

ITALY

15022-

*Sardinia 11,567
* Power Plants
* Stockholm Cable 15922*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 12, 1943

SECRET

*Secretariat
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TO: General William J. Donovan
FROM: R. Davis Halliwell
SUBJECT: April 28th cable from Stockholm #15922

In reply to your memorandum of May 6th on the subject, Lt. Shabeen has spent a good deal of time in investigating possibilities of destruction of the power plant in Sardinia, which would cause serious damage to the enemy.

We are just in receipt of a report from R & A indicating that the substance of the Stockholm cable is incorrect.

There are apparently three power stations in Sardinia generating from twenty-two to twenty-seven thousand kilowatts each. The new power station at Arbatax has been confirmed as being under construction with an ultimate capacity of 50,000 kilowatts. (KVA)

R & A further reports that the strategic significance of the three known power plants are principally in connection with irrigation and industry. The most promising effect which might be secured through attack would be impairment of water supplies during the dry season.

As a result of the above information, it appears this target, while desirable is not as potentially intriguing as it appeared from the Stockholm cable. We will transmit the relative information to Colonel Eddy by pouch.

[Signature]
R. Davis Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USSE
Chief, SO

RHH:ET

SECRET

Report on Sardinia, S. I. (cont'd.)

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The power station is on the Sardinian coast immediately opposite San Gavino Island. It is a thermal plant, designed to burn Sicilian lignite, which is delivered to small landing wharves. It was planned to build a 200-mw lignite unit, there are four 50-mw units, operating independently, each for its own transformer.

The installed capacity is 20,000 kW, and was estimated same 1/2 year ago. A 10-kV line runs to Carbonia, via a substation at Villanova; the station also supplies port installations at Porto Cervo, Porto Torres, and Porto Torres Romano.

The plant consists of four blocks, containing steam generators, distribution apparatus and pumps, turbo-alternators, and 30-kV bus bars. Construction was probably completed in 1956 autumn of 1957.

The Pisanella river is dammed near its source and it was planned to build three power stations to use the head of water formed. Work was started and later suspended; the most recent information dates from 1957, when the stations were not operating.

The project (about which information is only fragmentary) seems to provide for the construction of a dam creating a reservoir of 40 million cu. m. capacity, from which water would be carried by a canal 3 3/4 miles long. There would be two falls: one, from the 2,000-foot down to the 1,377-foot level, would drive turbines of 10,000 h.p.; the other, a vertical fall of 800 feet, would drive turbines of 20,000 h.p.; no precise information is available. Finally the water would be retained by a 350-foot dam to form a reservoir of 300,000 cu. m. capacity, which would serve for the irrigation of the Cagliari plain. Above Mulas there was to be a second dam creating a 400-million cu. m. reservoir to supply underground generating equipment.

(10) LABOUR

As the island's economy is predominantly agricultural there are likely to be no large reserves of labour in concentrations except as follows:

- (a) in the coal-mining areas, where there are believed to be about 15,000 miners.
- (b) in the metal mines and smelters at Montepulci, Montevecchio, and San Gavino Monreale, where there are probably 7,000-8,000 workers.
- (c) in the docks at Cagliari. There is no information about the number of dockers, but it is of interest that the port handled about 1,000,000 tons of cargo in 1958.

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I.L. 1. 2. Report on Sanctions, C. 1. 1953 (Cont'd.)

Page 3

SANTA CHIARA (SANTA CHIARA-BUSACHI). (Photographs AT-53.)

By means of a barrage across the river Tinnis an artificial lake has been produced; the lake is about 22 sq. km. in area with about 250 million cu. m. of impounded water, rendering available an average continuous flow of 25 cu. m. per second, for producing electric energy and for irrigation. The installed capacity of the power station is given variously between 19,200 and 21,000 kW.

The installation consists of a straight, hollow-arched dam (833 feet in length, with a crest height of 200 feet above the river-bed) comprising 17 arches, each of 49 feet span. The power station is in the interior of the hollow dam and occupies five of the compartments enclosed by the main piers and the inclined arches forming the up-stream face of the dam; it is the only example of this type of construction in Italy.

