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INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OSS 13,120

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7 MAY 1945

Mr. Putzell

These matters have been discussed with the Branch Chiefs and most of the points covered have been dealt with in the field; others are now history.

JM

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

(8636)

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General Magruder

The Director asked
that you and appropriate groups con-
sider the attached
& let him have your
comments.

2/23

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OSS Form 4151

Date

To: General

this seems to OCD + ought to be a very competent agent. Perhaps you will want Magruder, Bruce, Langer + Abegglen to consider it + make recommendations to you on the matter suggested on pp. 2+3 of forwarding memo from Horton

Office of the Executive Officer

(10449)

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OSS Form 41b1

Date 21 Feb.

re: Lt. PUTZELL

I think this deserves real attention as it seems to me a very competent report.

O.S.S., Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

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Mr. Chapman's copy has
been seen by the General and is now
being routed to Magruder & Bruce

Director's Office

(Jane)

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Hq AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

APO 887

5 February 1945

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of the Reports Board, Paris

TO : Secretariat, Washington

1. At the request of the Paris Secretariat, we are transmitting herewith a copy of the Quarterly Report of the Reports Board. A copy of this document has already been sent to Mr. Whitney Shepardson in Washington.

/s/ Philip Horton
PHILIP HORTON
Chief, Reports Board.

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HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

SHAEF Paris

12 January 1945

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of SHAEF Reports Board, Paris

TO : Director's Office and the Chiefs of SI and R&A

1. The attached report, covering the three-months period ending 31 December 1944, is submitted with special reference to recent requests from the Director's office for a summary statement and appropriate recommendations on the following points:

a. OSS-Allied intelligence coverage of major enemy troop movements on the Western Front.

b. OSS-Allied strategic intelligence coverage of enemy-held territory in ETO.

c. General intelligence production of OSS Missions and Field Detachments.

2. Points a. and b. are covered specifically in paras. 4 and 5 of the report of the Military Section. (See also attachment 3 of the report of the Military Section, a map showing OSS-Allied intelligence coverage of enemy-held territory in ETO with reference to the priority railroad junctions for enemy military transport as defined by G-2 (OI) SHAEF.

3. Point c. is covered by the appropriate sections of the entire report. For convenience these may be summarized very briefly as follows:

a. OSS Missions: Of the chief OSS/ETO missions, only Aquitaine is producing a substantial volume of original intelligence, both political and military. The production of the Lapinette and Belanie missions is almost entirely limited to intelligence originating with Belgian and Dutch intelligence services. Within this limitation, their production of military intelligence has been considerable, both in bulk and in value. The Belanie reports, in particular those transmitted by w/t, have been greatly appreciated by SHAEF as is witnessed by the high proportion printed in the SHAEF Daily Digest. (See attachments 1 and 2 of the report of the Military Section). The Lapinette and Belanie production of political intelligence on Belgium and

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Holland, has been limited to a small flow of R&A material. There have been no political reports of an SI character from either Mission. This forms a striking contrast to the steady flow of valuable political intelligence produced by the City Teams in MEDTO and raises the question whether the charter under which the two Missions operate and which appears to ban all SI reporting on Belgium and Holland should not be reviewed and officially reinterpreted by the Director's Office.

b. OSS Field Detachments: There can be little question that the production of tactical and combat intelligence by the Field Detachments has represented a valuable contribution to G-2 intelligence at Army, Corps and Division level. The Detachments have, however, produced no OSS strategic intelligence to speak of. A more detailed statement of their production may be found in the report of the Military Section, para. 1,b.

Recommendations

A careful review of the points raised by the requests from the Director's Office (para. 1 above) suggests that the following recommendations should receive serious consideration.

a. That OSS-SI operational activities in ETO be directed primarily towards placing fixed agent teams, equipped with w/t communications at one or more of the primary railroad junctions for German military transport. (See para. 6 of the report of the Military Section.)

b. That the OSS Field Detachments be reorganized wherever possible to allow a substantial diversion of the personnel and equipment at their disposal into a coordinated effort to establish strategic rear-area coverage in preference to short-range tactical penetration.

c. That OSS Missions, Field Detachments and out-posts on the Continent be directed to cease the lateral dissemination of intelligence in order to regularize and coordinate the dissemination of OSS intelligence to Continental consumers and to secure a centralized screening and evaluation of intelligence without which it is impossible to improve the quality of intelligence disseminated by OSS. (See report of the Military Section, para. 6,c and attachment 4.) A suggested directive on this subject is now in preparation for submission to the Director's Office.

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d. That the Director's Office review the charter under which the Espinette and Melanie Missions operate with a view to clarifying and enlarging the mandate of both R&A and SI political reporting on Belgium and Holland.

e. That the R&A staff members attached to the Espinette and Melanie Missions participate more fully in the total operations of the missions with a view to establishing better political intelligence coverage, whether of enemy or Allied territory.

f. That R&A London and R&A Paris direct more of their efforts towards contributing to the formulation of political and economic intelligence objectives which would be communicated through appropriate channels to OSS agents and missions.

g. That the Reports Boards in London and Paris be kept informed of the progress of agent operations in order

1. To advise G-2 SHAEF and secure from them and from other appropriate agencies intelligence target data and last minute spot briefs.

11. To secure in advance from the appropriate operational sections the necessary data affecting the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence from new sources.

111. In order to anticipate new communication channels and to coordinate these with established dissemination procedures.

Philip Horton
PHILIP HORTON
Chief, SHAEF Reports Board.

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HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

APO 887

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of the Political Section

TO : Mr. Philip Horton, Chief, ETHA Reports Board

I. Main Categories of Incoming Political Intelligence

The principal sources of political intelligence (and of general economic intelligence, as distinct from target intelligence) supplying original reports to OSS Paris, and the volume and quality of their product, are as follows:

A. OSS Missions

1. Bern. The Bern Mission transmits to OSS Paris a small number of political and economic reports. The most firm and valuable Bern coverage is on the transport situation in Southern Germany and the state of opposition in Austria. The political reports from Germany proper apparently consist mostly of interrogations of returned travellers and are not perhaps as valuable as they could be. (This summary excludes high security material such as the Rood and Platinum reports which represent intelligence of the highest order.)

2 Stockholm. The Stockholm Mission has transmitted virtually no political intelligence, but has produced a certain number of reports of value on economic conditions and relations in Scandinavia.

3. Caserta. The Caserta Mission has transmitted considerable political intelligence of value especially on Balkan and Italian problems. The new series of Vatican reports holds promise of increasing interest and value. It should be noted, however, that the cable coverage of the Greek crisis was often behind the newspapers. It failed to scoop the press on any really significant item, except for the invitation to General Plastiras, and it was badly scooped by the press on the Churchill-Eden visit.

4. Melanie Mission. The Melanie Mission at Eindhoven has sent a trickle of political reports to OSS Paris. This material originated almost exclusively with the Dutch Underground Intelligence Service, except for the F&A reports, which are treated separately.

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The Toulouse Mission has been our main source of intelligence on the Resistance movement. Apart from this, however, the new Paris , which consists mainly of interrogations, has not been very rich. Except for M&A, there has been no coverage of Dutch political problems.

5. Lapinette Mission. The Lapinette Mission has sent a negligible amount of political intelligence. The reports originate almost exclusively with the Belgian intelligence Service and consist of interrogations and a small amount of documentary material. There was no coverage of the recent Belgian crisis except from M&A/Brussels.

6. Aquitaine. The Aquitaine Mission, operating out of Toulouse, has transmitted to us a considerable volume of political material ranging in quality from the trivial to the very useful. The Aquitaine reports have suffered from the understaffing of the Mission, which has meant that the agents are inadequately briefed and directed and that the reports themselves have, in many cases, been inadequately evaluated. With the additional staff currently being assigned to the Mission at Toulouse, it is expected that the volume and quality of the output will quickly increase.

4. Our Field Stations

Our field stations have provided a negligible amount of political intelligence. Their reports, such as they are, consist in the main of brief interrogations. They are so general as to be almost valueless.

5. Branches, Paris

1. M&A. Except for the Aquitaine reports on the French-Spanish border problem, the M&A current reporting program has been the major source of political intelligence on France. While much of this material is not secret intelligence, it has earned wide a continuing clientele for M&A reports on working and interviews with public personalities because of the demands of consumers and because much material is not available elsewhere. Our M&A staff members at Paris and Lapinette have been the main source of political intelligence on Dutch and Belgian affairs.

2. [redacted] Division. The [redacted] Division has transmitted political reports covering a miscellany of subjects. Among them have been reports on Soviet, German and Austrian refugees from Paris on French labor problems and personalities and on German economic and documentation problems. These, taken together with a spasmodic but regular flow of useful reports on defense and industrial installations in Germany represent the most solid intelligence contribution to date from [redacted]

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3. X-2. X-2 Paris has begun recently to transmit a small amount of political intelligence. The X-2 reports from the Spanish border have been of particular interest, but to date the reports on Germany have been of little use. Certain bodies which X-2 has made available for interrogation have also provided valuable intelligence.

D. Allied Intelligence

1. French Intelligence. French Intelligence is transmitted to OSS Paris in three main forms. The SR reports from the section of DGER working with the First French Army at Besançon, the reports of the Deuxième Bureau at Bern - transmitted by the Bern Mission under the code designation 472 - and the standard DGER Paris reports. A certain amount of confusion and duplication is created by the fact that reports from the first and second categories are disseminated under the third. French intelligence reports in general contain much that is trivial but their material has been by far the richest source of information on the Volksaturm and has supplied much valuable counter-intelligence.

2. British Intelligence. A few Broadway reports are supplied for OSS information. The most valuable of these reports are those on Spain. Because of the condition under which OSS receives SOE intelligence, its circulation is necessarily limited.

3. Dutch and Belgian Intelligence. See paragraphs above on the Belgian and Dutch missions.

[illegible]

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
(FOMAD)

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AFHQ 687

5 January 1945

Subject: Quarterly Report of the Military Section

To: Initial Operations Chief Air Reports Board

1. [redacted] The principal sources of air-borne intelligence supplying original reports to [redacted] and the volume and type of their reportage are as follows (omitted are the visual search, and ground-based intelligence services whose original reports have thus far proved of little value to operational needs or use):

[redacted]

(1) [redacted] The Mediterranean Division has transmitted to [redacted] the following volume of air-borne intelligence (not including daily inter-level reports):

	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Total
Photo	[redacted]	40	19	97
Y Touch	[redacted]	96	136	297

The Mediterranean Division has concentrated on small-scale troop and material localities and movements, primarily in Southern France and Northern Italy, and a steady, though slender, volume of reports on the railroad situation in the same area. It has also supplied an extensive collection of data on the various beaches of the Riviera and related meteorological statistics.

The [redacted] Division has transmitted to [redacted] [redacted] Photo Interpretation Reports belatedly announcing [redacted] operations in Norway and Denmark, and sporadic photographic coverage of ship movements and locations in Norway and German cargo-ship movements in the Baltic.

[redacted] The [redacted] Division has transmitted to [redacted] [redacted] Photo Interpretation Reports, [redacted] Military Mobile Reporting Units [redacted] or Interpretive Reports on Italy and the Balkans, and a daily volume of Touch reports covering both tactical and strategic aspects of the enemy situation in the same areas.

(3) [redacted] The [redacted] Division (Naval Intelligence Service) [redacted] has also on occasion furnished to [redacted] the

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the following values of intelligence:

	Jul	Nov	Dec	Total
by cable	70	113	104	287
by couch	52	921	917	690

These reports originated almost exclusively with the Dutch underground intelligence service who obtained the information from their sources by w/t, by telephone lines (no longer operating), by courier, and by interrogation. The intelligence provided pin-point coverage of troop, AA, and material locations and movements in occupied Holland, identification of personalities, defense installations, and V-launching sites.

(5) [illegible] (Belgian Intelligence Service). The [illegible] mission at Brussels has transmitted to OCI during the following values of intelligence:

	Jul	Nov	Dec	Total
by cable	36	43	32	111
by couch	194	82	142	491

These reports are related almost exclusively with the Belgian intelligence service (SDR) who obtained most of their intelligence from interrogations. The couched reports are concerned primarily with defense installations and occasional troop movements in the Rhineland area and with industrial and secret weapon data. SDR has also issued a series of comprehensive studies on the Meuse River and other waterways, railroads and bridges and hydro-electric installations which [illegible] has provided to an efficient courier for its immediate distribution to field and theater commanders.

(6) [illegible] has also been operating out of Calcutta and Kandy has transmitted to [illegible] cable by group, AC military codes from [illegible] and a dozen military couch reports. These reports provided tactical coverage of troop movements, installations, and general enemy activity in the area, chiefly in Burma, and on Sumatra sectors of the front west to [illegible].

[illegible] Attachments

(1) [illegible] Government at third country has supplied this service with information on [illegible] of all reports it has turned over to [illegible]. These have included intelligence gained from French underground resistance operating in Occupied [illegible] and information gained by French and American personnel of the detachment by interrogation

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and infiltration:

		Nov	Dec	Total
French Underground:	strategic	24	17	
	tactical	94	50	185
[illegible] Agents	strategic	10	15	
	tactical	22	45	92

The majority of these strategic reports have been concerned with defense installations and industrial targets, mostly in the Saar area.

(2) Seventh Army. The G-3 detachment at Seventh Army has supplied G-2 Paris with information copies of all reports it has turned over to G-2 Seventh Army. These have included in all, some 110 primarily tactical reports produced by G-2 teams at division and corps level, covering installations and troop movements in the area immediately behind the Seventh Army.

(3) Twelfth Army Group. The G-3 Luxembourg detachment set up at Montabaur has so far supplied 22 reports on Luxembourg since 6 December from interrogations of interpreters and a recent operation in northeast Luxembourg. Two of these reports dated of the impending enemy offensive of 15 or 16 [illegible].

c. [illegible] section of [illegible] with Q at Headquarters 6th Army Group has transmitted to [illegible] by [illegible] such the following volume of intelligence:

	Nov	Dec	Total
[illegible]	192	95	306	203

Q reports consist of translations of documents captured in the recent First French Army offensive, of interrogations, and of agent reports primarily [illegible]. They have provided extensive data on [illegible] organization, location, and movement of units in the [illegible] Seventh Army area, on railroad activity, [illegible] roads and [illegible] production in recently evacuated territory and industries, and on miscellaneous [illegible], enemy use of chemical warfare, and equipment topics. Q reports also include [illegible] the translations of the reports [illegible] (see paragraph 4(2)).

