intelligence and counter-espionage service in favor of the Allied cause in the Western Hemisphere, because of the ease with which they can penetrate the Spanish colonies in these countries which are the principal sources from which Nazi and other Axis agents often rise, and because of the splendid situation which they enjoy in all the American countries of Spanish language, where the Basque colonies are of the greatest importance in religious, political and economic spheres.

2). The Basques with their Catholic and Democratic sentiments are the most appropriate instruments for the psychological warfare which must be waged against the imperialist tendencies of HISPANISMO, which is the enemy of the United States and the countries of Latin America, and the cloak under which Totalitarian doctrines are introduced into these countries.

This matter has been the subject of previous memoranda by PRESIDENT AGUIRRE. Because of this reason and because of the voyage upon which the PRESIDENT is about to embark, we are leaving the description of a detailed plan of action for his return.

SECRET

Basque 9197

November 20, 1942

Memorandum to Mr. Ryan

From: Valery C. Huntington, Jr.

Subject: Iberian Peninsula, Independent Basque Government - Jose Antonio Aguirre

1. In connection with your memorandum of November 11th I think the answer to Senor Aguirre should be about as follows:

a. You have certain connections which may be able to assist him in regard to items mentioned under paragraph 1 of your memorandum.

b. This assistance would probably come from North Africa where proper contact would have to be made in due course.

c. You will within the next few weeks give Senor Aguirre the name and address of a person who may be contacted in North Africa and with whom discussions concerning possible arrangements may be had.

2. It would appear to me to be very dangerous for this organization to openly use groups of this sort as possible political repercussions are serious. From an SO standpoint I would like to assign one individual who would contact and negotiate with the group in question. This individual would, of course, be a part of the SO Mission in North Africa, but

SECRET

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SECRET

[illegible], 1942

Mr. Ryan

[illegible] should not be known [illegible]. Under this type of arrangement it would be possible to receive the train troops, [illegible] program of operation [illegible] supply etc. [illegible] and identify. [illegible] other groups of this character and is the procedure I would like to follow.

I [illegible] to convey assurance that you cannot [illegible] for your friend [illegible] let him know that the arrangements [illegible] have to be worked out in North Africa.

Lilery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Copy to: Colonel Donovan
Lt. Butler

October 26, [illegible]

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Frederic P. Bolbeare

FROM: Colonel William J. Donovan

Thanks for your memo about Aguirre.

I have noted the impression Congton has. Will you tell me what yours is?

William J. Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

FROM: Frederic R. Dolbeare

Referring to the conversation between you and Dulles, I am enclosing herewith the letter from Colonel Heard of October 17, with annex from the Military Attache at Montevideo.

In connection with this matter it may be of interest to you to see Mr. Wilson's letter of October 5, dealing specifically with the transmission of unsealed communications from the Basques in Latin America, to which as yet no answer has been forthcoming. I understand that at a somewhat earlier date Wilson arranged orally with Heard for the transmission through the military attache pouch of letters written by Aguirre while en route. These were described as "Aguirre's communications." I gather that somewhere the phrase "Aguirre's communications" was understood by the New York office or by Aguirre to mean not only letters written by him en route but also letters addressed to him from his representatives in South America.

Colonel Heard left Saturday afternoon for Miami and should be back here by the fifth or seventh of November.

F. R. D.

Enclosure

SECRET

C O P Y

October 5, 1942

Dear Colonel Heard:

With reference to the Basque organization of which we have spoken several times, may I bring up another phase of it?

We are anxious to facilitate as far as possible communication dealing with European matters from Basques in South America to Aguirre in New York. To this end it occurred to me that it might be possible for Basques in Latin America to submit communications unsealed to the military attaches in the various capitals, such communications to be forwarded to you addressed to President Aguirre in care of Allen Dulles or of Gregory Thomas of his office.

By this means you would have complete check of the operations; Dulles could also have check and the communications, if it is thought advisable, could reach Aguirre.

Would you let me know whether such procedure would be acceptable?

Sincerely yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

Colonel R. T. Heard
War Department
2-E-736, Pengaton Building

SECRET

COPY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Washington

October 17, 1942

Mr. Hugh Wilson,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ambassador:

I enclose herewith a report from our Military Attache in Montevideo regarding the visit of Mr. Aguirre. I have had reports from both the Military Attaches at Santiago and Buenos Aires which indicate that their views correspond with those of the Military Attache at Montevideo.