There are four main generating sets, two of 5,200 (or 6,300) kW. and two of 4,400 (or 4,200) kW., each occupying a single compartment with its 3-phase, delta-star, step-up transformer of a secondary voltage of 79,220/70,000 volts, to which it is tied in. The turbines are of the horizontal Francis type, with double runners, and use a fall varying from 69 to 184 feet at a speed of 428 r.p.m. The intakes to the turbines are arranged vertically in the relieving arches of the dam and are protected with horizontal screens. The alternators are rated at 9,000 kVA. and 6,000 kVA. respectively, with a power factor of 0.7, 50 cycles, 4,400/5,600 volts. The main 70,000-volt bars, which are carried on insulators attached to the outside of the piers on the down-stream face of the dam, after running the length of the four machine compartments enter the fifth compartment, in which the switch-gear, arresters, etc., are arranged on four floors, from the topmost of which issue the lines to the two 3-phase circuit towers.

About 2 3/4 miles below lies the power station of Busachi, the power for which is derived from water impounded by a solid gravity-type dam 122 feet in length, in the form of a circular arc of 349 feet radius. The station is constructed close to the foot of the dam at one end and uses a fall of 45 to 59 feet. The equipment consists of a single vertical-type Francis turbine of 3,500 kW. output at 214 r.p.m. The alternator is designed for 4,500 kVA., power factor 0.7, 4,400/5,600 volts, 50 cycles, and is connected to a 3-phase 5,000/79,000-volt transformer. The station is designed to work automatically and is remote-controlled from the main station at Santa Chiara d'Ula.

The output from these stations is taken by the grid and by the nitrogen plants of the Soc. Anonima e Prodotti Nitrici.

SANTA CATERINA

Information on this power station was received after the completion of the map (fig. 3), which is therefore incorrect in two respects: the capacity is far greater than shown, and the location (marked "position doubtful") is not on Saint' Artice island.

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Copy of material in I.S.I.S. Report On Sardinia, C.B. 4886 G, pages 53, 52, 51, and 54.

(3) EFFICIENCY (see fig. 4)**GENERAL**

The island is supplied chiefly by two hydro-electric and two thermal stations, which feed a high-voltage grid. Probably there is also an extensive network (110 kv.) whose purpose can only be for lighting, owing to the small amount of power available.

GENERATING STATIONS. The four important stations (Coghinas, Cagliari, Santa Chiara d'Ula-Bussachi, and Santa Catarina) are described below in such detail as is available. In addition there are numerous small stations of purely local significance. Work on the three projected hydro-electric plants (totalling 15,000 kw.) in the Fluxendosa area has been started; it is not known if they have been completed.

LOCAL SUPPLIES. So far as is known the greater part of the island uses 3-phase A.C. at 50 cycles, but D.C. is also generated. The local voltage at Cagliari is 150/200 A.C.; there is no information for other localities.

COGHINAS. (Photographs 54-5.)

About 9 miles south-west of Tempio Pausania, in the northern part of the island, the river Coghinas has been dammed to form an artificial lake of 242 million cu. m. capacity; the river has a very irregular flow and is subject to violent floods in seasons of especially heavy rain. Elaborate arrangements have therefore been made to deal with the heavy surpluses of water that accumulate rapidly. The installed capacity of the plant is 27,000 kw.

The dam gives a head of water of about 200 feet. The turbine race, which contains 4 turbines totalling 30,000 h.p., is about 130 feet below the bed of the reservoir and is hewn out of the rock. The water is fed to the turbines through a vertical reinforced-concrete pipe coupled to a horizontal steel pipe-line; the outflow passes back to the lower levels of the river below the dam through a horizontal pipe-line about 2½ miles long.

Both A.C. and D.C. are generated; the A.C. is transmitted at H.T. to the transformer and switching station (at ground-level); the D.C. goes straight into the adjoining chemical works. La Maddalena arsenal receives its supplies from this station via a line at unknown voltage.