[illegible] Sixth Army Group [illegible] all-source intelligence [illegible] Seventh Army, and [illegible] translations to prime-

[illegible] official intelligence
[illegible] Army Group
[illegible] Twelfth Army Group
[illegible] Army
[illegible] Seventh Army

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[illegible] 16th Army
[illegible] First Allied Airborne Army
[illegible] 9th Division
[illegible] XIX TAC
[illegible] Delta (XVIII)
[illegible] Ninth Air Force

a. Number of processed dive bomber [illegible]

9th	approximately 400
19th	200
36th	600

b. Number of processed dive bomber [illegible] and fuels transmitted to [illegible]

9th	approximately 400
19th	200
36th	1111

c. Number of A/C whose functions [illegible]

9th	[illegible]
19th	[illegible]
36th	[illegible] heavily hard sported

[illegible] number of A/C [illegible] reported at the proof [illegible] these

19th	[illegible]
36th	

[illegible] conclusions [illegible] and

3. Operations [illegible] Analysis of [illegible] Interrogation of [illegible] Personnel [illegible]

Recommendations

[illegible] have been [illegible]

[illegible] application [illegible] location of hydraulic [illegible] [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] supported [illegible] by Army [illegible]

[illegible], the [illegible] Air Force operations officer, [illegible] [illegible] results

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(3) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied by Gen Staff:

a) Coverage of military transport at the priority rail junctions in West and South Germany as specified by Chief. Coverage of this type now supplied by [redacted] is completely unreliable and is given no dissemination whatever.

b) Coverage of the formation areas currently employed for the organization and training of Volksgrenadier divisions.

c) More detailed coverage of Reichsbahn operational efficiency throughout Germany (possibly through extension of [redacted] contacts).

d) Supplying of synoptic meteorological reports from Swiss international weather stations.

b. Sweden. Current coverage is inadequate, but excellent [redacted] coverage of German evacuation from Norway minimizes Stockholm failure to cover this movement.

c. Russia. Current coverage is highly satisfactory for Chief and Army Group requirements.

d. Poland.

a) The primary contribution of the Polish division has been a private net, [redacted] and efficient intercept channel between the Dutch intelligence service and [redacted], thereby enabling the latter to receive [redacted] (C1) more efficiently than [redacted] on the only extensive [redacted] reportage of the enemy situation on the western front. The outstanding coverage furnished by the Polish division has been:

a) Identification and location of almost all divisions in Holland for the quarterly period.

b) Special locations of [redacted] higher commands, especially those of von [redacted], Christiansen, Student, and Reinhard. These reports have frequently been followed by warning of [redacted] concerned.

c) Present [redacted] will, if not all, of the twelve divisions [redacted] have left Holland for other sectors during the next three months.

d) Note on the recent concentration of troops, especially [redacted] troops, in the central sector which will prevent an attack from Holland, if it comes, from being a surprise.

An extensive use [redacted] of these reports by G-2 Chief (C1) is clearly indicated by the high proportion of Polish

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reports printed in the Chief Daily Digest for November and December.

(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied through Melanie from the Dutch Intelligence in the future are:

(a) Extension of troop location and movement w/t coverage to the Rhineland and West Italia (Note: plans for this extension are under way).

(b) Coverage of military activity in Hamburg-Hannover-Schleswig-Holstein area through courier connections with displaced Dutch nationals in these areas who have thus far simply been used for interrogation on their return to Holland.

e. Lapinette.

(1) The primary contribution of the Lapinette mission has been to provide a convenient relay-point for transmission to the Paris of the reports of the Belgian Intelligence section of the MIN. The daily MIN bulletins are of operational value only to defense and terrain sections. The research publications of the MIN, especially their studies of the Rhine, have been of value to the Army and Theatre Engineers.

(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied through Lapinette from the Belgian Intelligence in the employment of such agents as those who supplied two first-rate transmit reports on order of battle in the Koblenz-Aachen area for fixed w/t coverage of that area.

f. Aquitaine.

(1) The primary contribution of the Aquitaine mission has been to provide, since late November, precise, over-all tactical coverage of enemy activity in the Meyon and Le Mans/Alencon areas for General Lemmitz's HQ, Sixth Army Group and Chief.

(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied by Aquitaine are:

(a) Coverage of the Spanish and of the Spain-German power ship-traffic currently going on.

(b) Coverage of the Spanish side of the Franco-Spanish border for location and identification of German and Spanish military units.

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4. Survey of Declassified Strategic Intelligence Coverage of Major Troop Movements on the Eastern Front during October-December 1944.

a. Successful SI coverage:

(1) Movement of six divisions from Scandinavia and Denmark (SHAEF).

(2) Departure of at least 12 divisions from Holland for more southern sectors (Scandinavian-Dutch Intelligence).

b. Complete absence of SI coverage:

(1) Movement of a total of about 20 divisions of all types from Poland, the Protectorate, and the interior of Germany to the Eastern Front.

(2) Withdrawal of numerous divisions in the line in September for reorganization and return to the line.

(3) Movement of replacement units from the Fahrkreise of Central Germany as Ersatz units to stabilize the line in September-October.

(4) Withdrawal of seven Panzer divisions from the front to the Hungarian area for rest (Attached as the sixth Panzer Army).

(5) Movement of the Sixth Panzer Army to the area behind the front north and northwest of Kovno.

(6) Movement of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Kovno area to the Aral area without detraining prior to the offensive of 16 December.

(7) Concentration of some 12 infantry divisions in the Eifel area, some from the Protectorate and Poland, in preparation for the attack of 16 December.

(8) Recent strong reinforcement of the Kowelina bridgehead from east of the Vistula.

5. Survey of current declassified strategic intelligence coverage of Enemy-Held Territory on the Eastern Sector of the Front.

a. The attached map (Attachment 1) indicates, in very rough form, the approximate areas covered by fixed agents of U.S. and Allied strategic intelligence services.

b. From information gained primarily from an examination of the intelligence produced in this theatre during the past three months, the following highly tentative survey of the coverage obtained by U.S. and Allied strategic intelligence services may be made:

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(1) [illegible]

(a) Thin coverage of Denmark and Southern Norway by agents operating with Danish and Norwegian resistance groups reporting to London and continental HQ . by w/t.

(b) Spotty coverage of Occupied Holland by teams operating independently and with Dutch resistance groups reporting to London and continental HQ. by w/t.

(c) SIS: It appears likely that SIS has one agent in the South Baden area furnished with w/t communications.

(d) Dutch Intelligence: Dense coverage of all Occupied Holland by agents and groups reporting to Eindhoven by w/t (and formerly by telephone).

(e) Belgian Intelligence: No evidence exists indicating the existence of an active Belgian agent inside Germany proper furnished with w/t communications.

(f) French Intelligence:

(a) [illegible] Resistance have been operating in the Alsace sector though their only (?) w/t team (at Mulhouse) was recently pulled out. Plans are under way for w/t communication with one or more agents in Alsace.

(b) The Resistance are operating throughout the Alsace pocket, reporting to Switzerland, but they do not have w/t communications.

(c) Some Alsatian Army Resistance are operating in the Baden area with [illegible] agents, but it is unlikely they have w/t communications. These agents are probably located at most of the following places: [illegible], Freiburg, Colmar, Stuttgart, Loerrach, Frankfurt, Karlsruhe, and Lake Constance area.

(g) [illegible]

(a) [illegible] has a series of fixed agents apparently confined to South Baden and the area north of the Swiss-German frontier extending eastward into Austria. None of these agents have w/t communications.

(b) [illegible] Station has no fixed agents currently producing intelligence inside Germany proper.

(c) [illegible] has no fixed agents currently producing intelligence inside Germany proper.

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6. Recommendations:

a. That [illegible] operational activities be primarily directed to the placing of fixed agent teams equipped with s/t communications at one or more of the following priority military transport [illegible] junctions in the area [illegible]:

Cheboksary
Gorkiy
Kuybyshev
Kazan
Ufa
Ulyanovsk
Perm
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Petropavlovsk
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Barnaul

b. That the [illegible] be directed that, whenever feasible, they employ appropriate cover at their disposal for agents or instructors traveling in preference to short-range tactical penetrations.

c. That [illegible] be directed to give the highest priority to the establishment of strategic intelligence nets to [illegible], preferably in the Moscow area, and to maximize the exploitation of [illegible] for this purpose. The attached sketch [illegible] plus [illegible] positions that have developed in the past three months [illegible] incidental penalty of local liaison arrangements unsatisfactory to the [illegible].

d. That [illegible] be provided to speed up the transmission of agent reports to headquarters and for the consideration of the reports from agents to [illegible] of [illegible] services, of both and [illegible] on this coverage.

e. That the military section be kept informed of the progress of agent operations both from within and [illegible] in order to be able to advise [illegible] of possible or [illegible] and secure last-minute [illegible] or [illegible] under way.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], SR
Chief, Military Section
[illegible]

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attachment 1

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[redacted]

11 December 1944

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
10 Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Troop locations
10 Nov	[illegible]	Holland	German Retreat Routes
11 Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
11 Nov	Atlantic Patrol	Holland	Order of Battle
11 Nov	[illegible] (Stockholm)	Norway	Troop Movements
12 Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
12 Nov	Atlantic Patrol	Holland	Troop Locations
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	Atlantic Patrol	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Rail Traffic, Rocket Bombs
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Troop Locations
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Troop Locations etc.
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Military Installations
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Movements
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Ger. Troop Convoy
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Defense, Ship; Angle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Order of Battle, Defenses etc.
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	Germany	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	Atlantic Patrol	[illegible]	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Order of Battle, Defense Lines
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	Atlantic Patrol	[illegible]	Order of Battle, Defense etc.
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Air Locations, Flying Bombs etc.
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Troop and Staff Locations
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Army Situation in Border Sectors
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Air Traffic, Order of Battle
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle, Defense Lines
[illegible] Nov	[illegible]	[illegible]	Troop and Staff Locations

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Date	Report No.	Quarter	Subject
13 Jan	[illegible]	[illegible]	Food and Staff Locations
20 Jan	[illegible]	[illegible]	Food locations
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Food locations, Bill Proffit
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Food locations, Dunbing
			[illegible] Munition Stores

Hans Frederick
[illegible]
Assistant
Chief Military Section
[illegible]

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[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
(For...OB)

Attachment 2

TOP SECRET

AIO 867

9 January 1945

[illegible] report issued in chief daily digest, [illegible] week of 1944.

[illegible] brief [illegible] reports issued

The following [illegible] submitted reports were printed and commented [illegible] last [illegible] digest during December.

Source:

[illegible] reports from Dutch Intelligence
[illegible] reports from Polish Intelligence
[illegible] Communication Cables
[illegible] Agent Intelligence
[illegible] Press Report from France
[illegible] Reports

Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Departure of elements of 7 [illegible] for [illegible].
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Location of [illegible] tanks.
[illegible]	[illegible]	France	Plan [illegible] to [illegible] and use in [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Germany	[illegible] Panzer division to [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Germany	Arrival of [illegible] Panzer division in [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Denmark	Movement of [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	[illegible] at Leiden [illegible] division staffs organized and [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	[illegible] at Leyden.
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Anticipated arrival of "Hermann Goering" division.
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Movement of Division "Hermann Goering" toward [illegible].

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Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
5 Dec	FD-1[illegible]	Holland	Staff of 5th Corps at Wesel.
	FD-1[illegible]C	Holland	Formation two new divisions under von Tettau.
	FD-1[illegible]C	Holland	Removal tank repair troops to Immerial.
6 Dec	FD-1[illegible]	Holland	Movement 5th Corps to Aachen.
11 Dec	FD-20[illegible]	Holland	"Hermann" troops in Veenendaal.
1 Dec	FD-2065	Holland	Absence of Germans from Hilversumberg.
	[illegible]	Holland	Movement of par troopers from Amsterdam; von Tettau's movements.
	[illegible]	Holland	Hits of "Lord" rept in Portugal.
	FD-20[illegible]	Holland	Location of [illegible] trains of 346 Art. Bn.
1 Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Location student's telephone exchange
1 Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Rpt of 15th Army at Arnhem.
	[illegible] (Spitzbergen)	[illegible]	Absence of enemy action at Virsos.
	[illegible] (Army)	[illegible]	Movement of "Grossdeutschland" division from Berlin.
1 Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Info on weapons activities of Student & Christiansen
1 Dec	[illegible]	Army	Info of Dist Army.
	[illegible]	Germany	Location of bridge, specialist units & war.
[illegible] Dec	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] of von Tettau's units.
1 Dec		[illegible]	Movement of [illegible] from Arnhem to [illegible].
[illegible] Dec	[illegible]	[illegible]	Replacement of [illegible] by 711 Div.
	[illegible]	Holland	Army Gp H[illegible] Arnhem & Rotterdam.
	[illegible]	Holland	[illegible] & Arnhem.
	[illegible]	Holland	Movement of 5th Corps in Grolin and [illegible] areas.
	[illegible]	Holland	Concentration of airborne troops in Vecsa, Western area.
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Arrival of par troops at Driebergen.


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Date	Report No.	Country	
22 Dec	FD-6630	Holland	26 Sicherheits regt in Laren.
	FD-6660	Holland	Movement alte Church Tower division from Vorden.
	[illegible]-703	Germany	Transfer Naval personnel to Army.
23 Dec	FD-6920	Holland	Christian en's staff. New para troopers at Vernon.
24 Dec	FD-7420	Holland	Arrival of new army in Holland.
	FD-7430	Holland	Troop concentrations Land van Altena.
	FD-7410	Holland	New German offensive in Land van Altena predicted.
26 Dec	FD-7620	Holland	Arrival Tank Bn. at Leiut.
27 Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Departure 26 Sicherungs regt from Laren.
	[illegible] 33[illegible]	Germany	3 Brigade Charlemagne at Jln.
[illegible] Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Location en Class at Arnhm.
	[illegible]	Holland	Travel of a divisional HQ from Cameren to Komiriche.
[illegible] Dec	[illegible]	Holland	Combat Trainers turn unit at Doent.
30 Dec	FD-7[illegible]	Holland	Movement of para troops from Lisse - Hillegom for a rumor.
	[illegible]	Belgium	and move ent Cologne to Aulpich.
1 Jan	[illegible]	Holland	Troop co centrations in Domaleerwaard and end v n Ijkna.
	[illegible]	Holland	Troops le ving for attack of Arnhem.
	[illegible]	Holland	[illegible] of troops in Domaleerwaard.


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
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
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OSS - ETO


Channels of Lateral Dissemination

1 Jan. 1945




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SUBJECT : QUARTERLY REPORT OF MILITARY, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1944

TO : PHILIP HORCH

SMS 32-1

The following numerical tabulation, broken down according to source, represents the total flow of incoming OSS and Allied intelligence reports over the three-month period ending 31 December 1944. It is inclusive of the figures listed in the quarterly report of the Military Section, but does not include the considerable bulk of periodic information reports such as G-2 periodics, OSUTO reports, etc.

		MO's	MIA's	DNC's	TOTAL	
London	Pouch	37	12	252	411	
	Cable	74	8	172	295	
	To London	10	1	9	20	
Stockholm		9	7	31	47	
Caserta		21	25	90	136	
Helsinki	Pouch	52	211	327	690	
	Cable	56	15	112	253	
Caphinette	Pouch	124	225	144	493	
	Cable	17	20	48	91	
[illegible]		---	31	79	153	
[illegible]		1	1	--	10	
[illegible]		--	--	13	16	
Aden				134	125	2759
Washington	TWX	--				
FIELD HEADQUARTERS						
3rd Army	Pouch	8	140	41	219	
	Cable	9	16	81	185	
				1	6	
9th Army		65	40	12	120	
7th Army		12	--	44	56	
12th AG					1	
6th AG	Pouch	1	--	--	47	634
	Cable	--	47	--		

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
ORO, etc.	292	790	1300	2990	2990
PRACTICE					
K-2	1	--	27	28	
KA	14	22	43	79	
KO	15	42	5	62	
KT (Labor, German, and French desks)	47	20	36	103	272
INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED FROM [illegible]					
Broadway	10	14	54	96	
Dutch via London	24	5	2	31	
French via London	1	6	25	32	
Polish via London	10	13	27	50	
Czech via London	1	2	3	6	215
				[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]
Adolphus Berle
Acting Secretary
[illegible]

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Form 113, 4006

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3.		[illegible]	1/28	10:00	[illegible]	1/28	10:25
4.	Mr Charlton	[illegible]	1/28	11:25	[illegible]	1/28	11:00
5.	Col Dorn	[illegible]	2/1	5:35			
6.	[illegible]	[illegible]	2/1	9:30	[illegible]	2/1	10:00
7.							
8.							
9.							
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[illegible]	1-23	1430	[illegible]	1-29	0930
[illegible]	1-24	1PM			
[illegible]	1-25	1115	[illegible]	1-29	0930
[illegible]	2-9	1600	[illegible]	2-10	1230
[illegible]	2-10	1510	[illegible]	2-15	1130
[illegible]	2-15	1215	[illegible]	2-15	1245
[illegible]					
[illegible]	17-3	1600	[illegible]	17-3	0945

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MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

RAA Paris

12 January 1945

Quarterly Report of SIRA Reports Board, Paris - Distribution

Director's Office, Paris
Chief, SI Paris
Chief, SI London
Chief, RAA Paris
Chief, RAA London
OFSAE, London
Washington
Caserta
Bern

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TSP 2-3-7

HQ AMG HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

SHAEF Paris
12 January 1945

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of SHAEF Reports Board, Paris

TO : Director's Office and the Chiefs of SI and R&A

1. The attached report, covering the three-months period ending 31 December 1944, is submitted with special reference to recent requests from the Director's Office for a summary statement and appropriate recommendations on the following points

a. OSS-Allied intelligence coverage of major enemy troop movements on the Western Front.

b. OSS-Allied strategic intelligence coverage of enemy-held territory in ETO.

c. General intelligence production of OSS Missions and Field Detachments.