Needless to say I am informing the Attaches that the use of our offices by his followers for sending codes and other secret communications has not been directed by the War Department. I have taken this matter up with General Strong who says he will discuss the question with you at your next meeting.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Townsend Heard

TOWNSEND HEARD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, American Intelligence Command.

Encl.
Report from M.A. dated 9/22/42

SECRET

Sept [illegible]

Subject: Additional Cov[illegible] in Latin Amer[illegible].

To: Chief, M.I.S., War Department, [illegible]
[illegible]

1. In reply [illegible] Latin A[illegible] Pr[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] in South America. [illegible] that [illegible] either [illegible] to the other [illegible].

[illegible] exists to [illegible] for [illegible] the Spanish [illegible] of [illegible] information, but also for [illegible] propaganda and espionage. [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible] issued orders to all Military Attaches to allow his representatives [illegible] of the [illegible] codes to send messages

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

C
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P
Y

September [illegible], 194[illegible]

[illegible] and forth, with the [illegible] that we do all [illegible] and demanding and [illegible] [illegible] handle. This office has not yet received any [illegible] this, although it is [illegible] other Military Attaches [illegible] American [illegible] given them [illegible].

[illegible] the [illegible] Co. [illegible] [illegible] which we [illegible] their [illegible] at their [illegible] it up.

[illegible]. All of the local [illegible] of his [illegible] and lectures. [illegible] [illegible] where his [illegible] confidence [illegible].

[illegible]. The only [illegible] local representatives [illegible] following [illegible]. They [illegible] themselves [illegible] the Secretary, [illegible] the [illegible] of the two admitted that it would be a long and difficult job to organize the Basks into something that could be smooth running as was [illegible] by [illegible], or that [illegible] anywhere near the number suggested by him. They admitted there are many Basks who could not be trusted and [illegible] little education. One conservative estimate [illegible] and not all of these to be trusted.

The officers of this section were both [illegible] and unfavorably impressed with [illegible]'s personality. He has much personal charm and magnetism, is forceful, [illegible], and does not hesitate to bluster, [illegible], or lie to further his ends. What his motives are [illegible] not be determined but he is probably ultimately sincere, [illegible] if not in his methods of obtaining his desired ends. I believe his two local representatives realize that he "talks too big" for [illegible] and that they cannot produce to his pattern.

The ultimate organization of Basks for intelligence must, however, await the visit of Jose Maria de La[illegible], the "chief of intelligence." According to [illegible] that gentleman is the paragon of all intelligence

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

OFFICE OF [illegible]

September [illegible], 1942

men tho very young, and [illegible] arrive here within the [illegible] time, within a few days thereafter [illegible], [illegible] will [illegible] become "the best intelligence organization at the disposal of [illegible] English and American."

The spelling of the name of [illegible] in the above report is that used by the press in Montevideo. It is noted that in Buenos Aires the press emphasizes [illegible] and in your letter it is [illegible]. According to [illegible] the proper spelling is [illegible], as used in Buenos Aires.

[illegible],
Lt. Colonel, [illegible],
Military Attache.

M.C/am

- 3 -

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Colonel Donovan

DATE November 24, 1942

FROM David Bruce

SUBJECT

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

To bring you up to date on the matter of assistance requested by President Aguirre, I am attaching copies of memoranda which are self-explanatory.

In view of the fact that his requests are receiving active consideration, perhaps it will not be necessary to make any further statement to him at this time, in connection with Gregory Thomas' E-X of November 14th, which is returned herewith.

D. B.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

November 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: Major David Bruce

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Jose Antonio Aguirre and Assistance to be given the Basque Intelligence Service.

With reference to my attached memo to you of November 11 and your request to have me advise you in writing as to how these matters have been attended to, I wish to advise as follows:

Point 1. - This has already been attended to, and the cipher in question was dispatched to Madrid in the pouch that left on Nov. 20th.

Point 2. - Two radio sets were dispatched to Madrid in the pouch which left on Nov. 20th. These will be turned over to the Basque Organization on instructions to be later issued by Aguirre. Preliminary contact between one of our representatives and the Basque Intelligence Service is scheduled to take place this week or next in Bilbao.

Point 3. - This point is one that requires considerable negotiation but is being actively worked on by Capt. De Vries in conjunction with Mr. Bowden.

Point 4. - I refer you to Col. Huntington's attached memo of Nov. 20th - to me - which I believe is self explanatory.