CAGLIARI. (Photograph 133.)

This thermal station (for position see mosaic 14) has an installed capacity of 25,000 kw. Lignite from the Saou Abis mine is used. It is thought to operate only when there is a scarcity of water for the hydro plants. No other information.

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May 19, 1946

c. It is a known fact that all the copies of intelligence material on Sardina available in Washington is also available for your use in AFM in Algiers.

d. If you plan an operation for this target, we recommend you refer to the following documents among others:

- I.S.I.S. Report on Sardina, O.S. 4696 U, dated November 1941, pages 51, 52, 53 and 54;
- I.S.I.S. Report on Sardina, O.S. 4695 (Plans); Preliminary Report, Strategic Engineering Study, No. 45, Sardina, Volume I, Beaches of Sardina;
- Special Report, Strategic Engineering Study, No. 46 Sardina, Volume II, Terrain Intelligence of Sardina, prepared by U.S. Geological Survey.

e. We are enclosing a typewritten copy of the material in I.S.I.S. Report on Sardina, O.S. 4696 U, to make certain you have this in the event the volume should not be readily available. Also enclosed is a photostat of a map showing the port of Arbatax.

R. Davis Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Chief - SO Branch

Enclosures

RDH:lp

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May 18, 1944

The large stations are linked by a grid system which runs in a roughly north and south direction through the length of the island.

The new plant at Arborea referred to in the cable as being under construction is probably the Fluminara project which has been building for more than six years. This scheme comprises several irrigation reservoirs and power stations which are to generate in all 54,000 H.P.

Strategic Significance

While the number of main power stations in Sardinia is not so large that effective behind-the-line attack would be precluded, it is probable that little weakening of the enemy's direct military strength would be achieved even under the most favorable conditions. While the Italian Army needs a certain amount of electricity for communications, radar, searchlight operations, battery charging and perhaps operation of heavy coast defense guns, provision is usually made for independent and mobile sources of power supply to operate these facilities.

The main use of power on Sardinia is in connection with irrigation and industry. Since there is virtually no surface water during the summer months the use of power for irrigation is of considerable importance in the economic life of the island.

The coal, zinc and lead mines and the magnesium plant are useful adjuncts to the Axis economy but could easily be dispensed with without affecting enemy military capabilities.

The most promising effect which might be secured through attack on power in Sardinia might be the impairment of water supplies during the dry season. While no detailed study has been made of the subject it is believed that such attack would be more effective if concentrated against aqueducts and pumping stations themselves rather than against the power supply."

As a result of the R & A analysis, it appears this target, while desirable, is not as potentially intriguing as appeared in the State Dept. report. However, your own local intelligence might furnish you with more specific information which may make this an important target.

SECRET

OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

Mar 23, 1963

TO: Colonel William A. ...
of the U. S. Central
Intelligence Agency

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell

SUBJECT: Electric Generating Plant in Arbatax, Sardinia.

1. A State Department cable from Stockholm dated April 20, 1963, is quoted as follows:

"The Germans are very apprehensive lest a bomb may strike the single electric power plant which apparently supplies all the power for Sardinia. They are making efforts to erect a new plant at Arbatax with little success, inasmuch as they have available only small sailboats for transporting cement needed for this construction. The power plant which now supplies Sardinia is located in a section near the port of Arbatax."

2. An analysis of this information was made at our request by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. Their report is quoted as follows:

"A. Installations

The cable states that "a single electric power plant apparently supplies all the power for Sardinia". Other intelligence indicates that this statement is incorrect. The British I.S.I.S. report lists the following four main stations:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Type</u>
Soghiana	27,600 KW	Hydro
Cagliari	26,000 KW	Thermal
Santa Chiara	19,200 to 22,400 KW	Hydro
Santa Caterina	20,000 KVA	Thermal

In addition there are said to be numerous small local stations.