2. Points a and b. are covered specifically in paras. 4 and 5 of the report of the Military Section. (See also attachment 3 of the report of the Military Section, a map showing OSS-Allied intelligence coverage of enemy-held territory in ETO with reference to the priority railroad junctions for enemy military transport as defined by G-2 (OI) SHAEF.

3. Point c. is covered by the appropriate sections of the entire report. For convenience these may be summarized very briefly as follows:

a. OSS Missions. Of the chief OSS/ETO Missions, only Aquitaine is producing a substantial volume of original intelligence, both political and military. The production of the Espinette and Melanie Missions is almost entirely limited to intelligence originating with Belgian and Dutch intelligence services. Within this limitation, their production of military intelligence has been considerable, both in bulk and in value. The Melanie reports, in particular those transmitted by w/t, have been greatly appreciated by SHAEF as is witnessed by the high proportion printed in the SHAEF Daily Digest. (See attachments 1 and 2 of the report of the Military Section). The Espinette and Melanie production of political intelligence on Belgium and

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Holland, has been limited to a small flow of R&A material. There have been no political reports of an SI character from either Mission. This forms a striking contrast to the steady flow of valuable political intelligence produced by the City Teams in MEDTO and raises the question whether the charter under which the two Missions operate and which appears to ban all SI reporting on Belgium and Holland should not be reviewed and officially reinterpreted by the Director's Office.

b. OSS Field Detachments: There can be little question that the production of tactical and combat intelligence by the Field Detachments has represented a valuable contribution to G-2 intelligence at Army, Corps and Division level. The Detachments have, however, produced no OSS strategic intelligence to speak of. A more detailed statement of their production may be found in the report of the Military Section, para. 1,b.

4. Recommendations

A careful review of the points raised by the requests from the Director's Office (para. 1 above) suggests that the following recommendations should receive serious consideration:

a. That OSS-SI operational activities in ETO be directed primarily towards placing fixed agent teams, equipped with w/t communications at one or more of the primary railroad junctions for German military transport. (See para. 6 of the report of the Military Section.)

b. That the OSS Field Detachments be reorganized wherever possible to allow a substantial diversion of the personnel and equipment at their disposal into a coordinated effort to establish strategic rear-area coverage in preference to short-range tactical penetration.

c. That OSS Missions, Field Detachments and out-posts on the Continent be directed to cease the lateral dissemination of intelligence in order to regularize and coordinate the dissemination of OSS intelligence to Continental consumers and to secure a centralized screening and evaluation of intelligence without which it is impossible to improve the quality of intelligence disseminated by OSS. (See report of the Military Section, para. 6,c and attachment 4.) A suggested directive on this subject is now in preparation for submission to the Director's Office.

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d. That the Director's office review the charter under which the Lapinette and Melanie Missions operate with a view to clarifying and enlarging the mandate of both R&A and SI political reporting on Belgium and Holland.

e. That the R&A staff members attached to the Lapinette and Melanie Missions participate more fully in the total operations of the missions with a view to establishing better political intelligence coverage, whether of enemy or Allied territory.

f. That R&A London and R&A Paris direct more of their efforts towards contributing to the formulation of political and economic intelligence objectives which would be communicated through appropriate channels to OSS agents and missions.

g. That the Reports Boards in London and Paris be kept informed of the progress of agent operations in order

i. To advise G-2 SHAEF and secure from them and from other appropriate agencies intelligence target data and last minute spot briefs.

ii. To secure in advance from the appropriate operational sections the necessary data affecting the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence from new sources.

iii. In order to anticipate new communication channels and to coordinate these with established dissemination procedures.

Philip Horton
PHILIP HORTON
Chief, SHAEF Reports Board.

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WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

AIO 607

5 January 1945

Subject: Quarterly Report of the Military Section

To: Philip Horton, Chief Air Reports Board

1. Air Interception of Enemy Military Air-Transport Intelligence. The principal sources of air-transport intelligence supplying original reports to OSS Paris and the volume and type of their reportage are as follows (omitted are the Polish, Czech, and French-Metz intelligence services whose original reports have thus far proved of little value to operational headquarters):

a. Switzerland.

(1) Bern. The Bern mission has transmitted to OSS Paris the following volume of air-transport intelligence (not including daily water-level reports):

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
by cable	36	40	19	97
by pouch	93	96	130	257

The Bern coverage has concentrated on small-scale troop and material locations and movements, primarily in Southern Germany and Tyrol, and a steady, though slender, volume of reports on the railroad situation in the same area. It has also supplied an extensive collection of data on the Swiss stretch of the Rhine and related meteorological statistics.

(2) Geneva. The Geneva mission has transmitted to OSS Paris via London (military cables belatedly announcing troop movements in Norway and Denmark, and sporadic pouch reports covering troop movements and locations in Norway and German ship-to-ship movements in the Baltic.

(3) Caserta. The Caserta mission has transmitted to OSS Paris, first via London, now direct, 30 military cables reporting divisional or large-scale moves in Italy and the Balkans, and a steady volume of pouch reports covering both tactical and strategic aspects of the enemy situation in the same area.

(4) Belgium-Holland (Dutch Intelligence Service). The Antwerp mission of Eindhoven has transmitted to OSS Paris the

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the following volume of intelligence:

	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
by cable	70	113	104	287
by pouch	52	321	317	690

These reports originated almost exclusively with the Dutch Underground Intelligence Service who obtained the information from their sources by w/t, by telephone lines (no longer operating), by courier, and by interrogation. The intelligence provided pin-point coverage of troop, sq. and material locations and movements in occupied Holland, identification of personalities, defense installations, and V-launching sites.

(S) Belgian Mission (Belgian Intelligence Service). The Belgian mission of Brussels has transmitted to OSS Paris the following volume of intelligence:

	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Total
by cable	30	65	32	113
by pouch	124	225	142	491

These reports originated almost exclusively with the Belgian Intelligence Service (SDN) who obtained most of their intelligence from interrogations. The cabled reports are concerned primarily with defense installations and occasional troop movements in the Rhineland area and with industrial and secret weapon data. OSS has also issued a series of comprehensive studies on the Rhine river and other waterways, on German bridges and hydro-electric installations which Belgian has provided in sufficient copies to permit adequate distribution to Chief and other OSS, concerned.

(S) [illegible] The Equipe mission (operating out of Toulouse and Bordeaux, has transmitted to OSS Paris [illegible] 40 military cables from [illegible] and a dozen military pouch reports. These reports provided tactical coverage of [illegible] installations, and general enemy activity in the area, points in move, and in doodle bugging [illegible].

[illegible]

(1) [illegible] The [illegible] detachment at Third Army has supplied [illegible] with information copies of all reports it has turned over to the Third Army. These have included intelligence collected by French underground resources operating [illegible] and information gained by French and [illegible] personnel of the detachment by interrogation.

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and infiltration:

		Nov	Dec	Total
French Underground:	strategic	24	17	
	tactical	94	90	105
OSS Agents:	strategic	10	15	
	tactical	82	85	92

The majority of these strategic reports have been concerned with defense installations and industrial targets, mostly in the Metz area.

(2) Seventh Army. The OSS detachment at Seventh Army has supplied CIB Paris with information copies of all reports it has turned over to the Seventh Army. These have included in all, some 110 primarily tactical reports produced by OSS teams at division and corps level, covering installations and troop movements in the area immediately behind the Seventh Army.

(3) Twelfth Army Group. The OSS Luxemburg detachment and up at Attelbruck has so far supplied 28 reports on information gained in connection with interrogation of Luxembourgers and Germans operating in northeast Luxembourg. Two of these reports warned of the impending enemy offensive of 16 December.

4. French Intelligence (section of CIB with HQ at Versailles with Fifth French Army). CIB has transmitted to CIB Paris by pouch the following volume of intelligence:

Intelligence	Nov	Dec	Total
192	953	900	2045

140 reports consist of translations of documents captured in the recent First French Army offensive, of interrogations, and of agent reports primarily on almost. They have provided extensive data on personalities, organization, location, and movement of units in the central Rhineland Army area, on railroad activity, bombing results and war-plant production in primarily Rottweil-Tuttlingen and Austria, and on miscellaneous air, coast watch, chemical warfare, and equipment topics. Daily reports also include verbatim reproduction of the reports obtained by the Detailed Interrogation Centers (CIC Corps) (7).

5. The Army Chief of Military Intelligence (Allied Intelligence Bureau) has been cleared by [illegible] and certain documents transmitted, to primarily the following operational [illegible] numbers:

CIB Detail, operational intelligence
CIB Sixth Army Group
CIB Twelfth Army Group
CIB First [illegible]
CIB Seventh Army

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G-2 Ninth Army
G-2 First Allied Airborne Army
G-2 79th Division
G-2 MTOUSA
G-2 USSTAF (Fwd)
G-2 Ninth Air Force

a. Number of processed disseminations:

Oct	approximately	550
Nov		535
Dec		657

b. Number of processed disseminations and originals transmitted to [illegible]:

Oct	approximately	425
Nov		743
Dec		1111

c. Number of w/t dissemination to OSS field detachments:

Oct	23
Nov	26
Dec	113 (including daily Rhine reports)

d. Number of [illegible]-transmitted reports printed in the Chief Daily Digest:

Nov	47
Dec	52

e. [illegible] see attachments 1 and 2.

3. [illegible] of OSS [illegible] and field detachments in preparation of [illegible] Allied Armies.

a. Form

(1) The primary contribution of the Berl mission here has been:

(a) The supplying of a comprehensive collection of hydraulic, [illegible]-meteorological data on the Rhine below Basel and the South Germany-Switzerland area and the current daily reporting of Rhine water-level, precipitation, and temperature readings at stations specified by Army engineers.

(b) [illegible] coverage of Reichsbahn operating efficiency, especially in South Germany and Austria and AF bombing results.

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(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied by Sons are:

(a) Coverage of military transport at the priority [illegible] junctions in West and South Germany as specified by Chief. Reportage of this type now supplied by 3708 and 667 is completely unreliable and is given no dissemination whatever.

(b) Coverage of the formation areas currently employed for the organization and training of Volksgrenadier divisions.

(c) More detailed coverage of Reichsbahn operational efficiency throughout Germany (possibly through evaluation of Navis and 399 contacts).

(d) Supplying of synoptic meteorological reports from Swiss international weather stations.

b. Stockholm. Current coverage is inadequate, but excellent [illegible] coverage of German evacuation from Norway minimizes Stockholm failure to cover this mission.

c. Lourenco. Current coverage is highly satisfactory for Chief and Army Group requirements.

d. Helsinki.

(1) The primary contribution of the Helsinki mission has been to provide a rapid and efficient screening-channel between the Dutch intelligence service and CIA Paris, thereby enabling the latter to service Chief G-2 (OI) more efficiently than [illegible] on the only extensive [illegible] of the enemy situation on the Western Front. The outstanding coverage transmitted by the Helsinki mission has been:

(a) Identification and location of almost all divisions in Holland for the quarterly period

(b) Pinpoint locations of HQ of higher commands, as usually those of von Zangen, Christiansen, Student, and Reinhard. These reports have frequently been followed by bombing of the concerned.

(c) Movement of most, if not all, of the twelve divisions that have left Holland for other sectors during the past three months.

(d) Data on the recent concentration of troops, especially paratroops, in the central sector which all pointed to an attack from Holland, if it came, from having a surprise.

The extensive use made of these reports by Chief Staff (OI) is clearly illustrated by the high proportion of Helsinki

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reports printed in the Chief Daily Digest for November and December.

(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied through agents from the Dutch intelligence in the future are:

(a) attempts at troop location and movement w/t coverage to the Ijsselmeer and Texel/Julia (Note: plans for this extension are under way).

(b) coverage of military activity in Hamburg-Hannover-Bohlenia-Schleswig area through courier connections with displaced Dutch nationals in these areas who have thus far simply been used for interrogation on their return to Holland.

c. Belgium.

(1) The primary contribution of the Antinette mission has been to provide a convenient relay-point for transmission to U.K. parts of the reports of the Belgian Intelligence section of the M.N. The daily M.N. bulletins are of operational value only to defense and terrain sections. The research publications of the M.N., especially the studies of the Rhine, have been of value to the Army and Theatre Headquarters.

(2) The primary requirement of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied through Antinette from the Belgian intelligence is the employment of such new agents as those who supplied the first-rate transit reports on order of battle in the Aachen-Krefeld area for Allied w/t coverage of that area.

f. Holland.

(1) The primary contribution of the Aquitaine mission has been to provide, since late November, precise, overall tactical coverage of enemy activity in the seven and 15 mile zones for General Bedell Smith's Sixth Army Group, and Theatre.

(2) The primary requirements of operational headquarters that may potentially be supplied by Aquitaine are:

(a) Coverage of the Spanish end of the Spain-German packet ship-traffic currently going on.

(b) Coverage of the Spanish side of the Franco-Spanish border for location and identification of German and Spanish military units.

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4. Survey of U.S.-Allied Strategic Intelligence Coverage of Enemy Troop Movements on the Western Front during October-December 1944.

a. Successful SI coverage:

(1) Movement of six divisions from Scandinavia and Denmark (SFHQ).

(2) Departure of at least 12 divisions from Holland for more southern sectors (Belgian-Dutch Intelligence).

b. Complete absence of SI coverage:

(1) Movement of a total of about 20 divisions of all types from Poland, the Protectorate, and the interior of Germany to the western front.

(2) Withdrawal of numerous divisions in the line in September for reorganization and return to the line.

(3) Movement of replacement units from the Wehrkreise of West Germany as scratch units to stabilize the line in September-October.

(4) Withdrawal of 5 Panzer divisions from the front to the Koblenz area for reorganization of the Sixth SS Panzer Army.

(5) Movement of the Sixth SS Panzer Army to the area behind the front northwest and southwest of Koeln.

(6) Movement of the Sixth SS Panzer Army from the Koeln area to the Eifel area southwest of Koblenz prior to the offensive of 16 December.

(7) Concentration of some 12 infantry divisions in the Eifel area, some from the Protectorate and Poland, in preparation for the attack of 16 December.

(8) Recent strong reenforcement of the Aachen bridgehead from east of the Rhine.

5. Survey of current U.S.-Allied Strategic Intelligence Coverage of enemy territory in the European Theater of Operations.

a. The attached map (attachment 2) indicates, in very rough form, the approximate areas covered by fixed agents of SI and Allied strategic intelligence services.

b. From information gained primarily from an examination of the intelligence produced in this theatre during the past three months, the following highly tentative survey of the coverage obtained by U.S. and Allied strategic intelligence services may be made:

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(1) [illegible]

(a) This coverage of Denmark and southern Norway by agents operating with Danish and Norwegian resistance groups reporting to London and continental HQ . by w/t.