F. T. R.

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

November 20, 1942

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Memorandum to Mr. Ryan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

Subject: Iberian Peninsula, Independent Basque Government - Jose Antonio Aguirre

1. In connection with your memorandum of November 11th I think the answer to Senor Aguirre should be about as follows:

a You have certain connections which may be able to assist him in regard to items mentioned under paragraph 4 of your memorandum.

b This assistance would probably come from North Africa where proper contact would have to be made in due course.

c You will within the next few weeks give Senor Aguirre the name and address of a person who may be contacted in North Africa and with whom discussions concerning possible arrangements may be had.

2. It would appear to me to be very dangerous for this organization to openly use groups of this sort as possible political repercussions are serious. From an SO standpoint I would wish to designate one individual who would contact and negotiate with the group in question. This individual would, of course, be a part of the SO Mission in North Africa, but

SECRET

OFFICE OF [illegible] SERVICES

Mr. Ryan

November 20, 1942

should not be known as such. Under this type of arrangement it would be possible to receive and train groups, work out programs of operation and supply etc., without disclosing our own identity. This is the basis on which SO is working with other groups of this character and is the procedure I would like to follow.

3. Please state to Senor Aguirre that you cannot speak for your friends and let him know that the arrangements respecting the amount and kind of supplies available will have to be worked out in Iberia Africa.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Copy to: Colonel Donovan
Lt. Potter

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D.C.

DATE: November 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: Major David Bruce

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Jose Antonio Aguirre - President of the Independent Basque Government

The subject, accompanied by his colleague and secretary, Senor de la Soto, saw Colonel Donovan yesterday on an appointment arranged by Gregory Thomas.

The purpose of Senor Aguirre's visit was to unfold to the Colonel certain plans, the fulfillment of which would require the assistance of this organization.

As you know, Senor Aguirre, in addition to being the President of the Independent Basque Government, actively directs the Basque Intelligence Service, which I understand is quite well organized in Latin America, as well as in the Basque Country of Spain.

Specifically, the assistance Aguirre is interested in receiving is outlined as follows:

1. To send through our communications to Spain a cipher, which he wishes delivered to a designated party in the Basque Country. I was informed that this cipher covers approximately three typewritten pages.

2. To deliver two, or possibly three, radio sending sets to their organization in Spain.

3. To arrange a visitor's visa to this country for a Spanish officer of the former Loyalist Army, at present living in Venezuela, for the purpose of training him in radio sending and receiving. The idea behind this being that the officer whom Senor Aguirre wishes to select would be chosen from five former Loyalist officers

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Major Bruce

November 11, 1942

residing in Venezuela. The officer selected for radio training in this country would return to Venezuela and transmit as much of the radio training knowledge that he received to the other officers. This group would then embark for Spain. Aguirre's organization can arrange their transportation.

4. To supply arms, ammunition, explosives and other equipment to this group when they have established themselves in the Basque country. In this connection, Aguirre pointed out that they would have the facilities of small fishing craft and other smaller vessels that could meet at specified rendezvous and unload these supplies from our larger boats for transference to selected spots on the Spanish coast.

Senor Aguirre is in principle interested in learning whether or not our organization is prepared to lend him assistance in any one or all of the above mentioned points.

The question of our (Washington Headquarters O.S.S.) dealing contacts with subversive elements that are directly opposed to the present Spanish Government is one of high policy. The events of the immediate future will, no doubt, indicate whether or not Spain will in some way or another enter the present conflict in North Africa. If she is determined to resist all German pressure, including that which may be exerted upon her for the use of air-bases in Southern Spain, then it would be my personal belief that it would be a mistake to jeopardize our relations with Spain by attempting to enter joint operations with revolutionary or independent groups such as represented by Aguirre and his Independent Basque following.

I informed Aguirre that we would take under consideration his petition. Will you please, therefore, let me know just now far we are prepared to go on the assistance which Aguirre has asked for .

F.T.R.

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE ITTNYKT US GOVERNMENT NOVEMBER 14, 1942 9TT AM
FROM

H. GREGORY THOMAS OSS FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK NY
TO (FOR ACTION) SECRET:

COLONEL DONOVAN OSS WASHINGTON DC
TO (FOR INFORMATION)

TEXT

PRESIDENT AGUIRRE HAS JUST ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT HE IS PREPARED TO TAKE ANY OR ALL STEPS WHICH THE SITUATION MAY WARRANT, IN YOUR OPINION, IN OUR MILITARY INTEREST. HE WISHES ME TO REITERATE HIS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEDE TO SPAIN, OR THE MACQUE COUNTRY, AT SUCH A TIME AS YOU MAY CONSIDER IT NECESSARY.