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Sardinia 11,567
X Power Plants
X Stockholm Cable 15922


OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 19, 1943

TO: General William J. Donovan
FROM: R. Davis Halliwell
SUBJECT: Power Plants - Sardinia

Attached is a copy of our memorandum to Colonel Eddy on the subject of Electric Generating Plant in Arbatax, Sardinia.

The original of this memorandum was today sent to Colonel Eddy by air pouch.


R. Davis Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Chief, SO

RDH:ET

Attachment

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SECRET

Date May 19, 1943

To: GENERAL MONROE

Re: Description of Power Plants in
Sardinia

1. As requested, we have spoken with Commander Halliwell in connection with the difference of opinion as to the power plant situation in Sardinia.

2. Attached hereto is a copy of memorandum forwarded this day by Commander Halliwell to Colonel Eddy which discusses at length this matter.


R. C. H. J.

Office of the Secretariat

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3. Morocco

There may be a good many Sardinians among the 15,000 or so Italians in Morocco.

B. Italian Political Prisoners and Refugees.

There may be some Sardinians among the Italian anti-Fascist political refugees in North Africa. Refugees have come from Sardinia (when Fascists were in power), from France (after the German invasion), and from Spain (after the Civil War).

Sardinians should be sought among the Italian political prisoners in such places as Lampedusa, Pantelleria, and Lipari, all of which are now occupied by us.

Sardinians 120,475

Africa, North
Personnel

August 26, 1943

Availability of Sardinians

Agrees our conversation of this morning, the following may be of interest regarding the availability of Sardinians in North Africa and among Italian political prisoners and refugees.

A. North Africa1. Tunisia

Among the 100,000 or so Italians in Tunisia, there is a considerable Sardinian colony, as the following figures suggest:

	No. of Italians in Tunisia Who Were Born in Italy	No. of Italian-born Italians in Tunisia Who Came from Sardinia
1906	52,679	2,927
1911	49,039	4,032
1931	37,797	2,979

Many Sardinians are employed in mining, particularly in the phosphate mines of the west and southwest, but more "useful" Sardinians should probably be sought in the Tunisian fishing industry, in which Italians play an important part, at such places as La Goulette, Biserte, Sousses and Sfax.

2. Algeria

Among the 50,000 or so Italians in Algeria, there is an old Sardinian element. Sardinians (and Calabrians as well, in connection with our plans for Southern Italy) should be sought in the fishing industry, in which Italians have long played an important part.

SECRET

Director, OSS

- 2 -

1 September 1943

who have helped us considerably in our Italian recruiting, we have access to most of this reservoir. In addition to the men listed above, we have in this reservoir a small number of prospective recruits. It has not been our intention to continue with any extensive recruiting program because of the time which the recruiting would require and the time it would be necessary to satisfactorily train any personnel that we might add to our staff at the present time.

E.H.
E.H.

Sardinia 12975
Africa North
SECRET
x Personnel

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSS
 FROM: Earl Brennan
 SUBJECT: Sardinian Personnel

DATE: 1 September 1943

File

In accordance with Colonel Buxton's request of August 31, I submit the following information concerning personnel with Sardinian background:

- (a) There is at present on the island a mission consisting of four agents and a radio operator. Two of the agents are Sardinian and the other two are men of Sicilian background;
- (b) Two other Sardinian men arrived in Algiers about July 1, which was too late for them to be used in the mission now operating on the island. They are at present performing other duties in the North African theater;
- (c) One Sardinian recruited from the Army left by sea on August 9 and no doubt has reported in Algiers by this time;
- (d) A group of four Sardinians whom we recruited from civilian life and militarized went to a port of embarkation August 20 and are now en route by sea;
- (e) A soldier whom we recruited from the Army was requested for assignment here August 11. He has not yet reported for duty and will require some indoctrination here or abroad before he can be used satisfactorily;
- (f) One native Sardinian was recruited from civilian life and trained at the basic SI-SO school. We were unable to militarize him because of age and physical disabilities and released him upon the completion of his training because it was felt that he could not operate satisfactorily as an agent. We have since recalled him to serve as a consultant. He is 59 years of age and has been in this country since 1920.