(b) Spotty coverage of occupied Holland by teams operating independently and with Dutch resistance groups reporting to London and continental HQ. by w/t.

(2) Abw. It appears likely that Abw has one agent in the South Baden area furnished with w/t communications.

(3) Dutch Intelligence. Good coverage of all occupied Holland by agents and groups reporting to Eindhoven by w/t (and formerly by telephone).

(4) Belgian Intelligence. No evidence exists indicating the existence of an active Belgian agent inside Germany proper furnished with w/t communications.

(5) French Intelligence.

(a) Many gollists have been operating in the [illegible] sector though there only (2) w/t teams (at Gitalia) have recently pulled out. Items are under way for w/t communication with one or more agents in Alsace.

(b) The resistance are operating throughout the whole pocket, reporting to Paris, but they do not have w/t communications.

(c) Agents [illegible] Swiss frontier area. In the Jeden and Basel [illegible] border areas, but it is unlikely they have w/t communications. Fixed agents are probably located at least at the following places: Villach, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Bregenz, Lermoos, Reutte, Garmisch, and Lake Constance area.

(6) [illegible]

(a) [illegible] has a [illegible] of fixed agents apparently confined to South Baden and the area north of the Swiss-German frontier into Austria. Some of these agents have w/t communications.

(b) [illegible] has no fixed agents currently producing intelligence [illegible] proper.

(c) [illegible] has no fixed agents currently producing intelligence [illegible] proper.

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6. Recommendations:

a. That initial CI operational activities be primarily directed to the placing of fixed agent-teams equipped with W/T communications at one or more of the following priority military transport CP junctions in the shortest possible time:

Cassel
Hannover
Munster
Hagenau
Soest
Halle
Leipzig
Kassel
Frankfurt
Mainz
Mannheim
Nuernberg
Karlsruhe
Stuttgart
Augsburg
Munich

b. That the CIC Field detachments be directed that, whenever feasible, they exploit appropriate agents at their disposal for strategic reporting coverage in preference to short-range tactical penetration.

c. That CIC Divisions and Detachments and headquarters on the Continent be directed to assess the internal dissemination of strategic intelligence in order to standardize, professionalize, and coordinate the dissemination of CIC intelligence on the Continent. The attached sketch (attachment 4) describes internal dissemination practices that have developed in the past three months through accidental proximity and local liaison arrangements uncontrolled by the Paris headquarters.

d. That facilities be provided to speed up the transmission of CIC agent reports to Washington and for the transmission of CIC reports from Washington to the Paris for the more effective servicing of Chief and Washington Group on this coverage.

e. That the Military Section be kept informed of the progress of agent-operations both from it and Washington in order to be able to advise G-2 Theater of probable or possible future withdrawals and secure installation sites-billets for the operations under way.

Henry A. Reitzke
Captain, AUS
Chief, Military Section
Field Reports Board

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HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

AFO 887

3 January 1945

Subject: [illegible] Reports noted in Chief Daily Digest, 1-31 December 1944.

To : [illegible] Philip Horton, Chief CI&A Reports Board

The following [illegible] transmitted reports were printed and commented upon in the Chief Daily Digest during December.

Sources:

[illegible]	[illegible] onic reports from Dutch Intelligence
[illegible]	[illegible] ructic reports from Belgian Intelligence
[illegible]	Miscellaneous
[illegible]	[illegible]nch Intelligence
[illegible]	reports from France
[illegible]	[illegible] reports

Date of Mail Digest	Report No.	Country	Subject
[illegible] Dec	D-170	Holland	Departure of elements of 719th for Colombo.
	D-171	Holland	Location of 158 Flak.
	F-143 (Addition)	France	2nd Group Regt. 124 Group Regt. and [illegible] in points de Gravelines sector
Dec	F-144 (Corr)	Germany	3rd Flieger division in Achrendorf.
	F-721	Germany	Arrival of Volksgrenadier division in Jadern.
	I-1744	Denmark	Movement of Schnellb. Abt. 346.
[illegible] Dec	I-1745	Holland	Schule VI at Leiden; location division staffs Gregamino and Schu
	D-170	Holland	I of C Hq at Noorden.
	D-1711	Holland	Anticipated arrival of "Charon Tower" division.
	D-1719	Holland	Movement of Division "Clevers" toward Arnemuiden.

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Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
5 Dec	FD-1980	Holland	Staff of 5th Para at Harmond.
	FD-1814	Holland	Formation two new divisions under von Tettau.
	FD-1826	Holland	Removal tank repair troops to Emmerich.
6 Dec	FD-1910	Holland	Movement 5th Para to Aachen.
11 Dec	FD-2050	Holland	"Hannibal" troops in Veenendaal.
12 Dec	FD-2060	Holland	Absence of Warning from Hillegersberg.
	FD-2120	Holland	Movement of para-troopers from Amsterdam; von Tettau's movements.
	FD-2090	Holland	Elts of "Lais" regt in Poortugaal.
	FD-2070	Holland	Location of baggage trains of 346 Arty. Bn.
13 Dec	FD-2130	Holland	Location Student's telephone exchange.
14 Dec	FD-2170	Holland	Hq of 1_th Army at Bilthoven.
	FD-199 (Aquitaine)	France	Incidence of enemy attack at Virson.
	FD-202 (Bern)	Germany	Movement of "G[illegible]eutschland' division from Berlin.
[illegible]	FD-6000	Holland	Hq of von Zangen; activities of Student and Christiansen.
[illegible]	FD-4250	Germany	Hq of First Army.
	FD-4260	Germany	Location of bridges, specialist units in Ruhr.
[illegible]	FD-6190	Holland	Location of von Tettau's units.
[illegible]	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Movement of 5th Para from Leiden to Groningen.
[illegible]	FD-4490	Holland	Replacement of 59 ID by 711 ID.
	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Troop locations Utrecht and Rotterdam.
	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Defenses at Den Helder.
[illegible]	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Movement of 5th Para in Groningen-Rotterdam areas.
	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Concentration of airborne troops in Veluwe, Southern area.
	FD-[illegible]	Holland	Arrival of para troops at Driebergen.

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Date	Report	Country	Subject
22 Dec	FD-6630	Holland	86 Sicherheits Regt in Laren.
	FD-6660	Holland	Movement also Church Tower division from Vorden.
	B-709	Germany	Transfer Naval personnel to Army.
23 Dec	FD-6920	Holland	Christiansen's staff. New paratroopers at Warmond.
24 Dec	FD-7420	Holland	Arrival of new army in Holland.
	FD-7430	Holland	Troop concentrations Land van Altena.
	FD-7410	Holland	New German offensive in Land van Altena predicted.
26 Dec	FD-7620	Holland	Arrival tank Bn. at Ulft.
27 Dec	FD-7640	Holland	Departure 26 Sicherungs Regt from Laren.
	FD-7639	Germany	20 Brigade Charlemagne at Ulm.
28 Dec	FD-7710	Holland	Location von Obstfelder Regiment.
	FD-7800	Holland	Removal of 1 division HQ from Oosterbeek to Nunspeet.
29 Dec	FD-8020	Holland	Deserter Waffen SS unit at Ugchelen.
30 Dec	FD-8060	Holland	Movement of paratroops from Lisse - Hillegom for 4 days.
	FD-8100	Belgium	Tank movement Colonge to Sulpich.
1 Jan	FD-8150	Holland	Troop concentrations in Noordelorward and Land van Altena.
	FD-8	Holland	Troops leaving for Tank on Oosterbeek.
	FD-8	Holland	Concentrations of troops in Noordelorward

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attachment 2

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
(TURKEY)

A-0007

11 December 1961

[illegible] reports noted in Chief Daily Digest, 1- 30 November 1961.

[illegible] Philip Horton, Chief NIB Branch Team 4

The following [illegible] reports were printed and commented upon in the Chief Daily Digest for November 30:

[illegible] Classic reports from DD/I Intelligence
[illegible] Intelligence reports from Soviet Intelligence
[illegible] Reports from Soviet Bloc
[illegible] Reports from France
[illegible] Reports from Germany
[illegible] Other reports

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
16 Nov	FE-926	Holland	Troop Locations
17 Nov	FE-82C	Holland	German Retreat Routes
19 Nov	FE-90C	Holland	Order of Battle
22 Nov	Melanie pouch	Holland	Order of Battle
23 Nov	FE-101 (Stockholm)	Norway	Troop Movements
1 Nov	FE-101C	Holland	Order of Battle
12 Nov	Melanie pouch	Holland	Troop Locations
1[illegible] Nov	FE-104C	Holland	Order of Battle
1 Nov	Melanie pouch	Holland	Order of Battle
1[illegible] Nov	FE-106C	Holland	Rail Traffic; Rocket Bombs
12 Nov	Melanie pouch	Holland	Troop Locations
16 Nov	FE-111	Holland	Troop Locations etc.
17 Nov	FE-112	Holland	Order of Battle
17 Nov	FE-117	Holland	Military Installations
17 Dec	Melanie pouch	Holland	Naval Operations
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible]	[illegible]	Baltic Sea	German Troop Convoy
[illegible]	FE-23	Holland	Air Defence, Ship Channels
[illegible]	FE-13	Germany	Order of Battle, Defenses etc.
[illegible]	Melanie pouch	Germany	Order of Battle
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle, Air Fighter Area
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle, defenses etc.
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Ship Locations, Flying Bombs etc.
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Troop and Staff Locations
[illegible]	[illegible]	France	Enemy Situation in Western Europe
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Order of Battle, defense Lines
[illegible]	[illegible]	Holland	Troop and Staff Locations

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
Date	Report No.	Country	Subject
19 Nov	FDB-1650	Holland	Troop and Staff Locations
20 Nov	[illegible] (Bern)	Germany	Troop Locations
30 Nov	FDB-1669	Holland	Troop Locations, Rail Traffic
30 Nov	FDB-1670	Holland	Troop Locations, Bombing Results, Ammunition Storage

[illegible]
[illegible]
Captain, AUS
Chief Military Section
SHAEF Mission Board

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Channels of Lateral Dissemination

1 Jan. 19 5




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LEGEND

Normal flow of intelligence

Irregular channels of lateral dissemination
formally established as of 31 Dec. 1944

Symptomatic instances of lateral
dissemination, Oct.-Dec. 1944

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HQ, AFHQ and HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

APO 887

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of the Political Section

TO : Mr. Philip Horton, Chief, SI/A Reports Board

Main Categories of Incoming Political Intelligence

The principal sources of political intelligence (and of general economic intelligence, as distinct from target intelligence) supplying original reports to OSS Paris, and the volume and quality of their product, are as follows:

A. OSS Missions

1. Bern. The Bern Mission transmits to OSS Paris a small number of political and economic reports. The most firm and valuable Bern coverage is on the transport situation in Southern Germany and the state of opposition in Austria. The political reports from Germany proper apparently consist mostly of interrogations of returned travellers and are not perhaps as valuable as they could be. (This summary excludes high security material such as the Wood and Platinum reports which represent intelligence of the highest order.)

2. Stockholm. The Stockholm Mission has transmitted virtually no political intelligence, but has produced a certain number of reports of value on economic conditions and relations in Scandinavia.

3. Caserta. The Caserta Mission has transmitted considerable political intelligence of value especially on Balkan and Italian problems. The new series of Vatican reports holds promise of increasing interest and value. It should be noted, however, that the cable coverage of the Greek crisis was often behind the newspapers. It failed to scoop the press on any really significant item, except for the invitation to General Plastiras, and it was badly scooped by the press on the Churchill-Eden visit.

4. Melange Mission. The Melange Mission at Eindhoven has sent a trickle of political reports to OSS Paris. This material originated almost exclusively with the Dutch Underground Intelligence Service, except for the R&A reports, which are treated separately.

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The Melanie Mission has been our main source of intelligence on the Edelweiss movement. Apart from this, however, the material, which consists mainly of interrogations, has not been very rich. Except for R&A, there has been no coverage of Dutch political problems.

5. Espinette Mission. The Espinette Mission has sent a negligible amount of political intelligence. Its reports originate almost exclusively with the Belgian Intelligence Service and consist of interrogations and a small amount of documentary material. There was no coverage of the recent Belgian crisis except from R&A/Melanie.

6. Aquitaine. The Aquitaine Mission, operating out of Toulouse, has transmitted to OSS Paris a considerable volume of political material ranging in quality from the trivial to the very useful. The Aquitaine reports have suffered from the understaffing of the Mission, which has meant that the agents are inadequately briefed and directed and that the reports themselves have, in many cases, been inadequately evaluated. With the additional staff currently being assigned to the Mission at Toulouse, it is expected that the volume and quality of its output will quickly increase.

B. OSS Field Detachments

OSS Field Detachments have originated a negligible amount of political intelligence. Their reports, such as they are, consist in the main of brief interrogations. They are so general as to be almost valueless.

C. OSS Branches, Paris

1. R&A. Except for the Aquitaine reports on the French-Spanish border problems, the R&A current reporting program has been the main source of political intelligence on France. While much of this material is not secret intelligence, it has seemed wise to continue dissemination of R&A reports on meetings and interviews with public persons, because of the demands of consumers and because such material is not available elsewhere. The R&A staff members at Melanie and Espinette have been the main source of political intelligence on Dutch and Belgian affairs.

2. SI Labor Division. The SI Labor Division has transmitted political reports covering a miscellany of subjects. Among them have been reports on Russian, German and Austrian refugees from Paris on French labor problems and personalities and on German economic and documentation problems. These, taken together with a sparse but regular flow of useful reports on defense and industrial installations in Germany represent the most solid intelligence contribution to date from SI/ETO.

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3. X-2. X-2 Paris has begun recently to transmit a small amount of political intelligence. The X-2 reports from the Spanish border have been of particular interest, but to date the reports on Germany have been of little use. Certain bodies which X-2 has made available for interrogation have also provided valuable intelligence.

D. Allied Intelligence

1. French Intelligence. French Intelligence is transmitted to OSS Paris in three main forms: The SRO reports from the section of DGER working with the First French Army at Besancon; the reports of the Deuxieme Bureau at Bern - transmitted by the Bern Mission under the code designation 472 - and the standard DGER Paris reports. A certain amount of confusion and duplication is created by the fact that reports from the first and second categories are redisseminated under the third. French intelligence reports in general contain much that is trivial; but the SRO material has been by far the richest source of information on the Volkssturm and has supplied much valuable documentary matter.

2. British Intelligence. A few Broadway reports are supplied for OSS information. The most valuable of these reports are those on Spain. Because of the conditions under which OSS receives SSF intelligence, its circulation is necessarily limited.

3. Dutch and Belgian Intelligence. See paragraphs above on the Polanie and Espinette Missions.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
Deputy Chief
SI/RA Reports Board, Paris.

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SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT OF REGISTRY, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1944

TO : PHILIP HONTZ

The following numerical tabulation, broken down according to source, represents the total flow of incoming OSS and Allied intelligence reports over the three-month period ending 31 December 1944. It is inclusive of the figures listed in the Quarterly Report of the Military Section, but does not include the considerable bulk of periodic information reports such as O-2 periodics, CSDIC reports, etc.

		OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	TOTAL	
Bern	pouch	37	132	252	411	
	cable	74	49	172	295	
	via London	10	1	9	20	
Stockholm		9	7	31	47	
Caserta		21	25	90	136	
Helsinki	pouch	52	221	317	690	
	cable	56	85	112	253	
Bagnoletto	pouch	174	225	144	493	
	cable	17	29	48	91	
Algiers		--	80	73	153	
Madrid		1	12	--	13	
Lisbon		--	3	13	16	
Washington	[illegible]	--	1	134	135	2753
FIELD DETACHMENTS						
3rd Army	G-2 Intell.	18	160	41	219	
	G-3	39	26	81	185	
9th Army		3	2	1	6	
7th Army		65	42	12	120	
12th AG		12	--	44	56	
6th AG	G-3	1	--	--	1	
	G-2 Intell.	--	37	--	37	634

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	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	TOTAL	
FRENCH INTELLIGENCE					
SFHQ, etc.	292	798	1300	2390	2390
BRANCHES					
X-2	1	--	27	28	
FNA	14	32	33	79	
SO	15	42	5	62	
SI (Labor, German, and French desks)	42	24	36	102	272
INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED FROM LONDON					
Broadway	10	34	52	96	
Dutch via London	24	5	2	31	
French via London	1	6	25	32	
Polish via London	10	13	27	50	
Czech via London	1	2	3	6	215
				Total	6268

Adeline Nelson
Adeline Nelson
Acting Head
OTR Registry

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6 December 1944.

Dear David:

When the proposals to set up SEAC Board was first put before a considerable amount of opposition to it appeared from various quarters. Since the war in SEAC, as it now appeared to be, was no longer thought to be a primarily British war. The paper was circulated was the joint memorandum of John Haskell and Chandler Morse, dated 22 September 1944.

I had been very discussion of the idea when I passed through London but I had understood the idea in terms of joint regulation, common library, and common use of certain physical facilities such as the mess room. I liked these ideas, and still do. I believe that rapid management and good economy dictate this wherever physical conditions permit.

But because the memorandum went well beyond these provisions, and because of the criticisms directed against the plan from many quarters here in DMS, I requested that it be studied by a committee. Before the committee's report was finished, we received word that SEAC Boards had been established in SEAC, through an SCAO order dated 10 November, effective October 30th.

This word arrived on about 20 November, and came as a complete surprise to all of us, including Whitney, who had agreed with Allen Evans on 3 November that the SEAC Board conception was impractical for the present, and had departed with Colonel Sandys a memorandum to that effect on the day he left London.

The committee's report is now finished, and I enclose a copy. With it before me I sent a cable yesterday recommending a careful re-examination of the conception of a joint SEAC Board, and detailing my reasons for this recommendation.

Will you reconsider the matter in the light of that cable and the attached report, and let me know what your conclusion is.

Sincerely yours,

William D. Donovan
Director.

Col. D.K.S. Bruce,
Paris, France.

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1. The SIRA Board as it now operates exists in a certain integration of Secret Intelligence and Research and Analysis functions which we believe to be unsound. It is the task of SI to procure intelligence by clandestine means and to maintain liaison with similar organizations of other Nations. Intelligence so obtained serves as raw material to those who use it. Some evaluation is necessary and desirable for the guidance of the consumer. Particularly is this true with respect to the source, by which term we mean the personality who obtained the information. The SI organization itself is best suited to evaluate the source.

2. The memorandum describing the SIRA organization states: "R & A should not only contribute appraisals of SI intelligence but should also participate in the evaluation of intelligence and sources." We do not agree that R & A personnel should participate in the evaluation of the source, using the term in the sense referred to above. We believe that R & A experts can and should assist in making a sound judgment as to the reasonableness of information. However, since such information is to be distributed as raw material from SI, responsibility for the final judgment in this regard must rest with that Branch.

3. The memorandum on the SIRA reporting organization further states that: "SI dissemination in the political and economic fields should preferably include appraisal and commentary. R & A appraisers should be prepared to write their comments in a form suitable for publication and to rewrite such raw reports as it may seem desirable to combine for dissemination. The Board may consider the issuing of a periodic summary, to include reports which do not require urgent and immediate dissemination." This proposal integrates the Research and Analysis function with that of Secret Intelligence in a manner which we cannot approve. When appraisal and commentary are added to the material and disseminated with it, OSS is no longer disseminating raw intelligence as such. We feel that material disseminated by SI should be raw material, and not be a combination of secret intelligence with analytical comment or interpretation by research experts. Such interpretation or analysis is to be undertaken by the consumers of the material in the light of their own needs.

4. We appreciate that all intelligence obtained by SI is not worthy of distribution as raw material but can be used for certain purposes by R & A experts. The distribution of such material might well be made by R & A in R & A reports identified as such.

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5. The chief R & A function is to employ material from all sources, including SI, in the preparation of correlated studies in accordance with existing orders and directives. Incidental to this work, R & A often obtains current information from overt sources. This can be disseminated by R & A in report form if such dissemination is desirable.

6. Both SI and R & A require certain library, registry, filing, and distribution facilities. To a large degree these facilities can be used in common by the two Branches. An organizational arrangement is required which assures the most efficient utilization of personnel for these tasks, and it should be developed wherever possible in the European Theater. However, the present SIRA Boards go much beyond any arrangements necessary to assure these desirable ends.

7. It is suggested in the memorandum on the joint SIRA Board that R & A participate in the recommendation of intelligence targets for SI. We concur in this. We understand that since the inception of the two Branches, R & A has made such recommendations. Other consumers must, of course, also recommend targets to SI. While the final selection of targets is in part an operational question and should be determined by SI, the expert assistance of R & A representatives in setting priorities should be enlisted whenever necessary.

8. The SIRA Board as now established results in a divided authority with respect to the functions set forth above. This is a possible source of friction. The functions of the two Branches differ, and their leadership must inevitably think along separate functional lines. The SI Branch must bear full responsibility for the SI functions, and R & A must assume responsibility for its functions. It is the further responsibility of the Intelligence Officer (wherever there is such officer), acting under authority from the Strategic Services Officer, and with full cooperation and assistance from the Branch Chiefs concerned, to coordinate the intelligence activities of the various Branches where such coordination is required.

9. In taking exception to the present structure and practices of the SIRA Boards, we do not wish to appear to encourage Branch separatism. On the contrary, we hope to see developed as efficient an organization as possible, making use of the resources of the several Branches to achieve their common ends. In achieving this increased efficiency, however, we must not lose sight of the basic distinctions between the functions of SI and R & A.

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Form 97
Form as Revised

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE DECEMBER 4, 1944 RECD 12/5/44 - 6:20 PM

TO PARIS, FRANCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES OUT: 4588

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) | FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR | SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER, BIRCH, ETO.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER | SECRET

#3544. To 109 from 109 and 154. Action: Paris. Information: Crous, Morse and Horton, London.

1. Letter being forwarded recommending fundamental reconsideration of SIRA Boards. SI and R & A functions are to be carried out in full as exclusive responsibility of the respective branches. However, Library and Registry are to be conducted jointly wherever possible. Latter regarded as particularly necessary in Paris and Germany to save manpower. Since much of the existing misconception revolves around its use believe retention name SIRA will only lead to confusion.

2. You may wish await receipt of letter before initiating action.

END: 12/5/44 - 7:10 PM WJH JDW WJD SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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DISTRIBUTION

TO: General

Date 12/6

It is my understanding that you told Colonel Burton and Lt. Wilson on Sunday that you would rewrite the attached proposed letter to Bruce concerning the joint SIRA boards.

EJP

Attached memorandum from Lt. Wilson, prepared in accordance with your instructions, is submitted for your signature.

Executive Officer

(Signed)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 14 November 44

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT:

Lt. Wilson, who had certain convictions concerning the SIRA Board in the European Theater, has cleared through General Magruder and Mr. O'Gara a revision of the original proposed letter on this subject, submitted to you by General Magruder. If it is satisfactory to you, we shall prepare it in form for your signature.

Lt. Wilson's suggestion seems to ~~suggest~~ present a very sound solution of the problem, in view of the fact that SIRA is already underway in the theater and personnel have been assigned to it.

C. A. Bane

Charles A. Bane

To Col Burton
For Comment.

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11/15 6:10 PM.

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10 November 1944

TO: General William J. Donovan

THROUGH: General John Magruder

FROM: European Theater Officer

SUBJECT: Directive to Colonel Bruce Ordering Reorganization of the Joint SIRA Boards

The most recent reports from the European Theater indicate that the Joint SIRA Boards have been established in Paris and London. To dissolve them immediately probably would not be feasible. Some organization must be created in their place and personnel shifted, not only as between tasks but also as between geographic areas. In all likelihood the SI representation in Paris will have to be increased, and that of R&A decreased.

There are certain real administrative needs in the European Theater which the SIRA Boards meet. I believe you will wish these aspects of the SIRA organization to be retained in whatever new arrangement is developed as a substitute. I refer particularly to the following:

1. The establishment of common registry, library, and disseminating facilities in order to prevent unnecessary duplication and to assure the most efficient use of available personnel. (Particularly important in Paris and Germany.)

2. The employment of R&A expertism to assist in the determination of the reasonableness of information obtained by SI. At the present time the SI Branch lacks sufficient personnel with the qualifications required for such judgments, if Reporting Boards are established in London, Paris, and Germany.

The memorandum of 12 September 1944 from Haskell and Morse to the Chiefs of R&A and SI, Washington, which described the joint SIRA organization, stated the Director had approved it when he was in the Theater. The present statement, therefore, should explain in some detail the Director's reasons for desiring a modification of the organization.

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After talking with General Magruder about the problem, I drafted the attached letter, which enlarged on that previously submitted, and took the above factors into account. General Magruder and Mr. O'Gara made certain revisions in a preliminary draft. The attached letter embodies these revisions.

John D. Wilson

John D. Wilson
European Theater Officer

Attachment

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SUGGESTED LETTER FROM GENERAL DONOVAN TO COLONEL BRUCE CONCERNING THE JOINT SIRA BOARDS

1. In establishing the joint SIRA Reporting Boards in ETO, you have created an organization whose structure and practices, as described in the memorandum of 12 September 1944 from Haskell and Morse to the Chiefs of SI and R&A, Washington, are inconsistent with certain basic policies that have in the past governed our SI and R&A activities. Accordingly, I requested that these policies be re-examined and that the advantages and disadvantages of the SIRA Reporting Boards be given careful reconsideration. The committee undertaking this task has now reported to me. I am adopting their recommendation that you change the structure of the Reporting Boards as you now apparently have established them in London and Paris so as to make their practices consistent with the basic policies set forth below.

2. The SIRA Board as it now operates results in a certain integration of Secret Intelligence and Research and Analysis functions which I believe to be unsound. It is the task of SI to procure intelligence by clandestine means and to maintain liaison with similar organizations of other Nations. Intelligence so obtained serves as raw material to those who use it. Some evaluation is necessary and desirable for the guidance of the consumer. Particularly is this true with respect to the source, by which term I mean the personality who obtained the information. The SI organization itself is best suited to evaluate the source,

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Some judgment of the reasonableness of the information itself (in the sense of its being consistent with what is already known about the subject) also is useful as a guide to the consumer. However, the consumer is the final judge in this respect.

3. The memorandum describing the SIRA organization states "R&A should not only contribute appraisals of SI intelligence but should also participate in the evaluation of intelligence and sources." I cannot agree that R&A personnel should participate in the evaluation of the source, using the term in the sense referred to above. I do believe R&A experts can and should assist in making a sound judgment as to the reasonableness of information. However, since such information is to be distributed as raw material from SI, responsibility for the final judgment in this regard must rest with that Branch.

4. The memorandum on the SIRA reporting organization further states that "SI dissemination in the political and economic fields should preferably include appraisal and commentary. R&A appraisers should be prepared to write their comments in a form suitable for publication and to rewrite such raw reports as it may seem desirable to combine for dissemination. The Board may consider the issuing of a periodic summary, to include reports which do not require urgent and immediate dissemination." This proposal integrates the Research and Analysis function with that of Secret Intelligence in a manner which I cannot approve. When appraisal and commentary are added to the material and disseminated with it, OSS is no

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longer disseminating raw intelligence as such. I desire that material disseminated by SI be raw material, and not be a hybrid form combining secret intelligence with analytical comment or interpretation by research experts. Such interpretation or analysis is to be undertaken by the consumers of the material in the light of their own needs.

5. I appreciate that all intelligence obtained by SI is not worthy of distribution as raw material but can be used for certain purposes by R&A experts. The distribution of such material might well be made by R&A in R&A reports identified as such.

6. The chief R&A function is to employ material from all sources, including SI, in the preparation of correlated studies in accordance with existing orders and directives. Incidental to this work, R&A often obtains current information from overt sources. This can be disseminated by R&A in report form if such dissemination is desirable.

7. Both SI and R&A require certain library, registry, filing, and distribution facilities. To a large degree these facilities can be used in common by the two Branches. An organizational arrangement is required which assures the most efficient utilization of personnel for these tasks, and I wish it developed wherever possible in the European Theater. However, the present SI/RA Boards go much beyond any arrangements necessary to assure these desirable ends.

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8. It is suggested in the memorandum on the joint SIRA Board that R&A participate in the recommendation of intelligence targets for SI. I concur in this and it is my understanding that since the inception of the two Branches, R&A has made such recommendations. Other consumers must, of course, also recommend targets to SI. While the final selection of targets is in part an operational question and should be determined by SI, the expert assistance of R&A representatives in setting priorities should be enlisted whenever necessary.

9. The SIRA Board as now established results in a divided authority with respect to the functions set forth above. This is a possible source of friction. The functions of the two Branches differ, and their leadership must inevitably think along separate functional lines. The SI Branch must bear full responsibility for the SI functions, and R&A must assume responsibility for its functions. It is the further responsibility of ~~an~~ Intelligence Officer (whose title is to be filled in), acting under authority from the Strategic Services Officer, and with full cooperation and assistance from the Branch Chiefs concerned, to coordinate the intelligence activities of the various Branches where such coordination is required.

10. In requesting that you re-examine the present structure and practices of the SIRA Boards, I do not wish you to believe I am encouraging Branch separatism. On the contrary, I wish you to develop as efficient an organization as possible, making use of the resources of the several Branches to achieve their common ends. In achieving this increased efficiency, however, you must not lose sight of the basic distinctions between the functions of SI and R&A. I shall appreciate being informed of the changes you make in the SIRA Boards in accordance with the principles set forth above.

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(Rev. 7/27/44)

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TO	NAME	DATE	INITIALS
	O. C. Doering, Jr.		
	J. J. Monigan		
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.		
	R. Thrum		
	[illegible]		
	D. C. Lee		
	J. W. Auchincloss		
	W. B. Kastack		
	W. H. Miley		
	P. F. Pugliese		
	A. W. Sulloway		
	J. B. Donovan		
	A. W. Dulles, Jr.		
	A. L. Dart		
	H. H. Hamilton		
	L. R. Houston		
	C. S. McClelland		
	J. L. McDonnell		
	J. H. Schoemer, Jr.		
	Secretariat Files		
✓	Director's Files		
	O. G. C. Files		

JM's [illegible] to make [illegible] letters are suggested [illegible] the patterns are pretty [illegible]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 October 1944

Filed

MEMORANDUM FOR General Donovan

SUBJECT: SIRA

Herewith is a suggested letter to Colonels Bruce and Glavin with respect to SIRA.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

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30 October 1944

I have discussed with all interested parties here SIRA as described in a memorandum dated 31 August to the Chiefs of SI and R&A from Coolidge, Deutsch, Evans, and Horton. The project does not accord with my ideas for the following reasons:

Instead of integrating the products of OSS intelligence, it results in an integration of SI and R&A functions which I believe to be unsound. SI should retain intact its function of collecting and disseminating raw material. SI reports should be unmistakably identified as raw material. R&A, incidental to its activities abroad, should disseminate some current information unmistakably identified as non-correlated material. Both SI and R&A should evaluate this material as to credability of source, and should obtain the best available evaluations from users in order to improve this type of material.