THIS STATEMENT IS MADE BY HIM TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE MATTERS WHICH HE DISCUSSED WITH YOU ON NOVEMBER 10.

H.G.T.

TOU 1155 AM DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

Sometime ago Mr. Hugh Wilson called on Colonel Thomason at my suggestion, to explain the outlines of the Basque Information Service and to request that a message be sent to Buenos Aires, as a result of which the Naval Attache there would interview a certain Basque in respect of the alleged furnishing of oil to German submarines by the steamer ALBOA. Colonel Thomason was good enough to dispatch a message in this sense.

I am in receipt of a further communication of an analogous character. I append herewith the pertinent portion thereof. You may feel that it is advisable to instruct the Naval Attache in Rio to interview Mr. Zaradogoitia.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure (1)

HRWilson:che
7/4/42

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

July 2, 1942

Our Basque friends have informed us that one of their reliable partisans, JOSE LARADOGOITIA MENCHACA, was a stowaway aboard the S.S. Aldecoa when this ship was recently stopped by a submarine for refuelling in mid-Atlantic.

The Naval Attache in Rio de Janeiro might find it of interest to interview LARADOGOITIA with a view to establishing the facts which surround this incident. LARADOGOITIA can be reached in Rio de Janeiro through COL. CAPAMA, Flamengo Hotel, Praia do Flamengo. He may also be reached direct at the following address:

Bar Casa Carioca
Largo da Carioca
Rio de Janeiro.

Our Basque friends, who received this news in a letter from CAPAMA, say that LARADOGOITIA was recommended to CAPAMA by the Embassy of one of the Allied Nations. Our Basque friends believe that this may have been the United States Embassy, in which case it is possible that LARADOGOITIA may already have made the full statement of any knowledge he may have had concerning the submarine incident.

LARADOGOITIA was formerly a resident of Salt Lake City, where he was taken into custody by the United States Immigration Authorities and sent to Ellis Island, whence he was deported. LARADOGOITIA has asked our Basque friends to use their influence in Mexico to obtain an immigration visa for him to that country.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

July 8, 1942

Our Basque friends have informed us that one of their reliable partisans, JOSE LARADOGOITIA MENCHACA, was a stowaway aboard the S.S. Aldecoa when this ship was recently stopped by a submarine for refueling in mid-Atlantic.

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Largo da Carioca
Rio de Janeiro.

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 8. 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have read with interest your letter of July 3, 1942 in regard to the Basque leader in New York, and particularly in regard to the relations of your organization with him.

I am sure that you will understand that while maintaining relations with the present Spanish Government, this Department cannot associate itself with the enterprise suggested in your letter. I may add that the Basque movement, aiming as it does toward autonomy, is not one which is likely to be received sympathetically by any Spanish faction outside of Euzkadi, with the possible exception of the Catalan autonomists.

Sincerely yours,

Sumner Welles

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

[illegible]

OFFICE OF [illegible]

July 3, 1942

The Honorable James Dunn
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Will you look over the attached letter to the Secretary and if you approve I wish you would take it up with him.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Basque Op.

July 3, 1942

SECRET

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

My office in New York is now in close touch with a man who carried the personal letter of the President to the Basque Republic. As you know the Basques have been considered Republicans. They seem to be, to a man, opposed to Franco. They are a sturdy and independent folk. We feel that a great deal of valuable degree of dependence can be placed in this organization.

Furthermore, a high proportion of the sailors on Spanish ships are Basques which gives them considerable mobility. Also, their location in the Pyrenees would make them useful persons for the transmission of information both to and from occupied and unoccupied France.

The President of the Basque Republic has a well set-up organization functioning out of the Iberian Peninsula, and is very desirous of placing this organization at our disposal, and we are equally desirous of making use of it for the benefit of our cause.

A certain proportion of this transmission of information would have to be made through parts of Latin America

which would [illegible] to essential [illegible] freedom of [illegible] be permitted and some or vol prov [illegible] for [illegible] of [illegible] regulations. [illegible] [illegible] be [illegible], I [illegible] will [illegible] this [illegible] [illegible] procedure.

Cordially,

William J. Donovan

Donovan

HPWilson:vbp (5/29/42 S.A. File [illegible]