We have found that there is a very limited reservoir of people of Sardinian background in the United States. Through various connections that we have, particularly certain connections

1. The supplying of arms and ammunition to civilian groups in Sardinia for use against the German troops.

2. Providing of direction and leadership to assist armed civilian groups.

3. Providing 20 personnel which might be used for special sabotage purposes against the Germans if required.

2. SECONDARY OBJECTIVES

To assist the theater commander in the actual invasion of the island in such ways as he may approve. For this purpose OSS operatives will undertake or be prepared to undertake the following tasks:

a. The SI mission at present in Sardinia will direct its intelligence activities toward:

1. Battle order information

2. Troop movements

3. Fortifications

4. Landing beaches and lines of communication.

b. Operatives for morale operations will be held in readiness to go into Sardinia with the troops for the following purposes:

1. Contact prisoners and induce them with arguments, gifts, or money, to persuade other troops to surrender.

2. Employ civilians to go behind the lines creating panic and confusion which will handicap troop movements.

3. To operate Sardinian radio stations to confuse the defense and control the population.

4. Send to the Italian troops false orders by radio, telephone or other methods at the opportune moment.

5. Additional personnel will be trained and held in readiness of the following for such/special operations as the theater commander may request:

1. Special sabotage of communication behind the lines.

2. Marking of landing beaches or fields, guiding and interpreting for landing troops.

OPERATIONS BY THE SARDINIAN SERVICE**SECRET****1. GENERAL OBJECTIVE**

To endeavor to get the Sardinians to capitulate without military resistance to the forces of the Allies. For this purpose OSS operations are envisaged as follows:

a. The SI mission at present in Sardinia will direct intelligence activities toward:

1. Groups and movements which might be used to influence the actions of the people and the administration of the island.

2. The administrative, business, labor, and clerical leaders who might be favorable to the Allies.

3. Italian military leaders who are the key men in the defense of the island and who might be induced or restrained so as to prevent opposition to the Allied invasion.

4. Troops who might be led to desert or otherwise weaken the defense against the Allies.

b. The OSS personnel available from SI and MO in America and in Algiers for morale operations will endeavor through agents, underground leaders (Lussu), clandestine press, black radio, and black documents and leaflets, to:

1. Incite the population to demonstrate for peace, to riot, and to otherwise disrupt the civil administration.

2. Influence the churches and their people to work and pray for peace.

3. Induce civil leaders to use their influence against continued resistance to the Allies.

4. Induce the Italian military leaders to see the futility of Italian resistance.

5. Work among the Italian troops to encourage desertion and individual surrenders.

c. Steps will be taken to provide personnel and materials for special operations against the German troops should the Italian government in Rome capitulate and be opposed by German arms.

These activities would include:

opinion and friends, bribery, coercion, will be used. Some individuals who are in a position to seriously oppose our ends and who cannot in some way be neutralized will be destroyed.

By seeing to it that at least some of those people who are in authority and who are intractably against us are eliminated and that those who are favorable toward us gain power, it is hoped to produce a situation which will produce a plot by Sicilian leaders to deliver the island.

Attached hereto is a list of primary and secondary objectives in somewhat greater detail than stated above.

The party to be dispatched from here will function in North Africa within the framework of the existing organization and will make full use of the communications, training, dispatching and other facilities of that organization. Tentatively, the composition of the party which is to undertake this operation is as follows:

I. D. Shapiro	In Charge
Earle Brennan	SI
Eugene Warner	MO
Sherman Kent	R&A
Lt. W.W. Downey, USNR	SC

Agents to be used in Sardinia:

Emilio Lussu
 Lt. Mathieu (MO Branch)
 *Seven Sardinian-born agents of Mr. Brennan

A Communications officer will be assigned in Algiers to handle communications work of this operation.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE

*Most of whom are already in North African Theater.

(SO have no agents with Sardinian background. However they are dispatching a number of Italian-speaking agents to NA and these will be drawn if need arises.)