R&A's primary function, however, is to employ material from all sources, including SI, in the preparation of correlated studies as contemplated in existing orders and directives.

I see no objection to The Reporting Board handling the mechanics of dissemination for both branches.

While I appreciate the necessity of a more flexible employment of personnel in the field and the cooperative spirit which the branch representatives have manifested in this project, I am convinced that the arrangement would be damaging to the spirit of clandestine intelligence, while diverting R&A from its own broad functions. The project creates a new entity which misses the purpose of each branch.

Another but less important point is the creation of a possible source of friction by the employment in the integration of information of personnel from several branches looking to different authority--if for no other reason than that the groups do and should think along separate functional lines.

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I would not have you think that I wish to foster branch separatism, either in Washington or in the field. I am sure that you can arrive at an orderly procedure for improving the quality of both SI reports and current R&A reports and of disseminating them in an orderly manner without setting up the large and intricate organization described in paragraph 3 of the memorandum of 31 August.

The Intelligence Officer, by means of a group representing the several intelligence branches, should assign intelligence objectives to the appropriate branches. He should also coordinate the process as for the orderly issuance of SI and R&A current reports.

The committee which conceived SIRA in its present scope, should reconsider it in light of the foregoing principles.

The regularization of reports

JM

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27 Oct 44

To Indian

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR General Donovan

This project is a profound modification of our present concepts of the functions of SI and R&A. The principle seems to be that if raw petroleum is good and 100 octane gasoline is good their mixture is better. I start with the conviction that SI deals in raw secret information while R&A uses this raw material as one of many contributions to the fund of information from which it builds studies.

SI and R&A have distinct functions. Each organization can improve itself: SI by getting more specialized personnel on its reporting boards; and R&A assuming responsibility for improving SI raw material by prompt and critical evaluations.

Not only do I believe that this integration of personnel on the reporting board level will not work--R&A will engulf SI or SI will engulf R&A--but the effects will be destructive of the spirit of clandestine operations and will divert R&A from its own function.

It is true that as the field of combat intelligence narrows SI tends to revert to political and economic reporting. This is all right but it should be restricted to clandestine sources. So long as R&A personnel is abroad it should have the primary mission of collecting such information as is openly available. There is no harm in including surplus SI personnel, if competent, on R&A teams but the resulting reports should be R&A material. A bit of overlap in the collection of information is not serious but the reporting board is not the place for its ultimate processing.

This project in effect creates a wholly new intelligence entity which is neither SI nor R&A. It is quite different from the ideas I formed of it after the exposition of Major Coolidge in Paris.

I recommend that SIRA be not authorized. Instead I suggest that you instruct SI to consider the modifications of the reporting board along the lines recommended in Memorandum to the Director from Colonel Forgan, Committee Chairman, dated 4 Jan. 1944, "Evaluation of Intelligence Material."

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR General Donovan

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

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Date: 10/17/54

To: General Magruder

Please let me have your comments.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

CONFIDENTIAL

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 October 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: General Donovan

From: Lt. Commander Taylor

The formation of joint R&A and SI Reporting Boards in ETO seems to me a vaulable experiment in coordination between these two Branches. There is always a need for constant interchange of materials and experience between R&A and SI in the field, and this undoubtedly becomes more and more important as information activities are concentrated on political and economic questions.

Only experience can tell whether this ETO proposal is the best solution, but it looks pretty good on paper. I am not certain how certain features of the plan will work out, e.g., having R&A participate in evaluation of sources. But in any event, it is certainly worthwhile trying out such a complete integration of functions.

I shall be anxious to follow the progress of this joint board idea in ETO as the experience there may be of great value to me in the future organization of intelligence activities in SEAC.

E&T

To
Ned Buxton — Lemnitzer Bryant
for comment C - C

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Ed. Taylor

Would you

give me your

comments

AC

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Ed. Taylor

handed you

give me your

Comments

OSS Form 9151

Date 10/3

To: General Donovan

You asked to see the attached memorandum from Colonel John Haskell and Mr. Chandler Morse to the Chief, SI and R&A Branches, Washington on the subject of a joint SI and R&A Reports Board in ETO.

E. J. Putzell Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

(over)

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OSS Form 1309

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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. [illegible]

Date Rec'd. SEP 20 1944

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. 10		9/21 10:65	9/21	[illegible]	
2. [illegible]	[illegible]	SEP 25 [illegible]		[illegible]	
3. D'Aura	212	SEP 23 [illegible]	SEP 25 [illegible]	VD	
4. [illegible]	1108	3 SEP 24	3 [illegible]	[illegible]	
5. [illegible]	[illegible]	SEP 30 1944		[illegible]	
6. [illegible]		[illegible]			
7. [illegible]					
8. [illegible]					
9. [illegible]					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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MEMORANDUM

12 September 1944

FROM : John Haskell, Colonel, Inf., Chief, SI Branch and Chandler Morse, Chief, R&A Branch, London

TO : The Chiefs, SI and R&A Branches, Washington

1. The working relations between R&A and SI Reporting Board, London may profitably be reviewed at this time, because:

a. SI is likely increasingly to direct its attention to political and economic intelligence.

b. The processing and dissemination of such intelligence are operations in which R&A is particularly well fitted to participate.

c. The new R&A program of current reporting increases even further R&A's need for SI materials and its ability to participate in the processing.

d. Establishment of new OSS headquarters in Paris, Berlin and elsewhere offers an opportunity for the initiation of improved integration.

e. Shortage of personnel suggests a need to avoid duplication of effort.

2. For efficient functioning of the OSS intelligence service, we suggest that the following policies are essential:

a. R&A and SI should jointly operate the Reporting Board; each will contribute staff at all levels.*

b. R&A should not only contribute appraisals of SI intelligence, but should also participate in the evaluation of intelligence and of sources.

c. SI disseminations in the political and economic fields should preferably include appraisal and commentary. R&A appraisers should be prepared to write their comments in a form suitable for publication and to rewrite such raw reports as it may seem desirable to com-

*See Addendum 1.

United States

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bine for dissemination. The Board may consider the issuing of a periodical summary, to include reports which do not require urgent and immediate dissemination.

d. SI should make available to R&A, at levels appropriate to the classification, all intelligence without exception. This principle might be elaborated to read that all OSS intelligence should be made available to the SI and R&A Branches.

e. R&A should participate through its membership on the SIRA Board in the recommendation of intelligence targets for SI operations.

f. For proper working collaboration the Reporting Board and R&A should be quartered contiguously, so as to allow the least possible physical obstacle to free and continuous consultation and exchange of information. Suitable space location will also permit amalgamation of document collections (Registry and Library), for ready use by both groups.

3. To implement these principles the attached chart of organization is proposed, which may be analysed as follows:

a. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Reporting Board will report to the Chiefs of SI and R&A jointly. One of these officers will be from SI and one from R&A, should suitable personnel be available.* The Deputy Chief will have particular responsibility within the Board for co-ordinating intelligence target recommendations.

b. The Editor will be responsible to the Office of the Chief, for control of the form and content of Reporting Board disseminations.

c. The SIRA Reporting Board will comprise the Chief, Deputy Chief, Editor and four Reports Officers. This Board will, in accordance with settled policies, make final decisions on:

Evaluation
Dissemination
Editorial control
Processing

* See Addendum 1.

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and will summarize recommendations of its staff on target directives.

d. The X-2 liaison officer will be responsible for the proper integration of intelligence needs and outputs between the Board and X-2.

e. The Intelligence Sections will be four in number:

(i) Political Reports Officer (R&A) with appropriate staff, who will be responsible for processing and primary recommendations for dissemination intelligence within his field. He and his staff will be closely assimilated with the R&A Political Division, and will utilize agreed members of that Division as part of the working staff for handling his materials.

(ii) The Economic Reports Officer (R&A) and his staff will have similar duties and will work similarly with the Economics Division of R&A.

(iii) The Military Reports Officer (SI) will have similar duties. His working staff will be furnished by SI.

(iv) The Technical Reports Officer (SI) will have similar duties. His staff will be furnished by SI.

f. The Documents Section Chief may be from SI or R&A. He shall be responsible to the office of the Chief for the following units:

(i) Joint Registry, which shall accession, catalogue, circulate and store materials of the sort which it now chiefly handles, i.e. primary intelligence reports and series similar in form and substance which now flow into R&A. It shall also serve as a central file for papers and correspondence of both Branches. Special categories, such as operational material, will receive high security handling.*

(ii) Joint Library, under R&A head, which shall accession, catalogue, circulate and store materials of the sort which it now handles, i.e. pre-

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* See Addendum B.

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ceased intelligence documents, particularly those of large scope or book form, including similar materials as present handled by the Registry.

(iii) Press Intelligence Unit, staffed by either or both Branches, which shall handle, circulate and file information from the press.

(iv) Cable and Pouch Control, staffed preferably by SI, which shall order and record the receipt, circulation and dispatch of all cable and pouch intelligence materials for the Reporting Board.

5. Administrative Section Chief, from either Branch, shall be responsible to the Office of the Chief for the following activities:

(i) The clerical staff.

(ii) The corps of translators.

(iii) Reproduction - this unit will be responsible either directly or through liaison with the Reproduction Branch for the duplication of materials by Ditto, microfilm or photostat.

(iv) Cartography - this unit will be responsible for rapid preparation of maps, sketches and charts to accompany intelligence reports; it will maintain a working relationship with the [illegible] Map Division where such personnel is available.

6. The writers suggest this organizational pattern for the major headquarters in London, Paris, and Berlin. They hope that the pattern, with appropriate modifications in detail, may be found applicable where other Reporting Boards exist.

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ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1944

1. In the joint memorandum dated 18 September 1944, and known to Gen. Sa; [redacted] and SI will contribute staff at all levels, except that the Chief of the SIRA Board and the Chief of the Joint Registry will be members of the SI staff. The reason for this is in the interest of maintaining the continuity of certain security policies essential to the functioning of the SI Branch.

2. Addendum to Par. 3 f (1): In view of the special security problems involved in the Registry handling of SI operational material, there shall be established in the Joint Registry a special SI section to be known as "The Vault". Certain members of the Registry staff will be designated to handle exclusively "The Vault" material and the Chief of the Joint Registry will deal directly with the Chief of the SI Branch or the SI operational desks in all matters concerning "The Vault" material. If it becomes necessary to house "The Vault" material, outside the Joint Registry, this can be done, but it is hoped that "The Vault" can be maintained as part of the Joint Registry to facilitate matters of administration, i.e. handling cables and pouches, general security, and the widest use of limited trained personnel.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 11, 1944

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

XN-16937

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)
MAGRUDER

(FOR INFORMATION)
SECRETARIAT, DIRECTOR, ETO.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#66731. For Magruder and Banks from Forgan.

Please forward soonest possible copy my paper to 109 on suggested re-organization reporting board.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR: 8/11/44 4:53 P.M.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER:
ISSUED:
EFFECTIVE:

TO: LIST B

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE ON DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Under the Deputy Director, IS, a Committee on Dissemination of Intelligence is hereby established. The personnel of the Committee shall consist of a member of the staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence who shall serve as chairman; the Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, CIS; and a member of the Reporting Board to be named by the Chief, RB.

2. The duties and functions of the Committee shall be:

(a) To insure the observance of policies relating to dissemination of intelligence prescribed by the Director, OSS.

(b) To establish rules for the guidance of the several branches of the Intelligence Service, embodying sound general principles and techniques to be applied in the preparation, editing and dissemination of intelligence reports.

(c) To review all intelligence reports issued by the several branches, and to institute such corrective measures as are indicated.

(d) To establish special procedures for the handling of certain types of intelligence requiring other than routine processing or dissemination.

(e) To arrange for the preparation or assemblage of significant intelligence reports appropriate for special dissemination by the Director, OSS, or by the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

3. The Current Intelligence Staff will perform such operations as are required by the Committee, including the preparation of special reports, the routine examination of branch dissemminations, and such other editorial work as may be required.

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William J. Donovan
Director

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Date: March 28 1944

To: General William J. Donovan

Attached file: Dissemination of Intelligence

I have read General Magruder's recommendation and I think it is a sound solution.

I do not believe the Secretariat needs to be represented on the Committee, but think it should be in touch with its policies and performance. This could be accomplished, as Colonel Doering suggests, by copies of reports being sent to the Director's office.

JEB.
JEB

SECRET

R. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

30 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OSS

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Intelligence.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To establish sound procedures for the dissemination of OSS intelligence.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. The term "OSS intelligence" is used in this memorandum to include processed information derived through OSS sources, intelligence derived from other Allied intelligence agencies for which OSS acts as distributor, and basic intelligence reports and studies prepared by the branches of the Intelligence Service.

3. Such intelligence is presently disseminated as follows:

a. Each branch directly disseminates its own product as a routine matter.

b. The Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service makes a limited dissemination of certain significant items of spot intelligence on a higher level (e.g., to the Administrative Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House Map Room, and, on occasion, ranking officials of the State

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Department). Such items are normally prepared by the Current Intelligence Staff; in certain instances by members of the Deputy Director's staff.

c. The Director, OSS, similarly makes occasional dissemination of significant intelligence items on the highest level (e.g., the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State). Such items are prepared either by the Secretariat or by the staff of the Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service.

4. General supervision over dissemination is exercised by the Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service and his staff, implemented by office orders, office memoranda, and consultation with appropriate units in the branches. A member of the staff serves on the R&A Projects Committee. More recently, a committee composed of a staff member, the Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, and a member of the Reporting Board, SI, has been constituted to implement policies governing certain special types of dissemination (e.g., to the Administrative Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; to the Russian Mission for transmission to USSR). Certain deficiencies in supervision have resulted from a lack of a clear definition of authority and assignment of functions. For example, responsibility has not been clearly fixed for the preparation of items appropriate for dissemination by the Director. On occasion this has caused confusion and delay.

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5. Possible procedures are:

a. To give each branch complete autonomy over the dissemination of its own product.

b. To create a new over-all dissemination unit.

c. To leave routine dissemination to the branches, but to have an effective over-all supervision to insure the application of sound policies respecting the preparation, editing and dissemination of all intelligence reports, as well as a simple but workable mechanism for handling the dissemination of special items of intelligence which do not lend themselves to routine treatment.

6. Uncontrolled branch dissemination does not appear desirable. It makes difficult the application of any consistent OSS policy or the formulation of uniform fundamental principles relating to the distribution of intelligence. On occasion it produces duplication and inconsistencies in the output of the agency. In practice it has not evolved satisfactory procedures for handling special types of dissemination.

7. On the other hand, a centralized dissemination unit has even greater practical disadvantages. It would still be necessary for each branch to retain its own processing unit. Because of the peculiar problems relating to the product of each branch, these units could not well be dispensed with or unified. Hence, a centralized dissemination unit would have to be superimposed on the existing structure. Such a unit would be unnecessary and unduly cumbersome. It could con-

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tribute little to the routine dissemination of reports, which, on the whole, is adequately handled by the branches themselves. It would tend to retard dissemination, whereas one of the best features of the existing system is its ability (unique among the intelligence agencies) to distribute intelligence quickly and with a minimum of red tape. Furthermore, the staff of such unit would probably not have sufficient contact either with the operations of the branches or with their customers. It would create new problems of space, funds, personnel and security.

8. The recommended alternative is 5-c. This would preserve the simplicity and flexibility of the present routine practices while providing a proper degree of unified control. Such control can be effected with a minimum of organizational change by giving formal recognition to the system now in partial operation.

9. Under this proposal, the existing Committee, composed of a member of the staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence and representatives of R&A and SI, would be given general supervision over the dissemination of intelligence. It is believed that such a unit is small enough to be effective, while having represented on it the two branches which distribute the bulk of the intelligence produced by this agency. The duties of the Committee would include as well the preparation of such reports as require special treatment. Since the members of the Committee are engaged in the performance of other functions, it is

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proposed that they utilize the facilities of the Current Intelligence Staff for the preparation of such special items, for the routine examination of the reports put out by each branch, and for such editorial work as may seem desirable. The use of this Staff will obviate the necessity of creating any new operational unit.

10. The Current Intelligence Staff is well qualified by the nature of its work to process items requiring special treatment, and to act as an editorial board of review. Its personnel has the requisite discretion and experience. Its Chief is a member of the R&A Projects Committee, currently reviews R&A Situation Reports, and serves both on the J.I.C. Weekly Summary Committee and on a special committee of the J.I.C. appointed to review the publications of the several intelligence agencies.

11. It is contemplated that the proposed Committee will require the services of an Administrative Assistant, and that the Current Intelligence Staff will require the addition of two trained assistants to handle the increased flow of work.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that an order be issued substantially as follows:

a. Under the Deputy Director, IS, a Committee on Dissemination of Intelligence is hereby established. The personnel of the Committee shall consist of a member of the staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence who shall

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serve as chairman; the Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, R&A; and a member of the Reporting Board to be named by the Chief, SI.

4. The duties and functions of the Committee shall be:

(1) To insure the observance of policies relating to dissemination of intelligence prescribed by the Director, OSS.

(2) To establish rules for the guidance of the several branches of the Intelligence Service, embodying sound general principles and techniques to be applied in the preparation, editing and dissemination of intelligence reports.

(3) To review all intelligence reports issued by the several branches, and to institute such corrective measures as are indicated.

(4) To establish special procedures for the handling of certain types of intelligence requiring other than routine processing or dissemination.

(5) To arrange for the preparation or assemblage of significant intelligence reports appropriate for special dissemination by the Director, OSS, or by the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

5. The Current Intelligence Staff will perform such operations as are required by the Committee, including the preparation of special reports, the routine examination of

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branch dissaminations, and such other editorial work as may be required.

15. It is further recommended that the Committee on Dissemination of Intelligence be authorized to employ an Administrative Assistant and one stenographer; and that the Chief, Current Intelligence Staff, be authorized to employ two additional professional assistants.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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[redacted] 7 PM 5 34

6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Material (Reference: Colonel Forgan's Report of 4 January 1944)

My comments and recommendations on the above report were submitted to the Director in a memorandum dated 21 February 1944. The report is returned herewith.

John Magruder

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Attachment.

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Date 26 March '44

To: GENERAL DONOVAN

1. I think this is excellent.

A proval of the proposed order is re-

commended.

2. I do not think it necessary for

the Executive Office to have a repre-

sentative sitting full-time on the

Committee, but I do believe it is im-

portant that the Director's Office

receive copies of all reports dissemin

ated except such as may be specifically

[illegible], and that this office keep in

close touch with the working Committee.

Office of the Executive Officer

W. J. D., Jr.

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COLONEL BUXTON

Read Colonel Doering's comments on this and please give me your recommendations.

W. J. D.

3/27/44

Director's Office

(3508)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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21 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Material
(References: Memorandum of Colonel Forgan, 4 January 1944; Memorandum of Mr. Shepardson, 10 February 1944)

1. In my opinion the over-all objectives outlined in Colonel Forgan's report are eminently sound. It is highly desirable to encourage the closest possible relationship with the several agencies who are the primary customers of our intelligence, and it is equally desirable to have the material processed by individuals having some expertness in the types of material handled, particularly those of a more technical nature.

2. On the other hand, I am not convinced that it is necessary or advisable to put into immediate effect the full plan recommended in Colonel Forgan's report. I would be inclined to agree with Mr. Shepardson that it would be wise to delay final action until the Evaluation Procedures Officer is in a position to give a report on the results attained by his work. We will then be in a better position to know the extent of the cooperation which may be expected from other agencies, as well as the weaknesses, if any, in our present system.

OCD

Please give me your views

John Magruder

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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Date: Feb.15.

To: Mr.Putzell

SECRET

Attached: Memo from Mr.Shepardson to Col.Buxton,dated Feb.10,1944

EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL (Memorandum of Col.Forgan,Jan.4 1944)

Please show Mr.Shepardson's memo to General Magruder for comment.

G.EDWARD BUXTON

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G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(1 678)

To:

For comment & return

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 February 1944

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Material.
(Memorandum of Col. Forgan, 4 January 1944.)

1. I have been asked for comments and recommendations on the above paper.

2. Comments follow:

(a) The transfer of Dr. Callisen from G-2 to OSS is (I understand) almost complete. His transfer is expected to effect improvement in SI intelligence.

(1) through evaluation of subject matter by R & A experts

(2) through evaluation of source through description of sources (now in process).


This auxiliary is expected to improve point (b) of Col. Forgan's report, page 2, "The actual evaluating of the reports based on the analysis of the material by their own (SI) staff and by R & A".

It is on point (b) above that Col. Forgan's memorandum wholly turns.

3. Recommendations follow:

(a) That the scheme proposed by Col. Forgan be reexamined in the light of actual experience of the procedure outlined above, which is, in itself, calculated to improve the quality of the reports.

(b) That, since, the proposed scheme involves personnel and space, - neither of which can



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presently be alloted to the SI Reporting Board in Que Building, - the problem be approached more realistically, with the thought that the present Board, if accorded additional space and personnel, could accomplish a high percentage of the results set down as desirable.

(c) That no action be taken on the above recommendations until the subject has been discussed thoroughly before General Donovan.

W.H.S.

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Intelligence Pub. 13,120
1 Dissemination
1 Collection
1 Evaluation
1 Committee

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton DATE: 2 February 1944

FROM: Lt. Colonel Doering

SUBJECT: Report of Colonel Forgan's Committee on Evaluation of Intelligence Material

I have carefully examined Colonel Forgan's report, copy of which is attached. It seems very good to me.

I understand Colonel Forgan gave you another copy, and he has asked the Secretariat to give it to the General when he returns, and in the meantime to treat the existence of it as highly confidential.


I should think that at some point the General would want the comments of Messrs. Shepardson, Langer, Mason, and possibly others. Langer—

Copy to Secretariat

O[illegible], Jr.

To be held for General D.

G.H.B.



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretariat

SUBJECT Evaluation of Intelligence Material

1. Attached hereto is the original and one copy of the memorandum for the Director, OSS, on the subject of Evaluation of Intelligence Material.

2. This memorandum is a result of an order from the Director quoted in the first paragraph.

3. It is requested that the memorandum be submitted to the Director as soon as possible on his return and that in the meantime the existence of it be treated as highly confidential. A copy has been furnished to Colonel Buxton.

J. R. Forgan

Colonel J. R. Forgan, G.S.C.
Assistant Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

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ACTION

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ROUTING SHEET

Originator Colonel L. Morgan
Date 7 January 1944
Addressee The Director, OSS
Subject Evaluation of Intelligence Materia... Date Rec'd

To	Room No.	Date	Initials	Comments: Indicate action desired or taken
Mr. Shepardson	1212	Due [illegible] 1944	[illegible]	For your comments and recommendations.
Dr. Langer	604 Annex Navy	[illegible] 18 944	[illegible]	" " " " "
Mr. Mason	Annex No. 1			" " " " "
Major McDonough	2076	Que 7/11 7/15		" " " " "
General Magruder	121	3/4 Central		" " " " "
Executive Office - Admin.				

E. J. P., Jr.

E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Asst. Executive Officer
8 February 1944

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, OSS.

SUBJECT Evaluation of Intelligence Material

The Director, OSS, commented on the memorandum on the above subject of November 8, 1943, as follows: "What I am aiming for is to set up a real evaluation board made up of scholars, soldiers, diplomats, and statesmen working together. In preparation for that day, I would like to see us set up our own board made up of our own men with these qualities. Put this paper into effect but let the Committee continue its studies and have the larger plan ready for my return."

In accordance with these instructions, the Committee has continued its studies, and it is felt that the recommendations contained in the report which follows, if adopted, will provide OSS with the type of evaluation machinery envisaged by the Director.

Statement of the Problem: Prepare a plan for setting up in OSS mechanism for a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of intelligence material which will make use of the best available knowledge on military, naval, political, and economic subjects.

Discussion: The duties of the present Reporting

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Board fall broadly into three classifications: (a) The physical processing of the material, including recording, editing, translating, deleting operational data, and reproduction. (b) The actual evaluating of the reports based on the analysis of the material by their own staff and by R&A. (c) Distribution within OSS and dissemination to outside using agencies. With respect to (a), the Reporting Board has performed an outstanding job in the face of considerable practical difficulties; and with respect to (c), their performance has on the whole been satisfactory. It is with respect to (b) that the present operation has not been fully developed and the proposed new set-up is directed primarily to strengthening this process.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. It is recommended that the Reporting Board be reconstituted with the following sections: A Processing Section and six Evaluating Sections -- Military, Naval, Air, Political (including psychological and sociological intelligence), Economic, and Technical. A chart of organization is attached (Tab A), as well as a flow chart indicating the movement of the reports through the Board (Tab B).

1. Processing Section.

(a) Functions. This section would be entrusted with the recording, translating, editing, reproducing, filing, and dissemination of all SI/OSS reports.

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(b) Remarks. This section would perform all of the functions connected with the processing of reports in much the same manner as the present Reporting Board with the following exceptions.

Editing would consist, as at present, of the removal of operational data and such material as for security or other reasons cannot be given regular distribution. It would likewise put the reports into correct literary form after they have passed through the Evaluating Sections. However, except for the elimination of obvious and gross errors the Processing Section will make no revisions, corrections, emendations or eliminations not prescribed and sanctioned by the Evaluating Sections.

The reports would only be reproduced after the above mentioned editing had taken place.

Dissemination of the finished reports would be made through the appropriate Liaison Officers, or other responsible channels, to the interested agencies as indicated by the Evaluating Sections.

2. Evaluating Sections.

(a) Functions. Under the supervision of a competent and experienced chief the Evaluating Sections would be entrusted with the criticism, analysis, and evaluation of all SI/OSS reports and would indicate their distribution.

(b) Remarks. The Chiefs of the Military,

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Naval, and Air Sections would be high-ranking and experienced officers; those of the Political and Economic Sections, civilians with similar qualifications. The Chief of the Technical Section might be either a military man or a civilian. The officers would be nominated by MID, ONI, and A-2 respectively, with the approval of the Director, OSS. The State Department would nominate the Chief of the Political Section, and R&A or FEA the Chief of the Economic Section, subject in each case to the approval of the Director, OSS. The Chiefs thus selected would function as members of OSS and have their headquarters in OSS but would remain in close contact with the appropriate outside agencies.

Each Chief will be provided with a staff of a size adequate to assist him in the performance of his duties. It is contemplated that the majority of the staff of the Political and Economic Sections will be composed of R&A personnel. In general, the staff should be kept as small as possible and should not duplicate available facilities in R&A.

Criticism of the reports would involve the elimination of any material for reasons of obsolescence, triviality or improbability. Reports which are of little or no value because of faulty reporting, or otherwise unsatisfactory, would be brought to the attention of the appropriate SI Desks who, in turn, would bring the matter to the attention of the field agents. Outstanding reports would likewise be brought to the

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attention of the SI Desks for the same purpose. A record of the work of the individual field agents would be maintained by the Evaluating Sections in such a way as not to disclose the identity of the agents, but so as to provide a check of their ability and reliability in reporting information of interest to the individual Evaluating Sections. The Desk heads would be kept informed of the ratings given their agents by the Section Chiefs, and would keep a record of such ratings for their own use.

Analysis of the reports would include adding any notes which might seem appropriate or helpful, and when possible spot-checking any doubtful items with the appropriate outside agencies. Any such notes would be included by the Processing Section in the final reproduction of the reports for dissemination. The system of referring reports to R&A for analysis and comment would be continued.

The Evaluating Sections would have the final responsibility for evaluation both of the source and of the information contained in the reports. As the field agents and Desk heads have the more direct relationship with the source, the evaluation of the source received from the Desk should be given the greatest weight, and changes in such evaluation should normally be made only after consultation with the Desk. As far as possible, the Sections would obtain evaluation and criticisms of the reports from the appropriate outside agencies,

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together with requests for additional data and confirmation. It is hoped that with the closer working relationship to be expected between Section Chief and using agency, evaluation and criticism will be submitted by the latter as a routine matter (as under the British system), and that this will prove one of the major advantages of the proposal. It is recommended in this connection that there be printed on the back of the present cover sheet an evaluation blank similar to that now in use by the MID/SI Liaison Offices (Tab C). Such evaluations and criticisms would be used by the Evaluating Sections as an additional check on the quality of the reports with an eye to the ultimate improvement of the work of the field agents. When necessary, supplementary reports could be issued correcting errors in reports previously disseminated.

The Evaluating Sections would indicate to the Processing Section the distribution which should be made of the finished reports.

B. It is recommended that a smaller replica of the Reporting Board in Washington be created in each of the main OSS Missions and that the closest possible liaison between the Section Chiefs in Washington and their opposite numbers in the field be maintained.

General Comments: The following objections may be raised to the proposed set-up:

1. OSS will never receive the necessary cooperation

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from the Army, Navy, and other government agencies.

Answer: Cooperation will, of course, be slow at the outset, but the great strength of the British system of evaluation is that over a period of time the British government has recognized the great value of secret intelligence and all British Government departments both military and civilian are keenly aware of the necessity for accurate reports and are, therefore, willing and ready to cooperate with SIS to the utmost of their ability. It is unthinkable that over a period of time the government of the United States will not come to the same conclusion. The present close relationship with the Order of Battle Section, MID, is an example of present cooperation along this line.

2. By giving the agents' numbers to the various sections, security may be imperiled.

Answer: Whereas it is true that the more people who know an agent's number the more chance for a violation of security exists, nevertheless the advantages to be gained by this procedure far outweigh the slight increase in security risk.

3. The proposed procedure would result in a material slowing up in the ultimate receipt of reports by the using agencies.

Answer: Actually, the procedure from a time standpoint is not materially different from that which is now in effect. The Evaluating Section Chiefs would take the place of

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the present regional analysts. Checking with other branches or agencies prior to dissemination would take place as a rule only (a) when a routine procedure has been established similar to that approved for analysis by R&A; or (b) when the report is of such a nature that the necessity for careful scrutiny outweighs the need for immediate dissemination. In the latter case, the agency having a primary interest in the intelligence would normally receive the report immediately for analysis; and agencies having a secondary interest would gain more from thorough screening and analysis than they would lose by any lapse of time. Cabled intelligence of immediate interest would receive special treatment as at present.

4. If we depend on section chiefs appointed by outside agencies, we may have inferior men wished on us.

Answer: Of course the strength of any operation is in direct proportion to the ability of the individuals involved. No section chief will be appointed without the approval of the Director, OSS; and we should certainly be sufficiently alert to the prime necessity of obtaining good men to insure us against having men of low caliber assigned to us. In any event, the plan presupposes a reasonable degree of cooperation from other agencies.

5. Because of the lack of cooperation in general, the Army, Navy, and State Department may refuse to nominate section heads.

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Answer: If the whole procedure is explained and if the Army, Navy, and State Department realize that what we are attempting to do is to make our product more useful to them, it is not believed that they will adopt this attitude. If, however, they should, we will simply have to find our own men to fill the jobs. The advantage of having the using agency nominate the section head is because it will then feel a sense of responsibility towards him and he should obtain their active cooperation. Also, presumably, he will be a man who knows his way around the agency with which he was formerly associated and will, therefore, be able to refer material to the proper divisions for analysis.