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

of A.P.M.C. will be used in the strictest sense.

While, from outside the island, every form of propaganda is being used to depress the spirit of the Sardinian population and portray in the most vivid way the defeat of the Axis on the Italian mainland, agents will be infiltrated into Sardinia to work from within. The presence of OSS Intelligence agents who are already in Sardinia should prove of very material assistance in the infiltration of additional men.

A notable Italian anti-Fascist, who is at the same time a leader of an appreciable following in Sardinia, will at a chosen moment be landed on the island and kept carefully under cover by our organization there. It is believed that through this individual we will be able to contact and make use of the anti-Fascist underground movement in Sardinia. Since the number of agents that we can put into Sardinia is very limited and in most cases their movements and activities will be very restricted, it is only through the possibility of working with the Sardinian underground which has ramifications throughout the island and in all spheres that we can hope to accomplish our objective. Consequently, this Sardinian leader above mentioned is an indispensable element in the operation.

Our agents will act as "go-between" of the leader and his friends. It is hoped that in this way we will soon have an appreciable number of influential secret sympathizers working for our cause. Every effort will be made to produce a clamor amongst the civil population that Sardinia not become the field for a hopeless battle. It is hoped that some of the Italian military leaders in Sardinia will be amenable to taking the action we desire. Those leaders who are most susceptible and those who are in the best position to serve our ends will be selected and appropriate methods, such as pressure of public

OUTLINE PLAN

The code name assigned the operation herein described is "Christmas".

The objective is to bring about a situation in the island of Sardinia that will permit an American occupation without bloodshed.

The operation is to begin at the earliest possible moment and carried out concurrently with the Anglo-American invasion of the Italian mainland so that the maximum psychological effect of events on the mainland will be obtained in support of this operation.

The operation is based on the premise that the German forces in Sardinia are too small to hold the island should the Italian leaders, military and civil, become determined to deliver the island in order to avoid useless destruction and bloodshed.

The general idea of the plan has received the approbation of General Marshall (Joint Chiefs of Staff?) and has been submitted to General Eisenhower. It is assumed that General Eisenhower will approve the plan and support its execution by providing priorities for air transportation of personnel to the North African Theater, by providing aircraft, submarines or P.T. boat transportation to Sardinia for agents to be infiltrated and such other facilities within reason as may be required. Without that support it would be senseless to undertake the operation.

The plan is to employ in this operation all the tools of psychological warfare in a closely coordinated fashion. The basic action will be along the lines of morale subversion supported by propaganda. The facilities of the Secret Intelligence Branch and the Morale Operations Branch of OSS and the P.W. Branch

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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advised you yesterday, has not had time to acquire much SO background. We are somewhat doubtful that Lt. Roberts will be sufficiently experienced to undertake the mission, unless as you commented yesterday, it will be possible for Commander Breed to supply the supervision which will be necessary.

5. In the event neither of these possibilities are available, it will be necessary for us to assign Lt. William Downey, USNR, to the group which will be a serious matter for SO inasmuch as he is presently our North African Area Operations Officer.



J. M. SCRIBNER
Acting Chief, SO

CC: Colonel Buxton
Commander Halliwell
Captain Lincoln

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 September 1943

Sardinia 12/11/46

Corsica

Christmas Mission

TO: General William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Sardinia - Corsica

1. This is to advise that SO has delivered to Shapiro a list of targets in Sardinia which we believe are susceptible to SO treatment.

2. We are proceeding as rapidly as possible with the assistance of R. & A. to develop specific information necessary for the completion of the missions which might be directed against these targets.

3. The individual we would like to propose to join the Shapiro (Christmas) Group and to handle the SO phase of the undertaking is Major Richard McLallen, AUS, O-910614, who is now an instructor at Area E. McLallen is very anxious to undertake this job but he is, at the present time, awaiting orders for transportation to London as an instructor. Regardless of this fact, we feel he is the best qualified man for the undertaking, consequently we present our recommendation for your decision.