Advantages Inherent in the Proposed Set-up:

1. Through the medium of the proposed Reporting Board, our relationships with our customers would be much closer.

2. It should be possible to obtain the comments of the using agencies on the value of our reports which in turn can be relayed to our agents. At the present time one of our great weaknesses is the fact that our agents know so little about whether or not their work is appreciated and used.

3. We should also receive from the using agencies valuable suggestions with regard to their requirements and our desk heads should, therefore, be able to give much more intelligent direction to our agents in the field.

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4. If the ideal of complete cooperation can be achieved, we should be able to coopt the best brains in the United States Government for the analysis of our incoming material.

5. The initial screening given by the Section of the Reporting Board in the field and again by the equivalent Section of the Reporting Board in Washington should result in killing any reports which because they are out-of-date, inaccurate, or for other reasons should not be sent out. At the present time it is felt that we are sending out a good many reports which are of no value, and do not reflect credit on the agency.

6. There is a tendency on the part of some desk heads to get into fields which are apart from their primary duty of managing their agents. The proposed set-up would relieve the desk head of any additional duties and should furnish him with the material necessary to rate his agents and more efficiently direct their activities.

7. The creation of sections on a functional rather than on a geographic basis should produce a better evaluated product. The sections internally may be broken down geographically to permit further specialization.

8. Finally, the mechanism will readily serve as the model for and possibly as the nucleus of an overall

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evaluation unit in the event of a true centralization of U. S. intelligence activities.

J.R. Forgan

Colonel J. R. Forgan, G.S.C., Chairman,
Committee on Evaluation, Collection, and
Dissemination of Intelligence Material

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Reporting Board
Organization Chart
for Functional Evaluation
and Reporting

Air

Political

Economic
Evaluation Section

Technical
Evaluation Section

Army Air F.

Navy Air C.

State Dept.

FRB

Commerce Dept.

Treasury Dept.

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[illegible] OF MATERIAL FOR [illegible]

REGISTRY

1. Receives all material.
If cable, it is sent directly to Central Desk and Geographic Desks.
If [illegible] material it is checked for former references, indexed, cross-indexed, sent to Geographic Desks
Files processed and/or distributed material.

GEOGRAPHIC DESKS

2. Suggests evaluation of source and material, sends to Central Desk.

EVALUATING SECTIONS

4. Analyzes and assesses material.
Consults with Geographic Desks and outside consultants when advisable. Makes final evaluation.
Sends to Central Desk for [illegible] (if it is to be disseminated), or to Registry (if it is not to be disseminated).

7. Submits certain processed reports for analysis to ONI and other agencies, [illegible] final approval, initials and indicates dissemination.

CENTRAL DESK

3. Logs in.
If in foreign language, send to Translator, otherwise, sends directly to Evaluating Sections.

5. Reports and cables to be disseminated are given a [illegible] and transmitted to an editor.

6. Transmits to Processing Sec. for Reproduction and dissemination

10. Logs material out to Registry for file.

PROCESSING SECTION

3-a. Translator — Translates and returns original copy to Evaluating Sections via Central Desk.

6. Editor — Edits material, [illegible] interpretation of Evaluating Sec, dictates heading and forwards to Evaluating Sections via Central Desk.

9. Reproduces, on [illegible] copies on "Ditto" machine, [illegible] distributes and disseminates.

Original material, together with one copy, is returned to Central Desk.

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From: Central Cover[illegible]

OSI Report No.

To: Chief,

For official purposes and by agreement within the two operations (OSI and WIP), a check is desired of the quality of the material in the attached report. Please indicate your estimate by checking (✓) or annotating) below:

VALUE OF DATA	
Definitely valuable	
Of secondary interest	
Of casual interest	
Worthless	
RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION	
1. Confirmed by other sources	
2. Probably true	
3. Possibly true	
4. Doubtful	
5. Improbable	
6. Cannot be judged	
TIMELINESS OF REPORT	
Current	
Somewhat out of date	
Completely out of date	
ORIGINALITY OF REPORT	
Original	
Confirmed but adds significantly	
Adds little of significance	
Duplicates [illegible] received	

Remarks:

[illegible] to Central Cover Section, Collection Div.

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ACTION ROUTING SHEET **SECRET**

Originator [illegible]
Date [illegible]
Addressee Asst. Director, OSS
Subject: Evaluation of Intelligence Materials Date Rec'd

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
Mr. Shepardson	1212	Que			For your comments and recommendations.
Dr. Langer	604 Annex No. 1				" " " " "
Mr. Mason	Annex No. 1				" " " " "
Major McDonough	2076	Que			" " " " "
General Magruder	121	Central			" " " " "
Executive Office - Admin.					

E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Asst. Executive Officer
8 February 1944

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4 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, OSS.

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Material

The Director, OSS, commented on the memorandum on the above subject of November 8, 1943, as follows: "What I am aiming for is to set up a real evaluation board made up of scholars, soldiers, diplomats, and statesmen working together. In preparation for that day, I would like to see us set up our own board made up of our own men with these qualities. Put this paper into effect but let the Committee continue its studies and have the larger plan ready for my return."

In accordance with these instructions, the Committee has continued its studies, and it is felt that the recommendations contained in the report which follows, if adopted, will provide OSS with the type of evaluation machinery envisaged by the Director.

Statement of the Problem: Prepare a plan for setting up in OSS mechanism for a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of intelligence material which will make use of the best available knowledge on military, naval, political, and economic subjects.

Discussion: The duties of the present Reporting

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[illegible] fall broadly into three classifications: (a) the [illegible] processing of the material, including recording, editing, translating, deleting operational data, and reproduction, (b) the actual evaluating of the reports based on the analysis of the material by those [illegible] and by the, (c) distribution which is the dissemination by various [illegible] channels. With respect to (a), the Reporting Board has performed an outstanding job in the face of considerable practical difficulties, and with respect to (c), their performance has on the whole been satisfactory. It is with respect to (b) that the present operation has not been fully developed and the proposed new setup is directed primarily to strengthening this process.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. It is recommended that the Reporting Board be reorganized with the following sections: A Processing Section and six Evaluating Sections -- Military, Naval, Air, Political (including psychological and sociological intelligence), Economic, and Technical. A chart of organization is attached (Tab A), as well as a flow chart indicating the movement of the reports through the Board (Tab B).

1. Processing Section.

(a) Function. This section would be entrusted with the recording, translating, editing, reproducing, filing, and dissemination of all NIS reports.

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(b) Reporting. This section would perform all of the functions connected with the processing of reports in much the same manner as the present Reporting Board with the following exceptions.

Editing would consist, as at present, of the removal of operational data and such material as the security or other reasons cannot be given regular dissemination. It would likewise put the reports into correct literary form after they have passed through the Evaluating Sections. However, except for the elimination of obvious and gross errors, the Processing Section will make no revisions, corrections, emendations or eliminations not prescribed and sanctioned by the Evaluating Sections.

The reports would only be reproduced after the above mentioned editing had taken place.

Dissemination of the finished reports would be made through the appropriate Liaison Officers, or other responsible channels, to the interested agencies as indicated by the Evaluating Sections.

3. Evaluating Sections.

(a) Functions. Under the supervision of a competent and experienced chief the Evaluating Sections would be entrusted with the criticism, analysis, and evaluation of all SI/CIB reports and would indicate their distribution.

(b) Members. The Chiefs of the Military,

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distribution of the Department of State for this purpose. A number of this copy of the Intelligence Memorandum should be distributed by the Intelligence Services in such a way as not to disclose the identity of the agency, but so as to provide a check of their utility and reliability in reporting intelligence of interest to the Intelligence Services. The Director would be kept informed of the action given these reports by the Services concerned, and would keep a record of such action for their use.

Subjects of the reports would include adding any other items which might seem appropriate or helpful, and also providing any detailed plans with the appropriate security classification. Any such notes would be included by the Intelligence Service in the final reproduction of the reports for dissemination. The system of referring reports to all for comments would be continued.

The Intelligence Services could have the final responsibility for evaluation both of the source and of the information contained in the reports. In the field agency and Army Area they may have many different relationships with the sources, the evaluation of the source received from the field should in time be greatly aided, and changes in such evaluation should normally be made only after consultation with the Army, as far as possible. The Services would assist distribution and evaluation of the reports from the appropriate point of view.

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together with proposals for additional data and evaluations. It is hoped that with the close working relationship which is expected between Section Chief and Desk Officer, evaluation and criticism will be subjected by the latter to a critical review (as under the British system), and that this will leave one of the major advantages of the proposals. It is recommended in this connection that there be printed on the back of the present cover sheet an evaluation blank similar to that now in use by the NE/FI Liaison Officer (the file, both evaluations and criticisms would be used by the Evaluating Sections as an additional check on the quality of the reports with an eye to the ultimate improvement of the work of the field agents. When necessary, supplementary reports would be issued correcting errors in reports previously disseminated.

The Evaluating Sections would indicate to the Reporting Section the distribution which should be made of the finished reports.

8. It is recommended that a smaller replica of the Reporting Board in Washington be created in each of the main CIA Missions and that the closest possible liaison between the Section Chiefs in Washington and their opposite numbers in the field be maintained.

General Remarks: The following objections may be raised to the proposed set-up:

1. CIA will never receive the necessary cooperation

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from the Army, Navy, and other government agencies.

Answer: Cooperation will, of course, be sought at the outset, but the great strength of the British system of evaluation is that over a period of time the British government has recognized the great value of secret intelligence and all British government departments both military and civilian are keenly aware of the necessity for secrecy regards and are, therefore, willing and ready to cooperate with SIS to the utmost of their ability. It is unthinkable that after a period of time the government of the United States will not come to the same conclusion. The present close relationship with the Order of Battle Section, MID, is an example of present cooperation along this line.

2. By giving the agents' numbers to the various sections, security may be imperiled.

Answer: Whereas it is true that the more people who know an agent's number the more chance for a violation of security exists, nevertheless the advantages to be gained by this procedure far outweigh the slight increase in security risk.

3. The proposed procedure would result in a material slowing up in the ultimate receipt of reports by the using agencies.

Answer: Actually, the procedure from a time standpoint is not materially different from that which is now in effect. The Evaluating Section Chiefs would take the place of

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the present centralized analysis. Dealing with other agencies prior to dissemination would take place as a rule only (a) when a routine procedure has been established which is that approved for analysis by NSA or (b) when the report is of such a nature that the necessity for careful scrutiny outweighs the need for immediate dissemination. In the latter case, the agency having a primary interest in the intelligence would normally receive the report immediately for analytical and agencies having a secondary interest would gain more from thorough screening and analysis than they could lose by any lapse of time. Coded intelligence of immediate interest would receive special treatment as at present.

6. If we depend on section chiefs appointed by outside agencies, we may have inferior men placed on us.

Answer: Of course the strength of any operation is in direct proportion to the ability of the individuals involved. No section chief will be appointed without the approval of the Director, OSO; and we should certainly be sufficiently alert to the prime necessity of obtaining good men to insure us against having men of low caliber assigned to us. In any event, the plan presupposes a reasonable degree of cooperation from other agencies.

b. Because of the lack of cooperation in general, the Army, Navy, and State Department may refuse to nominate section heads.

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Answer: If the whole procedure is explained and if the Army, Navy, and State Department realize that what we are attempting to do is to make our product more useful to them, it is not believed that they will adopt this attitude. If, however, they should, we will simply have to find our own men to fill the jobs. The advantage of having the using agency nominate the section head is because it will then feel a sense of responsibility towards him and he should obtain their active cooperation. Also, presumably, he will be a man who knows his way around the agency with which he was formerly associated and will, therefore, be able to refer material to the proper divisions for analysis.

Advantages inherent in the proposed setup:

1. Through the medium of the proposed Reporting Board, our relationships with our customers would be much closer.

2. It should be possible to obtain the comments of the using agencies on the value of our reports which in turn can be relayed to our agents. At the present time one of our great weaknesses is the fact that our agents know so little about whether or not their work is appreciated and used.

3. We should also receive from the using agencies valuable suggestions with regard to their requirements and our desk heads should, therefore, be able to give much more intelligent direction to our agents in the field.

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evaluation unit in the event of a new investigation of U. S. intelligence activities.

[redacted]
Colonel J. H. Ives, U.S. Air Force
Committee on Evaluation, Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence Activities

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4. If the ideal of complete coordination can be achieved, we should be able to secure the best brains in the United States Government for the analysis of our incoming materials.

5. The initial screening given by the Section of the Reporting Board in the field and again by the equivalent Section of the Reporting Board in Washington should result in killing any reports which because they are out-of-date, inaccurate, or for other reasons should not be sent out. At the present time it is felt that we are sending out a good many reports which are of no value, and do not reflect credit on the Agency.

6. There is a tendency on the part of some desk heads to get into fields which are apart from their primary duty of managing their agents. The proposed set-up would relieve the desk head of any additional duties and should furnish him with the material necessary to rate his agents and more efficiently direct their activities.


7. The creation of sections on a functional rather than on a geographic basis should produce a better evaluated product. The sections internally may be broken down geographically to permit further specialization.

8. Finally, the mechanism will readily serve as the model for and possibly as the nucleus of an overall

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D[redacted]

From: Contact Section

OSS Report No. [redacted]

To: Chief,

For official purposes and by agreement within the two agencies (OSS and MIS), a check is desired of the quality of the material in the attached report. Please indicate your estimate by checking (or commenting) below:

VALUE AND AID	
Definitely valuable	
Of secondary interest	
Of casual interest	
Worthless	
RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION	
1. Confirmed by other sources	
2. Probably true	
3. Possibly true	
4. Doubtful	
5. Improbable	
6. Cannot be judged	
TIMELINESS OF REPORT	
Current	
Somewhat out of date	
Completely out of date	
ORIGINALITY OF REPORT	
[illegible]	

Comments

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Colonel J. R. Pierson

Louis Fatrell

[redacted]

Please be advised that Mr. Thomas, Acting Director, has this day approved the request contained in paragraph 4 of the subject memorandum.

W. J. Fatrell, Jr.
Major, USMC
Asst. Executive Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR The Acting Director, OSS
(Through the Secretariat)

SUBJECT Committee on Evaluation, Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence Material.

1. On the 22nd of October 1943, the Director, OSS, established a committee on the evaluation, collection, and dissemination of intelligence material with the writer as chairman. The duties of the Committee are to prepare:

"A. A plan for setting up in OSS mechanism for comprehensive and thorough evaluation of intelligence material.

"B. A report on the advisability of creating a central collection and dissemination branch embodying the present functions of the Reporting Board, the Registry, C.I.D., J.I.C.A., and any other collection and dissemination activities not covered by the above. If, in the opinion of the committee, such a centralization either in whole or in part of collection and dissemination or a modification of the existing machinery is desirable, the report should embody a plan setting forth the type of organization necessary to carry out effectively the work. The committee will obtain the views of personnel of OSS whose experience would make their opinions of value with respect to this subject."

2. A report covering sub-paragraph (a) was forwarded to the Director on the 8th of November and was approved by him.

3. In connection with sub-paragraph (b) the committee has held a series of hearings for the past 8 weeks and has come to the following conclusions.

A. The subject is an extremely involved one which affects in one way or another practically every branch of OSS.

B. As a practical matter it is an impossibility for the committee as such to obtain all the

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necessary facts on which to base conclusions and recommendations.

C. The Budget and Procedures Branch has a staff of competent people who are in a position to ascertain the facts and are ready and willing to take on the necessary investigative work.

4. It is requested that approval be given to employing Mr. Hicks and his assistants for the above mentioned purpose. Their work would be conducted in accordance with a questionnaire carefully prepared by the Committee and their activities would be subject to the direction and control of the Committee.

J. R. Fagan

Colonel J. R. Fagan, G.S.C.
Acting Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

Major Dean is on Fagan committee and approves request. 28/2 11/VV

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