4. In the event it is not possible to secure McLallen, we have been schooling Lt. Dennis Roberts, USNR, who, as I

*Told Scribner
9/2/43*

*TO
L. Sabin
TALK
with
H. Sabin
He
knows
this
as he might
recognize
the value
of info.
notes this
by phone.*

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In considering the projects involving Sardinia and Corsica, the following should be considered:

1. Where are the main units of the Italian fleet?

(It is believed they are limited to the Eastern Mediterranean, and that we are carrying on anti-submarine operations in the Central Mediterranean.)

We know also that the bulk of the German ground and air force is contained on the Russian front.

Also, we know that we are aware our convoys are moving through the Mediterranean.

It is not contemplated that there will be a German invasion of Turkey.

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Air Force of Germany (including German)	1164
Italy	<u>1425</u>
Total of	2589 planes

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It should note the population, standard of living, the use of ballistic missiles, etc.

There must be careful consideration of the targets aimed at by H.Q.

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Installations adequate in Sardinia except for ports -- there are 4 useful ports. Cagliari is the principal port; they are all tied into main road and rail nets. Railroads run through the center of the Island and connects the principal towns. There are 3 main north and south roads, all running from Cagliari, and 3 east and west roads, one from each end and one from the center. There are 9 certain and 13 probable airfields, 3 of main importance.

We should consider the advisability of this operation and its advantages and disadvantages.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET**Geographical Data**

1. The total map prepared 7/2/54 shows Corbiou is a small, low lying island. It is poorly developed and has limited communications. The island is 11.5 miles north-south, 3.4 miles east to west.

2. From Bastia south to 40 miles there is a narrow channel with a fringe of beach and cut by lagoons and marshes. Everywhere else the coast is rock. Small bays for our purposes are to be found in most of the coves and around river mouths.

Our information is that the local population is anti-Italian and is a fruitful ground for our activities.

Ajaccio and Bastia are the only important towns.

One corps of two Italian Divisions are on Corbiou and with supporting troops constitutes about 40,000 men.

The original French defenses continue to exist, and they have been strengthened by the Italians.

There are supposed to be 4 airfields in Corsica. Roads and railroads are susceptible to closure by coalition against bridges and tunnels.

Jeeps could probably make use of the rough trails and logging roads and donkey trails. We could not use motor vehicles.

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SECRETCapabilities for reinforcement of ground forces:

Reinforcement would normally be by sea from Corsica and Italy, where there are supposedly 12 Italian Infantry Divisions. However, this does not seem likely while operations are going on in Italy.

It should not be taken for granted that the effectiveness of Italian troops defending Sardinia would be higher than those in Sicily, but we should try to ascertain what the fact is.

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7. The most important element of Sardinian defense is the island of Cagliari. This is the most important in Italy.

Military Situation

The Germans are supposed to have only 6,000 men on the island, but these are guarding airfields.

The ground forces of the enemy there are reported to be evacuating but the latest information we have is as follows:

- 2 Infantry divisions (each of 2 Infantry Bns. and one Black-shirt Legion)
- 2 Coastal Divisions
- 1 separate Infantry Bn.
- 1 Sardinian Cav. Regiment
- 12 Bns. Fascist Militia including 3 tank Bns.
- 3 Bersaglieri

Fixed defenses include coast defenses and anti-aircraft artillery at all main ports.

Mine fields and anti-submarine nets are at Cagliari and Maddalena and possibly other parts.

SECRET

SECRETGeographic estimates.

We should give attention to the studies made by our MA branch on this, but the following is good to keep in mind:

A. The country is in general mountainous, except the plain which is called Campidano which runs northwest from Cagliari. There are no major natural obstacles in the Island, and it is not heavily forested.

B. There are few landing beaches, some near Cagliari, some near Oristano near the northwest end of the Campidano plain, and the Gulf of Asinara in the northwest of the Island, and in the vicinity of San Antioco.

(We should check on this with our people who did work with the PT boats and the Navy.)

C. Surf conditions may be heavy everywhere except in the Gulf of Oristano. There are salt lakes and lagoons. We should check up on this.

D. Mine fields and fixed defenses might be found near the landing beaches.

E. Prevailing easterly winds are likely to make surf conditions bad. This would be found true between March and October.

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SARINIA

There are landing fields in the Oristano-Villacidro-Iglesias area that would be excellent as score-base support aviation.

There are airbases surrounding Cagliari.

It would be important that we should have the beach-heads on the west and southwest coast of the Island.

We ought to ascertain where the airfields and vital communication centers are located that could be subject to parachute attack.

SECRET

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- 11. Mapping
 - a. Requirements
 - b. Availability
- 12. Installations
(This refers to ports, railroads)
- 13. Advisability of the contemplated operation
 - a. Advantages
 - b. Disadvantages

SECRET

SECRET**9. Geographic estimate**

- a. Condition of terrain
- b. Coast
- c. If once footing has been obtained, are there any natural obstacles.
- d. Climatic limitations.
- e. Natural resources

10. Military estimates

- a. Ground forces of the enemy
 - 1. Last intelligent estimate
 - 2. Fixed defenses, including coast defenses, mine fields, etc.
 - 3. Capability for reinforcement of ground forces
 - 4. Effectiveness of the troops defending the country.
- b. Air forces
 - 1. Estimate of most effective strength
 - 2. Capability of air force.
- c. Navy forces
 - 1. Probable strength to be encountered.

11. Political estimate

- a. Population
- b. Possibility of enlisting local support
- c. Known political factors that might affect the operation.

12. Cox forces required for the operation.

- a. Ground forces
- b. Air forces
- c. Services of supply
- d. Navy forces
- e. Availability

13. Supply

(What would it require us to maintain the forces)

SECRET

SECRET**9. Geographic estimate**

- a. Condition of terrain
- b. Coast
- c. If exact footing has been obtained, are there any natural obstacles.
- d. Climatic limitations.
- e. Economic resources

10. Military estimates

- a. Ground forces of the enemy
 - 1. Last intelligent estimate
 - 2. Fixed defenses, including coast defenses, mine fields, etc.
 - 3. Capability for reinforcement of ground forces
 - 4. Effectiveness of the troops defending the country.
- b. Air force
 - 1. Estimate of most effective strength
 - 2. Capability of air force.
- c. Navy forces
 - 1. Probable strength to be encountered.

11. Political estimate

- a. Population
- b. Possibility of enlisting local support
- c. Known political factors that might affect the operation.

12. Our forces required for the operation.

- a. Ground forces
- b. Air forces
- c. Services of supply
- d. Navy forces
- e. Availability

13. Supply

(What would it require us to maintain the forces)

SECRET

Target: R.17377

OPERATION PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF "BLOG" **SECRET**

1. An outline plan for the seizure of "Blog" was contained in Enclosure A.
2. A concept of the operation is briefly stated below:
3. Forces required:
 - a. Intelligence
 - b. SO operators
 - c. SO personnel
 - d. Communications personnel
4. Availability -- All forces and transportation required should be available in the area on or about ___ day of _____.
5. Advisability of the operation.
(The question we should ask -- Is the gain resulting from the proposed operation commensurate with its cost?)
6. Assumptions.
(insert here the various conditions which it is believed exist in the area and would influence the operations.)
7. Mission of the operation -- seize and hold "Blog".
8. Concept of the operation:
 - a. To conduct intelligence operations, etc. (specify them)
 - b. Kind to be carried on (insert them).
 - c. What specific objectives can be attained by SO agents.
 - d. Use and employment of operational groups.

SECRET

File Italy.

Date 9/5/43

To:

Mrs. J. D. Darnell
This is your file
J.S.

Colonel Glavin

To \longrightarrow GEdward Buxton

7 SEPT. 43

- 1. Noted.
- 2. Discussed w/ Messrs. SHAPIRO & KENT in detail. 6 SEPT 43.
- 3. Returned Hamilton.

EG

Col. E. GLAVIN

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(12678)